Ryan v. Moore

Ryan v. Moore
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2005-06-16
Neutral citation
2005 SCC 38
Report
[2005] 2 SCR 53
Case number
29849
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; Major, John C.; Bastarache, Michel; LeBel, Louis; Deschamps, Marie; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Charron, Louise
On appeal from
Newfoundland and Labrador
Subjects
Action
Evidence
Notes
SCC Case Information: 29849
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Ryan v. Moore, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 53, 2005 SCC 38
Date: 20050616
Docket: 29849
Between:
Cabot Insurance Company Limited
and Rex Gilbert Moore, deceased,
by his Administratix, Muriel Smith
Appellants
v.
Peter Ryan
Respondent
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Major, Bastarache, LeBel, Deschamps, Abella and Charron JJ.
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 80)
Bastarache J. (McLachlin C.J. and Major, LeBel, Deschamps, Abella and Charron JJ. concurring)
______________________________
Ryan v. Moore, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 53, 2005 SCC 38
Cabot Insurance Company Limited
and Rex Gilbert Moore, deceased,
by his Administratrix, Muriel Smith Appellants
v.
Peter Ryan Respondent
Indexed as: Ryan v. Moore
Neutral citation: 2005 SCC 38.
File No.: 29849.
2004: December 7; 2005: June 16.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Major, Bastarache, LeBel, Deschamps, Abella and Charron JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal of newfoundland and labrador
Limitation of actions — Survival of action against deceased — Limitation periods — Estoppel by convention — Estoppel by representation — Discoverability rule — Confirmation of cause of action — Limitation period under Survival of Actions Act expiring one year after death of party to action or six months after date when letters of administration granted — Statement of claim for damages in relation to motor vehicle accident issued against defendant within two‑year limitation period prescribed by Limitations Act — Defendant’s death unknown to plaintiff until after shorter limitation period in Survival of Actions Act had expired — Whether doctrine of estoppel by convention or by representation applicable to prevent defendant from raising limitation defence — Whether confirmation of cause of action or discoverability rule applicable to extend limitation period of Survival of Actions Act — Survival of Actions Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. S‑32, s. 5 — Limitations Act, S.N.L. 1995, c. L‑16.1, ss. 5, 16.
Estoppel — Estoppel by convention — Requirements — Whether requirements of doctrine of estoppel by convention met.
Estoppel — Estoppel by representation — Limitation of actions — Whether defendant’s silence regarding shorter limitation period constitutes representation grounding estoppel.
On November 27, 1997, three vehicles operated by the respondent R, the appellant M, and a third party were involved in an accident. R decided to pursue a personal injury claim against M. He was unaware that, on December 26, 1998, M had died of causes unrelated to the accident. On February 16, 1999, Letters of Administration were granted to M’s administratrix. On October 28, 1999, R issued his statement of claim naming M as the defendant; it was within the two‑year limitation period prescribed by the Limitations Act, but outside the limitation period under the Survival of Actions Act, namely one year after the death of a party to an action or six months after letters of administration are granted. The appellant insurer sought an order striking out the statement of claim for being out of time. R also filed an application to amend the name of the defendant in the statement of claim. The Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador denied the insurer’s application to have the action dismissed and granted R’s application. The Court of Appeal allowed, in part, both the appeal and cross‑appeal, concluding that the Survival of Actions Act applied to the action, but that the appellants were nevertheless estopped from relying upon the shorter limitation period.
Held: The appeal should be allowed on the issue of estoppel and the statement of claim struck out. The decision of the Court of Appeal should otherwise be affirmed. There are no reasons based on any legal doctrine to preclude M’s estate or the insurer from relying on the Survival of Actions Act limitation period.
The discoverability rule does not apply to the Survival of Actions Act. This rule cannot be relied on where, as here, the limitation period is explicitly linked by the governing legislation to a fixed event unrelated to the injured party’s knowledge or the basis of the cause of action. By using a specific event as the starting point of the “limitation clock” under the Survival of Actions Act, the legislature displaced the discoverability rule in all situations to which the Survival of Actions Act applies. [24‑25] [27]
Section 16 of the Limitations Act does not apply to the Survival of Actions Act either. Any confirmation of the cause of action would have no effect on the Survival of Actions Act limitation period because the Survival of Actions Act does not create a cause of action but simply confers a right to pursue a claim notwithstanding the fact that one of the parties has died. In any event, there was no confirmation of the cause of action in this case, as there was no admission of liability through the letters sent between the parties’ representatives or through the payments made by the insurer to R’s counsel for property damage or for medical reports. The letters and payments were intended only to promote the investigation and early resolution of certain aspects of the claim. [37] [42] [45‑48]
The requirements to establish estoppel by convention — a communicated shared assumption between the parties, reliance on the shared assumption and detriment — are not met. None of the letters exchanged by R’s counsel and the adjuster with respect to R’s personal injury claim prove the existence of a common assumption that M was alive or that the limitation defence would not be relied on. The letters lack clarity and certainty. Even if one could conclude that there was a mutual assumption between the parties, it cannot realistically be asserted that R communicated to the appellants that he shared the mistaken assumption. Moreover, R not only did not rely on the alleged assumption, but his conduct does not show an intention to affect the legal relations between the parties. The record does not disclose that R changed his position in any way on the basis of this alleged mutual assumption. Rather, the evidence suggests that he never put his mind to the shorter Survival of Actions Act limitation period. Given that there was no shared assumption or reliance, the detriment requirement does not need to be addressed. It should be noted, however, that a detriment is not established by a reduced limitation period. [63‑66] [70‑72] [75]
Finally, R cannot rely on estoppel by representation. Estoppel by representation cannot arise from silence unless a party is under a duty to speak. In the present case, there was no duty on the appellants to advise R of a limitation period, to assist him in the prosecution of the claim, or to advise him of the consequences of the death of one of the parties. [76‑77]
Cases Cited
Referred to: Central Trust Co. v. Rafuse, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 147; Page v. Austin (1884), 10 S.C.R. 132; Kamloops (City of) v. Nielsen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2; M. (K.) v. M. (H.), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6; Peixeiro v. Haberman, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 549; Fehr v. Jacob (1993), 14 C.C.L.T. (2d) 200; Snow v. Kashyap (1995), 125 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 182; Payne v. Brady (1996), 140 D.L.R. (4th) 88, leave to appeal refused, [1997] 2 S.C.R. xiii; Burt v. LeLacheur (2000), 189 D.L.R. (4th) 193; Waschkowski v. Hopkinson Estate (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 370; Canadian Red Cross Society (Re), [2003] O.J. No. 5669 (QL); Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada (No. 1) (2000), 48 O.R. (3d) 321; MacKenzie Estate v. MacKenzie (1992), 84 Man. R. (2d) 149; Justice v. Cairnie Estate (1993), 105 D.L.R. (4th) 501; Good v. Parry, [1963] 2 All E.R. 59; Surrendra Overseas Ltd. v. Government of Sri Lanka, [1977] 2 All E.R. 481; Podovinikoff v. Montgomery (1984), 14 D.L.R. (4th) 716; Wheaton v. Palmer (2001), 205 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 304; MacKay v. Lemley (1997), 44 B.C.L.R. (3d) 382; Harper v. Cameron (1892), 2 B.C.R. 365; Amalgamated Investment & Property Co. (In Liquidation) v. Texas Commerce Intenational Bank Ltd., [1982] 1 Q.B. 84; National Westminster Finance NZ Ltd. v. National Bank of NZ Ltd., [1996] 1 N.Z.L.R. 548; The “Indian Grace”, [1998] 1 Lloyd’s L.R. 1; The “August Leonhardt”, [1985] 2 Lloyd’s L.R. 28; The “Vistafjord”, [1988] 2 Lloyd’s L.R. 343; Canacemal Investment Inc. v. PCI Realty Corp., [1999] B.C.J. No. 2029 (QL); Capro Investments Ltd. v. Tartan Development Corp., [1998] O.J. No. 1763 (QL); Troop v. Gibson, [1986] 1 E.G.L.R. 1; Hillingdon London Borough v. ARC Ltd., [2000] E.W.J. No. 3278 (QL); Baird Textile Holdings Ltd. v. Marks & Spencer plc, [2002] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 737, [2001] EWCA Civ 274; John v. George, [1995] E.W.J. No. 4375 (QL); Seechurn v. ACE Insurance S.A.‑N.V., [2002] 2 Lloyd’s L.R. 390, [2002] EWCA Civ 67; Litwin Construction (1973) Ltd. v. Pan (1988), 52 D.L.R. (4th) 459; Vancouver City Savings Credit Union v. Norenger Development (Canada) Inc., [2002] B.C.J. No. 1417 (QL), 2002 BCSC 934; 32262 B.C. Ltd. v. Companions Restaurant Inc. (1995), 17 B.L.R. (2d) 227; Grundt v. Great Boulder Proprietary Gold Mines Ltd. (1937), 59 C.L.R. 641; Queen v. Cognos Inc., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 87.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. F‑6.
Limitations Act, S.N.L. 1995, c. L‑16.1, ss. 5, 16.
Survival of Actions Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. S‑32, ss. 2, 5, 8(1).
Authors Cited
Bower, George Spencer. The Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation, 4th ed. by P. Feltham, D. Hochberg and T. Leech. London: LexisNexis UK, 2004.
Chitty on Contracts, vol. 1, 29th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004.
Dawson, T. Brettel. “Estoppel and obligation: the modern role of estoppel by convention” (1989), 9 L.S. 16.
Fridman, G. H. L. The Law of Contract in Canada, 4th ed. Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1999.
Mew, Graeme. The Law of Limitations, 2nd ed. Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2004.
Wilken, Sean. Wilken and Villiers: The Law of Waiver, Variation and Estoppel, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal (Wells C.J.N. and Cameron, Roberts and Welsh JJ.A., and Russell J. (ex officio)) (2003), 224 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 181, 669 A.P.R. 181, 50 E.T.R. (2d) 8, [2003] N.J. No. 113 (QL), 2003 NLCA 19, reversing, in part, a decision of Orsborn J. (2001), 205 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 211, 615 A.P.R. 211, 18 C.P.C. (5th) 95, 41 E.T.R. (2d) 287, 19 M.V.R. (4th) 120, [2001] N.J. No. 284 (QL). Appeal allowed.
Sandra R. Chaytor and Jorge P. Segovia, for the appellants.
Ian F. Kelly, Q.C., and Gregory A. French, for the respondent.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
1 Bastarache J. — We are asked to decide whether or not a shortened limitation period under s. 5 of the Survival of Actions Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. S-32 (see Appendix), applicable upon the death of one of the parties to an action, can be enforced against a party who had no knowledge of the death until after the limitation period had expired. The respondent, Peter Ryan (“Ryan”), argues that the answer should be no; he invoked in front of our Court and in the courts below a number of legal principles which I shall address: discoverability, confirmation, estoppel by convention and estoppel by representation. The issue of estoppel was raised for the first time by the Court of Appeal itself.
2 The discoverability rule dictates that a cause of action arises for purposes of a limitation period when the material facts on which it is based have been discovered or ought to have been discovered by the plaintiff by the exercise of reasonable diligence (Central Trust Co. v. Rafuse, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 147, at p. 224).
3 Section 16(1) of the Limitations Act, S.N.L. 1995, c. L-16.1 (see Appendix), prescribes that confirmation of a cause of action occurs when a person acknowledges the cause of action of another person or makes a payment in respect of that cause of action. Thus, at that moment, the limitation clock is restarted, and the time before the date of the confirmation will not be counted.
4 Estoppel by convention operates where the parties have agreed that certain facts are deemed to be true and to form the basis of the transaction into which they are about to enter (G. H. L. Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada (4th ed. 1999), at p. 140, note 302). If they have acted upon the agreed assumption, then, as regards that transaction, each is estopped against the other from questioning the truth of the statement of facts so assumed if it would be unjust to allow one to go back on it (G. S. Bower, The Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation (4th ed. 2004), at pp. 7-8).
5 Estoppel by representation requires a positive representation made by the party whom it is sought to bind, with the intention that it shall be acted on by the party with whom he or she is dealing, the latter having so acted upon it as to make it inequitable that the party making the representation should be permitted to dispute its truth, or do anything inconsistent with it (Page v. Austin (1884), 10 S.C.R. 132, at p. 164).
6 None of these doctrines can find application in the present case. I will address each of these doctrines and in most cases adopt the reasons of the Court of Appeal with mere comment. One legal concept requires more attention from this Court, given that it is being asked to develop a legal test with regard to its application: estoppel by convention.
I. Background
A. Facts
7 On November 27, 1997, three vehicles were involved in an accident. They were operated by the respondent, Ryan, the appellant, Rex Gilbert Moore, and a third party (not involved in this matter), David Crummey. Ryan decided to pursue a personal injury claim against Moore. He was unaware that, on December 26, 1998, Moore had died of causes unrelated to the accident. On February 16, 1999, Letters of Administration were granted to Moore’s administratrix, Muriel Smith. On October 28, 1999, Ryan issued his statement of claim; it was within the two-year limitation period prescribed by the Limitations Act, but outside the applicable six-month limitation period from the granting of the letters of administration under the Survival of Actions Act. Ryan argues that the appellant is estopped from relying upon the shorter limitation period. Alternatively, he argues that the discoverability principle or the confirmation rule apply to extend this shorter limitation period.
8 As this case is centred on issues related to limitation periods, it is important to recollect the important events leading up to this litigation:
November 27, 1997
November 28, 1997
December 1997 – December 1998
December 26, 1998
January 25, 1999
February 16, 1999
April 5, 1999
July 29, 1999
August 16, 1999
October 28, 1999
February 10, 2000
March 2, 2000
May 18, 2000
September 22, 2000
October 24, 2000
November 9, 2000
The accident
Cabot Insurance Co. (“Cabot Insurance”) appoints adjuster Brian Lacey to look after the claim against its insured Moore. Ryan retains counsel who contacts the adjuster advising of his retainer and that Ryan, while his injuries are being assessed, will pursue his property damage claim directly with the adjuster.
Cabot Insurance pays Ryan’s property damage claim directly to him. Correspondence is exchanged between Ryan’s counsel and the adjuster concerning Ryan’s medical condition, the adjuster seeking documentation and updates on Ryan’s condition, and the counsel providing the information requested. The counsel forwards Ryan’s hospital chart to the adjuster, for which Cabot Insurance reimburses counsel the $40 fee.
Moore dies at age 75 from causes unrelated to the accident.
The adjuster writes to Ryan’s counsel seeking medical information and reiterating that the insurer would pay a reasonable fee for a medical report. He refers to Moore as “Our Insured”.
Letters of Administration of the Estate of Rex Moore are granted to Muriel Smith.
Ryan’s counsel forwards to the adjuster an invoice for a medical report of Ryan’s examination by an orthopaedic surgeon.
The adjuster forwards to Ryan’s counsel a cheque for payment of the medical report. The cheque is payable to Dr. Landells. He refers to Moore as “Our Insured”.
Six months have passed since the grant of letters of administration of Moore’s estate.
The statement of claim is issued naming Rex Moore as defendant.
Ryan’s counsel writes to the adjuster seeking payment for the cost of obtaining the chart from Ryan’s family physician. He refers to Moore as “Your Insured”.
Ryan’s counsel writes to the adjuster requesting payment for the chart of another physician. He refers to Moore as “Your Insured”.
The adjuster learns of Moore’s death.
Ryan’s counsel learns of Moore’s death after attempting to serve the statement of claim.
Ryan’s counsel suggests to Cabot Insurance’s claims examiner, Valerie Moore, in a meeting (to discuss claims unrelated to this case) that there might be a problem with the limitation period.
Cabot Insurance refuses to settle Ryan’s claim because the action is outside the limitation period.
9 Cabot Insurance applied to intervene in the proceedings and sought an order striking out the statement of claim for being out of time. It further claimed that the statement of claim naming a dead person as defendant was a nullity and was not capable of being amended. Ryan also filed an application to amend the statement of claim to describe the defendant as “Rex Moore, Deceased, by his administratrix, Muriel Smith”.
B. Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador (2001), 205 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 211
10 At the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador, Orsborn J. denied Cabot Insurance’s application to have the action dismissed. First, he held that the discoverability rule did not apply to postpone the running of the Survival of Actions Act limitation period, since the fact of death was not an element of the cause of action and was not required to complete the cause of action (paras. 50-51). Second, Orsborn J. held that the confirmation provisions of s. 16 of the Limitations Act are not expressly confined to the limitation periods fixed by the Limitations Act. He saw no reason in principle why a cause of action continued under the Survival of Actions Act could not be confirmed and the limitation period fixed by that Act thus continued. He concluded that Cabot Insurance’s payment for the medical report on July 29, 1999 constituted a confirmation of Ryan’s cause of action. Since the action was commenced within six months of this payment, the proceeding was still within the short Survival of Actions Act limitation period and was not statute barred (paras. 52-63). Third, Orsborn J. concluded that in any event, on the facts of this case, the cause of action against Moore was not a cause of action to which the Survival of Actions Act applies. The Survival of Actions Act permits a cause of action to survive “for the benefit of or against” an estate (s. 2(b)). The Survival of Actions Act deals with the potential acquisition or dissipation of estate assets. However, in this case, Ryan’s claim poses no risk to the assets of the estate. Instead, the risk lies on the insurer. Moore was a defendant in name only, and the real party to the action was the insurer. Thus, Ryan’s cause of action was not extinguished on Moore’s death (paras. 66-76). Fourth, Orsborn J. held that if Ryan’s cause of action had not been confirmed and if the Survival of Actions Act was indeed applicable (which he held it was not), then the action would have been a nullity for being commenced outside the limitation period. However, as this was not the case, the plaintiff was not statute barred.
C. Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador (2003), 224 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 181, 2003 NLCA 19
(1) Wells C.J. (for the majority)
11 The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed, in part, both the appeal and cross-appeal. The applications judge’s order to permit the intervention of Cabot Insurance and the amendment of the statement of claim was affirmed. Wells C.J. held that the applications judge made no error in considering the existence of insurance in determining whether or not the action posed a financial risk to the estate. He nevertheless held that the applications judge erred in holding that the cause of action against Moore is a cause of action to which the Survival of Actions Act did not apply. The court explained that unless the Survival of Actions Act applies, the action will be a nullity. The right to institute a tort action after death, or continue an action after death, derives from the statute. Without such a statute, this right does not otherwise exist.
12 The majority agreed with the applications judge that the discoverability rule does not apply to postpone the running of the limitation period under the Survival of Actions Act. Concluding that the limitation period in the statute runs from an event that occurs without regard to the injured party’s knowledge, the majority deemed that allowing the application of the discoverability rule would disrupt the exception to the common law rule, the courts thereby intruding into the legislature’s jurisdiction.
13 The majority disagreed with Orsborn J.’s holding that the confirmation provisions of the Limitations Act also apply to the limitation period under the Survival of Actions Act. Wells C.J. held that s. 16 of the Limitations Act provides confirmation of a cause of action and not of the right to commence it. The majority pointed out that the nature of the cause of action, or whether it is confirmed, is not relevant to the date of death or of grant of probate which triggers the limitation period created by the Survival of Actions Act. Confirmation did not arise in relation to the limitation period stemming from the Limitations Act because the statement of claim was issued within two years of the collision, i.e. within the prescribed delay.
14 Turning to the last issue, the majority held that Moore’s estate and Cabot Insurance were barred by the principle of estoppel from relying on the fact of Moore’s death and the granting of letters of administration. The particular form of estoppel invoked was estoppel by convention. Wells C.J., having reviewed Canadian and foreign authorities and decisions, concluded that estoppel by convention was established (para. 79). The majority held that detrimental reliance was not required. Consequently, Cabot Insurance and Moore were estopped from pleading that Moore died or that letters of administration were granted prior to May 2000 in order to invoke the shorter Survival of Actions Act limitation period. As a result, nullity could not be established and the statement of claim was amended to name the administratrix of Moore as defendant in the action.
(2) Cameron J.A. (dissenting)
15 In dissenting reasons, concurred in by Welsh J.A., Cameron J.A. disagreed with the estoppel analysis and held that it did not apply to the case at bar. After analysing case law and doctrine, she concluded that mutual misunderstanding (both parties assuming that Moore was alive) did not amount to a common assumption. The dissenting judges did not find that the letters sent by Cabot Insurance to Ryan’s counsel referring to “Our Insured: Rex Moore” formed the basis on which the parties governed their conduct. The failure to commence the action within the Survival of Actions Act’s limitation period was not due to any arrangement between the parties, and consequently, there was no reliance on any convention. Therefore, this principle did not apply. Ryan’s action was therefore time barred. The dissenting judges would have allowed the appeal.
II. Analysis
A. Discoverability
(1) Statutory Limitation Periods
16 The situation here is governed by two limitation periods: s. 5 of the Limitations Act (see Appendix) and s. 5 of the Survival of Actions Act. The limitation period in s. 5 of the Limitations Act applies initially. Section 5 of the Survival of Actions Act superimposes itself on s. 5 at a later point in time, but does not eliminate it. This follows from the fact that the Survival of Actions Act does not create a new cause of action, as will be explained later.
17 Pursuant to s. 5 of the Limitations Act, a person can bring an action for damages in respect of injury based on contract or tort within two years of the date on which the right to do so arose. Ryan, by issuing a statement of claim on October 28, 1999, naming Rex Moore as the defendant, therefore, met the prescribed limitation period in the Limitations Act. Nevertheless, unknown to the parties, Rex Moore had died on December 26, 1998, altering the fact scenario.
18 As stated by the Court of Appeal, it is well known that at common law a personal action in tort is extinguished on the death of the victim or the wrongdoer: actio personalis moritur cum persona (see G. Mew, The Law of Limitations (2nd ed. 2004), at p. 253). Being unable to sue the estate of a deceased tortfeasor was particularly severe as it left injured survivors of motor vehicle accidents without any means of recovery. This led legislatures to enact statutes to diminish the hardship of the common law rule. The Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. F-6, and the Survival of Actions Act were such statutes. Under the Fatal Accidents Act, the estate of a person who died as a result of the accident, or the survivors of that person, are accorded the right to maintain an action for death by wrongful act. Also, pursuant to s. 2 of the Survival of Actions Act (see Appendix), an action vested in or existing against a person who has died can be maintained by or against the deceased person’s estate. However, s. 5 of the Survival of Actions Act prohibits an action brought six months after letters of probate or administration of the estate of the deceased have been granted, and after the expiration of one year from the date of death. Hence, the provision is meant to keep the action “alive” for a specific period of time. The Survival of Actions Act imposes an additional limitation period. As eloquently affirmed by Orsborn J., the Survival of Actions Act does not create a cause of action. It grafts its provision onto an existing cause of action, one which is complete in all of its elements before the operation of the Survival of Actions Act (para. 45).
19 In the case at bar, the Survival of Actions Act has the effect of shortening the time period within which the action could be taken because “an action founded in tort may only be taken by or against the estate of a deceased person if it is commenced within that period of time that is common to both limitations periods”: per Wells C.J., at para. 37.
20 Ryan argues that the Survival of Actions Act contemplates that a cause of action can arise under the Survival of Actions Act. I fail to see how the expression “[c]auses of action under this Act” or “an action . . . under this Act” found in ss. 8(1) and 5 respectively can be seen to indicate the creation of a new cause of action. The Survival of Actions Act expressly contemplates the survival of causes of action existing against a person who has died (s. 2). I take that to mean that the cause of action existed prior to the application of the Survival of Actions Act. The survival of a cause of action for a time and its creation are two different things.
(2) Discoverability: The Judge-Made Rule
21 The debate concerning the use of the discoverability principle in tort actions has been settled by this Court in Kamloops (City of) v. Nielsen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2, Central Trust and M. (K.) v. M. (H.), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6.
22 The discoverability principle provides that “a cause of action arises for purposes of a limitation period when the material facts on which it is based have been discovered or ought to have been discovered by the plaintiff by the exercise of reasonable diligence”: Central Trust, at p. 224. In some provinces, the discoverability rule has been codified by statute; in others, it has been deemed redundant because of other remedial provisions.
23 While discoverability has been qualified in the past as a “general rule” (Central Trust, at p. 224; Peixeiro v. Haberman, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 549, at para. 36), it must not be applied systematically without a thorough balancing of competing interests (Peixeiro, at para. 34). The rule is an interpretative tool for construing limitation statutes. I agree with the Manitoba Court of Appeal when it writes:
In my opinion, the judge‑made discoverability rule is nothing more than a rule of construction. Whenever a statute requires an action to be commenced within a specified time from the happening of a specific event, the statutory language must be construed. When time runs from “the accrual of the cause of action” or from some other event which can be construed as occurring only when the injured party has knowledge of the injury sustained, the judge‑made discoverability rule applies. But, when time runs from an event which clearly occurs without regard to the injured party’s knowledge, the judge‑made discoverability rule may not extend the period the legislature has prescribed. [Emphasis added.]
(Fehr v. Jacob (1993), 14 C.C.L.T. (2d) 200, at p. 206)
See also Peixeiro, at para. 37; Snow v. Kashyap (1995), 125 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 182 (Nfld. C.A.).
24 Thus, the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador is correct in stating that the rule is “generally” applicable where the commencement of the limitation period is related by the legislation to the arising or accrual of the cause of action. The law does not permit resort to the judge‑made discoverability rule when the limitation period is explicitly linked by the governing legislation to a fixed event unrelated to the injured party’s knowledge or the basis of the cause of action (see Mew, at p. 55).
(3) Discoverability Principle Does Not Apply to the Survival of Actions Act
25 Ryan submits that the discoverability rule applies to the limitation period contained in s. 5 of the Survival of Actions Act. He argues that the limitation period should not begin to run until he knew, or ought reasonably to have known, the material facts which determine (i) his cause of action under the Survival of Actions Act and (ii) the limitation period. In sum, Ryan claims that the death of Moore is integral to the cause of action and that the limitation period should not start to run until he knew that he had a cause of action against the estate of Rex Moore. The appellants submit that the discoverability rule does not apply to the Survival of Actions Act as it would transcend the logic of statutory interpretation and the scheme enacted by the legislature. In addition, they say that the rule does not apply where time runs from a fixed event.
26 Like the Court of Appeal, I am of the view that the appellants’ position is correct. For ease of reference, I reproduce s. 5 of the Survival of Actions Act:
5. An action shall not be brought under this Act unless proceedings are started within 6 months after letters of probate or administration of the estate of the deceased have been granted and proceedings shall not be started in an action under this Act after the expiration of 1 year after the date of death of the deceased.
27 Pursuant to the Survival of Actions Act, the limitation period is triggered by the death of the defendant or the granting by a court of the letters of administration or probate. The section is clear and explicit: time begins to run from one of these two specific events. The Act does not establish a relationship between these events and the injured party’s knowledge. I agree with the appellants that knowledge is not a factor: the death or granting of the letters occurs regardless of the state of mind of the plaintiff. We face here a situation in respect of which, as recognized by this Court in Peixeiro, the judge‑made discoverability rule does not apply to extend the period the legislature has prescribed. Thus, I agree with the Court of Appeal that by using a specific event as the starting point of the “limitation clock”, the legislature was displacing the discoverability rule in all the situations to which the Survival of Actions Act applies.
28 A number of the appellate courts have dealt with the question of discoverability in the context of actions by or against estates of deceased persons. The appellants rely extensively on Payne v. Brady (1996), 140 D.L.R. (4th) 88 (Nfld. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1997] 2 S.C.R. xiii. While the facts of that case are very similar to the present, it is not clear whether the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland decided that the rule of discoverability did not apply because death is always a possibility or because the appellant Payne had ample time after she became aware of the death of Brady to commence her action. What is clear is the point advanced by O’Neill J.A.: the death of a prospective defendant and the possibility of a shortened period to commence an action is a reality that claimants and their counsel have to guard against: Payne, at p. 94.
29 The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal decision in Burt v. LeLacheur (2000), 189 D.L.R. (4th) 193, is invoked by the respondent. However, the reasoning of that case cannot be applied in the case at bar. In Burt, the Court of Appeal held that the discoverability rule applied to s. 10 of the Fatal Injuries Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 163. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal stated its position in the following manner (at p. 208):
If the discoverability rule applies to a limitation period running from “when the damages were sustained” (Peixeiro) and from “the final determination of the action against the insured” (Grenier), I think it is not unreasonable to apply it to the period one year after the death so as to start time running only when the claimant knows or ought to know that the death might be a wrongful one. This, having in mind the statutory scheme of the Fatal Injuries Act, is no greater a stretch of the language than was made by the courts in Peixeiro, Grenier and other cases, all for the purpose of preventing a potential injustice.
We must avoid the accusation of usurping the role of the Legislature, but in my opinion to apply the discoverability rule here is consistent with what has already been done before. On the true consideration of s. 10 of the Fatal Injuries Act, time does not run simply from a fixed event, but from constituent elements of the cause of action created by the statute. [Emphasis added.]
30 In Burt, the death of a person for which an action can be brought under the Fatal Injuries Act does not merely refer to the time of death as provided in the Survival of Actions Act, but to a “wrongful” death. It is not an event totally unrelated to the accrual of the cause of action. Hence, the death of the person there is in fact a “constituent elemen[t] of the cause of action”, contrary to the present case.
31 In my view, the case that best assists this Court in the present matter is the one giving rise to the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Waschkowski v. Hopkinson Estate (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 370. The court had to determine the possible application of the discoverability rule to s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.23, the statutory provision in Ontario permitting an action in tort by or against the estate of a deceased person and limiting the period during which such actions may be commenced. Abella J.A., as she then was, concluded, at para. 16, that the discoverability rule did not apply to the section since the state of actual or attributed knowledge of an injured person in a tort claim is not germane when a death has occurred. She explained at paras. 8‑9:
In s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act, the limitation period runs from a death. Unlike cases where the wording of the limitation period permits the time to run, for example, from “when the damage was sustained” (Peixeiro) or when the cause of action arose (Kamloops), there is no temporal elasticity possible when the pivotal event is the date of a death. Regardless of when the injuries occurred or matured into an actionable wrong, s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act prevents their transformation into a legal claim unless that claim is brought within two years of the death of the wrongdoer or the person wronged.
The underlying policy considerations of this clear time limit are not difficult to understand. The draconian legal impact of the common law was that death terminated any possible redress for negligent conduct. On the other hand, there was a benefit to disposing of estate matters with finality. The legislative compromise in s. 38 of the Trustee Act was to open a two‑year window, making access to a remedy available for a limited time without creating indefinite fiscal vulnerability for an estate. [Emphasis added.]
See also Canadian Red Cross Society (Re), [2003] O.J. No. 5669 (QL) (C.A.), and Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada (No. 1) (2000), 48 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.).
32 Ryan’s cause of action arose prior to Moore’s death and Ryan was well aware of his cause of action both before Moore’s death and before the expiration of the Survival of Actions Act limitation period. In fact, the day following the accident, Ryan retained a solicitor to pursue a claim for damages against Moore for injuries alleged to have resulted from the accident. At that point, Ryan could have sued Moore as all the elements of his cause of action were known. He did not need to have knowledge of the death in question to prove his claim or issue and serve the statement of claim. Moore’s subsequent death had no impact whatsoever on the accrual of Ryan’s cause of action. Consequently, I agree with the conclusion of the applications judge, at para. 50:
The fact of death is of no relevance to the cause of action in question. It is not an element of the cause of action and is not required to complete the cause of action. Whatever the nature of the cause of action, it is existing and complete before the Survival of Actions Act operates, in the case of a death, to maintain it and provide a limited time window within which it must be pursued. The fact of the death is irrelevant to the cause of action and serves only to provide a time from which the time within which to bring the action is to be calculated.
33 A further reason for the non‑application of the discoverability rule is the evident impact such a rule would have on the distribution of assets to the beneficiaries. Without a time limit, an executor or an administrator would not feel free to distribute the assets of an estate until all reasonable possibilities of claim had been addressed. This would be cumbersome and unrealistic. “An estate should not be held to ransom interminably by the advancement of claims which are not proceeded with in a timely manner”: MacKenzie Estate v. MacKenzie (1992), 84 Man. R. (2d) 149 (Q.B.), at para. 18, cited in Justice v. Cairnie Estate (1993), 105 D.L.R. (4th) 501 (Man. C.A.), at p. 510.
34 The Survival of Actions Act is itself a legislative exception to a common law rule. Thus, it would displace the intention of the legislature to “stretch” the limitation period. Borrowing the words of Marshall J.A. in Snow, at para. 43, to apply the rule of construction of reasonable discoverability to such a provision would be tantamount to mounting a fiction transcending the limits of logical statutory interpretation. Hence, it would constitute an impermissible incursion into the legislative process.
(4) Special Circumstances
35 Ryan submits, as an alternative, that if the discoverability rule does not apply, the limitation period should be extended because of the “special circumstances” principle. He claims that, pursuant to this principle, fairness and j