R. v. Tse

R. v. Tse
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2012-04-13
Neutral citation
2012 SCC 16
Report
[2012] 1 SCR 531
Case number
33751
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; LeBel, Louis; Deschamps, Marie; Fish, Morris J.; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Rothstein, Marshall; Cromwell, Thomas Albert; Moldaver, Michael J.; Karakatsanis, Andromache
On appeal from
British Columbia
Subjects
Constitutional law
Notes
SCC Case Information: 33751
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: R. v. Tse, 2012 SCC 16, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 531
Date: 20120413
Docket: 33751
Between:
Her Majesty The Queen
Appellant
and
Yat Fung Albert Tse, Nhan Trong Ly, Viet Bac Nguyen, Huong Dac Doan,
Daniel Luis Soux and Myles Alexander Vandrick
Respondents
- and -
Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General of Ontario,
Attorney General of Quebec, Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario),
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association and
Canadian Civil Liberties Association
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ.
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 103):
Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ. (McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. concurring)
R. v. Tse, 2012 SCC 16, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 531
Her Majesty The Queen Appellant
v.
Yat Fung Albert Tse,
Nhan Trong Ly,
Viet Bac Nguyen,
Huong Dac Doan,
Daniel Luis Soux and
Myles Alexander Vandrick Respondents
and
Attorney General of Canada,
Attorney General of Ontario,
Attorney General of Quebec,
Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario),
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association and
Canadian Civil Liberties Association Interveners
Indexed as: R. v. Tse
2012 SCC 16
File No.: 33751.
2011: November 18; 2012: April 13.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ.
on appeal from the supreme court of british columbia
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Search and seizure — Interception of private communications — Police intercepting communications without authorization pursuant to s. 184.4 of Criminal Code on grounds interceptions were immediately necessary to prevent serious harm to person or property and judicial authorization not available with reasonable diligence — Whether s. 184.4 contravenes right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure pursuant to s. 8 of the Charter — Whether provision saved under s. 1 — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1 and 8 — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46, ss. 184.4 , 185 , 186 , 188 .
This appeal concerns the constitutionality of the emergency wiretap provision, s. 184.4 of the Criminal Code . In this case, the police used s. 184.4 to carry out unauthorized warrantless interceptions of private communications when the daughter of an alleged kidnapping victim began receiving calls from her father stating that he was being held for ransom. Approximately 24 hours later, the police obtained a judicial authorization for continued interceptions, pursuant to s. 186 of the Code. The trial judge found that s. 184.4 contravened the right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure under s. 8 of the Charter and that it was not a reasonable limit under s. 1 . The Crown has appealed the declaration of unconstitutionality directly to this Court.
Held: The appeal should be dismissed.
Section 184.4 permits a peace officer to intercept certain private communications, without prior judicial authorization, if the officer believes on reasonable grounds that the interception is immediately necessary to prevent an unlawful act that would cause serious harm, provided judicial authorization could not be obtained with reasonable diligence. In principle, Parliament may craft such a narrow emergency wiretap authority for exigent circumstances. The more difficult question is whether the particular power enacted in s. 184.4 strikes a reasonable balance between an individual’s right to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures and society’s interest in preventing serious harm. To the extent that the power to intercept private communications without judicial authorization is available only in exigent circumstances to prevent serious harm, this section strikes an appropriate balance. However, s. 184.4 violates s. 8 of the Charter as it does not provide a mechanism for oversight, and more particularly, notice to persons whose private communications have been intercepted. This breach cannot be saved under s. 1 of the Charter .
The language of s. 184.4 is sufficiently flexible to provide for different urgent circumstances that may arise, and it is far from vague when properly construed. While it is the only wiretapping power that does not require either the consent of one of the parties to the communication or judicial pre‑authorization, a number of conditions and constraints are embedded in the language of s. 184.4 that ensure that the power to intercept private communications without judicial authorization is available only in exigent circumstances to prevent serious harm. Police officers may only use this authority if they believe “on reasonable grounds” that the “urgency of the situation” is such that an authorization could not, with “reasonable diligence”, “be obtained under any other provision of this Part”. Each of these requirements provides a legal restriction on the use of s. 184.4. The provision imports an objective standard — credibly based probability for each of the requirements. The conditions incorporate implicit and strict temporal limitations and the onus rests with the Crown to show, on balance, that the conditions have been met. As time goes by it may be more difficult to satisfy the requirement that an authorization could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence, the situation is urgent or it is immediately necessary to prevent serious harm.
Section 188 provides a streamlined process for obtaining a temporary authorization in circumstances of urgency that can be accessed expeditiously with a view to limiting within reason, the length of time that unauthorized interceptions under s. 184.4 may lawfully be continued. It permits a specially designated peace officer to seek a 36‑hour wiretap authorization from a specially designated judge where the urgency of the situation requires the interception of private communications to commence before an authorization could “with reasonable diligence” be obtained under s. 186 of the Code.
Section 188 should be construed in a manner that promotes an efficient and expeditious result and effective judicial oversight. Section 188 applications, which are designed to provide short‑term judicial authorization in urgent circumstances may be conducted orally as this would expedite the process and further Parliament’s objective in enacting the provision. Even though applications may be conducted orally and are less cumbersome and labour‑intensive than written applications, they still take time, so the need for unauthorized emergency interceptions under s. 184.4 remains.
Section 184.4 recognizes that on occasion, the privacy interests of some may have to yield temporarily for the greater good of society — here, the protection of lives and property from harm that is both serious and imminent. The stringent conditions Parliament has imposed to ensure that the provision is only used in exigent circumstances, effect an appropriate balance between an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy and society’s interest in preventing serious harm. To that extent, s. 184.4 passes constitutional muster. In its present form however, s. 184.4 contains no accountability measures to permit oversight of the police use of the power. It does not require that “after the fact” notice be given to persons whose private communications have been intercepted. Unless a criminal prosecution results, the targets of the wiretapping may never learn of the interceptions and will be unable to challenge police use of this power. There is no other measure in the Code to ensure specific oversight of the use of s. 184.4. In its present form, the provision fails to meet the minimum constitutional standards of s. 8 of the Charter . An accountability mechanism is necessary to protect the important privacy interests at stake and a notice provision would adequately meet that need, although Parliament may choose an alternative measure for providing accountability. The lack of notice requirement or some other satisfactory substitute renders s. 184.4 constitutionally infirm. In the absence of a proper record, the issue of whether the use of the section by peace officers, other than police officers, renders this section overbroad is not addressed.
The objective of preventing serious harm to persons or property in exigent circumstances is pressing and substantial and rationally connected to the power provided under s. 184.4. It is at the proportionality analysis of Oakes that the provision fails. The obligation to give notice to intercepted parties would not impact in any way the ability of the police to act in emergencies. It would, however, enhance the ability of targeted individuals to identify and challenge invasions to their privacy and seek meaningful remedies. Section 184.4 of the Code is constitutionally invalid legislation. This declaration of invalidity is suspended for 12 months to allow Parliament to redraft a constitutionally compliant provision.
Cases Cited
Applied: Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145; R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30; R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; approved: R. v. Riley (2008), 174 C.R.R. (2d) 250; considered: R. v. Riley (2008), 174 C.R.R. (2d) 288; R. v. Godoy, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 311; R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13; R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59; referred to: Brais v. R., 2009 QCCS 1212, [2009] R.J.Q. 1092; R. v. Deacon, 2008 CanLII 78109; R. v. Moldovan, 2009 CanLII 58062; R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731; Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re), 2004 SCC 42, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248; R. v. Wiggins, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 62; R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606; R. v. Kang‑Brown, 2008 SCC 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456; R. v. Prosper, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236; R. v. Silveira, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297; R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223; R. v. Araujo, 2000 SCC 65, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992; Smith v. Jones, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 455; Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. K.L.W., 2000 SCC 48, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 519; R. v. McCraw, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 72; R. v. Galbraith (1989), 49 C.C.C. (3d) 178; R. v. Laudicina (1990), 53 C.C.C. (3d) 281; R. v. Finlay and Grellette (1985), 52 O.R. (2d) 632; Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Bill C‑30, An Act to enact the Investigating and Preventing Criminal Electronic Communications Act and to amend the Criminal Code and other Acts, 1st Sess., 41st Parl., 2011‑2012.
Bill C‑31, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act and the Identification of Criminals Act and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, 2nd Sess., 40th Parl., 2009.
Bill C‑50, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (interception of private communications and related warrants and orders), 3rd Sess., 40th Parl., 2010.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1 , 7 , 8 .
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C‑34, s. 178.11(2)(a) [ad. 1973‑74, c. 50, s. 2].
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46, ss. 2 “peace officer”, 21, 22, Part VI [am. 1993, c. 40], 183, 184(1), 184.1 to 184.4 [ad. idem, s. 4 ], 185, 186, 188 [am. idem, s. 8 ], 189, 195, 196, 722(4).
Protection of Privacy Act, S.C. 1973‑74, c. 50.
Authors Cited
Canada. Senate. Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, No. 44, 3rd Sess., 34th Parl., June 2, 1993, p. 44:10.
Canada. Senate. Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, No. 48, 3rd Sess., 34th Parl., June 15, 1993, p. 48:16.
Driedger, Elmer A. Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. Toronto: Butterworths, 1983.
Sullivan, Ruth. Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2008.
APPEAL from a decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court (Davies J.), 2008 BCSC 211, 235 C.C.C. (3d) 161, 180 C.R.R. (2d) 24, [2008] B.C.J. No. 1764 (QL), 2008 CarswellBC 1948, declaring s. 184.4 of the Criminal Code to be unconstitutional. Appeal dismissed.
Trevor Shaw and Samiran Lakshman, for the appellant.
Simon R. A. Buck and Dagmar Dlab, for the respondent Yat Fung Albert Tse.
Brent V. Bagnall, for the respondent Nhan Trong Ly.
Howard Rubin, Q.C., and David Albert, for the respondent Viet Bac Nguyen.
Kenneth S. Westlake, Q.C., for the respondent Huong Dac Doan.
Ian Donaldson, Q.C., for the respondents Daniel Luis Soux and Myles Alexander Vandrick.
Cheryl J. Tobias, Q.C., and Nancy Dennison, for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada.
Michal Fairburn and Grace Choi, for the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario.
Brigitte Bussières and Gilles Laporte, for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec.
Joseph S. Wilkinson and Fredrick Schumann, for the intervener the Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario).
Roy W. Millen and Laura M. Cundari, for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.
Christopher A. Wayland and H. Michael Rosenberg, for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ. —
I. Overview
[1] This appeal concerns the constitutionality of the emergency wiretap provision, s. 184.4 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 . The trial judge found that the provision contravened the right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure under s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and that it was not a reasonable limit under s. 1 (2008 BCSC 211, 235 C.C.C. (3d) 161). The Crown has appealed the declaration of unconstitutionality directly to this Court.
[2] Section 184.4 permits a peace officer to intercept certain private communications, without prior judicial authorization, if the officer believes on reasonable grounds that the interception is immediately necessary to prevent an unlawful act that would cause serious harm, provided judicial authorization could not be obtained with reasonable diligence.
[3] In this case, the police used s. 184.4 to carry out unauthorized warrantless interceptions of private communications when the daughter of an alleged kidnapping victim began receiving calls from her father stating that he was being held for ransom. Approximately 24 hours later, the police obtained a judicial authorization for continued interceptions, pursuant to s. 186 of the Code.
[4] The trial judge, Davies J., concluded that the section breached s. 8 of the Charter due to the “total absence of the constitutional safeguards” generally found in other sections of Part VI of the Code. Davies J. was particularly concerned about the lack of any requirement for officers (i) to give notice to those persons whose communications had been intercepted and (ii) to report their use of s. 184.4 to senior, independent law enforcement officials, the executive branch of government or to Parliament.[1]
[5] In R. v. Riley (2008), 174 C.R.R. (2d) 250 (Ont. S.C.J.) (“Riley (No. 1)”),[2] Dambrot J. also considered the constitutionality of s. 184.4 and found that the lack of any requirement for police to give notice to the targets of the interception rendered the section constitutionally infirm. He read in the notice provisions set out in s. 196 of Part VI.[3]
[6] Both judges were concerned that the provision could be accessed by peace officers as defined in s. 2 of the Code. The wide variety of people included in that definition raised concerns about overbreadth.
[7] Both judges also considered the availability of judicial authorizations under other sections in Part VI of the Code; they differed, however, in their views about the procedural requirements of s. 188 , a provision that addresses judicial authorization in urgent circumstances. Because s. 184.4 is restricted to urgent situations that do not permit officers, with reasonable diligence, to obtain an authorization under any other provision of this Part, the availability of s. 188 bears significantly upon the scope of the warrantless emergency wiretap provision in s. 184.4.
[8] The key issue before us is whether the power created in s. 184.4 of the Code strikes an appropriate constitutional balance between an individual’s right to be secure against unreasonable searches or seizures and society’s interest in preventing serious harm. The main concerns raised by the parties relate to (1) the overbreadth of the definition of peace officer; (2) the interrelationship between ss. 184.4 and 188 ; (3) the lack of notice to the object of the interception; and (4) the lack of a reporting obligation.
[9] The respondents also raised other Charter challenges but the focus of the submissions and the decision below was on the s. 8 analysis. The submission that s. 184.4 violates s. 7 of the Charter because it is both vague and overbroad, is addressed below in the determination of the scope of s. 184.4 .
[10] For the reasons set out below, we have reached the following conclusions. Section 184.4 contains a number of legislative conditions. Properly construed, these conditions are designed to ensure that the power to intercept private communications without judicial authorization is available only in exigent circumstances to prevent serious harm. To that extent, the section strikes an appropriate balance between an individual’s s. 8 Charter rights and society’s interests in preventing serious harm.
[11] However, in our view, s. 184.4 falls down on the matter of accountability because the legislative scheme does not provide any mechanism to permit oversight of the police use of this power. Of particular concern, it does not require that notice be given to persons whose private communications have been intercepted. For this reason, we believe that s. 184.4 violates s. 8 of the Charter . We are further of the view that the breach cannot be saved under s. 1 of the Charter . Accordingly, we would declare the section to be unconstitutional. By way of remedy, we have concluded that the declaration should be suspended for a period of 12 months to afford Parliament sufficient time to bring the section into conformity with the Charter .
[12] In the absence of a proper record, we do not address the issue of whether the use of the section by peace officers, other than police officers, renders this section overbroad.
II. Issues
[13] This appeal raises the following issues:
A. Is an unauthorized interception of private communications in exigent circumstances constitutional?
B. What is the scope of s. 184.4?
C. What authorizations are available to police with reasonable diligence in urgent situations? In particular, what is the scope of s. 188 ?
D. Does s. 184.4 lack accountability measures or specific limitations, in breach of s. 8 of the Charter ?
E. If s. 184.4 breaches the Charter , is it saved by s. 1 ? If not, what is the appropriate remedy?
III. Analysis
[14] Section 184.4 reads as follows:
184.4 A peace officer may intercept, by means of any electro-magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device, a private communication where
(a) the peace officer believes on reasonable grounds that the urgency of the situation is such that an authorization could not, with reasonable diligence, be obtained under any other provision of this Part;
(b) the peace officer believes on reasonable grounds that such an interception is immediately necessary to prevent an unlawful act that would cause serious harm to any person or to property; and
(c) either the originator of the private communication or the person intended by the originator to receive it is the person who would perform the act that is likely to cause the harm or is the victim, or intended victim, of the harm.
A. Is an Unauthorized Interception of Private Communications in Exigent Circumstances Constitutional?
[15] Section 8 of the Charter provides: “Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.”
[16] In the landmark decision Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, this Court determined that a warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable. The presumed constitutional standard for searches or seizures in the criminal sphere is judicial pre-authorization: a prior determination by a neutral and impartial arbiter, acting judicially, that the search or seizure is supported by reasonable grounds, established on oath (pp. 160-62 and 167-68). As Dickson J. noted, at p. 161:
I recognize that it may not be reasonable in every instance to insist on prior authorization in order to validate governmental intrusions upon individuals’ expectations of privacy. Nevertheless, where it is feasible to obtain prior authorization, I would hold that such authorization is a precondition for a valid search and seizure.
[17] The importance of prior judicial authorization is even greater for covert interceptions of private communications, which constitute serious intrusions into the privacy rights of those affected. In R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, La Forest J. explained, at p. 46:
. . . if the surreptitious recording of private communications is a search and seizure within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter , it is because the law recognizes that a person’s privacy is intruded on in an unreasonable manner whenever the state, without a prior showing of reasonable cause before a neutral judicial officer, arrogates to itself the right surreptitiously to record communications that the originator expects will not be intercepted by anyone other than the person intended by its originator to receive them, to use the language of the Code. [Emphasis in original.]
La Forest J. found that “as a general proposition, surreptitious electronic surveillance of the individual by an agency of the state constitutes an unreasonable search or seizure under s. 8 of the Charter ” (p. 42).
[18] However, there is a long line of authority from this Court recognizing that the reach of s. 8 protection is legitimately circumscribed by the existence of the potential for serious and immediate harm. Exigent circumstances are factors that inform the reasonableness of the search or authorizing law and may justify the absence of prior judicial authorization. For example, in R. v. Godoy, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 311, where the issue was whether the Charter precluded warrantless entry into private premises in response to 911 calls, this Court stated: “. . . the importance of the police duty to protect life warrants and justifies a forced entry into a dwelling in order to ascertain the health and safety of a 911 caller” (para. 22). See also R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13 (warrantless entry into a home in hot pursuit), and R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 (warrantless pat-down searches incidental to arrest to protect officer and public safety). Thus, in principle, it would seem that Parliament may craft a narrow emergency wiretap authority for exigent circumstances to prevent serious harm if judicial authorization is not available through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
[19] The more difficult question is whether the particular power enacted in s. 184.4 constitutes an unreasonable search or seizure contrary to s. 8 of the Charter . Does s. 184.4 strike a reasonable balance between an individual’s right to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures and society’s interest in preventing serious harm?
B. What Is the Scope of Section 184.4?
(1) Approach to Interpretation
[20] The modern principle of statutory interpretation requires that the words of the legislation be read “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: E. A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87. Underlying this approach is the presumption that legislation is enacted to comply with constitutional norms, including the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter . “For centuries courts have interpreted legislation to comply with common law values, not because compliance was necessary for validity, but because the values themselves were considered important. This reasoning applies with even greater force to entrenched constitutional values”: R. Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes (5th ed. 2008), at p. 461. Accordingly, where legislation is permitting of two equal interpretations, the Court should adopt the interpretation which accords with Charter values: R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731, at p. 771; Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re), 2004 SCC 42, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248, at para. 35.
[21] In this case, the constitutional lens must take into account the privacy interests of anyone whose communications may be intercepted, and the interests of public safety, including the right to life, liberty and security of the person who is in danger of serious harm. Lamer C.J. observed in Godoy that “dignity, integrity and autonomy” are values underlying a privacy interest; however, the interests of a person in need of police assistance are “closer to the core of the values of dignity, integrity and autonomy than the interest of the person who seeks to deny entry to police who arrive in response to the call for help” (para. 19).
(2) Scheme of Part VI of the Act
[22] Entitled “Invasion of Privacy”, Part VI of the Code makes it an offence under s. 184(1) to intercept private communications. Sections 185 and 186 set out the general provisions governing the application and the granting of judicial authorizations for the interception of private communications. Section 188 permits temporary authorizations (for up to 36 hours) by specially appointed judges, on the application of specially designated peace officers, if the urgency of the situation requires interception of private communications before an authorization could, with reasonable diligence, be obtained under s. 186 .
[23] In addition to the prerequisites for and conditions of authorized interceptions, there are a number of after-the-fact provisions that build accountability into the process. Section 195 requires an annual statistical report to Parliament concerning the use of s. 186 and s. 188 authorizations and resulting prosecutions. Section 196 sets out the obligations of the responsible Minister of the Crown to subsequently give notice in writing to the person who was the object of the interception pursuant to a s. 186 authorization. Under s. 189, an accused must be given notice of any interception intended to be produced in evidence.
[24] When the first comprehensive wiretap legislation in Canada, the Protection of Privacy Act, S.C. 1973-74, c. 50, came into force in 1974, there was no emergency wiretap provision like s. 184.4. Wiretaps were permitted without judicial authorization only with the consent of a party, under then s. 178.11(2)(a) of the Code. Following the constitutional challenge to that section in Duarte and R. v. Wiggins, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 62, Parliament introduced the current Part VI in 1993, with a number of additional provisions that permit interceptions in special situations (S.C. 1993, c. 40).
[25] Two of the new provisions introduced in 1993 are specifically preventative in nature. Section 184.4 is the emergency power to intercept for the purpose of preventing serious harm. Section 184.1 permits interception with a person’s consent in order to prevent bodily harm to that person. These are the only two sections that permit interceptions without a specific time limit and without judicial authorization. In addition, s. 184.2 provides for judicial authorization with consent of one of the persons being intercepted for up to 60 days; under s. 184.3 such authorizations can be obtained by means of telecommunication. None of the interceptions under these special sections is subject to the s. 195 reporting or the s. 196 notice requirements.
[26] To summarize, Part VI sets out a broad spectrum of wiretapping provisions. Sections 185 and 186 set out the standard requirements for wiretapping. Section 188 permits designated officers to seek authorizations from designated judges for interceptions limited to 36 hours when the “urgency of the situation” requires it. Accountability requirements apply to these powers. They do not apply to the special circumstance provisions in ss. 184.1, 184.2 and 184.4 that involve consent or exigent circumstances.
[27] Section 184.4, the emergency power to intercept, is the only section that does not require either consent of a party or pre-authorization. However, it is clearly available only on an urgent basis to prevent harm that is both serious and imminent. While s. 184.4 does not contain a time limitation, each interception is limited to urgent situations where there is an immediate necessity to prevent serious harm and judicial pre-authorization is not available with reasonable diligence. As discussed below, these prerequisites create strict inherent time restrictions.
(3) Intention of Parliament
[28] It is clear from the overall context of the provisions in Part VI of the Code that Parliament intended to limit the operation of the authority under s. 184.4 to genuine emergencies. Evidence before the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs was that this emergency power was necessary for “hostage takings, bomb threats and armed standoffs”; to be used “only if time does not permit obtaining an authorization”; and for “very short period[s] of time during which it may be possible to stop the threat and harm from occurring”: Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, No. 44, 3rd Sess., 34th Parl., June 2, 1993, at p. 44:10. The Minister of Justice noted that these are situations where “every minute counts” and that the provision was “necessary to ensure public safety”: Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, No. 48, 3rd Sess., 34th Parl., June 15, 1993, at p. 48:16. The evidence filed before the trial judge noted that kidnappings, child protection and hostage taking form a substantial backdrop for the use of s. 184.4 by police.
(4) The Language of Section 184.4
[29] The respondents submitted that the terms “the urgency of the situation”, “reasonable diligence”, “unlawful act” and “serious harm” were vague and overbroad.
[30] For the reasons that follow, we disagree. While s. 184.4 is sufficiently flexible to provide for different urgent circumstances that may arise, it is far from vague when properly construed. As Gonthier J. held for the Court in R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606, enactments are not expected to “predict the legal consequences of any given course of conduct in advance” (p. 639). Rather, they are to provide meaningful guidance about the circumstances in which they can be applied.
[31] A number of conditions and constraints are embedded in the language of s. 184.4. As noted by the trial judge, each of these conditions significantly restricts the availability of this section. These conditions incorporate implicit and strict temporal limitations.
[32] Section 184.4(a) provides that peace officers may only use this authority if they believe “on reasonable grounds” that the “urgency of the situation” is such that an authorization could not, with “reasonable diligence”, “be obtained under any other provision of this Part.”
(a) “Reasonable Grounds”
[33] Belief “on reasonable grounds” imports both a subjective and objective element. The officers must have subjective belief in the grounds justifying the actions taken and those grounds must be objectively reasonable in the circumstances. The constitutional balance between the reasonable expectation of privacy and the legitimate needs of the state in detecting and preventing crime requires an objective standard — credibly based probability: Hunter v. Southam, at pp. 166-68; R. v. Kang-Brown, 2008 SCC 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456, at paras. 75-79.
(b) “Urgency of the Situation”
[34] Davies J. construed the phrase “urgency of the situation” as follows:
. . . the phrase “urgency of the situation” cannot be read in isolation. It must be read in conjunction with the requirement that the peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe not only that the circumstances are exigent (by reason of an apprehension of the occurrence of imminent serious harm under ss. 184.4(b)), but also with the requirement to believe that prior judicial authorization could not be obtained with reasonable diligence. [para. 157]
We agree with this interpretation. As time goes by, it may be more difficult to satisfy the requirement that an authorization could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence, or that the situation is urgent and the need is immediate.
(c) “Reasonable Diligence”
[35] The term “reasonable diligence” is used in this Court’s jurisprudence and is directly tied to other constitutional rights.[4] This Court has acknowledged that exigent circumstances could permit a warrantless search where it is not “feasible” (see Hunter v. Southam, at pp. 160-61; R. v. Silveira, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297, at para. 94) or where it is “impracticable” (see R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223, at p. 241) to obtain prior judicial authorization. Davies J. noted that “reasonable diligence” under s. 184.4(a) of the Code should be construed to conform with the s. 8 Charter right to be free from “unreasonable” search or seizure (para. 163). He concluded that the only way to comply with the requirement of “reasonable diligence” is to ensure that once s. 184.4 is being used, the police take all necessary steps to obtain judicial authorization under Part VI “immediately, and with the least delay possible in the circumstances” (para. 166).
[36] In Riley (No. 1), Dambrot J. noted, at para. 23, that the “reasonable diligence” requirement “increases in significance as time goes on” and that in order to continue intercepting under s. 184.4 once intercepting has begun, “the police are compelled to immediately put in motion an effort to obtain judicial authorization with dispatch, if that is possible, or risk being out of compliance with s. 184.4” (emphasis added).
[37] There are any number of reasons why judicial authorization may not be feasible or may not be immediately available. The urgency of the underlying unlawful act and potential harm may require the full attention of the police. In addition, there may be logistical reasons such as the availability of a judge or designated judge or designated police officer; the time required to ready an application and access the judge; and the time for the judge to consider the matter and reach a decision.
[38] We do not say that police must proceed in every case with an immediate application for judicial authorization. Each case will depend on its own circumstances. However, if the police have not proceeded to seek the appropriate authorization when circumstances allow, they risk non-compliance if they continue intercepting under s. 184.4.
(d) “An Authorization . . . Under Any Other Provision of This Part”
[39] The requirement that an authorization not be available raises the very real issue of the accessibility and availability of judicial authorizations under Part VI of the Criminal Code . Davies J. suggested that police must seek an authorization under s. 188 at the same time they start preparing a s. 186 application. He contemplated an oral application under s. 188 . In Riley (No. 2), Dambrot J. concluded that s. 188 was not available without a written affidavit (para. 50).
[40] The Crown seeks guidance for the police about what steps are possible under the other provisions in the Code. This issue also bears on the constitutional analysis of the impact of s. 184.4 upon privacy interests. Obviously, the greater the availability of an authorization under s. 188 , the more circumscribed the authority to proceed unauthorized under s. 184.4. For the reasons set out below, we conclude that s. 188 is available for urgent situations without the requirement of a written affidavit. This does not, however, obviate the need for unauthorized emergency interceptions under s. 184.4.
(e) “Immediately Necessary”
[41] Section 184.4(b) authorizes wiretapping if
the peace officer believes on reasonable grounds that such an interception is immediately necessary to prevent an unlawful act that would cause serious harm to any person or to property; . . . .
[42] In Riley (No. 1), at para. 17, Dambrot J. observed that the “fundamental prerequisite to unauthorized interception is the requirement that it be immediately necessary”. In his view, the phrase “immediately necessary” connoted both a temporal and an analytical component. We agree. This requirement ensures that unauthorized interceptions are available only when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the threat of serious harm is immediate and only when it is necessary to prevent serious harm. Thus, the threat must be imminent and it must be likely that interception will be an effective means of preventing the unlawful act.
[43] However, the word “necessary” does not in our view require that unauthorized interception is the only effective means — or even the most effective means available to police. Section 184.4 is not available only as a last resort. To conclude otherwise would be to introduce an element of uncertainty that would undermine the effective use of this power by police to prevent serious harm in exigent circumstances. In a kidnapping, for example, the police may be able to pursue a number of additional effective investigative means, such as canvassing possible witnesses or using dogs to follow a scent. While the phrase “immediately necessary” ensures that this power is not available unless there is an emergency, it does not require police to exhaust all other investigative means. The section does not preclude police from pursuing all effective means available to them if they otherwise meet the strict conditions of s. 184.4.
[44] This threshold differs from that found under s. 186 of the Criminal Code , which requires that there be “no other reasonable alternative method of investigation, in the circumstances of the particular criminal inquiry” (R. v. Araujo, 2000 SCC 65, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992, at para. 29 (emphasis in original)). That is not surprising since s. 184.4 serves to prevent imminent serious harm, whereas s. 186 is an evidence-gathering tool.
(f) “Unlawful Act”
[45] In addressing the respondents’ vagueness argument, the trial judge held that the “unlawful act” referred to in s. 184.4(b) is limited to an offence enumerated in s. 183 of the Code (para. 175). Davies J. reasoned that since the section requires as a precondition to its use the reasonable belief that an authorization could not be obtained with reasonable diligence, Parliament cannot have intended to allow the unauthorized interception by the police of communications for which a judicial authorization could not be obtained.
[46] We disagree. There may be situations that would justify interceptions under s. 184.4 for unlawful acts not enumerated in s. 183. We prefer the conclusion of Dambrot J. in Riley (No. 1) that the scope of the unlawful act requirement is sufficiently, if not more, circumscribed for constitutional purposes, by the requirement that the unlawful act must be one that would cause serious harm to persons or property (para. 21). No meaningful additional protection of privacy would be gained by listing the unlawful acts that could give rise to such serious harm. The list of offences in s. 183