Canada (Attorney General) v. Almalki

Canada (Attorney General) v. Almalki
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2015-11-23
Neutral citation
2015 FC 1278
File numbers
DES-1-11
Notes
A correction was made on December 13, 2016
Reported Decision
Decision Content
Date: 20151123
Docket: DES-1-11
Citation: 2015 FC 1278
BETWEEN:
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Applicant
and
ABDULLAH ALMALKI, KHUZAIMAH KALIFAH, ABDULRAHMAN ALMALKI, by his Litigation Guardian Khuzaimah Kalifah, SAJEDA ALMALKI, by her Litigation Guardian Khuzaimah Kalifah, MUAZ ALMALKI, by his Litigation Guardian Khuzaimah Kalifah, ZAKARIYY A ALMALKI, by his Litigation Guardian Khuzaimah Kalifah, NADIM ALMALKI, FATIMA ALMALKI, AHMAD ABOU- ELMAATI, BADR ABOU-ELMAATI, SAMIRA AL-SHALLASH, RASHA ABOU-ELMAATI, MUAYYED NUREDDIN, ABDUL JABBAR NUREDDIN, FADILA SIDDIQU, MOFAK NUREDDIN, AYDIN NUREDDIN, YASHAR NUREDDIN, AHMED NUREDDIN, SARAB NUREDDIN, BYDA NUREDDIN
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MOSLEY J.
I. INTRODUCTION [1] Bill C-44, an Act to Amend the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and other Acts was introduced in the House of Commons on October 27, 2014. The Bill received Royal Assent on April 23, 2015 and was brought into force as the Protection of Canada from Terrorists Act, S.C. 2015, c. 9.
[2] The legislation amended subsection 18 (1) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-23 [CSIS Act], which makes it an offence to disclose the identity of an employee of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service [CSIS or the Service], and created a new section 18.1.
[3] Section 18.1 now provides that the identity of human sources or information that would disclose the identity of human sources is to be “kept confidential in order to protect their life and security and to encourage individuals to provide information to the Service”.
[4] This is an interlocutory decision regarding the application of these two provisions to proceedings initiated prior to the enactment of the legislation. In this matter, the Attorney General of Canada has applied for an Order with respect to the disclosure of information that is the subject of discovery proceedings in actions brought by the respondents in the Superior Court of Justice of Ontario. In those actions, Messrs. Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin, joined by members of their families, seek compensatory damages from the Government of Canada for, among other things, alleged complicity by Canadian officials, departments and agencies in their detention and torture in Syria (and Egypt, in the case of Mr. Elmaati) and breach of their rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 (the Charter).
[5]In addition to being the applicant in these proceedings, the Attorney General of Canada is also, pursuant to the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S., 1985, c. C-50, s 23, the representative defendant in the underlying civil actions on behalf of the public servants and government departments and agencies alleged to have been complicit in the harms suffered by the respondents. The application is brought in the Federal Court under section 38.04 (1) of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5 [CEA].
[6] The information which is the subject matter of this application is in the possession of departments and agencies of the Government of Canada. It has been withheld from the respondents in the discovery process pursuant to the claim of national interest privilege, a statutory prohibition on disclosure of information that would be injurious to Canada’s national defence, national security or international relations if released to the public, set out in paragraph 38.02 (1) (a) of the CEA.
[7]The Attorney General seeks to have the prohibition of disclosure based on claims of injury to the protected national interests [the s 38 claims] confirmed by the Court. Alternatively, the Attorney General requests that the Court exercise its discretion under subsection 38.06 (2) of the CEA to disclose the information in the form and subject to such conditions as are most likely to limit any injury to national security, national defence or international relations.
[8] The respondents request an order authorizing the disclosure of all information relevant to their civil actions that the applicant seeks to withhold or, in the alternative, the disclosure of summaries or substitutions that would meet the public interest including their interests in obtaining disclosure to the fullest degree possible in each case. The information they seek includes the identities of CSIS employees, and human source information that may be in the collection of documents before the Court, and if so, presently withheld from disclosure.
[9]The Court was advised by counsel for the Attorney General of Canada following the coming into force of Bill C-44 that its provisions may have some bearing on the issues before the Court in these proceedings. As a result, the Court has received oral and written submissions with regard to the interpretation and application of the new and revised legislation.
[10] It is not my intention in these reasons to refer to the test established in Ribic v Canada (Attorney General), 2003 FCT 10, affirmed 2003 FCA 246 [Ribic] with regard to disclosure of the contested information. Nor do I intend to discuss the application of the Ribic principles to the redacted identities or information that may tend to identify any CSIS employees or human sources that may be in the collection of documents before the Court. That task, if necessary, will be undertaken as part of the Court’s overall review of the disputed information which is currently underway.
[11] However, in the interests of greater transparency relating to the Court’s interpretation and application of the recent amendments, I consider it necessary to address the Court’s interpretation of the recent changes to the law in these public reasons. In doing so, I will not refer to any of the information received during the closed proceedings. These reasons do not reflect any conclusions reached with respect to the application of the Ribic test to the disputed information.
[12] In these reasons I outline the background of the application, describe the applicable legal framework, and discuss the legal arguments raised by the parties and the principles I have relied upon in determining whether the amended subsection 18 (1) and new section 18.1 ought to apply in these proceedings.
[13] For convenience, reference in these reasons to section 38 encompasses sections 38 to 38.16 of the CEA.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY [14] The respondents’ claims in the Superior Court of Justice were initiated following the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, and the consequent report (the O’Connor Inquiry Report). In his report, Mr. Justice Dennis O’Connor recommended that the cases of the three principal respondents be reviewed but in a manner more appropriate than a full-scale public inquiry because of the national security issues involved. As a result, the Honourable Frank Iacobucci, Q.C. was appointed to conduct the Internal Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Abou-Elmaati, and Muayyed Nureddin (the Iacobucci Inquiry).
[15] The proceedings before the Superior Court were held in abeyance pending the outcome of the Iacobucci Inquiry and resumed following the issuance of the Report. In April, 2009, the parties agreed to conduct mediations. To that end, in July 2009, counsel for the Attorney General disclosed approximately 486 documents to the respondents, of which 290 contained redactions. The 486 documents had been specifically requested by the respondents because of references to them in the Iacobucci Report. For reasons unknown to this Court the mediation did not proceed as planned in November 2009 and the litigation resumed. Notice was given to the Attorney General pursuant to section 38.01(1) of the CEA in January 2010 that 289 of the documents disclosed to the respondents for discovery purposes contained sensitive or potentially injurious information. This number was later reduced to 268 as the Attorney General authorized additional disclosures. A Notice of Application under subsection 38.04 (1) of the CEA was filed on February 9, 2010.
[16] The initial s 38 proceeding continued in this Court under Federal Court file number DES-1-10 leading to a public decision released in November 2010: Canada (Attorney General) v Almalki et al, 2010 FC 1106 [Almalki 2010]. A confidential Order was also issued at that time with an attached Annex listing the redacted information for which protection claims were made and the Court's decisions in relation to each claim. Disclosure of certain of the withheld information was ordered in either full text or summary form.
[17] In DES-1-10, the respondents sought disclosure of certain human source information and the names of specified CSIS employees that were redacted in the documents under review or, in the alternative, consistent aliases for those employees. With respect to the employees, they cited in particular those whose names were known publicly because they identified themselves to the respondents by leaving business cards with their names, telephone numbers and other contact information as CSIS officers.
[18] In rendering judgment on the application in DES-1-10, I accepted that that the identity of covert human sources and information provided by such sources that would tend to identify them could be subject to public interest privilege and that the Court should be conscious of the effect that a decision to order disclosure of such information might have on the recruitment of human sources. I found that the privilege was not absolute, considering the case by case analysis called for by Justice Simon Noël in Harkat (Re), 2009 FC 204.
[19] In that decision, Justice Noël applied the four fundamental conditions for extending or recognizing a common law privilege set out in Wigmore on Evidence:
1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered.
4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of the litigation.
[The New Wigmore: Evidentiary Privileges (New York: AspenLaw & Business, 2002) at 3.2.3]
[20] Justice Noël concluded, at paragraph 31, that the relationship between the Service and a covert human intelligence source in that particular case met the conditions for establishing the privilege and that the identity of the source should be protected.
[21] At paragraphs 169 and 170 of Almalki 2010, I stated the following:
However, I do not accept that the privilege should apply in every instance to persons who provide information to CSIS. The Service tends to treat virtually everyone who provides information as a confidential source whether there is any real expectation of confidentiality on the part of the source, a risk of harm to the source or likelihood that they would not be forthcoming without such assurances. This extends to employees of law enforcement agencies, public utilities and business corporations who provide information that may be publicly available. In reviewing documents for disclosure, Service officials routinely redact the names of such persons and related identifying information. In my view, the Service approach is overbroad.
I recognize that the redacted information may be of little or no relevance to the underlying proceedings. However, if relevant, as discussed above, the Court has to consider whether injury would result from disclosure and whether the privilege is justified on a case by case basis. In some instances, this will not be difficult as the circumstances relating to the recruitment and development of the source will make it clear that the information should be treated as privileged. However, the public interest in nondisclosure of the information will not in every case outweigh the public interest in disclosure. That assessment has to be made in the third and final stage of the inquiry.
[22] This discussion was based in part on the Court’s understanding of the very broad definition of “human source” employed by the Service which encompassed anyone who provided information to CSIS or otherwise facilitated its operational activities. The Service drew distinctions in its management of human sources through internal policies and procedures.
[23] The Order issued in Almalki 2010 did not authorize the disclosure of the names of CSIS employees nor the identities of human sources but did authorize the release of information in some documents from which the Attorney General argued the identity of a human source could be inferred. I was not persuaded that disclosure of the information would reveal the identity of the source. The Attorney General appealed the Order in relation to that information and information in a number of documents respecting information received from foreign agencies.
[24] The Federal Court of Appeal issued its decision in Canada (Attorney General) v Almalki et al, 2011 FCA 199 [Almalki FCA 2011]. This Court’s treatment of the privilege issue was upheld, at paragraphs 29-30, but its application to the documents in question was reversed. A motion for reconsideration was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on October 13, 2011 and an application for leave to appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Canada on January 12, 2012.
[25] No information that would identify covert human sources or the names of CSIS employees was disclosed to the respondents as a result of the Orders issued by this Court in Almalki 2010 and by the Federal Court of Appeal in Almalki FCA 2011.
[26] The current review of the claims in relation to the redacted information was initiated by Order of this Court on September 19, 2011. In that Order, the Court appointed the same two security cleared members of the private bar who had served as amici curiae in DES-1-10, Messrs. Bernard Grenier and François Dadour of Montreal. Mr Grenier resigned the appointment in 2014 and was replaced by Mr John Norris of Toronto.
[27] It is worth noting that the collection of documents in DES-1-10 was limited to a specific group identified by the respondents based on their review of the Iacobucci Report and, initially at least, was for the purpose of facilitating the mediations between the parties that were ultimately suspended. The collection of documents in DES-1-11 is much broader and encompasses all of the material within the possession of the Government of Canada that is considered by the Attorney General to be relevant to the underlying civil actions. This stems from the Attorney General’s obligation to produce documents to the respondent plaintiffs in the pre-trial discovery process. Consequently, the information contained in the documents under review in the present proceeding is much more comprehensive in relation to the facts alleged in the pleadings.
[28] The respondents submit that they have been unable to discern from the public reasons for decision of both courts in DES-1-10 the basis upon which their requests for disclosure were not given effect. They contend that the names of at least six CSIS employees are known to them because they had interactions with those employees, and further, that those names are in the public domain (on social media and in a book published about their experiences). At the relevant time, the CSIS policy for the conduct of interviews generally required members to identify themselves as employees of the Service.
[29] The respondents note that those employees may or may not be among the Attorney General’s list of 10 proposed but unnamed CSIS witnesses offered in the synopses of testimony to be led at trial.
[30] The six publicly named persons said to be CSIS employees had been added to the list of defendants in the civil actions before the Ontario Superior Court. Those names have now been withdrawn as a result of undertakings by the Attorney General that the named persons would be produced for pre-trial examination during the discovery process. Should liability ultimately be found at trial for any of their acts or omissions respecting the respondents, liability would attach to the Federal Crown vicariously.
[31] In their written and oral submissions in these proceedings, the respondents have maintained their request for disclosure of the redacted names of any CSIS employees that may appear in the collected documents or, in the alternative, consistent aliases so that they may be able to understand which anonymous employees played a significant role in the documented events.
[32] The Attorney General has consistently taken the position, on behalf of the Service, that the identification of CSIS employees – particularly those who engage in covert activities – would impair the Service’s ability to investigate threats to the security of Canada. He has also argued that identifying Service personnel could endanger their personal safety or that of their families. The Attorney General contends that this information falls within a category that the Court has consistently protected in applying the test established in Ribic, above. See for example Canada (Attorney General) v Telbani, 2014 FC 1050, at para 46.
[33] With respect to the issue of human sources, in Almalki 2010, at paras 168-170, I accepted as a general proposition that the identity of covert human sources and information provided by such sources that would tend to identify them would be subject to public interest privilege and that an order to disclose such information would have an adverse effect on the ability of CSIS to recruit such sources. I did not accept that the privilege should apply in every instance to persons who provide information to CSIS and found that the public interest in disclosure may, in some instances, outweigh that of non-disclosure.
[34] The Court of Appeal agreed that there was no class privilege for information obtained from CSIS human sources: Almalki FCA 2011, at para 34. It maintained that position in Harkat v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FCA 122, at para 93, in the context of a security certificate proceeding. That aspect of the decision was upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Harkat, 2014 SCC 37 (Harkat SCC), at para 85.
[35] In Harkat SCC, the majority of the Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Court of Appeal that the common law police informer privilege did not attach to CSIS human sources. Among other reasons cited, the majority noted that police have an incentive not to promise confidentiality except where truly necessary because doing so can make it harder to use an informer as a witness. CSIS was not so constrained in collecting intelligence. The majority observed, at paragraph 87, that it was open to Parliament to create a new class privilege should it deem it desirable that CSIS human sources’ identities and related information be privileged.
[36] During the course of the current s 38 proceedings in DES-1-11, Bill C-44 was introduced and enacted by Parliament. In light of representations made by the parties and amici, I considered that the interpretation and application of subsection 18 (1) and section 18.1 of the CSIS Act must be determined in order to complete my review. As such, I requested that the amici and the Attorney General make submissions on this issue, and ex parte oral arguments were heard in camera at the Court’s secure facilities on September 1, 2015. Written submissions filed by the amici and the Attorney General were made public and available to the respondents. Written submissions were also received from the respondents. Counsel for the Attorney General submitted a public reply and additional brief classified ex parte representations.
III. LegAL FRAMEWORK [37] When legislation is amended or replaced, provisions are often included to deal with the transition from the old law to the new law. Bill C-44 does not contain any such transitional provisions which would govern the coming into operation and effect of the amendments related to the CSIS Act. In the absence of such provisions and in conformity with subsection 5(2) of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, the date of commencement of the amendments is the day the Bill received Royal Assent, April 23, 2015.
[38] Prior to the amendments, section 18 read as follows:
18. (1) Subject to subsection (2), no person shall disclose any information that the person obtained or to which the person had access in the course of the performance by that person of duties and functions under this Act or the participation by that person in the administration or enforcement of this Act and from which the identity of
18. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), nul ne peut communiquer des informations qu’il a acquises ou auxquelles il avait accès dans l’exercice des fonctions qui lui sont conférées en vertu de la présente loi ou lors de sa participation à l’exécution ou au contrôle d’application de cette loi et qui permettraient de découvrir l’identité :
(a) any other person who is or was a confidential source of information or assistance to the Service, or
a) d’une autre personne qui fournit ou a fourni au Service des informations ou une aide à titre confidentiel;
(b) any person who is or was an employee engaged in covert operational activities of the Service can be inferred
b) d’une personne qui est ou était un employé occupé à des activités opérationnelles cachées du Service.
Exceptions
Exceptions
(2) A person may disclose information referred to in subsection (1) for the purposes of the performance of duties and functions under this Act or any other Act of Parliament or the administration or enforcement of this Act or as required by any other law or in the circumstances described in any of paragraphs 19(2)(a) to (d).
(2) La communication visée au paragraphe (1) peut se faire dans l’exercice de fonctions conférées en vertu de la présente loi ou de toute autre loi fédérale ou pour l’exécution ou le contrôle d’application de la présente loi, si une autre règle de droit l’exige ou dans les circonstances visées aux alinéas 19(2)a) à d).
Offence
Infraction
(3) Everyone who contravenes subsection (1)
(3) Quiconque contrevient au paragraphe (1) est coupable :
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years; or
a) soit d’un acte criminel et passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de cinq ans;
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
b) soit d’une infraction punissable par procédure sommaire
[39] Section 19 of the CSIS Act, which was not amended by Bill C-44, authorizes the disclosure of information obtained in the performance of the duties and functions of the Service in the circumstances described in paragraphs 19 (2) (a) to (d):
19. (1) Information obtained in the performance of the duties and functions of the Service under this Act shall not be disclosed by the Service except in accordance with this section.
19. (1) Les informations qu’acquiert le Service dans l’exercice des fonctions qui lui sont conférées en vertu de la présente loi ne peuvent être communiquées qu’en conformité avec le présent article.
Idem
Idem
(2) The Service may disclose information referred to in subsection (1) for the purposes of the performance of its duties and functions under this Act or the administration or enforcement of this Act or as required by any other law and may also disclose such information,
(2) Le Service peut, en vue de l’exercice des fonctions qui lui sont conférées en vertu de la présente loi ou pour l’exécution ou le contrôle d’application de celle-ci, ou en conformité avec les exigences d’une autre règle de droit, communiquer les informations visées au paragraphe (1). Il peut aussi les communiquer aux autorités ou personnes suivantes :
(a) where the information may be used in the investigation or prosecution of an alleged contravention of any law of Canada or a province, to a peace officer having jurisdiction to investigate the alleged contravention and to the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of the province in which proceedings in respect of the alleged contravention may be taken;
a) lorsqu’elles peuvent servir dans le cadre d’une enquête ou de poursuites relatives à une infraction présumée à une loi fédérale ou provinciale, aux agents de la paix compétents pour mener l’enquête, au procureur général du Canada et au procureur général de la province où des poursuites peuvent être intentées à l’égard de cette infraction;
(b) where the information relates to the conduct of the international affairs of Canada, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs or a person designated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the purpose;
b) lorsqu’elles concernent la conduite des affaires internationales du Canada, au ministre des Affaires étrangères ou à la personne qu’il désigne à cette fin;
(c) where the information is relevant to the defence of Canada, to the Minister of National Defence or a person designated by the Minister of National Defence for the purpose; or
c) lorsqu’elles concernent la défense du Canada, au ministre de la Défense nationale ou à la personne qu’il désigne à cette fin;
(d) where, in the opinion of the Minister, disclosure of the information to any minister of the Crown or person in the federal public administration is essential in the public interest and that interest clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that could result from the disclosure, to that minister or person.
d) lorsque, selon le ministre, leur communication à un ministre ou à une personne appartenant à l’administration publique fédérale est essentielle pour des raisons d’intérêt public et que celles-ci justifient nettement une éventuelle violation de la vie privée, à ce ministre ou à cette personne.
Report to Review Committee
Rapport au comité de surveillance
(3) The Director shall, as soon as practicable after a disclosure referred to in paragraph (2) (d) is made, submit a report to the Review Committee with respect to the disclosure.
(3) Dans les plus brefs délais possible après la communication visée à l’alinéa (2) (d), le directeur en fait rapport au comité de surveillance.
[40] In Almalki FCA 2011, above, at para 28, the Federal Court of Appeal observed that section 18 created an offence for a person to disclose the information mentioned therein, unless he or she was authorized to do so by subsection 18 (2) and section 19. The Court of Appeal further stated that section 18
...does not create an absolute prohibition against disclosure as the informer class privilege does. Indeed, subsection 18 (2) allows a person to disclose the information “as required by any other law”. This is compatible with section 38 of the Act which allows for disclosure pursuant to an order issued by a designated judge in the exercise of the discretion conferred by that section.
[41] With the enactment of Bill C-44, section 19 remains unchanged. Section 18 was amended as follows:
Offence to disclose identity
Infraction — communication de l’identité
18. (1) Subject to subsection (2), no person shall knowingly disclose any information that they obtained or to which they had access in the course of the performance of their duties and functions under this Act or their participation in the administration or enforcement of this Act and from which could be inferred the identity of an employee who was, is or is likely to become engaged in covert operational activities of the Service or the identity of a person who was an employee engaged in such activities.
18. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), nul ne peut sciemment communiquer des informations qu’il a acquises ou auxquelles il avait accès dans l’exercice des fonctions qui lui sont conférées en vertu de la présente loi ou lors de sa participation à l’exécution ou au contrôle d’application de cette loi et qui permettraient de découvrir l’identité d’un employé qui a participé, participe ou pourrait vraisemblablement participer à des activités opérationnelles cachées du Service ou l’identité d’une personne qui était un employé et a participé à de telles activités.
Exceptions
Exceptions
(2) A person may disclose information referred to in subsection (1) for the purposes of the performance of duties and functions under this Act or any other Act of Parliament or the administration or enforcement of this Act or as required by any other law or in the circumstances described in any of paragraphs 19(2)(a) to (d).
(2) La communication visée au paragraphe (1) peut se faire dans l’exercice de fonctions conférées en vertu de la présente loi ou de toute autre loi fédérale ou pour l’exécution ou le contrôle d’application de la présente loi, si une autre règle de droit l’exige ou dans les circonstances visées aux alinéas 19(2)a) à d).
Offence
Infraction
(3) Everyone who contravenes subsection (1)
(3) Quiconque contrevient au paragraphe (1) est coupable :
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years; or
a) soit d’un acte criminel et passible d’un emprisonnement maximal de cinq ans;
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction
b) soit d’une infraction punissable par procédure sommaire.
[42] Bill C-44 thus maintained the offence of disclosing information about a CSIS employee in subsection 18 (1), with changes. It removed the offence of disclosing information about a CSIS source and amended the English version to include the requirement that the offence be committed knowingly, presumably to reflect the constitutional requirement of mens rea for criminal offences, and clarified that the offence related to information from which the identity of an employee who was, is or is likely to become engaged in Service covert operational activities could be inferred or the identity of a person who was a Service employee engaged in such activities. The French version was also amended in similar terms. Both versions now more clearly provide that the scope of the offence is limited to persons employed by CSIS or otherwise associated with the enforcement of the CSIS Act. The section no longer prohibits the disclosure of the identity of a confidential source of information or assistance to the Service.
[43] At the same time, a new section 18.1 was created by Bill C-44. In the words of the Bill’s sponsor, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the purpose of this amendment is to “give greater protection to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s human sources”: Bill C-44, summary.
[44] The new section 18.1 reads as follows:
Human Sources
Sources humaines
18.1 (1) The purpose of this section is to ensure that the identity of human sources is kept confidential in order to protect their life and security and to encourage individuals to provide information to the Service
18.1 (1) Le présent article vise à préserver l’anonymat des sources humaines afin de protéger leur vie et leur sécurité et d’encourager les personnes physiques à fournir des informations au Service.
Prohibition on disclosure
Interdiction de communication
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (8), no person shall, in a proceeding before a court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the production of information, disclose the identity of a human source or any information from which the identity of a human source could be inferred.
(2) Sous réserve des paragraphes (3) et (8), dans une instance devant un tribunal, un organisme ou une personne qui ont le pouvoir de contraindre à la production d’informations, nul ne peut communiquer l’identité d’une source humaine ou toute information qui permettrait de découvrir cette identité
Exception - consent
Exception - consentement
(3) The identity of a human source or information from which the identity of a human source could be inferred may be disclosed in a proceeding referred to in subsection (2) if the human source and the Director consent to the disclosure of that information.
(3) L’identité d’une source humaine ou une information qui permettrait de découvrir cette identité peut être communiquée dans une instance visée au paragraphe (2) si la source humaine et le directeur y consentent.
Application to judge
Demande-à-un-juge
(4) A party to a proceeding referred to in subsection (2), an amicus curiae who is appointed in respect of the proceeding or a person who is appointed to act as a special advocate if the proceeding is under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act may apply to a judge for one of the following orders if it is relevant to the proceeding:
(4) La partie à une instance visée au paragraphe (2), l’amicus curiae nommé dans cette instance ou l’avocat spécial nommé sous le régime de la Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés peut demander à un juge de déclarer, par ordonnance, si une telle déclaration est pertinente dans l’instance :
(a) an order declaring that an individual is not a human source or that information is not information from which the identity of a human source could be inferred; or
a) qu’une personne physique n’est pas une source humaine ou qu’une information ne permettrait pas de découvrir l’identité d’une source humaine;
(b) if the proceeding is a prosecution of an offence, an order declaring that the disclosure of the identity of a human source or information from which the identity of a human source could be inferred is essential to establish the accused’s innocence and that it may be disclosed in the proceeding.
b) dans le cas où l’instance est une poursuite pour infraction, que la communication de l’identité d’une source humaine ou d’une information qui permettrait de découvrir cette identité est essentielle pour établir l’innocence de l’accusé et que cette communication peut être faite dans la poursuite.
Contents and service of application
Contenu et signification de la demande
(5) The application and the applicant’s affidavit deposing to the facts relied on in support of the application shall be filed in the Registry of the Federal Court. The applicant shall, without delay after the application and affidavit are filed, serve a copy of them on the Attorney General of Canada.
(5) La demande et l’affidavit du demandeur portant sur les faits sur lesquels il fonde celle-ci sont déposés au greffe de la Cour fédérale. Sans délai après le dépôt, le demandeur signifie copie de la demande et de l’affidavit au procureur général du Canada
Attorney General of Canada
Procureur général du Canada
(6) Once served, the Attorney General of Canada is deemed to be a party to the application.
(6) Le procureur général du Canada est réputé être partie à la demande dès que celle-ci lui est signifiée.
Hearing
Audition
(7) The hearing of the application shall be held in private and in the absence of the applicant and their counsel, unless the judge orders otherwise.
(7) La demande est entendue à huis clos et en l’absence du demandeur et de son avocat, sauf si le juge en ordonne autrement.
Order — disclosure to establish innocence
Ordonnance de communication pour établir l’innocence
(8) If the judge grants an application made under paragraph (4)(b), the judge may order the disclosure that the judge considers appropriate subject to any conditions that the judge specifies.
(8) Si le juge accueille la demande présentée au titre de l’alinéa (4)b), il peut ordonner la communication qu’il estime indiquée sous réserve des conditions qu’il précise.
Effective date of order
Prise d’effet de l’ordonnance
(9) If the judge grants an application made under subsection (4), any order made by the judge does not take effect until the time provided to appeal the order has expired or, if the order is appealed and is confirmed, until either the time provided to appeal the judgement confirming the order has expired or all rights of appeal have been exhausted.
(9) Si la demande présentée au titre du paragraphe (4) est accueillie, l’ordonnance prend effet après l’expiration du délai prévu pour en appeler ou, en cas d’appel, après sa confirmation et l’épuisement des recours en appel.
Confidentiality
Confidentialité
(10) The judge shall ensure the confidentiality of the following:
(10) Il incombe au juge de garantir la confidentialité :
(a) the identity of any human source and any information from which the identity of a human source could be inferred; and
a) d’une part, de l’identité de toute source humaine ainsi que de toute information qui permettrait de découvrir cette identité;
(b) information and other evidence provided in respect of the application if, in the judge’s opinion, its disclosure would be injurious to national security or endanger the safety of any person.
b) d’autre part, des informations et autres éléments de preuve qui lui sont fournis dans le cadre de la demande et dont la communication porterait atteinte, selon lui, à la sécurité nationale ou à la sécurité d’autrui.
Confidentiality on appeal
Confidentialité en appel
(11) In the case of an appeal, subsection (10) applies, with any necessary modifications, to the court to which the appeal is taken.
(11) En cas d’appel, le paragraphe (10) s’applique, avec les adaptations nécessaires, aux tribunaux d’appel.
[45] “Human source” is defined in s 2 of the CSIS Act as follows:
“Human source” means an individual who, after having received a promise of confidentiality, has provided, provides or is likely to provide information to the Service;
« source humaine » Personne physique qui a reçu une promesse d’anonymat et qui, par la suite, a fourni, fournit ou pourrait vraisemblablement fournir des informations au Service.
IV. THE ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED [46] The issues to be determined are as follows:
1) Does subsection 18 (1) of the CSIS Act prohibit the disclosure of CSIS employees’ identities under s 38 of the CEA.
2) Does the statutory human source privilege established through the enactment of section 18.1 of the CSIS Act apply to the information at issue in these proceedings?
V. DISCUSSION A. Interpretation and application of section 18 (1) [47] The parties are generally in agreement on this issue. The Attorney General acknowledges that subsection 18 (1) does not bind the Court so as to preclude the disclosure of the names of Service employees under s 38 should the Court find that it is necessary to do so in the public interest. Subsection 18 (1) applies only to CSIS employees or others involved “in the administration or enforcement” of the CSIS Act, not to the Courts or other sources of official disclosure acting under other lawful authority such as s 38.
[48] The parties differ over what weight, if any, the enactment of subsection 18 (1) should be given under the Ribic test. The Attorney General asks the Court to recognize that subsection 18 (1) is a strong expression of Parliament’s intent to protect the names of CSIS employees, and that this should weigh heavily in the Court’s analysis at the balancing stage of the Ribic test. The respondents contend that it is incorrect to assert that disclosure of the identities of all CSIS employees would be potentially injurious.
[49] The application of the previous version of section 18 to the public identification of a CSIS employee was raised in Jaballah (Re), 2009 FC 279. In that matter, the Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness requested that a Service witness be permitted to testify in public identified only by their first name for “operational security reasons”. At the outset of he