Montréal (City) v. Dorval

Montréal (City) v. Dorval
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2017-10-13
Neutral citation
2017 SCC 48
Report
[2017] 2 SCR 250
Case number
36752
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Moldaver, Michael J.; Wagner, Richard; Gascon, Clément; Côté, Suzanne; Brown, Russell
On appeal from
Quebec
Notes
SCC Case Information: 36752
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Montréal (City) v. Dorval, 2017 SCC 48, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 250
Appeal Heard: February 23, 2017
Judgment Rendered: October 13, 2017
Docket: 36752
Between:
City of Montréal
Appellant
and
Nousla Dorval, Nouslaine Dorval and Jolène Bien-Aimée
Respondents
Official English Translation
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Wagner, Gascon, Côté and Brown JJ.
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 57)
Wagner J. (McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Moldaver and Gascon JJ. concurring)
Joint Dissenting Reasons:
(paras. 58 to 102)
Côté and Brown JJ.
Montréal (City) v. Dorval, 2017 SCC 48, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 250
City of Montréal Appellant
v.
Nousla Dorval,
Nouslaine Dorval and
Jolène Bien‑Aimée Respondents
Indexed as: Montréal (City) v. Dorval
2017 SCC 48
File No.: 36752.
2017: February 23; 2017: October 13.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Wagner, Gascon, Côté and Brown JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for quebec
Prescription — Civil liability — Municipalities — Bodily injury — Indirect victim — Victim murdered by her former spouse after having reported death threats she had received from him to police of municipality — Members of victim’s family bringing action in damages on their own behalf against municipality for negligence because of failure of its police to act — Whether family members’ action is “based on obligation to make reparation for bodily injury caused to another” within meaning of art. 2930 of Civil Code of Québec — Whether members of victim’s family may avail themselves of three‑year general law prescriptive period provided for in Code — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 2925, 2930.
Municipal law — Civil liability — Prescription — Bodily injury — Indirect victim — Victim murdered by her former spouse after having reported death threats she had received from him to police of municipality — Members of victim’s family bringing action in damages on their own behalf against municipality for negligence because of failure of its police to act — Motion to dismiss arguing that action was prescribed on ground that family members had not suffered “bodily injury” within meaning of art. 2930 of Civil Code of Québec — Whether three‑year general law prescriptive period provided for in Code prevails over six‑month period provided for in Cities and Towns Act — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 2925, 2930 — Cities and Towns Act, CQLR, c. C‑19, s. 586.
In October 2010, D was murdered by her former spouse. In October 2013, members of D’s immediate family sued the City of Montréal in its capacity as principal of the police officers whose negligence had allegedly contributed to D’s death in that they had failed to take appropriate action to adequately ensure her safety. The family members sought damages personally for moral and material injuries (solatium doloris, funeral expenses and loss of emotional support). The City countered their action with a motion to dismiss, arguing that the action was prescribed under s. 586 of the Cities and Towns Act, which provides that every action against a municipality is prescribed by six months from the day on which the cause of action accrued.
The trial judge concluded that the family members’ action was prescribed under s. 586 of the Cities and Towns Act because they had not themselves suffered any interference with their physical integrity, that is, any “bodily injury”. They therefore could not avail themselves of art. 2930 of the Civil Code of Québec (“C.C.Q.”), under which the three‑year general law prescriptive period would apply. The Court of Appeal held that the action was not prescribed. In the words of art. 2930 C.C.Q., the family members’ action was indeed “based on the obligation to make reparation for bodily injury caused to another”.
Held (Côté and Brown JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be dismissed.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Wagner and Gascon JJ.: The action is not prescribed. For the purposes of the application and interpretation of art. 2930 C.C.Q., any civil liability action instituted to claim reparation for the direct and immediate consequences of interference with a person’s physical integrity must be based on the obligation to make reparation for bodily injury caused to another. The words “where an action is based on the obligation to make reparation for bodily injury caused to another” in art. 2930 C.C.Q. require that the court characterize the basis for the action in order to determine whether that article applies to a particular case. The basis for the action corresponds here to the wrongful act that gave rise to interference with the victim’s physical integrity. This interpretation has neither as its purpose nor as its effect to turn a moral or material injury into a bodily injury. When the term “bodily injury” is used in the Code, it necessarily refers to interference with a person’s physical integrity. However, wrongful interference, whether bodily, material or moral in nature, remains the basis for the civil liability action. For the purposes of art. 2930, it is the nature of the initial interference rather than the head of damages being claimed that results in the injury being characterized as “bodily injury” and that constitutes the source or basis of the action. Any victim of wrongful interference with his or her physical integrity and any other victim who also suffers immediate and direct consequences of that interference will be able to claim damages for their pecuniary or non‑pecuniary losses under heads alleged in an action based on that same wrongful interference.
This interpretation of the words of art. 2930 C.C.Q. is consistent with the legislature’s intention. Article 2930 is one of a set of legislative provisions that were enacted to better protect the integrity of the person and to ensure full compensation for those whose personal integrity has been interfered with. It is the right to physical integrity that corresponds to the interest the legislature is seeking to protect, which necessarily encompasses the right to reparation for all immediate and direct consequences that flow from such interference with physical integrity. The result of this is that all victims who suffer direct and immediate consequences of the same wrongful interference must have the same period of extinctive prescription to institute their actions. This large and liberal interpretation of art. 2930 is thus a solution that is both consistent and fair, one that can facilitate access to justice for victims.
In this case, the family members’ civil liability action is based on D’s death, which allegedly resulted from the wrongful act of the City of Montréal, namely the inaction of its police officers. It is thus claimed that the City has an obligation to make reparation for the interference with physical integrity it allegedly caused to D, as well as for all pecuniary and non‑pecuniary consequences suffered by the family members that are a direct and immediate result of that interference. The three‑year prescriptive period applies to the family members’ action, which was therefore not prescribed at the time it was filed.
Per Côté and Brown JJ. (dissenting): The action is prescribed. The members of D’s family may not avail themselves of the three‑year prescriptive period under art. 2930 C.C.Q., given that they have not themselves suffered bodily injury as a result of D’s death. This conclusion is based on decisions in which the Court clearly held that although the concept of bodily injury is flexible, an action based on bodily injury must arise out of interference with the physical integrity of the person claiming compensation.
Nor is it possible for the family members to avail themselves of the exception provided for in art. 2930 C.C.Q. on the basis that the source of their action is D’s bodily injury. The injury must be characterized in terms of its consequences, not its source. The contrary position has the effect of conflating two distinct elements that are necessary for any right of action to exist in civil liability, namely fault and injury. It also leads to an artificial characterization of bodily injury that would introduce confusion into Quebec civil law. An injury that is not bodily injury cannot be transformed into bodily injury in this way simply on the basis that it has been occasioned by an initial bodily injury. In this case, the action is based on the obligation to make reparation for moral and material injuries the family members allege they have suffered, and not on the obligation to make reparation for bodily injury suffered by a third party. The words of art. 2930 C.C.Q. are clear: the article applies only “where an action is based on the obligation to make reparation for bodily injury”. The obligation to make reparation concerns bodily injury suffered by the plaintiff, and not any other types of injury that third parties may have suffered as a result of the same fault. Although the legislature did intend to protect the right to physical integrity, nothing in the words of art. 2930 supports the suggestion that it encompasses the right to reparation for all consequences that flow from such interference with physical integrity.
If the legislature had intended to protect victims of moral or material injury in the same way as victims of bodily injury, it would have expressly extended the scope of art. 2930 C.C.Q. as it did in other provisions of the Code. The clear language of art. 2930 cannot be disregarded. Consistency of provisions respecting prescriptive periods is the prerogative of the legislature and should not be subject to general policy preferences of the courts.
Cases Cited
By Wagner J.
Applied: Montréal (Ville) v. Tarquini, [2001] R.J.Q. 1405; distinguished: Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 62, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 269; Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014 SCC 62, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 176; referred to: Andrusiak v. Montréal (Ville), [2004] R.J.Q. 2655; Islamic Republic of Iran v. Hashemi, 2012 QCCA 1449, [2012] R.J.Q. 1567; Cinar Corp. v. Robinson, 2013 SCC 73, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1168; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27; Doré v. Verdun (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862; Regent Taxi and Transport Co. v. Congrégation des Petits Frères de Marie, [1932] A.C. 295; Lepage v. Méthot, [2003] R.J.Q. 861; Fils‑Aimé v. Montréal (Ville), 2003 CanLII 19812; Gasse v. Québec (Ville), 2004 CanLII 4468; Tremblay v. Lapointe, [2004] R.R.A. 854; Arcand v. Beaumier, 2012 QCCS 2667; Harvey v. Trois‑Rivières (Ville), 2006 QCCS 3192.
By Côté and Brown JJ. (dissenting)
Gauthier v. Beaumont, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 3; Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 62, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 269; Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014 SCC 62, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 176, aff’g 2012 QCCA 1449, [2012] R.J.Q. 1567; Montréal (Ville) v. Tarquini, [2001] R.J.Q. 1405; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. SODRAC 2003 Inc., 2015 SCC 57, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 615; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27; Regent Taxi and Transport Co. v. Congrégation des Petits Frères de Marie, [1932] A.C. 295; Doré v. Verdun (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862; Lepage v. Méthot, [2003] R.J.Q. 861.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Charter of human rights and freedoms, CQLR, c. C‑12, s. 1.
Charter of the city of Montreal, 1960, S.Q. 1959‑60, c. 102, arts. 1090, 1092.
Cities and Towns Act, CQLR, c. C‑19, s. 586.
Civil Code of Lower Canada, art. 1053.
Civil Code of Québec, arts. 3, 10, 1457, 1474, 1607, 1609, 1614, 1615, 2925, 2930.
Code civil (France), art. 2226.
Interpretation Act, CQLR, c. I‑16, ss. 41, 41.1.
State Immunity Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S‑18, s. 6 .
Authors Cited
Baudouin, Jean‑Louis, Patrice Deslauriers et Benoît Moore. La responsabilité civile, 8e éd. Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 2014.
Bergel, Jean‑Louis. “Spécificité des codes et autonomie de leur interprétation”, dans Le nouveau Code civil: interprétation et application — Les journées Maximilien‑Caron 1992. Montréal: Thémis, 1993, 3.
Côté, Pierre‑André, in collaboration with Stéphane Beaulac and Mathieu Devinat. The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 4th ed. Toronto: Carswell, 2011.
Driedger, Elmer A. Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. Toronto: Butterworths, 1983.
Gardner, Daniel. Le préjudice corporel, 4e éd. Montréal: Yvon Blais, 2016.
Gervais, Céline. La prescription. Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 2009.
Quebec. Ministère de la Justice. Commentaires du ministre de la Justice, t. II, Le Code civil du Québec — Un mouvement de société. Québec: Publications du Québec, 1993.
Turgeon‑Dorion, Louis. “La qualification du préjudice en droit civil québécois” (2015), 49 R.J.T.U.M. 133.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal (Vézina, Savard and Schrager JJ.A.), 2015 QCCA 1607, [2015] AZ‑51220061, [2015] J.Q. no 9782 (QL), 2015 CarswellQue 9409 (WL Can.), setting aside a decision of Nantel J., 2014 QCCS 4590, [2014] AZ‑51112017, [2014] J.Q. no 10528 (QL), 2014 CarswellQue 10054 (WL Can.). Appeal dismissed, Côté and Brown JJ. dissenting.
Pierre Yves Boisvert, for the appellant.
Ronald Silverson, François Joubert and Andrée‑Ann Robert, for the respondents.
English version of the judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Wagner and Gascon JJ. delivered by
Wagner J. —
I. Overview
[1] In Quebec civil law, court actions have always been subject to prescriptive periods that vary in length depending on the nature of a case or the identities of the parties.
[2] In the most recent reform of the Civil Code of Québec (“C.C.Q.” or “Code”), the legislature aimed to simplify the rules on the prescription of actions by harmonizing them and thereby promoting access to justice. Such rules are essential in a democratic society that wishes to preserve public order, sanction the negligence of creditors or ensure social peace (C. Gervais, La prescription (2009), at pp. 4‑5). These are some of the purposes behind the obligation imposed on litigants to act and to bring an action within a specific period, without which they will no longer be able to obtain a remedy.
[3] This appeal concerns a conflict between, on the one hand, the application of an exceptionally short prescriptive period of six months to actions against a municipality under the Cities and Towns Act, CQLR, c. C‑19 (“C.T.A.”), and, on the other, the interpretation of art. 2930 C.C.Q., under which the three‑year general law prescriptive period provided for in art. 2925 C.C.Q. applies where an action in damages is “based on the obligation to make reparation for bodily injury caused to another”. When art. 2930 C.C.Q. applies, it precludes, inter alia, the application of the six‑month prescriptive period provided for in s. 586 C.T.A.
II. Background
[4] In October 2010, Maria Altagracia Dorval was murdered by her former spouse. During the weeks before that, Ms. Dorval had complained in vain to the City of Montréal (“City”) police after receiving death threats from her former spouse. The respondents, who are members of Ms. Dorval’s immediate family (“family members”), argue that the police failed to take appropriate action to adequately ensure Ms. Dorval’s safety.
[5] In October 2013, the family members sued the City in its capacity as principal of the police officers whose negligence had allegedly contributed to Ms. Dorval’s death. They sought damages personally for solatium doloris, funeral expenses and loss of emotional support. The City countered their action with a motion to dismiss, arguing that the action was prescribed under s. 586 C.T.A., which provides that every action against a municipality is prescribed by six months from the day on which the cause of action accrued. The City contended that the family members had not themselves suffered any interference with their physical integrity, that is, any “bodily injury”, and therefore could not avail themselves of art. 2930 C.C.Q. In response, the family members argued that their action was based on the City’s obligation to make reparation for bodily injury caused to the deceased, Ms. Dorval, and that the action was therefore prescribed by three years.
[6] The Superior Court granted the motion to dismiss based on prescription of the action, but the Quebec Court of Appeal reversed that decision. The City urges us to reject the interpretation of art. 2930 C.C.Q. that has been endorsed by most of the authors and by the courts since the 1994 reform of the Code. For the reasons that follow, I am unable to do so. I will explain why.
III. Judicial History
A. Superior Court (2014 QCCS 4590)
[7] The Quebec Superior Court judge granted the motion to dismiss on the basis that the family members’ action was prescribed under s. 586 C.T.A. She therefore rejected their main argument that the cause of action was governed by a three‑year prescriptive period by virtue of art. 2930 C.C.Q.
[8] The judge put the issue as follows: [translation] “. . . absent any interference with the indirect collateral victims’ own integrity (physical or psychological), can the injury suffered by them be characterized as bodily injury merely because the direct victim, in this case Ms. Dorval, suffered bodily injury?” (para. 10 (CanLII)).
[9] After considering the reasons of the minority of the Quebec Court of Appeal in Montréal (Ville) v. Tarquini, [2001] R.J.Q. 1405, and the decisions in Andrusiak v. Montréal (Ville), [2004] R.J.Q. 2655 (C.A.), in Islamic Republic of Iran v. Hashemi, 2012 QCCA 1449, [2012] R.J.Q. 1567, and in Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 62, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 269, the judge concluded that the respondents, as indirect victims, could not avail themselves of art. 2930 C.C.Q., because they had not themselves suffered any bodily injury as a result of Ms. Dorval’s death. Rather, they had suffered moral and material injury, an action which was prescribed by six months from Ms. Dorval’s death. Their action was therefore out of time and prescribed.
B. Court of Appeal (2015 QCCA 1607)
[10] Vézina, Savard and Schrager JJ.A. allowed the appeal and dismissed the motion to dismiss.
[11] Vézina J.A., writing for the court, began by noting that what was determinative was the interpretation of the words “an action . . . based on the obligation to make reparation for bodily injury caused to another” in art. 2930 C.C.Q., and not just that of the expression “bodily injury” to which, in his view, the trial judge had limited herself.
[12] The Court of Appeal noted that the obligation referred to in the words in question is defined in art. 1457 C.C.Q., which, unlike art. 1053 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada, its predecessor, speaks of an “injury” rather than of “damage”. However, this change had not substantively altered the applicable law; in reality, the new provision had codified the existing law. Moreover, the majority in Tarquini had established the proper approach for the interpretation of art. 2930 C.C.Q.
[13] The Court of Appeal stated that it was necessary to characterize the injury suffered by the members of the deceased person’s family on the basis of its source rather than of its nature before finding that they were victims of the bodily injury caused to her. The moral or material injury they had suffered was merely a consequence of their family member’s death, which remained the source of the injury. Therefore, in the words of art. 2930 C.C.Q., the family members’ action was indeed based on the obligation to make reparation for bodily injury caused to another. This meant that the three‑year prescriptive period applied and that the action was not prescribed.
[14] The Court of Appeal added that an analysis of this Court’s decisions in Schreiber, in Cinar Corp. v. Robinson, 2013 SCC 73, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1168, and in Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014 SCC 62, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 176, did not change the interpretation to be given to the exception provided for in art. 2930 C.C.Q. In its view, Cinar had instead confirmed the new characterization of an injury — bodily, moral or material — on the basis of its source rather than of its nature.
IV. Analysis
[15] The central issue in this appeal is whether the action of the family members, who are claiming damages for, inter alia, solatium doloris as a result of Ms. Dorval’s death, is “based on the obligation to make reparation for bodily injury caused to another” within the meaning of art. 2930 C.C.Q. I conclude that it is. The action of the members of Ms. Dorval’s family was not prescribed, contrary to what the City argues.
[16] I should make it clear at the outset that my conclusion on the interpretation of art. 2930 C.C.Q. and its application to this case cannot mean that each of the family members’ heads of claim, including that of solatium doloris, corresponds to bodily injury in the strict sense in which that term is used in the Code. Thus, there is no question here of turning a moral or material injury into a bodily injury. What can be drawn from the Court’s case law is that it was the interference with Ms. Dorval’s physical integrity that constituted bodily injury (Schreiber, at paras. 62‑64). Nonetheless, because the family members’ action is based on the City’s obligation to make reparation for bodily injury caused to Ms. Dorval and because the pecuniary and non‑pecuniary consequences suffered by the family members were the immediate and direct result of the wrongful interference with Ms. Dorval’s physical integrity, their action is prescribed by three years.
A. Interpretation Adopted With Regard to Article 2930 C.C.Q.
[17] Although the Court has never ruled on this issue, it must be recognized that Quebec authors and judges have always endorsed a large and liberal interpretation of art. 2930 C.C.Q., that is, one favourable to “indirect” victims of bodily injury. In my view, such an interpretation must prevail.
[18] According to this interpretation, for the application of art. 2930 C.C.Q., the characterization of the heads of damages claimed by a victim matters little if the injury is the direct and immediate result of wrongful interference with the physical integrity of a person for which the party responsible for the interference has an obligation to make reparation. Despite any provision to the contrary, an action in which such damages are claimed is prescribed by three years because it is based on interference with a person’s physical integrity. This has been the law in Quebec since the 1994 reform, as is confirmed by Tarquini, at paras. 176‑85, 189 and 195 (per Otis J.A.), and at para. 103 (per Pelletier J.A.).
(1) Tarquini
[19] In that case, Ms. Tarquini, the widow of a cyclist who had died on a bicycle path in Montréal, alleged that the City’s failure to properly maintain the path had led to her spouse’s death. She therefore claimed damages for solatium doloris, loss of consortium and loss of support, and for funeral expenses. The City argued that the action, which had been instituted more than six months after the fatal accident, was prescribed under arts. 1090 and 1092 of the Charter of the city of Montreal, 1960, S.Q. 1959‑60, c. 102. Ms. Tarquini contended that art. 2930 C.C.Q. negated this short prescriptive period, because her action was based on the obligation to make reparation for bodily injury caused to another, namely the death of her spouse. The Superior Court rejected the City’s argument that the action was prescribed. The Court of Appeal, per Pelletier and Otis JJ.A., affirmed that judgment. Chamberland J.A., dissenting, would have held that the action against the City was prescribed.
[20] In interpreting art. 2930 C.C.Q., Chamberland J.A. noted that there had been no interference with Ms. Tarquini’s physical integrity. In his view, the only issue under art. 2930 C.C.Q. was whether Ms. Tarquini had, as an indirect victim, suffered bodily injury as a result of her husband’s cycling accident. Because this was clearly not the case, art. 2930 C.C.Q. did not apply.
[21] Pelletier J.A. disagreed with Chamberland J.A., as he found that it did not make sense to limit the use of the qualifier “bodily” to the immediate victim. He devoted a significant part of his analysis to the definition of bodily injury, a [translation] “concept that encompasses all moral and material losses that are the direct, immediate or remote consequence of interference with a person’s physical integrity” (para. 101). He concluded that Ms. Tarquini’s action was not prescribed.
[22] Otis J.A. agreed with Pelletier J.A.’s conclusion, but she also addressed some other legal considerations. Otis J.A. expressed the view that the literal interpretation proposed by Chamberland J.A. was contrary not only to the words of the Code, but also to the philosophy that underlies it. That literal interpretation disregarded the legislature’s intent, given that the obligation to make reparation for any damage resulting from bodily injury is recognized in art. 2930 C.C.Q. While it is true that Otis J.A.’s reasoning differed from that of Pelletier J.A., the fact remains that their common conclusion, that indirect victims whose own physical integrity has not been interfered with can avail themselves of art. 2930 C.C.Q., has the full weight of a majority decision of the Court of Appeal.
[23] I agree with the interpretation of art. 2930 C.C.Q. that has prevailed since Tarquini, and particularly with Otis J.A.’s reasons, which, going beyond a literal interpretation, show that a large and liberal interpretation is consistent with the legislature’s objectives at the time of the article’s enactment. That interpretation, which I am adopting here, is in fact supported by a textual and contextual analysis of the legislative provision in question and is justified by concerns for consistency and stability in the law.
(2) Textual Analysis
[24] Article 2930 C.C.Q. provides that “[n]otwithstanding any provision to the contrary, where an action is based on the obligation to make reparation for bodily injury caused to another, the requirement . . . that the action be instituted within a period of less than 3 years . . . cannot affect a prescriptive period provided for in this Book.”
[25] The definition of the term “bodily injury” used in that article and the approach to be taken in characterizing the injury suffered by an “indirect victim” were argued at length by the parties. The different views of the parties can be explained by the fact that both in the cases and in the academic literature, in everyday language and in the parties’ factums, the term “bodily injury” (“préjudice corporel”) has been used to refer to various realities. For example, sometimes it is used to refer to interference with the right of another or, in this case, the effect of the wrongful act on Ms. Dorval’s physical integrity — her death. At other times it is used to refer to the consequences of such interference, that is, the pecuniary and non‑pecuniary losses on the basis of which a claim for damages can be made both by the deceased victim and by the indirect victims. However, there can be no doubt that, when the term “bodily injury” is used in the Code, it necessarily refers to interference with a person’s physical integrity (Schreiber, at para. 64; Andrusiak, at para. 47). This interpretation is not in question.
[26] The issue instead relates to the interpretation of art. 2930 C.C.Q. as a whole, and specifically to the words “where an action is based on the obligation to make reparation for bodily injury caused to another”. It is clear from these words that we must characterize the basis for the action in order to determine whether art. 2930 C.C.Q. applies to a particular case. The basis for the action corresponds here to the wrongful act that gave rise to interference with the deceased victim’s physical integrity, that is, to the bodily injury he or she suffered. This means that, for the purposes of this article, it is the nature of the initial interference rather than the head of damages being claimed that results in the injury being characterized as “bodily injury” and that constitutes the source or basis of the action.
[27] This interpretation of the words of art. 2930 C.C.Q. is consistent with the Quebec law of civil liability. In this context, the damages (or compensation) that must be paid to the victim by the person who committed the wrongful act remedy the consequences (according to the heads of damages being claimed) of that interference with the victim’s rights or property that are an immediate and direct result of the interference. This Court has recognized that, where the interference and its consequences have been suffered by the same person, it is the initial wrongful interference or breach, rather than the consequences flowing from that interference or breach, that serves to characterize the injury that has been suffered (Cinar, at para. 102). According to art. 1457 C.C.Q., the injury may be bodily, moral or material in nature. The wrongful interference may therefore be either with a person’s physical or mental integrity or with his or her material assets.
[28] The wrongful interference may have various consequences, depending on the profile and characteristics of the victims. The consequences may be pecuniary or non‑pecuniary. These two types of consequences are sometimes characterized as material injury in the former case, and moral injury in the latter. This use of the word “injury” to refer both to material or moral wrongful interference and to the heads of damages that can be claimed contributes to the confusion that exists over the word’s meaning.
[29] The consequences of wrongful interference are compensable only if they are related directly and immediately to that interference. Judges and authors often use the term “indirect victim” to describe, for example, a member of the family of a deceased victim or “the direct victim” who seeks reparation for solatium doloris or under any other head of damages. This reflects the situation in the instant case. However, the victims, the creditors of the obligation, must show that their injury, whatever it may be, is an immediate and direct result of the fault of a person, namely the debtor of the obligation (arts. 1457 and 1607 C.C.Q.). The need to prove this causal link means that the debtor’s obligation to pay compensation to the creditor is limited to the direct and immediate consequences of his or her wrongful act. If the victims can discharge this burden of proof, then they are in actual fact direct victims. From this standpoint, I consider it inappropriate to characterize these victims as “indirect victims” other than for the purpose of drawing a distinction between different creditors of the obligation to make reparation for bodily injury caused to another.
[30] In short, wrongful interference, whether bodily, material or moral in nature, remains the basis for the civil liability action, and the consequences of the interference are crystallized in the heads of damages being claimed. A victim of wrongful interference with his or her physical integrity and any other victim who also suffers immediate and direct consequences of that interference will be able to claim damages for their pecuniary or non‑pecuniary losses under heads alleged in an action based on that same wrongful interference.
[31] In the instant case, the family members allege that the fault of the City, namely the inaction of its police officers, contributed to Ms. Dorval’s death. In their view, that wrongful act gave rise to interference with Ms. Dorval’s physical integrity that then had direct and immediate consequences for her loved ones or, more specifically, caused losses that were both pecuniary (funeral expenses) and non‑pecuniary (solatium doloris and loss of emotional support) in nature. Because the family members’ action is based on the City’s alleged obligation to make reparation for bodily injury caused to Ms. Dorval, the three‑year prescriptive period under arts. 2925 and 2930 C.C.Q. applies to it.
(3) Contextual Analysis
[32] The interpretation of a legislative provision must go beyond a consideration of the words of the provision to further the legislature’s objectives (Interpretation Act, CQLR, c. I‑16, s. 41). It is therefore necessary to stand back from the words used in order to analyze the scheme and purpose of the provision (P.‑A. Côté, in collaboration with S. Beaulac and M. Devinat, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (4th ed. 2011), at pp. 411‑12 and 421‑22). This does not mean that the words are to be disregarded; rather, it means that “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of [the legislature]” (Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21, quoting E. A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87).
[33] Article 2930 C.C.Q. is one of a set of legislative provisions (with, for example, arts. 1474 and 1609 C.C.Q.) that were enacted to better protect the integrity of the person and to ensure full compensation for those whose personal integrity has been interfered with (see e.g. Tarquini, at paras. 174‑75 and 180 (per Otis J.A.); Gervais, at pp. 38‑40). In his commentary on this article, the Minister of Justice stated that [translation] “[i]ts purpose is . . . to better protect the fundamental right to integrity and, where integrity is interfered with, the right to reparation” (Ministère de la Justice, Commentaires du ministre de la Justice, vol. II, Le Code civil du Québec — Un mouvement de société (1993), at p. 1838). These objectives were expressly recognized by this Court in Doré v. Verdun (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862, in which Gonthier J. stated that “the legislature’s intention in the new Code [is] to ensure that fair compensation is provided for bodily injury, which is a form of interference with a person’s physical integrity” (para. 30). He went on to note that art. 2930 C.C.Q. is just an expression of the legislature’s support for protection of the physical integrity of the person as a fundamental value of the Code (arts. 3 and 10) and the Charter of human rights and freedoms, CQLR, c. C‑12 (s. 1).
[34] In the context of prescription, therefore, where the application of art. 2930 C.C.Q. is concerned, it is the right to physical integrity that corresponds to the interest the legislature is seeking to protect. This article also encompasses the right to reparation for all immediate and direct consequences that flow from such interference with physical integrity.
[35] In the instant case, the family members’ civil liability action is based on Ms. Dorval’s death, which allegedly resulted from the City’s wrongful act. In other words, it is claimed that the City has an obligation to make reparation for the interference with physical integrity it allegedly caused to Ms. Dorval, which is alleged to also include all pecuniary and non‑pecuniary consequences that are a direct and immediate result of that interference regardless of whether they were suffered by Ms. Dorval or by other victims. The three‑year prescriptive period applies to the family members’ action, which was therefore not prescribed at the time it was filed.
(4) Other Considerations
(a) Consistency in the Law
[36] My proposed interpretation of art. 2930 C.C.Q. favours consistency in the law, which is a legitimate concern for an interpreter (Côté, at p. 267). If the article were interpreted narrowly, as the City proposes, the effect would be that different prescriptive periods would be applicable to civil liability actions brought by victims who suffered direct and immediate consequences of the same wrongful act. The direct victim would have three years to institute an action, whereas all other victims ― despite being “direct” victims of the wrongful interference ― would have to act within six months. Such a situation would be contrary to common sense.
[37] Indeed, this is why, even in the context of the Civil Code of Lower Canada, the Privy Council refused in Regent Taxi and Transport Co. v. Congrégation des Petits Frères de Marie, [1932] A.C. 295, to recognize the application of different prescriptive periods depending on whether the action was instituted by the victim of bodily injuries or by a third party whose action for material damages was based on the bodily injuries caused to the victim:
. . . the present action, being an action to recover damages caused to the community by the wrongful infliction of bodily injuries upon the Brother, is an action for bodily injuries within the meaning of art. 2262(2) and was “prescribed by one year” under that article. Indeed, it would be strange if it were otherwise; for the result then would be (still upon the hypothesis that the community has a right of action under art. 1053) that in the case of a wrongful infliction of bodily injuries, the physical victim must sue within one year while third parties may take twice as long before asserting their claims. Their Lordships find it impossible to suggest any plausible reason why this should be so. [Emphasis added; pp. 302‑3.]
[38] The large and liberal interpretation of art. 2930 C.C.Q. that I favour offers a solution that is both consistent and fair. All victims who suffer direct and immediate consequences of the same wrongful interference must have the same period of extinctive prescription to institute their actions (Congrégation des Petits Frères de Marie; Tarquini, at paras. 178 and 191 (per Otis J.A.); Lepage v. Méthot, [2003] R.J.Q. 861 (Que. Sup. Ct.), at para. 37; J.‑L. Baudouin, P. Deslauriers and B. Moore, La responsabilité civile (8th ed. 2014), at Nos. 1‑324 and 1‑1311).
[39] Such an interpretation also facilitates access to justice for those who suffer consequences that are the immediate and direct result of wrongful interference with a person’s physical integrity. It gives everyone the time needed to gather the necessary information and institute a civil liability action in a timely manner against the person who committed the interference.
(b) Stability in the Law
[40] Finally, it can be seen from both the academic literature and the case law that a large and liberal interpretation of art. 2930 C.C.Q. has prevailed in Quebec civil law since Tarquini.
[41] Professors Baudouin, Deslauriers and Moore subscribe to this interpretation. More specifically, they note that, even though [translation] “where a person has died, an indirect victim who brings a direct personal action has suffered no bodily injury in the strict sense . . . it can be argued that the characterization must be based on the initial interference” (No. 1‑324 (footnote omitted)). They add the following: “Because the action ultimately exists only as a result of bodily injury suffered by the deceased, the members of his or her family necessarily suffer such injury” (ibid.).
[42] Professor Daniel Gardner is of the same view (D. Gardner, Le préjudice corporel (4th ed. 2016), at No. 24). He takes the reasoning even further, asserting that [translation] “the pain felt on being told of a loved one’s death can no longer, legally speaking, be characterized as a moral injury, but is in fact one of the components of the bodily injury” (No. 652 (emphasis deleted)). He justifies this assertion by saying that “[t]he initial interference (in this case a death) dictates the characterization that applies to all of its consequences, both pecuniary and non‑pecuniary” (ibid. (emphasis deleted)).
[43] Louis Turgeon‑Dorion agrees with the majority in Tarquini, and in particular with Otis J.A. (L. Turgeon‑Dorion, “La qualification du préjud