Reference as to Validity of The Debt Adjustment Act, Alberta

Reference as to Validity of The Debt Adjustment Act, Alberta
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
1941-12-02
Report
[1942] SCR 31
Judges
Duff, Lyman Poore; Rinfret, Thibaudeau; Crocket, Oswald Smith; Davis, Henry Hague; Kerwin, Patrick; Hudson, Albert Blellock; Taschereau, Robert
On appeal from
Alberta
Subjects
Constitutional law
Decision Content
Supreme Court of Canada
Reference as to Validity of The Debt Adjustment Act, Alberta, [1942] S.C.R. 31
Date: 1941-12-02.
In The Matter of A Reference as to The Validity of The Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, Statutes of Alberta, 1937, Chapter 9, as Amended, and as to The Operation Thereof.
1941: June 24, 25, 26; 1941: December 2.
Present:—Duff C.J. and Rinfret, Crocket, Davis, Kerwin, Hudson and Taschereau JJ.
Constitutional law—Debt Adjustment Act, Alta., 1937, c. 9 (as amended)—Constitutional validity—Object, effect, pith and substance, of the legislation—Whether laws of general application—Repugnancy to Dominion legislation—Invasion of field of legislation reserved to the Dominion—B.N.A. Act, ss. 91, 92.
The Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, Statutes of Alberta, 1937, c. 9 (as amended in 1937 (3rd session), c. 2; 1938, c. 27; 1938 (2nd session), c. 5; 1939, c. 81; and 1941, c. 42), is ultra vires in whole. Its effect is to take away from all creditors who are the owners of debts or liquidated demands that, apart from the Act, would be presently enforceable by law, their rights in respect of their enforceability by action or suit, and to substitute for such rights the chance of obtaining, by the arbitrary determination of a public authority, the Debt Adjustment Board (the appeal given therefrom is merely one from the arbitrary determination of one authority to the arbitrary determination of another), permission to enforce them. Such an enactment is something more than one relating to procedure; it strikes at the substance of the creditor's rights. The Act is repugnant to the provisions of Dominion statutes (instances mentioned) relating to matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Dominion Parliament, provisions creating or directly giving rise to or recognizing obligations in the nature of debts or liquidated demands. To establish any such authority, with its powers of selection, involving a considerable power of regulation of classes of business and undertakings over which the B.N.A. Act gives to the Parliament of Canada exclusive control, is incompetent to the provincial legislature.
The prohibitory provisions of the Act in question against proceedings by way of execution, etc., without the Board's permit, is ultra vires by reason of considerations of much the same character as those aforesaid. The Board is authorized to refuse a permit in any particular case. The pith and substance of the legislation is to establish, a provincial authority empowered to exercise a discriminatory control. While in form it is legislation in relation to remedy and procedure, yet, in attempting to regulate the remedial incidents of the right in manner aforesaid, it must, when read in light of its context in the Act, in substance be regarded as a step in a design to regulate the right itself.
As to companies incorporated by the Dominion, companies with objects other than provincial objects, in relation to the incorporation, status and powers of which companies the Dominion Parliament has, under s. 91 of the B.N.A. Act, exclusive power to legislate:—It is true that, where the business of the company is subject to provincial legislative regulation, the provincial legislature may legislate in such a manner as to affect the business of the company by laws of general application in relation to the kind of business in which the company engages in the province—but the enactments now in question, authorizing interference with the affairs of creditors in manner aforesaid, are not a general law in this sense.
The matters dealt with by s. 26 of the Act are so related to the subject-matter of The Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act as to be withdrawn from provincial jurisdiction by force of the last paragraph of s. 91 of the B.N.A. Act.
Also the Act constitutes an attempt to invade the field reserved to the Dominion under Bankruptcy and Insolvency.
Assuming that, by apt legislation strictly limited to enactments relating exclusively to matters within the legislative jurisdiction of a province, a Board might lawfully be constituted having some of the powers which the Debt Adjustment Board receives under the Act, yet, in any view of that question, it is impossible in the Act to disentangle what a provincial legislature might competently enact from the principal enactments of the Act constituting the Board with authority to exercise powers that the legislature is incompetent to confer upon it; and indeed, if this were possible and the Act could be re-written excluding what is ultra vires from what (on said assumption) might be intra vires, there can be no probability that the legislature would have enacted the Act in this truncated form. The competent elements of the legislation, if such there be, not being severable from the incompetent enactments constituting the Board with the powers conferred upon it, the Act is, as a whole, ultra vires.
Crocket J. dissented, holding: The Act (as amended as aforesaid) is not ultra vires, in whole or in part, except in so far as its provisions may be found to conflict with any existing Dominion legislation strictly relating to any of the classes of subjects specially enumerated in s. 91 of the B.N.A. Act or as being necessarily incidental to the particular subject-matter upon which the Parliament of Canada has undertaken to legislate as falling within one or other of the said enumerated heads. The whole purpose of the Act in question is to regulate and control the enforcement of contractual obligations for the payment of money so as to safeguard during a period of financial stress the interests of unfortunate resident debtors who, owing entirely to general depreciation of values through abnormal economic conditions, find themselves in such a position that the stringent enforcement of creditors' claims might entail irreparable loss upon them. Its provisions are predominantly directed to procedure in civil matters in provincial courts. The right to sue in provincial courts is a civil right in the province, whether the claim sought to be enforced arose in the province or not. The Act is one of general application in the province, within the meaning of the authorities. None of its provisions are directed to insolvency legislation nor to banks or banking legislation, nor to the contracts of Dominion companies, carrying on business either within or without the province, though they may affect these subjects and these rights collaterally as a necessary incident to the attainment of the objects of the Act. While it was held in Attorney-General for Alberta and Winstanley v. Atlas Lumber Co. Ltd., [1941] S.C.R. 87, that s. 8 of the Act conflicted with certain Dominion legislation strictly and necessarily relating to head 18 of s. 91 of the B.N.A. Act (Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes) and that the latter must prevail, it does not follow that the Act in question must be held to be wholly ultra vires merely because it affects or may affect Bankruptcy or Insolvency, Banks and Banking, Interest or any other subject enumerated in s. 91 upon which the Dominion Parliament has purported to legislate as falling within one or more of those classes of subjects. "Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes" is the only class of contracts specifically mentioned in s. 91 of the B.N.A. Act, and this specific enumeration may well be said to expressly withdraw that class of contracts from the exclusive jurisdiction of the province in relation to s. 92 (13), "Property and Civil Rights in the Province." (Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons, 7 App. Cas. 96; Attorney-General of Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1894] A.C. 189; Ladore v. Bennett, [1939] A.C. 468, and other cases, cited).
REFERENCE by His Excellency the Governor General in Council, pursuant to the authority of s. 55 of the Supreme Court Act (R.S.C., 1927, c. 35), to the Supreme Court of Canada, of the following questions for hearing and consideration, namely: (1) Is The Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, being chapter 9 of the Statutes of Alberta, 1937, as amended by chapter 2 of the Statutes of Alberta, 1937 (3rd session), chapter 27. of the Statutes of Alberta, 1938, chapter 5 of the Statutes of Alberta, 1938 (2nd session), chapter 81 of the Statutes of Alberta, 1939, and chapter 42 of the Statutes of Alberta, 1941, ultra vires of the Legislature of Alberta, either in whole or in part, and if so, in what particular or particulars or to what extent?
(2) Is the said Act as amended operative in respect of any action or suit for the recovery of moneys alleged to be owing under or in respect of any bill of exchange or promissory note?
(3) Is the said Act as amended operative in respect of any proceedings taken to enforce any judgment obtained in any action or suit for the recovery of moneys owing under or in respect of any bill of exchange or promissory note?
(4) Is the said Act as amended operative in respect of any action or suit for the recovery of money or interest thereon, or both, not being money or interest alleged to be owing under or in respect of any bill of exchange or promissory note, whether or not such money or interest is secured upon land situated in the said province, in the following cases, namely, where such action or suit is for the recovery of,—
(a) the principal amount of such money and interest, if any, where the same are payable in the said province;
(b) the principal amount of such money and interest, if any, where the same are payable outside the said province;
(c) the interest only upon such money.
(5) If the answer to any of the parts (a), (b) and (c) of question 4 is in the negative, is the said Act as amended operative in respect of any proceedings taken to enforce any judgment obtained in any action or suit in respect of which such answer is given?
The respective Attorneys-General of the Provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Quebec and Saskatchewan, and the Mortgage Loans Association of Alberta and the Canadian Bankers' Association were, pursuant to order of the Chief Justice of Canada, notified of the hearing of the Reference.
Aimé Geoffrion K.C. and F. P. Varcoe K.C. for the Attorney-General of Canada.
W. N. Tilley K.C., T. D'Arcy Leonard K.C., and R. D. Tighe K.C. for The Mortgage Loans Association of Alberta.
W.N. Tilley K.C., R. C. McMichael K.C. and W. H. McLaws K.C., for The Canadian Bankers' Association.
J. W. deB. Farris K.C., W. S. Gray K.C. and J. J. Frawley K.C., for the Attorney-General of Alberta. J. M. Stevenson K.C. for the Attorney-General of Saskatchewan.
L. St-Laurent K.C. for the Attorney-General of Quebec.
The judgment of the Chief Justice and Rinfret, Davis, Kerwin, Hudson and Taschereau JJ. was delivered by
The Chief Justice—By section 8, subsection 1 (a), of the Debt Adjustment Act, a legal right which the owner of it is entitled to enforce is converted into a conditional right, enforceable only by grace of a permit from the Board granting to the owner of it a dispensation from the incidence of the general rule.
This authority of the Board may be considered with reference to debts arising by virtue of statutes, or legal rules, that the legislature is powerless to repeal or vary, as well as with reference to creditors whose powers and status it is incompetent to impair, or whose undertakings, or business, the legislature is incompetent to regulate.
It is most important, I think, not to lose sight of the arbitrary nature of the Board's authority. The powers of the Board, it will be noticed, may be exercised by any single member of the Board, or by any person designated by the Board, with the approval of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council. Ex hypothesi the debt or liquidated demand, which the Board has to consider on any application for a permit, may be one which, but for the statute, would admittedly be enforceable by law; and in discussing the operation of the enactment I shall assume that we are dealing with a debt, or demand, admittedly so enforceable.
The statute prescribes no rule, or principle, by which the Board, or its designated agent, is to be guided in granting, or refusing, a permit; nor does it give any clue to the considerations upon which the Board is to act. I do not think that any Court can, with any confidence, form a judgment as to the reasons by which the Board will be guided, except that the Board may be assumed to act in accordance with its own conception of its duty in each particular case. It is the duty of the Board, under section 10 of the Act, to make such enquiries as it may deem proper into the circumstances, but that section makes it clear. I think, that it is for the Board exclusively to decide what are the considerations by which it ought to be influenced in granting, or refusing, an application for a permit, or adjourning the application for such period as it "may deem advisable under the circumstances." In effect the Board is empowered to exercise in each particular case an arbitrary determination. The appeal to a jury, given by the amending statute, on which it is to decide as a question of fact whether the determination of the Board is to stand, or is to be changed, merely gives an appeal from the arbitrary determination of one authority to the arbitrary determination of another. The consequence of all this is that all creditors who are the owners of debts, or liquidated demands, that, apart from the statute, would be presently enforceable by law, have their rights in respect of their enforceability by action, or suit, taken away, and for them they have substituted the possibility of obtaining from this authority permission to enforce them.
The distinction between right and remedy is often a useful distinction, but an enactment which takes away the remedy by action, which the law otherwise would give to the creditor in respect of his debt, and substitutes therefor the chance of obtaining, by the arbitrary act of a public authority, permission to enforce a remedy is, I think, something more than an enactment relating to procedure. It strikes, I think, at the substance of the creditor's rights. The enactment is repugnant to the provisions of Dominion statutes relating to matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Dominion Parliament, provisions creating or directly giving rise to, or recognizing, obligations in the nature of debts and liquidated demands: for example, certain provisions of the Bills of Exchange Act, section 125 of the Bank Act, and provisions in respect of calls made by a Dominion company upon the holders of unpaid shares (see section 44, Companies Act). Such instances could be multiplied.
There is another class of cases that I have just alluded to, the consideration of which leaves it, I think, very clear that in attempting to establish an authority of this character a provincial legislature is exceeding its authority. Section 91 of the British North America Act gives to the Parliament of Canada exclusive control over certain types of business and undertakings. I particularly refer to two classes of business only. The first of these, that of banks, perhaps illustrates the point most strikingly. The lending of money is a principal part of the business of any bank. A debt arising from a loan by a bank to a customer will, speaking generally, fall within section 8.(1) (a), and the bank's right to enforce repayment is by the enactment conditioned upon the existence of a permit. It is in the power of the Board to refuse a permit in all such cases, or in the case of any particular debt. This power of selection seems to involve a considerable power of regulation of the business of the banks. It is, I think, incompetent to the legislature to establish any such authority. I think the case of banking is, perhaps, from this point of view, the most striking case, although the application of the authority of the Board to companies engaged in operating Dominion undertakings, such as Dominion railway companies and companies engaged in operating lines of ocean shipping, might well exceed the ambit of provincial authority.
What I have said is sufficient, in my opinion, to show that subsection (1) (a) of section 8 is ultra vires. I assume that debts and liquidated demands falling entirely (that is to say, exclusively) under the regulative authority of the province, as being "civil rights within the province", could be dealt with by a province by an enactment having the characteristics of section 8(1) (a), but limited to such debts and demands. It is not necessary to decide it, but I assume that to be so. I do not think that section 8(1) (a) can properly be construed as limited in its application to such debts and demands and it is, therefore, I think, entirely destitute of effect.
Subsection 1 (b) of section 8 presents a different question, but it is, in my opinion, ultra vires by reason of considerations of much the same character. It is no answer to say that the authority extends to all judgments; because the Board can arbitrarily refuse to grant a permit in any particular case. The Board is authorized to refuse a permit for a writ of execution where the debt sued upon is one which it has no power to regulate and to do so for any reason which to it may appear sufficient; and, of course, to discriminate in this respect between debts which it has power to regulate and debts in respect of which it has no such power.
We are not required to consider the authority of a provincial legislature to restrict the jurisdiction of the provincial Courts to giving declaratory judgments and to deprive them of the power to grant any consequential relief. This legislation affects the jurisdiction of the provincial Courts, but the pith and substance of it is to establish a provincial authority which is empowered to exercise the discriminatory control just mentioned. While in form this is legislation in relation to remedy and procedure, in substance this provision which attempts to regulate the remedial incidents of the right in this manner must, when it is read in light of the context in which it stands in this section 8 (1), be regarded as a step in a design to regulate the right itself.
There is a class of creditors occupying a special position which must be considered. I refer to companies incorporated by the Dominion. It is settled that in the case of companies with objects other than provincial objects, the exclusive power to legislate in relation to incorporation is vested in Parliament, and that by the joint operation of the residuary power under section 91 of the Confederation Act and the powers conferred upon Parliament in relation to the enumerated subject, the regulation of trade and commerce, this power extends to the status and powers of the company. True, where the business of the company is subject to provincial legislative regulation, the provincial legislature may legislate in such a manner as to affect the business of the company by laws of general application in relation to the kind of business in which the company engages in the province; but the provisions of this statute giving to the Board the authority to interfere with the affairs of creditors in the manner set forth in section 8 would not appear to be a general law in this sense.
A company, for example, incorporated by the Dominion with authority to carry on the business of lending money upon various kinds of security in the province, may find itself in a position, under the operation of subsections 1 (a) and (b) of section 8, in which it and other Dominion companies are precluded from enforcing their securities in the usual way. In my view, such legislation is not competent and, accordingly, paragraphs (c), (d), (e) and (f) would appear to be incompetent, as well as paragraphs (a) and (b).
As regards interest, subsection (1) of section 8 is plainly repugnant to section 2 of the Interest Act. In truth, the scope of subsection (1) of section 8 is indicated by paragraph (g) thereof and by section 41 which withdraws from the operation of the Act debts owing to The Canadian Farm Loan Board or to The Soldiers' Settlement Board and proceedings for enforcing the payment of any such debts. I think we must conclude that subsection (1) must be treated as a whole, that is to say, that it is valid or invalid as a whole, and for the reasons I have given it is, I think, invalid. The provisions of subsection (3) limiting the application of section 8 in the manner there mentioned do not, it appears to me, affect the force of what has been said. The whole of section 8 is ultra vires.
As to section 26, the matters dealt with by this enactment, in my opinion, are so related to the subject-matter of The Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act as to be withdrawn from provincial jurisdiction by force of the last paragraph of section 91.
There remains the contention of the Attorney-General of Canada that the statute as a whole constitutes an attempt to legislate in relation to bankruptcy and insolvency. I have very carefully considered this contention and the first thing that strikes one is that the effect of section 8 (1) is, as regards debts where the creditor and debtor reside in the province and the contract has been made in the province and the debt is payable in the province, that the creditor is deprived of his right to present a bankruptcy petition. As appears from what has already been said, section 8 (1) does not merely suspend the remedy—it takes away the remedy given by law and substitutes therefor a remedy dependent upon the arbitrary consent of the Board, or the arbitrary determination of a jury. As I have already said, this, in my opinion, strikes at the debt itself and I do not think that in any Court governed by this legislation it could be successfully contended that in respect of an obligation to which the statute applies there is a "debt owing" to the creditor, within the meaning of section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act. Moreover, I find it impossible to escape the conclusion that Part III contemplates the use of the Board's powers under section 8(1) to enable it to secure compulsorily the consent of the parties to arrangements proposed by it for composition and settlement. Bankruptcy is not mentioned, but normally the powers and duties of the Board under Part III will come into operation when a state of insolvency exists. It is not too much to say that it is for the purpose of dealing with the affairs of debtors who are pressed and unable to pay their debts as they fall due that these powers and duties are created. Indeed the whole statute is conceived as a means of protecting embarrassed debtors who are residents of Alberta. Most people would agree that in this point of view the motives prompting the legislation may be laudable ones. But the legislature, in seeking to attain its object, seems to have entered upon a field not open to it. The statute, if valid, enables the Board (invested with exclusive possession of the key to the Courts) to employ its position and powers coercively in compelling the creditors of an insolvent debtor and the debtor himself to consent to a disposition of the resources of the debtor prescribed by the Board. In this way the statute seeks to empower the Board to impose upon the insolvent debtor and his creditors a settlement of his affairs, which the creditors must accept in satisfaction of their claims. I cannot escape the conclusion that the statute contemplates the use of the powers of the Board in this way. I think this is an attempt to invade the field reserved to the Dominion under Bankruptcy and Insolvency.
It may be that by apt legislation strictly limited to enactments relating exclusively to matters within the legislative jurisdiction of a province, a Board might lawfully be constituted having some of the powers which the Debt Adjustment Board receives under this legislation. As already intimated, it is unnecessary to express any opinion upon that. In any view of that question, it is impossible in this legislation to disentangle what a provincial legislature might competently enact from the principal enactments of the statute constituting this Board with authority to exercise powers that the legislature is incompetent to confer upon it; and indeed, if this were possible and the Debt Adjustment Act could be re-written excluding what is ultra vires from what I assume might be intra vires, there can be no probability that the legislature would have enacted the statute in this truncated form. The competent elements of the legislation, if such there be, not being severable from the incompetent enactments constituting the Board with the powers conferred upon it, the statute is, as a whole, ultra vires.
It follows that the first interrogatory should be answered by stating that the enactment in question is ultra vires in whole. As regards the second, third, fourth and fifth interrogatories, it follows from the answer to the first that "the said Act as amended" is not operative in respect of any of the matters mentioned in those interrogatories.
Crocket J. (dissenting)—This reference raises the question of the authority of the Legislature of Alberta to enact legislation dealing with the matters to which the provisions of the Alberta Debt Adjustment Act are directed. The answers to the general question (1) and the other four subordinate questions submitted manifestly depend upon the scope and extent of the legislative powers committed to the Legislatures of the Provinces of Canada by s. 92 of the British North America Act, as read in the light of s. 91 and the intendment of the whole Act regarding the distribution of legislative authority between the Parliament of Canada on the one hand and the Provinces on the other.
We must, I think, take it as settled that provincial legislation upon matters, which prima facie fall within one or more of the 16 classes of subjects enumerated in s. 92 of the B.N.A. Act, cannot be validly superseded by any Dominion legislation of the Parliament of Canada unless the latter is necessarily incidental to the exercise of the powers conferred upon it by one or other of the 29 specially enumerated heads of s. 91, that is to say, as Lord Tomlin expressed it in Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for British Columbia[1], in his summing up of the effect of the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council regarding the interpretation and application of ss. 91 and 92, unless such legislation "strictly relates to subjects of legislation expressly enumerated in s. 91" or is "necessarily incidental to effective legislation by the Parliament of the Dominion upon a subject of legislation expressly enumerated in s. 91". See also Citizens Ins. Co. v. Parsons[2]; Cushing v. Dupuy[3]; Tennant v. Union Bank of Canada[4]; Attorney-General of Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominion of Canada[5], and City of Montreal v. Montreal Street Railway[6].
Another principle, which bears particularly on the construction of the words "Property and Civil Rights in the Province", as used in s. 92(13), was also distinctly laid down by the Judicial Committee in the Parsons case (1) at p. 109, viz., that the words "Property and Civil Rights" are there used in their largest sense, and are not limited to such rights only as flow from the law, e.g., the status of persons. There is "no sufficient reason in the language itself", said Sir Montague Smith in the judgment of the Board, "nor in the other parts of the Act, for giving so narrow an interpretation to the words 'civil rights'." This, of course, as my Lord the Chief Justice pointed out in delivering the unanimous judgment of this Court on the Reference re the Natural Products Marketing Act[7], is subject to the limitations expressly arising from the exception of the enumerated heads of s. 91 and impliedly from the specification of subjects in s. 92. Sir Montague himself went on to say regarding the enumerated heads of s. 91:
In looking at s. 91, it will be found, not only that there is no class including, generally, contracts and the rights arising from them, but that one class of contracts is mentioned and enumerated, viz., "18. Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes", which it would have been unnecessary to specify if authority over all contracts and the rights arising from them had belonged to the Dominion Parliament.
Practically the same thing was said of the phrase "Administration of Justice", as used in 92 (14), by Street J., in delivering the judgment of himself and Falconbridge J., in Reg. v. Bush[8]. The words of paragraph 14 of s. 92, he said, confer upon the Provincial Legislatures the right to regulate and provide for the whole machinery connected with the administration of justice in the Provinces, including the appointment of all Judges and officers requisite for the proper administration of justice in its widest sense, reserving only the procedure in criminal matters,
as reserved by 91 (27) and subject to the provisions of ss. 96-100 relating to the appointment and payment of judges of Superior, District and County Courts and the constitution of a General Court of Appeal for Canada under s. 101. This pronouncement was distinctly and unanimously approved by this Court in a judgment delivered by the learned Chief Justice. See [1938] S.C.R., at p. 406, on the Reference regarding the validity of the provisions of the Ontario Adoption, the Children's Protection and the Deserted Wives' and Children's Maintenance Acts vesting certain functions in County Court and District Court Judges, and in Police Magistrates and Juvenile Court Judges[9].
The case of Attorney-General of Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominion of Canada[10] seems to me to have a very special bearing upon the present case. It was cited along with Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominion[11] by Lord Tomlin in delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for British Columbia[12], in support of the Board's statement that
It is within the competence of the Dominion Parliament to provide for matters which, though otherwise within the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature, are necessarily incidental to effective legislation by the Parliament of the Dominion upon a subject of legislation expressly enumerated in s. 91.
The 1894 case[13] involved the validity of an enactment of the Ontario Legislature relating to voluntary assignments, which the Board stated postponed judgments and executions not completely executed by payment to an assignment for the benefit of creditors under the Act. "Now there can be no doubt", the Board said,
that the effect to be given to judgments and executions and the manner and extent to which they may be made available for the recovery of debts are primâ facie within the legislative powers of the provincial parliament. Executions are a part of the machinery by which debts are recovered, and are subject to regulation by that parliament. A creditor has no inherent right to have his debt satisfied by means of a levy by the sheriff, or to any priority in respect of such levy. The execution is a mere creature of the law which may determine and regulate the rights' to which it gives rise.
Their Lordships held that the provisions in question, relating as they did to assignments purely voluntary, did not infringe on the exclusive legislative power conferred upon the Dominion Parliament. "They would observe", the Lord Chancellor (Herschell), who delivered the judgment, continued,
that a system of bankruptcy legislation may frequently require various ancillary provisions for the purpose of preventing the scheme of the Act from being defeated. It may be necessary for this purpose to deal with the effect of executions and other matters which would otherwise be within the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature. Their Lordships do not doubt that it would be open to the Dominion Parliament to deal with such matters as part of a bankruptcy law, and the Provincial Legislature would doubtless be then precluded from interfering with this legislation inasmuch as such interference would affect the bankruptcy law of the Dominion Parliament. But it does not follow that such subjects, as might properly be treated as ancillary to such a law and therefore within the powers of the Dominion Parliament, are excluded from the legislative authority of the Provincial Legislature when there is no bankruptcy or insolvency legislation of the Dominion Parliament in existence.
The clear effect of this judgment, I think, is that legislation dealing with the effect of judgments and executions and the manner and extent to which they may be made available for the recovery of debts are primâ facie within the exclusive legislative powers of the Provinces as coming within 92 (13) and 92 (14) and that such provincial legislation must be held valid unless it is found to be inconsistent with the provisions of some existing Dominion legislation enacted in relation to one or other of the classes of subjects specially enumerated in s. 91, and necessary for the purpose of effecting the object to which such legislation is directed.
At the time of this decision there was no Dominion bankruptcy or insolvency legislation in force, the Dominion Insolvent Act of 1875 having been previously wholly repealed.
I should like to refer to another case, which the Judicial Committee considered in 1898, that of Attorney-General for the Dominion of Canada v. Attorneys-General for the Provinces of Ontario, Quebec and Nova Scotia[14], in which the Board heard an appeal from the judgment of this Court on a reference involving, inter alia, the validity of s. 4, Revised Statutes of Canada, c. 95, purporting to empower the grant of an exclusive right to fish in property belonging to the Provinces. It was held, affirming the judgment of this Court[15], that that enactment, so far as it purported to empower the grant of exclusive fishing rights over provincial property, was ultra vires of the Parliament of Canada. The clear ground of the decision was that the provision did not fall within the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the Dominion under s. 91 (12). I quote the following passage from that judgment at p. 716:
But whilst in their Lordships' opinion all restrictions or limitations by which public rights of fishing are sought to be limited or controlled can be the subject of Dominion legislation only, it does not follow that the legislation of Provincial Legislatures is incompetent merely because it may have relation to fisheries. For example, provisions prescribing the mode in which a private fishery is to be conveyed or otherwise disposed of, and the rights of succession in respect of it, would be properly treated as falling under the heading "Property and Civil Rights" within s. 92, and not as in the class "Fisheries" within the meaning of s. 91. So, too, the terms and conditions upon which the fisheries which are the property of the province may be granted, leased, or otherwise disposed of, and the rights which consistently with any general regulations respecting fisheries enacted by the Dominion Parliament may be conferred therein, appear proper subjects for provincial legislation, either under class 5 of s. 92, "The Management and Sale of Public Lands" or under the class "Property and Civil Rights". Such legislation deals directly with property, its disposal, and the rights to be enjoyed in respect of it, and was not in their Lordships' opinion intended to be within the scope of the class "Fisheries" as that word is used in s. 91.
As late as 1939 another case came before the Judicial Committee, which clearly involved the application of the same principles, and in which the Board in a judgment delivered by Lord Atkin affirmed a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, holding that certain parts of the Ontario Municipal Board Act, 1932, and the Department of Municipal Affairs Act, 1935, were intra vires of the Provincial Legislature. This was the case of Ladore v. Bennett[16], which arose out of the financial difficulties of four adjoining municipalities in the Province of Ontario and their amalgamation under the provisions of c. 74 of the Provincial Act of 1935 into one municipality under the name of the Corporation of the City of Windsor. Under the provisions of this Act the existing municipal corporations were dissolved and a special body called the Windsor Finance Commission was constituted with the same rights, powers and duties as by the provisions of Part III of the Department of Municipal Affairs Act, 1935, were conferred upon that Department, and the provisions of Part III of the latter Act were to apply to the new city. By the provisions of Part III the Ontario Municipal Board, if satisfied inter alia that a municipality had failed to meet its debentures or interest when due owing to financial difficulties, was given power inter alia to order postponement of or variation in the terms, time and places for payment of the whole or any portion of the debenture debt and outstanding debentures and other indebtedness and interest thereon, and variation in the rates of interest. A scheme having been formulated by the Windsor Commission pursuant to its powers and approved by the Ontario Municipal Board for funding and refunding the debts of the amalgamated municipalities, under which former creditors of the old independent municipalities received debentures of the new city of equal nominal amount to those formerly held, but with the interest scaled down in various classes of debentures, the Windsor Finance Commission was abolished by an amending Act of 1936, and its duties transferred to the Department of Municipal Affairs for Ontario. The plaintiff's action prayed inter alia for a declaration that the provisions of the Ontario Municipal Board Act, 1932, and the Department of Municipal Affairs Act, 1935, and amendments thereto, under which the funding and refunding debt scheme was effected, were ultra vires of the Provincial Legislature. It was contended that they invaded the legislative jurisdiction of the Dominion as to (1) bankruptcy and insolvency; (2) interest; and (3) because they affected private rights outside the Province.
On account of their peculiar applicability to the attack which is made against the validity of the Alberta Debt Adjustment Act in the present case, I quote the following passages from Lord Atkin's reasons:
It appears to their Lordships that the Provincial legislation cannot be attacked on the ground that it encroaches on the exclusive legislative power of the Dominion in relation to this class of subject. Their Lordships cannot agree with the opinion of Henderson, J.A., that there is no evidence that these municipalities are insolvent. Insolvency is the inability to pay debts in the ordinary course as they become due; and there appears to be no doubt that this was the condition of these corporations. But it does not follow that because a municipality is insolvent the Provincial Legislature may not legislate to provide remedies for that condition of affairs. The Province has exclusive legislative power in relation to municipal institutions in the Province: s. 92 (8) of the British North America Act, 1867. Sovereign within its constitutional powers, the Province is charged with the local government of its inhabitants by means of municipal institutions.
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Efficient local government could not be provided in similar circumstances unless the Province were armed with these