Air Canada v. Thibodeau

Air Canada v. Thibodeau
Court (s) Database
Federal Court of Appeal Decisions
Date
2012-09-25
Neutral citation
2012 FCA 246
File numbers
A-358-11
Notes
Reported Decision
Decision Content
Date: 20120925
Docket: A-358-11
Citation: 2012 FCA 246
CORAM: PELLETIER J.A.
GAUTHIER J.A.
TRUDEL J.A.
BETWEEN:
AIR CANADA
Appelant
and
MICHEL THIBODEAU
and
LYNDA THIBODEAU
Respondents
and
THE COMMISSIONER OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES
Intervener
Heard at Ottawa, Ontario, on April 25, 2012.
Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on September 25, 2012.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: TRUDEL J.A.
CONCURRED IN BY: PELLETIER J.A.
GAUTHIER J.A.
Date: 20120925
Docket: A-358-11
Citation: 2012 FCA 246
CORAM: PELLETIER J.A.
GAUTHIER J.A.
TRUDEL J.A.
BETWEEN:
AIR CANADA
Appelant
and
MICHEL THIBODEAU
and
LYNDA THIBODEAU
Respondents
and
THE COMMISSIONER OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES
Intervener
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
TRUDEL J.A.
Introduction
[1] In this appeal, the Court is called to review the exercise of the remedial power of the Federal Court in response to an application by the respondents, Michel and Lynda Thibodeau (the Thibodeaus), under subsection 77(1) of the Official Languages Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 31 (4th Supp.) (OLA) for violations of their language rights that occurred in the course of international air flights.
[2] Under this subsection, any person having filed a complaint with the Commissioner of Official Languages concerning, among others, a right under Part IV of the OLA, may apply to the Federal Court to obtain relief. The judge hearing such an application is not bound by the Commissioner’s investigation report related to this complaint, and must rather determine whether there has been a breach of the OLA after weighing the evidence presented by the parties (Forum des maires de la Péninsule acadienne v. Canada (Canadian Food Inspection Agency), 2004 FCA 263, [2004] 4 F.C.R. 276 at paragraph 21 [Forum des maires]) and then, eventually, grant such remedy as the Court considers “appropriate and just in the circumstances” (subsection 77(4) of the OLA).
[3] In their application, the Thibodeaus alleged that the carrier Air Canada (or the appellant) had breached the linguistic duties imposed on it by Part IV of the OLA, specifically, under subsection 23(1), under which it must ensure that members of the travelling public:
…can communicate with and obtain those services in either official language from an office or facility of the institution in Canada or elsewhere where there is a significant demand for those services in that language.
Hence, the Thibodeaus sought a declaratory judgment that Air Canada breached its linguistic duties, a letter of apology and damages, including exemplary and punitive damages. They also submitted that Air Canada's breaches of its linguistic duties are systemic. Consequently, they asked the Federal Court to render a so-called structural (or institutional) order to remedy this situation.
[4] The facts of the case are very simple. The Thibodeaus complained to the Commissioner that on two separate round trips between Canada and the United States, Air Canada did not offer them the service in French to which they were entitled at each point of service in their itinerary. The Commissioner found that some of these complaints were justified. The grounds for complaint accepted by the Commissioner included not only in flight services but also ground services (the absence of services in French at the check-in counters and during announcements directed at passengers concerning changes in luggage carousels). These incidents are described more specifically in paragraphs 14 to 17, inclusive, of the reasons issued by a judge of the Federal Court (the Judge). Air Canada and Jazz are the airlines involved.
[5] On the basis of subsection 77(4) of the OLA, the Judge ruled as follows:
JUDGMENT
THE COURT ALLOWS this application:
DECLARES that Air Canada breached its duties under Part IV of the Official Languages Act. More specifically, Air Canada breached its duties by:
· failing to offer services in French on board (Jazz-operated) flight AC8627, a flight on which there is significant demand for services in French, on January 23, 2009;
· failing to translate into French an announcement made in English by the pilot who was the captain of (Jazz-operated) flight AC8622 on February 1, 2009;
· failing to offer service in French on board (Jazz-operated) flight AC7923, a flight on which there is significant demand for services in French, on May 12, 2009;
· making a passenger announcement regarding baggage collection at the Toronto airport on May 12, 2009, in English only.
ORDERS Air Canada to:
· give the applicants a letter of apology containing the text appearing in Schedule “A” to this order, which is the text of the draft apology letter filed by Air Canada;
· make every reasonable effort to comply with all of its duties under Part IV of the Official Languages Act;
· introduce, within six months of this judgment, a proper monitoring system and procedures to quickly identify, document and quantify potential violations of its language duties, as set out at Part IV of the OLA and at section 10 of the ACPPA, particularly by introducing a procedure to identify and document occasions on which Jazz does not assign flight attendants able to provide services in French on board flights on which there is significant demand for services in French;
· pay the amount of $6,000 in damages to each of the applicants;
· pay the applicants the total amount of $6,982.19 in costs, including the disbursements.
[6] Air Canada is appealing from that judgment (2011 FC 876), submitting that it is vitiated by errors of law calling for the intervention of our Court. During the appeal, Air Canada obtained a stay of execution of the judgment of the Federal Court (order of Chief Justice Blais, 2011 FCA 343). In the appeal, the Commissioner, just as in the proceeding before the Federal Court, was recognized as intervener (order of Chief Justice Blais, 2012 FCA 14).
[7] Air Canada submits that it should not be ordered to pay any damages whatsoever for the three incidents which occurred during international air carriage, specifically, for the absence of services in French on flights AC 8627, AC 8622 and AC 7923, since Article 29 of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage By Air signed in Montréal, on May 28, 1999, incorporated under Canadian law under the Carriage by Air Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26, Schedule IV (Montreal Convention) provides an exclusive remedy for such breaches. In addition to the legal principle cited, the amount at stake is $4,500 for each Thibodeau. Air Canada also submits that the Federal Court erred in law and in fact in rendering the general and structural orders found in the judgment reproduced above.
[8] That said, the appeal book shows that Air Canada agreed to submit a letter of apology to the Thibodeaus with respect to certain specific breaches, to pay them damages of $3,000 ($1,500 each) with respect to an announcement to passengers made in English only concerning baggage claim and procedures for connecting flights at the Toronto airport on May 12, 2009, as well as a total of $6,982.19 in costs including disbursements (Appellant’s Memorandum of Fact and Law at paragraphs 3 and 7; letter of apology, Appeal Book, Schedule A at page 84).
[9] Thus, the parties agree that the appeal raises the three issues below, to which I propose to respond as follows:
A) Does Article 29 of the Montreal Convention exclude the action in damages brought by the Thibodeaus under Part IV of the OLA for incidents having occurred during international carriage? Yes.
B) Was the Judge entitled to a general order against Air Canada to comply with Part IV of the OLA dealing with the obligations of federal institutions in the area of communication with the public and provision of services? No.
C) Was the Judge entitled to a structural order against Air Canada? No.
[10] In my discussion, I will refer to the relevant passages of the judgment appealed from and to the respective position of the parties with regard to each of these questions.
Discussion
Preliminary remarks: the legislative framework
[11] The Judge meticulously presented the legislative regime which applies to the appellant’s commercial activities: the OLA, the Air Canada Public Participation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 35 (4th Supp.) (ACPPA) and the Official Languages Regulations, SOR/92-48.
[12] I will quote the very apt comments of the Judge found at paragraphs 7 to 12, inclusive:
[7] The OLA, which applies to federal institutions, gives concrete expression to the principle of equality of Canada’s two official languages, which is enshrined at section 16 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter), and the right of members of the public to communicate with any central office in the official language of their choice, set out at section 20 of the Charter. The courts have consistently held that the OLA has quasi‑constitutional status (Canada (Attorney General) v. Viola, [1991] 1 FC 373 (available on QL) [Viola]; R. v. Beaulac, [1999] 1 SCR 768 (available on CanLII); Lavigne v. Canada (Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages), 2002 SCC 53, [2002] 2 SCR 773[Lavigne]; DesRochers v. Canada (Industry), 2009 SCC 8, [2009] 1 SCR 194 [DesRochers]).
[8] According to section 2 of the OLA, the purpose of this statute is to ensure respect for English and French as official languages, their equality of status and equal rights and privileges concerning their use in all federal institutions with respect to various aspects of federal institutions’ activities, including communications with, or the provision of services to, the public.
[9] The OLA concerns the federal institutions identified at section 3 of this statute.
[10] Air Canada was initially created as a Crown corporation and, as such, was subject to the Official Languages Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. O‑2 and, then, to the OLA, which replaced it. In 1988, Air Canada was privatized, and the Air Canada Public Participation Act, [abbreviated reference and citation omitted] provided for the continuance of Air Canada under the Canada Business Corporations Act. Otherwise, under section 10 of the ACPPA, Air Canada is still subject to the OLA. Subsections 1 and 2 of section 10 of the ACPPA read as follows:
10. (1) The Official Languages Act applies to the Corporation.
Duty re subsidiaries
(2) Subject to subsection (5), if air services, including incidental services, are provided or made available by a subsidiary of the Corporation, the Corporation has the duty to ensure that any of the subsidiary’s customers can communicate with the subsidiary in respect of those services, and obtain those services from the subsidiary, in either official language in any case where those services, if provided by the Corporation, would be required under Part IV of the Official Languages Act to be provided in either official language.
10. (1) La Loi sur les langues officielles s’applique à la Société.
Communication avec les voyageurs
(2) Sous réserve du paragraphe (5), la Société est tenue de veiller à ce que les services aériens, y compris les services connexes, offerts par ses filiales à leurs clients le soient, et à ce que ces clients puissent communiquer avec celles-ci relativement à ces services, dans l’une ou l’autre des langues officielles dans le cas où, offrant elle-même les services, elle serait tenue, au titre de la partie IV de la Loi sur les langues officielles, à une telle obligation.
[11] Part IV of the OLA applies to communications with and the provision of services to the public. This part includes the following provisions:
Rights relating to language of communication
21. Any member of the public in Canada has the right to communicate with and to receive available services from federal institutions in accordance with this Part.
Where communications and services must be in both official languages
22. Every federal institution has the duty to ensure that any member of the public can communicate with and obtain available services from its head or central office in either official language, and has the same duty with respect to any of its other offices or facilities
(a) within the National Capital Region; or
(b) in Canada or elsewhere, where there is significant demand for communications with and services from that office or facility in that language.
Travelling public
23. (1) For greater certainty, every federal institution that provides services or makes them available to the travelling public has the duty to ensure that any member of the travelling public can communicate with and obtain those services in either official language from any office or facility of the institution in Canada or elsewhere where there is significant demand for those services in that language.
Services provided pursuant to a contract
(2) Every federal institution has the duty to ensure that such services to the travelling public as may be prescribed by regulation of the Governor in Council that are provided or made available by another person or organization pursuant to a contract with the federal institution for the provision of those services at an office or facility referred to in subsection (1) are provided or made available, in both official languages, in the manner prescribed by regulation of the Governor in Council.
. . .
Where services provided on behalf of federal institutions
25. Every federal institution has the duty to ensure that, where services are provided or made available by another person or organization on its behalf, any member of the public in Canada or elsewhere can communicate with and obtain those services from that person or organization in either official language in any case where those services, if provided by the institution, would be required under this Part to be provided in either official language.
Droits en matière de communication
21. Le public a, au Canada, le droit de communiquer avec les institutions fédérales et d’en recevoir les services conformément à la présente partie.
Langues des communications et services
22. Il incombe aux institutions fédérales de veiller à ce que le public puisse communiquer avec leur siège ou leur administration centrale, et en recevoir les services, dans l’une ou l’autre des langues officielles. Cette obligation vaut également pour leurs bureaux — auxquels sont assimilés, pour l’application de la présente partie, tous autres lieux où ces institutions offrent des services — situés soit dans la région de la capitale nationale, soit là où, au Canada comme à l’étranger, l’emploi de cette langue fait l’objet d’une demande importante.
Voyageurs
23. (1) Il est entendu qu’il incombe aux institutions fédérales offrant des services aux voyageurs de veiller à ce que ceux-ci puissent, dans l’une ou l’autre des langues officielles, communiquer avec leurs bureaux et en recevoir les services, là où, au Canada comme à l’étranger, l’emploi de cette langue fait l’objet d’une demande importante.
Services conventionnés
(2) Il incombe aux institutions fédérales de veiller à ce que, dans les bureaux visés au paragraphe (1), les services réglementaires offerts aux voyageurs par des tiers conventionnés par elles à cette fin le soient, dans les deux langues officielles, selon les modalités réglementaires.
[…]
Fourniture dans les deux langues
25. Il incombe aux institutions fédérales de veiller à ce que, tant au Canada qu’à l’étranger, les services offerts au public par des tiers pour leur compte le soient, et à ce qu’il puisse communiquer avec ceux-ci, dans l’une ou l’autre des langues officielles dans le cas où, offrant elles-mêmes les services, elles seraient tenues, au titre de la présente partie, à une telle obligation.
[12] According to section 22 of the OLA, federal institutions are required to communicate and provide services in both official languages where there is significant demand for those services in the minority language and where it is warranted by the nature of the office or facility. Under the Official Languages Regulations, SOR/92-48 (the Regulations), there is significant demand for the use of an official language in an airport where over a year, the total number of emplaned and deplaned passengers at that airport is at least one million and, for the other airports, where over a year, at least 5 percent of the demand from the public for services at that airport is in that language (subsections 7(1) and 7(3)). With regard to services on board flights, the Regulations provide that some flights are automatically designated as routes on which there is significant demand in the minority language, whereas others are so designated in accordance with the volume of demand. In that regard, subsection 7(2) and paragraph 7(4)(c) of the Regulations provide as follows:
7. (2) For the purposes of subsection 23(1) of the Act, there is significant demand for services to the travelling public from an office or facility of a federal institution in an official language where the office or facility provides those services on a route and on that route over a year at least 5 per cent of the demand from the travelling public for services is in that language.
. . .
(4) For the purposes of subsection 23(1) of the Act, there is significant demand for services to the travelling public from an office or facility of a federal institution in both official languages where
. . .
(c) the office or facility provides those services on board an aircraft
(i) on a route that starts, has an intermediate stop or finishes at an airport located in the National Capital Region, the CMA of Montreal or the City of Moncton or in such proximity to that Region, CMA or City that it primarily serves that Region, CMA or City,
(ii) on a route that starts and finishes at airports located in the same province and that province has an English or French linguistic minority population that is equal to at least 5 per cent of the total population in the province, or
(iii) on a route that starts and finishes at airports located in different provinces and each province has an English or French linguistic minority population that is equal to at least 5 per cent of the total population in the province;
7. (2) Pour l’application du paragraphe 23(1) de la Loi, l’emploi d’une langue officielle fait l’objet d’une demande importante à un bureau d’une institution fédérale en ce qui a trait aux services offerts aux voyageurs lorsque le bureau offre ces services sur un trajet et qu’au moins cinq pour cent de la demande de services faite par les voyageurs sur ce trajet, au cours d’une année, est dans cette langue.
[…]
(4) Pour l’application du paragraphe 23(1) de la Loi, l’emploi des deux langues officielles fait l’objet d’une demande importante à un bureau d’une institution fédérale en ce qui a trait aux services offerts aux voyageurs, dans l’une ou l’autre des cibconstances suivantes :
[…]
c) le bureau offre les services à bord d’un aéronef :
(i) soit sur un trajet dont la tête de ligne, une escale ou le terminus est un aéroport situé dans la région de la capitale nationale, dans la région métropolitaine de recensement de Montréal ou dans la ville de Moncton, ou un aéroport situé à proximité de l’une de ces régions ou ville qui la dessert principalement,
(ii) soit sur un trajet dont la tête de ligne et le terminus sont des aéroports situés dans une même province dont la population de la minorité francophone ou anglophone représente au moins cinq pour cent de l’ensemble de la population de la province,
(iii) soit sur un trajet dont la tête de ligne et le terminus sont des aéroports situés dans deux provinces dont chacune a une population de la minorité francophone ou anglophone représentant au moins cinq pour cent de l’ensemble de la population de la province;
[13] In addition to these legislative instruments, there is the Montreal Convention, whose relevant portions were cited by the Judge at paragraph 51 of her reasons:
[51] The following provisions of the Convention are relevant:
CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES FOR INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE BY AIR
THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION
RECOGNIZING the significant contribution of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air signed in Warsaw on 12 October 1929, hereinafter referred to as the “Warsaw Convention”, and other related instruments to the harmonization of private international air law;
RECOGNIZING the need to modernize and consolidate the Warsaw Convention and related instruments;
RECOGNIZING the importance of ensuring protection of the interests of consumers in international carriage by air and the need for equitable compensation based on the principle of restitution;
REAFFIRMING the desirability of an orderly development of international air transport operations and the smooth flow of passengers, baggage and cargo in accordance with the principles and objectives of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, done at Chicago on 7 December 1944;
CONVINCED that collective State action for further harmonization and codification of certain rules governing international carriage by air through a new Convention is the most adequate means of achieving an equitable balance of interests;
. . .
Article 1 — Scope of Application
1. This Convention applies to all international carriage of persons, baggage or cargo performed by aircraft for reward. It applies equally to gratuitous carriage by aircraft performed by an air transport undertaking.
2. For the purposes of this Convention, the expression international carriage means any carriage in which, according to the agreement between the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the carriage or a transhipment, are situated either within the territories of two States Parties, or within the territory of a single State Party if there is an agreed stopping place within the territory of another State, even if that State is not a State Party. Carriage between two points within the territory of a single State Party without an agreed stopping place within the territory of another State is not international carriage for the purposes of this Convention.
. . .
Chapter III
Liability of the Carrier and Extent of Compensation for Damage
Article 17 — Death and Injury of Passengers — Damage to Baggage
1. The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
2. The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of destruction or loss of, or of damage to, checked baggage upon condition only that the event which caused the destruction, loss or damage took place on board the aircraft or during any period within which the checked baggage was in the charge of the carrier. However, the carrier is not liable if and to the extent that the damage resulted from the inherent defect, quality or vice of the baggage. In the case of unchecked baggage, including personal items, the carrier is liable if the damage resulted from its fault or that of its servants or agents.
. . .
Article 18 — Damage to Cargo
1. The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the destruction or loss of, or damage to, cargo upon condition only that the event which caused the damage so sustained took place during the carriage by air.
2. However, the carrier is not liable if and to the extent it proves that the destruction, or loss of, or damage to, the cargo resulted from one or more of the following:
. . .
Article 19 — Delay
The carrier is liable for damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, baggage or cargo. Nevertheless, the carrier shall not be liable for damage occasioned by delay if it proves that it and its servants and agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for it or them to take such measures.
. . .
Article 21 — Compensation in Case of Death or Injury of Passengers
1. For damages arising under paragraph 1 of Article 17 not exceeding 100 000 Special Drawing Rights for each passenger, the carrier shall not be able to exclude or limit its liability.
2. The carrier shall not be liable for damages arising under paragraph 1 of Article 17 to the extent that they exceed for each passenger 100 000 Special Drawing Rights if the carrier proves that:
(a) such damage was not due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the carrier or its servants or agents; or
(b) such damage was solely due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of a third party.
. . .
Article 29 — Basis of Claims
In the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for damages, however founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out in this Convention without prejudice to the question as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights. In any such action, punitive, exemplary or any other non-compensatory damages shall not be recoverable.
CONVENTION POUR L'UNIFICATION DE CERTAINES RÈGLES RELATIVES AU TRANSPORT AÉRIEN INTERNATIONAL
LES ÉTATS PARTIES À LA PRÉSENTE CONVENTION
RECONNAISSANT l'importante contribution de la Convention pour l'unification de certaines règles relatives au transport aérien international, signée à Varsovie le 12 octobre 1929, ci-après appelée la « Convention de Varsovie » et celle d'autres instruments connexes à l'harmonisation du droit aérien international privé,
RECONNAISSANT la nécessité de moderniser et de refondre la Convention de Varsovie et les instruments connexes,
RECONNAISSANT l'importance d'assurer la protection des intérêts des consommateurs dans le transport aérien international et la nécessité d'une indemnisation équitable fondée sur le principe de réparation,
RÉAFFIRMANT l'intérêt d'assurer le développement d'une exploitation ordonnée du transport aérien international et un acheminement sans heurt des passagers, des bagages et des marchandises, conformément aux principes et aux objectifs de la Convention relative à l'aviation civile internationale faite à Chicago le 7 décembre 1944,
CONVAINCUS que l'adoption de mesures collectives par les États en vue d'harmoniser davantage et de codifier certaines règles régissant le transport aérien international est le meilleur moyen de réaliser un équilibre équitable des intérêts,
[…]
Article 1 — Champ d'application
1. La présente convention s'applique à tout transport international de personnes, bagages ou marchandises, effectué par aéronef contre rémunération. Elle s'applique également aux transports gratuits effectués par aéronef par une entreprise de transport aérien.
2. Au sens de la présente convention, l'expression transport international s'entend de tout transport dans lequel, d'après les stipulations des parties, le point de départ et le point de destination, qu'il y ait ou non interruption de transport ou transbordement, sont situés soit sur le territoire de deux États parties, soit sur le territoire d'un seul État partie si une escale est prévue sur le territoire d'un autre État, même si cet État n'est pas un État partie. Le transport sans une telle escale entre deux points du territoire d'un seul État partie n'est pas considéré comme international au sens de la présente convention.
[…]
Chapitre III
Responsabilité du transporteur et étendue de l'indemnisation du préjudice
Article 17 — Mort ou lésion subie par le passager — Dommage causé aux bagages
1. Le transporteur est responsable du préjudice survenu en cas de mort ou de lésion corporelle subie par un passager, par cela seul que l'accident qui a causé la mort ou la lésion s'est produit à bord de l'aéronef ou au cours de toutes opérations d'embarquement ou de débarquement.
2. Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu en cas de destruction, perte ou avarie de bagages enregistrés, par cela seul que le fait qui a causé la destruction, la perte ou l'avarie s'est produit à bord de l'aéronef ou au cours de toute période durant laquelle le transporteur avait la garde des bagages enregistrés. Toutefois, le transporteur n'est pas responsable si et dans la mesure où le dommage résulte de la nature ou du vice propre des bagages. Dans le cas des bagages non enregistrés, notamment des effets personnels, le transporteur est responsable si le dommage résulte de sa faute ou de celle de ses préposés ou mandataires.
[…]
Article 18 — Dommage causé à la marchandise
1. Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu en cas de destruction, perte ou avarie de la marchandise par cela seul que le fait qui a causé le dommage s'est produit pendant le transport aérien.
2. Toutefois, le transporteur n'est pas responsable s'il établit, et dans la mesure où il établit, que la destruction, la perte ou l'avarie de la marchandise résulte de l'un ou de plusieurs des faits suivants :
[…]
Article 19 — Retard
Le transporteur est responsable du dommage résultant d'un retard dans le transport aérien de passagers, de bagages ou de marchandises. Cependant, le transporteur n'est pas responsable du dommage causé par un retard s'il prouve que lui, ses préposés et mandataires ont pris toutes les mesures qui pouvaient raisonnablement s'imposer pour éviter le dommage, ou qu'il leur était impossible de les prendre.
[…]
Article 21 — Indemnisation en cas de mort ou de lésion subie par le passager
1. Pour les dommages visés au paragraphe 1 de l'article 17 et ne dépassant pas 100 000 droits de tirage spéciaux par passager, le transporteur ne peut exclure ou limiter sa responsabilité.
2. Le transporteur n'est pas responsable des dommages visés au paragraphe 1 de l'article 17 dans la mesure où ils dépassent 100 000 droits de tirage spéciaux par passager, s'il prouve :
a) que le dommage n'est pas dû à la négligence ou à un autre acte ou omission préjudiciable du transporteur, de ses préposés ou de ses mandataires, ou
b) que ces dommages résultent uniquement de la négligence ou d'un autre acte ou omission préjudiciable d'un tiers.
[…]
Article 29 — Principe des recours
Dans le transport de passagers, de bagages et de marchandises, toute action en dommages-intérêts, à quelque titre que ce soit, en vertu de la présente convention, en raison d'un contrat ou d'un acte illicite ou pour toute autre cause, ne peut être exercée que dans les conditions et limites de responsabilité prévues par la présente convention, sans préjudice de la détermination des personnes qui ont le droit d'agir et de leurs droits respectifs. Dans toute action de ce genre, on ne pourra pas obtenir de dommages-intérêts punitifs ou exemplaires ni de dommages à un titre autre que la réparation.
[14] Air Canada readily concedes that it is subject to Part IV of the OLA, and in no wise disputes the objectives of that law or its quasi-constitutional status. It is also agreed that the appellant’s linguistic obligations apply to “services to the travelling public as may be prescribed by regulation of the Governor in Council that are provided or made available by another person or organization pursuant to a contract” (subsection 23(2) of the OLA), in this instance Jazz, which entered into a commercial agreement with Air Canada whereby Air Canada purchases almost all of Jazz’s fleet capacity at predetermined prices.
[15] In addition, as seen in its letter of apology mentioned above, Air Canada does not deny that it failed to observe its linguistic obligations with regard to the Thibodeaus on three occasions by failing to offer services in French on international flights during which the use of the French language was required (Appellant’s Memorandum at paragraph 3).
A) The first issue: Does Article 29 of the Montreal Convention exclude the action in damages brought by the Thibodeaus under Part IV of the OLA for incidents having occurred during international carriage?
[16] In this case, the first issue is whether, in view of Article 29 of the Montreal Convention, the Judge erred in law in ordering Air Canada to pay damages in the amount of $4,500 to each of the respondents for the three breaches of their linguistic rights. The interpretation of Article 29 of the Montreal Convention and its interaction with the remedial provisions of the OLA in the context of international air carriage are questions of law subject to a standard of correctness: Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235 at paragraph 8.
[17] After expressing some hesitation as to the scope of Article 29 of the Montreal Convention, the Judge undertook to resolve the conflict of laws which, in her opinion, was raised by the application initiated by the Thibodeaus. At the end of the day, the Judge ruled in favour of the application of the OLA, resulting in the damages awarded to the Thibodeaus for the complaints concerning incidents during international carriage.
[18] Indeed, the Judge said that, at first glance, she was “tempted to accept the Commissioner’s argument,” also that of the Thibodeaus, that the Montreal Convention in no way limits the remedial power of the Federal Court under the OLA because
…the Montreal Convention cannot apply in this case because it concerns situations that are totally foreign to the ambit of the OLA . . . (Reasons at paragraph 67).
[19] It is not disputed that the facts giving rise to the Thibodeaus’ complaints do not fall under Articles 17 to 19 of the Montreal Convention (death and injury of passengers; damage to baggage or cargo; delay in air carriage). In addition, I note that the Thibodeaus do not argue that the incidents which gave rise to their complaints constituted “accidents” within the meaning of Article 17 of the Montreal Convention. Nor has it been disputed that Air Canada’s linguistic duties are not connected to international air carriage, that they do not stem from the Montreal Convention and further do not concern the other signatory States.
[20] That being said, the Judge did not accept the argument of the Commissioner and of the Thibodeaus. Rather, she concluded as follows:
…that in interpreting the Montreal Convention as allowing compensation on the basis of a cause of action which is not contemplated by the Convention, I would depart from the Canadian and international case law (ibidem at paragraph 77).
[21] Although with “reservations,” the Judge thus accepted the doctrine of this case law:
[t]he liberal interpretation given to the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions leads me to acknowledge the very broad ambit of the Montreal Convention, which comes into play once an incident or a situation occurs during international carriage and sets out, in a limited way, the causes of action which may give rise to compensation and the compensable types of damage (ibidem at paragraph 75).
[22] I am in agreement with this interpretation of the Montreal Convention. My disagreement with the Federal Court’s position stems from the fact that the Judge went on to conclude that there was a conflict of laws and that she was unable to harmonize the two legislative instruments, thus rejecting Air Canada’s argument to the contrary. The Judge wrote:
…it does not seem possible to me to reconcile the two instruments. If I were to conclude that subsection 77(4) of the OLA excludes the award of damages when the violation occurs during an international flight, this would weaken the OLA considerably (ibidem at paragraph 77).
[23] In order to resolve this apparent conflict of laws, the Judge undertook to determine which of the two instruments must prevail over the other. Citing subsection 82(1) of the OLA, which provides that, in the event of inconsistency with any Act of Parliament or regulation thereunder, the provisions of Part IV of the OLA “prevail to the extent of the inconsistency,” the Judge ruled in favour of the primacy of the OLA on the basis of, on the one hand, the implicit precedence of “the remedy provisions by means of which breaches of the duties set out in Part IV of [the OLA] may be enforced” (ibidem at paragraph 82) and, on the other hand, of the quasi-constitutional nature of the OLA (Viola, above at page 386; Lavigne, above at paragraph 21; DesRochers, above at paragraph 2).
[24] With respect, my examination of the record and of the applicable law leads me to conclude otherwise. In my view, the legislative instruments, properly construed, can be harmonized. They can both be applied concurrently without producing an unreasonable result or one which fails to respect the objectives of each.
A.1) Article 29 of the Montreal Convention
[25] Although I have already stated my agreement with the Federal Court’s conclusion as to the correct interpretation of Article 29 of the Montreal Convention, I feel that it is useful, at this stage, to present a brief discussion of the international and Canadian case law that the Judge cited in her reasons, and which the parties have argued before our Court. The parties have taken diametrically opposed positions, often interpreting the same case differently. Air Canada’s argument, which was accepted by the Judge, correctly in my view, save for her reservation, is that the Montreal Convention constitutes the sole remedy for a passenger against a carrier for any loss, bodily injury or property damage incurred during or arising out of international air carriage. In opposition to this, the argument advanced by the Thibodeaus and the Commissioner is that the Montreal Convention has no force except in cases where it provides for a remedy. In their submissions, if the Montreal Convention does not provide for a remedy for a loss suffered, the applicant is free to seek damages under domestic law, in this case, under the OLA.
[26] In Sidhu v. British Airways, [1997] 1 All ER 193 [Sidhu], the leading case in this field, the House of Lords addressed the purpose of Article 24 of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage By Air, signed in Warsaw on October 12, 1929, reproduced in the Carriage by Air Act, Schedule I, [Warsaw Convention], the previous version of Article 29 of the Montreal Convention. The following comments are found at page 27 of that decision:
The intention seems to be to provide a secure regime, within which the restriction on the carrier's freedom of contract is to operate. Benefits are given to the passenger in return, but only in clearly defined circumstances to which the limits of liability set out by the Convention are to apply. To permit exceptions, whereby a passenger could sue outwith the Convention for losses sustained in the course of international carriage by air, would distort the whole system, even in cases for which the Convention did not create any liability on the part of the carrier. Thus, the purpose is to ensure that, in all questions relating to the carrier's liability, it is the provisions of the Convention which apply and that the passenger does not have access to any other remedies, whether under the common law or otherwise, which may be available within the particular country where he chooses to raise his action. The carrier does not need to make provision for the risk of being subjected to such remedies, because the whole matter is regulated by the Convention.
[Emphasis added.]
[27] Then, in El Al Israel Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 US 155 (1999) 119 S. Ct. 662, [Tseng], the Supreme Court of the United States followed Sidhu, writing “. . . recovery for a personal injury suffered ‘on board [an] aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking,’ . . . if not allowed under the Convention, is not available at all” (at page 161). Mr. Tseng had brought an action against the airli