X (Re)

X (Re)
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2018-08-30
Neutral citation
2018 FC 738
Notes
A correction was made on June 18, 2019.
Reported Decision
Decision Content
TOP SECRET
Date: ||||||||||||||||||||
Docket: CONF-1-18
Citation: 2018 FC 738
Ottawa, Ontario, ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice S. Noël
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| FOR WARRANTS PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 16 AND 21 OF THE CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ACT, RSC 1985, c C-23
AND IN THE MATTER OF ||||||||||||||||||
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. GENERAL OVERVIEW 2
II. FACTS 3
III. ISSUE 7
IV. A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE SUBMISSIONS 7
V. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 9
VI. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION SPECIFIC TO NATIONAL SECURITY LEGISLATION 11
A. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s Mandate and Functions 15
B. Interpreting Section 16 of the CSIS Act 16
(1) The Textual Meaning 16
(2) The Contextual Approach 22
(a) The Scheme of the CSIS Act 22
(b) The 2015 Amendments to the CSIS Act 28
(c) Conditions in the Applied-for-Warrant 35
(d) Legislative History and Extrinsic Evidence 36
(i) The McDonald Commission (1981) 39
(ii) The Pitfield Report (1983) 41
(iii) Bill C-9: Act to establish the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (1984) 46
(iv) The Security Intelligence Review Committee Report (1989) 47
(v) The 5-year Parliamentary Review following the enactment of the CSIS Act (1990) 48
(vi) The Government Response to the 5-year review Report (1991) 50
(vii) The Government’s Interest in a Foreign Intelligence Agency (2006–2007) 52
(viii) The SIRC Annual Report 2012–2013: Bridging the Gap 54
(ix) Bill C-44: Protection of Canada from Terrorists Act 55
(3) The Purposive Approach 57
(a) Canada’s Material Interest in the Information to be |||||||| 60
(b) The Perceived Foreign Intelligence Gap 62
(c) The Changing Nature of |||||||||||||||| 66
(d) Technological Advances: |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 69
(4) The Presumption of Conformity with International Law 72
VII. |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 81
A. |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| interpreting section 16 of the CSIS Act? 82
B. Should the Court consider |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||| 84
C. Would the Service, |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| be acting “within Canada”? 90
VIII. CONCLUSION 92
IX. BIBLIOGRAPHY 97
I.
GENERAL OVERVIEW
[1] Can this Court issue a warrant authorizing the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (“the Service or CSIS”) to |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| pursuant to sections 16 and 21 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (“the CSIS Act”)? The Service proposes to |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| The Attorney General of Canada (“the Attorney General”) argues that the authority for such an operation is found in section 16 of the CSIS Act and is contemplated by the “within Canada” requirement in the section.
II. FACTS
[2] On |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| pursuant to the requirements of subsection 16(3)(a) of the CSIS Act, the Minister |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (“the Minister”) personally requested, by letter addressed to the Minister of Public Safety, assistance in the collection of information and intelligence with respect to the capabilities, intentions and activities of |||||||||||| (“the foreign state”).
[3] On |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| pursuant to subsection 16(3)(b), the Minister of Public Safety provided personal consent to the Director of the Service to assist the Minister in the collection of information or intelligence relating to the capabilities, intentions and activities of the foreign state by the means described in the request from the Minister.
[4] On |||||||||||||||||||||||||||| the Service applied to the Federal Court for a warrant pursuant to sections 16 and 21 of the CSIS Act. At the time I issued the warrants on |||||||||||||||||||||||||||| I was satisfied that the legislative prerequisite for section 16 warrants were met. However, I was not prepared to authorize the Service to |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| The only issue remaining to be determined in this judgment is whether this Court has jurisdiction under sections 16 and 21 of the CSIS Act, to issue a warrant that has extraterritorial effect.
[5] The subjects of the warrant are |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
[6] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
[7] Information and intelligence collected, through past section 16 warrants, permitted the Service to provide the Minister with useful information on |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| It also provided the Service with information concerning |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| of which |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| is deemed essential for the Service to be able to fulfill requests for assistance from the Minister.
[8] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
[9] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
[10] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
[11] The warrant seeks to authorize the Service |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
[12] To have a more in depth understanding of the facts, I reproduce the following exchange, in which the CSIS witness |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (Transcript of file |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| at 16–18):
Juge Noël: |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The witness: That’s right.
[…]
Juge Noël: |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The witness: That’s right.
Juge Noël: ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The witness: Yes.
Juge Noël: ||||||||||||||||||||
The witness: Yes.
[…]
The witness: |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||
[13] The Service advised that it may also seek technical and operational assistance from the Communication Security Establishment (“CSE”) |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
[14] Due to the important and novel legal issues brought forward in this warrant application, I appointed Mr. Gordon Cameron as Amicus Curiae (“the amicus”).
III. ISSUE
[15] The legal issue arising from the facts enumerated above require this Court to determine whether it has jurisdiction under section 16 of the CSIS Act, to issue a warrant that has extraterritorial effect. More specifically, the question at issue is whether the expression contained in section 16 of the CSIS Act “within Canada” or in French “dans les limites du Canada”, prohibits the Service from obtaining a warrant for investigative activities that |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| Or put in another way, |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| contradict the express geographical limitation found in section 16 of the CSIS Act?
IV. A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE SUBMISSIONS
[16] The Attorney General submits that the Court has the jurisdiction under sections 16 and 21 of the CSIS Act to issue the warrant because (1) |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| and (2) |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| The Attorney General argues that the Court must adopt a purposive interpretation of section 16 that supports the presence of an extraterritorial dimension when providing assistance from “within Canada.” Accordingly, a strict and literal interpretation would lead to absurd results since it would prevent the collection of any information with a foreign dimension, such as in this case, where the Service seeks to|||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| Moreover, (3) the “within Canada” restriction was intended by Parliament to restrict the Service |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
[17] The amicus asked the Court to consider that the position of the Attorney General is not supported by the wording of section 16 of the CSIS Act, accordingly the Court does not have jurisdiction to issue the warrant. The amicus submits that the wording is clear, the phrase “within Canada” is an express restriction, and should be understood as |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||
[18] As it will be explained in more detail below, in order to answer the question we must rely on the modern approach to statutory interpretation to determine the proper scope of the expression or phrase “within Canada.” We must first meticulously read the words of the statute to ascertain their ordinary and grammatical senses, and further interpret them in the context of the CSIS Act as a whole. Second, we must illuminate the ordinary sense of the words by ascertaining Parliament’s intention by analyzing extrinsic sources such as parliamentary debates, commission reports, parliamentary committee reports, and oversight body recommendations as well as government responses to these aforementioned reports. Once the correct interpretation of the expression “within Canada” is determined, the facts shall be reviewed to address in greater depth the arguments submitted by counsel in light of the true meaning of the phrase.
V. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
[19] In Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, Professor Ruth Sullivan set forth a three-pronged method to interpret statutes. First, the ordinary meaning approach, which requires the interpreter to use the literal text of the statute as the primary source. Second, the contextual approach, originally defined by Elmer Driedger, redefined and endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27, requires the interpreter to look at the words of the statute in their entire context. Third, the purposive approach, which requires the interpreter to consider the practical idea behind the enactment of both the interpreted section and the statute as a whole while considering the real-world effects of the Court’s interpretation (Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed (Markham: Lexis Nexis, 2014) at paras 2.1 - 2.5 [“Sullivan 2014”]).
[20] This Court has preferred the modern or contextual approach to statutory interpretation of the CSIS Act (see X(Re), 2017 FC 136; X(Re), 2016 FC 1105 [“Associated Data”]; Reference re sections 16 and 21 of the Canadian security Intelligence Service Act (CA), 2012 FC 1437; Articles 12 & 21 de la Loi sur le Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité (Re), 2008 FC 301 [“CSIS (Re) 2008”]). Particularly, in X(Re), 2014 FCA 249, Dawson JA thoroughly summarized the current state of the law concerning statutory interpretation:
[68] The preferred approach to statutory interpretation has been expressed in the following terms by the Supreme Court:
Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.
See: Rizzo& Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 SCR 27 at paragraph 21. See also: R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., 2001 SCC 56 (CanLII), [2001] 2 SCR 867 at paragraph 29.
[69] The Supreme Court restated this principle in Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v Canada, 2005 SCC 54 (CanLII), [2005] 2 SCR 601 at paragraph 10:
It has been long established as a matter of statutory interpretation that “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: see 65302 British Columbia Ltd. v Canada, 1999 CanLII 639 (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 804, at para. 50. The interpretation of a statutory provision must be made according to a textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that is harmonious with the Act as a whole. When the words of a provision are precise and unequivocal, the ordinary meaning of the words play a dominant role in the interpretive process. On the other hand, where the words can support more than one reasonable meaning, the ordinary meaning of the words plays a lesser role. The relative effects of ordinary meaning, context and purpose on the interpretive process may vary, but in all cases the court must seek to read the provisions of an Act as a harmonious whole.
[70] This formulation of the proper approach to statutory interpretation was repeated in Celgene Corp. v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 1 (CanLII), [2011] 1 SCR 3 at paragraph 21, and Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2011 SCC 25 (CanLII), [2011] 2 SCR 306 at paragraph 27.
[71] Inherent in the contextual approach to statutory interpretation is the understanding that the grammatical and ordinary sense of a provision is not determinative of its meaning. A court must consider the total context of the provision to be interpreted “no matter how plain the disposition may seem upon initial reading” (ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd. v Alberta (Energy and Utilities Board), 2006 SCC 4 (CanLII), [2006] 1 SCR 140 at paragraph 48). From the text and this wider context the interpreting court aims to ascertain legislative intent, “[t]he most significant element of this analysis” (R. v Monney, 1999 CanLII 678 (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 652 at paragraph 26).
[21] Furthermore, as expressed by the Federal Court of Appeal, both Professor Côté and Professor Sullivan asserted that the ordinary meaning approach by itself is no longer sufficient to adequately interpret statutes. Rather, the context is paramount and interpretation is legitimate even if the ordinary meaning appears to be clear. In his book, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, Professor Côté indicates:
“[…] [W]e want to note our profound disagreement with the idea that interpretation is legitimate or appropriate only when the text is obscure. This idea is based on the view, incorrect, that the meaning of a legal rule is identical to its literal legislative wording. The role of the interpreter is to establish the meaning of rules, not texts, with textual meaning at most the starting point of a process which necessarily takes into account extra-textual elements. The prima facie meaning of a text must be construed in the light of the other indicia relevant to interpretation. A competent interpreter asks whether the rule so construed can be reconciled with the other rules and principles of the legal system: Is this meaning consistent with the history of the text? Do the consequences of construing the rule solely in terms of the literal rule justify revisiting the interpretation and so on?”
(Pierre-André Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) at 268–269 [“PA Côté 2011”].)
VI. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION SPECIFIC TO NATIONAL SECURITY LEGISLATION
[22] Legislation that infringes on civil liberties, such as the CSIS Act must be interpreted cautiously to ensure minimal infringement of our most fundamental liberties, while ensuring that the rule of law is upheld. Accordingly, this requires courts to cautiously scrutinize and interpret the investigative powers that have been meticulously prescribed by Parliament with a view to ensure that security intelligence agencies are not authorized to overstep their mandate by Judges. The Supreme Court has recognized that strict controls have been put in place in the CSIS Act to limit the extraordinary powers of the Service. As I explained in the above cited Associated Data:
[153] The Federal Court of Appeal’s assessment of the purpose of the CSIS Act in X(Re), 2014 FCA 249 at paragraph 86, provides a good starting point to support the idea that strict controls are built into the scheme of the CSIS Act:
[86] […] The need for strict controls on the operations of security intelligence agencies has long been recognized. In Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 SCC 38 (CanLII), [2008] 2 SCR 326 the Supreme Court considered the legislative purpose and guiding principles that attended the creation of CSIS. At paragraph 22 of the reasons the Court quoted from the report of the Special Committee of the Senate on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to the effect that:
A credible and effective security intelligence agency does need to have some extraordinary powers, and does need to collect and analyze information in a way which may infringe on the civil liberties of some. But it must also be strictly controlled, and have no more power than is necessary to accomplish its objectives, which must in turn not exceed what is necessary for the protection of the security of Canada. (Report of the Special Senate Committee, at para. 25)
[23] In Associated Data, I also touched upon strict controls in the context of the primary mandate of CSIS, where I set out the legislative history of the CSIS Act and demonstrated that the primary mandate of CSIS, threat-related security intelligence collection (sections 2, 12 and 21 of the CSIS Act), which I will expand upon in detail below, was to be strictly and expressly defined in order to restrain and deter illegal activities by members of the Service (see Associated Data at paras 120–158). To support my conclusions, I cited the 1981 McDonald Commission, which was born out of an investigation into the illegal activities carried out by the former Intelligence Service of the RCMP. The McDonald Commission report recommended that the mandate of the Service be specific:
190. […] But in the absence of a clearly defined mandate, there is a natural tendency for a security intelligence agency, no matter how good its analytical capabilities, to err on the side of excessive intelligence-gathering, lest it be faulted by government for not having intelligence when asked. Intelligence-gathering is not something that can be simply turned on and off like a tap. This is another reason for the importance of Parliament’s establishing a coherent, comprehensive mandate for security intelligence activities in this country.
(Canada, Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Second Report: Freedom and Security Under the Law, vol 1, Part V (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1981) at 499.)
[24] I continued my analysis in Associated Data, by highlighting the importance of legal parameters, which aim to prevent intelligence officers from acting illegally in the name of national security (see specifically paragraph 130 of my reasons). The McDonald Commission also cemented the importance of the rule of law in the sense that the mandate of the Service must not be interpreted broadly so as to include powers that are not found in the letter of the law.
21. […] If those responsible for security believe that the law does not give them enough power to protect security effectively, they must try to persuade the law-makers, Parliament and the provincial legislatures, to change the law. They must not take the law into their own hands. This is a requirement of a liberal society. It is, therefore, unacceptable to adopt the view, which we have found expressed within the RCMP, that when the interests of national security are in conflict with the freedom of the individual, the balance to be struck is not for the court of law but for the executive. [Emphasis mine]
(Canada, Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Second Report: Freedom and Security Under the Law, vol 1, Part II (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1981) at 45.)
[25] Even though my conclusions in Associated Data apply to the primary mandate and function of CSIS, that of security intelligence collection, my general finding concerning the importance of a circumscribed and strict mandate, is also pertinent to the secondary functions including section 16, which is at issue before us. Strict limitations and controls on intelligence gathering powers are guiding principles in the interpretation of national security legislation. This obliges the Court to interpret intrusive powers cautiously to avoid authorizing excessive intelligence gathering that is not prescribed by an act of Parliament. If the scope of the powers in the CSIS Act require expansion in order to provide assistance to the Minister of Foreign Affairs or National Defence, such change must be brought through legislative amendment, not by the Court broadly interpreting the CSIS Act.
[26] Some may assert that primary and secondary functions of CSIS should not be compared in the same light since they have two distinct policy objectives. However, I am inclined, subject to a more in-depth analysis, to view the totality of the functions given to the Service within the same interpretative parameters. After all, an Act must be interpreted by looking at it as a whole, rather than as individual distinct watertight compartments.
A. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s Mandate and Functions
[27] I will first begin the discussion with a brief overview of the different mandates and functions granted to the Service by the CSIS Act. This will permit us to contextualize the foreign intelligence collection within the broader context of the Service’s mandate and various functions. Understanding the larger context in which this foreign intelligence collection operates, will be vital throughout the interpretative exercise.
[28] The primary mandate of the Service found in section 12, is to collect, analyse and retain information and intelligence respecting “threats to the security of Canada” as defined in section 2. The Service also has secondary functions: section 13 enables it to provide security assessments to various departments of the Government of Canada; section 14 authorizes it to advise the Crown on matters related to the security of Canada; section 15 allows it to conduct investigations in the course of activities falling under sections 13 and 15; and, section 16, often called the foreign intelligence function, enables CSIS to collect foreign related information of a political, economic and commercial nature that could benefit Canada’s interests.
[29] When the section 16 authority is coupled with a section 21 warrant obtained from this Court, CSIS may be authorized to use intrusive techniques to collect “within Canada”, information concerning foreign states or persons for the benefit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of National Defence.
B. Interpreting Section 16 of the CSIS Act
[30] In order to properly interpret the expression “within Canada” found in section 16 of the CSIS Act, we will conduct our analysis in three parts: first, according to the textual meaning of the legislative text; second, through the contextual approach; and third, according to the purposive approach with a particular emphasis on the practical consequences of the said interpretation.
(1) The Textual Meaning
[31] I have reproduced below the pertinent sections of the CSIS Act to facilitate the interpretative exercise:
Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, RSC 1985, c C-23
Loi sur le Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité, LRC (1985), ch C-23
Collection of information concerning foreign states and persons
Assistance
16 (1) Subject to this section, the Service may, in relation to the defence of Canada or the conduct of the international affairs of Canada, assist the Minister of National Defence or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, within Canada, in the collection of information or intelligence relating to the capabilities, intentions or activities of
16 (1) Sous réserve des autres dispositions du présent article, le Service peut, dans les domaines de la défense et de la conduite des affaires internationales du Canada, prêter son assistance au ministre de la Défense nationale ou au ministre des Affaires étrangères, dans les limites du Canada, à la collecte d’informations ou de renseignements sur les moyens, les intentions ou les activités :
(a) any foreign state or group of foreign states; or
a) d’un État étranger ou d’un groupe d’États étrangers;
(b) any person other than
b) d’une personne qui n’appartient à aucune des catégories suivantes :
(i) a Canadian citizen,
(i) les citoyens canadiens,
(ii) a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2 (1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, or
(ii) les résidents permanents au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés,
(iii) a corporation incorporated by or under an Act of Parliament or of the legislature of a province.
(iii) les personnes morales constituées sous le régime d’une loi fédérale ou provinciale.
Limitation
Restriction
(2) The assistance provided pursuant to subsection (1) shall not be directed at any person referred to in subparagraph (1) (b) (i), (ii) or (iii).
(2) L’assistance autorisée au paragraphe (1) est subordonnée au fait qu’elle ne vise pas des personnes mentionnées à l’alinéa (1)b).
Personal consent of Ministers required
Consentement personnel des ministres
(3) The Service shall not perform its duties and functions under subsection (1) unless it does so
(3) L’exercice par le Service des fonctions visées au paragraphe (1) est subordonné :
(a) on the personal request in writing of the Minister of National Defence or the Minister of Foreign Affairs; and
a) à une demande personnelle écrite du ministre de la Défense nationale ou du ministre des Affaires étrangères;
(b) with the personal consent in writing of the Minister.
b) au consentement personnel écrit du ministre
(I have underlined the specific wording in section 16(1).)
(J’ai souligné spécifiquement les mots à l’article 16(1).)
[32] Although dictionary definitions should not be considered determinative of the plain meaning of the statute, they may permit a judge to consider the plausible breadth of available meanings. However, definitions are of little assistance if the words are removed from their context. As explained by Prof. Sullivan:
Dictionaries also assist by suggesting the limits of plausible interpretation. Although it is permissible to reject the ordinary meaning of a provision in favour of an interpretation that promotes the purpose or avoids unacceptable consequences, under the plausible meaning rule the interpretation that is adopted must normally be one that the words are capable of bearing. By fixing the outer limits of meaning, dictionary definitions help to establish the range of plausible meanings a given word may bear.
(Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation, 3rd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2016) at 65–66 [“Sullivan 2016”].)
[33] Reproducing dictionary definitions of “within” and “dans les limites” in section 16, can only help us determine the scope of plausible interpretations related to these words.
[34] The Canadian Oxford Dictionary defines “within” as:
A preposition (1) inside; enclosed or contained by. (2a) not beyond or exceeding [within one’s means]. (2b) not transgressing [within the law; within reason]. (3) Not further off than [within three miles of a station; within shouting distance] […] (5) Lying within an area implied “within the walls of London.” It is also defined as an adverb inside; to, at or on the inside;
(Canadian Oxford Dictionary, 2nd ed, sub verbo “within”.)
[35] The French dictionary Le petit Robert de la langue française defines “dans” as a:
“préposition indiquant la situation d’une personne, d’une chose par rapport à ce qui la contient. (1) Marque le lieu […]”.
[36] The same dictionary defines the noun “limite” as:
Ligne qui sépare deux terrains ou territoires contigus. Bord, borne, confins, démarcations frontière, lisière. […] (2) Partie extrême où se termine une surface ou une étendue […] (4) Point que ne peut ou ne doit pas dépasser l’influence, l’action de quelque chose.
(Le petit Robert de la langue français, 2006, sub verbo “dans” and “limite”.)
[37] The expression “within Canada” acts as both an adverb describing the action to assist, but also acts as a preposition that latches onto the noun “Canada.” The expression “within Canada” is an express geographical limitation of the Service’s assistance function. The preposition “within” refers to an action occurring inside a range or a boundary. The French version explicitly evokes the concept of a geographical limitation because of the use of the noun “les limites” (literally the limits or the limitations). Limits are understood as lines that circumscribe, designate or mark the start and the end of a space. The preposition “within” and the noun “les limites” both clearly put forward the notion of circumscribing the Service’s assistance function to Canada’s physical and geographical boundaries.
[38] Once the words of the said expression are interpreted, we must contemplate how this isolated interpretation interacts with the remainder of the words in the section. We must consider “within Canada” in relation to the broader statutory context of the foreign intelligence function. A literal analysis of the words of subsection 16(1) reveals six intelligible components that make up the foreign intelligence function of the Service which can be dissected as follows: the Service may, in relation to (1) the defence of Canada or the conduct of the international affairs of Canada (2) assist the Minister of National Defence or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, (3) within Canada, (4) in the collection of information or intelligence (5) relating to the capabilities, intentions or activities of (6) any foreign state or group of foreign states; or any person other than a Canadian citizen a permanent resident, or a corporation incorporated in Canada.
[39] First, the Service is authorized to collect information in relation to the “defence of Canada or the conduct of the international affairs of Canada” or in French “dans les domaines de la défense et de la conduite des affaires internationales du Canada.” These represent the respective portfolios of the Mini