Court headnote

R. v. Fearon
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2014-12-11
Neutral citation
2014 SCC 77
Report
[2014] 3 SCR 621
Case number
35298
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; LeBel, Louis; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Cromwell, Thomas Albert; Moldaver, Michael J.; Karakatsanis, Andromache; Wagner, Richard
On appeal from
Ontario
Subjects
Constitutional law
Notes
SCC Case Information: 35298
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: R. v. Fearon, 2014 SCC 77, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621
Date: 20141211 Docket: 35298
Between:
Kevin Fearon
Appellant
and
Her Majesty The Queen
Respondent
- and -
Director of Public Prosecutions of Canada, Attorney General of Quebec, Attorney General of Alberta, Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, Criminal Trial Lawyers’ Association (Alberta), Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police and Criminal Lawyers’ Association
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ.
Reasons for Judgment: (paras. 1 to 99)
Dissenting Reasons: (paras. 100 to 198)
Cromwell J. (McLachlin C.J. and Moldaver and Wagner JJ. concurring)
Karakatsanis J. (LeBel and Abella JJ. concurring)
r. v. fearon, 2014 SCC 77, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621
Kevin Fearon Appellant
v.
Her Majesty The Queen Respondent
and
Director of Public Prosecutions of Canada,
Attorney General of Quebec,
Attorney General of Alberta,
Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic,
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association,
Criminal Trial Lawyers’ Association (Alberta),
Canadian Civil Liberties Association,
Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police and
Criminal Lawyers’ Association Interveners
Indexed as: R. v. Fearon
2014 SCC 77
File No.: 35298.
2014: May 23; 2014: December 11.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for ontario
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Search and seizure — Search incident to arrest — Cell phone found on accused and searched without warrant — Text message and photos on cell phone introduced as evidence at trial — Whether general common law framework for searches incident to arrest needs to be modified in case of cell phone searches incident to arrest — Whether search of cell phone incident to arrest was unreasonable and contrary to accused’s right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure — If so, whether evidence discovered in search should be excluded — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 8 , 24(2) .
Police — Powers — Search incident to arrest — Warrantless search of cell phone — Text message and photos on cell phone introduced as evidence at trial of accused — Whether common law police power to search incident to arrest permits cell phone searches — Whether search of cell phone incident to arrest was unreasonable and contrary to accused’s right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 8 .
Two men, one armed with a handgun, robbed a merchant as she loaded her car with jewellery. The robbers grabbed some bags, one of which was filled with jewellery, and fled in a black vehicle. The police became involved very shortly afterward. At that point, they had not located the jewellery or the handgun. Later that evening, they located and secured the getaway vehicle, and arrested F and C. During the pat-down search of F conducted incident to arrest, police found a cell phone in F’s pocket. Police searched the phone at that time and again within less than two hours of the arrest. They found a draft text message which read “We did it were the jewlery at nigga burrrrrrrrrrr”, and some photos, including one of a handgun. A day and a half later, when police had a warrant to search the vehicle, they recovered the handgun used in the robbery and depicted in the photo. Months later, police applied for and were granted a warrant to search the contents of the phone. No new evidence was discovered.
On a voir dire, the trial judge found that the search of the cell phone incident to arrest had not breached s. 8 of the Charter . She admitted the photos and text message and convicted F of robbery with a firearm and related offences. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal.
Held (LeBel, Abella and Karakatsanis JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be dismissed.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Cromwell, Moldaver and Wagner JJ.: The common law power to search incident to a lawful arrest permits the search of cell phones and similar devices found on the suspect, although some modification of the existing common law framework is necessary because the search of a cell phone has the potential to be a much more significant invasion of privacy than the typical search incident to arrest.
The power to search incident to arrest is extraordinary in that it permits reasonable searches when the police have neither a warrant nor reasonable and probable grounds. That the exercise of this extraordinary power has been considered in general to meet constitutional muster reflects the important law enforcement objectives which are served by searches of people who have been lawfully arrested. This power must be exercised in the pursuit of a valid purpose related to the proper administration of justice and the search must be truly incidental to the arrest.
Like other searches incident to arrest, prompt cell phone searches incident to arrest may serve important law enforcement objectives: they can assist police to identify and mitigate risks to public safety; locate firearms or stolen goods; identify accomplices; locate and preserve evidence; prevent suspects from evading or resisting law enforcement; locate the other perpetrators; warn officers of possible impending danger; and follow leads promptly. Cell phone searches also have an element of urgency, which supports the extension of the power to search incident to arrest.
Safeguards must be added to the law of search of cell phones incident to arrest in order to make that power compliant with s. 8 of the Charter . Ultimately, the purpose of the exercise is to strike a balance that gives due weight to the important law enforcement objectives served by searches incidental to arrest and to the very significant privacy interests at stake in cell phone searches. Consequently, four conditions must be met in order for the search of a cell phone or similar device incidental to arrest to comply with s. 8. First, the arrest must be lawful. Second, the search must be truly incidental to the arrest. This requirement should be strictly applied to permit searches that must be done promptly upon arrest in order to effectively serve the law enforcement purposes. In this context, those purposes are protecting the police, the accused or the public; preserving evidence; and, if the investigation will be stymied or significantly hampered absent the ability to promptly conduct the search, discovering evidence. Third, the nature and the extent of the search must be tailored to its purpose. In practice, this will mean that only recently sent or drafted emails, texts, photos and the call log will, generally, be available, although other searches may, in some circumstances, be justified. Finally, the police must take detailed notes of what they have examined on the device and how they examined it. The notes should generally include the applications searched, the extent of the search, the time of the search, its purpose and its duration. The record-keeping requirement is important to the effectiveness of after-the-fact judicial review. It will also help police officers to focus on whether what they are doing in relation to the phone falls squarely within the parameters of a lawful search incident to arrest.
None of the three main modifications to the common law power to search cell phones incident to arrest previously suggested in the case law strike the balance required by s. 8. First, the considerations that prompted the Court to take a categorical approach with respect to the non-consensual seizure of bodily samples are entirely absent in this case. Second, police will rarely have reasonable and probable grounds to search for safety purposes or to believe that evidence of the offence will be found on the phone at the time of arrest. Third, allowing cell phone searches only in exigent circumstances would share the pitfalls of imposing a standard of reasonable and probable grounds, and would give almost no weight to the law enforcement objectives served by prompt searches. Moreover, the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement is not a subset of the exigency exception.
In this case, the initial search of the cell phone, which disclosed all of the cell phone evidence tendered by the Crown at trial, breached F’s s. 8 rights. Although they were truly incidental to F’s arrest for robbery, were for valid law enforcement objectives, and were appropriately linked to the offence for which F had been lawfully arrested, detailed evidence about precisely what was searched, how and why, was lacking.
Despite that breach, the evidence should not be excluded. The impact of the breach on F’s Charter-protected interests favours exclusion of the evidence, but it does so weakly. Although any search of any cell phone has the potential to be a very significant invasion of a person’s informational privacy interests, the invasion of F’s privacy was not particularly grave. Further, as he did not challenge the warrant that was subsequently issued for the comprehensive search of the cell phone, his privacy interests were going to be impacted and the particular breach did not significantly change the nature of that impact. However, other factors favour inclusion. As to the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct, the dominant view at the time of the search approved cell phone searches incident to arrest. In addition, the police fully disclosed the earlier searches when they decided to obtain the warrant to search the cell phone. While the police should, when faced with real uncertainty, choose a course of action that is more respectful of the accused’s potential privacy rights, an honest mistake, reasonably made, is not state misconduct that requires the exclusion of evidence. Society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits also favours admission: the evidence is cogent and reliable, and its exclusion would undermine the truth-seeking function of the justice system.
Per LeBel, Abella and Karakatsanis JJ. (dissenting): Searches of personal digital devices — including personal computers — risk serious encroachments on privacy and are therefore not authorized under the common law power to search incident to arrest. Only judicial pre-authorization can provide the effective and impartial balancing of the state’s law enforcement objectives with the intensely personal and uniquely pervasive privacy interests in our digital devices. Section 8 of the Charter provides constitutional protection for privacy, which includes the right to be free of the threat of unreasonable intrusions on privacy and the right to determine when, how, and to what extent we release personal information.
Generally, the law enforcement interests will outweigh the privacy interest that an arrested person has in the physical items in his immediate vicinity. However, because the privacy interest in a digital device is quantitatively and qualitatively different from that in other physical items traditionally subject to such searches, the constitutional balance between privacy and the needs of law enforcement with respect to the search of cell phones and similar digital devices incident to arrest must be reassessed, using first principles.
A cell phone cannot be treated like any other piece of physical evidence that may be found on an arrestee and searched incident to arrest. Individuals have a high expectation of privacy in their digital devices because they store immense amounts of information, are fastidious record keepers, retain files and data even after users think they have been destroyed, make the temporal and territorial limitations on a search incident to arrest meaningless, and can continue to generate evidence even after they have been seized.
The law enforcement interests relate to the three purposes justifying searches incident to arrest: safety, the preservation of evidence, and the discovery of evidence. Digital devices are not physically dangerous weapons and they cannot conceal such a weapon. The mere possibility that a phone could have been used to summon backup or that evidence on the cell phone could be remotely deleted should not justify a search incident to arrest. Although the delay of obtaining a warrant may come at a cost to the prompt pursuit of the investigation, this cost must be weighed against the privacy interest in a personal digital device.
The most pressing state interests can be accommodated by the existing doctrine that permits warrantless searches under exigent circumstances. Exigent circumstances exist when (1) there is a reasonable basis to suspect a search may prevent an imminent threat to safety or (2) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the imminent destruction of evidence can be prevented by a warrantless search. Where exigent circumstances do not exist, a telewarrant can usually be obtained relatively quickly and with little harm to the investigation.
Thus, the weighty privacy interest that an arrested person has in a personal digital device will outweigh the state interest in performing a warrantless search incident to arrest, except in exigent circumstances.
Searches that treat a cell phone merely as a physical object continue to be permissible incident to arrest since it is the information that attracts a heightened expectation of privacy. As such, the police may usually seize a phone incident to arrest in order to preserve the evidence, but will require a warrant before they can search its contents.
In performing a search of a cell phone, whether under exigent circumstances or pursuant to a warrant, the police officers must not extend that search beyond the scope of the grounds permitting the search.
Tailoring the scope of the common law power to search incident to arrest does not adequately protect the reasonable expectations of privacy in personal digital devices. The majority’s proposed modifications generate problems of impracticality, police uncertainty, and increased after-the-fact litigation. And while detailed note-taking may be desirable, it may prove to be an impractical requirement, and it is not an adequate remedy to what would be an extraordinary search power. Fundamentally, the police are not in the best position to determine whether the law enforcement objectives clearly outweigh the potentially significant intrusion on privacy in the search of a digital device, and, if they are wrong, the subsequent exclusion of the evidence will not remedy the initial privacy violation.
Here, the searches of F’s phone were not justified and unreasonably infringed his privacy, in violation of s. 8 of the Charter . The facts of this case fall far below either standard for exigency.
The evidence which was unconstitutionally obtained should be excluded. The state conduct was not particularly objectionable, given that the police acted in good faith, and the evidence is reliable; however, the high privacy interest individuals have in their electronic devices tips the balance in favour of exclusion. Unwarranted searches undermine the public’s confidence that personal communications, ideas and beliefs will be protected on their digital devices. This is particularly important given the increasing use and ubiquity of such technology. It is difficult to conceive of a sphere of privacy more intensely personal ― or indeed more pervasive ― than that found in an individual’s personal digital device or computer. To admit evidence obtained in breach of this particularly strong privacy interest would tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
Cases Cited
By Cromwell J.
Distinguished: R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679; R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607; referred to: R. v. Giles, 2007 BCSC 1147 (CanLII); R. v. Otchere-Badu, 2010 ONSC 1059 (CanLII); Young v. Canada, 2010 CanLII 74003; R. v. Howell, 2011 NSSC 284, 313 N.S.R. (2d) 4; R. v. Franko, 2012 ABQB 282, 541 A.R. 23; R. v. Cater, 2014 NSCA 74 (CanLII); R. v. D’Annunzio (2010), 224 C.R.R. (2d) 221; R. v. Polius (2009), 196 C.R.R. (2d) 288; R. v. Hiscoe, 2013 NSCA 48, 328 N.S.R. (2d) 381; R. v. Mann, 2014 BCCA 231, 310 C.C.C. (3d) 143; R. v. Liew, 2012 ONSC 1826 (CanLII); Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145; R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265; R. v. Caslake, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51; Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158; R. v. Beare, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387; R. v. Debot, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140; R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417; R. v. Pohoretsky, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 945; R. v. Nolet, 2010 SCC 24, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 851; United States v. Santillan, 571 F.Supp.2d 1093 (2008); R. v. Vu, 2013 SCC 60, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657; R. v. Khan, 2013 ONSC 4587, 287 C.R.R. (2d) 192; R. v. Rochwell, 2012 ONSC 5594, 268 C.R.R. (2d) 283; Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13; R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353; R. v. Finnikin, 2009 CanLII 82187; R. v. Côté, 2011 SCC 46, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 215.
By Karakatsanis J. (dissenting)
R. v. Caslake, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51; R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432; R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417; R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212; R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30; United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145; R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265; R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59; R. v. Clayton, 2007 SCC 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725; Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158; R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13; R. v. Golub (1997), 34 O.R. (3d) 743; R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607; R. v. Vu, 2013 SCC 60, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657; R. v. White, 2007 ONCA 318, 85 O.R. (3d) 407; R. v. TELUS Communications Co., 2013 SCC 16, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Polius (2009), 196 C.R.R. (2d) 288; R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679; R. v. Kelsy, 2011 ONCA 605, 283 O.A.C. 201; R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353; R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223; R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253; R. v. Cole, 2012 SCC 53, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , ss. 8 , 24(2) .
Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 487(1) (b), 487.11 , 529.3 .
Authors Cited
Austin, Lisa. “Privacy and the Question of Technology” (2003), 22 Law & Phil. 119.
Austin, Lisa M. “Control Yourself, or at Least Your Core Self” (2010), 30 Bull. Sci. Tech. & Soc. 26.
Brown, Patrick. “Searches of Cell Phones Incident to Arrest: Overview of the Law as It Stands and a New Path Forward” (2014), 27 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 563.
Fontana, James A. The Law of Search and Seizure in Canada, 3rd ed. Toronto: Butterworths, 1992.
Fontana, James A., and David Keeshan. The Law of Search and Seizure in Canada, 8th ed. Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2010.
Nagel, Thomas. “Concealment and Exposure” (1998), 27 Phil. & Publ. Aff. 3.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (MacPherson, Armstrong and Watt JJ.A.), 2013 ONCA 106, 114 O.R. (3d) 81, 302 O.A.C. 284, 296 C.C.C. (3d) 331, 100 C.R. (6th) 296, 277 C.R.R. (2d) 126, [2013] O.J. No. 704 (QL), 2013 CarswellOnt 1703, affirming the accused’s conviction for armed robbery and related offences. Appeal dismissed, LeBel, Abella and Karakatsanis JJ. dissenting.
Sam Goldstein and Shelley Flam, for the appellant.
Randy Schwartz, for the respondent.
Kevin Wilson and W. Paul Riley, for the intervener the Director of Public Prosecutions of Canada.
Dominique A. Jobin, for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec.
Jolaine Antonio, for the intervener the Attorney General of Alberta.
Written submissions only by Tamir Israel, for the intervener the Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic.
Gerald Chan and Nader R. Hasan, for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.
Dane F. Bullerwell and Jeffrey W. Beedell, for the intervener the Criminal Trial Lawyers’ Association (Alberta).
Matthew Milne-Smith, for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
Leonard T. Doust, Q.C., and Bronson Toy, for the intervener the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police.
Written submissions only by Susan M. Chapman, Jennifer Micallef and Kristen Allen, for the intervener the Criminal Lawyers’ Association.
The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Cromwell, Moldaver and Wagner JJ. was delivered by
Cromwell J. —
I. Introduction
[1] The police have a common law power to search incident to a lawful arrest. Does this power permit the search of cell phones and similar devices found on the suspect? That is the main question raised by this appeal.
[2] Canadian courts have so far not provided a consistent answer. At least four approaches have emerged. The first is to hold that the power to search incident to arrest generally includes the power to search cell phones, provided that the search is truly incidental to the arrest: R. v. Giles, 2007 BCSC 1147 (CanLII); R. v. Otchere-Badu, 2010 ONSC 1059 (CanLII); Young v. Canada, 2010 CanLII 74003 (Nfld. Prov. Ct.); R. v. Howell, 2011 NSSC 284, 313 N.S.R. (2d) 4; R. v. Franko, 2012 ABQB 282, 541 A.R. 23; R. v. Cater, 2014 NSCA 74 (CanLII); R. v. D’Annunzio (2010), 224 C.R.R. (2d) 221 (Ont. S.C.J.). The second view is that “cursory” searches are permitted: R. v. Polius (2009), 196 C.R.R. (2d) 288 (Ont. S.C.J.). A third is that thorough “data-dump” searches are not permitted incident to arrest: R. v. Hiscoe, 2013 NSCA 48, 328 N.S.R. (2d) 381; R. v. Mann, 2014 BCCA 231, 310 C.C.C. (3d) 143. Finally, it has also been held that searches of cell phones incident to arrest are not permitted except in exigent circumstances, in which a “cursory” search is permissible: R. v. Liew, 2012 ONSC 1826 (CanLII). These divergent results underline both the difficulty of the question and the need for a more consistent approach.
[3] In order to resolve the issue, we must strike a balance between the demands of effective law enforcement and everyone’s right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. In short, we must identify the point at which the “public’s interest in being left alone by government must give way to the government’s interest in intruding on the individual’s privacy in order to advance its goals, notably those of law enforcement”: Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at pp. 159-60.
[4] In my view, we can achieve that balance with a rule that permits searches of cell phones incident to arrest, provided that the search — both what is searched and how it is searched— is strictly incidental to the arrest and that the police keep detailed notes of what has been searched and why.
II. Overview of the Facts, Proceedings and Issues
[5] The issue on appeal concerns the admissibility at Mr. Fearon’s armed robbery trial of a draft text message and two photos found by police on his cell phone. The issue arises out of the investigation of a crime that has become depressingly routine.
[6] Two men, one armed with a handgun, robbed a merchant as she loaded her car with jewellery. The robbers grabbed some bags, one of which was filled with jewellery, and fled in a black vehicle. The police became involved very shortly afterward and at that point, they reasonably believed that there was a handgun on the streets and that the robbers had taken a large quantity of readily-disposable jewellery. It was obviously important to locate the gun before it could be used again and the jewellery before it could be disposed of or hidden.
[7] The investigation quickly centred on the appellant, Kevin Fearon, and Junior Chapman. Later that same evening, police arrested both men, but had not at that point located any jewellery or the handgun. Police also quickly located the getaway vehicle and secured it, but they did not search it until a day and a half later when they had a warrant to do so.
[8] When Mr. Fearon was arrested, Sgt. Hicks conducted a pat-down search incident to the arrest. He found a cell phone in Mr. Fearon’s right front pants pocket. Police searched the phone at that time and again within less than two hours of the arrest. They found a draft text message referring to jewellery and opening with the words “We did it”. They also found a photo of a handgun and photos of males. Police later recovered a handgun during their search of the getaway vehicle and, at trial, the judge found that it was the handgun used in the robbery and depicted in the photo found on Mr. Fearon’s cell phone: trial judge’s oral reasons. Months later, police applied for and were granted a warrant to search the contents of the phone. No new evidence was discovered.
[9] At his trial for robbery, Mr. Fearon argued that the search of his cell phone had violated s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and that admitting the photographs and text message into evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. On a voir dire, the trial judge found that the search of the cell phone incident to arrest had not breached s. 8 of the Charter and that the photos and text message were admissible. She convicted Mr. Fearon of robbery with a firearm and related offences.
[10] The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed Mr. Fearon’s appeal. The court affirmed the trial judge’s conclusion that the search incident to arrest had not violated Mr. Fearon’s s. 8 rights.
[11] The appeal to this Court raises two main questions:
1. Was the search incident to arrest unreasonable and therefore contrary to s. 8 of the Charter ?
2. If so, should the evidence be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter ?
III. Analysis
A. First Issue: The Search Incident to Arrest
(1) The Analytical Framework
[12] A search is reasonable within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter if it is authorized by a reasonable law and is conducted reasonably: R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at p. 278; R. v. Caslake, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51, at para. 10. The main question on appeal therefore concerns the proper scope of the common law power to search incident to arrest: is a cell phone search incident to arrest authorized by a reasonable law?
[13] This question about the scope of the power to search incident to arrest cannot be answered in too categorical a fashion. As Lamer C.J. explained in Caslake, the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest turns on several different aspects of the search including the nature of items seized, the place of search and the time of search in relation to the time of arrest: paras. 15-16. Each of these aspects may engage distinct considerations that cannot be addressed in very general terms. Moreover, arrests relate to many different crimes and are made in many different circumstances. It follows that the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest will be affected by the particular circumstances of the particular arrest. The courts will rarely be able to establish any categorical limit applicable to all arrests and all purposes incidental to them.
[14] There is no question that there is a common law police power to search incident to arrest. The question here — and it is a novel one for this Court — relates to whether this power permits the particular cell phone searches in issue here. To determine the precise scope of this common law power, the Court must weigh the competing interests involved, particularly whether the search “is reasonable in light of the public purposes served by effective control of criminal acts on the one hand and on the other respect for the liberty and fundamental dignity of individuals”: Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158, at pp. 181-82; Caslake, at para. 17. The Court’s task is “to delineate the scope of the common law power . . . in a way that is consistent with the Charter right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure”: R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, at para. 87.
[15] This task may be approached in more than one way. I approach it by considering first whether the search falls within the existing general framework of the common law power to search incident to arrest. Having decided that it does, I go on to ask whether that framework must be modified so that the common law search power complies with s. 8 of the Charter in light of the particular law enforcement and privacy interests at stake in this context. The Court followed this analytical approach in R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, and Golden, two important cases which considered whether searches incident to arrest were Charter compliant, and it serves equally well in this case. My conclusion is that some modification of the existing common law framework is necessary.
(2) The Common Law Police Power to Search Incident to Arrest
[16] Although the common law power to search incident to arrest is deeply rooted in our law, it is an extraordinary power in two respects. The power to search incident to arrest not only permits searches without a warrant, but does so in circumstances in which the grounds to obtain a warrant do not exist. The cases teach us that the power to search incident to arrest is a focussed power given to the police so that they can pursue their investigations promptly upon making an arrest. The power must be exercised in the pursuit of a valid purpose related to the proper administration of justice. The central guiding principle is that the search must be, as the case law puts it, truly incidental to the arrest.
[17] The Court affirmed the common law power of the police to search incident to arrest in R. v. Beare, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387. La Forest J., for the Court, noted that the search incident to arrest power exists because of the need “to arm the police with adequate and reasonable powers for the investigation of crime” and that “[p]romptitude and facility in the identification and the discovery of indicia of guilt or innocence are of great importance in criminal investigations”: p. 404; see also R. v. Debot, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140, at p. 1146. Thus, the need for the police to be able to promptly pursue their investigation upon making a lawful arrest is an important consideration underlying the power to search incident to arrest.
[18] The power was further affirmed and explained in Cloutier, at pp. 180-81, where L’Heureux-Dubé J. summed up Canadian common law to that point:
. . . it seems beyond question that the common law as recognized and developed in Canada holds that the police have a power to search a lawfully arrested person and to seize anything in his or her possession or immediate surroundings to guarantee the safety of the police and the accused, prevent the prisoner’s escape or provide evidence against him.
[19] The Court held, in Cloutier, that a “‘frisk’ search incidental to a lawful arrest reconciles the public’s interest in the effective and safe enforcement of the law . . . and . . . its interest in ensuring the freedom and dignity of individuals”: p. 185. The search “must be for a valid objective in pursuit of the ends of criminal justice, such as the discovery of an object that may be a threat to the safety of the police, the accused or the public, or that may facilitate escape or act as evidence against the accused”, and it “must not be conducted in an abusive fashion”: p. 186.
[20] The Court next considered search incident to arrest in Stillman, at paras. 27-50, a case that considered whether taking teeth impressions, hair samples and buccal swabs from a suspect after his lawful arrest for murder fell within the scope of the power to search incident to arrest. The Court affirmed that, in order for a search incident to arrest to be lawful, the arrest itself must be lawful, the search must be an incident of that arrest, and the manner in which it is conducted must be reasonable: para. 27. Turning to the specific issue of whether the common law power of search incident to arrest extends to the seizure of bodily substances, the Court ruled that it did not. Seizure of bodily substances “invades an area of personal privacy essential to the maintenance of . . . human dignity” and is “much more serious” than an intrusion into the suspect’s office or home: at para. 42, quoting with approval R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, at p. 432; see also R. v. Pohoretsky, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 945, at p. 949. Seizing bodily samples gives rise to “completely different concerns” because of the impact on a person’s bodily integrity, which may be “the ultimate affront to human dignity”: para. 39. Moreover, there is no need for prompt access to the information: there is no danger of the bodily samples disappearing, or that the suspect’s teeth impressions or DNA will change with the passage of time: para. 49.
[21] That brings me to the leading case from this Court, Caslake. The case concerned an inventory search of a suspect’s vehicle six hours after he was arrested for possession of narcotics. The Court concluded that the search did not fall within the scope of lawful search incident to arrest. Lamer C.J. articulated the justification of the common law power as being the need for law enforcement authorities to gain control of things or information, a need which outweighs the individual’s interest in privacy: para. 17. Whether the search is justified depends on whether the search is truly incidental to the arrest: para. 17. This means that the police must be attempting to achieve some valid purpose connected to the arrest. That turns on what they were looking for and why. The police must have one of the purposes for a valid search incident to arrest in mind when the search is conducted, and the officer conducting the search must reasonably believe that this purpose may be served by the search.
[22] This is not a standard of reasonable and probable grounds, but simply a requirement that there be some reasonable basis for doing what the police did. For example, if the purpose of the search is to find evidence, there must be some reasonable prospect of finding evidence of the offence for which the accused is being arrested: Caslake, at paras. 19-24. Lamer C.J. summarized the law as follows:
If the law on which the Crown is relying for authorization is the common law doctrine of search incident to arrest, then the limits of this doctrine must be respected. The most important of these limits is that the search must be truly incidental to the arrest. This means that the police must be able to explain, within the purposes articulated in Cloutier, supra (protecting the police, protecting the evidence, discovering evidence), or by reference to some other valid purpose, why they searched. They do not need reasonable and probable grounds. However, they must have had some reason related to the arrest for conducting the search at the time the search was carried out, and that reason must be objectively reasonable. Delay and distance do not automatically preclude a search from being incidental to arrest, but they may cause the court to draw a negative inference. However, that inference may be rebutted by a proper explanation. [Emphasis added; para. 25.]
[23] The Court next considered search incident to arrest in Golden. The question before the Court was whether the common law power to search incident to arrest includes the power to strip search (i.e. a search involving “the removal or rearrangement of some or all of the clothing of a person so as to permit a visual inspection of a person’s private areas, namely genitals, buttocks, breasts (in the case of a female), or undergarments”: para. 47). The Court concluded that, because of the intrusive nature of a strip search, as compared with the frisk search in issue in Cloutier, a higher degree of justification was required. A serious infringement of privacy and personal dignity was “an inevitable consequence of a strip search”: para. 99 (emphasis added). In addition, the Court noted that strip searches are rarely required to be done promptly given the low risk of disposal or loss of the evidence: para. 93.
[24] For these reasons, strip searches will only be reasonable when they are conducted in a reasonable manner “as an incident to a lawful arrest for the purpose of discovering weapons in the detainee’s possession or evidence related to the reason for the arrest” and the police “have reasonable and probable grounds for concluding that a strip search is necessary in the particular circumstances of the arrest”: Golden, at paras. 98-99.
[25] I turn finally to R. v. Nolet, 2010 SCC 24, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 851. One of the issues was whether the search of a vehicle some two hours after the driver’s arrest for possession of the proceeds of crime was lawful. The Court unanimously upheld the legality of the search as being incidental to the accused’s lawful arrest. Binnie J. reiterated the important point made in Caslake and Golden that a search is properly incidental to arrest when “the police attempt to ‘achieve some valid purpose connected to the arrest’ including ‘ensuring the safety of the police and the public, the protection of evidence from destruction at the hands of the arrestee or others, and the discovery of evidence . . .’”: para. 49 (emphasis deleted), quoting Caslake, at para. 19. As Binnie J. put it, “[t]he important consideration is the link between the location and purpose of the search and the grounds for the arrest”: para. 49. He repeated the propositions, settled in other cases, that, first, reasonable and probable grounds are not required, and second, the basis of the warrantless search is not exigent circumstances, but connection or relatedness to the crime for which the suspect has been arrested: paras. 51-52.
[26] In light of this review, I turn to the two analytical steps. The first is whether the search here falls within the general common law parameters for searches incident to arrest. If it does, the second issue is whether, having regard to the appropriate balance between the need for effective law enforcement and the suspect’s privacy interests, some further restrictions must be imposed and if so, what they should be.
(3) Were the Searches Truly Incidental to a Lawful Arrest?
[27] The common law framework requires that a search incident to arrest must be founded on a lawful arrest, be truly incidental to that arrest and be conducted reasonably. In my view, the initial searches of the cell phone in this case satisfied these requirements.
[28] Mr. Fearon was lawfully arrested for robbery, and that satisfies the first requirement.
[29] There is no serious suggestion in this Court that the cell phone searches that led police to the text message and the photo of the handgun were other than truly incidental to the arrest, or, in other words that they were not conducted in pursuit of a “valid purpose connected to the arrest”, as required by Caslake, at para. 19. To understand why, we need at this point to review the facts in more detail.
[30] Recall that, upon his arrest, Mr. Fearon was subjected to a pat-down search that led the police to seize a cell phone found in his pants pocket. Mr. Fearon does not complain about this search or the seizure of the phone resulting from it. Sgt. Hicks, the officer conducting the pat-down search, had “a look through the phone”: trial judge’s ruling on cell phone search, 2010 ONCJ 645 (CanLII) (the “Ruling”), at para. 20. Sergeant Hicks “explained that he manipulated the keypad to the extent that he entered into different modes to access text messages and photographs on the phone”: para. 22. He did not remember spec

Court headnote

R. v. Fearon Collection Supreme Court Judgments Date 2014-12-11 Neutral citation 2014 SCC 77 Report [2014] 3 SCR 621 Case number 35298 Judges McLachlin, Beverley; LeBel, Louis; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Cromwell, Thomas Albert; Moldaver, Michael J.; Karakatsanis, Andromache; Wagner, Richard On appeal from Ontario Subjects Constitutional law Notes SCC Case Information: 35298 Decision Content SUPREME COURT OF CANADA Citation: R. v. Fearon, 2014 SCC 77, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621 Date: 20141211 Docket: 35298 Between: Kevin Fearon Appellant and Her Majesty The Queen Respondent - and - Director of Public Prosecutions of Canada, Attorney General of Quebec, Attorney General of Alberta, Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, Criminal Trial Lawyers’ Association (Alberta), Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police and Criminal Lawyers’ Association Interveners Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ. Reasons for Judgment: (paras. 1 to 99) Dissenting Reasons: (paras. 100 to 198) Cromwell J. (McLachlin C.J. and Moldaver and Wagner JJ. concurring) Karakatsanis J. (LeBel and Abella JJ. concurring) r. v. fearon, 2014 SCC 77, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621 Kevin Fearon Appellant v. Her Majesty The Queen Respondent and Director of Public Prosecutions of Canada, Attorney General of Quebec, Attorney General of Alberta, Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, Criminal Trial Lawyers’ Association (Alberta), Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police and Criminal Lawyers’ Association Interveners Indexed as: R. v. Fearon 2014 SCC 77 File No.: 35298. 2014: May 23; 2014: December 11. Present: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ. on appeal from the court of appeal for ontario Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Search and seizure — Search incident to arrest — Cell phone found on accused and searched without warrant — Text message and photos on cell phone introduced as evidence at trial — Whether general common law framework for searches incident to arrest needs to be modified in case of cell phone searches incident to arrest — Whether search of cell phone incident to arrest was unreasonable and contrary to accused’s right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure — If so, whether evidence discovered in search should be excluded — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 8 , 24(2) . Police — Powers — Search incident to arrest — Warrantless search of cell phone — Text message and photos on cell phone introduced as evidence at trial of accused — Whether common law police power to search incident to arrest permits cell phone searches — Whether search of cell phone incident to arrest was unreasonable and contrary to accused’s right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 8 . Two men, one armed with a handgun, robbed a merchant as she loaded her car with jewellery. The robbers grabbed some bags, one of which was filled with jewellery, and fled in a black vehicle. The police became involved very shortly afterward. At that point, they had not located the jewellery or the handgun. Later that evening, they located and secured the getaway vehicle, and arrested F and C. During the pat-down search of F conducted incident to arrest, police found a cell phone in F’s pocket. Police searched the phone at that time and again within less than two hours of the arrest. They found a draft text message which read “We did it were the jewlery at nigga burrrrrrrrrrr”, and some photos, including one of a handgun. A day and a half later, when police had a warrant to search the vehicle, they recovered the handgun used in the robbery and depicted in the photo. Months later, police applied for and were granted a warrant to search the contents of the phone. No new evidence was discovered. On a voir dire, the trial judge found that the search of the cell phone incident to arrest had not breached s. 8 of the Charter . She admitted the photos and text message and convicted F of robbery with a firearm and related offences. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. Held (LeBel, Abella and Karakatsanis JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be dismissed. Per McLachlin C.J. and Cromwell, Moldaver and Wagner JJ.: The common law power to search incident to a lawful arrest permits the search of cell phones and similar devices found on the suspect, although some modification of the existing common law framework is necessary because the search of a cell phone has the potential to be a much more significant invasion of privacy than the typical search incident to arrest. The power to search incident to arrest is extraordinary in that it permits reasonable searches when the police have neither a warrant nor reasonable and probable grounds. That the exercise of this extraordinary power has been considered in general to meet constitutional muster reflects the important law enforcement objectives which are served by searches of people who have been lawfully arrested. This power must be exercised in the pursuit of a valid purpose related to the proper administration of justice and the search must be truly incidental to the arrest. Like other searches incident to arrest, prompt cell phone searches incident to arrest may serve important law enforcement objectives: they can assist police to identify and mitigate risks to public safety; locate firearms or stolen goods; identify accomplices; locate and preserve evidence; prevent suspects from evading or resisting law enforcement; locate the other perpetrators; warn officers of possible impending danger; and follow leads promptly. Cell phone searches also have an element of urgency, which supports the extension of the power to search incident to arrest. Safeguards must be added to the law of search of cell phones incident to arrest in order to make that power compliant with s. 8 of the Charter . Ultimately, the purpose of the exercise is to strike a balance that gives due weight to the important law enforcement objectives served by searches incidental to arrest and to the very significant privacy interests at stake in cell phone searches. Consequently, four conditions must be met in order for the search of a cell phone or similar device incidental to arrest to comply with s. 8. First, the arrest must be lawful. Second, the search must be truly incidental to the arrest. This requirement should be strictly applied to permit searches that must be done promptly upon arrest in order to effectively serve the law enforcement purposes. In this context, those purposes are protecting the police, the accused or the public; preserving evidence; and, if the investigation will be stymied or significantly hampered absent the ability to promptly conduct the search, discovering evidence. Third, the nature and the extent of the search must be tailored to its purpose. In practice, this will mean that only recently sent or drafted emails, texts, photos and the call log will, generally, be available, although other searches may, in some circumstances, be justified. Finally, the police must take detailed notes of what they have examined on the device and how they examined it. The notes should generally include the applications searched, the extent of the search, the time of the search, its purpose and its duration. The record-keeping requirement is important to the effectiveness of after-the-fact judicial review. It will also help police officers to focus on whether what they are doing in relation to the phone falls squarely within the parameters of a lawful search incident to arrest. None of the three main modifications to the common law power to search cell phones incident to arrest previously suggested in the case law strike the balance required by s. 8. First, the considerations that prompted the Court to take a categorical approach with respect to the non-consensual seizure of bodily samples are entirely absent in this case. Second, police will rarely have reasonable and probable grounds to search for safety purposes or to believe that evidence of the offence will be found on the phone at the time of arrest. Third, allowing cell phone searches only in exigent circumstances would share the pitfalls of imposing a standard of reasonable and probable grounds, and would give almost no weight to the law enforcement objectives served by prompt searches. Moreover, the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement is not a subset of the exigency exception. In this case, the initial search of the cell phone, which disclosed all of the cell phone evidence tendered by the Crown at trial, breached F’s s. 8 rights. Although they were truly incidental to F’s arrest for robbery, were for valid law enforcement objectives, and were appropriately linked to the offence for which F had been lawfully arrested, detailed evidence about precisely what was searched, how and why, was lacking. Despite that breach, the evidence should not be excluded. The impact of the breach on F’s Charter-protected interests favours exclusion of the evidence, but it does so weakly. Although any search of any cell phone has the potential to be a very significant invasion of a person’s informational privacy interests, the invasion of F’s privacy was not particularly grave. Further, as he did not challenge the warrant that was subsequently issued for the comprehensive search of the cell phone, his privacy interests were going to be impacted and the particular breach did not significantly change the nature of that impact. However, other factors favour inclusion. As to the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct, the dominant view at the time of the search approved cell phone searches incident to arrest. In addition, the police fully disclosed the earlier searches when they decided to obtain the warrant to search the cell phone. While the police should, when faced with real uncertainty, choose a course of action that is more respectful of the accused’s potential privacy rights, an honest mistake, reasonably made, is not state misconduct that requires the exclusion of evidence. Society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits also favours admission: the evidence is cogent and reliable, and its exclusion would undermine the truth-seeking function of the justice system. Per LeBel, Abella and Karakatsanis JJ. (dissenting): Searches of personal digital devices — including personal computers — risk serious encroachments on privacy and are therefore not authorized under the common law power to search incident to arrest. Only judicial pre-authorization can provide the effective and impartial balancing of the state’s law enforcement objectives with the intensely personal and uniquely pervasive privacy interests in our digital devices. Section 8 of the Charter provides constitutional protection for privacy, which includes the right to be free of the threat of unreasonable intrusions on privacy and the right to determine when, how, and to what extent we release personal information. Generally, the law enforcement interests will outweigh the privacy interest that an arrested person has in the physical items in his immediate vicinity. However, because the privacy interest in a digital device is quantitatively and qualitatively different from that in other physical items traditionally subject to such searches, the constitutional balance between privacy and the needs of law enforcement with respect to the search of cell phones and similar digital devices incident to arrest must be reassessed, using first principles. A cell phone cannot be treated like any other piece of physical evidence that may be found on an arrestee and searched incident to arrest. Individuals have a high expectation of privacy in their digital devices because they store immense amounts of information, are fastidious record keepers, retain files and data even after users think they have been destroyed, make the temporal and territorial limitations on a search incident to arrest meaningless, and can continue to generate evidence even after they have been seized. The law enforcement interests relate to the three purposes justifying searches incident to arrest: safety, the preservation of evidence, and the discovery of evidence. Digital devices are not physically dangerous weapons and they cannot conceal such a weapon. The mere possibility that a phone could have been used to summon backup or that evidence on the cell phone could be remotely deleted should not justify a search incident to arrest. Although the delay of obtaining a warrant may come at a cost to the prompt pursuit of the investigation, this cost must be weighed against the privacy interest in a personal digital device. The most pressing state interests can be accommodated by the existing doctrine that permits warrantless searches under exigent circumstances. Exigent circumstances exist when (1) there is a reasonable basis to suspect a search may prevent an imminent threat to safety or (2) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the imminent destruction of evidence can be prevented by a warrantless search. Where exigent circumstances do not exist, a telewarrant can usually be obtained relatively quickly and with little harm to the investigation. Thus, the weighty privacy interest that an arrested person has in a personal digital device will outweigh the state interest in performing a warrantless search incident to arrest, except in exigent circumstances. Searches that treat a cell phone merely as a physical object continue to be permissible incident to arrest since it is the information that attracts a heightened expectation of privacy. As such, the police may usually seize a phone incident to arrest in order to preserve the evidence, but will require a warrant before they can search its contents. In performing a search of a cell phone, whether under exigent circumstances or pursuant to a warrant, the police officers must not extend that search beyond the scope of the grounds permitting the search. Tailoring the scope of the common law power to search incident to arrest does not adequately protect the reasonable expectations of privacy in personal digital devices. The majority’s proposed modifications generate problems of impracticality, police uncertainty, and increased after-the-fact litigation. And while detailed note-taking may be desirable, it may prove to be an impractical requirement, and it is not an adequate remedy to what would be an extraordinary search power. Fundamentally, the police are not in the best position to determine whether the law enforcement objectives clearly outweigh the potentially significant intrusion on privacy in the search of a digital device, and, if they are wrong, the subsequent exclusion of the evidence will not remedy the initial privacy violation. Here, the searches of F’s phone were not justified and unreasonably infringed his privacy, in violation of s. 8 of the Charter . The facts of this case fall far below either standard for exigency. The evidence which was unconstitutionally obtained should be excluded. The state conduct was not particularly objectionable, given that the police acted in good faith, and the evidence is reliable; however, the high privacy interest individuals have in their electronic devices tips the balance in favour of exclusion. Unwarranted searches undermine the public’s confidence that personal communications, ideas and beliefs will be protected on their digital devices. This is particularly important given the increasing use and ubiquity of such technology. It is difficult to conceive of a sphere of privacy more intensely personal ― or indeed more pervasive ― than that found in an individual’s personal digital device or computer. To admit evidence obtained in breach of this particularly strong privacy interest would tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Cases Cited By Cromwell J. Distinguished: R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679; R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607; referred to: R. v. Giles, 2007 BCSC 1147 (CanLII); R. v. Otchere-Badu, 2010 ONSC 1059 (CanLII); Young v. Canada, 2010 CanLII 74003; R. v. Howell, 2011 NSSC 284, 313 N.S.R. (2d) 4; R. v. Franko, 2012 ABQB 282, 541 A.R. 23; R. v. Cater, 2014 NSCA 74 (CanLII); R. v. D’Annunzio (2010), 224 C.R.R. (2d) 221; R. v. Polius (2009), 196 C.R.R. (2d) 288; R. v. Hiscoe, 2013 NSCA 48, 328 N.S.R. (2d) 381; R. v. Mann, 2014 BCCA 231, 310 C.C.C. (3d) 143; R. v. Liew, 2012 ONSC 1826 (CanLII); Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145; R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265; R. v. Caslake, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51; Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158; R. v. Beare, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387; R. v. Debot, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140; R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417; R. v. Pohoretsky, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 945; R. v. Nolet, 2010 SCC 24, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 851; United States v. Santillan, 571 F.Supp.2d 1093 (2008); R. v. Vu, 2013 SCC 60, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657; R. v. Khan, 2013 ONSC 4587, 287 C.R.R. (2d) 192; R. v. Rochwell, 2012 ONSC 5594, 268 C.R.R. (2d) 283; Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13; R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353; R. v. Finnikin, 2009 CanLII 82187; R. v. Côté, 2011 SCC 46, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 215. By Karakatsanis J. (dissenting) R. v. Caslake, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51; R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432; R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417; R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212; R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30; United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145; R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265; R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59; R. v. Clayton, 2007 SCC 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725; Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158; R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13; R. v. Golub (1997), 34 O.R. (3d) 743; R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607; R. v. Vu, 2013 SCC 60, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657; R. v. White, 2007 ONCA 318, 85 O.R. (3d) 407; R. v. TELUS Communications Co., 2013 SCC 16, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Polius (2009), 196 C.R.R. (2d) 288; R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679; R. v. Kelsy, 2011 ONCA 605, 283 O.A.C. 201; R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353; R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223; R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253; R. v. Cole, 2012 SCC 53, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34. Statutes and Regulations Cited Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , ss. 8 , 24(2) . Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 487(1) (b), 487.11 , 529.3 . Authors Cited Austin, Lisa. “Privacy and the Question of Technology” (2003), 22 Law & Phil. 119. Austin, Lisa M. “Control Yourself, or at Least Your Core Self” (2010), 30 Bull. Sci. Tech. & Soc. 26. Brown, Patrick. “Searches of Cell Phones Incident to Arrest: Overview of the Law as It Stands and a New Path Forward” (2014), 27 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 563. Fontana, James A. The Law of Search and Seizure in Canada, 3rd ed. Toronto: Butterworths, 1992. Fontana, James A., and David Keeshan. The Law of Search and Seizure in Canada, 8th ed. Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2010. Nagel, Thomas. “Concealment and Exposure” (1998), 27 Phil. & Publ. Aff. 3. APPEAL from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (MacPherson, Armstrong and Watt JJ.A.), 2013 ONCA 106, 114 O.R. (3d) 81, 302 O.A.C. 284, 296 C.C.C. (3d) 331, 100 C.R. (6th) 296, 277 C.R.R. (2d) 126, [2013] O.J. No. 704 (QL), 2013 CarswellOnt 1703, affirming the accused’s conviction for armed robbery and related offences. Appeal dismissed, LeBel, Abella and Karakatsanis JJ. dissenting. Sam Goldstein and Shelley Flam, for the appellant. Randy Schwartz, for the respondent. Kevin Wilson and W. Paul Riley, for the intervener the Director of Public Prosecutions of Canada. Dominique A. Jobin, for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec. Jolaine Antonio, for the intervener the Attorney General of Alberta. Written submissions only by Tamir Israel, for the intervener the Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic. Gerald Chan and Nader R. Hasan, for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association. Dane F. Bullerwell and Jeffrey W. Beedell, for the intervener the Criminal Trial Lawyers’ Association (Alberta). Matthew Milne-Smith, for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. Leonard T. Doust, Q.C., and Bronson Toy, for the intervener the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police. Written submissions only by Susan M. Chapman, Jennifer Micallef and Kristen Allen, for the intervener the Criminal Lawyers’ Association. The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Cromwell, Moldaver and Wagner JJ. was delivered by Cromwell J. — I. Introduction [1] The police have a common law power to search incident to a lawful arrest. Does this power permit the search of cell phones and similar devices found on the suspect? That is the main question raised by this appeal. [2] Canadian courts have so far not provided a consistent answer. At least four approaches have emerged. The first is to hold that the power to search incident to arrest generally includes the power to search cell phones, provided that the search is truly incidental to the arrest: R. v. Giles, 2007 BCSC 1147 (CanLII); R. v. Otchere-Badu, 2010 ONSC 1059 (CanLII); Young v. Canada, 2010 CanLII 74003 (Nfld. Prov. Ct.); R. v. Howell, 2011 NSSC 284, 313 N.S.R. (2d) 4; R. v. Franko, 2012 ABQB 282, 541 A.R. 23; R. v. Cater, 2014 NSCA 74 (CanLII); R. v. D’Annunzio (2010), 224 C.R.R. (2d) 221 (Ont. S.C.J.). The second view is that “cursory” searches are permitted: R. v. Polius (2009), 196 C.R.R. (2d) 288 (Ont. S.C.J.). A third is that thorough “data-dump” searches are not permitted incident to arrest: R. v. Hiscoe, 2013 NSCA 48, 328 N.S.R. (2d) 381; R. v. Mann, 2014 BCCA 231, 310 C.C.C. (3d) 143. Finally, it has also been held that searches of cell phones incident to arrest are not permitted except in exigent circumstances, in which a “cursory” search is permissible: R. v. Liew, 2012 ONSC 1826 (CanLII). These divergent results underline both the difficulty of the question and the need for a more consistent approach. [3] In order to resolve the issue, we must strike a balance between the demands of effective law enforcement and everyone’s right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. In short, we must identify the point at which the “public’s interest in being left alone by government must give way to the government’s interest in intruding on the individual’s privacy in order to advance its goals, notably those of law enforcement”: Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at pp. 159-60. [4] In my view, we can achieve that balance with a rule that permits searches of cell phones incident to arrest, provided that the search — both what is searched and how it is searched— is strictly incidental to the arrest and that the police keep detailed notes of what has been searched and why. II. Overview of the Facts, Proceedings and Issues [5] The issue on appeal concerns the admissibility at Mr. Fearon’s armed robbery trial of a draft text message and two photos found by police on his cell phone. The issue arises out of the investigation of a crime that has become depressingly routine. [6] Two men, one armed with a handgun, robbed a merchant as she loaded her car with jewellery. The robbers grabbed some bags, one of which was filled with jewellery, and fled in a black vehicle. The police became involved very shortly afterward and at that point, they reasonably believed that there was a handgun on the streets and that the robbers had taken a large quantity of readily-disposable jewellery. It was obviously important to locate the gun before it could be used again and the jewellery before it could be disposed of or hidden. [7] The investigation quickly centred on the appellant, Kevin Fearon, and Junior Chapman. Later that same evening, police arrested both men, but had not at that point located any jewellery or the handgun. Police also quickly located the getaway vehicle and secured it, but they did not search it until a day and a half later when they had a warrant to do so. [8] When Mr. Fearon was arrested, Sgt. Hicks conducted a pat-down search incident to the arrest. He found a cell phone in Mr. Fearon’s right front pants pocket. Police searched the phone at that time and again within less than two hours of the arrest. They found a draft text message referring to jewellery and opening with the words “We did it”. They also found a photo of a handgun and photos of males. Police later recovered a handgun during their search of the getaway vehicle and, at trial, the judge found that it was the handgun used in the robbery and depicted in the photo found on Mr. Fearon’s cell phone: trial judge’s oral reasons. Months later, police applied for and were granted a warrant to search the contents of the phone. No new evidence was discovered. [9] At his trial for robbery, Mr. Fearon argued that the search of his cell phone had violated s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and that admitting the photographs and text message into evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. On a voir dire, the trial judge found that the search of the cell phone incident to arrest had not breached s. 8 of the Charter and that the photos and text message were admissible. She convicted Mr. Fearon of robbery with a firearm and related offences. [10] The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed Mr. Fearon’s appeal. The court affirmed the trial judge’s conclusion that the search incident to arrest had not violated Mr. Fearon’s s. 8 rights. [11] The appeal to this Court raises two main questions: 1. Was the search incident to arrest unreasonable and therefore contrary to s. 8 of the Charter ? 2. If so, should the evidence be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter ? III. Analysis A. First Issue: The Search Incident to Arrest (1) The Analytical Framework [12] A search is reasonable within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter if it is authorized by a reasonable law and is conducted reasonably: R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at p. 278; R. v. Caslake, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51, at para. 10. The main question on appeal therefore concerns the proper scope of the common law power to search incident to arrest: is a cell phone search incident to arrest authorized by a reasonable law? [13] This question about the scope of the power to search incident to arrest cannot be answered in too categorical a fashion. As Lamer C.J. explained in Caslake, the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest turns on several different aspects of the search including the nature of items seized, the place of search and the time of search in relation to the time of arrest: paras. 15-16. Each of these aspects may engage distinct considerations that cannot be addressed in very general terms. Moreover, arrests relate to many different crimes and are made in many different circumstances. It follows that the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest will be affected by the particular circumstances of the particular arrest. The courts will rarely be able to establish any categorical limit applicable to all arrests and all purposes incidental to them. [14] There is no question that there is a common law police power to search incident to arrest. The question here — and it is a novel one for this Court — relates to whether this power permits the particular cell phone searches in issue here. To determine the precise scope of this common law power, the Court must weigh the competing interests involved, particularly whether the search “is reasonable in light of the public purposes served by effective control of criminal acts on the one hand and on the other respect for the liberty and fundamental dignity of individuals”: Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158, at pp. 181-82; Caslake, at para. 17. The Court’s task is “to delineate the scope of the common law power . . . in a way that is consistent with the Charter right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure”: R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, at para. 87. [15] This task may be approached in more than one way. I approach it by considering first whether the search falls within the existing general framework of the common law power to search incident to arrest. Having decided that it does, I go on to ask whether that framework must be modified so that the common law search power complies with s. 8 of the Charter in light of the particular law enforcement and privacy interests at stake in this context. The Court followed this analytical approach in R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, and Golden, two important cases which considered whether searches incident to arrest were Charter compliant, and it serves equally well in this case. My conclusion is that some modification of the existing common law framework is necessary. (2) The Common Law Police Power to Search Incident to Arrest [16] Although the common law power to search incident to arrest is deeply rooted in our law, it is an extraordinary power in two respects. The power to search incident to arrest not only permits searches without a warrant, but does so in circumstances in which the grounds to obtain a warrant do not exist. The cases teach us that the power to search incident to arrest is a focussed power given to the police so that they can pursue their investigations promptly upon making an arrest. The power must be exercised in the pursuit of a valid purpose related to the proper administration of justice. The central guiding principle is that the search must be, as the case law puts it, truly incidental to the arrest. [17] The Court affirmed the common law power of the police to search incident to arrest in R. v. Beare, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387. La Forest J., for the Court, noted that the search incident to arrest power exists because of the need “to arm the police with adequate and reasonable powers for the investigation of crime” and that “[p]romptitude and facility in the identification and the discovery of indicia of guilt or innocence are of great importance in criminal investigations”: p. 404; see also R. v. Debot, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140, at p. 1146. Thus, the need for the police to be able to promptly pursue their investigation upon making a lawful arrest is an important consideration underlying the power to search incident to arrest. [18] The power was further affirmed and explained in Cloutier, at pp. 180-81, where L’Heureux-Dubé J. summed up Canadian common law to that point: . . . it seems beyond question that the common law as recognized and developed in Canada holds that the police have a power to search a lawfully arrested person and to seize anything in his or her possession or immediate surroundings to guarantee the safety of the police and the accused, prevent the prisoner’s escape or provide evidence against him. [19] The Court held, in Cloutier, that a “‘frisk’ search incidental to a lawful arrest reconciles the public’s interest in the effective and safe enforcement of the law . . . and . . . its interest in ensuring the freedom and dignity of individuals”: p. 185. The search “must be for a valid objective in pursuit of the ends of criminal justice, such as the discovery of an object that may be a threat to the safety of the police, the accused or the public, or that may facilitate escape or act as evidence against the accused”, and it “must not be conducted in an abusive fashion”: p. 186. [20] The Court next considered search incident to arrest in Stillman, at paras. 27-50, a case that considered whether taking teeth impressions, hair samples and buccal swabs from a suspect after his lawful arrest for murder fell within the scope of the power to search incident to arrest. The Court affirmed that, in order for a search incident to arrest to be lawful, the arrest itself must be lawful, the search must be an incident of that arrest, and the manner in which it is conducted must be reasonable: para. 27. Turning to the specific issue of whether the common law power of search incident to arrest extends to the seizure of bodily substances, the Court ruled that it did not. Seizure of bodily substances “invades an area of personal privacy essential to the maintenance of . . . human dignity” and is “much more serious” than an intrusion into the suspect’s office or home: at para. 42, quoting with approval R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, at p. 432; see also R. v. Pohoretsky, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 945, at p. 949. Seizing bodily samples gives rise to “completely different concerns” because of the impact on a person’s bodily integrity, which may be “the ultimate affront to human dignity”: para. 39. Moreover, there is no need for prompt access to the information: there is no danger of the bodily samples disappearing, or that the suspect’s teeth impressions or DNA will change with the passage of time: para. 49. [21] That brings me to the leading case from this Court, Caslake. The case concerned an inventory search of a suspect’s vehicle six hours after he was arrested for possession of narcotics. The Court concluded that the search did not fall within the scope of lawful search incident to arrest. Lamer C.J. articulated the justification of the common law power as being the need for law enforcement authorities to gain control of things or information, a need which outweighs the individual’s interest in privacy: para. 17. Whether the search is justified depends on whether the search is truly incidental to the arrest: para. 17. This means that the police must be attempting to achieve some valid purpose connected to the arrest. That turns on what they were looking for and why. The police must have one of the purposes for a valid search incident to arrest in mind when the search is conducted, and the officer conducting the search must reasonably believe that this purpose may be served by the search. [22] This is not a standard of reasonable and probable grounds, but simply a requirement that there be some reasonable basis for doing what the police did. For example, if the purpose of the search is to find evidence, there must be some reasonable prospect of finding evidence of the offence for which the accused is being arrested: Caslake, at paras. 19-24. Lamer C.J. summarized the law as follows: If the law on which the Crown is relying for authorization is the common law doctrine of search incident to arrest, then the limits of this doctrine must be respected. The most important of these limits is that the search must be truly incidental to the arrest. This means that the police must be able to explain, within the purposes articulated in Cloutier, supra (protecting the police, protecting the evidence, discovering evidence), or by reference to some other valid purpose, why they searched. They do not need reasonable and probable grounds. However, they must have had some reason related to the arrest for conducting the search at the time the search was carried out, and that reason must be objectively reasonable. Delay and distance do not automatically preclude a search from being incidental to arrest, but they may cause the court to draw a negative inference. However, that inference may be rebutted by a proper explanation. [Emphasis added; para. 25.] [23] The Court next considered search incident to arrest in Golden. The question before the Court was whether the common law power to search incident to arrest includes the power to strip search (i.e. a search involving “the removal or rearrangement of some or all of the clothing of a person so as to permit a visual inspection of a person’s private areas, namely genitals, buttocks, breasts (in the case of a female), or undergarments”: para. 47). The Court concluded that, because of the intrusive nature of a strip search, as compared with the frisk search in issue in Cloutier, a higher degree of justification was required. A serious infringement of privacy and personal dignity was “an inevitable consequence of a strip search”: para. 99 (emphasis added). In addition, the Court noted that strip searches are rarely required to be done promptly given the low risk of disposal or loss of the evidence: para. 93. [24] For these reasons, strip searches will only be reasonable when they are conducted in a reasonable manner “as an incident to a lawful arrest for the purpose of discovering weapons in the detainee’s possession or evidence related to the reason for the arrest” and the police “have reasonable and probable grounds for concluding that a strip search is necessary in the particular circumstances of the arrest”: Golden, at paras. 98-99. [25] I turn finally to R. v. Nolet, 2010 SCC 24, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 851. One of the issues was whether the search of a vehicle some two hours after the driver’s arrest for possession of the proceeds of crime was lawful. The Court unanimously upheld the legality of the search as being incidental to the accused’s lawful arrest. Binnie J. reiterated the important point made in Caslake and Golden that a search is properly incidental to arrest when “the police attempt to ‘achieve some valid purpose connected to the arrest’ including ‘ensuring the safety of the police and the public, the protection of evidence from destruction at the hands of the arrestee or others, and the discovery of evidence . . .’”: para. 49 (emphasis deleted), quoting Caslake, at para. 19. As Binnie J. put it, “[t]he important consideration is the link between the location and purpose of the search and the grounds for the arrest”: para. 49. He repeated the propositions, settled in other cases, that, first, reasonable and probable grounds are not required, and second, the basis of the warrantless search is not exigent circumstances, but connection or relatedness to the crime for which the suspect has been arrested: paras. 51-52. [26] In light of this review, I turn to the two analytical steps. The first is whether the search here falls within the general common law parameters for searches incident to arrest. If it does, the second issue is whether, having regard to the appropriate balance between the need for effective law enforcement and the suspect’s privacy interests, some further restrictions must be imposed and if so, what they should be. (3) Were the Searches Truly Incidental to a Lawful Arrest? [27] The common law framework requires that a search incident to arrest must be founded on a lawful arrest, be truly incidental to that arrest and be conducted reasonably. In my view, the initial searches of the cell phone in this case satisfied these requirements. [28] Mr. Fearon was lawfully arrested for robbery, and that satisfies the first requirement. [29] There is no serious suggestion in this Court that the cell phone searches that led police to the text message and the photo of the handgun were other than truly incidental to the arrest, or, in other words that they were not conducted in pursuit of a “valid purpose connected to the arrest”, as required by Caslake, at para. 19. To understand why, we need at this point to review the facts in more detail. [30] Recall that, upon his arrest, Mr. Fearon was subjected to a pat-down search that led the police to seize a cell phone found in his pants pocket. Mr. Fearon does not complain about this search or the seizure of the phone resulting from it. Sgt. Hicks, the officer conducting the pat-down search, had “a look through the phone”: trial judge’s ruling on cell phone search, 2010 ONCJ 645 (CanLII) (the “Ruling”), at para. 20. Sergeant Hicks “explained that he manipulated the keypad to the extent that he entered into different modes to access text messages and photographs on the phone”: para. 22. He did not remember spec

R. v. Fearon

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