C.M. Callow Inc. v. Zollinger

C.M. Callow Inc. v. Zollinger
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2020-12-18
Neutral citation
2020 SCC 45
Report
[2020] 3 SCR 908
Case number
38463
Judges
Wagner, Richard; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Moldaver, Michael J.; Karakatsanis, Andromache; Côté, Suzanne; Brown, Russell; Rowe, Malcolm; Martin, Sheilah; Kasirer, Nicholas
On appeal from
Ontario
Notes
Case in Brief SCC Case Information
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: C.M. Callow Inc. v. Zollinger, 2020 SCC 45, [2020] 3 S.C.R. 908
Appeal Heard: December 6, 2019 Judgment Rendered: December 18, 2020 Docket: 38463
Between:
C.M. Callow Inc.
Appellant
and
Tammy Zollinger, Condominium Management Group, Carleton
Condominium Corporation No. 703, Carleton Condominium Corporation
No. 726, Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 742, Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 765, Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 783, Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 791, Carleton Condominium Corporation
No. 806, Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 826, Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 839 and Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 877
Respondents
- and -
Canadian Federation of Independent Business and Canadian Chamber of Commerce
Interveners
Coram: Wagner C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Côté, Brown, Rowe, Martin and Kasirer JJ.
Reasons for Judgment: (paras. 1 to 120)
Kasirer J. (Wagner C.J. and Abella, Karakatsanis and Martin JJ. concurring)
Concurring Reasons: (paras. 121 to 182)
Brown J. (Moldaver and Rowe JJ. concurring)
Dissenting Reasons: (paras. 183 to 238)
Côté J.
c.m. callow inc. v. zollinger
C.M. Callow Inc. Appellant
v.
Tammy Zollinger,
Condominium Management Group,
Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 703,
Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 726,
Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 742,
Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 765,
Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 783,
Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 791, Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 806, Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 826, Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 839 and Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 877 Respondents
and
Canadian Federation of Independent Business and Canadian Chamber of Commerce Interveners
Indexed as: C.M. Callow Inc. v. Zollinger
2020 SCC 45
File No.: 38463.
2019: December 6; 2020: December 18.
Present: Wagner C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Côté, Brown, Rowe, Martin and Kasirer JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for ontario
Contracts — Breach — Performance — Duty of honest performance — Clause in winter maintenance agreement permitting unilateral termination of contract without cause upon 10 days’ notice — Contract terminated by condominium corporations with required notice to contractor — Contractor suing for breach of contract — Trial judge finding that statements and conduct by condominium corporations actively deceived contractor and led it to believe contract would not be terminated — Trial judge awarding damages for breach of contract — Whether exercise of termination clause constituted breach of duty of honest performance.
In 2012, a group of condominium corporations (“Baycrest”) entered into a two‑year winter maintenance contract and into a separate summer maintenance contract with C.M. Callow Inc. (“Callow”). Pursuant to clause 9 of the winter maintenance contract, Baycrest was entitled to terminate that agreement if Callow failed to give satisfactory service in accordance with its terms. Clause 9 also provided that if, for any other reason, Callow’s services were no longer required, Baycrest could terminate the contract upon giving 10 days’ written notice.
In early 2013, Baycrest decided to terminate the winter maintenance agreement but chose not to inform Callow of its decision at that time. Throughout the spring and summer of 2013, Callow had discussions with Baycrest regarding a renewal of the winter maintenance agreement. Following those discussions, Callow thought that it was likely to get a two‑year renewal of the winter maintenance contract and that Baycrest was satisfied with its services. During the summer of 2013, Callow performed work above and beyond the summer maintenance contract at no charge, which it hoped would act as an incentive for Baycrest to renew the winter maintenance agreement.
Baycrest informed Callow of its decision to terminate the winter maintenance agreement in September 2013. Callow filed a statement of claim for breach of contract, alleging that Baycrest acted in bad faith. The trial judge held that the organizing principle of good faith performance and the duty of honest performance were engaged. She was satisfied that Baycrest actively deceived Callow from the time the termination decision was made to September 2013, and found that Baycrest acted in bad faith by withholding that information to ensure Callow performed the summer maintenance contract and by continuing to represent that the contract was not in danger despite knowing that Callow was taking on extra tasks to bolster the chances of the winter maintenance contract being renewed. She awarded damages to Callow in order to place it in the same position as if the breach had not occurred. The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment at first instance, holding that the trial judge erred by improperly expanding the duty of honest performance beyond the terms of the winter maintenance agreement. Further, it held that any deception in the communications during the summer of 2013 related to a new contract not yet in existence, namely the renewal that Callow hoped to negotiate, and therefore was not directly linked to the performance of the winter contract.
Held (Côté J. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed and the judgment of the trial judge reinstated.
Per Wagner C.J. and Abella, Karakatsanis, Martin and Kasirer JJ.: The duty to act honestly in the performance of the contract precluded the active deception by Baycrest by which it knowingly misled Callow into believing that the winter maintenance agreement would not be terminated. By exercising the termination clause dishonestly, it breached the duty of honesty on a matter directly linked to the performance of the contract, even if the 10‑day notice period was satisfied. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal should not have interfered with the conclusions of the trial judge.
The duty of honest performance in contract, formulated in Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 494, applies to all contracts and requires that parties must not lie or otherwise knowingly mislead each other about matters directly linked to the performance of the contract. In determining whether dishonesty is connected to a given contract, the relevant question is whether a right under that contract was exercised, or an obligation under that contract was performed, dishonestly. While the duty of honest performance is not to be equated with a positive obligation of disclosure, in circumstances where a contracting party lies to or knowingly misleads another, a lack of a positive obligation of disclosure does not preclude an obligation to correct a false impression created through that party’s own actions.
The organizing principle of good faith recognized in Bhasin is not a free‑standing rule, but instead manifests itself through existing good faith doctrines. While the duty of honest performance and the duty to exercise discretionary powers in good faith are distinct, like each of the different manifestations of the organizing principle, they should not be thought of as disconnected from one another. The duty of honest performance shares a common methodology with the duty to exercise contractual discretionary powers in good faith by fixing on the wrongful exercise of a contractual prerogative. Each of the specific legal doctrines derived from the organizing principle rest on a requirement of justice that a contracting party have appropriate regard to the legitimate contractual interests of their counterparty. They need not subvert their own interests to those of the counterparty by acting as a fiduciary or in a selfless manner. This requirement of justice reflects the notion that the bargain, the rights and obligations agreed to, is the first source of fairness between parties to a contract. Those rights and obligations must be exercised and performed honestly and reasonably and not capriciously or arbitrarily where recognized by law.
The duty of honesty as contractual doctrine has a limiting function on the exercise of an otherwise complete and clear right since the duty, irrespective of the intention of the parties, applies to the performance of all contracts, and by extension, to all contractual obligations and rights. Instead of constraining the decision to terminate in and of itself, the duty of honest performance attracts damages where the manner in which the right was exercised was dishonest. This focus on the manner in which the termination right was exercised should not be confused with whether the right could be exercised. No contractual right, including a termination right, can be exercised dishonestly and, as such, contrary to the requirements of good faith.
The requirements of honesty in performance can go further than prohibiting outright lies. Whether or not a party has knowingly misled its counterparty is a highly fact‑specific determination, and can include lies, half‑truths, omissions, and even silence, depending on the circumstances. One can mislead through action, by saying something directly to its counterparty, or through inaction, by failing to correct a misapprehension caused by one’s own misleading conduct.
The duty of honest performance is a contract law doctrine, not a tort and therefore a nexus with the contractual relationship is required. A breach must be directly linked to the performance of the contract. The framework for abuse of rights in Quebec is useful to illustrate the required direct link between dishonesty and performance from Bhasin. Authorities from Quebec serve as persuasive authority and comparison between the common law and civil law as they evolve in Canada is a particularly useful and familiar exercise for the Court. Like in the Quebec civil law, no contractual right may be exercised dishonestly and therefore contrary to the requirements of good faith. The direct link exists when the party performs their obligation or exercises their right under the contract dishonestly. While the duty of honest performance has similarities with civil fraud and estoppel, it is not subsumed by them. Unlike estoppel and civil fraud, the duty of honest performance does not require a defendant to intend that the plaintiff rely on their representation or false statement.
The duty of honest performance attracts damages according to the ordinary contractual measure. The ordinary approach is to award contractual damages corresponding to the expectation interest. That is, damages should put the injured party in the position that it would have been in had the duty been performed. Although reliance damages, which are the ordinary measure of damages in tort, and expectation damages will be the same in many if not most cases, they are conceptually distinct, and there is no basis to hold that a breach of the duty of honest performance should in general be compensated by way of reliance damages.
In the instant case, Baycrest knowingly misled Callow in the manner in which it exercised clause 9 of the winter maintenance agreement and this wrongful exercise of the termination clause amounts to a breach of contract. Even though Baycrest had what was, on its face, an unfettered right to terminate the winter maintenance agreement on 10 days’ notice, the right had to be exercised in keeping with the duty to act honestly. Baycrest’s deception was directly linked to this contract, because its exercise of the termination clause was dishonest. It may not have had a free‑standing obligation to disclose its intention to terminate, but it nonetheless had an obligation to refrain from misleading Callow in the exercise of that clause. Baycrest had to refrain from false representations in anticipation of the notice period. If someone is led to believe that their counterparty is content with their work and their ongoing contract is likely to be renewed, it is reasonable for that person to infer that the ongoing contract is in good standing and will not be terminated early. Having failed to correct Callow’s misapprehension that arose due to these false representations, Baycrest breached its duty of good faith in the exercise of its right of termination. Damages thus flow for the consequential loss of opportunity. While damages are to be measured against a defendant’s least onerous means of performance, the least onerous means of performance in this case would have been to correct the misrepresentation once Baycrest knew Callow had drawn a false inference. Had it done so, Callow would have had the opportunity to secure another contract for the upcoming winter.
Per Moldaver, Brown and Rowe JJ.: As a universally applicable minimum standard, all contracts must be performed honestly. Contracting parties may therefore not lie to, or otherwise knowingly mislead, each other about matters directly linked to performance. If a plaintiff suffers loss in reliance on its counterparty’s misleading conduct, the duty of honest performance serves to make the plaintiff whole. It does not, however, impose a duty of loyalty or of disclosure or require a party to forego advantages flowing from the contract. The dividing line between (1) actively misleading conduct, and (2) permissible non‑disclosure has been clearly demarcated by cases addressing misrepresentation and the same settled principles apply to the duty of honest performance, although it also applies (unlike misrepresentation) to representations made after contract formation.
There is, in the context of misrepresentation, a rich law accepting that sometimes silence or half‑truths amount to a statement. Although contracting parties have no duty to disclose material information, a contracting party may not create a misleading picture about its contractual performance by relying on half‑truths or partial disclosure. Representations need not take the form of an express statement. So long as it is clearly communicated, it may comprise other acts or conduct on the part of the defendant. The entire context, which includes the nature of the parties’ relationship, is to be considered in determining, objectively, whether the defendant made a representation to the plaintiff. The question is whether the defendant’s active conduct contributed to a misapprehension that could be corrected only by disclosing additional information. Contracting parties are required to correct representations that are subsequently rendered false, or which the representor later discovers were erroneous. The question of whether a representation has been made is a question of mixed fact and law, subject to appellate review only for palpable and overriding error.
The legal aim in remedying a breach of contract is to give the innocent party the full benefit of the bargain by placing it in the position it would have occupied had the contract been performed. But the justification for awarding expectation damages does not apply to breach of the duty of honest performance. In such cases, the issue is not that the defendant has failed to perform the contract, thereby defeating the plaintiff’s expectations. It is, rather, that the defendant has performed the contract, but has also caused the plaintiff loss by making dishonest extra‑contractual misrepresentations concerning that performance, upon which the plaintiff relied to its detriment. The plaintiff’s complaint is not lost value of performance, but detrimental reliance on dishonest misrepresentations. The interest being protected is not an expectation interest, but a reliance interest. And just as these are unrelated interests, an expectation measure of damage is unrelated to the breach of the duty of honest performance.
Much like estoppel and civil fraud, the duty of honest performance vindicates the plaintiff’s reliance interest. A contracting party that breaches this duty will be liable to compensate its counterparty for any foreseeable losses suffered in reliance on the misleading representations. The duty of honest performance is not subsumed by estoppel and civil fraud; rather, it protects the reliance interest in a distinct and broader manner since the defendant may be held liable even where it does not intend for the plaintiff to rely on the misleading representation. Irrespective of the defendant’s intention, all a plaintiff need show is that, but for its reliance on the misleading representation, it would not have sustained the loss.
Disposing of the present case is a simple matter of applying the Court’s decision in Bhasin; Callow’s claim should be resolved by applying only the duty of honest performance. There is no basis for disturbing the trial judge’s conclusions. Baycrest’s conduct did not fall on the side of innocent non‑disclosure. The trial judge found that active communications between the parties deceived Callow. Baycrest identifies no palpable and overriding error to justify overturning these conclusions. The proper measure of damages represents the loss Callow suffered in reliance on Baycrest’s misleading representations.
The majority relies on the civilian concept of “abuse of rights” in its analysis. In so doing, it departs from the Court’s accepted practice in respect of comparative legal analysis. The principles that apply to this appeal are determinative and settled. Canada’s common law and civil law systems have adopted very different approaches to the place of good faith in contract law. The majority’s reliance on the civilian doctrine of abuse of a right distorts the analysis in Bhasin and elides the distinction between honest performance and good faith in the exercise of a contractual discretion.
Courts should draw on external legal concepts only where domestic law does not provide an answer or where it is necessary to modify or otherwise develop an existing legal rule. Courts may also look to the experience of other legal systems in considering whether a potential solution to a legal problem will result in negative consequences, or to observe that a domestic legal concept mirrors one found in another system. Even where comparative analysis is appropriate, it must be undertaken with care and circumspection. The golden rule in using concepts from one of Canada’s legal systems to modify the other is that the proposed solution must be able to completely and coherently integrate into the adopting system’s structure.
Per Côté J. (dissenting): The appeal should be dismissed. Callow’s recourse cannot be based on a breach of the duty of honest performance. Although Baycrest’s conduct may not be laudable, it does not fall within the category of active dishonesty prohibited by that duty.
The duty of honest performance is described in Bhasin as a simple requirement not to lie or knowingly mislead about matters directly linked to performance of the contract. The requirement that parties not lie is straightforward; however, the kind of conduct covered by the requirement that they not otherwise knowingly mislead each other is not. The law imposes neither a duty of loyalty or of disclosure nor a requirement to forego advantages flowing from the contract on a contracting party. Absent a duty to disclose, it is far from obvious when exactly one’s silence will knowingly mislead the other contracting party or at what point a permissible silence turns into a non‑permissible silence that may constitute a breach of contract. In any event, the duty of honest performance should remain clear and easy to apply.
The obligations flowing from the duty of honest performance are negative obligations. Extending the duty beyond that scope would detract from certainty in commercial dealings. Therefore, silence cannot be considered dishonest within the meaning of Bhasin unless there is a positive obligation to speak. Such an obligation does not arise simply because a party to a contract realizes that his counterparty is operating under a mistaken belief. Absent a duty of disclosure, a party to a contract has no obligation to correct his counterparty’s mistaken belief unless the party’s active conduct has materially contributed to it. What constitutes a material contribution will obviously depend upon the context, which includes the nature of the parties’ relationship as well as the relevant provisions of the contract. Parties that prefer not to disclose certain information — which they are entitled not to do — are not required to adopt a new line of conduct in their contractual relationship simply because they chose silence over speech.
In the context of a right to terminate a contract without cause, a party that intends to end an agreement does not have to convey hints in order to alert his counterparty that their business relationship is in danger. No obligation to speak arises when a party becomes aware of his counterparty’s mistaken belief that the contract will not be terminated unless the party has taken positive action that materially contributed to that belief. If one party leads another to believe that their contract will be renewed, it follows that the other party can reasonably expect their business relationship to be extended rather than terminated. But an inference to that effect cannot be drawn in the abstract. In order to infer that one party, through discussions about renewal, led the other party to think that there was no risk their existing agreement would be terminated, the inference‑drawing process must obviously take into account the nature of the risk at stake and what was actually communicated during those discussions. Otherwise, the inference would entail a palpable and overriding error that would be subject to appellate review.
In the present case, Baycrest bargained for a right to terminate its winter agreement for any reason and at any time upon giving 10 days’ notice. In her assessment of Baycrest’s conduct, the trial judge did not ask herself if Baycrest lied or otherwise knowingly misled Callow about the exercise of its right to terminate the winter agreement for any other reason than unsatisfactory services. She wrongfully insisted on addressing alleged performance issues despite the fact that the winter agreement could be terminated even if Callow’s services were satisfactory. The trial judge also did not consider that the active deception had to be directly linked to the performance of the contract. It is clear that the representations she found had been made by Baycrest were not directly linked to the performance of the winter agreement. The trial judge’s misunderstanding of the applicable legal principles vitiated the fact‑finding process.
Cases Cited
By Kasirer J.
Applied: Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 494; referred to: Canadian National Railway Co. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021; Deloitte & Touche v. Livent Inc. (Receiver of), 2017 SCC 63, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 855; Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance), 2007 SCC 1, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 3; Farber v. Royal Trust Co., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 846; St. Lawrence Cement Inc. v. Barrette, 2008 SCC 64, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 392; Bou Malhab v. Diffusion Métromédia CMR inc., 2011 SCC 9, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 214; Potter v. New Brunswick Legal Aid Services Commission, 2015 SCC 10, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 500; Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701; Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corp. v. Hydro‑Québec, 2018 SCC 46, [2018] 3 S.C.R. 101; Houle v. Canadian National Bank, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 122; Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles, [1895] A.C. 587; Allen v. Flood, [1898] A.C. 1; United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate‑Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1981); IFP Technologies (Canada) Inc. v. EnCana Midstream and Marketing, 2017 ABCA 157, 53 Alta. L.R. (6th) 96; Xerex Exploration Ltd. v. Petro‑Canada, 2005 ABCA 224, 47 Alta. L.R. (4th) 6; Yam Seng Pte Ltd. v. International Trade Corp. Ltd., [2013] E.W.H.C. 111, [2013] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 1321; Dunning v. Royal Bank (1996), 23 C.C.E.L. (2d) 71; Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays, 2008 SCC 39, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 362; Atlantic Lottery Corp. Inc. v. Babstock, 2020 SCC 19, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 420; PreMD Inc. v. Ogilvy Renault LLP, 2013 ONCA 412, 309 O.A.C. 139; Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 303; Lamb v. Kincaid (1907), 38 S.C.R. 516.
By Brown J.
Applied: Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 494; referred to: Alevizos v. Nirula, 2003 MBCA 148, 180 Man. R. (2d) 186; Xerex Exploration Ltd. v. Petro‑Canada, 2005 ABCA 224, 47 Alta. L.R. (4th) 6; Opron Construction Co. v. Alberta (1994), 151 A.R. 241; Peek v. Gurney (1873), L.R. 6 H.L. 377; Outaouais Synergest Inc. v. Lang Michener LLP, 2013 ONCA 526, 116 O.R. (3d) 742; C.R.F. Holdings Ltd. v. Fundy Chemical International Ltd. (1981), 33 B.C.L.R. 291; Queen v. Cognos Inc., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 87; Styles v. Alberta Investment Management Corp., 2017 ABCA 1, 44 Alta. L.R. (6th) 214; Mohamed v. Information Systems Architects Inc., 2018 ONCA 428, 423 D.L.R. (4th) 174; Greenberg v. Meffert (1985), 50 O.R. (2d) 755; Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Amoco Canada Resources Ltd. (1994), 19 Alta. L.R. (3d) 38; Fidler v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 2006 SCC 30, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 3; Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 303; Wood v. Grand Valley Rway. Co. (1915), 51 S.C.R. 283; Lamb v. Kincaid (1907), 38 S.C.R. 516; Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 433; Caisse populaire des Deux Rives v. Société mutuelle d’assurance contre l’incendie de la Vallée du Richelieu, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 995; Gilles E. Néron Communication Marketing Inc. v. Chambre des notaires du Québec, 2004 SCC 53, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 95; Moses v. Macferlan (1760), 2 Burr. 1005, 97 E.R. 676; Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co., 2004 SCC 25, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 629; Canadian National Railway Co. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021; Bou Malhab v. Diffusion Métromédia CMR inc., 2011 SCC 9, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 214; Saadati v. Moorhead, 2017 SCC 28, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 543; Deloitte & Touche v. Livent Inc. (Receiver of), 2017 SCC 63, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 855; Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance), 2007 SCC 1, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 3; St. Lawrence Cement Inc. v. Barrette, 2008 SCC 64, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 392; Sport Maska Inc. v. Zittrer, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 564; Colonial Real Estate Co. v. La Communauté des Soeurs de la Charité de l’Hôpital Général de Montréal (1918), 57 S.C.R. 585; Birdair inc. v. Danny’s Construction Co., 2013 QCCA 580; Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2011 ABQB 637, 526 A.R. 1; Atlantic Lottery Corp. Inc. v. Babstock, 2020 SCC 19, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 420.
By Côté J. (dissenting)
Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 494; Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Civil Code of Québec, arts. 6, 7, 1375.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (Lauwers, Huscroft and Trotter JJ.A.), 2018 ONCA 896, 429 D.L.R. (4th) 704, 86 B.L.R. (5th) 53, [2018] O.J. No. 5855 (QL), 2018 CarswellOnt 18697 (WL Can.), setting aside a decision of O’Bonsawin J., 2017 ONSC 7095, [2017] O.J. No. 6176 (QL), 2017 CarswellOnt 18587 (WL Can.). Appeal allowed, Côté J. dissenting.
Brandon Kain, Adam Goldenberg, Vivian Ntiri and Miriam Vale Peters, for the appellant.
Anne Tardif, Rodrigue Escayola and David Plotkin, for the respondents.
Catherine Beagan Flood and Nicole Henderson, for the intervener the Canadian Federation of Independent Business.
Jeremy Opolsky and Winston Gee, for the intervener the Canadian Chamber of Commerce.
The judgment of Wagner C.J. and Abella, Karakatsanis, Martin and Kasirer JJ. was delivered by
Kasirer J. —
I. Introduction
[1] This appeal concerns a clause in a commercial winter maintenance agreement that permitted the clients to terminate the contract unilaterally, without cause, upon giving the contractor 10 days’ notice. The dispute does not turn on whether the clause represented a fair bargain between the parties. There is also no issue about the meaning of the termination clause. The dispute turns rather on the manner in which the respondents (collectively “Baycrest”) exercised the termination clause. Acknowledging that 10 days’ notice was given the appellant, C.M. Callow Inc. (“Callow”), argues that Baycrest exercised the termination clause contrary to the requirements of good faith set forth by this Court in Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 494, in particular the duty to perform the contract honestly.
[2] In Bhasin, Cromwell J. recognized a general organizing principle of good faith, which means that “parties generally must perform their contractual duties honestly and reasonably and not capriciously or arbitrarily” (para. 63). This organizing principle, he explained, “is not a free-standing rule, but rather a standard that underpins and is manifested in more specific legal doctrines and may be given different weight in different situations” (para. 64). The organizing principle of good faith manifests itself through “existing doctrines” addressing “the types of situations and relationships in which the law requires, in certain respects, honest, candid, forthright or reasonable contractual performance” (para. 66).
[3] In this appeal, the applicable good faith doctrine is the duty of honesty in contractual performance. As Cromwell J. explained in Bhasin, at para. 73, the duty of honesty applies to all contracts as a matter of contractual doctrine, and means “simply that parties must not lie or otherwise knowingly mislead each other about matters directly linked to the performance of the contract”. Callow says Baycrest’s failure to exercise its right to terminate in keeping with the mandatory duty of honest performance amounted to a breach of contract. It points to the trial judge’s findings that Baycrest withheld the information that the contract was in danger of termination. Baycrest then continued to represent that the contract was not in danger and knowingly declined to correct the false impression it had created and under which Callow was operating. This dishonesty continued for several months, “in anticipation of the notice period” wrote the trial judge and, claims Callow, resulted in it foregoing the opportunity to bid on other winter contracts and thereby justifies an award of damages (2017 ONSC 7095, at para. 67 (CanLII)).
[4] Baycrest, for its part, recalling that Cromwell J. explicitly stated in Bhasin that the duty of honest performance does not amount to a duty to disclose, argues that its silence did not constitute dishonesty. It also says the alleged dishonesty was not connected to the contract in place at the time because, in its submission, the impugned communications related to the possibility of a future contract not yet executed. The Court of Appeal agreed and overturned the trial judge’s decision (2018 ONCA 896, 429 D.L.R. (4th) 704).
[5] I respectfully disagree with the Court of Appeal on whether the manner in which the termination clause was exercised ran afoul of the minimum standard of honesty. The duty to act honestly in the performance of the contract precludes active deception. Baycrest breached its duty by knowingly misleading Callow into believing the winter maintenance agreement would not be terminated. By exercising the termination clause dishonestly, it breached the duty of honesty on a matter directly linked to the performance of the contract, even if the 10-day notice period was satisfied and irrespective of their motive for termination. For the reasons that follow, I would allow the appeal and restore the judgment of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.
II. Background
[6] Baycrest includes 10 condominium corporations managed by Condominium Management Group and a designated property manager. Each corporation has its own board of directors to manage its affairs and, collectively, they established a Joint Use Committee (“JUC”). The JUC makes decisions regarding the joint and shared assets of the condominiums. In 2010, the condominium corporations entered into a two-year winter maintenance agreement with Callow, a corporation owned and operated by Christopher Callow. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Callow provided winter services, including snow removal, to the condominium corporations.
[7] At the conclusion of the two-year term in 2012, the corporations entered into two new agreements with Callow. Joseph Peixoto — president of one of the condominium corporations, and representative on the JUC — negotiated the main pricing terms with Mr. Callow for the renewal of the winter maintenance contract, which also added a separate summer maintenance services contract.
[8] At issue in this appeal is the winter maintenance agreement, which had a new two-winter term from November 1, 2012 to April 30, 2014. Pursuant to clause 9, the corporations were entitled to terminate the winter maintenance agreement if Callow failed to give satisfactory service in accordance with the terms of this Agreement. Moreover, clause 9 provided that “if for any other reason [Callow’s] services are no longer required for the whole or part of the property covered by this Agreement, then the [condominium corporations] may terminate this contract upon giving ten (10) days’ notice in writing to [Callow]” (A.R., vol. III, at p. 10).
[9] During the first winter of the two-winter term, there were complaints from occupants of various condominiums, many of which related to snow removal from individual parking stalls. In January 2013, Mr. Callow attended a JUC meeting to address the concerns. The minutes reflected the positive nature of this meeting, recording that “[t]he Committee confirmed that [Callow] has been diligent in addressing this issue as best as could be expected considering the nature of the storms recently experienced” (A.R., vol. III, at p. 35). After the meeting, the property manager at the time also sent a follow-up email to the JUC members: “I know that your Board has been generally satisfied