S.A. v. Metro Vancouver Housing Corp.

S.A. v. Metro Vancouver Housing Corp.
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2019-01-25
Neutral citation
2019 SCC 4
Report
[2019] 1 SCR 99
Case number
37551
Judges
Wagner, Richard; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Moldaver, Michael J.; Karakatsanis, Andromache; Gascon, Clément; Côté, Suzanne; Brown, Russell; Rowe, Malcolm; Martin, Sheilah
On appeal from
British Columbia
Notes
Case in Brief SCC Case Information
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: S.A. v. Metro Vancouver Housing Corp., 2019 SCC 4, [2019] 1 S.C.R. 99
Appeal Heard: April 25, 2018
Judgement Rendered: January 25, 2019
Docket: 37551
Between:
S.A.
Appellant
and
Metro Vancouver Housing Corporation
Respondent
- and -
Attorney General of British Columbia, Canadian Association for Community Living, People First of Canada, Council of Canadians with Disabilities, Income Security Advocacy Centre, HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario and Disability Alliance BC Society
Interveners
Coram: Wagner C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Gascon, Côté, Brown, Rowe and Martin JJ.
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 74)
Côté J. (Wagner C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Gascon and Martin JJ. concurring)
Reasons Dissenting in Part:
(paras. 75 to 94)
Rowe J. (Brown J. concurring)
S.A. v. Metro Vancouver Housing Corp., 2019 SCC 4, [2019] 1 S.C.R. 99
S.A. Appellant
v.
Metro Vancouver Housing Corporation Respondent
and
Attorney General of British Columbia,
Canadian Association for Community Living,
People First of Canada,
Council of Canadians with Disabilities,
Income Security Advocacy Centre,
HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario and
Disability Alliance BC Society Interveners
Indexed as: S.A. v. Metro Vancouver Housing Corp.
2019 SCC 4
File No.: 37551.
2018: April 25; 2019: January 25.
Present: Wagner C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Gascon, Côté, Brown, Rowe and Martin JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for british columbia
Social law — Affordable housing — Rental assistance program — Application for means-tested rent subsidy — Disclosure of assets — Henson trust — Landlord offering discretionary rental assistance to tenants who have less than $25,000 in assets — Tenant refusing to disclose balance of Henson trust established for her care and maintenance in application for rental assistance — Whether trust should be treated as tenant’s asset for purpose of determining eligibility for rental assistance.
Contracts — Tenancy agreement — Rental assistance program — Landlord offering discretionary rental assistance to tenants — Whether landlord has contractual obligation to consider complete application for rent subsidy by tenant — Whether tenant’s application was complete when it did not include value of her Henson trust — If so, whether landlord breached contractual obligation — Appropriate remedy — Availability of declaratory relief.
The respondent, Metro Vancouver Housing Corporation (“MVHC”), is a non-profit corporation that operates subsidized housing complexes. It also offers means-tested rental assistance in the form of rent subsidies to eligible tenants on a discretionary basis. Tenants wishing to receive rent subsidies must demonstrate, on an annual basis, that they meet the eligibility criteria by completing and submitting an assistance application. MVHC limits eligibility for rental assistance to tenants who have less than $25,000 in assets.
The appellant, A, a person with disabilities, has resided in one of MVHC’s housing complexes since 1992 and received rental assistance from MVHC every year until 2015. The terms of her tenancy were set out in a tenancy agreement, which required that she provide an income verification statement to MVHC once a year.
A also has an interest in a trust that was settled for her benefit in 2012. The terms of the trust provide that the two co-trustees — A and her sister — together have the discretion to pay so much of the income and capital as they decide is necessary or advisable for the care, maintenance, education, or benefit of A. The structure of this kind of trust, commonly known as a Henson trust, means that A cannot compel the trustees to make any payments to her and that she cannot unilaterally collapse the trust. In 2015, MVHC requested that A disclose the balance of the trust. A refused, taking the position that her interest in the trust was not an “asset” that could affect her eligibility for rental assistance. MVHC advised her that it was unable to approve her application, as in its view, her trust was an asset and its value was required for it to determine her eligibility for rental assistance.
Both A and MVHC filed petitions in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, seeking a determination as to whether A’s interest in the trust is an asset for the purpose of considering her application for rental assistance. The chambers judge held that the meaning of the word “assets” as used in the tenancy agreement was broad enough to encompass A’s interest in the trust, and therefore that MVHC was entitled to require that A disclose the value of the trust before it would consider her application for rental assistance. The Court of Appeal dismissed A’s appeal.
Held (Brown and Rowe JJ. dissenting in part): The appeal should be allowed.
Per Wagner C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Gascon, Côté, and Martin JJ.: As A has no actual entitlement to the trust property under the terms of the trust, her interest in the trust is not an asset that could disqualify her from being considered by MVHC for a rent subsidy. Accordingly, A was eligible to be considered by MVHC for rental assistance in 2015.
The interpretation of the word “asset” as it is used in the assistance application is a justiciable issue that falls within the jurisdiction of this Court. Although A does not have a contractual entitlement to a rent subsidy even if she satisfies the eligibility criteria for rental assistance, the dispute between the parties is fundamentally contractual in nature. It turns on whether MVHC had a contractual obligation to consider any complete assistance application received from A, and, if so, whether the assistance application that A submitted for the year 2015 was in fact complete so as to trigger MVHC’s obligation.
The tenancy agreement imposes an obligation on MVHC to consider a complete application for rental assistance submitted by A. Individual tenants of MVHC properties have no contractual entitlement to receive rental assistance and the amount, if any, that eligible tenants might be granted is determined by MVHC on a discretionary basis. However, the tenancy agreement imposes on MVHC an obligation to consider whether a tenant’s rent will be adjusted in accordance with the terms of and information provided on the assistance application. The existence of this obligation is rooted in cl. 5(a) of the tenancy agreement and in the tenancy agreement’s definition of the term “unit rent”. Both provisions provide that rent to be paid includes a possible decrease in rent determined in accordance with the terms of a “rental assistance agreement”. Since the expression “rental assistance agreement” is not defined in the tenancy agreement, it is necessary to look at the factual matrix surrounding the formation of that contract. It is clear from the factual matrix that MVHC decides whether an applicant will be accorded a rent subsidy, that is, whether it will enter into a rental assistance agreement with a tenant, on the basis of the information provided on the assistance application. Upon entering into the tenancy agreement, the parties must therefore have understood that MVHC would determine whether to provide rental assistance to A in accordance with the terms of and information provided on the assistance application if A chose to submit one.
A’s interest in the trust does not form part of her assets for the purpose of determining her eligibility to be considered for a rent subsidy from MVHC. First, the trust has the essential features of a Henson trust: the trustee is given ultimate discretion with respect to payments out of the trust to the person with disabilities for whom the trust was settled, the effect being that this person cannot compel the trustee to make payments to him or her, and is prevented from unilaterally collapsing the trust. As a result, A has no enforceable right to receive any of the trust’s income or capital. Her interest in the trust is akin to a mere hope that some or all of its property will be distributed to her at some point in the future. Trust arrangements such as these cannot be treated as actually enriching the person with disabilities for whom they were settled, because they are structured in a way that puts the trust property beyond that person’s control.
Second, the word “assets” must be given its ordinary and grammatical meaning in light of the specific context in which it was used. A reasonable person who interprets the assistance application objectively would understand the word “assets” to mean an applicant’s property or interests in property that can actually be used to discharge his or her debts and liabilities, including monthly rent. This meaning aligns with the overall purpose of the rental assistance program, which is to provide rent subsidies to tenants who are in significant financial need.
The word “assets” as it is used in the assistance application is therefore not broad enough to encompass A’s interest in the trust, because this interest on its own is not something that A can use to pay her rent or to discharge her other debts or liabilities. Her financial circumstances are only ameliorated if and when the trustees actually decide to make distributions to her. For this reason, the value of the trust is not pertinent to the determination of A’s eligibility to receive rental assistance and there was thus no basis for MVHC to require that A provide information regarding the value of her trust before considering her assistance application. MVHC therefore breached its obligation to determine whether A would receive a rent subsidy in accordance with the terms of the assistance application.
All of the criteria for issuing declaratory relief are met in this case. The interpretation of the word “asset” is a justiciable issue that is real, and one in which both parties clearly have a genuine interest. Moreover, a declaration would have practical utility, as it would settle the live controversy between the parties. Accordingly, it is declared that A has a right to have her application for a rent subsidy considered by MVHC in accordance with the terms of the assistance application, and that her interest in the trust is not an “asset” for the purpose of such a determination. A may also be entitled to a monetary remedy for MVHC’s failure to consider her application. However, there is insufficient evidence in the record before the Court make a determination as to the amount of such a remedy. This issue should be remitted for determination by the court of original jurisdiction for it to analyze the evidence and grant an award of damages that would put A in the position that she would have been in had MVHC not breached its obligation. The declarations made by the Court of Appeal are set aside.
Per Brown and Rowe JJ. (dissenting in part): The appeal should be allowed in part and the declaratory relief granted to MVHC by the Court of Appeal should be set aside. While there is agreement with the majority’s analysis with respect to Henson trusts, there is disagreement with the analysis relating to MVHC’s rental assistance program. There is no legal basis on which a court can make an order as to the operation of this discretionary program, as there is no contractual obligation requiring MVHC to consider any rental assistance application nor is MVHC bound to a particular framework for the determination of who is to receive rental assistance.
The availability of declaratory relief is premised on the actual or potential infringement of an applicant’s rights. Absent a legal entitlement to anchor a declaration, one cannot be granted. In this case, A has no contractual entitlement to rental assistance under the tenancy agreement. The assistance application is a document designed to assist MVHC in running its discretionary program, and simply provides a means for MVHC to determine which applicants meet the asset cut-off it has established. The choice of who receives assistance from among individuals who satisfy the basic eligibility requirements is MVHC’s to make. MVHC’s discretion is not limited to consideration of the information provided in the assistance application or by the manner it distributed assistance in the past.
Furthermore, MVHC has no contractual obligation to consider A’s assistance application. Clause 5(a) of the tenancy agreement and the definition of the term “unit rent” contemplate the possibility of a tenant receiving additional rental assistance, but those provisions do not impose on MVHC an obligation to consider whether a tenant should receive rental assistance. That a decrease in rent may occur does not mean that MVHC has an obligation to consider whether for any tenant it will occur. For tenants who have merely applied for rental assistance, there is no rental assistance agreement, and therefore no contract, until it has been determined that they will in fact receive rental assistance
As the decision by MVHC of whether to provide rental assistance is not justiciable, then neither A nor MVHC can receive declaratory relief concerning that decision. Just as A does not have a right for her application to be considered, MVHC does not have a right to compel A to apply for rental assistance, nor a right to receive any information from A that will help it determine whether she should receive any assistance.
Cases Cited
By Côté J.
Applied: Ontario (Director of Income Maintenance Branch of the Ministry of Community and Social Services) v. Henson (1987), 26 O.A.C. 332, aff’d (1989), 36 E.T.R. 192; referred to: Saunders v. Vautier (1841), Cr. & Ph. 240, 41 E.R. 482; Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 633; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 129; Buschau v. Rogers Communications Inc., 2006 SCC 28, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 973; Stoor v. Stoor Estate, 2014 ONSC 5684, 5 E.T.R. (4th) 207; Ledcor Construction Ltd. v. Northbridge Indemnity Insurance Co., 2016 SCC 37, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 23; Ewert v. Canada, 2018 SCC 30, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 165; Daniels v. Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2016 SCC 12, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 99; Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44; Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441; Solosky v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 821; Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331.
By Rowe J. (dissenting in part)
Kaiser Resources Ltd. v. Western Canada Beverage Corp. (1992), 71 B.C.L.R. (2d) 236.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Employment and Assistance for Persons with Disabilities Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 41.
Family Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 151, s. 1(1)(a) [rep. & sub. 654/82, s. 1(a)].
R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 318 [made under the Family Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 151], s. 3(2)(a).
Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, r. 2‑1(2)(c).
Wills Variation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 490.
Authors Cited
Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., by Henry Campbell Black. St‑Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1990.
Hall, Geoff R. Canadian Contractual Interpretation Law, 3rd ed. Toronto: LexisNexis, 2016.
Merriam‑Webster (online: https://merriam-webster.com), “asset”.
Oosterhoff, Albert H., Robert Chambers and Mitchell McInnes. Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary and Materials, 8th ed. Toronto: Carswell, 2014.
Oxford English Dictionary (online: http://www.oed.com), “asset”.
Sarna, Lazar. The Law of Declaratory Judgments, 4th ed. Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2016.
Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada, 4th ed., by Donovan W. M. Waters, Mark R. Gillen and Lionel D. Smith. Toronto: Carswell, 2012.
APPEAL from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (Smith, Bennett and Goepel JJ.A.), 2017 BCCA 2, 410 D.L.R. (4th) 198, [2017] B.C.J. No. 70 (QL), 2017 CarswellBC 87 (WL Can.), amending a decision of Steeves J., 2015 BCSC 2260. Appeal allowed, Brown and Rowe JJ. dissenting in part.
Michael A. Feder, Patrick D. H. Williams and Connor Bildfell, for the appellant.
Eileen E. Vanderburgh and Pauline Storey, for the respondent.
Kate Hamm and Graham J. Underwood, for the intervener Attorney General of British Columbia.
Brendon Pooran and Jennifer Macko, for the interveners Canadian Association for Community Living and People First of Canada.
Dianne Wintermute and Luke Reid, for the intervener Council of Canadians with Disabilities.
Ewa Krajewska, Amy Wah and Jackie Esmonde, for the interveners Income Security Advocacy Centre and HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario.
Geoffrey W. White, Amy A. Mortimore and David P. Taylor, for the intervener Disability Alliance BC Society.
The judgment of Wagner C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Gascon, Côté and Martin JJ. was delivered by
Côté J. —
I. Introduction
[1] At issue in this appeal is whether the interest that the appellant, S.A., has in a trust that was set up for her care and maintenance should be treated as an “asset”, which would negatively affect her eligibility to participate in a rental subsidy program offered by her landlord, the respondent, Metro Vancouver Housing Corporation (“MVHC”).
[2] Resolving this issue requires this Court to consider, for the first time, the nature of a specific type of trust — commonly known as the “Henson trust” — settled for the benefit of a person with disabilities who relies on publicly funded social assistance benefits (see: Ontario (Director of Income Maintenance Branch of the Ministry of Community and Social Services) v. Henson (1987), 26 O.A.C. 332 (Div. Ct.), aff’d in (1989), 36 E.T.R. 192 (Ont. C.A.)). The central feature of the Henson trust is that the trustee is given ultimate discretion with respect to payments out of the trust to the person with disabilities for whom the trust was settled, the effect being that the latter (a) cannot compel the former to make payments to him or her, and (b) is prevented from unilaterally collapsing the trust under the rule in Saunders v. Vautier (1841), Cr. & Ph. 240, 41 E.R. 482. Because the person with disabilities has no enforceable right to receive any property from the trustee of a Henson trust unless and until the trustee exercises his or her discretion in that person’s favour, the interest he or she has therein is not generally treated as an “asset” for the purposes of means-tested social assistance programs (D. W. M. Waters, M. R. Gillen and L. D. Smith, eds., Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada (4th ed. 2012), at pp. 572-73). The Henson trust therefore makes it possible to set aside money or other valuable property for the benefit of a person with disabilities in a manner that jeopardizes that person’s entitlement to receive social benefits as little as possible.
[3] S.A. is a person with disabilities for whose benefit a Henson trust was settled in 2012 (“Trust”). She resides in a housing complex operated by MVHC. In addition to providing affordable housing in the Greater Vancouver area, MVHC offers rental assistance in the form of rent subsidies to certain eligible tenants on a discretionary basis. An “eligible tenant” is one who, among other things, has less than $25,000 in assets. At issue in this case is whether S.A.’s interest in the Trust should be treated as an “asset” for the purpose of determining whether she is eligible to be considered by MVHC for a rent subsidy. Both of the courts below answered this question in the affirmative. S.A. appeals to this Court.
[4] I would allow the appeal. In my view, S.A. has no actual entitlement to the trust property under the terms of the Trust. Although she is a co-trustee, she has no independent, concrete right to compel any payments to be made to her or for her benefit, and cannot unilaterally terminate the Trust. Her interest in the trust property therefore amounts to a “mere hope” that the trustees will exercise their discretion in a manner favourable to her (Waters, Gillen and Smith, at p. 1204, note 155). For this reason, I conclude that her interest in the Trust is not an asset that could disqualify her from being considered by MVHC for a rent subsidy.
II. Facts
[5] S.A. is a middle-aged person with disabilities. Because her disabilities prevent her from working, she derives her income from benefits paid to her under the Employment and Assistance for Persons with Disabilities Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 41 (“EAPDA”).
[6] MVHC is a non-profit corporation that is wholly owned by the Metro Vancouver Regional District. Its mandate is to provide affordable housing in the Greater Vancouver area. To this end, it operates a number of subsidized housing complexes.
[7] S.A. resides in one such complex (“Housing Complex”). MVHC’s operation of the Housing Complex is governed by two agreements with the British Columbia Housing Management Commission: an agreement on Assistance to Non-Profit Corporations (“Operating Agreement”), which was entered into in 1982 (R.R., at pp. 8-14), and an Umbrella Agreement, which was entered into in 2013 (R.R., at pp. 21-25). These agreements impose several obligations on MVHC in managing certain properties in its portfolio. In particular, the Operating Agreement provides that persons wishing to enter into tenancy agreements with MVHC must first demonstrate that they meet certain eligibility requirements pertaining to income, number of occupants, health, and other similar criteria. Both the Operating Agreement and the Umbrella Agreement require that MVHC verify the income of tenants at the time of their initial occupancy, and annually thereafter.
[8] The Umbrella Agreement also requires that MVHC provide rent subsidies to at least 15 percent of the tenants of the Housing Complex. In order to satisfy this obligation, MVHC offers rental assistance on a discretionary basis to tenants who meet a separate set of eligibility criteria (“Rental Assistance Program”). Tenants wishing to receive rent subsidies must demonstrate, on an annual basis, that they meet these criteria by completing and submitting an application form entitled “Additional Rent Assistance Application” (“Assistance Application”). Given MVHC’s financial limitations, however, not all eligible applicants will actually be granted rental assistance. In other words, MVHC tenants do not have a universal entitlement to rent subsidies. The amount, if anything, that may be granted to an eligible tenant is determined by MVHC on the basis of such factors as financial considerations and public housing needs.
[9] In order to “ensure that limited rental assistance funding is preserved for those who need it most”, MVHC has decided to limit eligibility for rental assistance to applicants who, among other things, have less than $25,000 in assets (A.R., at p. 105). A document entitled “Asset Ceiling Policy” includes the following non-exhaustive definition of the word “assets”:
Assets include, but are not limited to:
• Stocks, bonds, term deposits, mutual funds, bank deposits and cash
• Real estate equity, net of debt
• Assets in which you have a beneficial interest
• Business equity in a private incorporated company including cash, GICs, bonds, stocks, real estate equity, or equity in any other tangible asset
• Significant personal assets such as collector or luxury vehicles.
Assets that may be excluded include:
• Personal [e]ffects such as a household vehicle, jewelry and furniture
• Bursaries or scholarships from educational institutions for any household member that is a current student
• Registered Education Savings Plans (RESPs), and Registered Retirement Savings Plans (excluded to preserve the intent of these investments)
• Trade and business tools essential to continue currently active employment, such as equipment, tools and business use vehicles
• Assets derived from compensatory packages from government, for example, Indian Residential Schools Settlements and Japanese Canadian Redress.
(A.R., at pp. 105-6)
[10] The Assistance Application requires that applicants disclose whether they have assets in excess of $25,000, although the definition of “assets” from the Asset Ceiling Policy is not incorporated into the form. The Assistance Application indicates that complete applications will be processed within one week to thirty days, but makes clear that incomplete applications will not be considered at all. Applicants must also agree to provide MVHC with any materials that may be requested to support the information provided on the form.
[11] S.A. has resided at the Housing Complex since 1992. The terms of her tenancy at all material times were set out in a tenancy agreement dated January 5, 2015 (“Tenancy Agreement”). The Tenancy Agreement required that S.A. provide an income verification statement to MVHC once a year, or at any time if there was a change in her annual income or in the composition of her household (cl. 8(a)). She has complied with this obligation every year since her tenancy began.
[12] After S.A. began residing at the Housing Complex in 1992, she received rental assistance from MVHC every year until 2015 (A.R., at pp. 68 and 77). The last time rental assistance was accorded was on May 24, 2014, when MVHC granted her $629 in monthly subsidies, thereby reducing her rent from $894 to just $265 per month (A.R., at p. 92). As I will explain below, however, MVHC has not provided her with rental assistance since June 2015.
[13] After S.A.’s father passed away, the terms of his will — to the effect that S.A. was to inherit one third of the residue of his estate — were varied by a court order in 2012 pursuant to the Wills Variation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 490. The court order directed that S.A.’s share of her father’s estate be placed in a trust for her care and maintenance.
[14] The terms of the Trust (which are reproduced as an appendix to these reasons) provide that the two co-trustees — S.A. and her sister (“Trustees”) — have the discretion to pay so much of the income and capital as they “decide is necessary or advisable for the care, maintenance, education, or benefit of [S.A.]” (art. 1(a)(iv)(A)). Should anything remain in the Trust upon S.A.’s death, that remainder is to pass to the person(s) designated by S.A. in her will or, if she failed to make such a designation, to those who would have inherited S.A.’s estate if she had died intestate. However, S.A. cannot appoint either herself or any of her creditors as a remainder beneficiary. The terms of the Trust also confer on S.A. the power to appoint someone to replace her sister as co‑trustee, should her sister be unwilling or unable to act in that capacity (art. 1(a)(ii)).
[15] In a letter dated February 13, 2015, MVHC requested that S.A. disclose the current balance of the trust fund, together with details of all disbursements that had been made since it was established. This request was made as part of MVHC’s 2014 annual income review. S.A.’s reply, in a letter dated March 11, 2015, reads as follows:
In your letter dated February 13, 2015 (attached), you requested information about the current balance of the [Trust]. As Metro Vancouver Housing Corporation (MVHC) is aware, this is not an asset which could affect my eligibility for a housing subsidy. I am not aware of any rationale for MVHC requiring this information from the trustees. I can confirm that no disbursements have been made to me from the [Trust] since it was established. This information has previously been provided to Ms. Lynn LeNobel, counsel for the MVHC.
(R.R., at p. 1)
[16] S.A. submitted her Assistance Application for 2015 along with that letter. In response to the question of whether she had assets in excess of $25,000, she ticked the box labelled “No”, and wrote: “None that affects my eligibility. Please see my letter to you dated March 11, 2015 & previous correspondence from my legal representatives” (A.R., at p. 108).
[17] In a letter dated April 13, 2015, MVHC advised S.A. that it was unable to approve her application because she had failed to provide specific information regarding her eligibility under the Rental Assistance Program. The relevant portion of that letter reads as follows:
Pursuant to MVHC’s Asset Ceiling Policy, assets include “assets in which you have a beneficial interest”. Your discretionary trust is an asset in which you have a beneficial interest and is not one of the types of assets listed in the policy as excluded for the purposes of the asset limit. As MVHC has previously advised, further information regarding the trust, including the value of the trust, is required in order for MVHC to make a determination as to whether the asset should nevertheless be excluded in determining your eligibility for Additional Rent Assistance from MVHC.
MVHC has allowed an exceptionally long period of time for you to provide this information, both to respect the grieving period following the loss of your father and to enable you to seek advice from advocates and advisors regarding the Additional Rent Assistance program requirements. Indeed, your 2014 Additional Rent Assistance Application review remains open and outstanding; although MVHC has nevertheless continued to provide Additional Rent Assistance on the understanding that the requisite information would ultimately be provided. As we understand that information on the value of the trust will not be provided, MVHC is unable to approve your current application for Additional Rent Assistance. [Emphasis added.]
(A.R., at p. 98)
[18] S.A. ceased receiving rental assistance as of June 1, 2015, and since then she has been paying her full rent under protest. Her payments in June and July 2015 were assisted by a “crisis supplement” granted to her under the EAPDA. Counsel for S.A. advised this Court that payments from the Trust have helped S.A. in covering all other rent shortfalls (transcript, at pp. 23-24).
III. Judicial History
A. The Petitions
[19] In July 2015, S.A. commenced proceedings against MVHC under rule 2‑1(2)(c) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, which provides that a petition may be filed where “the sole or principal question at issue is alleged to be one of construction of . . . [an] oral or written contract or other document”. The core of S.A.’s case, as laid out in her amended petition, was that her interest in the Trust is not an “asset” within the meaning of that word as it is used in either the Tenancy Agreement or any agreement created by the completion of the Assistance Application — the implication being that MVHC had no right to demand that she provide information regarding the value of the Trust or to refuse to consider her 2015 Assistance Application when that information was not forthcoming (A.R., at p. 70). By way of remedy, S.A. sought, among other things, declaratory relief and an order directing MVHC to refund S.A. “the difference between the market rent of $894 per month [that was] paid by [S.A.] or on [her behalf] for the months of June and July 2015 and the subsidized rent of $265 for those months” (A.R., at p. 67).
[20] MVHC filed a petition of its own in August 2015, also under rule 2-1(2)(c) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, in which it sought a declaration to the effect that the Rental Assistance Program “requires [the] disclosure of the value of assets in which the applicant for rent assistance has a beneficial interest, including any type of discretionary or non-discretionary trust” (A.R., at p. 48). It also sought an order that S.A. disclose the value of the Trust if she wished to be considered by MVHC for rental assistance.
B. Supreme Court of British Columbia (2015 BCSC 2260)
[21] The two petitions were heard together on October 9, 2015. Steeves J. (“Chambers Judge”) dismissed S.A.’s petition and denied the order that she sought therein. He allowed MVHC’s petition and ordered that S.A. was required to disclose the value of the Trust if she wished to qualify for rental assistance.
[22] The Chambers Judge was of the view that the issue in this case turned on the interpretation of the word “assets” as used in the Tenancy Agreement. After determining that the Asset Ceiling Policy did not form part of the Tenancy Agreement, he went on to hold that the meaning of the disputed word was broad enough to encompass S.A.’s interest in the Trust. On this basis, the Chambers Judge concluded that MVHC was entitled to require that S.A. disclose the value of the Trust before it would consider her application for rental assistance.
C. British Columbia Court of Appeal (2017 BCCA 2, 410 D.L.R. (4th) 198)
[23] The British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed S.A.’s appeal. In the view of Goepel J.A., writing for a unanimous panel, the fundamental issue in the appeal was whether MVHC could require S.A. to provide additional details regarding the Trust’s value to determine whether she was eligible for rental assistance and, if so, how much (if anything) she should receive. He also took the position that the Chambers Judge had erred in analyzing this issue through the lens of the Tenancy Agreement, observing that the issue instead turned on the interpretation of the word “assets” as used in the Assistance Application. In light of the definition of “assets” in the Asset Ceiling Policy, Goepel J.A. held that the Trust should be characterized as S.A.’s asset. On that basis, he concluded that “MVHC is entitled, pursuant to the provisions of the Assistance Application, to the further information it requested concerning the Trust to assist it in determining whether to provide rental assistance” (para. 56).
IV. Analysis
A. Does This Appeal Raise a Justiciable Issue?
[24] The main issue in this appeal is the characterization of S.A.’s interest in the Trust, and specifically whether MVHC can treat that interest as her “asset” for the purpose of determining whether she meets the eligibility criteria for the Rental Assistance Program. S.A. submits that it cannot do so, and on that basis takes the position that MVHC had no right to demand that she provide further information as to the value of the Trust, or to refuse to consider her 2015 Assistance Application when she did not provide the requested information. MVHC submits that the Asset Ceiling Policy defines the term “assets” as including assets in which an applicant for rental assistance has a beneficial interest. It therefore says that S.A.’s interest in the Trust is indeed an asset and that the value of the Trust therefore ought to have been disclosed on her 2015 Assistance Application. Because S.A. did not provide that information either on the form or upon MVHC’s subsequent request, MVHC contends that S.A.’s 2015 Assistance Application form was not in fact complete, and that it thus had no obligation to consider her request for rental assistance.
[25] As a preliminary matter, however, MVHC submits that S.A. has not identified a legal basis that would justify awarding her either the declaration or the monetary order that she seeks. Put simply, its position is that S.A. has not demonstrated that she has either a contractual entitlement to receive rental assistance or a right to seek judicial review of MVHC’s decisions respecting the administration of the Rental Assistance Program.
[26] This case was not brought as an application for judicial review (A.R., at p. 47; transcript, at pp. 13-14), and I agree that S.A. does not have a contractual entitlement to a rent subsidy even if she satisfies the eligibility criteria for the Rental Assistance Program. That being said, I am nevertheless of the view that the dispute between the parties is fundamentally contractual in nature, as it turns on (a) whether MVHC had a contractual obligation to consider any complete Assistance Application received from S.A. in accordance with the terms of that application, and (b) whether the Assistance Application that S.A. submitted for the year 2015 was in fact complete and in compliance with the applicable terms, so as to trigger MVHC’s obligation. I will address both of these issues, in turn, below.
B. Does MVHC Have an Obligation to Consider a Complete Application for Rental Assistance Submitted by S.A.?
[27] On this first issue, I am of the view that the Tenancy Agreement imposes an obligation on MVHC to determine whether an adjustment will be made to S.A.’s base rent in accordance with her current income and the terms of a rental assistance agreement. The existence of this obligation is rooted in cl. 5(a) of the Tenancy Agreement, which requires that S.A. pay MVHC a pre-set amount in monthly rent. That clause reads as follows:
5. Rent and Security Deposit
(a) The Tenant agrees to pay rent calculated as follows:
(i) Unit Rent in the amount of $ 894.00;
(ii) less the decrease in rent determined in accordance with the Tenant’s current income and the terms of a Rental Assistance agreement, being at the time of this Tenancy Agreement the amount of $ 629.00;
(iii) plus Adjustments for a parking fee of $ 0. [Emphasis added.]
(A.R., at p. 80)
The Tenancy Agreement defines the term “Unit Rent” as “the monthly rent for the Rental Unit before any increase or decrease in rent determined in accordance with the Tenant’s income and the terms of a Rental Assistance [A]greement” (cl. 2(a)(xii) (A.R., at p. 80)).
[28] Taken together, these provisions indicate that MVHC has a contractual obligation to determine whether an adjustment will be made to S.A.’s monthly base rent. This is consistent with the Umbrella Agreement, which requires that MVHC provide rent subsidies to a minimum of 15 percent of the tenants residing at the Housing Complex (R.R., at pp. 23-24).
[29] It is equally significant that whether S.A. will get a rent decrease, under cl. 5(a)(ii) of the Tenancy Agreement, is to be determined by MVHC “in accordance with [her] current income and the terms of a Rental Assistance [A]greement” (emphasis added) (A.R., at p. 80). The expression “Rental Assistance [A]greement” is not defined in the Tenancy Agreement, although cl. 2(a)(vi) defines “Rental Assistance” as “a rent supplement provided by or through [MVHC] to a Tenant who meets eligibility criteria related to income, the number of occupants, or other criteria” (A.R., at p. 79).
[30] In order to appreciate what was meant by “the terms of a Rental Assistance Agreement”, it is therefore necessary to look beyond the four corners of the Tenancy Agreement, and at the factual matrix surrounding the formation of the contract. As this Court explained in Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 633, the factual matrix — which includes relevant background facts that the parties clearly knew or ought to have known when they entered into the agreement — can assist in ascertaining what the parties understood the words used in the agreement to mean (paras. 46-47, 58; see also G.R. Hall, Canadian Contractual Interpretation Law (3rd ed. 2016), at p. 29). Since contractual interpretation is an objective exercise, the factual matrix consists only of those facts and circumstances that were or “reasonably ought to have been within the knowledge of both parties at or before the date of contracting” (Sattva, at paras. 49 and 58; Hall, at p. 29). Evidence of one party’s subjective intention therefore “has no independent place” when considering the circumstances surrounding the formation of a contract (Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 129, at para. 54).
[31] Since 1992, S.A. has successfully applied year after year for tenancy at the Housing Complex. In addition to her tenancy application, S.A. has applied for rental assistance each year by filling out an Assistance Application. The Assistance Application that she filled out in 2015 — which is identical to th