R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd.

R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd.
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2001-10-19
Neutral citation
2001 SCC 70
Report
[2001] 3 SCR 209
Case number
26664
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; L'Heureux-Dubé, Claire; Gonthier, Charles Doherty; Iacobucci, Frank; Major, John C.; Bastarache, Michel; Binnie, William Ian Corneil; Arbour, Louise; LeBel, Louis
On appeal from
Quebec
Subjects
Constitutional law
Labour law
Notes
SCC Case Information: 26664
Decision Content
R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209, 2001 SCC 70
Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., Gilles Thériault,
Luc Loyer, Éric Schryer, Jean Grégoire, Daniel Matte,
Raymond Matte, Paul Rock, Marc Piché, Denis St-Amour,
Ray Matte Couvreur, 161614 Canada Inc.,
Ateliers de Menuiserie Allaire Inc., Paul Rodrigue,
Raymond Plante and Michel Mongeon Appellants
v.
Her Majesty The Queen Respondent
and
The Attorney General of Quebec Mis en cause
and
Commission de la construction du Québec,
Centrale des syndicats démocratiques (CSD-Construction),
Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN-Construction),
Conseil provincial du Québec des métiers de la construction (International),
Fédération des travailleurs du Québec (FTQ-Construction),
Canadian Coalition of Open Shop Contracting Associations and
Canadian Office of the Building and
Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO Interveners
Indexed as: R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd.
Neutral citation: 2001 SCC 70.
File No.: 26664.
2000: March 20; 2001: October 19.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and L’Heureux‑Dubé, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for quebec
Labour law -- Quebec construction industry -- Contractors charged with hiring employees who did not have competency certificates and workers charged with working without competency certificates as required under Quebec construction legislation -- Whether requirement that workers become members of one of listed union groups in order to obtain competency certificates unconstitutional -- Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2 (d) -- Act Respecting Labour Relations, Vocational Training and Manpower Management in the Construction Industry, R.S.Q., c. R-20, ss. 28-40, 85.5, 85.6, 119.1, 120.
Constitutional law -- Charter of Rights -- Freedom of association -- Contractors charged with hiring employees who did not have competency certificates and workers charged with working without competency certificates as required under Quebec construction legislation -- Whether requirement that workers become members of one of listed union groups in order to obtain competency certificates unconstitutional -- Whether guarantee of freedom of association includes right not to associate -- Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2 (d) -- Act Respecting Labour Relations, Vocational Training and Manpower Management in the Construction Industry, R.S.Q., c. R-20, ss. 28-40, 85.5, 85.6, 119.1, 120.
The appellants, who are contractors, real estate promoters and construction workers, were charged with hiring employees who did not have the required competency certificates to work on a construction project or with working in the industry without the proper competency certificates, contrary to s. 119.1 of the Quebec Act Respecting Labour Relations, Vocational Training and Manpower Management in the Construction Industry (the “Construction Act”). The appellants asserted that workers could not obtain the proper competency certificates without becoming members of one of the union groups listed in s. 28 of the Construction Act. They claimed that this obligation was unconstitutional because it breached the right not to associate which, in their opinion, was a component of the guarantee of freedom of association in s. 2 (d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms .
At the time, s. 28 of the Construction Act provided that the five union groups listed were the only groups entitled to an assessment of their representativeness. Under s. 30, the Commission de la construction du Québec draws up a list of construction workers qualified to take part in a mandatory vote under s. 32, during which each worker must opt for one of the union groups as his or her bargaining representative. In order to take part in that vote, a construction worker must hold a journeyman competency certificate, an occupation competency certificate or an apprentice competency certificate. Construction workers must also have worked 300 hours in the industry in the 15 months before the election is held. On the basis of the vote, the Commission determines the representativeness of every association under s. 35. This degree of representativeness determines the extent of the influence of each association in the negotiation process. Only a union or a group of associations with a representativeness of 50 percent or greater of all certified construction workers may negotiate collective agreements. If a union’s degree of representativeness does not reach at least 15 percent, it is even deprived of the right to attend collective bargaining sessions.
The trial judge dismissed the constitutional argument and found the appellants guilty as charged. The Superior Court affirmed that judgment. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants’ motion for leave to appeal to that court.
Held (McLachlin C.J. and Major, Bastarache and Binnie JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be dismissed. The impugned legislation is constitutional.
Per Gonthier, Arbour and LeBel JJ.: The appellants have standing to raise the constitutional questions stated. As appears from the legislation challenged, the conditions governing the issuance of competency certificates and union membership are closely linked. A successful challenge to the provisions governing the compulsory choice of a collective bargaining agent might give rise to some defence to the specific charges laid in this case. Moreover, at the present stage of the proceedings, the interest of justice favours a careful consideration of the substantive issues brought before this Court.
Although the right of association represents a social phenomenon involving the linking together of a number of persons, it belongs first to the individual. It fosters one’s self-fulfilment by allowing one to develop one’s qualities as a social being. The act of engaging in legal activities, in conjunction with others, receives constitutional protection. The focus of the analysis remains on the individual, not on the group.
While the majority of the Court acknowledged in Lavigne that there was a negative right not to associate, it also accepted a democratic rationale for putting internal limits on it. An approach that fails to read in some inner limits and restrictions on a right not to associate would deny the individual the benefits arising from an association. The acknowledgement of a negative right not to associate would not justify a finding of an infringement of the guarantee whenever a form of compelled association arises. Some forms of compelled association in the workplace might be compatible with Charter values and the guarantee of freedom of association. An inquiry must take place into the nature of the commitment to an association. In the case of a legislated form of union security, the nature of the legislative scheme must also be closely scrutinized.
The appellants have not made out a case that the challenged legislation establishes a form of ideological conformity that would trigger the application of s. 2 (d) of the Charter . As it stands, the law does not impose on construction workers much more than the bare obligation to belong to a union. Their obligation boils down to the obligation to designate a collective bargaining representative, to belong to it for a given period of time, and to pay union dues. At the same time, the Act provides protection against past, present and potential abuses of union power. Unions are deprived of any direct control over employment in the industry. They may not set up or operate an office or union hall. No discrimination is allowed against the members of different unions. Provided they hold the required competency certificates, all workers are entitled to work in the construction industry without regard to their particular union affiliation. Section 96 grants members clear rights of information and participation in union life. The law allows any construction worker to change his or her union affiliation, at the appropriate time.
There is simply no evidence to support judicial notice of Quebec unions ideologically coercing their members. Such an inference presumes that unions hold a single ideology and impose it on their rank and file, including the complainants in this case. Such an inference would amount to little more than an unsubstantiated stereotype. The appellants presented no evidence that the legislation imposes a form of ideological conformity or threatens a liberty interest protected by the Charter , which is necessary for it to infringe the right not to associate under s. 2 (d). The evidence does not even indicate whether unions are engaged in causes and activities that the appellants disapprove of. This is not a subject where judicial knowledge could and should replace proper evidentiary records unless the fact of joining a union were, of itself, evidence of a particular ideological bent. The well-known fact of trade union participation in public life in Canada does not demonstrate that every union worker joining a union under a union security arrangement should be considered prima facie a victim of a breach of the Charter .
The question at stake in this appeal should be left to the political process. Such a solution retains a balance in the application of the Charter , and leaves the legal management of labour relations to Parliament and legislatures as well as to the parties to labour agreements. The management of labour relations requires a delicate exercise in reconciling conflicting values and interests. The relevant political, social and economic considerations lie largely beyond the area of expertise of courts. This limited and prudent approach to court interventions in the field of labour relations reflects a proper understanding of the functions of courts and legislatures. In the application of the Charter , it also avoids characterizing any kind of governmental action in support of human rights as a prima facie infringement of the Charter that would have to be justified under s. 1 .
Even if the legislation had infringed the s. 2 (d) right not to associate, it would still be justified under s. 1 of the Charter . Legislatures are entitled to a substantial, though not absolute, degree of latitude and deference to settle social and economic policy issues. Courts should be mindful to avoid second-guessing legislatures on controversial and complex political choices. The jurisprudence acknowledges that legislative policy-making in the domain of labour relations is better left to the political process, as a general rule. The limits at issue here are prescribed by law. The law also addresses a pressing and substantial purpose. The history of the legislation demonstrates that the Quebec National Assembly tried to address problems that had become a pressing social and economic issue, which led to a process of trial and error that lasted for several years, and is still going on.
Moreover, a rational connection existed between the means chosen by the legislature and their goal. The voting procedure constituted the fairest and most effective way to determine the representativeness of unions. The obligation to join them demonstrated the will to involve workers in the management of their association, to foster and increase their participation in union life and in union decisions, after a period when democratic values had often been flouted by local unions. The legislature viewed this form of security as a better instrument to maintain and develop democracy than the Rand formula, under which workers pay for services and have no say on the most important issues concerning the association and its members. As it still does, the construction industry played a major role in the economy and development of the province. Its labour relations were constantly in turmoil for several years. Union democracy was in peril. It had become difficult to set up a workable system of collective bargaining. A resolution of these difficulties involved both the establishment of the representative status of labour unions and the safeguarding of union democracy. The National Assembly sought, in this way, to address the objective of establishing peace and economic efficiency in the industry. Given the nature of these difficulties, the provisions involving the selection of a bargaining representative, the obligation to choose among a limited number of union groups and compulsory financial support were related to this objective. They attempted to create a workable mechanism to establish the representativeness of unions while safeguarding union pluralism. There is no evidence that any active employee association in the industry was left out of the process. On the contrary, the legislature usually tried to take into account the numerous changes in the organization of the labour groups. In this manner, these measures directly aim to further important social and economic purposes.
Viewed in the context of the particular historical experience of Quebec’s labour relations, the legislation also meets the minimal impairment test. This limited form of compelled association respects fundamental democratic values. It requires only a limited commitment from construction employees. They must choose a collective bargaining agent. The legislation gives them a choice among five union groups. It appears that no new group has been left out of the process. The law also calls upon construction employers to support the chosen approach. Nothing more is imposed by the law. Finally, the advantages of the legislation clearly outweigh their limited impact upon the asserted negative right not to associate. The Construction Act imposes strict obligations on unions in respect of internal democracy. Any form of employment discrimination is also forbidden. The whole process of hiring has been entirely removed from union control by legislation. Through a difficult process of legislative experimentation, the legislation has reestablished a degree of peace and union democracy in the Quebec construction industry. The Court is called upon to consider the validity of a complex legislative scheme, born out of a history of attempts, failures and disappointments. At the time the present litigation started, this legislation presented the result of about 30 years of legislative work to create a proper system of collective bargaining in the industry. A considerable degree of deference is due to the legislature and the difficulties inherent in the art of government in such a traditionally fractious environment. Court intervention might affect sensitive aspects of a carefully balanced scheme and is not warranted in the circumstances of this case.
Per L’Heureux-Dubé J.: LeBel J.’s extensive review of the troubled history of labour relations in the Quebec construction industry and of the legislative history of the Construction Act was agreed with, as was his conclusion that the Act is constitutional. For the reasons given by Wilson J. in Lavigne, however, s. 2 (d) of the Charter includes only the positive freedom to associate. The alleged protected “right not to associate” is nowhere articulated in the Charter , and is antithetical to the purpose and scope of the protected right of association. The negative right does not sit well with the structure of the Charter . Moreover, it would trivialize the Charter since the recognition of such a right would have serious consequences, which would oblige the courts to adopt severe limitations to differentiate between genuine and constitutionally insignificant violations of s. 2 (d). While no one should be forced to associate, s. 2 (d) of the Charter does not offer such constitutional protection. Rather, and particularly on the narrowly circumscribed definition of that right and numerous built-in exceptions adopted by LeBel J., the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression under s. 2 (b) will come into play if and when one is forced to associate, as well as possibly s. 7 of the Charter .
Negative rights are viewed as individual rights embodying individual goals: an individual is given the constitutional right not to belong to an association. If the fundamental purpose of freedom of association is to permit the collective pursuit of common goals, then the very concept of a “negative freedom of association” becomes suspect. The collective pursuit of “common goals” in such a context leads to an abstraction which is difficult to justify.
The course of judicial restraint suggests that no new constitutional doctrine should be developed if existing doctrine could resolve the issue. Constitutional remedies are powerful tools which ought to be used with prudence. When required, however, they should be applied with vigour and in a purposive manner. An additional reason for caution is based on the fact that the impetus for efforts to establish the negative right to association has historically originated with those opposed to the establishment or maintenance of labour associations. The creation and application of new judicial tools, featuring a questionable mark of origin, will inevitably generate new jurisprudence to which there are certain risks attached. Such a development may not be viewed as prudent, especially in light of the fact that there is no need to take such a risk because proven alternatives are available.
Per Iacobucci J.: The freedom of association guaranteed by s. 2 (d) of the Charter encompasses a negative right to be free from compelled association, which is infringed by the legislation at issue here. An analysis that construes the negative freedom within s. 2 (d) more broadly than the “ideological conformity” test should be adopted. Where the state obliges an association of individuals whose affiliation is already compelled by the facts of life (such as in the workplace), and the association serves the common good or furthers the collective social welfare, s. 2 (d) will not be violated unless the forced association imposes a danger to a specific liberty interest. The state-imposed association established by the Construction Act does not promote the common good or further the collective social welfare within the context of s. 2 (d) of the Charter . The legislation fails to provide any justification for the compelled union association that it envisages for Quebec’s construction industry. Membership in union groups is not contingent upon any competency requirements and there is thus no public assurance that workers within these groups will have the necessary skills and abilities to carry out their trade. Furthermore, the provisions of this legislation impair the appellants’ liberty interests. The present appeal involves construction workers in Quebec who have no choice but to unionize in order to carry out their work. Their liberty is further restricted by the fact that they must become members of one of five union groups that have been specifically accepted by the state. However, the legislation is justified under s. 1 of the Charter . The Construction Act was adopted within a unique and complex historical context, and served to promote distinct social and economic objectives that were, and remain, pressing and substantial. Further, for the reasons given by LeBel J., the legislation is rationally connected to these objectives, it minimally impairs the freedoms guaranteed under s. 2 (d), and its benefits outweigh its deleterious effects.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Major, Bastarache and Binnie JJ. (dissenting): Section 2 (d) of the Charter implies a negative right not to associate. The test for an infringement of this right, however, is not whether there is evidence of ideological coercion or conformity imposed by the forced association. For ideological conformity to exist, it is not necessary that there be evidence of an imposition of union values or opinions on the member, evidence of a limitation of the member’s free expression, or evidence that the union participates in causes and activities of which the member disapproves. The interpretation of ideological conformity must be broader and take place in context. In this case, this context would take into account the true nature of unions as participatory bodies holding political and economic roles in society which, in turn, translates into the existence of ideological positions. To mandate that an individual adhere to such a union is ideological conformity.
The challenged statutory provisions infringe the negative right which forms part of s. 2 (d). Under the Construction Act, membership in one of the unions is obligatory. Furthermore, membership has meaning. Membership is about sharing values, joining to pursue goals in common, expressing views reflecting the position of a particular group in society. It is because of the collective force produced by membership that unions can be a potent force in public debate, that they can influence Parliament and the legislatures in their functions, that they can bargain effectively. This force must be constituted democratically to conform to s. 2 (d).
It is not necessary to have more independent evidence of the ideological views of the specific unions involved in this case. It is in fact sufficient that adherence is required to a scheme advocating state-imposed compulsory membership which affects freedom of conscience and expression, as well as liberty and mobility interests, for it to have a negative impact on the right to work, because such adherence itself is a form of ideological coercion. Ideological constraint exists in particular where membership numbers are used to promote ideological agendas and this is so even where there is no evidence that the union is coercing its members to believe in what it promotes.
In this case, workers objected to being forced to join a union and objected generally to the compulsory unionization scheme, which is ideological in nature. This is a case where the freedom not to associate is markedly infringed. It is a clear situation of government coercion, the result of which mandates that workers in the construction industry in Quebec group together in a few unions which are specified and approved by government. The fact that there are five unions from which workers can choose in no way negates this infringement for it remains government-mandated group affiliation. Self-realization of the worker is violated in many ways. He or she must unionize. Within the prescribed regime, democracy is further restricted by limited choice. There is no guarantee that a majority of voters will exercise their right. A default provision can determine the outcome of elections. Those voting for minority associations may be left out of future negotiations. When freedom not to associate is considered in light of other Charter values, including liberty, freedom of conscience and expression, mobility and the right to work, it must be concluded that governmental mandatory union association infringes this important Charter right. Ideological conformity is engaged in particular because the members of the associations necessarily participate in and indirectly support a system of forced association and state control over work opportunity. This is a situation whereby the democratic rights of workers are taken away. Being forced to accept and participate in a system that severely limits the democratic principle in the area of labour relations is a form of coercion that cannot be segregated totally from ideological conformity.
There is also a breach of the positive right to associate. There are severe restrictions on the right of a person to join one of the five chosen unions in order to work in the construction industry in Quebec. Even if the conditions imposed by s. 30 of the Construction Act were permissible limitations on freedom of association, the regional quotas would still need to be justified under s. 1 . They unduly infringe the ability of workers to join a union, which is a prerequisite for working in the construction industry in Quebec. As such, they are an infringement of the s. 2 (d) freedom of association.
The infringement of s. 2 (d) is not justifiable. In determining whether this infringement can be justified by s. 1 , this Court must again take into consideration Charter values including liberty, freedom of expression, the right to work and mobility rights. While it is in the public interest to have structured collective bargaining and to provide for competency requirements, and these are no doubt pressing and substantial objectives, they are not the true objectives of the impugned provisions. The legislation brings into play restrictions on the admission to the industry, cancellation of the ability to have a non-unionized business, restrictions on bargaining rights, imposition of regional quotas and impingement of regional mobility. It has not been demonstrated that there is a logical relationship between the legislation’s stated objectives and these restrictions. Any justification based on competency is untenable. The actual requirements of s. 30 and the regional quotas have little if anything to do with the professional competence of workers in the construction industry. Being a resident of Quebec in the previous year, having worked a set number of hours in that year, and being less than 50 years old, do not verify competence. The same may be said for the regional quotas and control over regional mobility within the province. There is accordingly no rational connection between the objective and the measures taken. Moreover, the requirements of the minimal impairment branch of the proportionality test have not been met. If the purpose of the legislation is viewed as ensuring the competency of construction workers, neither the limitation of the “freedom to associate” nor the limitation of the “freedom from association” is minimally impairing. Section 30 and the regional quotas have little or nothing at all to do with competence and therefore cannot be viewed as minimal impairments of s. 2 (d).
Cases Cited
By LeBel J.
Considered: Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211; Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; referred to: Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367; R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27; Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989; PSAC v. Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460; International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union __ Canada Area Local 500 v. Canada, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 150; RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573; Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497; Reference re Education Act (Que.), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 511; Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2000 SCC 1; Mahe v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010; R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101; Black v. Law Society of Alberta, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591; R. v. Skinner, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1235; Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123; Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569; Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157; U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048; Lester (W.W.) (1978) Ltd. v. United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry, Local 740, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 644; Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701; R. v. Find, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 863, 2001 SCC 32; R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128; Willick v. Willick, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 670; Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949); Railway Employes’ Department v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956); International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963); Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986); Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); Eur. Court H.R., Young, James and Webster judgment of 13 August 1981, Series A No. 44; Eur. Court H.R., Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere judgment of 23 June 1981, Series A No. 43; Eur. Court H.R., Sigurjónsson v. Iceland judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A No. 264; Eur. Court H.R., Gustafsson v. Sweden judgment of 25 April 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II; Chassagnou and Others v. France [GD], Nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, ECHR 1999-III; Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203; Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513; RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295; Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927; R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713; M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3; Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892; U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v. KMart Canada Ltd., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083; Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825; R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303; Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624; Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120, 2000 SCC 69; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
By L’Heureux-Dubé J.
Considered: Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211; referred to: Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989; Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157; R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296; Merry v. Manitoba and Manitoba Medical Association (1989), 58 Man. R. (2d) 221; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295; Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; Eur. Court H.R., Sigurjónsson v. Iceland judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A No. 264; Chassagnou and Others v. France [GD], Nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, ECHR 1999-III.
By Iacobucci J.
Considered: Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211.
By Bastarache J. (dissenting)
Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211; Ford Motor Co. of Canada v. U.A.W.-I.C.O. (1946), 46 C.L.L.C. ¶18,001; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295; R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817; Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326; R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411; Mills v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863; Mooring v. Canada (National Parole Board), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 75; R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2; R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315; Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Act Respecting Labour Relations, Vocational Training and Manpower Management in the Construction Industry, R.S.Q., c. R-20, ss. 1, 17(9), 27, 28-40, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 36.1 [ad. 1996, c. 74, s. 36], 38, 39, 41, 42.1, 85.5, 85.6, 94, 95, 96, 99, 101, 102, 104, 119, 119.1, 120, 124.
Act to amend the Act Respecting Labour Relations, Vocational Training and Manpower Management in the Construction Industry and other legislative provisions, S.Q. 1993, c. 61, s. 15(3).
Act to amend the Act Respecting Labour Relations, Vocational Training and Manpower Management in the Construction Industry and other legislative provisions, S.Q. 1994, c. 8.
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 10(2).
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1 , 2 (b), (d), 6 , 7 , 15 , 23 , 32 .
Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, arts. 2085, 2097.
Code of Penal Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25.1.
Collective Agreement Decrees Act, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 143 (now R.S.Q., c. D-2).
Collective Labour Agreements Extension Act, S.Q. 1934, c. 56.
Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35 .
Construction Industry Labour Relations Act, S.Q. 1968, c. 45, ss. 3, 59.
Election Act, R.S.Q., c. E-3.3.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, arts. 9, 10, 11.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, arts. 6, 8(1)(a).
Labour Code, R.S.Q., c. C-27, s. 47.
Labour Code, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 141.
Labour Code, S.Q. 1963-64, c. 45.
Labour Relations Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 162A.
Public Service Staff Relations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-35 .
Referendum Act, R.S.Q., c. C-64.1.
Regulation respecting the election of a representative association by the employees of the construction industry, (1997) 129 O.G. II, 1866, s. 23.
Regulation respecting the issuance of competency certificates, (1987) 119 O.G. II, 1471 [am. (1989) 121 O.G. II, 2782], ss. 1 , 2 , 2.1, 3, 4, 4.1.
Regulation respecting the placement of employees in the construction industry, R.R.Q. 1981, c. R-20, r. 10, ss. 6, 10.
Regulation respecting the registration certificate issued by the Office de la construction du Québec, R.R.Q. 1981, c. R-20, r. 3 [repealed in 1997], ss. 1 , 3 .
Regulation respecting the vocational training and qualification of manpower in the construction industry, R.R.Q. 1981, c. F-5, r. 3, ss. 7, 16, Schedule B.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), art. 20.
Authors Cited
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