Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society

Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2011-05-12
Neutral citation
2011 SCC 24
Report
[2011] 2 SCR 261
Case number
33551
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; Binnie, William Ian Corneil; LeBel, Louis; Deschamps, Marie; Fish, Morris J.; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Charron, Louise; Rothstein, Marshall; Cromwell, Thomas Albert
On appeal from
Alberta
Subjects
Civil procedure
Trust
Notes
SCC Case Information: 33551
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society, 2011 SCC 24, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 261
Date: 20110512
Docket: 33551
Between:
Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Alberta
Appellant
and
Elder Advocates of Alberta Society and James O. Darwish,
Personal Representative of the Estate of Johanna H. Darwish, deceased
Respondents
- and -
Attorney General of Canada and
Attorney General of British Columbia
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ.
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 103):
McLachlin C.J. (Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. concurring)
Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society, 2011 SCC 24, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 261
Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Alberta Appellant
v.
Elder Advocates of Alberta Society and
James O. Darwish, Personal Representative of the
Estate of Johanna H. Darwish, deceased Respondents
and
Attorney General of Canada and
Attorney General of British Columbia Interveners
Indexed as: Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society
2011 SCC 24
File No.: 33551.
2011: January 27; 2011: May 12.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for alberta
Civil procedure — Pleadings — Motion to strike — Government alleged to have artificially inflated accommodation charges required of elderly patients in long‑term care facilities to subsidize medical expenses properly the responsibility of government — Statement of claim alleging breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, unjust enrichment, bad faith exercise of discretion and breach of s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether disputed claims disclose cause of action.
Fiduciary duty — Government — Government alleged to have artificially inflated accommodation charges required of elderly patients in long‑term care facilities to subsidize medical expenses properly the responsibility of government — Whether principles of fiduciary duty applicable to private actors apply to governments — Whether government owed fiduciary duty to patients.
Alberta is responsible for the cost of medical care required by the residents of nursing homes and auxiliary hospitals, but patients may be asked to contribute to the costs of their housing and meals through the payment of accommodation charges. A large class of elderly residents of Alberta’s long‑term care facilities alleges that the government artificially inflated the accommodation charges to subsidize the cost of medical expenses. They initiated a class action alleging that the Province of Alberta and the nine Regional Health Authorities who administered and operated Alberta’s health care regime at the relevant times failed to ensure that the accommodation charges were used exclusively for that purpose. They claimed that this constituted a breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, bad faith and/or unjust enrichment, and made an equality claim under s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . At certification, Alberta challenged the claims of fiduciary duty and negligence. The certification judge struck out the plea of breach of fiduciary duty and partially limited the duty of care alleged in negligence. The Court of Appeal upheld the entitlement of the class to pursue the causes of action.
Held: The appeal should be allowed in part. The pleas of breach of fiduciary duty, negligence and bad faith in the exercise of discretion are struck from the statement of claim. The claim of unjust enrichment and the s. 15(1) Charter claim are allowed to proceed to trial.
In cases not covered by an existing category in which a fiduciary duty has been recognized, a claimant must show that (1) the alleged fiduciary has undertaken to act in the best interests of the alleged beneficiary or beneficiaries; (2) a defined person or class of persons is vulnerable to a fiduciary’s control; and (3) a legal interest or a substantial practical interest of the beneficiary or beneficiaries stands to be adversely affected by the alleged fiduciary’s exercise of discretion or control. Vulnerability alone is insufficient to support a fiduciary claim.
Since the government, as a general rule, must act in the interest of all citizens, governments will owe fiduciary duties only in limited and special circumstances. The interest affected must be a specific private law interest to which the person has a pre‑existing distinct and complete legal entitlement, and the degree of control exerted by the government over the interest in question must be equivalent or analogous to direct administration of that interest. Generally speaking, a strong correspondence with one of the traditional categories of fiduciary relationship is a precondition to finding an implied fiduciary duty on the government. A general obligation to the public or sectors of the public cannot establish an undertaking to act in the alleged beneficiary’s interest, and may make it difficult to show that a defined person or class of persons is vulnerable to the fiduciary’s exercise of discretionary power. Nor can the requirements be satisfied simply when a public authority has been granted a discretionary power to affect a person’s interest, when there is a general impact on a person’s well‑being, property or security, when an entitlement is contingent on future government action, or when there is a mere access to a benefit scheme. If the undertaking is alleged to flow from a statute, the language in the legislation must clearly support it.
Here, taking all the facts pleaded as true, the pleading of breach of fiduciary duty does not disclose a supportable cause of action. The claimants’ state of vulnerability, as alleged in their pleadings, does not arise from their relationship with Alberta. Although their financial situation may be affected by the levy of accommodation charges, that alone is not enough to warrant a fiduciary duty. Nothing in the legislation or in the factual relationship pleaded supports an undertaking by Alberta to act with undivided loyalty toward the claimant class members in the setting, receipt and administration of the accommodation charges, and the claimants point to no analogous duty in private law. The Alberta Health Care Insurance Act imposes an obligation on the Province to provide medical care, but provides no direction amounting to a statutory undertaking to act in the best interests of residents of Alberta generally, or in the best interests of patients residing in long‑term care facilities in particular. Nor does the statute impose any obligation on the government to take into account anyone’s interests in determining the contribution that may be sought from patients. The legal or substantial practical interests that are alleged to be affected by the Crown’s exercise of authority — the right to chronic care and the right to be assessed a reasonable fee for the receipt of care — are insufficient to attract a fiduciary duty. Deciding how to fund and implement insured health care services requires constant balancing of competing interests between all segments of the population. The Crown would be unable to meet its obligations to the public at large if it were held to a fiduciary standard of conduct for one group among many. Moreover, the Province is not responsible for the class members, who will generally still be competent to manage their own affairs, or will be beneficiaries of duties owed by their own guardians and trustees. The plea of breach of fiduciary duty should be struck from the statement of claim.
The pleadings do not support a negligence claim. While the pleadings arguably evoke negligence in auditing, supervising, monitoring and administering the funds related to the accommodation charges, the legislative scheme does not impose a duty of care on Alberta. While the Minister has a general duty, under the Alberta Health Care Insurance Act, to provide insured health care services, the plaintiffs have failed to point to any duty to audit, supervise, monitor or administer the funds related to the accommodation charges. Similarly, the Nursing Homes Act and its regulations impose no positive duty on the Crown, but grant only permissive monitoring powers. The same is true of the Regional Health Authorities Act and the Hospitals Act and their accompanying regulations. Furthermore, in the absence of a statutory duty, the fact that Alberta may have audited, supervised, monitored and generally administered the accommodation fees objected to does not create sufficient proximity to impose a prima facie duty of care. The specific acts alleged fall under the rubric of administration of the scheme. The mere supplying of a service is insufficient, without more, to establish a relationship of proximity between the government and the claimants.
The allegation of bad faith, as pleaded, is bootstrapped to the duty of care claim, and cannot survive on its own when the plea of negligence is struck. The facts necessary to support an allegation that the plea of bad faith discloses the tort of misfeasance in a public office cannot be extricated from the pleas of negligence and fiduciary duty, and the issue was not raised before the courts below.
It is not plain and obvious that the claim for unjust enrichment does not disclose a cause of action. The claim stands on different legal footing than the claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence. While public law remedies are the proper route for claims relating to restitution of taxes levied under an ultra vires statute, it may be possible to sue for unjust enrichment in other circumstances. Here, the claim pleaded is not for taxes paid under an ultra vires statute, and it should be allowed to proceed to trial, where its propriety may be explored more fully in the context of the evidence adduced.
The claim that the imposition on the class members of an obligation to pay health care costs violates s. 15(1) of the Charter is not directly challenged by the Province. In light of the survival of the plea of unjust enrichment especially, the s. 15 claim should be permitted to proceed as part of the class action.
The action should not be decertified since a class proceeding remains the preferable procedure. The claim as pleaded does not require an individual assessment of the nexus between specific accommodation and meal charges in order to ground any potential liability to the class, and the Class Proceedings Act provides sufficient remedial flexibility to address any potential difficulties in assessing, awarding, and distributing damages.
Cases Cited
Distinguished: Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335; Authorson v. Canada (Attorney General) (2000), 53 O.R. (3d) 221, aff’d (2002), 58 O.R. (3d) 417, rev’d on other grounds, 2003 SCC 39, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 40; Brewer Bros. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1992] 1 F.C. 25; Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263; Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance), 2007 SCC 1, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 3; referred to: Hollick v. Toronto (City), 2001 SCC 68, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 158; Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959; Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99; Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574; Galambos v. Perez, 2009 SCC 48, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 247; Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377; Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2002 SCC 79, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 245; Hogan v. Newfoundland (Attorney General) (2000), 183 D.L.R. (4th) 225; R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; Sagharian (Litigation Guardian of) v. Ontario (Minister of Education), 2008 ONCA 411, 172 C.R.R. (2d) 105; Harris v. Canada, 2001 FCT 1408, [2002] 2 F.C. 484; K.L.B. v. British Columbia, 2003 SCC 51, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 403; Bennett v. British Columbia, 2009 BCSC 1358 (CanLII); Drady v. Canada, 2007 CanLII 27970, aff’d 2008 ONCA 659, 300 D.L.R. (4th) 443, leave to appeal refused, [2009] 1 S.C.R. viii; Gorecki v. Canada (Attorney General) (2006), 208 O.A.C. 368; Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728; City of Kamloops v. Nielsen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2; Cooper v. Hobart, 2001 SCC 79, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537; Reference re Broome v. Prince Edward Island, 2010 SCC 11, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 360; Childs v. Desormeaux, 2006 SCC 18, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643; Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v. B.D., 2007 SCC 38, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 83; Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. Greater Winnipeg, [1971] S.C.R. 957; Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); Design Services Ltd. v. Canada, 2008 SCC 22, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 737; Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co., 2004 SCC 25, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 629; Air Canada v. British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1161; Eurig Estate (Re), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 565; Pacific National Investments Ltd. v. Victoria (City), 2004 SCC 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 575; 620 Connaught Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 SCC 7, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 131; Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 762.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Alberta Health Care Insurance Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A‑20, ss. 3, 4.
Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑6, ss. 2 , 19(2) .
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1 , 15 , 24(1) .
Class Proceedings Act, S.A. 2003, c. C‑16.5, ss. 30 to 33.
Constitution Act, 1982 .
Hospitalization Benefits Regulation, Alta. Reg. 244/90, s. 5(1)(d).
Hospitals Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H‑12, ss. 1(c), 25 to 27, 28(2), 29, 37, 38(1), 41, 43(l).
Nursing Homes Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. N‑7, ss. 1(a) “accommodation charge”, 8, 10(2), 12, 19, 24.
Nursing Homes General Regulation, Alta. Reg. 232/85, s. 4.
Nursing Homes Operation Amendment Regulation, Alta. Reg. 260/2003, s. 2.
Nursing Homes Operation Regulation, Alta. Reg. 258/85, ss. 3(1), 8, 9.
Regional Health Authorities Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. R‑10, ss. 5, 9, 13, 14, 21.
Royal Proclamation (1763), R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1.
Authors Cited
Ellis, Mark Vincent. Fiduciary Duties in Canada. Toronto: Carswell, 1993 (loose‑leaf updated 2011, release 1).
Finn, P. D. “The Fiduciary Principle”, in T. G. Youdan, ed., Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts. Toronto: Carswell, 1989, 1.
Maddaugh, Peter D., and John D. McCamus. The Law of Restitution. Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 2004 (loose‑leaf updated August 2010, release 6).
APPEAL from a judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal (Conrad, Berger and Rowbotham JJ.A.), 2009 ABCA 403, 16 Alta. L.R. (5th) 1, 469 A.R. 270, 315 D.L.R. (4th) 59, [2010] 2 W.W.R. 197, 203 C.R.R. (2d) 344, 79 C.P.C. (6th) 19, 70 C.C.L.T. (3d) 30, 470 W.A.C. 270, [2009] A.J. No. 1336 (QL), 2009 CarswellAlta 1986, reversing in part a decision of Greckol J., 2008 ABQB 490, 94 Alta. L.R. (4th) 10, 453 A.R. 1, [2008] 11 W.W.R. 70, 59 C.C.L.T. (3d) 23, 59 C.P.C. (6th) 243, [2008] A.J. No. 909 (QL), 2008 CarswellAlta 1104. Appeal allowed in part.
G. Alan Meikle, Q.C., Ward K. Branch and Michael Sobkin, for the appellant.
Allan A. Garber and Nathan J. Whitling, for the respondents.
Christine Mohr, for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada.
Anthony Fraser, for the intervener the Attorney General of British Columbia.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
[1] The Chief Justice — It is a sad reality of life that as people age they may become unable to care for themselves and be obliged to live in special facilities providing greater or lesser degrees of assistance and medical care. In Alberta, chronic care for the elderly is provided through nursing homes and auxiliary hospitals. In principle, the government of Alberta is responsible for the costs of residents’ medical care, but residents may be asked to contribute to the costs of their housing and meals through the payment of accommodation charges. In this case, 12,500 residents of Alberta’s long-term care facilities (“LTCFs”) sue as a class, alleging that the government artificially elevated the required resident contributions to subsidize medical expenses that are properly the responsibility of government.
[2] The class has filed a statement of claim in which it alleges that the government’s conduct constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, bad faith in the exercise of discretion and/or unjust enrichment. The class seeks the return of monies or damages equivalent to the amount of any overpayment of the permitted accommodation charges. It is on the basis of these allegations that the action was certified. The class also brings an equality claim under s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , which Alberta does not seek to have struck but argues should not proceed by way of class action.
[3] At certification, the Province of Alberta challenged the claims of fiduciary duty, negligence, and bad faith in the exercise of discretion. The certification judge struck out the plea of breach of fiduciary duty and partially limited the duty of care alleged in negligence (2008 ABQB 490, 94 Alta. L.R. (4th) 10). The Court of Appeal upheld the entitlement of the plaintiff class to pursue all three causes of action (2009 ABCA 403, 16 Alta. L.R. (5th) 1). The Crown in Right of Alberta now appeals to this Court, contending that all the claims should be struck out and the action decertified.
[4] This is not a decision on the merits of the action, but on whether the causes of action pleaded are supportable at law. The question is whether the pleadings, assuming the facts pleaded to be true, disclose a supportable cause of action. If it is plain and obvious that the claim cannot succeed, it should be struck out.
[5] I conclude that the pleas of fiduciary duty, negligence and bad faith in the exercise of discretion disclose no cause of action and should be struck out in their entirety, but that the claim of unjust enrichment should survive. It follows that the certification of the class is upheld, and the unjust enrichment claim may proceed to trial, together with the claim for discrimination under s. 15(1) of the Charter .
I. Background
[6] Since this action is at a preliminary stage and the facts as pleaded are assumed true for our purposes, it is unnecessary to exhaustively review the factual and statutory background. Nevertheless, a brief overview is helpful to understand the context of the claims made.
[7] When this action was commenced, the Province of Alberta and nine Regional Health Authorities (“RHAs”) administered and operated Alberta’s health care regime under a number of interlocking statutes and regulations, including the Alberta Health Care Insurance Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-20, the Nursing Homes Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. N-7, and the Hospitals Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-12. The RHAs received block funding from the Province to deliver health care services, and the RHAs were responsible for managing the provision of health services: Regional Health Authorities Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. R-10, s. 5. Alberta Health Services is the successor to the nine former RHAs. Although this action was brought against the RHAs as well as the Crown in Right of Alberta, the RHAs took no part in this appeal, and an action remains pending against them. The relief sought in this Court relates only to the Crown in Right of Alberta.
[8] Under the Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6 , a province does not qualify for contribution from the federal government for health care expenditures if the province permits user charges under its health care insurance plan, with certain exceptions. For example, user charges for “accommodation or meals provided to an in-patient who . . . requires chronic care and is more or less permanently resident in a hospital or other institution” are allowed: Canada Health Act, s. 19(2) . As a condition of funding, chronic care must be provided as an insured hospital service: Canada Health Act, s. 2 .
[9] In Alberta, the Province must pay for “benefits in respect of health services provided to residents [of the province]”, unless exempted by statute or regulation: Alberta Health Care Insurance Act, s. 4(1). Generally, persons attending hospitals in Alberta are not liable for services insured under the Canada Health Act . User charges are permitted for accommodation and meals: Hospitals Act, ss. 38(1) and 43(l).
[10] Nursing homes, or LTCFs, are regulated by the Nursing Homes Act and receive funding from both the Alberta government, by way of the RHAs, and the nursing home residents themselves. Nursing home operations — which are run by either private operators or the RHAs, not by the Province — may impose on residents an accommodation charge for housing and meals, not to exceed a maximum daily amount prescribed by regulation: Nursing Homes Act, ss. 8 and 24; Nursing Homes Operation Regulation, Alta. Reg. 258/85, s. 3(1). An “accommodation charge” is a “charge in respect of nursing home care payable by a resident for accommodation and meals in a nursing home or an approved [hospital that provides nursing home care]”: Nursing Homes Act, ss. 1(a) and 10(2). “Basic care” costs remain the fiscal responsibility of the Province: Alberta Health Care Insurance Act, ss. 3 and 4.
[11] Auxiliary hospitals, which also provide for the care of long-term or chronic patients, are funded and operated in the same way: Hospitals Act, ss. 1(c), 28(2) and 37, and Ministerial Order #1/2006. The accommodation charges paid by residents of auxiliary hospitals are governed by the Hospitals Act, s. 41, and the Hospitalization Benefits Regulation, Alta. Reg. 244/90, s. 5(1)(d).
[12] Collectively, these accommodation charges are the subject of the present action.
[13] The representative plaintiffs are James Darwish, in his capacity as the personal representative of the estate of his mother, Johanna Darwish, and the Elder Advocates of Alberta Society, a non-profit group. Mr. Darwish was his mother’s guardian and trustee when she lived in an LTCF; he is now her executor. When preparing her estate tax returns, he was advised by the local RHA that approximately two thirds of the monthly accommodation charge his mother had been paying was for a “care component”. He concluded that the remaining one third had been allotted to accommodation and meals. Mr. Darwish contends that the allocation for accommodation and meals that residents must pay is more than required, and in effect requires residents to subsidize medical care costs that are entirely the responsibility of the Province, and for which Alberta is not entitled to charge residents under the legislative scheme. Together with the Elder Advocates, he commenced an action to recover the amount of the overpayment.
[14] On August 1, 2003, Alberta’s Minister of Health and Wellness promulgated the Nursing Homes Operation Amendment Regulation, Alta. Reg. 260/2003, s. 2, which raised the maximum accommodation charge payable by residents of the province’s nursing homes and auxiliary hospitals. The plaintiffs’ contention is that the Minister increased the permissible charge even though he was aware of a “past practice” on the part of LTCFs to apply the accommodation fees “to subsidize health care and off set care funding”, and that, despite this knowledge, the Province instructed operators to charge the maximum allowable.
[15] The representative plaintiffs sought to certify a class action under the Class Proceedings Act, S.A. 2003, c. C-16.5, maintaining that the Crown and the RHAs have failed to ensure that the monies paid by the residents of LTCFs for “accommodation and meals” are used exclusively for that purpose. The pleadings allege that the Province is only allowed to charge for the actual cost of accommodation and meals, and not to use funds collected at the maximum level to subsidize basic care costs. They claim the residents of Alberta’s chronic care facilities have been overcharged and seek return of the overpayment or damages.
II. The Decisions of the Alberta Courts
[16] The class consists of about 12,500 residents who are institutionalized in LTCFs in Alberta. More than half are 85 years of age or older, and all have some form of chronic disability or incapacity. They are not capable of living on their own and require varying degrees of care, including help with feeding, toileting and other fundamental aspects of daily life.
[17] The representative plaintiffs pleaded numerous causes of action: (i) breach of fiduciary duty; (ii) breach of duty of care; (iii) breach of contract; (iv) unjust enrichment; (v) ultra vires action; (vi) ultra vires tax; and (vii) breach of s. 15(1) of the Charter . “[B]ad faith in the exercise of discretion” was also pleaded. I refer throughout to the pleas contained in the plaintiffs’ Fresh Statement of Claim No. 2, issued March 1, 2010.
[18] The certification judge approved the class definition and 67 common questions (2008 ABQB 490, 94 Alta. L.R. (4th) 10). In deciding to certify those questions, Justice Greckol declined to certify others based on fiduciary duty and ultra vires tax, striking them from the claim as they were bound to fail. She also struck a claim for a duty of care with respect to setting the accommodation charges, but permitted the plea of negligence in monitoring the collection and management of accommodation charges to stand. Finding that the requirements of certification were made out, Greckol J. concluded that a class action was the preferable procedure.
[19] The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the Province and permitted a cross-appeal by the representative plaintiffs (2009 ABCA 403, 16 Alta. L.R. (5th) 1). In unanimous reasons, the court reinstated the plaintiffs’ claim that Alberta owed and had breached a fiduciary duty to the class. The Province now appeals to this Court.
III. Analysis
[20] The test for striking out pleadings is not in dispute. The question at issue is whether the disputed claims disclose a cause of action, assuming the facts pleaded to be true. If it is plain and obvious that a claim cannot succeed, then it should be struck out: see Hollick v. Toronto (City), 2001 SCC 68, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 158, at para. 25; Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959, at p. 980.
[21] The issue we must decide on each of the disputed claims is whether this test is met and, separately, whether the class action should be decertified.
A. The Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
[22] The question is whether the pleading of breach of fiduciary duty discloses a supportable cause of action, taking all the facts pleaded as true: Hollick, at para. 25; Hunt, at p. 991. Fiduciary duty is a doctrine originating in trust. It requires that one party, the fiduciary, act with absolute loyalty toward another party, the beneficiary or cestui que trust, in managing the latter’s affairs.
[23] The plaintiff class argues that the categories of fiduciary duty are not closed and that basic principle supports their claim. The representative plaintiffs contend that they have pleaded sufficient facts to make it at least arguable that such a duty is owed to the vulnerable members of the class. In their view, fiduciary duty is a flexible principle aimed at protecting the vulnerable from abuses of power and should not be burdened by high hurdles or confined to limited categories.
[24] Alberta, by contrast, argues that it does not owe the plaintiff class a fiduciary duty on the facts pleaded. In its view, the doctrine that permits imposition of a fiduciary duty on a government is narrowly confined, and does not extend to a claim such as this. Together with the intervening Attorneys General of Canada and British Columbia, Alberta asks the Court to clarify the approach to identifying fiduciary duties owed by the government to its citizens and to hold that no duty lies in the circumstances before us.
[25] This case thus raises the question of when governments, as opposed to individuals, may be bound by a fiduciary duty. Fiduciary duty originated as a private law doctrine. In the past, state actors have been held to be under a fiduciary duty in limited circumstances, namely, in discharging the Crown’s special responsibilities towards Aboriginal peoples and where the Crown is acting in a private capacity, as in its role as the public guardian and trustee. This claim does not fall within either of these situations.
[26] In my view, the same broad principles apply to private actors and governments, though they may play out differently where the alleged fiduciary is a public authority. I will therefore proceed by examining the requirements of imposing fiduciary duty generally, and then turn to examine how those requirements apply in the governmental context.
(1) The General Requirements for Imposition of a Fiduciary Duty
[27] The plaintiff class argues that, in addition to traditionally recognized categories like trustee or solicitor-client relationships, a fiduciary duty more broadly may arise whenever one person exercises power over another “vulnerable” person. They rely on Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99, where Wilson J., in dissenting reasons later adopted and applied in Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, outlined the hallmarks of a fiduciary duty:
Relationships in which a fiduciary obligation has been imposed seem to possess three general characteristics:
(1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power.
(2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests.
(3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power. [p. 136]
[28] It is now clear that vulnerability alone is insufficient to support a fiduciary claim. As Cromwell J. explained in Galambos v. Perez, 2009 SCC 48, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 247, at para. 67:
An important focus of fiduciary law is the protection of one party against abuse of power by another in certain types of relationships or in particular circumstances. However, to assert that the protection of the vulnerable is the role of fiduciary law puts the matter too broadly. The law seeks to protect the vulnerable in many contexts and through many different doctrines.
Cromwell J. concluded, at para. 68, that
while vulnerability in the broad sense resulting from factors external to the relationship is a relevant consideration, a more important one is the extent to which vulnerability arises from the relationship: Hodgkinson, at p. 406. [Emphasis added.]
[29] As useful as the three “hallmarks” referred to in Frame are in explaining the source fiduciary duties, they are not a complete code for identifying fiduciary duties. It is now clear from the foundational principles outlined in Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377, and Galambos, that the elements outlined in the paragraphs that follow are those which identify the existence of a fiduciary duty in cases not covered by an existing category in which fiduciary duties have been recognized.
[30] First, the evidence must show that the alleged fiduciary gave an undertaking of responsibility to act in the best interests of a beneficiary: Galambos, at paras. 66, 71 and 77-78, and Hodgkinson, per La Forest J., at pp. 409-10. As Cromwell J. wrote in Galambos, at para. 75, “what is required in all cases is an undertaking by the fiduciary, express or implied, to act in accordance with the duty of loyalty reposed on him or her.”
[31] The existence and character of the undertaking is informed by the norms relating to the particular relationship: Galambos, at para. 77. The party asserting the duty must be able to point to a forsaking by the alleged fiduciary of the interests of all others in favour of those of the beneficiary, in relation to the specific legal interest at stake.
[32] The undertaking may be found in the relationship between the parties, in an imposition of responsibility by statute, or under an express agreement to act as trustee of the beneficiary’s interests. As stated in Galambos, at para. 77:
The fiduciary’s undertaking may be the result of the exercise of statutory powers, the express or implied terms of an agreement or, perhaps, simply an undertaking to act in this way. In cases of per se fiduciary relationships, this undertaking will be found in the nature of the category of relationship in issue. The critical point is that in both per se and ad hoc fiduciary relationships, there will be some undertaking on the part of the fiduciary to act with loyalty. [Emphasis added.]
[33] Second, the duty must be owed to a defined person or class of persons who must be vulnerable to the fiduciary in the sense that the fiduciary has a discretionary power over them. Fiduciary duties do not exist at large; they are confined to specific relationships between particular parties. Per se, historically recognized, fiduciary relationships exist as a matter of course within the traditional categories of trustee-cestui que trust, executor-beneficiary, solicitor-client, agent-principal, director-corporation, and guardian-ward or parent-child. By contrast, ad hoc fiduciary relationships must be established on a case-by-case basis.
[34] Finally, to establish a fiduciary duty, the claimant must show that the alleged fiduciary’s power may affect the legal or substantial practical interests of the beneficiary: Frame, per Wilson J., at p. 142.
[35] In the traditional categories of fiduciary relationship, the nature of the relationship itself defines the interest at stake. However, a party seeking to establish an ad hoc duty must be able to point to an identifiable legal or vital practical interest that is at stake. The most obvious example is an interest in property, although other interests recognized by law may also be protected.
[36] In summary, for an ad hoc fiduciary duty to arise, the claimant must show, in addition to the vulnerability arising from the relationship as described by Wilson J. in Frame: (1) an undertaking by the alleged fiduciary to act in the best interests of the alleged beneficiary or beneficiaries; (2) a defined person or class of persons vulnerable to a fiduciary’s control (the beneficiary or beneficiaries); and (3) a legal or substantial practical interest of the beneficiary or beneficiaries that stands to be adversely affected by the alleged fiduciary’s exercise of discretion or control.
(2) Fiduciary Duties in the Governmental Context
[37] The general principles discussed above apply not only to relationships between private actors, but also to cases where it is alleged that the government owes a fiduciary duty to an individual or class of individuals. However, the special characteristics of governmental responsibilities and functions mean that governments will owe fiduciary duties only in limited and special circumstances. As Dickson J., as he then was, wrote for the majority in Guerin, at p. 385:
It should be noted that fiduciary duties generally arise only with regard to obligations originating in a private law context. Public law duties, the performance of which requires the exercise of discretion, do not typically give rise to a fiduciary relationship. As the “political trust” cases indicate, the Crown is not normally viewed as a fiduciary in the exercise of its legislative or administrative function. [Emphasis added.]
[38] Binnie J., for the Court, made the same point in Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2002 SCC 79, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 245, at para. 96: “The Crown can be no ordinary fiduciary; it wears many hats and represents many interests, some of which cannot help but be conflicting”. Guerin exceptionally recognized that the Crown was under a fiduciary duty in the management of Indian lands for their benefit. But the Court there noted, at p. 385, that the fiduciary duty owed to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada is unique and grounded in analogy to private law:
The mere fact, however, that it is the Crown which is obligated to act on the Indians’ behalf does not of itself remove the Crown’s obligation from the scope of the fiduciary principle. As was pointed out earlier, the Indians’ interest in land is an independent legal interest. It is not a creation of either the legislative or executive branches of government. The Crown’s obligation to the Indians with respect to that interest is therefore not a public law duty. While it is not a private law duty in the strict sense either, it is nonetheless in the nature of a private law duty. Therefore, in this sui generis relationship, it is not improper to regard the Crown as a fiduciary. [Emphasis added.]
Noting the unique nature of the fiduciary duty owed by the Crown in the Aboriginal context, courts have suggested that this duty must be distinguished from other relationships: Hogan v. Newfoundland (Attorney General) (2000), 183 D.L.R. (4th) 225 (Nfld. C.A.), at paras. 66-67.
[39] In R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, the Court confirmed that the fiduciary duty owed by the Crown to Aboriginal peoples with respect to their lands is sui generis, at p. 1108:
The sui generis nature of Indian title, and the historic powers and responsibility assumed by the Crown constituted the source of such a fiduciary obligation. In our opinion, Guerin, together with R. v. Taylor and Williams (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 360, ground a general guiding principle for s. 35(1). That is, the Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the Government and aboriginals is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights must be defined in light of this historic relationship. [Emphasis added.]
Similarly, in Wewaykum, Binnie J. suggested that the fiduciary duty owed by the Crown to Aboriginal peoples is not restricted to instances where the facts raise “considerations ‘in the nature of a private law duty’” (para. 74).
[40] The unique and historic nature of Crown-Aboriginal relations described in these cases negates the plaintiff class’ assertion that they serve as a template for the duty of the government to citizens in other contexts. The same applies to the only other situation where a Crown fiduciary duty has been recognized — such as where the Crown acts as the public guardian and trustee.
[41] The special nature of the governmental context impacts on the requirements of a fiduciary relationship just discussed.
[42] First, the requirement of an undertaking to act in the alleged beneficiary’s interest will typically be lacking where what is at issue is the exercise of a government power or discretion.
[43] The duty is one of utmost loyalty to the beneficiary. As Finn states, the fiduciary principle’s function “is not to mediate between interests. It is to secure the paramountcy of one side’s interests . . . . The beneficiary’s interests are to be protected. This is achieved through a regime designed to secure loyal service of those interests” (P. D. Finn, “The Fiduciary Principle”, in T. G. Youdan, ed., Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (1989), 1, at p. 27 (underlining added); see also Hodgkinson, at p. 468, per Sopinka J. and McLachlin J. (as she then was), dissenting).
[44] Compelling a fiduciary to put the best interests of the beneficiary before their own is thus essential to the relationship. Imposing such a burden on the Crown is inherently at odds with its duty to act in the best interests of society as a whole, and its obligation to spread limited resources among competing groups with equally valid claims to its assistance: Sagharian (Litigation Guardian of) v. Ontario (Minister of Educa