Berthier Election Case

Berthier Election Case
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
1884-04-01
Report
(1884) 9 SCR 102
Judges
Ritchie, William Johnstone; Strong, Samuel Henry; Taschereau, Henri-Elzéar; Fournier, Télesphore; Gwynne, John Wellington; Henry, William Alexander
On appeal from
Quebec
Subjects
Elections
Decision Content
Supreme Court of Canada
Genereux v. Cuthbert, (1884) 9 SCR 102
Date: 1884-04-01
CONTROVERTED ELECTION FOR THE ELECTORAL DISTRICT OF BERTHIER, IN THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC.
NARCISSE GENEREUX et al
Appellant;
And
E. O. CUTHBERT
Respondent.
1884: Feb 19; 1884: April 1
PRESENT.—Sir W. J. Ritchie, C.J., and Strong, Fournier, Henry, Taschereau and Gwynnei JJ
ON APPEAL FROM DOHERTY J. SITTING- FOR THE TRIAL OF THE ABOVE NAMED ELECTION CASE.
Dominion Controverted Election—Railway Pass—37 Vict., ch. 9, secs, 92. 96, 98 and 100—-Questions of fact in appeal. Agent, limited powers of.
In appeal, four charges of bribery were relied upon, three of which were dismissed in the court below because there was not sufficient evidence that the electors had been bribed by an agent of the candidate; and the fourth charge was known as the Lamarche case. The facts were as follows:—One L., the agent of C., the respondent, gave to certain electors employed on certain steamboats, tickets over the North Shore Railroad, to enable them to go without paying any fare from Montreal to Berthier, to vote at the Berthier election, the voters having accepted the tickets without any promise being exacted from or given by them. The tickets showed on their face that they had been paid for, but there was evidence L. had received them gratuitously from one of the officers of the company.
The learned judge who tried the case found as a fact that the tickets had not been paid for, and were given unconditionally, and therefore held it was not a corrupt act.
Held—1. (Foumier and Henry, JJ., dissenting) that the taking unconditionally and gratuitously of a voter to the poll by a railway company or an individual, whatever his occupation may be, or giving a voter a free pass over a railway, or by boat, or other conveyance, if unaccompanied by any conditions or stipulations that shall affect the voter's action in reference to the vote to be given, is not prohibited by 39 Vict., ch. 9 (D).
2. That if a ticket, although given unconditionally to a voter by an agent of the candidate, has been paid for, then such a practice would be unlawful under section 96, and by virtue of section 98 a corrupt practice, and would avoid the election.
3. That an agent who is not a general agent but an agent with powers expressly limited, cannot bind the candidate by anything done beyond the scope of his authority.
As to the remaining three charges the Court was of opinion that, on the facts the judgment of the Court below was not clearly wrong and should therefore not be reversed. (Fournier and Henry JJ., dissenting on the charge known as the Maxwell case.)
APPEAL from a judgment delivered on the 21st of February, 1883, by Mr. Justice Doherty, dismissing the election petition against the return of the respondent, at the election which took place in June, 1882, for the electoral district of Berthier, to the House of Commons.
The petition in this cause was presented, in the usual form as to corrupt practices, without claiming the seat. This petition was supplemented by a list of particulars consisting of twenty-six charges.
Petitioners called and examined a large number of witnesses, and at the hearing, they abandoned all but five of the charges, persisting only in the 1st, 2nd, 8th and 20th, and in the additional particular A.
On appeal four charges of bribery were relied upon, 1st, the Lamarche case; 2nd, the Chalut case; 3rd, the Rithier & Cote's case; and 4th, the Maxwell case. The particulars of these charges are stated in the judgments hereinafter given.
Mr. Doutre, Q. C., and Mr. Mercier, Q. C., for appellants:
As to the Lamarche case.
The only question to decide on this question is whether the grant of free passes, some 20 in number, amounts to a corrupt practice, according to the Dominion election Act, 1874.
We submit that it is a corrupt practice according to sections 92, 96 and 98 of said Act.
The respondent was the conservative candidate, the railway was a government railway under the control and management of the Quebec conservative government. The passes were delivered by the officials of the road to convey electors to the poll, at the special request of respondent's agents. These passes were delivered the day before the polling day, and all these men were paid at the end of the week their full salary, although they lost a day and a half. Then it is established by the evidence that the value of these passes was $1 50cts. each. There is no doubt that these men would not have gone to Berthier that day, if they had been obliged to pay their travelling expenses and lose their salary during their absence.
This is a payment of a carriage to convey voters in violation of sec. 96. There is no actual payment proved, for Lamarche says he did not pay for these passes. But it comes to the same thing, and we fail to see the necessity of an actual payment of money, under the circumstances, to constitute a corrupt practice. To maintain such a system would be simply to give to a government, holding railways, the means of controlling, in a very extraordinary way, the elections of the whole country.
But suppose there is any doubt that this act falls under sec. 98, it seems that it can be brought under sec. 92, which constitutes a corrupt practice with the giving of any valuable consideration to an elector in order to induce him to vote or to favor the election of a candidate.
This point was specially raised in the celebrated case of Cooper and Slade, before the House of Lords in 1858 ([1]). Hickson v. Abbott ([2]). See also Leifgh and Lamarchand ([3]).
In the North Simcoe election case ([4]) it was decided in 1811 by Vice-Chancellor Strong that the hiring by an agent of the respondent of a railway train to convey voters was a payment of the travelling expenses of voters within the meaning of section 71 of 82 Vict., ch. 21, and was a corrupt practice.
According to the ruling in the Selkirk case ([5]), the 96th section of the Dominion Elections Act, 1874, is included in the 98th section of the same Act ([6])The gift to electors of passes on railways, for the purpose of allowing those voters to go at all to the polls was declared in 1881 to be a corrupt practice in Hickson v. Abbott ([7]).
It seems to us very clear that under the circumstances of this case the election ought to be voided on account of the delivery of these passes. They were a valuable consideration given to electors to induce them to vote. They were practical payment of travelling expenses, and it is quite indifferent whether this payment of travelling expenses was made with money or with a valuable consideration of any kind.
To uphold such a system would be to encourage the worst kind of bribery; for it would be to allow a candidate to convey any amount of voters to the polls by way of passes granted by a friendly railway company.
The Bolton ([8]) case cited by Mr. Justice Doherty has no authority here; and the Principles laid down by Judge Mellor are entirely opposed to our own jurisprudence.
[As to the three other charges, the argument of counsel sufficiently appear in the judgments.]
Mr. Lacoste, Q. C, and Mr. Bisaillon with him for respondent.
As Lamarche is admitted to have been an agent, the only question which arises is whether Lamarche has violated the 96th section of the Act by " having promised to pay, or paying for any horse, team, carriage, cab or other vehicle, by any candidate or by any person on his behalf, to convey any voter or voters to or from the poll, or to or from the neighbourhood thereof at the election."
The passes were given gratis; they were never paid for, and were given unconditionally. Lamarche or Labelee acted merely as would have acted any person voluntarily and gratuitously conveying voters at the poll with his own carriage, and the judge in the court below so found.
The appellant's proof entirely fails to bring the charge under the provisions of the said 96th section of the Act, but the petitioners contend that the passes given to the voters by Lamarche were things of value, and that they were given as a v valuable consideration," to induce said, voters to vote for respondent at the election. This question has been already fully discussed in the Boton case ([9]) where it was decided that the giving of a pass was not a valuable consideration under the Act. See also Rogers on Elections ([10]), where all the cases on this point are collected.
Then as to whether Lamarche has violated section 92, We submit that there has been no violation of that section because no payment was made. There is nothing in the law to prevent a railway company any more than a private company from granting a free conveyance to the voter. Cooper v. Slade is distinguishable on this point. Hickson v. Abbott ([11]) and the Simcoe case ([12]) relied on by appellants, are not applicable, because in those cases the tickets were paid for and the election was avoided not under section 92 but under section 96
Mr. Mercier, Q. C, in reply.
RITCHIE C. J.:—
There are in this case four charges which the petitioners rely on, viz.:—
1st. The Lamarche case.
The charge in this case is in these words:—
Que pendant la dite élection, le dit Edouard Octavien Cuthbert, directement et indirectement, par lui même, par le moyen d'autres personnes, et de ses a agents autorisés, et entr'autres par Olivier Lamarche, marchand de Berthierville district electoral de Berthier, de la part et du consentement et à Ia connaissance réelle du dit Intimé, a payé les dépenses de v voyage et autres dépeness d'un grand nombre d'élec teurs du dit district electoral de Berthier pour les aider à se rendre à l'élection, et à s'en retourner, à se rendre aux on aux environs des bureaux de votation et entr'autres à Octave Boucher, Jean Baptiste Godin, Alexandre Godin, Narcisse Boucher, Louis Valois, Pierre Latour, tous navigateurs de l'Ile Dupas, dans le district électoral de Berthier,' Joseph Plouffe, Alfred Bruno, Dolphis Rocrais, Dolphis Massé, Servius Massé, J Joseph Page, Octave Parent, tous navigateurs de Berthier dans le dit district Lafontaine de Québec, employé civil; Narcisse Boucher, navigateur de Trois Rivières, district de Trois Rivières; Pierre Arpin, navigateur de Lanoraie, dit district de Berthier; Dolphis Buron, navigateur de Berthier, district électoral de Berthier; Charles Rocrais, navigateur du même lieu; Alfred Chiquette, maître de pension de Montréal, district de Montréal; toutes ces personnes étant électeurs de la division électorale de Berthier et dùment qualifiés à voter à la dite election, et ayant v voté à la dite election donnant à chacune des dites personnes, un billet de passage sur le chemin de fer Quebec, Montréal, Ottawa et Occidental, et autres v valeurs et d'autres manières pour les conduire dans le u dit district électoral de Berthier aux ou aux environs d des bureaux de votation, où chacune des dites personnes avait respectivement droit de voter, et que les dites personnes ont ensuite revendu les dits billets de passage, qu'ils avaient ainsi obtenus gratis et dans un but frauduleux, illégal et de corruption, et pour les engager à voter pour le dit Intimé, et ont retire de ces ventes des sommes d'argent ou autres valeurs qu'ils ont gardées pour leur usage personnel exclusif.
Lamarche, the agent of Cuthbert, gave to certain parties employed on certain steamboats, being persons qualified to vote at the Berthier election, tickets or passes over the Quebec, Montreal, Ottawa & Occidental Railway, to enable them to go, without paying any fare from Montreal to Berthier to vote at such election It is very clear, indeed, not denied, that these voters travelled free on these tickets from Montreal to Berthier to vote, and voted there, but it is denied that they were given with any corrupt intent, or that the giving of these tickets or passes amounted to bribery or corrupt practices within the meaning of the Dominion Elections Act, 1874, and it is alleged that nothing was said or done by Lamarche corruptly to induce these persons to vote for or aid the respondent in his election, but that the passes were given unconditionally, and, therefore, there was no violation of the Dominion Elections Act 1874. The judgment of the learned judge in the court below would seem to proceed on the authority and applicability of the cases of Cooper and Slade ([13]), and the Bolton case ([14]). In the case of Cooper and Slade a conditional promise to pay travelling expenses was held to be bribery.
In the Bollon case, it was submitted that the sending of the letters and railway passes was either an act of bribery according to the doctrine laid down by the House of Lords in the case of Cooper and Slade (1) or a simple act of bribery within the meaning of the Corrupt Practices Act, 1854, sec. 2; and secondly, that if it was not an act of bribery still that it was an illegal act which had been systematically and wilfully done for the purpose of influencing the election, and that as such it ought to be held to have avoided the election.
The court held in the Bolton case that there was not a conditional promise, but had it been: " If you come and vote for the respondent the expense of obtaining a railway ticket will be paid," Mr. Justice Mellor says: " This would, no doubt, have brought it within the case of Cooper and Slade." 1 think neither the case of Cooper and Slade nor the Bolton case are at all applicable to the present, because I cannot satisfy my mind that the tickets were in this case given on any such condition as would legally constitute the act a case of bribery under the 92nd section. In the English acts there are no such enactments, as sections 96 and 101 of the Dominion Act of 1874 and it is under these sections that this case must, in my opinion, be determined. Under these sections the charge is not that of bribery, but of a corrupt practice by virtue of the prohibition of section 96 and the declaration of what offences shall be corrupt practices, as quite distinct from acts of bribery as provided against in section 92. Those provisions which are not to be found in the English Act of 1854 are as follows:
37 Vic. ch. 9 section 96:
And whereas doubts may arise as to whether the hiring of teams and vehicles to convey voters to and from the polls, and the paying of railway fares and other expenses of voters, be or be not according to law, it is declared and enacted, that the hiring or promising to pay or paying for any horse, team, carriage, cab or other vehicle, by any candidate or by any person on his behalf, to convey any voter or voters to or from the poll or to or from the neighbourhood thereof, at any election, or the payment by any candidate, or by any person on his behalf, of the travelling and other expenses of any voter, in going to or returning from any election, are and shall be unlawful acts; and the person so offending shall forfeit the sum of one hundred dollars to any person who shall sue for the same; and any voter hiring any horse, cab, cart, wagon, sleigh, carriage or other conveyance for any candidate, or for any agent of a candidate, for the purpose of conveying any voter or voters to or from the polling place or places, shall, ipso facto, be disqualified from voting at such election, and for every such offence shall forfeit the sum of one hundred dollars to any person suing for the same.
Section 98:
The offences of bribing, treating or undue influence, or any of such offences, as defined by this or any other Act of the Parliament of Canada, personating or the inducing any person to commit personating, or any willful offence against any one of the six next preceding sections of this Act, shall be corrupt practices, within the meaning of the provisions of this Act. Section 101:
If it is found by the report of any court, judge or other tribunal for the trial of election petitions, that any corrupt practice has been committed by any candidate at an election, or by his agent, whether with or without the actual knowledge and consent of such candidate, the election of such candidate, if he has been elected, shall be void.
In my opinion this offence or corrupt practice maybe complete without the slightest intent to bribe, as where a candidate or his agent knowing a voter intended to vote for the candidate and therefore required no inducement to do so, chooses to pay such a voter's railway fares or travelling expenses. In such a case, notwithstanding the voters may have accepted the free passage without any condition or promise being exacted from or given by them, the offence provided against by sec. 96 would be complete, though no offence of bribery could be thereby established, while on the other hand, if the voting for the candidate was made by the voter to dépend on the condition that he should be paid his railway fare and travelling expenses, then the offence of bribery would be made out, and parties so offending would be guilty of a misdemeanor under section 92 to which persons offending against the 96th section are not made liable.
The question here being, whether what is complained of was a corrupt practice under the 96 and 98 sections, let us see how the case stands.
It is established that Lamarche was the respondent's agent. The learned judge says " the proof summarized shows that he was a strong partizan and supporter of respondent, was a member of his committee, canvassed some and was engaged and interested in favor of respondent," and the judge further says that " Lamarche gave passes for 17 to 20, and that he gave them to the voters referred to and that they did travel free on them from Montreal to Berthier to vote and voted; this," he says, " is not and cannot be disputed." It is difficult to believe that those tickets or passes "were not placed in Lamarche's hands to enable him to convey voters to the polls who would vote for the respondent, or that when he delivered such tickets he did not well understand and believe that the voters to whom tickets were so supplied would proceed to Berthier and record their votes for the respondent, and that they did so.
Then, were these tickets paid for? The fair inference, in the absence of evidence to the contrary would seem to be that these tickets or passes were purchased from the government to be used for the conveyance of voters to vote for the respondent, and so in point of law the railway fares of these voters were paid for by the agent of the respondent who used these tickets and supplied them to the voters; or if not actually paid for by him were so used by him, knowing them to have been paid for
Then there is the evidence of Parent, one of those voters, and he produces the ticket supplied to him, which certainly goes far to show that these tickets were purchased and paid for, the ticket on its face stating that it was paid for though issued at a reduced rate. He says:
Q.—Avez-vous vu M. Olivier Lamarche ce jourlà? R.—Oui monsieur
Q.—Eh bien, dans quelle occasion et à quel propos, l'avez-vous vu?-
R.—Je l'ai vu an gang-way de l'arrière qui s'informait des gens qui avaient droit de vote, et il appelait leurs noms.
Q.—Il avait une listé? R.—Celui qui était là, ii avait un petit morceau de papier et celui qui se trouvait present il disait: ii est ici.
Q.—Ensuite? R. Il m'a demandé: Vas-tu voter? J'ai dit oui Il a dit: si tu veux aller voter, je Vais aller te chercher une passe. Je lui ai dit: C'est bien correct. Dans l'après-midi, il est venu avec une passe, ou un ticket: c'était pareil à celui qui est exhibé; je puis vous la montrer.
Q.—Montrez-le donc? R.—Je produis cette passe comme exhibit "C" des pétitionnaires à l'enquéte. Q.—Etes-vous parti plusieurs ensemble? R. Oui monsieur on a parti, je vais vous les nommer tous: Delphis Masse le Steward, son frŁre, Zéphirin Masse, Joseph Plouffe, moi, Alexandre Godin, Octave Boucher, Louis Valois, à bord du Chambly,
Q.—Tous ceux que vous venez de nommer, à part de Valois, étaient employés à bord du Trois Rivières? R.—Oui, monsieur; Alfred Bruneau et Delphis Rocrais
Q.—A bord du Trois Rivières? R.—Oui monsieur.
Q,—Avaient-ils tous des passes comme vous? R. Oui ils avaient tous des passes.
Q.—Aller et retour? R. Oui monsieur.
Q.—Combien coûte le passage do Montréal à Berthier, aller et retour? R. Sept chelins et demi, je suppose; c'est trois trente sous pour descendre.
Q.—En premiere classe? R.—Je ne sais pas, je ne connais pas le prix do la première classe.
Q.— C'est une piastre et demie dans la première classe? R.—Oui monsieur.
Q.—Naturellement, vous avez été dans la première classe cette fois-là? R. Oui.
Exhibit C
Quebec, Montreal, Ottawa and Occidental Railway.
One first-class passage.
From Ho chelaga to Berthierville and return.
In consideration of the reduced rate at which this ticket is sold it will only be valid until 22nd June 1882
Form
L. A, Sénecal,
2 R. 5703
General Superintendent.
The witness Masse received, from the captain of the boat a ticket left by Lamarche for distribution similar or nearly so to Exhibit C, under these circumstances
Q. La veille do la votation vous étiez à bord do votre steamboat, dans le port do Montreal? R. Oui monsieur.
Q.—Comment êtes-vous venu à Berthier? R.—Je suis venu dans les chars du Nord.
q.—D chemin de for du Nord? R. Oui.
Q,—vez-vous payé votre passage? R. Pardon, j'ai eu une. passe.
Q.—De qui avez-vous eu une passe? R. J'ai eu une passe du capitaine Duval.
Q.—Le capitaine de votre steamboat? R Oui, le capitaine de mon steamboat. Q.—Est-ce une passe comme celle-ci: exhibit "" produite à l'enquête des pétitionnaires?
Objecté à-cette question comme illégale.
Objection réservée.
R.—C'est à peu près semblable.,., Je no puis pas sermenter qu'elle est pareille, mais c'est une passe mince.
Q.—De cette couleur-là à peu prŁs? R.—Oui, à peu prŁs.
Q. C'était une passe pour la premiere classe du train de chemin de fer dû Nord? R.—Oui monsieur.
Q.—Vous savez lire? R.—Oui.
Q,—C'était signé: " L. A. Sénécal.? " B. La signature, je ne l'ai pas examinée parfaitement.
Q.—Qu'est-ce que vous a dit le capitaine Duval quand il vous a donné cette passe-là? R.—Premièremett, M. Lamarche est venu à bord demander quels étaient les voteurs qu'il y avait dans le Steamboat, moi-même, je lui ai nommé des gens que je connaissais qui avaient droit de vote; ii a marqué les noms, et ii a monte en haut au salon: il a demanéé au capitaine Duval la permission d'avoir les voteurs; le capitaine a dit: avec plaisir, je ne puis pas refuser cela;. ils sont maîtres d'aller pour qui bon leur semblera: de sorte que monsieur Lamarche a parti ii est allé à terre, et je n'ai pas vu rien de plus.
Q.—Il a vu les électeurs? R.—Pardon; il a eu Ia permission du capitaine, et ii est venu à bord dans l'aprésmidi; il a monte au salon: ii est venu trouver le capitaine: ii a vu plusienrs des gens qui sont ici presents et qui ont étb entendus comme témoins. Jo n'ai pas vu donner les passes moi-même, mais au moins il a monte en haut, et ii a donné des passes au capitaine. J'en ai eu une qui venait du capitaine. Jo no peux pas dire si elle venait de monsieur Lamarche ou do d'autres, mais je l'ai eue du capitaine.
It is suggestive that the witness, on cross-examination, says the captain did not, when giving him the ticket tell him for whom he was to vote but when the question is put to him: " Q. Vous a-t-il demandé pour qui vous alliez voter? " we find no answer given.
And this likewise negatives, if it does not dispose of, the hypothesis that these voters being employees of the Richelieu Navigation Co. were travelling by the railway free under an alleged usage whereby the employees of the railway company and the Richelieu Navigation Co. were permitted to travel free, a usage by no means clearly proved to have existed, stud which, had it existed. there is no evidence it was acted on in this case on the contrary had it been acted on there would have been no need for the interference or instrumentality of Lamarche, who was in no way connected with either company.
Inasmuch then as the statute has specially mentioned the paying of railway fares, and section 96 was expressly passed to put an end to any doubts that might arise in reference thereto, considering the great, dangerous and corrupt influence that can be exercised in favour of particular candidates through the instrumentality of railway tickets I think when such means are resorted to for bringing voters to the polls (by the candidate or his agents) the operation should be very narrowly watched and very strictly scrutinized, and as the fair and natural inference primû facts is that passengers travelling on railways, do so by paying the regular fares, a certain presumption is raised that when voters travel on a railway to the polling place on tickets supplied by the candidate, or his agent, that such tickets have been paid for by such candidate, or his agent in accordance with the usual course of the business of the railway, and this, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, appears to me to be much strengthened when the ticket shows on its face that it had been paid for, and it does seem to me to be a thin and flimsy cover indeed under which to allow the candidate or his agents supplying voters with such paid tickets, for what the law designates a corrupt practice, to screen the transaction by simply alleging that these tickets came to his or their hands enclosed in an envelope and leave the matter there. if there were any exceptional circumstances to withdraw the transaction from the operation of the statute, the burthen of disclosing such circumstances would, in my opinion, rather be on the candidate or his agents than on the petitioner, as the former have the knowledge within themselves, and were the persons who can best explain the matter, while on the Other hand in almost if not quite every case the means of exposing the details of the illegality of the transaction (by the petitioner) would be a matter of impossibility, establishing that a candidate or his agent has supplied voters with paid tickets by the instrumentality, of which they have gone to and returned from the polls, clearly, to my mind, establishes a primû tacie case. I cannot for a moment suppose that this strong partizan and supporter of the respondent obtained these passes with the patriotic, philanthropic or charitable view of enabling all these men to vote free of expense at the election, wholly irrespective of whom they would vote for I cannot believe that he did not know that if he got them to Berthier they would vote for the respondent and that he obtained the tickets and distributed them so that he might in the interest of the respondent secure their attendance and their votes at the polls for the respondent. No one can believe that Lamarche, who says he knew all these seafaring men and who adds "Je connais nos ennemis et nos amis," would furnish a ticket to any voter whom he thought would be an enemy at the poll nor doubt that he had a full reliance as to how the votes would be given. Giving these tickets to the voters was not as Willes, J., in Cooper v. Sladé suggests:—
Merely to induce the voters to come to the place of polling, and tot to vote at all or come there and vote for the rival candidates. Such suppositions, he says, are possible, but, speaking mildly, improbably in a high degree, because plainly inconsistent with the object for which the party was striving, namely, to get votes for his side.
Mr. Cuthbert, though examined, says nothing of this transaction, and neither Mr. Labelle nor Mr. Seneca in whose name the tickets were issued, nor any other person connected, with the railway have been examined to explain at whose instance, or on what consideration, these passes were issued, if they were not issued in the interest of the candidate to be used by his agents as tickets duly paid for, or otherwise than as expressed on their face. It is not suggested that Labelle did anything wrong, and in the absence of any evidence to show that the tickets were not regularly issued on being duly paid for, or that the tickets expressed on their face what was not literally true, I have very great difficulty in seeing how they can be treated as issued gratuitously. This was then à Government railway run in the interest of the Province at large. and not in the interest of any individual election candidate. It is not, therefore, to be presumed that the Government allowed it to be so used or that it was so used by the employees of the Government of their own mere motion.
I have, therefore, the greatest difficulty in arriving at any other conclusion than that these tickets were paid for, and that their distribution and user in the manner detailed in the evidence should be regarded in no other light than as amounting to a payment by the agent of the candidate on his behalf of the travelling expenses or railway fares of voters going to and returning from the election at Berthier, which if so would be an unlawful act under section 96 and by virtue of section 98 a corrupt practice, that section enacting that any wilful offence of section 96 shall be a corrupt practice which simply means purposely doing that which the section forbids and which by virtue of section 100 avoids the election, that section declaring that any corrupt practice committed by a candidate or his agent shall render the election of such candidate if he has been elected void
Though I am strongly impressed with these considerations I cannot lose sight of the principle which governs courts of appeal in dealing with the decisions of courts of first instance on questions of fact.
The learned judge of the first instance has found against this view of the evidence which has so strongly impressed me—his decision on the evidence being, that these tickets were not paid for in which conclusion I understand my brothers Strong and Gwynne entirely concur. As this is a question of fact, pure and simple, the finding of the judge who tried the case should not be lightly disturbed, nor should an election be lightly set aside. When this finding is thus supported by two of the five judges sitting in this court, making three of the six judges who have heard this case I cannot but distrust my own judgment, and such doubts are thereby raised in my mind as to the correctness of the conclusion I should have been disposed to arrive at if the decision rested with myself alone without any conflict of opinion that, considering an Appellate Court should not reverse on a question of fact without its being made apparent that the court below was clearly wrong, and the so often expressed opinions of judges that before a judge should upset an election, he should be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the election was void under such circumstances I think I am bound to give the respondent the benefit of the doubt thus created.
I am unable to say that 1 feel such confidence in my own impressions, strong though they be to the contrary, as would justify me in saying that I am entirely satisfied that the Judge was clearly wrong in the conclusion at which he arrived and therefore I do not feel that I should be justified in reversing his decree.
I think taking, unconditionally and gratuitously, a voter to the poll by a Railway Company, or an individual of whatever his occupation may be, or giving a voter a free pass over a railway, or by boat or other conveyance, if unaccompanied by any conditions or stipulations that shall affect the voter's action in reference to the vote to be given, is not prohibited by the statute. If it is against public policy, as I may think it is, that railway companies or others, having control of public conveyances, should be permitted to do this, its prohibition not being provided for by the statute, it is a casus omissus, which can only be remedied by Parliament. The courts cannot declare any Act illegal and corrupt, though one candidate may be thereby much benefitted, to the injury of the other which has not been made so by the law.
Objectionable, as unquestionably in my opinion such a proceeding is, as unfairly and unduly affecting the election, and possibly illegal as it may be as against the public interest and public policy, that officers or employees having the management of government railways, in which the public at large are individually and collectively equally interested, should issue free tickets to be distributed gratuitously, though unconditionally, in the interest of a particular candidate or party, yet, as the statute has not prohibited such a proceeding and has not declared such an Act to be illegal and a corrupt practice, or provided that it should invalidate the election I do not think this court has without statutory authority, any power to avoid an election for this cause.
The second charge is the Coté and Rithier case. The learned judge says: "I see no proof at all sufficient to establish the agency of Coté "—a conclusion from which I do not feel myself justified in differing.
As to the case of Maxwell, of St. Damien, I have no doubt the money was sent to bribe Maxwell and if it can be established that it was done by an agent of the respondent must annul the election. The evidence is full of suspicions, but whatever suspicious there may be, there is no evidence of the agency of Daveluy that I can put my hand on.
The case of Hénault is not quite so clear. Daveluy gives the letter containing this money to St, Cyr, who was not proved to be defendait's agent, at Hochelaga, to be forwarded to Maxwell at Berthier he meets Lamarche, the acknowledged agent of the respondents, and asks him who was going to St. Damien and was informed by him that it was Hénault. The inference is clearly that in asking who was going to St. Damien he was seeking to discover who was going there in the interest of the respondent. He seeks Hénault and gives him the money, telling him he was told there was money in it. Hénault was going to speak for respondent, as the judge says, evidently with his knowledge and consent. Though the money passed through the hands of Hénault and however suspicious the transaction is throughout, I cannot say the evidence sufficiently establishes that he was anything more than the bearer of the letter ignorant of the nature of the transaction, and therefore not a participator as the agent of the candidate in the act of bribery.
This case, surrounded as it undoubtedly is by the gravest suspicions, is not, however, so clearly made out as to justify me in reversing the judgment of the learned judge.
as to the Chalut case, I think this was nothing more than a bone tide payment of the expenses of Chalut, and was neither colorable nor corrupt, and therefore I agree with the learned judge that in this case petitioners have also failed to establish a charge of personal bribery against the respondent. The appeal will therefore be dismissed but I think without costs, following the course of the judge below, as I think the case a most proper one for the fullest investigation. STRONG J.:—
The appeal was confined to four distinct cases of alleged corrupt practices, which I will consider separately.
The first case is that of Olivier Lamarche, the facts of which may be concisely stated as follows:— Lamarche had his home at Berthier where his family resided but carried on business at Montreal. He was constantly passing between the two places on board the steamers of the Richelieu Navigation Company, and thus came to know the men comprising the crews of their vessels. He was, undoubtedly, as the learned judge has found on most ample evidence, an agent of the respondent, being an active member of his committee at Berthier, On the day before the polling day, Lamarche went on board the steamer Three Rivers " having a list of the names of those men of the crew who were voters in this County and asked some of them if they would go to Berthier to vote. He says he knew all these men the friends as well as the enemies of the political party with which he was allied. Some of the men thus appealed to, said that they would not go to Berthier unless they were furnished with free passes over the railway. It appears that Lamarche then went to Mr. Labelle the ticket agent of the Northern Railway, and applied for free passes for 17 or 20 men. These passes were furnished to him being handed to him the same day enclosed in an envelope, by Mr. Goodeve, a clerk employed in the railway office. In my view of the evidence it appears very clearly established that these tickets were granted freely by the railway authorities; that they were not paid for by Lamarche, or by any one else, nor was it intended they should be paid for. Lamarche took these passes on board the steamer "Three Rivers" and left some of them with the captain, and gave others to men. who were voters and some 8 or 10 men went by the railway, travelling on these passes the same day to Berthier, and voted there the next day. It does not appear 'that Lamarche imposed any conditions upon those to whom he delivered passes, as to how they were to vote, or that he requested them to vote for the res pondent, or made any enquiry of them as to their intensions with regard to the candidate for whom they were to vote. Upon this state of facts, two questions of law arise 1st. Was the furnishing of these railway passes or tickets to the voters in question a payment of travelling expenses within the 96th section of the Dominion Elections Act 1874? 2nd. Did it constitute bribery or a corrupt practice, within the 92nd section of the same Act?
On both these questions I concur in the conclusions arrived at by the learned judge before whom this petition was originally heard, that Lamarche, in delivering these railway passes to the voters named, did not commit a corrupt act under either of these sections.
As regards section 96, by which "the payment by any candidate, or by any person on his behalf of the travelling and other expenses of any voter in going to or returning from any election " is declared to be an unlawful act, and which, by section 98, is further declared to be a corrupt practice, and consequently an act avoiding the election by the express, provision of sec. 102, it cannot apply for the plain reason that there was no payment of expenses. The tickets or passes are proved to have been granted gratuitously by the railway authorities and consequently all that was done amounted to just this, and no more that the railway at the request of an agent of the respondents, carried certain voters from Montreal to Berthier free of charge and it cannot be contended that this is equivalent to a payment of travelling expenses any more than the carrying of a voter to the poll by a third person in his own carriage, at the request of a candidate or his agent could be said to come within this provision of the statute ([15]).
In order to bring a case within this 96th section there must be a payment of money for the expenses. If money is paid by a candidate or his agent for the travelling expenses of a voter, I should not consider it material in order to avoid the election within this 96th section, as distinguished from the case of section 92, that any condition was imposed upon the voter that he should vote for any particular candidate. The case would be within the words and spirit of the enactment if it could be shown that there was an actual disbursement made by the candidate, or his agent, for the purpose of paying any voter's expenses, regardless altogether of any stipulation or promise that his vote should be cast for a specified candidate. I repeat, however, that here there was no disbursement of money, and consequently there has not been, in this respect, the commission of any such corrupt act as involves an avoidance of the election under section 96. If as in the Bolton case ([16]), the tickets had been paid for, or even agreed to be paid for by Lamarche, I should have considered that that would have amounted to a payment of travelling expenses and that consequently the election ought to be set aside.
When the Bolton case was decided the state of the law in England was such that the payment of travelling expenses did not avoid the election but was merely an illegal act, subjecting the person committing it to a penalty, and Mr. Justice Mellor in that case, although he decided that sending a railway pass which had been paid for and which entitled the holder of the pass to exchange it for a ticket, did. not, having regard to the statutory provisions which, then existed avoid the election was still of opinion that it was an illegal act within the statute; and this opinion, as I understand that case, was founded upon the fact of the pass having been paid for.
Then as regards section 92 it seems to me that the conclusion of Mr. Justice Doherty, and the reasons upon which that conclusion was founded, was upon the authorities also entirely correct This 92nd section is as follows:—
Every person who directly or indirectly, by himself, or by any other person on his behalf, gives, lends, or agrees to give or lend, or offers or promises any money or valuable consideration, or promises to procure, or endeavour to procure, any money or valuable consideration, to or for any voters, or to or for any person on behalf of any voters, or to or for any person, in order to induce any voter to vote or refrain from voting, or corruptly doss any such act as aforesaid on account of such voter having voted or refrained from voting at any election.
Shall be deemed guilty of bribery and punishable accordingly.
This provision is a literal transcript of sub-sec. 1 of sec. 2 of the Imperial Act, 17 and 18 Vic, c. 102, and consequently the English decisions upon this latter enactment are express authorities to guide us in applying this 92nd section of our own act. Then the question we have to decide here is narrowed to this: Did the giving of these railway passes or tickets to the voters named constitute a giving of valuable consideration to such voters to induce them to vote? That the giving of these passes or tickets by Lamarche was the giving of a v valuable consideration " within the meaning of the statute, I entertain no doubt. That a railway ticket is a token of value is plain since it enables the holder of it to procure an advantage which, without it, he could only obtain by the payment of money. So far, therefore, the case is brought within the statute, and it is shown that a valuable consideration was given to voters by the respondents' agent, Lamarche. Is it, however, shewn that the case is brought within the other condition of the statute, which requires that the valuable consideration shall have been given " to induce such voter to vote?" Upon the construction to be placed upon these words, the decision must depend. Whatever doubt we might have felt in placing an interpretation upon this expression, if we had been called upon now to do so for the first time, we are relieved from any difficulty on this score by the decisions upon the corresponding Imperial enactment, which, being many in number and emanating from courts and judges of the highest authority, are conclusive of the present case, if any question of statutory construction can be concluded by authority. It is to be observed that there is nothing in the evidence to establish that Lamarche imposed any condition upon the voters to whom he gave the passes, that they were to vote for the respondent, or that he even invited or requested them so to vote, or to vote at all. It may indeed well be presumed that, from his constant and familiar intercourse with these men, he knew their political bias so well that he considered it superfluous to attach any such condition or make any such request. Indeed, I gather from his expression, "Je connais nos ennemis et nos amis," that he admits this was the case. It does not not appear, however, that he withheld any tickets from any voters amongst the crews because he supposed they were adverse to his party, but that the tickets were given to all the men who had votes. These being the well established facts the case of Cooper v. Slade decided in 1856 in the Exchequer Chamber, is an authority conclusively showing that the conduct of Lamarche, in the present case, did not amount to an act of bribery within this 92nd section of the Act of 1874. It was there held that in order to make out a promise to pay, or the payment of travelling expenses, to be a promise, or giving of a valuable consideration, to induce a voter to vote within the words of the claim under consideration, it must be shown that such a payment or promise was conditional upon the voter voting for a particular candidate. This decision was approved of as regards the law by the House of Lords in an action brought to recover a penalty, and, the judgment of the House having been delivered by Law Lords of great eminence, it must be deemed conclusive of the law upon this point. In the judgment delivered in the Exchequer Chamber in this case of Cooper v. Slade, with which the House of Lords agreed so far. as the law and the construction of the statute and the meaning to be attached to the words, "induce à voter to vote," were involved, though it differed as to the application of the principles of law to the facts there proved in evidence, Alderson, B., lays down the law in the following words :__
An unconditional promise of travelling expenses to a voter to go to the place of polling, with leave to him to vote or not, as and how he likes, seems to us certainly not a promise of money to induce the voter to vote, being neither a promise with that view nor directly calculated to cause it.
And Williams, J., who differed from the rest of the court, did so expressly upon the ground that the letter which had been written to the voter by the agents of the candidate was to be construed, not as an absolute but as a conditional promise to pay the expenses—an opinion which was also that of the House of Lords. This case of Cooper v. Slade was followed in the case upon which the decision of the learned judge in the case now under appeal was founded, that of the petition
(1) 2 O'M. & H. 146. for the Borough of Bolton, decided in 1874 by Mr. Justice Mellor ([17]) where it was held upon state of facts indistinguishable from those before this court in the present case (with the single exception that there the ticket or pass sent to the voter had been paid for whilst here it was granted by the railway company gratuitously), that the delivery of a railway pass to a voter to enable him to go to the poll free of expense, accompanied with a request to him to vote for the candidate by whose agent the pass was sent, was not, in the absence of any expressed condition that the pass was only to be used for the purpose of enabling him to vote for the candidate in whose interest it was furnished, bribery or a corrupt act either at common law or within the statute. The principle of the decision in these cases is very clearly defined in the opinion of Baron Channel in Cooper v. Slade in the House of Lords and in that of Mr. Justice Mellor in the Bolton case where he points out that a pass or ticket being given unconditionally, as the facts establish beyond dispute that the passes or tickets furnished by Lamarche were given in the present case, that there is no bargain or agreement at all that the voter shall vote in a particular manner, or that he should vote at all, that he may go to the poll and there refuse to vote or vote against the candidate from whose agent he has received the ticket or pass without being guilty of the breach of any obligation. I will quote a short passage from the judgment in the Bolton case, which appears to me to have a direct application here. The learned Judge says:—
The voter was not bound by any other consideration than an honorable one that is to say this is sent to me that I may go to the poll. If I were to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by this ticket, not to vote, but to go to Bolton on my own business, or to vote for the other side, I should be doing a shabby thing. That appears to me to be the only sort of obligation, something arising from the idea of honor or good faith, by which a voter receiving such a pass might be affected. But it is entirely free from that question which was the turning point in Cooper v. Slade. If he had voted for the other candidates, could they have recovered back the value of this pass from him? They could not. He was under no other obligation by accepting that pass than that which his own sense of honor might dictate: he was under no legal obligation whatever, and therefore it is not, in my opinion, within the case of Cooper v. Slade.
Every word of this is applicable to the facts in evidence here, and I am of opinion that the learned judge who heard this petition was entirely right in adopting the law as thus expounded by Mr. Justice Mellor, and dismissing the charge accordingly.
For the sake of distinctness, and in order that there may be no misapprehension of the grounds on which this opinion is founded, I think it right to add, though it may involve repetition, that had the tickets been purchased by Lamarche, and either paid for or agreed to be paid for, I should have considered the case as coming within the 96th section, which prohibits the payment of travelling expenses; and had the tickets been given to the voters upon the express condition or stipulation that they were to vote for the respondent, or had they promised so to vote, I should have thought the case within the principle of the actual decision in Cooper v. Slade, and so a corrupt act, avoiding the election under sec. 92.
It was forcibly argued by the learned counsel for the appellants, that although the railway authorities were not in any sense agents of the respondent, yet the granting free tickets by the managing officer of a government railway, or a railway company, was a practice so liable to abuse and one which would open the door to such an overwhelming amount of undue influence, that we ought, on grounds of public policy, and irrespective of any identification of the railway authorities with the candidate, and in the absence of all proof of agency, to mark it with disapproval by setting aside the election upon that ground alone. To this argument I can only repeat the answer already given by the Chief Justice, that if we were to accede to this argument we should be making, not administering, the law, and that whatever grounds such considerations may afford for alteration of the law, that is a matter for the appreciation of the Legislature and not one which can influence the decision of the courts.
Chalut's Case.
The conduct of the respondent and his agents in this case seems to me entirely free from any taint of illegality. Mr. Chalut was a warm supporter of the respondent, and the chairman of his principal committee. He was asked to go to a parish at some distance to canvass and make arrangements for the election, and $20 were sent him by the respondent for his expenses, and $5 by Mr. Tranchemontagne, a member of the committee. I can see no objection to this. The money was not an unreasonable indemnity for the ex-expenses and the loss of time of a professional man—a notary—for some four days. It is not and could not have been pretended that it was a colourable payment, cloaking a bribe, and I know of no law which prohibits the bonu fide employment of electors for lawful purposes incidental to the election. The case was rightly dismissed by the court below.
Coté-Rithier's Case.
It is sufficient to say as the learned judge held, that there was no evidence of any agency to identify the respondent with any act of Mr. Coté, and it is matter of surprise that this case, decided on grounds so very plain and satisfactory as those on which it has been placed by Mr. Justice Doherty, should have been made the subject of appeal.
Maxwell's s Case.
It cannot be denied that the contents of the letter sent by Daveluy to Maxwell create a strong presumption that the money enclosed in it was intended under color of paying for the entertainment of voters at a preceding provincial election, for the purpose of unduly influencing Maxwell and inducing him to support the respondent; in plain words, for the purpose of bribing him and this presumption is not removed or weakened but rather strengthened, by the extremely unsatisfactorily account which Maxwell gave of the transaction between Daveluy himself, and especially by his story about the account for butter and shingles which is only put forward after the adjournment of the court has given him an opportunity of conversing with others. But the evidence wholly fails, in my opinion, to connect the respondent with the corrupt act of Daveluy, if we are to assume such an act as established. There is no proof of the agency of Daveluy himself. St. Cyr, though an agent of the respondent, as being a member of the committee is not shown to have been privy in any manner to the purpose of Daveluy, or to have been cognizant of the contents of the letter in which the money was enclosed or of the purpose for which it was designed. As to Hénault his agency was a limited agency—that of a public speaker—and for his acts beyond those performed in that character the respondent cannot be made liable. No proposition in election law is better established than that an agent who is not a general agent, but an agent with powers expressly limited, cannot bind the candidate by anything done beyond the scope of his authority. Windsor ([18]); Durham ([19]); Bodmin ([20]); West burg ([21]); Blackburn ([22]) North Norfolk ([23]); Harwich ([24]).
Hénault was a paid agent, not a voter, having no connection with the election or with the respondent beyond this, that he was brought from Montrell and employed to make a speech on the Sunday after mass at the church door at St. Damien. Anything he did in the course of this special agency would have bound the respondent, but everything done out of the line of his special employment as an orator can, on the authorities referred to. have no such effect. I therefore concur with Mr. Justice Doherty in the conclusion at which he arrived in this as well as in the other cases, and I am of opinion that the appeal must be dismissed with costs. It is satisfactory to be able to come to this conclusion, as upon a consideration of the whole evidence, I am convinced that the respondent desired and did his best to ensure a pure election, and I cannot help adding that I think the learned judge who tried the petition should have dismissed it with costs, which is the only respect either as regards the results arrived at in the court below, or the reasons given for those results, in which I find any ground for differing from the judgment appealed against.
FOURNIES, J.:
La petition attaque l'élection de l'Intimé pour menées corruptrices pratiquées par lui-même et par ses agents. Le siege n'est pas demandé pour son adversaire. Aux accusations portées contre lui, l'Intimé a répondu par une denégation générale.
Lors de l'audition de la cause, plusieurs de ces accu sations ont été abandonnées comme n'étant pas supportees par la preuve. Les pétitionnarres n'ont insisté que sur cinq cas de corruption comme légalement prouvés, mais l'honorable juge Doherty qui présidait an procès étant dun avis contraire, a renvoyé Ia petition avec dépens, par son jugement du 21 fevrier 1883. C'est de ce jugement qu'il y a appel à cette cour.
Le premier dé ces cas est celui de Lamarche, accusé comme agent de l'Intimé d'avoir payé les dépenses de voyage de dix-neuf électeurs pour se rendre de Montréal à Berthier, à leurs polls respectifs. L'honorable juge en parlant du fait reproché à Lamarche, le qualifie de la manière suivante:
That Lamarche gave passes from seventeen to twenty, and that he gave them to the voters referred to and that they travelled free on them from Montreal to Berthier to vote, and voted there is not and cannot be disputed.
L'honorable juge ayant reconnu que l'agence de Lamarche était prouvée, il est inutile d'analyser les témoignages pour faire voir que ce fait a été légalement constaté, d'autant plus que le conseil de l'Intimé a positivement admis devant cette cour que cette agence était.prouvée.
D'ailleurs la preuve ne laisse aucun doute sur ce sujet.
Afin d'apprécier le véritable caractère de l'acte reproché à Lamarche, ii est important de faire connaître le détail de ses entrevues avec les électeurs auxquels ii a fourni des billets de passage.
Lamarche est conservateur et bien connu comme tel par la part active qu'il prend aux elections de son comté. Il demeure à Berthier, mais tient un bureau d'affaires à Montréal où il se rend tons les jours. Ayant été navigateur, il dit qu'il connaît tous les navigateurs. J Je connais nos ennemis et nos amis La veille de l'élection il se rendit à- bord des bateaux a vapeur Trois-Rivières, Chambly, Terrebonne et Québec pour y voir les électeurs de Berthier qui étaient employés à bord de ces bateaux Il ajoute qu'il a toujours fait cette besogne dans les elections qui out eu lieu l'été.
Ii fit ce jour-là deux visites à bord de ces bateaux, ,la première entre neuf et dix heures du matin, pour s'assurer de la présence et des dispositions des électeurs qui se trouvaient à bord de ces bateaux et la seconde vers une heure de l'après-midi pour leur donner les billets de passage qu'ils avaient exigés de lui lors de sa première visite pour aller voter
D'après le témoin Joly c'est entre 8½ et 9 heures du matin que Lamarche s'est rendu à bord du Trois Rivières.
En arrivant, dit ce témoin, ii a hâlé un papier: il a nommé thus les voteurs à bord; après qu'il a eu fini, il y a une couple de voteurs qui out dit: "on aimerait à partir aujourd'hui: si on ne part pas "i aujourd'hui, on n'y va pas et on aimerait à avoir notre passage " Dour aller et revenir et on aimerait à aller chacun chez nous " avant d'aller voter." C'est tout ce quo j'ai vu.
Q— Il avait une liste des électeurs qui travaillaient à bord ii les a appelés?
R—Oui, monsieur; il avait leurs noms sur un petit papier.
Q—Et tous les électeurs appelés sontils venus?
R—H manquait peut-être bien quelques-uns.
Q—Combien y en avait il à peu près s
r—Six à sept.
Q—Voulez-vous nous en nommer quelques-uns?
R—Oui, monsieur: Alfred Bruneau, il y avait: Dolphis Rocrais
Q—Ensuite?
R—Il y en avait d'autres, je no me rappelle pas de leurs noms là, mais je sais qu'il y en avait d'autres.
Q—Ils out dit qu'ils voulaient avoir leur passage pour aller et revenir
R—Oui, monsieur.
Q—Qu'est-ce que Lamarche a dit là?
R—Il a dit: " J'ai afïaire à aller à bord d'un autre steamboat, je viendrai tous vous les apporter." Je n'ai pas connaissance quand ii est revenu.
Q—Savez-vous si ces gens-là sont partis, toujours, pour aller voter. r—Oui monsieur.
Q—Vous dites que vous n'avez pas connaissance quand ii est revenu?
R—Non, monsieur.
Q__Quelle heure pouvait-il être quand il est venu dans ce temps-là?
R—Ertre huit heures et demie et neuf heures.
Q—Du matin?
R— Oui, monsieur.
Q—Pour qui Lamarche cabalaitil?
R—Il cabalait pour M. Cuthbert.
Q—Etaitil bien connu comme un partisan du Défendeur?
R—Je pense que oui.
Q—Le saviez voss vous-même quo c'était un partisan de M.Cuthbert?
R— Il avait l'air joliment chaud
Q—Dans toutes les elections précédentes où M. Cuthbert s'était présenté avait-il l'habitude de travailler?
R—Oui, monsieur.
Q—C'est un partisan zélé, n'es-ce pas?
R—Oui, monsieur.
Dolphis Rocrais est un de ceux qui sont allés voter avec un billet de passage fourni par Lamarche. L'extrait suivant de son témoignge confirme le fait important rapporté par Joly que ce sont les électeurs qui out demandé des passes pour aller voter lorsque Lamarche s'est présenté à bord des bateaux la première fois le matin; qu'il est ensuite revenu pour leur apporter les passes.
Ii s'exprime comme suit à ce sujet:
Q—Qui vous avait donné cette passe?
R—C'est M. Lamarche.
Q—M. Olivier Lamarche?
R—Oui.
Q—Quand a-t-il été vous donner cette passe?
R—Je no puis dire le temps.
Q—Est-ce la veille ou l'avant-veille do la votation?
R—C'est la veille.
Q—Le matin?
R Il est venu à bord le matin.
Q—Qu'est-ce qu'il est venu faire le matin? r—Il est venu voir comment il y avait de voteurs à bord.
q—Lui avez-vous parlé?
R—Jétais auprŁs.
Q—Qu'est-ce qu'il a dit?
R—Il a dit qu'il avait affaire à aller à terre.
Q—Quand ii est venu pour demander les nms, comment a-t-il demanéé cela et à qui parlaitil?
R— A. M. Pagé et à plusieurs autres.
Q—Qu'est-ce qu'il a dit?
r— Il a demandé le nom des voteurs.
Q—Avait-il une liste à la main?
R—Je no peux pas dire.
Q—A-t-il demandé: un tel un tel est-il ici comment a-t-il demandé ça?
R—Je sais qu'il a demanéé les noms des voteurs.
q—Les voteurs d'où? de Chicago, de Québec, do Ia Chine?
R—De Berthier
Q—Qu'est-ce qu'ils cnt réponddu?
R—Ils ont dit qu'il y en avait et ils sont venus; pas tous.
Q—Plusieurs sont venus?
R—Oui d'autres étaient en avant.
Q—Qu'est-ce qui s'est dit, ont-ils parlé de billets do passage?
r—Ils ont demanéé des passes?
Q—Qui a demanéé ces passes?
R—Quelqu'un de nous.
Q—Pour aller et revenir?
R-—On a demanéé des passes pour descendre.
q—Qu'est-ce que M. Lamarche a dit?
R—Il a dit: jo vais aller à terre, j'ai d'autres affaires, et il nous a laissés comme ça. Ensuite il est revenu, il s'en allait midi, je crois, il nous a apporté des passes. Premièrement, il a ètè au salon et ensuite il nous a donné nog passes.
Dolphis Massé confirme les mêmes faits:
Q—Qu'est-ce quo vous a dit le capitaine Duval quand ii vous a donné cette passe-là?
R—Premièrement, M. Lamarche est venu à bord demander quels étaient les voteurs qu'il y avait dans le Steamboat moi-même, je lui ai nommé dos gens que je connaissais qui avaient droit do vote il a marqué les noms, et ii a monte en haut au salon; il a demandé an capitaine Duval la permission d'avoir les voteurs: le capitaine a dit: avec plaisir, je no puis pas refuser cela; ils sont maîtres d'aller pour qui bon leur semblera; do sorte que M. Lamarche a parti i il est allé à terre, et je n'ai pas vu rien do plus. Q—Il a vu les électeurs?
R—Pardon; il a eu la permission du capitaine, et ii est venu à born dans l'après-midi; il a monte au salon; il est venu trouver le capitaine; il a vu plusieurs des gens qui sont ici presents et qui ont été entendus comme témoins. Je n'ai pas vu donner les passes moi-même. mass au moins ii a monte en haut et ml a donné des passes au capitaine. J'en ai eu une qui venait du capitaine. Je no peux pas dire si elle venait de M Lamarche ou de d'autres mass je l'ai eue du capitaine.
Q—A-t-il été question do passes devant vous quand Lamarche est venu?
R—La question des passes, je no puis pas dire rien à l'égard des passes des autres. J'entendais dire quo plusieurs désiraient en avoir, mais je ne peux pas dire rien de plus.
Octave Parent constate aussi le fait des deux visites de Lamarche de la manière suivante:
Q—Avez-vous vu M. Olivier Lamarche ce jour-là?
R—Oui, monsieur.
Q—Eh bien, dans quelle occasion et à quel propos, l'avez-vous vu?
r—je l'ai vu au gangway de l'arrière qui s'informait des gens qui avaient droit do vote et ii appelait leurs noms.
q—Il avait une liste?
R—Celui qui était là il avait un petit morceau de papier et celui qui se trouvait present il disait: il est ici
Q—Ensuite?
R—Il m'a demandé: Vas-tu voter? J'ai dit oui. Il & dit: Si tuveux aller voter, je vais aller te chercher une passe. Jo lui ai dit: C'est bien correct. Dans l'après-midi, il est venu avec une passe, ou un ticket; c'était pareil à celui qui est exhibé; je puis vous la montrer.
Joseph Page parle aussi de la visite du matin mais il commet une erreur évidenee en disant que c'est alors qu'il a eu sa passe:
Q.—Dites à la Cour dans quelles circonstances et où il vous a donné cette passe.
R.—Il est venu le matin à bord du steamboat le Trois Rivières, il m'a demanéé si je descendais; j'ai dit: oui i il a dit: " Voilà une passe si tu veux descendre, descends." J'ai descendu.
Q.—Aviez-vous besoin de cette passe-là pour descendre?
R.—Eh bien ! je pense quo oui. Q. —Vous connaissez bien M. Lamarche?
R.—Oui, on a été élevés ensemble ici.
Q.—Il avait une liste, je suppose, avec le nom des électeurs?
R.—Oui, je lui ai vu une liste.
Q.—A-t-il demandé des informations pour savoir si un telet un tel étaient à bord?
R.—Oui, je le lui ai dit.
Q.—Vous lui avez donné les noms des électeurs de Berthier qui étaient à bord?
R.—Oui, de ceux que je pensais qui avaient droit de voter.
Q.—Il les a tous vus ces électeurs-là?
R.—Oui.
Q.—Et il leur a donné une passe comme à vous?
R.—Je pense bien que oui; ils ont tous descendu.
Dans son témoignage, Lamarche dit qu'il est allé deux fois à bord des bateaux pour y voir les navigateurs qui étaient électeurs; ii y est d'abord allé le matin et v est ensuite retourné dans l'après-midi vers une heure ou deux. C'est après sa première visite aux bateaux qu'il a vu M. Labelle, l'agent des billets (ticket agent) du chemin de fer Q. M. O. & O., pour se procurer les billets qu'il a remis aux électeurs.
Tous ces témoignages établissent d'une manière certaine que Lamarche est d'abord allé aux steamers une premiere fois pour s'assurer du nombre de voteurs qu'il y avait et de leurs dispositions à aller voter. Les connaissant tous d'avance et depuis longtemps des conservateurs comme lui-même, il n'a pas eu, paraIt-ll, le trouble de les solliciter de voter pour son candidat, l'Intimé, car ils étaient eux-mêmes de ses partisans, bien disposés à voter, mais à une condition cependant, celle d'avoir leur passage pour aller et revenir. C'est la première chose dont on l'informe, comme le rapporte le témoun Joly: " On aimerait à partir aujourd'hui i " si on ne part pas aujourd'hui on n'y va pas, et on aiimerait à avoir notre passage pour aller et revenir, " et on aimerait à aller chacun chez nous avant d'aller v voter." Ils ont demandé des passes, dit Rocrais J J'avais besoin de cette passe-là pour descendre," dit Page.
Ainsi renseigné sur la disposition de ces électeurs de ne pas aller voter à moins l'avoir leur passage gratuitement, Lamarche se rend auprès de M. Libelle, le prepose à la vente des billets de passage ticket agent) sur le chemin de fer Q. M. 0. et 0., alors la propriété du gouvernement de Québec qui lexploitait pour son propre compte.
Lamarche rapporte comme suit son entrevue avec M. Labelle:
Q -Vous n'avez pas eu besoin do demander d'autorisation, ii vous les a accordés do suite?
E—Oui, quand je suis allé au bureau de M. Labelle je lui ai dit que i avais vu M. La-mère et que je lui avais demanéé de laisser descendre les navigateurs. Je lui ai dit que M. La-mère leur donnait la permission do venir voter. Quand je lui (M. Larnèré) ai demanéé cola ii ne m'a pas demandé si c'était pour M. Cuthbert ou M. Sylvestre. Je lui ai dit: Jo voudrais les avoir pour venir voter. Il m'a dit: c'est malaisé, il faudra quo vous vous arrangiez avec le capitaine. il faudra qu'il les remplace par les matelots du Chambly. Tªcho de voir 10 capitaine Lamoureux et le capitaine Duval pour qu'ils arrangent. Jo les ai vus et le capitaine Lamoureux du Chambly a promis des hommes au capitaine Duval du Trois Rivières Si ce dernier allait faire son voyage do plaisir le lundi soir.
Ensuite, c'est alors que je suis allé au bureau do M. Labelle. Jo lui ai dit qu'il me fallait des passes et ii m'a dit: " combien t'en faut-il? Jo lui ai dit: dix-sept à vingt. Il m'a dit: " tu reviendras tantôt." Jo suis repassé, j'allais voir M. Wurtele pour avoir doux hommes qui devaient venir voter; il y en avait un qui était employé sur le chemin à lEpiphanie. Il m'a dit: tout ça sera arrangé. M Grondines m'a dit: vous avez une lettre ici pour vous.
Cettre lettre contenait les passes ou billets demandes. A l'argument l'Intimé a prétendu que ces passes avaient été données gratuitement. Il est vrai que Lamarche n'a rien payé pour les obtenir; mais en examinant les passes on voit de suite que ce sont des billets de passages ordinaires faits dans la forme suivante: QUEBEC, MONTREAL AND OCCIDENTAL RAILWAY.
ONE FIRST CLASS PASSAGE.
From Hochelaga to Berthierville and Return.
In consideration of the reduced rate at which this ticket is sold it- will only be valid until 22nd June 1882.
L. A. SENECAL,
General Superintendent.
Form E.R. 5708.
A leur face ii appert que les billets out été vendus quoique à un taux réduit, et la preuve établit que la valeur de ces billets était de $1.50 chaque.
Ce fait constitue-til une violation de la section 96 de l'acte des elections de 1874? Cette section defend le louage de voitures pour le transport des électeurs aux polls, le paiement des passages de chemin de fer ou autres dépenses des voteurs, par un candidat on ses agents et declare tels actes illégaux et punissables d'une amende de $100. La section 98 met en outre ces actes au rang des menées corruptrices.
Dans le cas actuel il y a une preuve primû facie du paiement des billets de passage en question. C'est celle qui résulte des billets eux-mêmes comportant la déclaration qu'ils ont été vendus à prix réduits. Lamarche dit bien qu'il n'a rien payé lui-même, mais comme ils ne lui sont parvenus qu'après avoir passé en déverses mains il n'est pas en état de dire s'ils out été donnés on remis en échange du prix ordinaire. L'agent des billets, Labelle, n'ayant pas été appelé comme témoin, on ne doit point présumer contre la preuve faite par les billets, qu'il les a donnés sans en recevoir le prix. D'autres partisans que Lamarche out pu en payer le prix. Labelle lui-même, s'il ne l'a pas reçu de quelqu'un a du sans doute s'en charger puisqu'il les a vendus, ainsi que les billets le comportent. Il est done certain que ces billets ont été vendus, bien qu'on ne sache pas par qui ils ont été payés. Toutefois, d'après la preuve ii n'est pas possible de dire quills ont été donnés. Pour en arriver à cette conclusion, il aurait au moins fallu faire entendre Labelle pour constater qu'il n'a reçu de personne le prix des passages en question, et qu'il était autorisé à faire de pareilles libéralités. En l'absence d'une telle preuve on doit présumer que Labelle n'a livré les billets qu'après en avoir reçu le prix, ainsi que les billets en font foi
En conséquence je considère la preuve faite comme étant suffisante pour constater que le paiement des passages de chemins de fer de ces 17 ou 20 voteuss a été fait en contravention à l'acte des elections de 1874 Ce paiement étant, par la section 98, mis au rang des menées corruptrices, dolt entraîner la nullité de l'élection
Si Labelle a donné les billets et s'il avait le pouvoir de le faire, on n'aurait sans doute pas manqué d'en faire la preuve Aucune tentative à cet effet n'a été faite. Si les billets ont été donnés sans autorisation ce serait un détournement frauduleux commis au détriment du gouvernement, propriétaire du chemin de fer et le prix lui en serait dû par Labelle aussi bien que par ceux qui en out profité. En admettant même qu'il n'ait rien été payé et qu'il ne soit rien dû pour ces billets, leur remise aux électeurs en question et dans les circonstances particulières ci-dessus rapportées ne constitue-t-elle pas une violation de la section 92 de l'Acte des Elections de 1874?
Le premier paragraphe de cette section est ainsi conçu:
Every person who directly or indirectly, by himself, or by any other person on his behalf, gives, lends, or agrees to give or lend or offers or promises any money or valuable consideration, or promises to procure, or endeavour to procure, any money or valuable consideration, to or for any voters, or to or for any person on behalf of any voter, or to or for any person, in order to induce any voter to vote or refrain from voting, or corruptly does any such act as aforesaid on account of such voter having voted or refrained from voting at any election. Sur ce point de la cause, en prenant pour vrai que les billets en question out été remis gratuitement, l'honorable juge Doherty s'exprime ainsi:
This proposition raised the question which has not, so far as I know, been as yet extensively discussed in the trials of election cases: as to whether a railroad pass given gratis and unconditionally to a voter to go to vote, is, within the meaning of the sec. 92 sub. section 1 " a valuable consideration '' or of any such value as would support a promise.
Se fondant sur l'autorité du juge Mellor dans la cause de Bolton ([25])l'honorable juge Doherty en vient à la conclusion que des billets donnés comme l'ont été ceux dont ii s'agit ne constitue pas une valable consideration (valuable consideration) suivant l'intention de l'acte des elections.
Dans cette cause, ii s'agissait de savoir si le paiement des dépenses de voyage des voteuss constituait un acte de corruption.
Une circulaire conçue dans les termes suivants avait été adressée à des électeurs
CROSS AND KNOWLES', COMMITTEE ROOMS,
2nd February, 1884.
DEAR SIR,—Your name being on the list of Parliamentary voters for this borough, you are entitled to vote at the forthcoming election We inclose you a railway pass, on presenting which at the railway station named you will be furnished with a railway ticket to convey you to Bolton and back airain. I trust you will be able to make it convenient to come over and record your vote in favor of Messrs. Cross and Knowles
Les' pétitionnarres prétendaeent que l'envoi de cette lettre et des passes de chemin de fer constituait soit un acte de corruption conformément à la doctrine consacrée par la Chambre des Lords dans la cause de Cooper vs Slade, soit encore un acte de corruption en contravention à Ia sec. 2 de l'acte des menées corruptrices de 1854; et 2° que si ce n'était pas un acte de corruption que c'était dans tous les cas un acte illégal qui, ayant été volontairement et systématiquement fait dans le but d'influencer l'élection devait avoir l'effet de la faire declarer nulle.
Il serait inutile de rapporter les arguments faits par l'honorable juge pour établir une distinction entre cette cause et celle de Cooper et Slade dont ii admet la doctrine. Il suffit de dire que suivant son interpretation la circulaire dans cette cause ne faisait pas comme dans celle de Cooper et Slade, de la remise des passes une condition du vote, et que dans son opinion les passes ne pouvaient pas être considérée$ comme une considération valable (valuable consideration) suivant l’intention de la section 2 de l'acte des menées corruptrices. Ayant écarté ces deux objections, ii lui restait à decider si le paiement des dépeness de voyage des électeurs qui n'était alors, d'aprss la loi impériale, que simplement traité comme un acte illegal, punissable par amende, pouvait avoir de plus l'effet d'entraîner la nullité de l'élection
L'honorable juge, après avoir fait l'historique de Ia législation impériale an sujet du paiement des dépenses de transport des voteurs, et bien clairement constaté que la loi anglaise en déclarant ce paiement illégal n'en avait pas fait une menée corruptrice, qu'elle avait soigneusement évité d'en faire la declaration ([26]) conclut en ces termes:
I agree with the opinion of the late Mr Justice Willes; he was decidedly of opinion that a violation of an Act of Parliament which itself created the offense and provided the penalty could not avoid the election ' all it did was to inflict penal consequences upon the persons who did the act.
Cette dernière proposition est certainement correcte et la conclusion à laquelle en vient l'honorable juge que le paiement des frais de transport des voteurs tout en étant illégal ne pouvait avoir l'effet d'entraîner Ia nullité de l'élection et qu'il ne constituait pas une menée corruptrice ayant cet effet, est en stricte conformite à la loi anglaise. Mais c'est faire une étrange confusion et méconnaitre complètement l'état de notre propre legislation sur le même sujet que de vouloir faire application à la présente cause des principes de la decision rendue par l'honorable juge Mellor en conformité de lois différentes.
Au contraire de la loi impériale notre acte d'élection de 1874, declare positivement que le paiement du transport des voteurs, est une menée corruptrice. La section 96 declare comme suit
And whereas doubts may arise as to whether the hiring of teams and vehicles to convey voters to and from the polls and the paying of railway fares and other expenses of voters, be or be not according to law, it is declared and enacted, that the hiring or promising to pay or paying for any horse, team, carriage, cab, or other vehicle by any candidate or by any person on his behalf to convey any voter or voters to or from the poll, or to or from the neighbourhood thereof, at any election, or the payment by any candidate, or by any person on his behalf of the travelling and other expenses of any voter, in going to or returning from any election, are and shall be unlawful acts.
Le reste de Ia section prononce une pénalité de $100 pour chacune de ces offenses, et la peine de déqualification contre tout voteur pour louage de voitures en contravention à cette section. La loi anglaise comme notre section 96, a prononcé la peine d'amende contre ces offenses —mais Ia nôtre est allée beaucoup plus loin;—par la section 98, elle a declare que les offenses enuméréss dans Ia sec. 96 constitueraient des menées corruptrices suivant l'intention de l'acte desélections La sec. 98 declare que :
The offence of bribery, treating, or undue influence, or any of such offences as defined by this or any other Act of the Parliament of Canada, personation, or the inducing of any person to commit personation, or any wilful offence against any one of the six next preceding sections of this, Act shall be corrupt practices within the meaning of the provisions of this Act.
Il est evident, d'aprss la dernière partie de cette section que la section 96 se trouve sujette à l'effet de la sec 98—et que partant tous les actes mentionnés dans cette dernière section, sont déclarés être des menées corruptrices C'est ce qu'a décidé cette Cour dans la cause de l'élection de Selkirk, ([27])
Comme on le voit notre legislation ne laisse aucun doute sur la question de savoir si le paiement du transport des voteuss constitue une menée corruptrice L'honorable juge sïellor, s'il avait eu à decider cette question d'aprss nos lois, n'aurait sans doute pas en un seul moment d'hésitation à declarer le contraire de ce qu'il a décidé correctement d'aprss la loi anglaise.
L'appelant essaie encore de tirer avantage de l'argument fait par l'honorable juge Mellor pour établir que la remise des passes ne pouvait pas être considérée comme une valable considération suivant l'inteniion de la sec. 2, acte de 1854—menées corruptrices, acte imp. Essayant de démontrer qu'il n'y avait pas en cela un acte de corruption, l'honorable juge dit à ce sujet :
It is difficult to see in what it can be a valuable consideration to a voter. The coming to vote and voting may be so deemed by the sender; he may think he may get value, but it is difficult to see what value the voter gets by a free pass to the poll.
L'honorable juge ne fait aucun raisonnement pour démontrer que la remise d'une passe n'est pas en réalité une valable consideration; et ii faut avouer qu'il est difficile, pour ne pas dire impossible, d'en faire pour démontrer une pareille proposition. Il se borne à dire qu'il est difficile de voir quelle valeur reçoit le voteur par la remise d'une passe pour aller au poll. Ceci serait assez vrai si l'on fait abstraction des devoirs du voteur. Si l'on considére que son intérêt materiel du moment et que pour lui c'est un derangement de ses affaires ordinaires, que c'est une perte de temps d'