Bronskill v. Canada (Canadian Heritage)
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Bronskill v. Canada (Canadian Heritage) Court (s) Database Federal Court Decisions Date 2011-08-11 Neutral citation 2011 FC 983 File numbers T-1680-09 Notes a correction was made on December 18, 2013 Reported Decision Decision Content Federal Court Cour fédérale Date: 20110811 Docket: T-1680-09 Citation: 2011 FC 983 Ottawa, Ontario, August 11, 2011 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Simon Noël BETWEEN: JIM BRONSKILL Applicant and MINISTER OF CANADIAN HERITAGE Respondent and THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER OF CANADA Intervener REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT TABLE OF CONTENT (by paragraph numbers) I. Background A. Thomas Clement Douglas’ Life.......................................................................... 3 B. The Applicable Law...................................................................................... 4-27 C. History of the Proceeding.......................................................................... 28-46 D. The Second Review of the Douglas File..................................................... 47-61 E. The Applicable Standards of Review.......................................................... 62-82 F. Determinative Questions............................................................................ 83-85 II. Analysis A. Preliminary Matters (1) The completeness of the file before the Court.......................... 86-109 (2) The Amicus Curiae Request.................................................... 110-114 (3) The Evidence in Support of C…
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Bronskill v. Canada (Canadian Heritage) Court (s) Database Federal Court Decisions Date 2011-08-11 Neutral citation 2011 FC 983 File numbers T-1680-09 Notes a correction was made on December 18, 2013 Reported Decision Decision Content Federal Court Cour fédérale Date: 20110811 Docket: T-1680-09 Citation: 2011 FC 983 Ottawa, Ontario, August 11, 2011 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Simon Noël BETWEEN: JIM BRONSKILL Applicant and MINISTER OF CANADIAN HERITAGE Respondent and THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER OF CANADA Intervener REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT TABLE OF CONTENT (by paragraph numbers) I. Background A. Thomas Clement Douglas’ Life.......................................................................... 3 B. The Applicable Law...................................................................................... 4-27 C. History of the Proceeding.......................................................................... 28-46 D. The Second Review of the Douglas File..................................................... 47-61 E. The Applicable Standards of Review.......................................................... 62-82 F. Determinative Questions............................................................................ 83-85 II. Analysis A. Preliminary Matters (1) The completeness of the file before the Court.......................... 86-109 (2) The Amicus Curiae Request.................................................... 110-114 (3) The Evidence in Support of Confidentiality........................... 115-122 B. Were the documents properly considered as section 15 exempted documents? (1) General Considerations........................................................... 123-139 (2) Current Operational Interest................................................... 140-141 (3) Human Sources....................................................................... 142-155 (4) Technical Sources.................................................................... 156-158 (5) Targets of “transitory nature”.................................................. 159-171 (6) Identity of RCMP Officers..................................................... 172-177 (7) “Incidental Reporting”............................................................ 178-189 (8) RCMP’s Assessment of T.C. Douglas.................................... 190-193 C. Was the exercise of discretion reasonable in the circumstance?............ 194-209 D. What factors are to be considered in the exercise of discretion?........... 210-223 III. Conclusion.................................................................................................... 224-228 IV. Annex..................................................................................................... pages 92-94 [1] The present Application is brought under section 41 of the Access to Information Act, RSC 1985, c A-1 (the Act), whereby the Federal Court is to review Library and Archives Canada’s (LAC) refusal to disclose portions of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s dossier on Tommy Clement Douglas, a Canadian politician, deceased on February 24, 1986. The Applicant, Jim Bronskill, is a journalist with the Canadian Press. [2] At issue is what portions, if any, of the 1,142-page of LAC’s Douglas file should be made public, additionally to what had been initially disclosed by LAC after the access to information request (ATI request), and what has also emerged from the Application prior to this Court’s judgment. It should be noted that the scope of the present Judgment and the underlying ATI request does not extend to the full record on T.C. Douglas. It only deals with the portions of the record which LAC deemed responsive to the ATI request (see Transcript of the Public Hearing of February 23, 2011, at p. 138). I. Background A. Thomas Clement Douglas’ Life [3] Thomas Clement Douglas held the office of Premier of Saskatchewan from 1944 to 1961, when he led the first arguably social democratic government in North America. In 1961, he became the first leader of the newly formed New Democratic Party, a title which he held for close to ten years. Much can be said of his accomplishments both as a Member of Parliament and as a member of the Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan. The Court mentions in passing Douglas’ spearheading of the creation of the first provincial Medicare plan. It is clear that both History and Canadians from coast to coast have much to learn about Mr. Douglas, and this Application can be seen as contributing in this respect. It can also be said that access to information, whether the subject of the request is well-known or not, benefits all Canadians. B. The Applicable Law [4] The public’s right to information detained by government is governed by the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c P-21. The purpose of the Access to Information Act is to enshrine an essential component of democracy: the public’s right to government information (s 2 of the Act). This right to government information is mandatory for both public scrutiny of government activities, as well as the full and meaningful participation in public debate and discussion. If the adage that information is power holds true, then our democracy depends on the broad and liberal interpretation of the Act, subject to valid concerns represented by the exemptions provided. The Act has been recognized as having a quasi-constitutional status by the Supreme Court in Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2011 SCC 25. [5] The Act itself is unambiguous as to its scope and purpose. Firstly, the Act’s purpose is to extend the public’s right to access to information, and that the Act was not meant to “limit in any way” access to government information (s 2 of the Act). Section 2 of the Act also requires that the exemptions to the right of access should be “limited and specific”. This limited scope of the exemptions provided in the Act is essential to the Court’s interpretation of any application brought forth, and Courts have consistently recognized this policy objective as being a core component of the review of refusals of disclosure: It also appears clearly from these two provisions that Parliament intended the Act to apply liberally and broadly with the citizen's right of access to such information being denied only in limited and specific exceptions (Canada Post Corp. v Canada (Minister of Public Works), [1995] 2 FC 110 FCA; see also, inter alia, Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2003 SCC 8; Rubin v Canada (Minister of Transport), [1998] 2 FC 430 (FCA)). [6] The process for access to information begins with a written and sufficiently detailed request made to the institution that has the records sought (s 6 of the Act). In this case, the Applicant made a request directly to LAC. There is currently no direct process by which citizens may know which access requests are pending and the records sought after in these requests. The “head of a government institution”, as defined by the Act, is responsible for responding accurately and completely to the ATI request (ss 4(2.1) of the Act). Furthermore, the Act instructs that the head of a government institution shall “subject to the regulations, provide timely access to the record” without regard to the identity of the person making the ATI request (ss 4(2.1) of the Act). [7] The head of a government institution may refuse access to the records sought: Where access is refused 10. (1) Where the head of a government institution refuses to give access to a record requested under this Act or a part thereof, the head of the institution shall state in the notice given under paragraph 7(a) (a) that the record does not exist, or (b) the specific provision of this Act on which the refusal was based or, where the head of the institution does not indicate whether a record exists, the provision on which a refusal could reasonably be expected to be based if the record existed, and shall state in the notice that the person who made the request has a right to make a complaint to the Information Commissioner about the refusal. Existence of a record not required to be disclosed (2) The head of a government institution may but is not required to indicate under subsection (1) whether a record exists. Deemed refusal to give access (3) Where the head of a government institution fails to give access to a record requested under this Act or a part thereof within the time limits set out in this Act, the head of the institution shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to have refused to give access. Refus de communication 10. (1) En cas de refus de communication totale ou partielle d’un document demandé en vertu de la présente loi, l’avis prévu à l’alinéa 7a) doit mentionner, d’une part, le droit de la personne qui a fait la demande de déposer une plainte auprès du Commissaire à l’information et, d’autre part : a) soit le fait que le document n’existe pas; b) soit la disposition précise de la présente loi sur laquelle se fonde le refus ou, s’il n’est pas fait état de l’existence du document, la disposition sur laquelle il pourrait vraisemblablement se fonder si le document existait. Dispense de divulgation de l’existence d’un document (2) Le paragraphe (1) n’oblige pas le responsable de l’institution fédérale à faire état de l’existence du document demandé. Présomption de refus (3) Le défaut de communication totale ou partielle d’un document dans les délais prévus par la présente loi vaut décision de refus de communication. [8] For it to have sufficient traction, the Act enshrines the independent review of refusals of disclosure as another core principle (ss 2(1)). The Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada is statutorily mandated to review refusals of disclosure if a complaint is made in writing, and may initiate an investigation on its own behalf (s 30). Its investigative powers are clearly set out in the Act, and include the power to summon and enforce the appearance of persons (para 36(1)(a)); the power to administer oaths and evidence (para 36(1)(b) and para 36(1)(c)); and the power to access all government records, subject to security clearance of staff (para 36(1)(d) and ss 36(2)). [9] The Information Commissioner’s investigative mandate is complemented by its obligation to report to the government institution if it finds a complaint to be well-founded, and must provide its findings in support (ss 37(1)). In this respect, the Information Commissioner may also make recommendations and make a request that notice be given of the steps taken or proposed to implement these recommendations, or alternatively, reasons why these are not implemented (ss 37(2) of the Act). Where, following the investigation of a complaint, the head of a government institution maintains the refusal of disclosure of the record, the Information Commissioner informs the complainant that a right of review before the Federal Court is available (ss 37(5) of the Act). However, the Court’s review is of the decision of the head of the government institution to refuse disclosure, not the decision of the Information Commissioner (3430901 Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of Industry), 2001 FCA 254 [herein referred to as Telezone], at para 42). [10] It should also be noted that the Information Commissioner’s mandate is broader than what is alluded to in the present reasons. Suffice to say that the Information Commissioner’s mandate is one that should be taken with the utmost vigour and energy. Truly, the Information Commissioner is one of the custodians of our democracy. [11] Once the Information Commissioner’s review is completed, and if the head of the government institution’s refusal is maintained, the complainant may file an application before the Federal Court for a review of the refusal of disclosure (s 41). The Information Commissioner may file this application as well, and even appear on behalf of the initial complainant (s 42). The Court must be granted access to all the relevant documentation (s 46), and ultimately, is responsible for not divulging any of the protected information during the process of the application (s 47). The nature of the review undertaken by the Court will be discussed below. [12] In the case at bar, the exemption that was chiefly claimed is that of section 15 of the Act. Initially, LAC had refused access on the basis of section 19 as well. These provisions read as follows: International affairs and defence 15. (1) The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any record requested under this Act that contains information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the conduct of international affairs, the defence of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada or the detection, prevention or suppression of subversive or hostile activities, including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, any such information (a) relating to military tactics or strategy, or relating to military exercises or operations undertaken in preparation for hostilities or in connection with the detection, prevention or suppression of subversive or hostile activities; (b) relating to the quantity, characteristics, capabilities or deployment of weapons or other defence equipment or of anything being designed, developed, produced or considered for use as weapons or other defence equipment; (c) relating to the characteristics, capabilities, performance, potential, deployment, functions or role of any defence establishment, of any military force, unit or personnel or of any organization or person responsible for the detection, prevention or suppression of subversive or hostile activities; (d) obtained or prepared for the purpose of intelligence relating to (i) the defence of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada, or (ii) the detection, prevention or suppression of subversive or hostile activities; (e) obtained or prepared for the purpose of intelligence respecting foreign states, international organizations of states or citizens of foreign states used by the Government of Canada in the process of deliberation and consultation or in the conduct of international affairs; (f) on methods of, and scientific or technical equipment for, collecting, assessing or handling information referred to in paragraph (d) or (e) or on sources of such information; (g) on the positions adopted or to be adopted by the Government of Canada, governments of foreign states or international organizations of states for the purpose of present or future international negotiations; (h) that constitutes diplomatic correspondence exchanged with foreign states or international organizations of states or official correspondence exchanged with Canadian diplomatic missions or consular posts abroad; or (i) relating to the communications or cryptographic systems of Canada or foreign states used (i) for the conduct of international affairs, (ii) for the defence of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada, or (iii) in relation to the detection, prevention or suppression of subversive or hostile activities. Definitions (2) In this section, “defence of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada” « défense du Canada ou d’États alliés ou associés avec le Canada » “defence of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada” includes the efforts of Canada and of foreign states toward the detection, prevention or suppression of activities of any foreign state directed toward actual or potential attack or other acts of aggression against Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada; “subversive or hostile activities” « activités hostiles ou subversives » “subversive or hostile activities” means (a) espionage against Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada, (b) sabotage, (c) activities directed toward the commission of terrorist acts, including hijacking, in or against Canada or foreign states, (d) activities directed toward accomplishing government change within Canada or foreign states by the use of or the encouragement of the use of force, violence or any criminal means, (e) activities directed toward gathering information used for intelligence purposes that relates to Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada, and (f) activities directed toward threatening the safety of Canadians, employees of the Government of Canada or property of the Government of Canada outside Canada. Affaires internationales et défense 15. (1) Le responsable d’une institution fédérale peut refuser la communication de documents contenant des renseignements dont la divulgation risquerait vraisemblablement de porter préjudice à la conduite des affaires internationales, à la défense du Canada ou d’États alliés ou associés avec le Canada ou à la détection, à la prévention ou à la répression d’activités hostiles ou subversives, notamment : a) des renseignements d’ordre tactique ou stratégique ou des renseignements relatifs aux manoeuvres et opérations destinées à la préparation d’hostilités ou entreprises dans le cadre de la détection, de la prévention ou de la répression d’activités hostiles ou subversives; b) des renseignements concernant la quantité, les caractéristiques, les capacités ou le déploiement des armes ou des matériels de défense, ou de tout ce qui est conçu, mis au point, produit ou prévu à ces fins; c) des renseignements concernant les caractéristiques, les capacités, le rendement, le potentiel, le déploiement, les fonctions ou le rôle des établissements de défense, des forces, unités ou personnels militaires ou des personnes ou organisations chargées de la détection, de la prévention ou de la répression d’activités hostiles ou subversives; d) des éléments d’information recueillis ou préparés aux fins du renseignement relatif à : (i) la défense du Canada ou d’États alliés ou associés avec le Canada, (ii) la détection, la prévention ou la répression d’activités hostiles ou subversives; e) des éléments d’information recueillis ou préparés aux fins du renseignement relatif aux États étrangers, aux organisations internationales d’États ou aux citoyens étrangers et utilisés par le gouvernement du Canada dans le cadre de délibérations ou consultations ou dans la conduite des affaires internationales; f) des renseignements concernant les méthodes et le matériel technique ou scientifique de collecte, d’analyse ou de traitement des éléments d’information visés aux alinéas d) et e), ainsi que des renseignements concernant leurs sources; g) des renseignements concernant les positions adoptées ou envisagées, dans le cadre de négociations internationales présentes ou futures, par le gouvernement du Canada, les gouvernements d’États étrangers ou les organisations internationales d’États; h) des renseignements contenus dans la correspondance diplomatique échangée avec des États étrangers ou des organisations internationales d’États, ou dans la correspondance officielle échangée avec des missions diplomatiques ou des postes consulaires canadiens; i) des renseignements relatifs à ceux des réseaux de communications et des procédés de cryptographie du Canada ou d’États étrangers qui sont utilisés dans les buts suivants : (i) la conduite des affaires internationales, (ii) la défense du Canada ou d’États alliés ou associés avec le Canada, (iii) la détection, la prévention ou la répression d’activités hostiles ou subversives. Définitions (2) Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent au présent article. « activités hostiles ou subversives » “ subversive or hostile activities” « activités hostiles ou subversives » a) L’espionnage dirigé contre le Canada ou des États alliés ou associés avec le Canada; b) le sabotage; c) les activités visant la perpétration d’actes de terrorisme, y compris les détournements de moyens de transport, contre le Canada ou un État étranger ou sur leur territoire; d) les activités visant un changement de gouvernement au Canada ou sur le territoire d’États étrangers par l’emploi de moyens criminels, dont la force ou la violence, ou par l’incitation à l’emploi de ces moyens; e) les activités visant à recueillir des éléments d’information aux fins du renseignement relatif au Canada ou aux États qui sont alliés ou associés avec lui; f) les activités destinées à menacer, à l’étranger, la sécurité des citoyens ou des fonctionnaires fédéraux canadiens ou à mettre en danger des biens fédéraux situés à l’étranger. « défense du Canada ou d’États alliés ou associés avec le Canada » “ defence of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada ” « défense du Canada ou d’États alliés ou associés avec le Canada » Sont assimilés à la défense du Canada ou d’États alliés ou associés avec le Canada les efforts déployés par le Canada et des États étrangers pour détecter, prévenir ou réprimer les activités entreprises par des États étrangers en vue d’une attaque réelle ou éventuelle ou de la perpétration d’autres actes d’agression contre le Canada ou des États alliés ou associés avec le Canada. Personal information 19. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose any record requested under this Act that contains personal information as defined in section 3 of the Privacy Act. Where disclosure authorized (2) The head of a government institution may disclose any record requested under this Act that contains personal information if (a) the individual to whom it relates consents to the disclosure; (b) the information is publicly available; or (c) the disclosure is in accordance with section 8 of the Privacy Act. Renseignements personnels 19. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), le responsable d’une institution fédérale est tenu de refuser la communication de documents contenant les renseignements personnels visés à l’article 3 de la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels. Cas où la divulgation est autorisée (2) Le responsable d’une institution fédérale peut donner communication de documents contenant des renseignements personnels dans les cas où : a) l’individu qu’ils concernent y consent; b) le public y a accès; c) la communication est conforme à l’article 8 de la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels. [Emphasis added] [13] The exemptions laid out in the Act are to be considered in two aspects by the reviewing Court. Firstly, exemptions in the Act are either class-based or injury-based. Class-based exemptions are typically involved when the nature of the documentation sought is sensitive in and of itself. For example, the section 13 exemption is related to information obtained from foreign governments, which, by its nature, is a class-based exemption. Injury-based exemptions require that the decision-maker analyze whether the release of information could be prejudicial to the interests articulated in the exemption. Section 15 is an injury-based exemption: the head of the government institution must assess whether the disclosure of information could “be expected to be injurious to the conduct of international affairs, the defence of Canada or any state allied or associated with Canada or the detection, prevention or suppression of subversive or hostile activities”. [14] In the case at bar, while LAC had custody of some of the sought after records, it was required by the Act and Treasury Board Policy to consult with the institution from which the records originated. In this case, the record originated from the RCMP’s Security Intelligence Division. As this division was replaced by a civilian intelligence service, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), in 1984, LAC consulted with that organization as to the nature of the documentation and the applicability of the Act’s exemptions. [15] The second component of the exemptions under the Act is to determine whether the exemption is mandatory or discretionary. In the case of mandatory exemptions, the provisions of the Act mandate that the decision-maker “shall refuse to disclose” the records when they fall under the exemption (see, inter alia, section 19). In the case of discretionary exemptions, the decision-maker “may refuse” to disclose the record. Section 15 is a discretionary exemption, the aspects of which will be considered at length in the present reasons. [16] The Library and Archives of Canada Act, SC 2004, c 11 is inextricably linked to the Act. The most obvious link in the present application is that LAC is the respondent to the ATI request, but over and above that, the Library and Archives of Canada Act should be considered in every review of an ATI request, regardless as to the department or decision-maker involved. The responsibilities conferred by section 12 of the Library and Archives of Canada Act to the Librarian and Archivist, the head of LAC support this contention: Destruction and disposal 12. (1) No government or ministerial record, whether or not it is surplus property of a government institution, shall be disposed of, including by being destroyed, without the written consent of the Librarian and Archivist or of a person to whom the Librarian and Archivist has, in writing, delegated the power to give such consents. Élimination et aliénation 12. (1) L'élimination ou l'aliénation des documents fédéraux ou ministériels, qu'il s'agisse ou non de biens de surplus, est subordonnée à l'autorisation écrite de l'administrateur général ou de la personne à qui il a délégué, par écrit, ce pouvoir. [17] Considering the broad definitions of “government or ministerial record” and “government institution” found within the Library and Archives of Canada Act, it can be said that the ultimate approval of destruction and retention of documentation is an integral part of LAC’s mandate. Evidently, Parliament considers access to information in Canada and document retention as essential components of citizens’ right to government information. [18] LAC’s objectives are to be considered by any government institution assessing ATI requests as these objectives further compound the Act’s objectives and reinforce the importance of access to government records. In all clarity, LAC’s statutory mandate is defined as: Objects 7. The objects of the Library and Archives of Canada are (a) to acquire and preserve the documentary heritage; (b) to make that heritage known to Canadians and to anyone with an interest in Canada and to facilitate access to it; (c) to be the permanent repository of publications of the Government of Canada and of government and ministerial records that are of historical or archival value; (d) to facilitate the management of information by government institutions; (e) to coordinate the library services of government institutions; and (f) to support the development of the library and archival communities. Mission 7. Bibliothèque et Archives du Canada a pour mission : a) de constituer et de préserver le patrimoine documentaire; b) de faire connaître ce patrimoine aux Canadiens et à quiconque s'intéresse au Canada, et de le rendre accessible; c) d'être le dépositaire permanent des publications des institutions fédérales, ainsi que des documents fédéraux et ministériels qui ont un intérêt historique ou archivistique; d) de faciliter la gestion de l'information par les institutions fédérales; e) d'assurer la coordination des services de bibliothèque des institutions fédérales; f) d'appuyer les milieux des archives et des bibliothèques. [19] This mandate is not a passive one. LAC is instructed by Parliament to “acquire and preserve” the documentary heritage of Canadians. It is also instructed to “make that heritage known” as well as “facilitating access” to it. Insomuch as facilitating access to government documentation is the very objective of the Act, LAC’s mandate is not only similar; it is the logical extension of the Act. The Preamble of the Library and Archives of Canada Act reinforces this synergy between the Act and LAC’s mandate: HEREAS it is necessary that (a) the documentary heritage of Canada be preserved for the benefit of present and future generations; (b) Canada be served by an institution that is a source of enduring knowledge accessible to all, contributing to the cultural, social and economic advancement of Canada as a free and democratic society; (c) that institution facilitate in Canada cooperation among the communities involved in the acquisition, preservation and diffusion of knowledge; and (d) that institution serve as the continuing memory of the government of Canada and its institutions; Attendu qu'il est nécessaire : a) que le patrimoine documentaire du Canada soit préservé pour les générations présentes et futures; b) que le Canada se dote d'une institution qui soit une source de savoir permanent accessible à tous et qui contribue à l'épanouissement culturel, social et économique de la société libre et démocratique que constitue le Canada; c) que cette institution puisse faciliter au Canada la concertation des divers milieux intéressés à l'acquisition, à la préservation et à la diffusion du savoir; d) que cette institution soit la mémoire permanente de l'administration fédérale et de ses institutions, [20] The use of the preamble of an act to fully grasp its purpose is a method that is without controversy and a useful tool to understand LAC’s mandate and the mission with which it was entrusted with by Parliament. Professor Ruth Sullivan has stated that preambles and purpose statements are “the most authoritative evidence of purpose” (Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed., Lexis Nexis, 2008, at p 271). Professor Côté offers the view that the caselaw has evolved in a manner such that the preamble is to be considered, unless the circumstances, such as the clarity of the dispositions to be interpreted, justify not considering the indicia of intent that the preamble offers (Pierre-André Côté, avec la collaboration de Stéphane Beaulac et Mathieu Devinat, Interprétation des lois, 4th ed., Les Éditions Thémis, 2009, at para 226). [21] The Library and Archives of Canada Act emphasizes the accessibility of documentation, as well as its contributory role to Canada’s democracy (“enduring knowledge accessible to all, contributing to the cultural, social and economic advancement of Canada as a free and democratic society”). Again, LAC is mandated with a pragmatic mission: “acquisition, preservation and diffusion of knowledge” [emphasis added]. Ultimately, LAC is the custodian of our documentary heritage and the information contained therein (“continuing memory” or “mémoire permanente”). Whether or not the records are in LAC’s possession or not is beside the point, all government institutions answer to the Librarian and Archivist and those with his delegated authority in terms of document retention. Any decision to dispose of these records thus falls to the Librarian and Archivist or those with his delegated authority (section 12 of the Library and Archives of Canada Act). [22] Not only do the principles of statutory interpretation allow for consideration of statutes adopted on similar issues, the coherence of the Canadian legal order requires that the inherent principles of statutes in similar matters be considered fully complementary, especially in an issue as important as access to information. It is clear that the complimentary purposes of the Act and the Library and Archives Act of Canada are such that they are inextricably linked, as would the aims of the Privacy Act if it was to be considered by the Court in the present application. Professor Sullivan offered a learned perspective on statutes on the same subject: The presumptions of coherence and consistent expression apply as if the provisions of these statutes were part of a single Act. Definitions in one statute are taken to apply in the others and any purpose statements in the statutes are read together. (Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed., Lexis Nexis, 2008, at p 412) [Emphasis added] [23] This approach is consistent with the approach of the Supreme Court in R v Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., 2001 SCC 56 in terms of interpreting statutes in similar matters. [24] It should be noted that Madam Justice Sharlow of the Federal Court of Appeal has stated in Blank v Canada (Minister of the Environment), 2001 FCA 374 that “the Court should consider only the Act and the jurisprudence guiding its interpretation and application. Laws requiring disclosure in other legal proceedings cannot narrow or broaden the scope of disclosure required by the Access to Information Act.” However, in Blank, the Court was asked to import the Stinchcombe standard of disclosure in criminal matters to the ATI requests. The Court distinguishes the Blank case with the present application and comments therein with regards to the Library and Archives of Canada Act. Again, the Library and Archives of Canada Act and the Access to information Act are statutes adopted in pari materia, and are thus not incompatible and do not have the same implications as importing the Stinchcombe standard of disclosure of criminal law to ATI requests. [25] Thus, the dynamic mandate and purpose of LAC, including the intrinsic value of documentary archives and access thereof, must be considered by any decision-maker when considering ATI requests, as these fully complement the objectives and spirit of the Act itself. [26] This Court is mandated with the important task of safeguarding the confidentiality of the information it is to assess and must take “every reasonable precaution” to protect it from disclosure (s 47 of the Act). The Federal Court is also mandated with a similar task in other national security matters. Under the Canada Evidence Act, RSC 1985, c C-5, section 38.12 and subsection 38.04(4) entrust the Court with the responsibility of protecting confidential information. Under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c-27, paragraph 83(1)(d) confers to the Court the responsibility to protect the information submitted in the context of security certificates. [27] However, under the Canada Evidence Act and under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the power to draft summaries of the information is clearly provided for by statute. This power has not been clearly given by Parliament to the Information Commissioner or the decision-maker. The summary accomplishes a balance between the protection of national security information and the right to know a case or to be provided with relevant information. In the context of access to information, the right to access to information in and of itself could be balanced with national security information by providing summaries. While the Court could consider the issuance of summaries under the broad powers of section 50, it should be noted that this is a lengthy and resource-intensive exercise. It can be anticipated that the present application could have proceeded more efficiently if the head of the government institution and the Information Commissioner had the power to issue summaries, which could then be reviewed by the Court. C. History of the Proceeding [28] Since the Applicant’s original ATI request in November 2005, the request and subsequent proceedings have evolved in such a way that a general history is required to render a clear picture of the situation, as it may be illustrative of the dynamics of access to information in Canada. Applications under the Act are supposed to proceed in a summary way (s 45 of the Act). As will be seen, the nature and volume of the records were such that proceeding in a summary way was not possible. It would be expected that such a historical file would be processed more efficiently through all stages. [29] The Applicant’s request was brought to LAC in November 2005 and stated the following: A copy of the RCMP Security Service File(s) on Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas. (see attached biography). The 20th anniversary of Mr. Douglas’s death is February 24, 2006. I ask that you begin processing this request immediately as it will likely involve several weeks of preparation given the backlogs in handling applications under the Access to Information Act. [30] As indicated by the Public Affidavit of Nicole Jalbert, Access to Information and Privacy Coordinator for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Douglas dossier was to be retained “because of its historical significance”. It was transferred to the National Archives of Canada, as it was then, in April 2000. [31] As the records were contained in the “RG146 – Records of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service” file, LAC proceeded to consult with CSIS. After this initial consultation, the Senior Analyst in charge of the file wrote to the Applicant on December 9, 2005, indicating that an extension of up to 390 days was required beyond the statutory 30 day limit, as a result of the required consultations with CSIS, as prescribed under 9(1)(b) of the Act. [32] By way of a letter from the Senior Analyst at LAC, CSIS was instructed as follows (Exhibit 1 to the Cross-Examination of Nicole Jalbert, March 2, 2010): If you wish us to withhold these records or portions thereof, please mark them accordingly. We require a detailed written rationale demonstrating that the information recommended for exemption falls under one or more provisions of the Access to Information Act. Other substantiating information you can produce which will help us to support an exemption would also be useful. [33] Citing concerns of administrative expediency, Nicole Jalbert indicated during her cross-examination that CSIS only relied upon “sort of an umbrella rationale”, which gives an appreciation to LAC analysts about the general rationale behind exemptions, but not case-specific evidence (pp 40-41 of the Cross-Examination of Nicole Jalbert, January 21, 2010). The review undertaken by CSIS aimed to see if the documents properly fell within the section 15(1) exemption of the Act. On October 31, 2006, CSIS provided LAC with the redacted documents with an indication of what exemption was claimed over the portions of the record (Cross-Examination of Bill Wood, March 8, 2010). [34] The rationale document provided by CSIS was submitted in the public documentation, albeit in a redacted form. As will be seen later, as a result of the ex parte, in camera portion of the application, redacted portions of this document became public. The rationale document as well as the “Library and Archives (LAC) Consultations” document are now publicly available as a result of the present application. [35] The internal review of the record indicates that the Senior Analyst assigned to the review of CSIS’ recommendations was given the file on December 5, 2006 (“Access to Information Request –A-2005-00450/MIC – Bronskill, Jim (Media)”, Exhibit 2 to the Cross-Examination of Bill Wood, March 8, 2010). [36] On December 12, 2006, LAC’s Senior Analyst wrote to the Applicant indicating that 456 records from the file could be disclosed, but that the others were to be withheld under the exemptions provided by sections 15 and 19 of the Act. It was indicated that section 10 was also relied upon, whereby the institution was refusing to confirm or deny the existence of the records. It was later indicated that the reference to section 10 was said to be inadvertent. [37] On January 17, 2007, the Applicant made a formal complaint to the Information Commissioner of Canada, protesting “the excessive number and scope of the exemptions applied to the records”. [38] By way of a letter dated August 27, 2009, more than two years after this complaint was filed, the Information Commissioner found that the Applicant’s complaint was not justified. Further, the Information Commissioner indicated that its office had reviewed the documents strictly under the prism of section 15(1) of the
Source: decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca
Démocratie en surveillance c. Canada (Procureur général)
2024 CAF 75