Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward

Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
1993-06-30
Report
[1993] 2 SCR 689
Case number
21937
Judges
La Forest, Gérard V.; L'Heureux-Dubé, Claire; Gonthier, Charles Doherty; Stevenson, William; Iacobucci, Frank
On appeal from
Federal Court of Appeal
Subjects
Immigration
Notes
SCC Case Information: 21937
Decision Content
Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689
Patrick Francis Ward Appellant
v.
The Attorney General of Canada Respondent
and
United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, Immigration and Refugee Board and
Canadian Council for Refugees Interveners
Indexed as: Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward
File No.: 21937.
1992: March 25; 1993: June 30.
Present: La Forest, L'Heureux‑Dubé, Gonthier, Stevenson* and Iacobucci JJ.
on appeal from the federal court of appeal
Immigration ‑‑ Refugee status ‑‑ "Particular social group" ‑‑ Political opinion ‑‑ "Well‑founded fear of persecution" necessary to establishment of claim to Convention refugee status ‑‑ Claimant a former member of Irish terrorist organization sentenced to death by organization for complicity in assisting escape of hostages ‑‑ Claimant citizen of Ireland and of United Kingdom ‑‑ Whether state complicity requirement for persecution ‑‑ Whether terrorist organization a "particular social group" ‑‑ Whether dissention from politico‑military organization basis for persecution for political opinion ‑‑ Whether s. 15 of Charter applicable to definition of Convention refugee ‑‑ Burden of proof of want of protection of each country of nationality ‑‑ Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 15 ‑‑ Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976‑77, c. 52, ss.2(1), 4(2.1), 19(1)(c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (2), 46.04(1)(c).
Appellant was a resident of Northern Ireland. Motivated by a perceived need to "take a stand" in order to protect his family, mainly from the IRA, he voluntarily joined the INLA, a para‑military terrorist group dedicated to the political union of Ulster and the Irish Republic. Appellant, who had been detailed to guard innocent hostages, secured their escape when he learned that they were to be executed. This action was motivated by his conscience.
The police eventually let slip to an INLA member that one of their own had assisted the escape. The INLA, who had suspected appellant, confined and tortured him and sentenced him to death following a court‑martial by a kangaroo court. Appellant escaped from the INLA, sought police protection and was charged for his part in the hostage incident. The INLA, in a pre‑emptive move to prevent appellant's providing evidence to the police about INLA members and their activities, took his wife and children hostage.
Appellant pleaded guilty to the offence of forcible confinement and was sentenced to three years in jail. He did not give evidence against the INLA and never admitted publicly to having released the hostages. Towards the end of his prison sentence, appellant sought the assistance of the prison chaplain for protection from INLA members. The chaplain, with the assistance of police, obtained a Republic of Ireland passport for appellant and airline tickets to Canada.
Appellant arrived in Toronto in December 1985 and sought admission to Canada as a visitor. He became the subject of an inquiry in May, 1986, and claimed Convention refugee status citing a fear of persecution because of his membership in a particular social group (the INLA). The Minister of Employment and Immigration determined that appellant was not a Convention refugee and, as a result, appellant filed an application for redetermination of his claim before the Immigration Appeal Board. The Board allowed the redetermination and found appellant to be a Convention refugee. The Federal Court of Appeal granted the Attorney General of Canada's application under s. 28 of the Federal Court Act to set aside the decision and referred the matter back to the Board for reconsideration.
At issue before this Court were: (1) whether the element of state complicity is required to establish a refugee claim and the nature of the "unwillingness" or "inability" of a claimant to seek the protection of his or her home state; (2) the meaning of "particular social group"; (3) the nature of persecution for political opinion and whether desertion from a politico‑military organization for reasons of conscience may properly ground a claim based on that ground; (4) whether s. 15 of the Charter was applicable; and (5) in cases of multiple nationality, whether the claimant must establish want of protection in all states of citizenship.
Held: The appeal should be allowed.
International refugee law was formulated to serve as a back‑up to the protection owed a national by his or her state. It was meant to come into play only in situations where that protection is unavailable, and then only in certain situations. The international community intended that persecuted individuals be required to approach their home state for protection before the responsibility of other states becomes engaged.
"Persecution" includes situations where the state is not in strictness an accomplice to the persecution but is simply unable to protect its citizens. The dichotomy between "unable" and "unwilling" has become somewhat blurred. The inquiry as to whether a claimant meets the "Convention refugee" definition must focus on whether there is a "well‑founded fear", which the claimant must first establish, and all that follows must be "by reason of" that fear. Two categories, both requiring the claimant to be outside his or her state of nationality by reason of that fear, exist. The first requires that the claimant be unable to avail him‑ or herself of that state's protection. It originally related only to stateless persons, but can now include those refused passports or other protections by their state of nationality. The second requires that the claimant be unwilling to avail him‑ or herself of his or her state's protection by reason of that fear. Neither category of the "Convention refugee" definition, however, requires that the state have been involved in the persecution.
The test as to whether a state is unable to protect a national is bipartite: (1) the claimant must subjectively fear persecution; and (2) this fear must be well‑founded in an objective sense. The claimant need not literally approach the state unless it is objectively unreasonable for him or her not to have sought the protection of the home authorities. The Board, if the claimant's fear has been established, is entitled to presume that persecution will be likely and that the fear is well‑founded if there is an absence of state protection. The presumption goes to the heart of the inquiry, which is whether there is a likelihood of persecution. The persecution must be real ‑‑ the presumption cannot be built on fictional events ‑‑ but the well‑foundedness of the fears can be established through the use of such a presumption.
The presumption was of some importance to the Board in this case. It found that the appellant was a credible witness and therefore accepted that he had a legitimate fear of persecution. Since Ireland's inability to protect was established through evidence that state agents had admitted their ineffectiveness, the Board was then able to presume the well‑foundedness of appellant's fears.
The claimant must provide clear and convincing confirmation of a state's inability to protect absent an admission by the national's state of its inability to protect that national. Except in situations of complete breakdown of the state apparatus, it should be assumed that the state is capable of protecting a claimant. This presumption, while it increases the burden on the claimant, does not render illusory Canada's provision of a haven for refugees. It reinforces the underlying rationale of international protection as a surrogate, coming into play where no alternative remains to the claimant.
In distilling the contents of the head of "particular social group", account should be taken of the general underlying themes of the defence of human rights and anti‑discrimination that form the basis for the international refugee protection initiative. A good working rule for the meaning of "particular social group" provides that this basis of persecution consists of three categories: (1) groups defined by an innate, unchangeable characteristic; (2) groups whose members voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to their human dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the association; and (3) groups associated by a former voluntary status, unalterable due to its historical permanence.
Exclusions on the basis of criminality have been carefully drafted in the Immigration Act to avoid the admission of claimants who may pose a threat to the Canadian government or to the lives or property of the residents of Canada. These provisions specifically give the Minister of Employment and Immigration enough flexibility to reassess the desirability of permitting entry to a claimant with a past criminal record, where the Minister is convinced that rehabilitation has occurred. This demonstrates that Parliament has not opted to treat a criminal past as a reason to be estopped from obtaining refugee status. The scope of the term "particular social group" accordingly did not need to be interpreted narrowly to accommodate morality and criminality concerns. Such a blanket exclusion is more appropriately to be avoided in the face of an explicit, comprehensive structure for the assessment of these potentially inadmissible claimants.
Appellant did not meet the definition of "Convention refugee" with respect to his fear of persecution at the hands of the INLA upon his return to Northern Ireland. The group of INLA members is not a "particular social group". Its membership is neither characterized by an innate characteristic nor is it an unchangeable historical fact. Its objective of obtaining specific political goals by any means, including violence, cannot be said to be so fundamental to the human dignity of its members that it constitutes a "particular social group". In any event, appellant's fear was not based on his membership. Rather, he felt threatened because of what he did as an individual. His membership in the INLA placed him in the circumstances that led to his fear, but the fear itself was based on his action, not on his affiliation.
A claimant is not required to identify the reasons for the persecution. The examiner must decide whether the Convention definition is met; usually there will be more than one applicable ground.
Political opinion can generally be interpreted to be any opinion on any matter in which the machinery of state, government, and policy may be engaged. The political opinion at issue need not have been expressed outright. Often the claimant is not even given the opportunity to articulate his or her beliefs; often they are imputed to the claimant from his or her actions. The political opinion ascribed to the claimant and for which he or she fears persecution need not necessarily conform to the claimant's true beliefs. The examination of the circumstances should be approached from the perspective of the persecutor, since that is the perspective that is determinative in inciting the persecution. Similar considerations apply to other bases of persecution.
Appellant's fear of being killed by the INLA, should he return to Northern Ireland, stemmed initially from the group's threat of executing the death sentence imposed by its court‑martial. The act for which appellant was so punished was his assistance in the escape of the hostages he was guarding. From this act, a political opinion related to the proper limits to means used for the achievement of political change can be imputed. To appellant, who believed that the killing of innocent people to achieve political change is unacceptable, setting the hostages free was the only option that accorded with his conscience. The persecution appellant fears stemmed from his political opinion as manifested by this act.
Given that the relevant aspects of the majority decision were found to be incorrect for other reasons, recourse to s. 15 of the Charter with respect to "particular social group" and state complicity was unnecessary.
Appellant conceded dual nationality ‑‑ Irish and British. The burden of proof, including a showing of well‑founded fear of persecution in all countries of which the claimant is a national, lies with appellant and not the Minister.
The Board must investigate whether the claimant is unable or unwilling to avail him‑ or herself of the protection of each and every country of nationality. Any home state protection is a claimant's sole option when available since international refugee protection is to serve as "surrogate" shelter coming into play only upon failure of national support. The inability of a state of nationality to protect can be established where the claimant has actually approached the state and been denied protection. Where, as in the case of appellant, the second state has not actually been approached by the claimant, that state should be presumed capable of protecting its nationals. An underlying premise of this presumption is that citizenship carries with it certain basic consequences, such as the right to gain entry to the country at any time. Denial of admittance to the home territory can amount to a refusal of protection. Here, evidence, albeit not expert opinion, was led to establish that British legislation enabled the British Government to prohibit a national from being in, or entering, Great Britain, if the national had been connected with terrorism with regard to Northern Ireland. The applicability of this presumption and its rebuttal depended on the particular circumstances of this case and was to be determined by the Board.
Cases Cited
Considered: Rajudeen v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1984), 55 N.R. 129; Surujpal v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1985), 60 N.R. 73; Zalzali v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] 3 F.C. 605; McMullen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 658 F.2d 1312 (1981); Cheung v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1993] F.C.J. No. 309 (Q.L.), Appeal No. A‑785‑91; Mayers v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992), 97 D.L.R. (4th) 729; Matter of Acosta, Interim Decision 2986, 1985 WL 56042 (B.I.A.); referred to: Artiga Turcios v. I.N.S., 829 F.2d 720 (1987); Arteaga v. I.N.S., 836 F.2d 1227 (1988); Estrada‑Posadas v. I.N.S., 924 F.2d 916 (1991); Minister of Employment and Immigration v. Satiacum (1989), 99 N.R. 171; Astudillo v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1979), 31 N.R. 121; Arrechea Gonzalez v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1991), F.C.A. A‑899‑90; Ahmed v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1990), F.C.A. A‑215‑90; Lai v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989), Imm. L.R. 245; Osorio Cruz v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1988), I.A.B.D. M88‑20043X; Nalliah v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1987), I.A.B.D. M84‑1642; Escoto v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1987), I.A.B.D. T87‑9024X; Incirciyan v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1987), I.A.B.D. M87‑1541X/M87‑1248; Balareso v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1985), I.A.B.D. M83‑1542; Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143; I.N.S. v. Elias‑Zacarias, 112 S.Ct. 812 (1992).
Statutes and Regulations Cited
British Nationality Act 1981, 1981 (U.K.), c. 61.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 15 .
Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 28.
Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I‑2, ss. 2(1) [as am. by S.C. 1988, c. 35, s. 1 (R.S.C., 1985, c. 28 (4th Supp.), ss. 1(2), 34)], 19.
Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976‑77, c. 52, s. 2(1) [as am. by S.C. 1988, c. 35, s. 1], 4(2.1) [as ad. by Miscellaneous Statute Law Amendment Act, 1981, S.C. 1980‑81‑82‑83, c. 47, s. 3], 19(1)(c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (2) [as am. by S.C. ibid., ss. 23, 53], 46.04(1)(c) [as ad. by S.C. 1988, c. 35, s. 14].
Immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR/78‑172, s. 19(4)(j).
Interpretation Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I‑21, s. 33(2) .
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984, 1984 (U.K.), c. 8, later replaced by Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, 1989 (U.K.), c. 4, ss. 4, 5.
Authors Cited
Compton, Daniel. "Asylum for Persecuted Social Groups: A Closed Door Left Slightly Ajar ‑‑ Sanchez‑Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986)" (1987), 62 Wash. L. Rev. 913.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva, July 28, 1951), Can. T.S. 1969, No. 6.
Foighel, Isi. "The Legal Status of the Boat‑People", 48 Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Relations 217.
Goodwin‑Gill, Guy S. The Refugee in International Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.
Grahl‑Madsen, Atle. The Status of Refugees in International Law. (n.p.) Netherlands: A. W. Sijthoff‑Leyden, 1966.
Graves, Maureen. "From Definition to Exploration: Social Groups and Political Asylum Eligibility" (1989), 26 San Diego L. Rev. 739.
Gross, Douglas. "The Right of Asylum Under United States Law" (1980), 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1125.
Hathaway, James C. The Law of Refugee Status. Toronto: Butterworths, 1991.
Helton, Arthur C. "Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group As a Basis for Refugee Status" (1983), 15 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 39.
Hyndman, Patricia. "The 1951 Convention Definition of Refugee: An Appraisal with Particular Reference to the Case of Sri Lankan Tamil Applicants" (1987), 9 Hum. Rts. Q. 49.
Plender, Richard. "Admission of Refugees: Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum" (1977-78), 15 San Diego L. Rev. 45.
Takkenberg, Alex and Christopher C. Tahbaz. The Collected Travaux Préparatoires of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Vol. 1, Early History and the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems 16 January ‑ 16 February 1950 Lake Success, New York and Vol. 3, The Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons 2 ‑ 25 July 1951 Geneva, Switserland [sic]. Amsterdam: Dutch Refugee Council, under the auspices of the European Legal Network on Asylum, 1990.
United Nations. Economic and Social Council. Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems. First Session. Summary record of the Fifth Meeting, Lake Success, New York, 18 January 1950. Mr. Henkin (United States Delegate). UN Doc. E/AC.32/SR.5.
United Nations. Economic and Social Council. Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems. Lake Success, New York, 16 January to 16 February 1950. UN Doc. E/1618 and Corr. 1 ‑ E/AC.32/5.
United Nations. Economic and Social Council. Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems. United Kingdom. Revised draft proposal for Article 1. UN Doc. E/AC.32/L.2/Rev. 1.
United Nations. Economic and Social Council. Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems. United States of America: Memorandum on the Definition Article of the Preliminary Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (and Stateless Persons). UN Doc. E/AC.32/L.4.
United Nations. General Assembly. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons. Summary Record of the Third Meeting held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 3 July 1951. Mr. Petren (Swedish Delegate). UN Doc A/CONF.2/SR.3.
United Nations. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status. Geneva: 1988.
van der Veen, Job. "Does Persecution by Fellow‑Citizens in Certain Regions of a State Fall Within the Definition of `Persecution' in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951? Some Comments Based on Dutch Judicial Decisions" (1980), 11 Netherlands Y.B. Intl. L. 167.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, [1990] 2 F.C. 667, 67 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 10 Imm. L.R. (2d) 189, 108 N.R. 60, allowing an application to review and set aside a judgment of the Immigration Appeal Board (1988), 9 Imm. L.R. (2d) 48, finding appellant to be a convention refugee. Appeal allowed.
Peter A. Rekai, M. Christina F. Kurata, LeVern L. Robertson and Constance Nakatsu, for the appellant.
Roslyn J. Levine and Nanette Rosen, for the respondent.
Ronald B. Shacter and Phyllis Gordon, for the intervener Canadian Council for Refugees.
Brian A. Crane, Q.C., and Gerald Stobo, for the intervener Immigration and Refugee Board.
Written submission only for the intervener United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
//La Forest J.//
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
La Forest J. -- This case raises, for the first time in this Court, several fundamental issues respecting the definition of a "Convention refugee" in s. 2(1) of the Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, which reads:
2. . . .
"Convention refugee" means any person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion,
(a) is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, by reason of such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or
(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of his former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of such fear, is unwilling to return to that country . . .
This definition was revised somewhat by S.C. 1988, c. 35, s. 1 (R.S.C., 1985, c. 28 (4th Supp.), s. 1(2)), to its current version in the Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-2:
2. (1) . . .
"Convention refugee" means any person who
(a) by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion,
(i) is outside the country of the person's nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or
(ii) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of the person's former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, is unwilling to return to that country, and
(b) has not ceased to be a Convention refugee by virtue of subsection (2),
but does not include any person to whom the Convention does not apply pursuant to section E or F of Article 1 thereof, which sections are set out in the schedule to this Act;
The questions raised are the extent to which a claimant's "well-founded fear of persecution" must emanate from the state from which the claimant flees, as well as the scope of the enumerated grounds of persecution, particularly "membership in a particular social group" and "political opinion".
Facts
The appellant, Patrick Francis Ward, was born in Northern Ireland in 1955. He joined the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) in 1983 as a volunteer. Ward described the INLA as a ruthless para-military organization more violent than the Irish Republican Army (IRA), with a military-like hierarchy and strict discipline. Before joining as a volunteer, he had loose connections with the INLA in that he had sympathies for their cause. Indeed, Ward had been convicted of the offences of possession of firearms, conspiracy to convey things unlawfully into Northern Ireland, and contributing to acts of terrorism. He testified that with the constant turmoil in Northern Ireland, people were forced to "take a stand" to protect their loved ones and that his joining the INLA stemmed in part from a desire to protect himself and his family, mainly from the IRA.
Ward's first task as a member of the INLA was to assist in guarding two of the organization's hostages at a farm house in the Republic of Ireland. One day after Ward's guard duties commenced, the INLA ordered the hostages executed. He wanted no part in the execution of these innocent hostages, and underwent what he described as a "predicament of moral conscience". As a result, he resolved to release the hostages and succeeded in doing so without revealing himself to the INLA.
Some time later, the police let slip to an INLA member that one of their own had assisted the hostages in their escape. The INLA suspected Ward, and he was confined and tortured. Although he never admitted his role in the escape, Ward was court-martialled by a kangaroo court and sentenced to death. However, he managed to escape and sought police protection. The police in turn charged him for his part in the hostage incident, based on finding his fingerprints at the farm where the hostages had been held.
Ward expressed concern to the police about his wife and children. The police checked on them, only to discover that they had been taken hostage by the INLA in a pre-emptive move to prevent the claimant from "turning supergrass", the colloquial term for providing evidence to the police about INLA members and their activities.
Ward pleaded guilty to the offence of forcible confinement and was sentenced to three years in jail. He did not "turn supergrass"; nor did he ever admit publicly to having released the hostages. Towards the end of his prison sentence, Ward sought the assistance of the prison chaplain for protection from INLA members. The chaplain, with the assistance of police, obtained a Republic of Ireland passport for Ward and airline tickets to Canada. Ward arrived in Toronto in December 1985 and sought admission to Canada as a visitor. He became the subject of an inquiry in May 1986 and claimed Convention refugee status. His claim was based on a fear of persecution because of his membership in a particular social group, namely the INLA. The Minister of Employment and Immigration determined that Ward was not a Convention refugee and, as a result, he filed an application for redetermination of his claim before the Immigration Appeal Board. The Board allowed the redetermination and found Ward to be a Convention refugee.
The respondent, the Attorney General of Canada, brought an application under s. 28 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, to review and set aside the decision of the Board. This application was granted by the Federal Court of Appeal, which set aside the decision and referred the matter back to the Board for reconsideration.
Judgments
Immigration Appeal Board (1988), 9 Imm. L.R. (2d) 48 (K. J. Arkin for the Board)
The Board approached the case on the basis that two issues fell to be decided pertaining to the definition of a "Convention refugee": whether the definition contemplates a claimant whose country of nationality is unable to protect him adequately, and whether the definition requires state complicity in the persecution of the claimant. On the latter question, the Board found the authorities inconclusive but ruled that the definition does not necessarily contemplate state complicity in the persecution of a claimant, and, at p. 59, that "the state's being unable to offer effective protection is sufficient".
Turning to the first issue, the Board, at p. 59, found the requirement that the claimant be unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of his home state was "inextricably intertwined" with the state's inability to offer effective protection. Moreover, the Board reasoned as follows, at p. 59, on the link between persecution and protection:
Fear of persecution and lack of protection are also interrelated elements. Persecuted persons clearly do not enjoy the protection of their country of origin and evidence of the lack of protection may create a presumption as to the likelihood of persecution and to the well-foundedness of any fear.
As such, the Board concluded as follows, at p. 60:
In view of the basic nature of the test imposed by the definition of Convention refugee, i.e., whether or not the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for one of the enumerated reasons, it is reasonable, even necessary, to consider the state's ability to provide adequate protection to the applicant: to the extent that the state is unable to protect the individual, the applicant will have good reason to fear persecution. The reason for the state's inability to provide adequate protection from persecution seems irrelevant. The question in any such case then becomes whether or not there exists "adequate" protection. [Emphasis in original.]
On the key question of the state's ability to protect Ward, the Board, at p. 54, found Ward to be a "completely credible witness". It accepted that his life would be in danger if he were required to return to Northern Ireland because of the death sentence passed by the INLA and the threat he posed to that organization's security. Although Irish police had offered Ward protection, such protection would not be effective.
The Board turned its mind to the question of Ward's nationality, a question of immediate relevance given the proviso in the statutory definition that a refugee claimant be unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of "the country of [his] nationality". On this point, the Board found as follows, at p. 54:
Clearly, the evidence established that the claimant is a citizen of Ireland, both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. However, no evidence was presented to the Board to establish that the claimant is also a citizen of the United Kingdom. In response to questions put to him in cross-examination, the claimant testified that as a citizen of Northern Ireland, he is entitled to live in Britain unless he is excluded under the Protection of Terrorism Actof the United Kingdom, whereunder anyone with terrorist connections can be refused entry to British mainland. While the respondent questioned the reasonableness of the claimant's fear of the INLA were he to return to Britain, the respondent did not establish either the claimant's right to live in Britain or the claimant's right to citizenship in the United Kingdom. Accordingly, the Board finds the claimant's country of nationality to be Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
However, in a footnote to its reasons, at p. 55, the Board went on to note the following:
Had the Board concluded that the claimant was also a national of the United Kingdom, the Board would have made a finding that the claimant's life would be in danger from the INLA if he was returned to the United Kingdom.
In the result, the Board determined that Ward was a Convention refugee.
Federal Court of Appeal, [1990] 2 F.C. 667
On appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, the Attorney General advanced three basic arguments: the Board failed to consider whether the INLA was a "particular social group" within the terms of s. 2(1) of the Act; the Board erred in finding that there was no requirement of state complicity in "persecution"; and it erred in finding that Ward's only countries of nationality were Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Urie J.A., writing for himself and Marceau J.A., found that the Board had erred on the first and third of these points. MacGuigan J.A. held that the Board had erred only with respect to the third issue.
On the first question, Urie J.A. reasoned that persecution for reasons of social group membership can occur only when the group's activities are perceived to be a possible danger to the government. He stated, at p. 677:
The INLA activities are clearly contrary to the interests of the government of Northern Ireland and of the United Kingdom. But mere membership does not, of itself, substantiate a claim to refugee status. A fortiori, membership does not substantiate a claim to refugee status based upon a fear arising from acts committed by a member of the group contrary to the interests of the group, which group interests are themselves contrary to the well-being of the state. [Emphasis in original.]
In other words, if the claimant's fear arose from within the group itself and not the state, it cannot provide the basis of a claim of persecution. Urie J.A. was not persuaded that Ward, who feared persecution from the organization to which he belonged, was entitled to the protection afforded bona fide refugees who meet all the elements in the definition of Convention refugee. The fact that he was a member who had acted contrary to the interests of the INLA did not bring him within the definition. Urie J.A. remarked, at p. 678, that "[i]f such a view were to be taken anyone who dissents on anything could be said to be a member of a particular social group", a proposition he considered absurd. He rejected the argument that any group engaged in political activity would fall under the definition of a social group. Such an approach, he reasoned, would render the "political opinion" segment of the "Convention refugee" definition redundant.
In dissent, MacGuigan J.A. opined that there could be no serious argument that the INLA is not literally a particular social group since its members (at p. 689) "are united in a stable association with common purposes". He did not agree that "social group" must be deemed to exclude terrorists. However, even conceding this point, he noted that Ward had abandoned the group because of its terrorism and that the social group here at issue included members and former members of the INLA. The group's general commitment to terrorism did not, in his view, mean that Ward, as an individual, was unable to terminate his adherence to it. For MacGuigan J.A., the "true gravamen" of Ward's fear of persecution sprang from his membership in the organization, rather than from his misbehaviour as a member, since the INLA's motivation in sentencing him to death was, at least in part, to prevent future disclosures about the activities of the group. He further noted that a determination that Ward was a Convention refugee would not automatically entitle him to remain in Canada, as he would still be subject to the exceptions in s. 19 of the Act relating to previous convictions, espionage or subversion.
On the second issue, the need for state complicity in persecution, Urie J.A. appears to have decided that such state complicity is a prerequisite for "persecution" under the Act. In support of this, he turned to the requirements of the definition that a claimant be "unable" or "unwilling" to seek the assistance of his home state. Urie J.A. found that being "unable" to avail oneself of the protection of his national state meant, at p. 680, "quite literally that the claimant cannot, because of his physical inability to do so, even seek out the protection of his state. These imply circumstances over which he has no control and is not a concept applicable in facts of this case." On the "unwillingness" branch of the test, Urie J.A. made the following remarks, at p. 680:
If a claimant is "unwilling" to avail himself of the protection of his country of nationality, it is implicit from that fact that his unwillingness stems from his belief that the State and its authorities, cannot protect him from those he fears will persecute him. That inability may arise because the State and its authorities are either themselves the direct perpetrators of the feared acts of persecution, assist actively those who do them or simply turn a blind eye to the activities which the claimant fears. While there may well be other manifestations of it, these possibilities clearly demonstrate that for the claimant to be unwilling to avail himself of the protection of his country of nationality, to provide the foundation for a claim to be a refugee he must establish that the State cannot protect him from the persecution he fears arising, in this case, from his former membership in the INLA, i.e., he must establish that what he fears is in fact persecution as that term is statutorily and jurisprudentially understood. On that basis the involvement of the State is sine qua non where unwillingness to avail himself of the protection is the fact. [Emphasis in original.]
Urie J.A. found that the Board had confused the determination of persecution and ineffective protection. He also rejected the Board's finding that evidence of the lack of protection may create a presumption regarding the likelihood of persecution and the well-foundedness of any fear.
MacGuigan J.A. rejected the contention that the Board erred in its definition of persecution. In his view, the wording of s. 2(1)(a) of the Act does not necessarily import state complicity. While agreeing that "is unable" probably means literally unable, he found no reason to limit the sense of "is unwilling" to a single meaning. He stated, at pp. 697-98:
In sum, I believe that taking into account (1) the literal text of the statute, (2) the absence of any decisive Canadian precedents, and (3) the weight of international authority, the Board's interpretation of the statutory definition is the preferable one. No doubt this construction will make eligible for admission to Canada claimants from strife-torn countries whose problems arise, not from their nominal governments, but from various warring factions, but I cannot think that this is contrary to "Canada's international legal obligations with respect to refugees and . . . its humanitarian tradition with respect to the displaced and the persecuted".
In his view, then, persecution need not emanate from the state.
The third argument of the Attorney General, we saw, was that the Board erred in holding that no evidence had been presented to establish that Ward was a citizen of the United Kingdom, as well as of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Ward replied that while Northern Ireland was part of the United Kingdom, he did not have an unrestricted right to live anywhere in the United Kingdom as a result of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984, 1984 (U.K.), c. 8, under which he could be refused admission because of his terrorist activities. On this question Urie J.A. cited, at p. 685, the second paragraph of Art. 1(A)(2) of the Convention, which, while "not binding upon us since it has not been incorporated into Canadian law, . . . persuasive as forming a logical construction of the Convention refugee definition". Urie J.A. held, at p. 683, that "if it is found that he has more than one country of nationality the claimant is obliged to establish his unwillingness to avail himself of the protection of each of his countries of nationality before he can be considered to be a Convention refugee" (emphasis in original). In this respect, Urie J.A. remarked, at p. 685:
. . . I am of the opinion that a refugee claimant must establish that he is unable or unwilling to avail himself of all of his countries of nationality. It is the nationality of the claimant which is of prime importance. The right to live in his country of nationality becomes relevant only in the discharge of the onus on him of proving that he is unable to avail himself of the country of which he has established he is a national. [Emphasis in original.]
Not only did the Board fail to address the issue, he stated, at p. 685: "it compounded the error because it perceived that it was the Crown which had the onus of establishing `either the claimant's right to live in Britain or the claimant's right to citizenship in the United Kingdom'." Urie J.A. noted that s. 8(1) of the Act states that the burden of proof for a person seeking to enter Canada rests on that person. On this point, MacGuigan J.A. was largely in agreement with the majority. All three judges were of the view that the issue of whether Ward could avail himself of the protection of the United Kingdom should be returned to the Board for determination.
Issues
I propose to approach the issues raised by the parties in the following order:
A. Persecution and State Complicity
(a) Is the element of state complicity, either through direct persecution, collusion with the persecuting agents, or wilful blindness to the actions of the persecuting agents, a