Canada v. Mennes

Canada v. Mennes
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2004-12-10
Neutral citation
2004 FC 1731
File numbers
T-21-03
Decision Content
Date: 20041210
Docket: T-21-03
Citation: 2004 FC 1731
Ottawa, Ontario, December 10, 2004
Present: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE LAYDEN-STEVENSON
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Applicant
and
EMILE MARGUERITA MARCUS MENNES
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] Mr. Mennes, an inmate at Warkworth institution, is an articulate individual whose knowledge of the contents of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, as am. (The Act) and the Federal Courts Rules SOR/98-106, as am. (the Rules) would be the envy of many lawyers. The applicant, Her Majesty the Queen, seeks an order that no further proceedings may be instituted in this Court by him, except with leave of the Court, and that any existing proceedings brought by him should not proceed except by leave of the Court. The Attorney General has consented to the bringing of the application. I have determined that the applicant's request should be granted.
THE APPLICATION
[2] This application is dated December 31, 2002 and it was filed on January 7, 2003. It has a history of its own. It is supported by the affidavits of Angela McCarthy sworn August 31, 1999, Janice Rodgers sworn August 24, 2002, and Linda Ann Hall sworn September 9, 2002. The notice of application and supporting affidavits were served on Mr. Mennes on January 7, 2003 and he filed a notice of appearance on January 10, 2003.
[3] On February 5, 2003, Mr. Mennes wrote to the Court requesting a special sitting for the hearing of a motion requesting a stay of the proceeding. He did not file a notice of motion. On March 5th, he spoke with Ms. Martel in the office of the judicial administrator and agreed to file his motion record, without a return date, no later than March 31, 2003.
[4] The applicant's record was due on March 21, 2003. On March 14th, the applicant sought directions regarding the requirements of rule 309(2) and on March 20th, Prothonotary Lafrenière directed that "the applicant is hereby dispensed from reproducing the applicant's supporting affidavits in her application record in light of their volume". That direction was conveyed to the applicant but there is no indication that it was transmitted to Mr. Mennes.
[5] Meanwhile, various correspondence between the applicant and the respondent and from both parties to the Court ensued. On March 24, 2003, Associate Chief Justice Lutfy, as he then was, directed that the hearing of the motion for a stay be scheduled for June 25, 2003 and that the motion record be filed by March 31st. Mr. Justice Russell subsequently extended the time for filing and Prothonotary Lafrenière dispensed with the requirement for the applicant to file her application record pending disposition of the motion for a stay. The motion record was filed April 22, 2003.
[6] The "stay" hearing began on June 25th and its continuation was scheduled for February 24, 2004. On the latter date, Mr. Mennes requested that three ex parte motions be heard on grounds of urgency prior to the continuation of the stay motion. He tendered a notice of "conditional abandonment" with respect to the stay motion pending the hearing of his ex parte motions and presented five volumes of an ex parte motion record on which he was prepared to make submissions. Mr. Justice O'Keefe determined that the matter, in the circumstances, could not be heard and he instructed Mr. Mennes to file his material in Toronto in the normal manner.
[7] On April 28th, Mr. Justice Shore directed the parties to, jointly or separately, serve and file not later than May 17, 2004, a draft order setting out a revised schedule for the timely completion of the remaining steps to be taken in relation to the matter. The applicant responded on May 7th with a draft order and the filing of the application record along with a copy of correspondence to Mr. Mennes dated May 6, 2004, indicating, among other things, that Her Majesty's application record was enclosed. Mr. Mennes did not respond to Mr. Justice Shore's direction.
[8] On May 25th, Prothonotary Tabib ordered that Mr. Mennes' respondent's record be filed by June 16, 2004 and that the applicant file a requisition for hearing within the time prescribed by her order. Mr. Mennes did not file a respondent's record. On June 28th, Her Majesty filed, with proof of service, a requisition for hearing with respect to the application.
[9] By order dated July 29, 2004, Chief Justice Lutfy fixed October 5 and 6, 2004, at Toronto, for the hearing of the application. On August 19th, the applicant wrote to Mr. Mennes (a copy of the correspondence was filed with the Court) requesting that Mr. Mennes advise by September 10th if he wished the applicant to move for an order for his attendance at the hearing. Mr. Mennes did not respond.
[10] Not having heard from Mr. Mennes, the applicant sought directions from the Court. On my direction, registry contacted Warkworth institution. After registry's communications with the institution and the receipt of correspondence from Mr. Mennes, it was evident that Mr. Mennes did not wish to appear in person at Toronto, but did wish to appear by way of teleconference from Warkworth. I issued an order accordingly.
[11] At the outset of the hearing on October 5th, Mr. Mennes requested that the hearing be adjourned. After entertaining lengthy submissions from Mr Mennes, I denied his request and provided my reasons for so doing. I proceeded with the hearing and the applicant argued the merits of the application. When I provided Mr. Mennes an opportunity to respond to Her Majesty's submissions, he renewed his "objection" and requested that the proceeding be adjourned to a fixed date at Peterborough.
[12] During the arguments of both parties regarding the propriety of that request, it became apparent that Mr. Mennes did not have in his possession the application record or any of the supporting affidavits. This revelation precipitated immediate telephone contact between Her Majesty's counsel and the institution. After receiving confirmation that Mr. Mennes did not have the documents, arrangements were proposed to get the materials to Mr. Mennes late in the afternoon. The hearing was adjourned at 4:40 p.m.
[13] When the Court resumed on the morning of October 7th, Mr. Mennes again renewed his request for an adjournment. In seeking clarification regarding the documentation, I learned that, for want of a better word, the "search" for the documents began at 9:00 p.m. on October 6th and that Mr. Mennes still did not have all of the documents in his possession. To make a long story short, I varied my order refusing an adjournment, with reasons. I ordered that the matter be adjourned to November 30 and December 1, 2004 at Peterborough upon specified conditions. A copy of my order dated October 6, 2004 is attached to these reasons as Schedule "A".
[14] While I have no responsive affidavit, Mr. Mennes filed his written submissions on November 15th, as ordered. The hearing resumed on November 30th. Mr. Mennes made detailed responsive submissions that were, as usual, followed by the applicant's reply and the proceeding concluded on December 1st.
MR. MENNES
[15] Mr. Mennes was born on February 19, 1950. Between 1981 and 1996, he was convicted of a number of sexual offences in relation to children. On November 13, 1996, he was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender. He is serving his sentence as an inmate at Warkworth penitentiary.
OVERVIEW OF THE APPLICANT'S POSITION
[16] Her Majesty claims that Mr. Mennes is a vexatious litigant. Since 1987, he has launched over 74 legal proceedings, 44 of them in the Federal Court. Her Majesty alleges that the files are meritless, repetitive and abuse the Court's process. She submits that an order under subsection 40(1) of the Act is the only way to protect the Court, the public, and the Crown "from Mr. Mennes' persistent wastage".
[17] The applicant offers three affidavits outlining Mr. Mennes' activities before the courts. The affidavit of Angela McCarthy concerns his files in the Federal and British Columbia courts from 1987 to the mid-1990's. The affidavit of Linda Hall describes four proceedings before the Federal Court in 1992, filed in Ottawa. The affidavit of Janice Rodgers sets out the activities of Mr. Mennes in the Federal Court and the Ontario courts from 1998 to August 2002 in the Toronto area.
[18] The affidavit evidence discloses 64 separate proceedings dating from February 1987 to August 2002. Most of these files are concentrated in two periods, the first from 1987 to 1992, and the second from 1998 to the present. Mr. Mennes commenced only three proceedings between 1993 and 1997. Of the 64 files, 34 belong to the Federal Court, 26 are files from the provincial courts of British Columbia, two are from the provincial courts of Ontario and two are leave applications to the Supreme Court of Canada.
[19] Of the 34 files (detailed in the affidavits) in the Federal Court, 15 were applications, 11 were actions and eight were appeals. Nine were struck out at a preliminary stage, six were dismissed by the Court after some form of hearing, three were dismissed by the Court for delay, five were discontinued by Mr. Mennes, ten reflect a lack of prosecution at some stage in the proceeding without final disposition. One appeal was found in favour of Mr. Mennes. Additionally, since August 2002, when the Rodgers affidavit was sworn, Mr. Mennes has initiated another ten proceedings in the Federal Court. These include five new actions and five new applications.
THE RESPONSE OF MR. MENNES
[20] As previously noted, Mr. Mennes did not submit an affidavit. He did, however, pedantically argue against the granting of the applicant's request. He approached the matter from two fronts. The first, for convenience and want of a better description, I will refer to as the "technical" front. The second, again for convenience, I will refer to as the "substantive" front. The synopsis that follows constitutes a distilled version of the arguments.
[21] There are several components to the technical front. First, Mr. Mennes takes exception to the application record. He correctly notes that the record does not contain any of the affidavits relied upon by Her Majesty as required by rule 309(2). He turns to rule 55 which permits the Court, on motion, to dispense with compliance with any of the Rules, but points to rule 47(2) which expressly mandates that where the Rules provide that the powers of the Court are to be exercised on motion, they may be exercised only on the bringing of a motion. Thus, in Mr. Mennes' view, the applicant is improperly before the Court because there is no evidence in the record. If there exists an instruction from the Court in this respect, it too ought to have been included in the record (rule 309(2)) therefore the record is doubly deficient.
[22] Next, he refers to the applicant's citation of the Federal Court Act. The applicant cites the Act as "R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7" without including "as amended". Mr. Mennes contends that section 40 was repealed by Statutes of Canada, 1990, c. 8, s. 11 and the Court cannot proceed on a defective application that specifically relies on a section that was, in fact, repealed. Moreover, the consent of the Attorney General was given on that premise. The result, according to Mr. Mennes, is that the applicant relies on provisions unknown to law and the doctrine of contra proferentum applies.
[23] The third component of the "technical front" pertains to the jurat in the McCarthy affidavit. In this respect, Mr. Mennes turns to his copy and notes that the specific date in August, 1999 is not completed. (The jurat in the original affidavit filed with the Court indicates that it was sworn on August 31, 1999 and at least some of the copies are consistent with the original). Mr. Mennes submits that this constitutes an "alteration to documents". Someone, he says, has added something to the document and this is totally improper. He additionally points to paragraphs 2, 3, 142, 152, 162, 187, 195, 209, 214, 216, 223 and 224 of the McCarthy affidavit and submits that they contravene rule 81(1) which requires that affidavits be confined to facts within the personal knowledge of the deponent. The applicant ought to have produced the affidavits of deponents with personal knowledge.
[24] The last component of this front relates to the exhibits to the Hall and Rodgers affidavits. Referring to the "blank pages" on which the endorsement for the exhibit appears, Mr. Mennes maintains that these are not exhibits; they are merely blank pages and thus totally improper. Additionally, the Hall affidavit contains information and belief and the Rodgers affidavit is improper because it is sworn by a lawyer from the Department of Justice. Mr. Mennes says that there should be no distinction between a law firm and the Department of Justice for purposes of these proceedings. Since it would be improper for one lawyer to swear an affidavit and another lawyer from the same firm to argue, the situation is no different for the Department.
[25] The substantive front is specifically stated to be without prejudice to the technical submissions. Mr. Mennes argues that the applicant's case constitutes a charade to its core and is a perversion of logic. The applicant, he says, chooses "juicy little bits from cases, strings them together and contrives a characterization or stereotype". Because of layered deception, the Court is presented with a slanted view as portrayed by the applicant. Pared to the core, there is nothing in Her Majesty's submissions that reveals anything other than ordinary litigation with its attendant procedural errors in judgment.
[26] Mr. Mennes distinguishes the jurisprudence relied upon by Her Majesty on the basis that it did not deal with inmates and in none of the cases did the complaints in relation to the "vexatious" litigants amount to contempt as is the situation regarding the wrongs alleged by Mr. Mennes.
[27] He submits that there are four distinct reasons why the application should not succeed. First, there exists an available alternative remedy in rule 221. Her Majesty can move to strike, as she has oft been inclined to do. This provides an expeditious, cost-effective remedy. The second reason is the futility of the declaration sought - what will it accomplish other than add another step to litigation requiring the Court to consider the granting of leave? Third, the passage of time between August 1999, when the McCarthy affidavit was sworn and the institution of the application constitutes acquiescence on Her Majesty's part. Fourth, the applicant, Mr. Mennes says, comes to Court with unclean hands. In this respect, he asks that I refer to the contents of his ex parte motions.
[28] Mr. Mennes additionally dissects the exhibits in the affidavits in an effort to justify the existence of each of his proceedings and to illustrate that, viewed in proper context, each was defensible. For example, he submits that his references to scripture occur in the context of Her Majesty's Coronation Oath which is indisputably binding on the government.
[29] He then takes issue with all proceedings delineated in the McCarthy affidavit that refer to proceedings in the courts of British Columbia on the basis that the concern here is the Federal Court. He also takes issue with any proceedings, referred to by Ms. McCarthy, antecedent to 1990 on the basis of the applicant's failure to properly plead the Act. In a similar vein, he submits that proceedings in the Ontario courts delineated in the affidavit of Ms. Rodgers should be disregarded along with all proceedings that are not specific to him. Finally, in relation to proceedings in the Federal Court, on the strength of Foy v. Foy (No. 2) (1979), 102 D.L.R. (3d) 342 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal dismissed [1979] 2 S.C.R. vii, Mr. Mennes asserts that appeal proceedings should be excluded from any consideration of section 40 of the Act.
[30] In sum, Mr. Mennes considers that the motive underlying Her Majesty's application is to undermine his irrefutable common law right of access to the courts and effectively defeat proceedings without dealing with the merits. He regards the application as a personal attack and characterizes the situation as one where it is the "pot calling the kettle black".
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
[31] Before setting out the various proceedings initiated by Mr. Mennes in the Federal Court,
it is useful to address his arguments now in order to maintain cohesiveness and clarity in the analysis that follows later. My determination with respect to many of the "technical front" arguments can be disposed of on the basis of rule 56 which provides that non-compliance with the Rules does not render a proceeding, a step in a proceeding or an order void, but instead constitutes an irregularity, which may be addressed under rules 58 to 60. I regard the submissions of Mr. Mennes to be challenges to the applicant's non-compliance with the Rules and if it is necessary to do so, I deem those challenges to be motions made pursuant to rule 58.
[32] Regarding the applicant's record, I have already noted that there is no indication that Mr. Mennes was notified of Prothonotary Lafrenière's direction of March 20, 2003. However, he was aware of the contents of the applicant's record on May 6, 2004, when it was served on him. The applicant's correspondence of May 6th referred to the court's instructions regarding the affidavits. Mr. Mennes took no issue with the record until November 15th when he filed his written submissions in compliance with my order. It was incumbent upon Mr. Mennes to voice his objection regarding the record as soon as practicable after he had knowledge of it. Mr. Mennes was not prejudiced because he had been served with the supporting affidavits in January, 2003. I therefore dismiss this argument or motion.
[33] Regarding the applicant's failure to include "as amended" in her citation of the Act, I do not view this complaint as going to non-compliance with the Rules, even when regard is had to rule 301(e). It is assumed when referring to any statute that the reference is to the statute, as
amended, unless the contrary is specifically stated. There is no question as to the law upon which the applicant relies and Mr. Mennes' comprehensive response to the application leaves no doubt that he was not prejudiced by Her Majesty's failure to include "as amended" in the citation. The doctrine of contra proferentum, generally applicable to contract law, whereby, in interpreting documents, ambiguities are to be construed unfavourably against the drafter, has no application here.
[34] That said, Mr. Mennes will nonetheless reap some benefit from his submission. Section 40 was not repealed in 1990; it was enacted. It did not previously exist in any form. Its enactment replaced two previous sections that had no connection to the newly enacted section. I am of the view that notwithstanding the absence of a specific statutory provision relating to vexatious litigants, the Court nonetheless possesses jurisdiction to control its process. However, in the circumstances of this case, the applicant relies exclusively on section 40. Therefore, for purposes of this particular matter, proceedings initiated by Mr. Mennes, in any Court, prior to the coming into force of section 40 will not be considered. Chapter F-8 of the Statutes of Canada, assented to on March 29, 1990, came into force on February 1, 1992: S.I./92-6 C. Gaz. 1992. II. 280.
[35] The McCarthy affidavit will not be disregarded on the basis of the missing date in Mr. Mennes' copy. The original affidavit has the date "31" August, 1999. The applicant's counsel readily conceded the existence of the discrepancy in Mr. Mennes' copy and was at a loss to explain it other than to surmise that a copy of the unsworn affidavit was inadvertently and accidentally provided to him. Counsel apologized for the error and offered to replace the affidavit with a proper copy. I reject Mr. Mennes' allegations of "alteration of documents" as well as his references to contraventions of the Criminal Code of Canada that I have intentionally omitted from my consolidation of his submissions.
[36] Regarding contravention of rule 81(1) - requiring personal knowledge of the deponent - the purpose of the provision is to eliminate hearsay. In Éthier v. Canada (R.C.M.P. Commissioner), [1993] 2 F.C. 659 (C.A.), the Court held that documents obtained from the respondent by way of an access to information request met the requirements for admissibility. Here, the impugned paragraphs relate to the affiant obtaining information from Correctional Services Canada (CSC) regarding Mr. Mennes' sentence and the location of his incarceration and to information regarding proceedings in the British Columbia courts obtained from Agentis Information Services Inc. (an agency that provides assistance in service, filing and searching for court documents). While the preferable and proper route would have been to have the named individuals from CSC and Agentis swear the affidavits, the impugned information consists of uncontroverted facts and is largely a matter of public record. Rule 81(2) provides the option of attaching less weight to affidavits that fail to produce the best evidence. I am not inclined to strike the contested paragraphs although, as I have indicated, proceedings that pre-date the coming into force of section 40 will not be considered in any event.
[37] In relation to the "exhibits" in the Hall and Rodgers affidavits, rule 80(3) is dispositive. The "blank pages" with their endorsements are "certificates" as permitted by the rule.
[38] With respect to the argument that Ms. Rodgers, being a solicitor within the Department of Justice, was disqualified from swearing an affidavit, the prohibition in rule 82 extends to the same solicitor deposing to an affidavit and presenting argument based on that affidavit. The jurisprudence relating to another member of a solicitor's firm arguing a motion is not definitive, undoubtedly because the issue will turn on the circumstances of each particular matter.
[39] Where the purpose of the affidavit is merely to put documents before the Court and the "evidence" is not controversial, a solicitor within the same firm may be permitted to swear an affidavit, but not argue the matter. In this instance, Ms. Rodgers was the solicitor who had carriage of most of the files described in her affidavit. In relation to those files for which she did not have carriage, she reviewed the files. Her affidavit simply recites the history of Mr. Mennes' proceedings in the Federal Court during a specific time period and attaches the supporting documentation as exhibits. The fact that Mr. Mennes does not agree with the use that Her Majesty's counsel makes of the documents bears no relationship to the affidavit's contents. This is not a situation where it is improper for a solicitor within the Department of Justice to swear an affidavit.
[40] In coming to these determinations, I do not wish to be taken as condoning non-compliance with the Rules. Mr. Mennes properly notes the comments of Madam Justice Dawson in Canada v. Olympia Interiors Ltd. (2001), 209 F.T.R. 182 (T.D.) aff'd. (2004), 323 N.R. 191 (F.C.A.) to the effect that failure to comply with the Rules is never a trivial matter. I endorse that comment and adopt it as my own. There are, however, degrees of non-compliance. The applicant's mis-steps are not flagrant or wilful. Rather, they exhibit inattention to detail and Her Majesty, of all litigants, should exercise more care and caution. That said, rules 3 and 56 were not enacted in vain and I regard this matter as one that should be determined on its merits.
[41] Regarding the argument arising from Foy, supra, that: (a) proceedings in the Rodgers affidavit that are not specific to Mr. Mennes should not be included and (b) that appeal proceedings should be excluded, I do not accept Mr. Mennes' position. In Foy, the Court, interpreting the Ontario provision - similar but not identical to section 40 - stated that the section would not apply to "proceedings which were a response to, or a participation in, proceedings instituted by another party". Mr. Mennes interprets this ruling as one which would exclude any proceedings in which he was involved where there were also other plaintiffs (or applicants) or to proceedings where he initiated a proceeding in his name on his own behalf and on behalf of "all other inmates across Canada in the care and control of the Correctional Service of Canada under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act". Foy does not, in my view, stand for the proposition advanced by Mr. Mennes. In circumstances where Mr. Mennes is a plaintiff or an applicant, albeit with others, the proceeding is not excluded from consideration because it is not a proceeding instituted by another party - it is a proceeding instituted by Mr. Mennes and other parties.
[42] In relation to proceedings instituted by another inmate where Mr. Mennes proposed to represent that inmate in an action or application by virtue of a power of attorney by the inmate, it could be said that the Foy reasoning applies. However, the Rules prohibit such conduct and the jurisprudence of the Federal Court that will be discussed later in these reasons interprets section 40 more broadly than the Ontario Court of Appeal interpreted its rule in Foy.
[43] Similarly, with respect to the exclusion of appeals, the Federal Court jurisprudence reveals a wider interpretation of the phrase "instituted vexatious proceedings" than that advanced in Foy. Rule 2 defines "action" as a proceeding referred to in rule 169, "application" as a proceeding referred to in rule 300, and "appeal" as a proceeding referred to in rule 355. Moreover, the comments of Justice Blair, writing for a unanimous court in Mascan Corp. v. French (1988) 49 D.L.R. (4th) 434 (Ont. C.A.) are unequivocal. The Ontario Act was amended in response to Foy, supra, and now a decision in the Ontario courts regarding a vexatious litigant involves a "realistic appraisal of all proceedings whether original, interlocutory or by way of appeal..." Thus, I find that appeals are not to be excluded from consideration in a section 40 application.
[44] As to rule 221 being an available alternative remedy, an alternative remedy must be adequate. Rule 221, in and of itself, does not alleviate the necessity for a defendant or respondent to initiate further steps in a proceeding. If rule 221 provided the remedy advanced by Mr. Mennes, section 40 would be redundant. Parliament is presumed not to speak in vain. I agree with the respondent that, in circumstances where there is a multiplicity of proceedings, rule 221 is a piecemeal approach and section 40 addresses the bigger picture. The same reasoning applies to the submission regarding the futility of such a declaration due to adding yet another step to litigation. Leave will be granted for proceedings that are based on reasonable grounds and are not an abuse of process.
[45] There is no limitation period with respect to the bringing of an application under section 40. The provision is intended for situations where there is an ongoing problem with litigation. It is designed to protect the public interest, the administration of justice, and the administration of the courts as well as the interests of a party subject to vexatious litigation. Nothing turns on the fact that no application was instituted until 2003, while an affidavit was sworn in August 1999 detailing Mr. Mennes' activity in the Court during, for present purposes, the 1990's. The applicant's failure to act before January 2003 does not constitute acquiesence.
[46] With respect to the "unclean hands" argument, Mr. Mennes refers to his ex parte motions and asks that I review them. I have done so because I told Mr. Mennes that I would. I will briefly comment on those motions later in these reasons. However, as my order of October 6, 2004 provides, this application stands on its own and arguments or submissions on collateral issues or matters will not be addressed. The submission that Her Majesty comes to the Court with unclean hands has not been made out on the evidence before me.
FEDERAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
[47] I turn now to the history of Mr. Mennes' proceedings in the Federal Court since the coming into force of section 40. In the case of the Federal Court proceedings detailed in the McCarthy affidavit, this history excludes those proceedings referred to in paragraphs 4 through 79 and 114 to 116 of the affidavit.
[48] Because some of the proceedings in the history set out below reference the direction of the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, dated May 7, 1992, for clarity I mention it now. The direction provides, in part, that "any document that Mr. Mennes submits for filing should not be filed without first submitting it to a prothonotary for examination as to whether it contains scandalous, insulting or abusive matter that should not be permitted to be placed on a Court file". On February 16, 1998, the executive officer to the Chief Justice advised Mr. Mennes, in writing, that the direction remains in effect and applies to any material Mr. Mennes attempts to file with the Court.
[49] Time constraints do not permit an exhaustive review of each of the files. Consequently, I choose to review the first file in some detail and note that it is, for the most part, representative of the various files that are referred to in the history.
Court File No. T-289-91
[50] Although this proceeding was initiated on February 6, 1991, there was considerable activity in relation to it following the coming into force of section 40. The reference to the originating document is for the sole purpose of providing context for steps in the proceeding taken after February 1, 1992. References to interlocutory requests before that date are omitted.
[51] On February 6, 1991, Mr. Mennes filed a statement of claim requesting an order for restitution to him and several of his companies, restoration of his health and youth, reinstatement with various organizations and other relief. The statement of claim was amended three times. On April 6, 1992, Mr. Mennes filed a notice of motion for: an order condemning [John Doe] Q.C. for contempt of court; an order granting leave to have a writ of attachment attaching [John Doe] issued and executed; an order adjourning the remaining portions of his motion pending execution of the writ of attachment; an order of committal committing [John Doe] to imprisonment; and other orders. He additionally filed a formal demand to [John Doe] for an immediate apology and to inform the Court as to what steps he and the Minister of Justice will take or have taken.
[52] On April 21, 1992, Mr. Mennes filed a notice of motion for the relief claimed in his further amended statement of claim. On April 29, 1992, Mr. Justice Rouleau held that the order "issued by the Associate Chief Justice striking Mr. Mennes' statement of claim in court file No. T-1231-91 is also applicable to the present action". Justice Rouleau dismissed the section 324 contempt application with respect to [John Doe] and prohibited Mr. Mennes from instituting any further proceedings in the Federal Court without the express consent of a judge of the Court.
[53] On June 22nd, Mr. Mennes filed a notice of motion for an order allowing him to remove the original exhibits from the file. Prothonotary Hargrave, on June 27, 1994, ordered that Mr. Mennes' citizenship card and citizenship commemorative certificate be returned to him, provided that copies be placed on the file. He denied the remainder of the motion. On January 15, 1997, Mr. Justice Joyal dismissed Mr. Mennes' application for an order for rescission of the order of Mr. Justice Rouleau dated April 29, 1992.
[54] On September 18, 1997, Associate Chief Justice Jerome struck all of Mr. Mennes' pleadings in this action nunc pro tunc. On September 23, 1997, Mr. Mennes forwarded correspondence to the attention of the administrator of the Court advising that he would shortly be filing materials and instructions on his remaining motions. On December 2, 1997, Mr. Justice Joyal dismissed an application for a show cause order.
Court File No. A-566-92
[55] On April 29, 1992, Mr. Mennes filed a notice of appeal with respect to the order of Mr. Justice Rouleau dated April 28, 1992 in court file No. T-289-91. Before the appeal was heard, there were six motions by Mr. Mennes and various correspondence. From the Court there were four directions, four certificates and seven orders. As to disposition, on September 9, 1997, the Federal Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, referred the matter back to the Associate Chief Justice for signature of an order nunc pro tunc in court file No. T-289-91 implementing his reasons of July 24, 1991, and to the Trial Division for disposition of Mr. Mennes' motion under the former rule 1733. The request to stay proceedings was denied.
Court File No. A-306-92
[56] On March 3, 1992, Mr. Mennes filed a notice of appeal in relation to the judgment of Madam Justice Reed in court file No. T-7-92. Mr. Mennes filed two motions and there were five orders emanating from the Court in relation to this matter. On September 9, 1997, the appeal was dismissed.
Court File No. T-1724-92
[57] On August 7, 1997, Mr. Mennes filed an originating notice of motion for judicial review seeking a writ of certiorari and mandamus in relation to a transfer to Warkworth institution and his inmate grievance. Mr. Mennes filed two interlocutory motions; four directions issued from the court; and Mr. Justice Muldoon dismissed the judicial review application on May 7, 1998. On June 9, 1998, Mr. Mennes attempted to file a motion record seeking a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter for recommendation regarding Justice Muldoon's order.
Court File No. T-253-98
[58] On February 13, 1998, Mr. Mennes filed an originating notice of motion applying for a pardon under section 690 of the Criminal Code and for an order of certiorari and a stay of proceedings in court file No T-289-91. Again, there were a number of motions and orders. On July 21, 1998, Prothonotary Hargrave ordered that the motion record not be accepted because the material "runs afoul of a number of the definitions of scandalous, insulting or abuse". He permitted a reworked motion record to be tendered. On November 10, 1998, Prothonotary Hargrave struck the proceeding without leave to amend. Mr. Mennes subsequently continued to attempt to file documents in relation to this file, including, among other things, motions and notices of constitutional questions.
Court File No. T-538-98
[59] On March 16, 1998, Mr. Mennes sought judicial review of the direction of the Chief Justice dated May 7, 1992. The application was dismissed by Mr. Justice Richard, as he then was.
Court File No. A-402-98
[60] On June 26, 1998, Mr. Mennes appealed the order in court file No. T-538-98. He sought an order directing Ms. Rodgers to attend a hearing to defend a charge of contempt for having brought what Mr. Mennes asserted to be an illegal motion. He sought the same remedy in relation to Justice Richard for his order striking out the originating notice of motion. On August 14, 1998, Mr. Mennes brought a motion seeking, in part, an order directing Robert Biljan, administrator of the court, to appear to defend a charge of contempt allegedly as a result of a two-week delay between the date of Justice Richard's order and the date it was sent to Mr. Mennes. That motion was dismissed and the appeal was dismissed on September 21, 1999.
Court File No. T-1844-98
[61] On September 23, 1998, Mr. Mennes served the Attorney General with a statement of claim in which he sought a declaration that rule 70(2) of the Rules contravenes various sections of the Charter. A motion to have the matter specially managed resulted in his motion record being twice rejected as it contained insulting and abusive material. Mr. Mennes discontinued this proceeding on December 20, 2001.
Court File No. T-1845-98
[62] On September 23, 1998, Mr. Mennes served the Attorney General with a statement of claim in which he sought damages arising out of the alleged negligence and Charter violation of CSC in relation to its decision to refuse him permission to purchase a computer from another inmate as well as with respect to the outcome of his related grievances. His motion record regarding his request to have the matter specially managed was not accepted for filing. The proceeding was discontinued on December 20, 2001.
Court File No. T-2019-98
[63] On October 16, 1998, Mr. Mennes filed a notice of application seeking judicial review of a purported decision of the Governor in Council and CSC relating to the CSC inmate grievance procedure. His motion documents in relation to requests to have the matter specially managed were not accepted for filing. The Attorney General brought a motion to dismiss and Mr. Mennes responded with a motion for, among other things, a direction that the application be converted to an action and an injunction preventing CSC from charging him for photocopies. On February 3, 1999, Mr. Justice Blais dismissed the cross motion, granted the Attorney General's motion, and dismissed the application with costs.
Court File No. A-146-99
[64] On February 26, 1999, Mr. Mennes appealed the decision of Justice Blais in T-2019-98. The hearing was scheduled for September 10, 2001 and on August 1, 2001, the Chief Justice issued an order for "attendance of person in custody". Mr. Mennes wrote twice to the Court to request that his appeal be heard on the record and without his personal appearance. Prior to receipt of a response, he served and filed a notice of discontinuance. On August 16, 2001, he wrote to the Attorney General stating his intention to discontinue all of his proceedings in the Federal Court in response to the Chief Justice's order to appear at the hearing of the appeal. He asserted that Chief Justice Richard's order was illegal and amounted to kidnapping. He stated his intention to charge, prosecute and possibly sue Chief Justice Richard for what Mr. Mennes characterized as criminal misconduct. On September 25, 2001, Mr. Mennes moved to set aside the discontinuance. Mr. Justice Noel ordered the discontinuance set aside and on December 20, 2001, Mr. Mennes discontinued the proceeding.
Court File No. T-033-99
[65] On January 8, 1999, Mr. Mennes brought an action in libel against the Department of Justice based on statements in pleadings in other proceedings where the Court had stated that Mr. Mennes is a frivolous and vexatious litigant. The defendant successfully brought a motion to strike. By order dated March 1, 1999, Madam Justice Reed ordered that the statement of claim be struck out.
Court File No. T-207-00
[66] On February 3, 2000, Mr. Mennes filed a statement of claim seeking a declaration that his Charter rights were breached by the Committee on Justice and Human Rights, a committee of the House of Commons, because it did not hear from Mr. Mennes during its review of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act. Prothonotary Giles, on May 24, 2000, granted the Attorney General's motion to strike. On May 28, 2000, Mr. Mennes submitted an amended statement of claim that Prothonotary Aronovitch directed could not be filed. Mr. Mennes filed a motion for leave to amend the order of Prothonotary Giles to grant him leave to amend the statement of claim. Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer dismissed the motion by order dated November 6, 2000.
Court File No. A-752-00
[67] Mr. Mennes appealed the order of Justice Tremblay-Lamer in court file No. T-207-00, but discontinued the proceeding on February 18, 2002.
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