Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General)

Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General)
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2015-01-16
Neutral citation
2015 SCC 1
Report
[2015] 1 SCR 3
Case number
34948
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; LeBel, Louis; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Rothstein, Marshall; Cromwell, Thomas Albert; Karakatsanis, Andromache; Wagner, Richard
On appeal from
Ontario
Subjects
Constitutional law
Notes
SCC Case Information: 34948
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 1, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 3
Date: 20150116
Docket: 34948
Between:
Mounted Police Association of Ontario and British Columbia Mounted Police
Professional Association, on their own behalf and on behalf of all members
and employees of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Appellants
and
Attorney General of Canada
Respondent
- and -
Attorney General of Ontario, Attorney General of British Columbia,
Attorney General for Saskatchewan, Attorney General of Alberta,
Association des membres de la Police Montée du Québec Inc.,
Mounted Police Members’ Legal Fund, Confédération des syndicats nationaux,
Canadian Police Association, Canadian Labour Congress,
Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Public Service Alliance of Canada and
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ.
Joint Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 158)
Dissenting Reasons:
(paras. 159 to 270)
McLachlin C.J. and LeBel J. (Abella, Cromwell, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ. concurring)
Rothstein J.
mounted police association of ontario v. canada (attorney general), 2015 SCC 1, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 3
Mounted Police Association of Ontario and
British Columbia Mounted Police Professional
Association, on their own behalf and
on behalf of all members and employees of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police Appellants
v.
Attorney General of Canada Respondent
and
Attorney General of Ontario,
Attorney General of British Columbia,
Attorney General for Saskatchewan,
Attorney General of Alberta,
Association des membres de la Police Montée du Québec Inc.,
Mounted Police Members’ Legal Fund,
Confédération des syndicats nationaux,
Canadian Police Association,
Canadian Labour Congress,
Canadian Civil Liberties Association,
Public Service Alliance of Canada and
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association Interveners
Indexed as: Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General)
2015 SCC 1
File No.: 34948.
2014: February 18; 2015: January 16.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for ontario
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Freedom of association — Right to collective bargaining — Scope of constitutional protection — Private associations of RCMP members challenging constitutionality of legislation excluding RCMP members from public service labour relations regime and imposing non-unionized regime — Legislatively imposed regime not independent from management and not providing for employee choice of association or input into selection of collective goals — Whether impugned legislation substantially interferes with right to meaningful process of collective bargaining and thereby infringes constitutional guarantee of freedom of association — If so, whether infringement justifiable — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1 , 2 (d) — Royal Canadian Mounted Police Regulations, 1988, SOR/88-361, s. 96 — Public Service Labour Relations Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22, s. 2 (1) “employee” (d).
RCMP members are not permitted to unionize or engage in collective bargaining. They have been excluded from the labour relations regime governing the federal public service since collective bargaining was first introduced in the federal public service, first, under the Public Service Staff Relations Act (“PSSRA ”) and now under the Public Service Labour Relations Act (“PSLRA ”). Instead, members of the RCMP are subject to a non-unionized labour relations scheme. At the time of the hearing of this appeal, that scheme was imposed upon them by s. 96 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Regulations, 1988 (“RCMP Regulations”), since repealed and replaced by the substantially similar s. 56 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Regulations, 2014, SOR/2014-281.
The core component of the current RCMP labour relations regime is the Staff Relations Representative Program (“SRRP”). The SRRP is the primary mechanism through which RCMP members can raise labour relations issues (excluding wages), and the only form of employee representation recognized by management. The SRRP is governed by a National Executive Committee and is staffed by member representatives from various RCMP divisions and regions elected for a two-year term by both regular and civilian members of the RCMP. Two of its representatives act as the formal point of contact with the national management of the RCMP. The aim of the program is that, at each level of the hierarchy, members’ representatives and management consult on human resources initiatives and policies, with the understanding that the final word always rests with management.
A little over 15 years ago, the Court held that the exclusion of RCMP members from collective bargaining under the PSLRA ’s predecessor legislation did not infringe s. 2 (d) of the Charter : Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989. That case did not involve a direct challenge to the sufficiency of the entire RCMP labour relations scheme. Since that decision was rendered, the RCMP labour relations regime has undergone a number of changes that have increased the independence afforded to the SRRP, but none of those changes has substantially altered its purpose, place or function within the RCMP chain of command.
In May 2006, a constitutional challenge was initiated by two private associations of RCMP members whose goal is to represent RCMP members in Ontario and British Columbia on work-related issues, but who have never been recognized for the purpose of collective bargaining or consultation on workplace issues by RCMP management or the federal government. They sought a declaration that the combined effect of the exclusion of RCMP members from the application of the PSLRA and the imposition of the SRRP as a labour relations regime unjustifiably infringes members’ freedom of association. A judge of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice concluded that s. 96 of the RCMP Regulations, which imposed the SRRP as a labour relations regime, substantially interfered with freedom of association and could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter . However, the judge also held that the exclusion of RCMP members from the federal public service labour relations regime did not infringe s. 2 (d) of the Charter . The Court of Appeal allowed the Attorney General of Canada’s appeal and held that the current RCMP labour relations scheme does not breach s. 2 (d) of the Charter .
Held (Rothstein J. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed. Section 96 of the RCMP Regulations, which was in effect at the time of the hearing of this appeal, infringed s. 2 (d) of the Charter . Similarly, para. (d) of the definition of “employee” in s. 2(1) of the PSLRA infringes s. 2 (d). Neither infringement is justified under s. 1 of the Charter . Had s. 96 of the RCMP Regulations not been repealed, it would have been declared to be of no force or effect. The offending provision of the PSLRA is of no force and effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 . This declaration of invalidity is suspended for a period of 12 months.
Per McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Cromwell, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ.: The s. 2 (d) guarantee of freedom of association protects a meaningful process of collective bargaining that provides employees with a degree of choice and independence sufficient to enable them to determine and pursue their collective interests. However, the current labour relations regime denies RCMP members that choice, and imposes on them a scheme that does not permit them to identify and advance their workplace concerns free from management’s influence.
Section 2 (d) protects three classes of activities: (1) the right to join with others and form associations; (2) the right to join with others in the pursuit of other constitutional rights; and (3) the right to join with others to meet on more equal terms the power and strength of other groups or entities. Viewed purposively, s. 2 (d) guarantees the right of employees to meaningfully associate in the pursuit of collective workplace goals. This guarantee includes a right to collective bargaining. Collective bargaining is a necessary precondition to the meaningful exercise of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association. It is not a derivative right protected only if state action makes it effectively impossible to associate for workplace matters. That said, however, the right to collective bargaining is one that guarantees a process rather than an outcome or a particular model of labour relations.
The government cannot enact laws or impose a labour relations process that substantially interferes with the right of employees to associate for the purpose of meaningfully pursuing collective workplace goals. Just as a ban on employee association impairs freedom of association, so does a labour relations process that substantially interferes with the possibility of having meaningful collective negotiations on workplace matters. Similarly, a process of collective bargaining will not be meaningful if it denies employees the power to pursue their goals. Whatever the nature of the restriction, the ultimate question to be determined is whether the measures disrupt the balance between employees and employer that s. 2 (d) seeks to achieve, so as to substantially interfere with meaningful collective bargaining.
A meaningful process of collective bargaining is a process that provides employees with a degree of choice and independence sufficient to enable them to determine their collective interests and meaningfully pursue them. But choice and independence are not absolute: they are limited by the context of collective bargaining.
The degree of choice required by the Charter for collective bargaining purposes is one that enables employees to have effective input into the selection of the collective goals to be advanced by their association. Moreover, accountability to the members of the association plays an important role in assessing whether employee choice is present to a sufficient degree in any given labour relations scheme. A scheme that holds representatives accountable to the employees who chose them ensures that the association works towards the purposes for which the employees joined together.
In the same vein, the degree of independence required by the Charter for collective bargaining purposes is one that ensures that the activities of the association are aligned with the interests of its members. Although the function of collective bargaining is not served by a process which is dominated by or under the influence of management, like choice, independence in the collective bargaining context is not absolute. The degree of independence required is one that permits the activities of the association to be aligned with the interests of its members.
What is required to permit meaningful collective bargaining varies with the industry culture and workplace in question. As with all s. 2 (d) inquiries, the required analysis is contextual. Choice and independence do not require adversarial labour relations; nothing in the Charter prevents an employee association from engaging willingly with an employer in different, less adversarial and more cooperative ways. However, whatever the labour relations model, the Charter does not permit choice and independence to be eroded such that there is substantial interference with a meaningful process of collective bargaining.
This is not a case of a complete denial of the constitutional right to associate. Rather, it is a case of substantial interference with the right to associate for the purpose of addressing workplace goals through a meaningful process of collective bargaining, free from employer control. The flaws in the SRRP process do not permit meaningful collective bargaining, and are inconsistent with s. 2 (d) of the Charter . That process fails to respect RCMP members’ freedom of association in both its purpose and its effects.
Section 96 of the RCMP Regulations imposed the SRRP on RCMP members for the purpose of preventing collective bargaining through an independent association. Not only are members represented by an organization they did not choose and do not control, they must work within a structure that is part of the management organization of the RCMP and thus lacks independence from management. The SRRP process fails to achieve the balance between employees and employer that is essential to meaningful collective bargaining, and leaves members in a disadvantaged, vulnerable position.
The SRRP also infringes s. 2 (d) in its effects. The relevant inquiry is directed at whether RCMP members can genuinely advance their own interests through the SRRP, without interference by RCMP management. On the record here, they cannot. Simply put, the SRRP is not an association in any meaningful sense, nor a form of exercise of the right to freedom of association. It is simply an internal human relations scheme imposed on RCMP members by management. The element of employee choice is almost entirely missing and the structure has no independence from management.
The second issue raised by the present constitutional challenge concerns the exclusion of RCMP members from the application of the PSLRA by para. (d) of the definition of “employee” in s. 2(1) . This Court, in Delisle, held that the exclusion of the RCMP from the PSSRA , the PSLRA ’s predecessor legislation, did not violate s. 2 (d) of the Charter . Overturning precedents of this Court is not a step to be lightly taken. However, Delisle was decided before this Court’s shift to a purposive and generous approach to labour relations and Delisle considered a different question and narrower aspects of the labour relations regime than those at issue here. It follows that the result in Delisle must be revisited.
The purpose of para. (d) of the definition of “employee” in s. 2(1) of the PSLRA , viewed in its historical context, violates s. 2 (d) of the Charter . The PSSRA and, later, the PSLRA established the general framework for labour relations and collective bargaining in the federal public sector. A class of employees, the members of the RCMP, has, since the initial enactment of this regime, been excluded from its application in order to prevent them from exercising their associational rights under s. 2 (d). The purpose of excluding a specific class of employees from the labour relations regime in order to deny them the exercise of their freedom of association impermissibly breaches the constitutional rights of the affected employees.
Section 2 (d) gives Parliament much leeway in devising a scheme of collective bargaining that satisfies the special demands of the RCMP. Beyond this, s. 1 of the Charter provides additional room to tailor a labour relations regime to achieve pressing and substantial objectives, provided it can show that these are justified. In the present case, the infringement of the guarantee of freedom of association cannot be justified under s. 1 of the Charter .
Although the government’s objective of maintaining an independent and objective police force constitutes a pressing and substantial objective, the infringing measures are not rationally connected to their objective. First, it is not apparent how the exclusion of RCMP members from a statutorily protected collective bargaining process ensures the neutrality, stability or even reliability of the Force. Second, it is not established that permitting meaningful collective bargaining for RCMP members would disrupt the stability of the police force or affect the public’s perception of its neutrality.
While this conclusion is sufficient to dispose of the s. 1 analysis, denying RCMP members any meaningful process of collective bargaining is also more restrictive than necessary to maintain the Force’s neutrality, stability and reliability. The RCMP is the only police force in Canada without a collective agreement to regulate the working conditions of its officers. It has not been shown how or why the RCMP is materially different from the police forces that have the benefit of collective bargaining regimes that provide basic bargaining protections. A material difference between the forces having not been shown, it is clear that total exclusion of RCMP members from meaningful collective bargaining cannot be minimally impairing.
Having found that s. 96 of the RCMP Regulations and para. (d) of the definition of “employee” in s. 2(1) of the PSLRA infringe the freedom guaranteed to RCMP members under s. 2 (d) of the Charter , and that these provisions cannot be saved under s. 1 , the appropriate remedy is to strike down the offending provision of the PSLRA under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 . This declaration of invalidity is suspended for a period of 12 months. We would similarly strike down s. 96 of the RCMP Regulations were it not repealed. This conclusion does not mean that Parliament must include the RCMP in the PSLRA scheme. Section 2 (d) of the Charter does not mandate a particular model of labour relations. Should it see fit to do so, Parliament remains free to enact any labour relations model it considers appropriate to address the specific context in which members of the RCMP discharge their duties, within the constitutional limits imposed by the guarantee enshrined in s. 2 (d) and s. 1 of the Charter .
Per Rothstein J. (dissenting): The language used by the majority creates greater rights, and imposes greater restrictions on the government, than either a plain or generous reading of s. 2 (d) of the Charter can logically provide. The interpretation of a Charter right must be principled and must not be so divorced from the text of the provision as to depart from the foundation of the right. When, in Health Services and Support — Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, and Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3, this Court recognized a derivative right to collective bargaining stemming from the purpose of s. 2 (d) of the Charter , it extended constitutional rights beyond what had previously been accepted.
Now, less than four years after Fraser was decided, the majority further expands freedom of association and retreats from the effective impossibility test stated in that case. It also enshrines an adversarial model of labour relations as a Charter right, reversing this Court’s findings in Health Services and in Fraser that s. 2 (d) does not guarantee a particular model of collective bargaining or a particular outcome.
Section 2 (d) of the Charter protects the right to associate to make collective representations and to have employers consider those representations in good faith. The majority in Fraser unambiguously held that the test to find an infringement of s. 2 (d) in the labour relations context is whether the impugned law or state action has the effect of making it impossible to act collectively to achieve workplace goals. The language in Fraser does not support the majority’s revised — and lowered — s. 2 (d) standard. There is no doubt that the majority in Fraser firmly established a high threshold for infringement of the derivative right to collective bargaining. Fairness and certainty require that where settled law exists, courts must apply it to determine the result in a particular case. They may not identify a desired result and then search for a novel legal interpretation to bring that result about.
The essential feature of a labour relations regime that allows employees to exercise their constitutional right to make meaningful collective representations on their workplace goals is representativeness. Representativeness is the constitutional imperative required in order to ensure that s. 2 (d) rights are protected in the collective bargaining context and it is only where legislation impairs the right of employees to have their interests advanced honestly and fairly that legislation will be constitutionally deficient.
Neither the choice of the organization representing employees for bargaining purposes nor the independence of that association are necessary to ensure that meaningful collective bargaining can occur. Choice and independence are central to Wagner-style labour relations and, by selecting choice and independence as constitutional requirements for meaningful collective bargaining, the majority mandates an adversarial model of labour relations and precludes others which may be just as or more effective in contributing to meaningful collective bargaining.
A statutorily designated bargaining model can ensure that employees’ interests will be effectively represented to management even where the employees do not choose their individual representatives or the system in which this representation takes place. Section 2 (d) requires that the voice with which employees communicate with their employer as a collective be representative of their interests. Provided that the spokespersons through whom employees make representations to their employer have a duty to represent the interests of all employees and that there is a means to hold those representatives to account, the workers’ constitutional right to make collective representations and to have their collective representations considered in good faith is met. Representativeness is what Fraser mandates and there is no justification to embark upon the imposition of unnecessary constitutional constraints.
As with choice, the notion of independence is not an inherent aspect of collective bargaining. Where concerns are raised with respect to the independence of a legislatively prescribed employee association, the relevant question is not whether the association or process is independent in the sense that it segregates employees from management, but whether the process prevents employees, such as RCMP members, from associating to advance their collective workplace goals. To reiterate, the touchstone is representativeness. So long as employees have recourse to ensure that their views are put forward to management and that their representatives are working in their interests, the labour relations process will not be dominated by management and employees will have the means to work towards their collective workplace goals. Any representative who limits representation based on what management permits or who places their own employment interests above the interests of all employees will be held accountable for his or her own actions.
In the case at bar, the context of a national police force led to the adoption of a statutory collaborative labour relations model, the SRRP. The correct standard against which the SRRP should be evaluated is whether the process renders meaningful collective bargaining effectively impossible. Whether the Fraser-mandated effective impossibility test or the majority’s new substantial interference test is applied, it is clear that the SRRP does not infringe s. 2 (d) of the Charter .
That Parliament chose a collaborative model like the SRRP as a means of facilitating employer-employee engagement for the national police force does not mean that that model has rendered it effectively impossible for RCMP members to achieve collective workplace goals. Although RCMP members did not choose their associational framework for bargaining purposes, they are able to democratically elect their representatives and those representatives have a statutory duty to represent employee interests. They can be replaced if they fail to uphold that duty. Management also has a constitutional obligation to consider in good faith the representations made on behalf of RCMP members. In short, the evidence before this Court is that Staff Relations Representatives fairly advance employee interests to RCMP management and thus the SRRP meets the constitutional requirement of representativeness mandated under this Court’s interpretation of s. 2 (d).
The purpose of excluding RCMP members from the PSLRA is not to interfere with collective bargaining, but is driven by a legitimate concern that the model imposed under that legislation is ill suited to the national police force. The evolution in the legal understanding of s. 2 (d) since Delisle bears no relation to the majority’s finding in that case as to the purpose of the exclusion of RCMP members from the PSLRA ’s predecessor legislation, and thus cannot be used to support revisiting the issues settled in Delisle. Although Delisle was decided before Health Services and Fraser ushered in a more expansive approach to labour relations, the jurisprudential developments since do not allow this Court to conclude that the purpose of the exclusion is to deny RCMP members’ associational rights. In fact, changes to the SRRP since Delisle have reinforced the understanding that the program’s goal is to enhance representation of the interests of RCMP members without the imposition of an adversarial model.
Even if Delisle had been incorrectly decided and the purpose of the exclusion contained in the PSSRA in 1967 was to deny RCMP members meaningful collective bargaining, it does not follow that this continues to be the purpose of para. (d) of the definition of “employee” in s. 2(1) of the PSLRA today. By 2003, when the PSSRA was replaced by the PSLRA , the RCMP labour relations scheme was considerably changed from that which existed in 1967. The decision to continue the exclusion was made with the knowledge that doing so did not deny members collective bargaining rights. These individuals were subject to a parallel labour relations regime — the SRRP. To ignore the significantly different context in which the exclusion of RCMP members was re-enacted in the PSLRA disregards the current legislative reality.
Had para. (d) of the definition of “employee” in s. 2(1) of the PSLRA been found to breach s. 2 (d) of the Charter , it would nonetheless constitute a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society and would therefore be justified under s. 1 of the Charter . Parliament is entitled to address concerns that an adversarial RCMP members’ association might order its members to refuse to intervene in certain circumstances involving the labour disputes of others or that belonging to such associations could inhibit members from responding to such situations impartially. The RCMP is materially different from other Canadian police forces. The government must be permitted to organize the Force’s labour relations in view of its distinctive and essential role as our national police force.
Cases Cited
By McLachlin C.J. and LeBel J.
Overruled: Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989; applied: Health Services and Support — Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391; explained: Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3; referred to: Meredith v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 2, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 125; Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association, 2010 SCC 23, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 815; Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; PSAC v. Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460; Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367; Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157; Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211; R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., 2001 SCC 70, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209; Bernard v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 SCC 13, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 227; Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295; Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467; R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3; R. v. National Post, 2010 SCC 16, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 477; Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 2002 SCC 68, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519; Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567; Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, No. 45701/99, ECHR 2001-XII; Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401, 2013 SCC 62, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 733; MiningWatch Canada v. Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2010 SCC 2, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 6; RJR — MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311; Canada v. Craig, 2012 SCC 43, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 489; Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101; R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199; Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2000 SCC 69, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120; Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp., 2007 SCC 30, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610; Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 33, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827; Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825.
By Rothstein J. (dissenting)
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295; Divito v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 47, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 157; Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3; Health Services and Support — Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391; Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211; R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., 2001 SCC 70, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209; Canadian Merchant Service Guild v. Gagnon, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 509; Gendron v. Supply and Services Union of the Public Service Alliance of Canada, Local 50057, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1298; Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989; Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; PSAC v. Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460; Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016; Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101; Meredith v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 2, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 125; Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2000 SCC 69, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120; Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp., 2007 SCC 30, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610; RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199; Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825.
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Act respecting the Syndical Plan of the Sûreté du Québec, CQLR, c. R-14.
Agricultural Employees Protection Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 16.
Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2 , Part I, s. 6.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1 , 2 , 33 .
Commissioner’s Standing Orders (Division Staff Relations Representative Program) [made pursuant to s. 21(2) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. R-9; rep. SOR/2003-325].
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Ontario Provincial Police Collective Bargaining Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 35, Sch. B.
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War Measures Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 206.
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Treaties and Other International Instruments
Convention (No. 87) concerning freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, 68 U.N.T.S. 17, art. 9.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 22.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 8.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (Doherty, Rosenberg and Juriansz JJ.A.), 2012 ONCA 363, 111 O.R. (3d) 268, 292 O.A.C. 202, 350 D.L.R. (4th) 261, 260 C.R.R. (2d) 242, 220 L.A.C. (4th) 107, [2012] O.J. No. 2420 (QL), 2012 CarswellOnt 6781 (WL Can.), setting aside a decision of MacDonnell J., 96 O.R. (3d) 20, 188 C.R.R. (2d) 225, 2009 CLLC ¶220-027, 2009 CanLII 15149, [2009] O.J. No. 1352 (QL), 2009 Cars