Voltage Picture LLC v. John Doe

Voltage Picture LLC v. John Doe
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2015-02-16
Neutral citation
2014 FC 161
File numbers
T-2058-12
Notes
A correction was made on February 16, 2015.
Reported Decision
Decision Content
Date: 20150216
Docket: T-2058-12
Citation: 2014 FC 161
Toronto, Ontario, February 16, 2014
PRESENT: Prothonotary Kevin R. Aalto
BETWEEN:
VOLTAGE PICTURES LLC
Plaintiff
and
JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE
Defendants
and
SAMUELSON-GLUSHKO
CANADIAN INTERNET POLICY
AND PUBLIC INTEREST CLINIC
Interveners
AMENDED REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
“. . . the rise of so-called ‘copyright trolls’ – plaintiffs who file multitudes of lawsuits solely to extort quick settlements – requires courts to ensure that the litigation process and their scarce resources are not being abused.” [1]
INTRODUCTION [1] Do persons who download copyrighted material from the internet using a peer to peer (P2P) network and the BitTorrent Protocol (BitTorrent) through the auspices of an Internet Service Provider (ISP) have a right to privacy such that their contact information not be revealed to the party whose copyright is being infringed? If they are infringing copyright what remedy, if any, should the Court impose? These are the questions at issue on this motion. While at first blush the answer may seem simple enough, in reality given the issues in play the answers require a delicate balancing of privacy rights versus the rights of copyright holders. This is especially so in the context of modern day technology and users of the internet.
[2] In essence, in this proceeding the Plaintiff (Voltage) seeks the names and addresses of some 2,000 subscribers (Subscribers) of an ISP known TekSavvy Solutions Inc. This type of order is often referred to as a Norwich[2] Order – a litigation tool requiring non-parties to a litigation to be subject to discovery or being compelled to provide information.
[3] Voltage seeks the names and addresses so that they can pursue litigation against the Subscribers for the unauthorized copying and distribution of Voltage’s copyrighted cinematographic works (Works). The case engages provisions of the Copyright Act, RSC, 1985, c C-42 and the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c. 5 (PIPEDA).
[4] Pursuant to an order of this Court, the Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) was granted leave to intervene on this motion in order to enhance the record and provide arguments and evidence to assist the Court in determining the issue and to put the position of the Subscribers and Voltage in an appropriate context. To that end, CIPPIC filed evidence by way of affidavit and cross-examined the main deponent who gave evidence on behalf of Voltage. CIPPIC also filed extensive written representations. TekSavvy, the ISP took no position on the motion.
[5] CIPPIC has raised a number of objections to Voltage’s motion. It argues that privacy considerations and broader interests of justice should prevail in the particular circumstances of this case.
[6] Specifically, CIPPIC alleges that Voltage’s true intentions are not motivated by any rights it may hold under the Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42. CIPPIC characterizes Voltage and Canipre Inc. (Canipre) the forensic investigation company retained by Voltage to track the names of the Subscribers as “copyright trolls” engaged in “speculative invoicing” which seeks to intimidate individuals into easy settlements by way of demand letters and threats of litigation. It is alleged that the cost and the uncertainty or stigma of litigation coerces most individuals into making payments, whether or not they were involved in the unauthorized copying and distribution of films on the internet. The Court is cautioned not to become an inadvertent tool assisting parties in this type of business model.
FACTS [7] Extensive affidavit evidence was filed on the motion as well as extensive case briefs. Voltage filed the affidavit of Barry Logan (Logan Affidavit) the owner and principal forensic consultant of Canipre. Voltage also filed two affidavits of John Philpott (Philpott Affidavits), an associate with the law firm representing Voltage which attached the affidavit of Michael Wickstrom of Voltage and the affidavit of Mathias Gartner, an information technology expert. CIPPIC also filed evidence in the form of an affidavit of Timothy Lethbridge (Lethbridge Affidavit) which also dealt with technical issues relating to the internet. CIPPIC also filed the affidavit of Alexander Cooke (Cooke Affidavit), a law student who conducted searches to locate file-sharing lawsuits commenced by Voltage.
[8] Voltage sought to strike the Lethbridge Affidavit on the grounds that the witness had no direct knowledge of the matters in issue and was not an expert on the areas on which he opined. Voltage pointed to lengthy sections of the cross-examination to demonstrate that Mr. Lethbridge lacked expertise on issues relating to the case and the use of BitTorrent. However, in the end result, the Lethbridge Affidavit should be accepted subject to the qualifications advanced by Voltage.
[9] Voltage is a film production company which among other films produced the Oscar nominated film The Hurt Locker. The second of the Philpott Affidavits provides evidence both directly and indirectly through the Michael Wickstrom affidavit that Voltage in fact owns copyright in the Works.
[10] In 2012 Voltage retained Canipre to investigate whether any of Voltage’s cinematographic works (Works) were being copied and distributed in Canada over P2P networks using BitTorrent.
[11] Apparently, BitTorrent is a P2P file sharing protocol that facilitates the distribution of large amounts of data over the internet. The non-party TekSavvy is an ISP based in Canada which provides its customers with access to the internet.
[12] There appears to be little dispute about how the technology works. When a file is uploaded to a BitTorrent network that is referred to as “seeding”. Other P2P network users, called “peers”, can then connect to the user seeding the file. BitTorrent breaks a file into numerous small data packets, each of which is identifiable by a unique hash number created using a hash algorithm. Once the file is broken into packets other peers are able to download different sections of the same file from different users. Each new peer is directed to the most readily available packet they wish to download. Peers copy files from multiple users who may have the file available on the BitTorrent network. The peer then becomes a seeder as the data packet is distributed to other peers connected to the BitTorrent network. Once a packet is downloaded it is then available to other users who are also connected to the BitTorrent network.
[13] Voltage retained the services of Canipre to conduct a forensic investigation of the Works that had been downloaded from BitTorrent networks. The software used by Canipre was able to identify the IP address of each seeder and peer who offered any of the Works for transfer or distribution. This software was able to identify the IP address of the user; the date and time the file was distributed; the P2P network used; and, the file’s metadata including the name of the file and its size (collectively the File Data).
[14] The File Data was reviewed and transactions were isolated geographically to Ontario and to TekSavvy customers. This forensic investigation has resulted in some 2000 Subscribers being identified by their unique IP address assigned to them by TekSavvy.
[15] CIPPIC, in its evidence, qualifies the extent to which useful information can necessarily be obtained from the ISP. That is, IP addresses do not necessarily result in obtaining the person who may have engaged in downloading the Works. For example, on an open non-password protected WiFi network, any stranger could use a BitTorrent client to download connect. This frequently happens at internet cafes and the like. Thus, the particular infringer may not be able to be identified.
[16] Voltage has had a history in the U.S. of commencing file-sharing lawsuits such as this. According to the Cooke Affidavit there are 22 file-sharing lawsuits in the American Federal Court system where Voltage is listed as a Plaintiff. The majority involve unknown alleged infringers. The total number of unknown alleged infringers is in the range of 28,000.
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES TO THE MOTION [17] As there is no “real” Defendant in this proceeding other than the named John Doe and Jane Doe, there was no party which could oppose this motion. Thus, CIPPIC sought intervener status which was granted and it argued against making the order requested by Voltage.
POSITION OF VOLTAGE [18] Voltage’s position on this motion is relatively straightforward. That is, the identified Subscribers have infringed the copyright of Voltage by downloading or distributing the Works and are therefore prima facie liable under the Copyright Act for infringement. Thus, TekSavvy should be ordered to produce the contact information for the Subscribers who are all potential Defendants to this action.
[19] Relying primarily upon BMG Canada Inc. v Doe, 2005 FCA 193 (BMG) (discussed in greater detail below) Voltage argues that it has met all of the principles enunciated in BMG and TekSavvy should be ordered to release the information on the Subscribers. It is to be noted as well that the position of Voltage was that it fully intends to pursue claims against the Subscribers.
POSITION OF CIPPIC [20] The position of CIPPIC is that no information should be released by TekSavvy, as this will infringe the privacy rights of the Subscribers and may affect the scope of protection offered to anonymous online activity.
[21] They argue that there are important public policy issues involving the intersection of law and technology which require careful consideration and balancing by the Court before ordering third parties to reveal private information. They argue that this type of request of the Court may extend beyond mere infringers to require information about whistle-blowers and confidential sources of documents leaked in the public interest.
[22] To that end, CIPPIC argues that the right to privacy is implicitly a protected right under sections 7 and 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Thus, it is argued, the Court should not readily compel innocent third parties to divulge information which breaches the privacy expectations of individuals and which, in a rapidly changing technological environment, may not provide the real information relating to the unlawful conduct.
[23] CIPPIC points to the jurisprudence evolving in other jurisdictions, particularly the U.S. and United Kingdom, to argue that Canadian Courts should not be quick to issue this kind of order without first considering the real objective of the party seeking the information.
[24] CIPPIC argues that this type of litigation is, in fact, merely a business model to coerce payments from individuals who do not wish to incur the cost of defending a lawsuit and would rather pay something to an entity such as Voltage than pay lawyers. This type of business approach has been the subject of discussion in those other jurisdictions (discussed in greater detail below). Therefore, the Court should not be an unwitting tool of “copyright trolls”.
[25] However, it must be noted that on this motion, whether Voltage is or is not a “copyright troll” in pursuing information from TekSavvy is not for determination. The only issue is whether the test for granting a Norwich order has been met in accordance with the jurisprudence.
RELEVANT LEGISLATION [26] Before embarking on a consideration of the issues raised by the parties it is useful to set out the relevant legislation and rules which are engaged in this motion.
[27] First, Rule 238 of the Federal Courts Rules provides for granting leave to examine non-parties to an action. It reads as follows:
Examination of non-parties with leave
Interrogatoire d’un tiers
238. (1) A party to an action may bring a motion for leave to examine for discovery any person not a party to the action, other than an expert witness for a party, who might have information on an issue in the action.
238. (1) Une partie à une action peut, par voie de requête, demander l’autorisation de procéder à l’interrogatoire préalable d’une personne qui n’est pas une partie, autre qu’un témoin expert d’une partie, qui pourrait posséder des renseignements sur une question litigieuse soulevée dans l’action.
Personal service on non-party
Signification de l’avis de requête
(2) On a motion under subsection (1), the notice of motion shall be served on the other parties and personally served on the person to be examined.
(2) L’avis de la requête visée au paragraphe (1) est signifié aux autres parties et, par voie de signification à personne, à la personne que la partie se propose d’interroger.
Where Court may grant leave
Autorisation de la Cour
(3) The Court may, on a motion under subsection (1), grant leave to examine a person and determine the time and manner of conducting the examination, if it is satisfied that
(3) Par suite de la requête visée au paragraphe (1), la Cour peut autoriser la partie à interroger une personne et fixer la date et l’heure de l’interrogatoire et la façon de procéder, si elle est convaincue, à la fois :
(a) the person may have information on an issue in the action;
a) que la personne peut posséder des renseignements sur une question litigieuse soulevée dans l’action;
(b) the party has been unable to obtain the information informally from the person or from another source by any other reasonable means;
b) que la partie n’a pu obtenir ces renseignements de la personne de façon informelle ou d’une autre source par des moyens raisonnables;
(c) it would be unfair not to allow the party an opportunity to question the person before trial; and (d) the questioning will not cause undue delay, inconvenience or expense to the person or to the other parties.
c) qu’il serait injuste de ne pas permettre à la partie d’interroger la personne avant l’instruction; d) que l’interrogatoire n’occasionnera pas de retards, d’inconvénients ou de frais déraisonnables à la personne ou aux autres parties.
[28] As discussed below, Rule 238(3) is very much aligned with the principles set out in BMG.
[29] The two statutes engaged are the Copyright Act and PIPEDA. The relevant sections referred to by the parties to this motion are as follows:
Copyright Act, R.SC, 1985, c C-42
Liability for infringement
Violation du droit d’auteur : responsabilité
35. (1) Where a person infringes copyright, the person is liable to pay such damages to the owner of the copyright as the owner has suffered due to the infringement and, in addition to those damages, such part of the profits that the infringer has made from the infringement and that were not taken into account in calculating the damages as the court considers just.
35. (1) Quiconque viole le droit d’auteur est passible de payer, au titulaire du droit qui a été violé, des dommages-intérêts et, en sus, la proportion, que le tribunal peut juger équitable, des profits qu’il a réalisés en commettant cette violation et qui n’ont pas été pris en compte pour la fixation des dommages-intérêts.
Proof of profits
Détermination des profits
(2) In proving profits, (a) the plaintiff shall be required to prove only receipts or revenues derived from the infringement; and (b) the defendant shall be required to prove every element of cost that the defendant claims. R.S., 1985, c. C-42, s. 35; 1997, c. 24, s. 20.
(2) Dans la détermination des profits, le demandeur n’est tenu d’établir que ceux provenant de la violation et le défendeur doit prouver chaque élément du coût qu’il allègue. L.R. (1985), ch. C-42, art. 35; 1997, ch. 24, art. 20.
Statutory damages
Dommages-intérêts préétablis
38.1 (1) Subject to this section, a copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of damages and profits referred to in subsection 35(1), an award of statutory damages for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally,
38.1 (1) Sous réserve des autres dispositions du présent article, le titulaire du droit d’auteur, en sa qualité de demandeur, peut, avant le jugement ou l’ordonnance qui met fin au litige, choisir de recouvrer, au lieu des dommages-intérêts et des profits visés au paragraphe 35(1), les dommages-intérêts préétablis ci-après pour les violations reprochées en l’instance à un même défendeur ou à plusieurs défendeurs solidairement responsables:
(a) in a sum of not less than $500 and not more than $20,000 that the court considers just, with respect to all infringements involved in the proceedings for each work or other subject-matter, if the infringements are for commercial purposes; and
a) dans le cas des violations commises à des fins commerciales, pour toutes les violations — relatives à une oeuvre donnée ou à un autre objet donné du droit d’auteur —, des dommages-intérêts dont le montant, d’au moins 500 $ et d’au plus 20 000 $, est déterminé selon ce que le tribunal estime équitable en l’occurrence;
(b) in a sum of not less than $100 and not more than $5,000 that the court considers just, with respect to all infringements involved in the proceedings for all works or other subject-matter, if the infringements are for non-commercial purposes.
b) dans le cas des violations commises à des fins non commerciales, pour toutes les violations — relatives à toutes les oeuvres données ou tous les autres objets donnés du droit d’auteur —, des dommages-intérêts, d’au moins 100 $ et d’au plus 5000 $, dont le montant est déterminé selon ce que le tribunal estime équitable en l’occurrence.
Infringement of subsection 27(2.3)
Violation du paragraphe 27(2.3)
(1.1) An infringement under subsection 27(2.3) may give rise to an award of statutory damages with respect to a work or other subject-matter only if the copyright in that work or other subject-matter was actually infringed as a result of the use of a service referred to in that subsection.
(1.1) La violation visée au paragraphe 27(2.3) ne peut donner droit à l’octroi de dommages-intérêts préétablis à l’égard d’une oeuvre donnée ou à un autre objet donné du droit d’auteur que si le droit d’auteur de l’une ou de l’autre a été violé par suite de l’utilisation des services mentionnés à ce paragraphe.
Deeming — infringement of subsection 27(2.3)
Violation réputée: paragraphe 27(2.3)
(1.11) For the purpose of subsection (1), an infringement under subsection 27(2.3) is deemed to be for a commercial purpose.
(1.11) Pour l’application du paragraphe (1), la violation du droit d’auteur visée au paragraphe 27(2.3) est réputée être commise à des fins commerciales.
Infringements not involved in proceedings Infringements not involved in proceedings
Réserve
(1.12) If the copyright owner has made an election under subsection (1) with respect to a defendant’s infringements that are for non-commercial purposes, they are barred from recovering statutory damages under this section from that defendant with respect to any other of the defendant’s infringements that were done for non-commercial purposes before the institution of the proceedings in which the election was made.
(1.12) Toutefois, le titulaire du droit d’auteur qui a choisi de recouvrer des dommages-intérêts préétablis auprès de la personne visée au paragraphe (1) pour des violations qu’elle a commises à des fins non commerciales ne pourra pas recouvrer auprès d’elle de tels dommages-intérêts au titre du présent article pour les violations commises à ces fins avant la date de l’introduction de l’instance et qu’il ne lui a pas reprochées dans le cadre de celle-ci.
No other statutory damages
Réserve
(1.2) If a copyright owner has made an election under subsection (1) with respect to a defendant’s infringements that are for non-commercial purposes, every other copyright owner is barred from electing to recover statutory damages under this section in respect of that defendant for any of the defendant’s infringements that were done for non-commercial purposes before the institution of the proceedings in which the election was made.
(1.2) Si un titulaire du droit d’auteur a choisi de recouvrer des dommages-intérêts préétablis auprès de la personne visée au paragraphe (1) pour des violations qu’elle a commises à des fins non commerciales, aucun autre titulaire du droit d’auteur ne pourra recouvrer auprès d’elle de tels dommages-intérêts au titre du présent article pour les violations commises à ces fins avant la date de l’introduction de l’instance.
If defendant unaware of infringement
Cas particuliers
(2) If a copyright owner has made an election under subsection (1) and the defendant satisfies the court that the defendant was not aware and had no reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had infringed copyright, the court may reduce the amount of the award under paragraph (1)(a) to less than $500, but not less than $200.
(2) Dans les cas où le défendeur convainc le tribunal qu’il ne savait pas et n’avait aucun motif raisonnable de croire qu’il avait violé le droit d’auteur, le tribunal peut réduire le montant des dommages-intérêts visés à l’alinéa (1)a) jusqu’à 200 $.
Special case
Cas particuliers
(3) In awarding statutory damages under paragraph (1)(a) or subsection (2), the court may award, with respect to each work or other subject-matter, a lower amount than $500 or $200, as the case may be, that the court considers just, if (a) either (i) there is more than one work or other subject-matter in a single medium, or (ii) the award relates only to one or more infringements under subsection 27(2.3); and (b) the awarding of even the minimum amount referred to in that paragraph or that subsection would result in a total award that, in the court’s opinion, is grossly out of proportion to the infringement.
(3) Dans les cas où plus d’une oeuvre ou d’un autre objet du droit d’auteur sont incorporés dans un même support matériel ou dans le cas où seule la violation visée au paragraphe 27(2.3) donne ouverture aux dommages-intérêts préétablis, le tribunal peut, selon ce qu’il estime équitable en l’occurrence, réduire, à l’égard de chaque oeuvre ou autre objet du droit d’auteur, le montant minimal visé à l’alinéa (1)a) ou au paragraphe (2), selon le cas, s’il est d’avis que même s’il accordait le montant minimal de dommages-intérêts préétablis le montant total de ces dommages-intérêts serait extrêmement disproportionné à la violation.
Collective societies
Société de gestion
(4) Where the defendant has not paid applicable royalties, a collective society referred to in section 67 may only make an election under this section to recover, in lieu of any other remedy of a monetary nature provided by this Act, an award of statutory damages in a sum of not less than three and not more than ten times the amount of the applicable royalties, as the court considers just.
(4) Si le défendeur n’a pas payé les redevances applicables en l’espèce, la société de gestion visée à l’article 67 — au lieu de se prévaloir de tout autre recours en vue d’obtenir un redressement pécuniaire prévu par la présente loi — ne peut, aux termes du présent article, que choisir de recouvrer des dommages-intérêts préétablis dont le montant, de trois à dix fois le montant de ces redevances, est déterminé selon ce que le tribunal estime équitable en l’occurrence.
Factors to consider
Facteurs
(5) In exercising its discretion under subsections (1) to (4), the court shall consider all relevant factors, including
(5) Lorsqu’il rend une décision relativement aux paragraphes (1) à (4), le tribunal tient compte notamment des facteurs suivants :
(a) the good faith or bad faith of the defendant;
a) la bonne ou mauvaise foi du défendeur;
(b) the conduct of the parties before and during the proceedings;
b) le comportement des parties avant l’instance et au cours de celle-ci;
(c) the need to deter other infringements of the copyright in question; and
c) la nécessité de créer un effet dissuasif à l’égard de violations éventuelles du droit d’auteur en question;
(d) in the case of infringements for non-commercial purposes, the need for an award to be proportionate to the infringements, in consideration of the hardship the award may cause to the defendant, whether the infringement was for private purposes or not, and the impact of the infringements on the plaintiff.
d) dans le cas d’une violation qui est commise à des fins non commerciales, la nécessité d’octroyer des dommages-intérêts dont le montant soit proportionnel à la violation et tienne compte des difficultés qui en résulteront pour le défendeur, du fait que la violation a été commise à des fins privées ou non et de son effet sur le demandeur.
No award
Cas où les dommages-intérêts préétablis ne peuvent être accordés
(6) No statutory damages may be awarded against
(6) Ne peuvent être condamnés aux dommages-intérêts préétablis :
(a) an educational institution or a person acting under its authority that has committed an act referred to in section 29.6 or 29.7 and has not paid any royalties or complied with any terms and conditions fixed under this Act in relation to the commission of the act;
a) l’établissement d’enseignement ou la personne agissant sous l’autorité de celui-ci qui a fait les actes visés aux articles 29.6 ou 29.7 sans acquitter les redevances ou sans observer les modalités afférentes fixées sous le régime de la présente loi;
(b) an educational institution, library, archive or museum that is sued in the circumstances referred to in section 38.2;
b) l’établissement d’enseignement, la bibliothèque, le musée ou le service d’archives, selon le cas, qui est poursuivi dans les circonstances prévues à l’article 38.2;
(c) a person who infringes copyright under paragraph 27(2)(e) or section 27.1, where the copy in question was made with the consent of the copyright owner in the country where the copy was made; or
c) la personne qui commet la violation visée à l’alinéa 27(2)e) ou à l’article 27.1 dans les cas où la reproduction en cause a été faite avec le consentement du titulaire du droit d’auteur dans le pays de production;
(d) an educational institution that is sued in the circumstances referred to in subsection 30.02(7) or a person acting under its authority who is sued in the circumstances referred to in subsection 30.02(8).
d) l’établissement d’enseignement qui est poursuivi dans les circonstances prévues au paragraphe 30.02(7) et la personne agissant sous son autorité qui est poursuivie dans les circonstances prévues au paragraphe 30.02(8).
Exemplary or punitive damages not affected
Dommages-intérêts exemplaires
(7) An election under subsection (1) does not affect any right that the copyright owner may have to exemplary or punitive damages.
(7) Le choix fait par le demandeur en vertu du paragraphe (1) n’a pas pour effet de supprimer le droit de celui-ci, le cas échéant, à des dommages-intérêts exemplaires ou punitifs.
[30] These sections of the Copyright Act provide a complete code for the recovery of damages for copyright infringement. Voltage argues that it has demonstrated a bona fide case of infringement and is entitled to pursue the alleged infringers for damages in accordance with these sections of the Copyright Act.
[31] The relevant sections of PIPEDA are as follows:
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (SC 2000, c 5)
Disclosure without knowledge or consent
Communication à l’insu de l’intéressé et sans son consentement
7. (3) For the purpose of clause 4.3 of Schedule 1, and despite the note that accompanies that clause, an organization may disclose personal information without the knowledge or consent of the individual only if the disclosure is:
7. (3) Pour l’application de l’article 4.3 de l’annexe 1 et malgré la note afférente, l’organisation ne peut communiquer de renseignement personnel à l’insu de l’intéressé et sans son consentement que dans les cas suivants:
[…]
[…]
(c) required to comply with a subpoena or warrant issued or an order made by a court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the production of information, or to comply with rules of court relating to the production of records;
c) elle est exigée par assignation, mandat ou ordonnance d’un tribunal, d’une personne ou d’un organisme ayant le pouvoir de contraindre à la production de renseignements ou exigée par des règles de procédure se rapportant à la production de documents;
[…]
[…]
(i) required by law.
i) elle est exigée par la loi.
[…]
[…]
Disclosure without consent
Communication sans le consentement de l’intéressé
(5) Despite clause 4.5 of Schedule 1, an organization may disclose personal information for purposes other than those for which it was collected in any of the circumstances set out in paragraphs (3)(a) to (h.2).
(5) Malgré l’article 4.5 de l’annexe 1, l’organisation peut, dans les cas visés aux alinéas (3)a) à h.2), communiquer un renseignement personnel à des fins autres que celles auxquelles il a été recueilli.
[32] CIPPIC relies on these sections of PIPEDA to argue that the Court should weigh carefully releasing any information about the Subscribers. Such information can be released by TekSavvy if “required by law”.
ISSUES [33] Should an order be made granting Voltage the right to examine TekSavvy as a non-party to the litigation in order to obtain contact information of the Subscribers?
[34] If such an order is made what protections should be built into the order to protect or minimize the invasion of the privacy interests of internet users?
[35] As noted briefly above and discussed more fully below, there are important competing policy considerations as to whether the Norwich Order should be granted in this kind of situation. Such an order is a discretionary and extraordinary order. For the reasons discussed below, given that Voltage has demonstrated a bona fide case of copyright infringement, a Norwich Order will be granted. This Order will be granted with qualifications intended to protect the privacy rights of individuals, and ensure that the judicial process is not being used to support a business model intended to coerce innocent individuals to make payments to avoid being sued.
ANALYSIS [36] There is developing jurisprudence in Canada and in this Court dealing with Norwich Orders. The leading case in Canada is BMG, and the Court of Appeal for Ontario recently waded into this area in 1654776 Ontario Limited v. Stewart, 2013 ONCA 184. A consideration of these cases must be conducted to determine whether the threshold facts demonstrate that Voltage is entitled to the order requested.
BONA FIDE v PRIMA FACIE STANDARD IN CANADA [37] In BMG, the Honourable Justice Edgar Sexton on behalf of the Federal Court of Appeal addressed the tension between the privacy rights of internet users and copyright holders in the context of illegal downloading and sharing of music.
[38] The Court determined that the legal principles which apply to the equitable bill of discovery apply to the test that a plaintiff must satisfy under Rule 238 of the Federal Courts Rules. An order is warranted where a plaintiff has a bona fide claim and meets the criteria of Rule 238.
[39] BMG provides a framework for consideration of the issues on this motion. The observations of the Court on the requirement of a bona fide claim have been put in issue by CIPPIC. In BMG it was held that a bona fide standard was preferable to the higher standard of a prima facie case because the burden of establishing the higher standard would have the effect of stripping the plaintiffs of a remedy. Justice Sexton noted the difficulty of requiring a plaintiff to establish copyright infringement when it has neither the identity of the person they wish to sue nor the details of what was allegedly done by that person.
[40] According to the Court, establishing a bona fide claim requires a plaintiff to show: 1) that they really do intend to bring an action for infringement of copyright based upon the information they obtain, and 2) that there is no other improper purpose for seeking the identity of these persons. The Court said this at para. 34:
In my view, it would make little sense to require proof of a prima facie case at the stage of the present proceeding. The plaintiffs do not know the identity of the persons they wish to sue, let alone the details of precisely what was done by each of them such as to actually prove infringement. Such facts would only be established after examination for discovery and trial. The plaintiffs would be effectively stripped of a remedy if the Courts were to impose upon them, at this stage, the burden of showing a prima facie case. It is sufficient if they show a bona fide claim, i.e. that they really do intend to bring an action for infringement of copyright based upon the information they obtain, and that there is no other improper purpose for seeking the identity of these persons. (emphasis added)
[41] With respect to the balancing of competing interests, Justice Sexton identified the privacy issued raised by the case as “an important consideration” and noted that the balance between privacy interest and public interest are in play where confidential information is sought to be revealed. The Court made the following observations:
Privacy Issues
[36] I agree with the Motions Judge's characterization of the 5th criteria - that is - the public interest in favour of disclosure must outweigh the legitimate privacy concerns of the person sought to be identified if a disclosure order is made.
[37] All respondents raise the privacy issue. It is an important consideration. Pursuant to PIPEDA, ISPs are not entitled to "voluntarily" disclose personal information such as the identities requested except with the customer's consent or pursuant to a court order. Indeed, pursuant to subsections 7(3)(c), 8(8) and 28 of PIPEDA, any organization that receives a request for the release of personal information must "retain the information for as long as is necessary to allow the individual to exhaust any recourse" under PIPEDA. Failure to comply could result in the organization being found guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction or an indictable offence.
. . .
[39] The delicate balance between privacy interests and public interest has always been a concern of the court where confidential information is sought to be revealed. Although PIPEDA had not been enacted at the time of the Glaxo decision, Stone J.A. nonetheless noted at paragraph 62:
I am not persuaded that this is a sufficient justification for refusing to disclose the identity of the importers in the present case. While section 107 implies that information collected pursuant to the Act will be treated as confidential, section 108 indicates that it is susceptible to disclosure in certain situations. I am thus doubtful that importers have a high expectation of confidentiality regarding the information which they furnish to customs officials. More important, I am sceptical about the expectation and degree of confidentiality associated with the nature of the information which the appellant seeks. As the House of Lords observed in Norwich Pharmacal, supra, the names of the importers are likely to pass through many hands before reaching those of customs officials. It is therefore not reasonable to regard the identity of the importers as particularly sensitive information. In my opinion, in the circumstances of this case the public interest in ensuring that the appellant is able to pursue in the courts those who have allegedly violated its patent rights outweighs the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the importers' names.
He also approved, at paragraph 26, of the statement of Viscount Dilhorne in Norwich as follows:
Subject to the public interest in protecting the confidentiality of information given to Customs, in my opinion it is clearly in the public interest and right for protection of patent holders, where the validity of the patent is accepted and the infringement of it not disputed, that they should be able to obtain by discovery the names and addresses of the wrongdoers from someone involved but not a party to the wrongdoing.
[40] The reasoning in Glaxo and Norwich is compelling. Intellectual property laws originated in order to protect the promulgation of ideas. Copyright law provides incentives for innovators - artists, musicians, inventors, writers, performers and marketers - to create. It is designed to ensure that ideas are expressed and developed instead of remaining dormant. Individuals need to be encouraged to develop their own talents and personal expression of artistic ideas, including music. If they are robbed of the fruits of their efforts, their incentive to express their ideas in tangible form is diminished.
[41] Modern technology such as the Internet has provided extraordinary benefits for society, which include faster and more efficient means of communication to wider audiences. This technology must not be allowed to obliterate those personal property rights which society has deemed important. Although privacy concerns must also be considered, it seems to me that they must yield to public concerns for the protection of intellectual property rights in situations where infringement threatens to erode those rights. (emphasis added)
[42] In these passages the Court viewed the conflict as one between privacy interests and “public interest” or “public concerns”. In order to protect those privacy interests the Court went on at paragraphs 42 to 45 to observe that courts granting disclosure may wish to give specific direction as to the type of information to be disclosed and the manner in which it can be used. The option of a confidentiality order was also referenced. The Court stated:
[42] Thus, in my view, in cases where plaintiffs show that they have a bona fide claim that unknown persons are infringing their copyright, they have a right to have the identity revealed for the purpose of bringing action. However, caution must be exercised by the courts in ordering such disclosure, to make sure that privacy rights are invaded in the most minimal way.
. . .
[44] Also, as the intervener, Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic, pointed out, plaintiffs should be careful not to extract private information unrelated to copyright infringement, in their investigation. If private information irrelevant to the copyright issues is extracted, and disclosure of the user's identity is made, the recipient of the information may then be in possession of highly confidential information about the user. If this information is unrelated to copyright infringement, this would be an unjustified intrusion into the rights of the user and might well amount to a breach of PIPEDA by the ISPs, leaving them open to prosecution. Thus in situations where the plaintiffs have failed in their investigation to limit the acquisition of information to the copyright infringement issues, a court might well be justified in declining to grant an order for disclosure of the user's identity.
[45] In any event, if a disclosure order is granted, specific directions should be given as to the type of information disclosed and the manner in which it can be used. In addition, it must be said that where there exists evidence of copyright infringement, privacy concerns may be met if the court orders that the user only be identified by initials, or makes a confidentiality order.
[43] On this issue of copyright infringement, the Court made these observations:
Infringement of Copyright
[46] As has been mentioned, the Motions Judge made a number of statements relating to what would or would not constitute infringement of copyright. (See para. 15(f)). Presumably h