Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education)

Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education)
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2003-11-06
Neutral citation
2003 SCC 62
Report
[2003] 3 SCR 3
Case number
28807
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; Gonthier, Charles Doherty; Iacobucci, Frank; Major, John C.; Bastarache, Michel; Binnie, William Ian Corneil; Arbour, Louise; LeBel, Louis; Deschamps, Marie
On appeal from
Nova Scotia
Subjects
Appeal
Constitutional law
Notes
SCC Case Information: 28807
Decision Content
Doucet‑Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, 2003 SCC 62
Glenda Doucet‑Boudreau, Alice Boudreau, Jocelyn Bourbeau,
Bernadette Cormier‑Marchand, Yolande Levert and Cyrille Leblanc,
in their name and in the name of all Nova Scotia parents who are
entitled to the right, under Section 23 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, to have their children educated in the language
of the minority, namely the French language, in publicly funded
French-language school facilities, and Fédération des parents
acadiens de la Nouvelle‑Écosse Inc. Appellants
v.
Attorney General of Nova Scotia Respondent
and
Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General of Ontario, Attorney
General of New Brunswick, Attorney General of Newfoundland
and Labrador, Commissioner of Official Languages for Canada,
Fédération nationale des conseillères et conseillers scolaires
francophones, Fédération des associations de juristes d’expression
française de Common Law Inc. (FAJEFCL) and Conseil scolaire
acadien provincial (CSAP) Interveners
Indexed as: Doucet‑Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education)
Neutral citation: 2003 SCC 62.
File No.: 28807.
2002: October 4; 2003: November 6.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel and Deschamps JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for nova scotia
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Enforcement — Remedy available for realization of minority language education rights — Trial judge ordering province to make best efforts to provide homogeneous French-language facilities and programs by particular dates — Order further requiring parties to appear before same judge periodically to report on status of those efforts — Whether trial judge had authority to retain jurisdiction to hear reports from Province on the status of those efforts as part of his remedy under s. 24(1) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether reporting order was “appropriate and just in the circumstances” — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 23 , 24(1) .
Appeals — Mootness — Appropriate and just remedy — Minority language education rights — Appeal raising important question about jurisdiction of superior courts to order what may be an effective remedy in some classes of cases — Moot appeal should be heard to provide guidance in similar cases.
The appellants are Francophone parents living in five school districts in Nova Scotia. They applied for an order directing the Province and the Conseil scolaire acadien provincial to provide, out of public funds, homogeneous French-language facilities and programs at the secondary school level. The trial judge noted that the government did not deny the existence or content of the parents’ rights under s. 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms but rather failed to prioritize those rights and delayed fulfilling its obligations, despite clear reports showing that assimilation was “reaching critical levels”. He found a s. 23 violation and ordered the Province and the Conseil to use their “best efforts” to provide school facilities and programs by particular dates. He retained jurisdiction to hear reports on the status of the efforts. The Province appealed the part of the order in which the trial judge retained his jurisdiction to hear reports. The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and struck down the impugned portion of the order. On the basis of the common law principle of functus officio, the majority held that the trial judge, having decided the issue between the parties, had no further jurisdiction to remain seized of the case. They also held that, while courts have broad ranging powers under s. 24(1) of the Charter to fashion remedies, the Charter does not extend a court’s jurisdiction to permit it to enforce its remedies.
Held (Major, Binnie, LeBel and Deschamps JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed and the trial judge’s order restored.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache and Arbour JJ.: This appeal involves the nature of remedies available under s. 24(1) of the Charter for the realization of the minority language education rights protected by s. 23 . A purposive approach to remedies in a Charter context requires that both the purpose of the right being protected and the purpose of the remedies provision be promoted. To do so, courts must issue effective, responsive remedies that guarantee full and meaningful protection of Charter rights and freedoms.
Section 23 of the Charter is designed to correct past injustices not only by halting the progressive erosion of minority official language cultures across Canada, but also by actively promoting their flourishing. While the rights are granted to individuals, they apply only if the “numbers warrant”. For every school year that governments do not meet their obligations under s. 23 , there is an increased likelihood of assimilation which carries the risk that numbers might cease to “warrant”. If delay is tolerated, governments could potentially avoid the duties imposed upon them by s. 23 . The affirmative promise contained in s. 23 and the critical need for timely compliance will sometimes require courts to order affirmative remedies to guarantee that language rights are meaningfully, and therefore necessarily promptly, protected.
Under s. 24(1) of the Charter , a superior court may craft any remedy that it considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. In doing so, it must exercise a discretion based on its careful perception of the nature of the right and of the infringement, the facts of the case, and the application of the relevant legal principles. The court must also be sensitive to its role as judicial arbiter and not fashion remedies which usurp the role of the other branches of governance. The boundaries of the courts’ proper role will vary according to the right at issue and the context of each case.
The nature and extent of remedies available under s. 24(1) remain limited by the words of the section itself and must be read in harmony with the rest of our Constitution. While it would be unwise at this point to attempt to define the expression “appropriate and just”, there are some broad considerations that judges should bear in mind in evaluating the appropriateness and justice of a potential remedy. An appropriate and just remedy in the circumstances of a Charter claim is one that meaningfully vindicates the rights and freedoms of the claimants and employs means that are legitimate within the framework of our constitutional democracy. It is a judicial one which vindicates the right while invoking the function and powers of a court. An appropriate and just remedy is also fair to the party against whom the order is made. Since s. 24 is part of a constitutional scheme for the vindication of fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter , the judicial approach to remedies must remain flexible and responsive to the needs of a given case. The meaningful protection of Charter rights, and in particular the enforcement of s. 23 rights, may thus in some cases require the introduction of novel remedies. Lastly, the remedial power in s. 24(1) cannot be strictly limited by statutes or rules of the common law. However, insofar as the statutory provisions or common law rules express principles that are relevant to determining what is “appropriate and just in the circumstances”, they may be helpful to a court choosing a remedy under s. 24(1) .
Here, the remedy ordered by the trial judge was appropriate and just in the circumstances. He exercised his discretion to select an effective remedy that meaningfully vindicated the s. 23 rights of the appellants in the context of serious rates of assimilation and a history of delay in the provision of French-language education. The order is a creative blending of remedies and processes already known to the courts in order to give life to the rights in s. 23 . Given the critical rate of assimilation found by the trial judge, it was appropriate for him to grant a remedy that would in his view lead to prompt compliance. The remedy took into account, and did not depart unduly or unnecessarily from, the role of the courts in our constitutional democracy. The remedy vindicated the rights of the parents while leaving the detailed choices of means largely to the executive. The reporting order was judicial in the sense that it called on the functions and powers known to courts. The range of remedial orders available to courts in civil proceedings demonstrates that constitutional remedies involving some degree of ongoing supervision do not represent a radical break with the past practices of courts. Further, although the common law doctrine of functus officio cannot strictly pre-empt the remedial discretion in s. 24(1), an examination of the functus question indicates that the trial judge issued an order that is appropriately judicial. The retention of jurisdiction did not include any power to alter the disposition of the case and did nothing to undermine the provision of a stable basis for launching an appeal. Finally, in the context, the reporting order was not unfair to the government. While, in retrospect, it would certainly have been advisable for the trial judge to provide more guidance to the parties as to what they could expect from the reporting sessions, his order was not incomprehensible or impossible to follow. It was not vaguely worded so as to render it invalid.
Per Major, Binnie, LeBel and Deschamps JJ. (dissenting): While superior courts’ powers to craft Charter remedies may not be constrained by statutory or common law limits, they are nonetheless bound by rules of fundamental justice and by constitutional boundaries. Such remedies should be designed keeping in mind the canons of good legal drafting, the fundamental importance of procedural fairness, and a proper awareness of the nature of the role of courts in our democratic political regime. In the context of constitutional remedies, courts fulfill their proper function by issuing orders precise enough for the parties to know what is expected of them, and by permitting the parties to execute those orders. Such orders are final. A court purporting to retain jurisdiction to oversee the implementation of a remedy, after a final order has been issued, will likely be acting inappropriately on two levels: (1) by attempting to extend the court’s jurisdiction beyond its proper role, it will breach the separation of powers principle; (2) by acting after exhausting its jurisdiction, it will breach the functus officio doctrine.
Here, the drafting of the reporting order was anything but clear. The order gave the parties no clear notice of their obligations, the nature of the reports or even the purpose of the reporting hearings. The uncertainty engendered by the order amounted to a breach of procedural fairness. For this reason alone, the order can be found to be inappropriate under s. 24(1) and therefore void. In addition, the reporting order assumed that the judge could retain jurisdiction at will, after he had finally disposed of the matter of which he had been seized. As a general rule, courts should avoid interfering in the management of public administration. Once they have rendered judgment, they should resist the temptation to directly oversee or supervise the administration of their orders and operate under a presumption that judgments of courts will be executed with reasonable diligence and good faith. In this case, the trial judge assumed jurisdiction over a sphere traditionally outside the province of the judiciary, and also acted beyond the jurisdiction with which he was legitimately charged as a trial judge, thereby breaching the constitutional principle of separation of powers and the functus officio doctrine. His remedy undermined the proper role of the judiciary within our constitutional order and unnecessarily upset the balance between the three branches of government. Since no part of the Constitution can conflict with another, the trial judge’s order for reporting hearings cannot be interpreted as appropriate and just under s. 24(1).
The proper development of the law of constitutional remedies requires that courts reconcile their duty to act within proper jurisdictional limits with the need to give full effect to the rights of a claimant. The intrusiveness of the trial judge’s order was in no way necessary to secure the appellants’ s. 23 Charter interests. In the present case, refusing superior courts the power to order reporting hearings clearly would not deny claimants’ access to a recognized Charter remedy and, more importantly, to that which they are guaranteed by s. 23 — namely, the timely provision of minority language instruction facilities. If, as suggested by the appellants, the reporting hearings were an incentive for the government to comply with the best efforts order, it is difficult to see how they could have been more effective than the construction deadline coupled with the possibility of a contempt order. Moreover, at the level of constitutional principles, because this incentive is legal in nature, it would not have led to the improper politicization of the relationship between the judiciary and the executive. While a trial judge’s decisions with respect to remedies are owed deference, this must be tempered when, as here, fundamental legal principles are threatened. Proper consideration of the principles of procedural fairness and the separation of powers is required to establish the requisite legitimacy and certainty essential to an appropriate and just remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter .
Cases Cited
By Iacobucci and Arbour JJ.
Referred to: Mills v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863; Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 2085 v. Winnipeg Builders’ Exchange, [1967] S.C.R. 628; New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46; Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295; Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486; Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158; Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493; R. v. Gamble, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 595; R. v. Sarson, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 223; R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 575, 2001 SCC 81; Mahe v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342; Reference re Public Schools Act (Man.), s. 79(3), (4) and (7), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 839; Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2000 SCC 1; R. v. Beaulac, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768; Marchand v. Simcoe County Board of Education (1986), 29 D.L.R. (4th) 596; Marchand v. Simcoe County Board of Education (No. 2) (1987), 44 D.L.R. (4th) 171; Lavoie v. Nova Scotia (Attorney-General) (1988), 47 D.L.R. (4th) 586; Conseil des Écoles Séparées Catholiques Romaines de Dufferin et Peel v. Ontario (Ministre de l’Éducation et de la Formation) (1996), 136 D.L.R. (4th) 704, aff’d (1996), 30 O.R. (3d) 681; Conseil Scolaire Fransaskois de Zenon Park v. Saskatchewan, [1999] 3 W.W.R. 743, aff’d [1999] 12 W.W.R. 742; Assoc. Française des Conseils Scolaires de l’Ontario v. Ontario (1988), 66 O.R. (2d) 599; Assn. des parents francophones de la Colombie-Britannique v. British Columbia (1998), 167 D.L.R. (4th) 534; Re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714; Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217; Fraser v. Public Service Staff Relations Board, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455; New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319; RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199; Reference re Bill 30, An Act to amend the Education Act (Ont.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148; Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679; Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170; MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725; Reference re Young Offenders Act (P.E.I.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 252; Mooring v. Canada (National Parole Board), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 75; Weber v. Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929; R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588; R. v. Smith, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1120; Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. International Bulkcarriers S.A., [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 509; Anton Piller KG v. Manufacturing Processes Ltd., [1976] 1 Ch. 55; Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721; Re Manitoba Language Rights Order, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 347; Re Manitoba Language Rights Order, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1417; Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 212; British Columbia (Association des parents francophones) v. British Columbia (1996), 139 D.L.R. (4th) 356; Société des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. v. Minority Language School Board No. 50 (1983), 48 N.B.R. (2d) 361; Attorney-General v. Birmingham, Tame, and Rea District Drainage Board, [1910] 1 Ch. 48, aff’d [1912] A.C. 788; Kennard v. Cory Brothers and Co., [1922] 1 Ch. 265, aff’d [1922] 2 Ch. 1; Chandler v. Alberta Association of Architects, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 848; Reekie v. Messervey, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 219.
By LeBel and Deschamps JJ. (dissenting)
Sonoco Ltd. v. Local 433 (1970), 13 D.L.R. (3d) 617; Sporting Club du Sanctuaire Inc. v. 2320-4365 Québec Inc., [1989] R.D.J. 596; Supermarchés Jean Labrecque Inc. v. Flamand, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 219; MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725; Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing Branch), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781, 2001 SCC 52; Bell Canada v. Canadian Telephone Employees Association, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 884, 2003 SCC 36; New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319; Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3; Fraser v. Public Service Staff Relations Board, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455; Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405, 2002 SCC 13; In re St. Nazaire Co. (1879), 12 Ch. D. 88; In re Swire (1885), 30 Ch. D. 239; Paper Machinery Ltd. v. J. O. Ross Engineering Corp., [1934] S.C.R. 186; Chandler v. Alberta Association of Architects, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 848; Grillas v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1972] S.C.R. 577; R. v. H. (E.F.) (1997), 115 C.C.C. (3d) 89; Mills v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863; Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624; Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493; Dixon v. British Columbia (Attorney-General) (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 247; Attorney General of Quebec v. Blaikie, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 312; Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199; R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 575, 2001 SCC 81; Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Alberta Rules of Court, Alta. Reg. 390/68, r. 390(1).
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 23 , 24(1) .
Civil Procedure Rules (Nova Scotia), rr. 15.07, 15.08(d), (e).
Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 92 , 96 .
Constitution Act, 1982 .
Education Act, S.N.S. 1995-96, c. 1, ss. 11-16, 88(1).
Judicature Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 240, ss. 33, 34(d), 38.
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 59.06(2)(c), (d).
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal (2001), 203 D.L.R. (4th) 128, 194 N.S.R. (2d) 323, 85 C.R.R. (2d) 189, [2001] N.S.J. No. 240 (QL), 2001 NSCA 104, setting aside a decision of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (2000), 185 N.S.R. (2d) 246, 575 A.P.R. 246, [2000] N.S.J. No. 191 (QL). Appeal allowed, Major, Binnie, LeBel and Deschamps JJ. dissenting.
Joel E. Fichaud, Q.C., and Melanie S. Comstock, for the appellants.
Alexander M. Cameron, for the respondent.
Bernard Laprade and Christopher Rupar, for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada.
Janet E. Minor and Vanessa Yolles, for the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario.
Gabriel Bourgeois, Q.C., for the intervener the Attorney General of New Brunswick.
Written submissions only by Deborah Paquette, for the intervener the Attorney General of Newfoundland and Labrador.
Laura C. Snowball and Subrata Bhattacharjee, for the intervener the Commissioner of Official Languages for Canada.
Michel Doucet and Christian E. Michaud, for the intervener Fédération nationale des conseillères et conseillers scolaires francophones.
Roger J. F. Lepage and Peter T. Bergbusch, for the intervener Fédération des associations de juristes d’expression française de Common Law Inc.
Noella Martin and Janet M. Stevenson, for the intervener Conseil scolaire acadien provincial.
The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache and Arbour JJ. was delivered by
1 Iacobucci and Arbour JJ. — This appeal involves the nature of remedies available under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for the realization of the minority language education rights protected by s. 23 of the Charter . The specific issue is whether a trial judge may, after ordering that a provincial government use its best efforts to build French-language school facilities by given dates, retain jurisdiction to hear reports on the progress of those efforts. The issue of broader and ongoing judicial involvement in the administration of public institutions is not before the Court in this case.
I. Background and Judicial History
2 The appellants are Francophone parents living in five school districts in Nova Scotia (Kingston/Greenwood, Chéticamp, Île Madame-Arichat (Petit-de-Grat), Argyle, and Clare) and Fédération des parents acadiens de la Nouvelle-Écosse Inc., a non‑profit organization that monitors the advancement of educational rights of the Acadian and Francophone minority in Nova Scotia. The Attorney General of Nova Scotia is the respondent, acting on behalf of the Department of Education of Nova Scotia.
3 Apart from the specific facts of the case, it is most important to note the historical context on which this dispute is centred. As we will discuss below, French‑language education in Nova Scotia has not had an enviable record of success. While the situation improved over the rather dismal record of the previous centuries, the twentieth century left much to be achieved. Section 23 of the Charter has been the hope of the French-speaking minority of Nova Scotia to redress the linguistic failings and inequality of history.
4 It is conceded in this appeal that s. 23 of the Charter entitles the appellant parents to publicly funded French‑language educational facilities for their children. For some time, Francophone parents in these five school districts of Nova Scotia had been urging their provincial government to provide homogeneous French-language schools at the secondary level in addition to the existing primary level facilities. The government of Nova Scotia, for its part, agreed: it did not dispute that the number of students warranted the facilities demanded. The government amended the Education Act, S.N.S. 1995-96, c. 1, ss. 11-16, in 1996 to create the Conseil scolaire acadien provincial (the “Conseil”), a province-wide French-language school board, with a view to realizing the Charter ’s minority language education rights. However, while s. 11(1) empowered the Conseil to deliver and administer all French-language programs, only the Minister, with the approval of the Governor in Council, could construct, furnish and equip schools (see s. 88(1)). Although the government eventually announced the construction of the new French-language school facilities, construction of the promised schools never began. So in 1998, 16 years after the right was entrenched in the Constitution, the appellant parents applied to the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia for an order directing the Province and the Conseil to provide, out of public funds, homogeneous French-language facilities and programs at the secondary school level.
5 The application was heard before LeBlanc J. in October 1999. LeBlanc J. declared that the applicants were entitled parents under s. 23 of the Charter and that the number of students warranted the provision of French homogeneous secondary school facilities in Chéticamp, Île Madame-Arichat (Petit-de-Grat), Argyle, and Clare: (2000), 185 N.S.R. (2d) 246. He noted, however, that the real issue was not the existence and content of the applicants’ s. 23 rights, but the date on which the programs and facilities would finally be made available.
6 LeBlanc J. found that the respondents had not given sufficient attention to the serious rate of assimilation among Acadians and Francophones in Nova Scotia. The Province treated s. 23 rights as if they were but one more demand for educational programs and facilities, and failed to accord them due priority as constitutional rights. Meanwhile, assimilation continued. LeBlanc J. stated that “[i]t is beyond any doubt that it is time that homogeneous programs and facilities be provided to s. 23 students” (para. 206).
7 LeBlanc J. considered the state of school programs and facilities, including the progress that had already been made toward complying with s. 23 of the Charter , in each of the five school districts at issue. He directed the Province, which, through the Department of Education, is responsible for providing school facilities, and the Conseil, which is responsible for program provision, to build schools and provide programs by more and less specific deadlines. LeBlanc J. required that the respondents use their “best efforts” to comply with his order. Finally, he retained jurisdiction to hear reports from the respondents on their compliance. The precise wording of the order was as follows:
1. In Kingston/Greenwood, the entitled parents under Section 23 have a right to a homogeneous French program from grades Primary to 12 and the entitled parents have a right to a homogeneous French facility for grades Primary to 12 by September 2000.
2. In Cheticamp, the entitled parents under Section 23 have a right to a homogeneous French secondary program in a homogeneous French facility by September 2000.
3. In Île Madame‑Arichat (Petit-de-Grat), the Respondent CSAP shall use its best efforts to provide a homogeneous French program for grades 9 through 12 by September 2000 and the Respondent Department of Education shall use its best efforts (a) to provide a homogeneous French facility (on an interim basis) for grades 9 through 12 by September 2000 and (b) to provide a permanent homogeneous French facility by January 2001.
4. In Argyle, the Respondent CSAP shall use its best efforts to provide a homogeneous French program for grades Primary through 12 by September 2000 and the Respondent Department of Education shall provide a homogeneous French facility for grades Primary through 12 by September 2001.
5. In Clare, the Respondent CSAP shall provide a homogeneous French program for grades Primary through 12 by September 2000 and the Respondent Department of Education shall take immediate steps to provide homogeneous French facilities for grades Primary through 12 by September 2001.
6. The Respondents shall use their best efforts to comply with this Order.
7. The Court shall retain jurisdiction to hear reports from the Respondents respecting the Respondents’ compliance with this Order. The Respondents shall report to this Court on March 23, 2001 at 9:30 a.m., or on such other date as the Court may determine.
8 The reference to “the Court” in the final paragraph was interpreted by LeBlanc J., and the parties, as a reference to himself sitting as a judge of the provincial supreme court, rather than to the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia generally, which, as a court of first instance, would be competent to hear applications relating to any failure by the respondents to comply with LeBlanc J.’s order and would require no express retention of jurisdiction. LeBlanc J. presided over several of these “reporting hearings” between July 27, 2000, and March 23, 2001. Prior to each reporting session the trial judge directed the Province to file an affidavit from the appropriate official at the Department of Education, setting out the Department’s progress in complying with the trial judge’s decision. The trial judge permitted the respondent and Conseil to adduce evidence, including rebuttal evidence on various matters relating to compliance with the best efforts order. The Attorney General of Nova Scotia, on behalf of the Department of Education, appealed the part of the order in which LeBlanc J. retained his jurisdiction to hear reports.
9 The majority at the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal allowed the appeal before the final scheduled reporting hearing took place ((2001), 194 N.S.R. (2d) 323, 2001 NSCA 104). Flinn J.A., writing for the majority, emphasized that the declaration of the parents’ rights and the order to provide programs and facilities were not in issue in the appeal (para. 6). Only the trial judge’s retention of jurisdiction to hear reports was challenged. Flinn J.A. held that the trial judge, having decided the issue between the parties, had no further jurisdiction to remain seized of the case. This opinion was based on the common law principle of functus officio and Flinn J.A.’s view that the Judicature Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 240, not only fails explicitly to authorize the retention of jurisdiction by a trial court after it has decided the issues before it and provided a remedy, but also precludes a trial judge from retaining jurisdiction to determine whether there is compliance with the order. He cited this Court’s decision in Mills v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, at pp. 952-53, for the principle that it is for Parliament, and not judges, to fix the jurisdiction of courts and that the Charter was intended to fit in, rather than to alter, the existing scheme of Canadian legal procedure. After reviewing the language rights jurisprudence, Flinn J.A. concluded that there was no authority or precedent supporting the trial judge’s decision to order and conduct the reporting sessions. He concluded that, while it is true that courts have broad ranging powers under s. 24(1) to fashion remedies, and are encouraged to be creative in so doing, the Charter does not extend a court’s jurisdiction to permit it to enforce its remedies. Finally, Flinn J.A. expressed a reluctance to open the door to American jurisprudence on the enforcement of mandatory injunctions and a fear that post-trial intervention by trial judges in the enforcement of remedies would undermine the tradition of co-operation between the judiciary and the other branches of government.
10 Freeman J.A. dissented. In his view, LeBlanc J.’s order was not final and the judge was not functus officio until the continuing supervision was completed; the trial judge was able to keep his decision from being final simply by declaring that he was doing so. Freeman J.A. referred to the order as a “creative blending of declaratory and injunctive relief with a means of mediation” and found it to be “of the very essence of the kind of remedy courts are encouraged to seek pursuant to s. 24(1) to give life to Charter rights” (para. 70). He noted that requiring fresh applications by the parties each time the Province or the Conseil appeared not to be using its best efforts could have dragged matters out interminably, and would have left the matter to a judge with less familiarity with the issues and legal principles involved. Freeman J.A. concluded that the order, meant to “head off the potential for an enforcement nightmare”, “got the job done, virtually on time, with a minimum of inconvenience or unnecessary cost” (para. 84).
II. Issues
11 A preliminary issue raised by the respondent is whether the Court should decline to hear this appeal because it is moot.
12 The main issue in the appeal is simply this: having found a violation of s. 23 of the Charter and having ordered that the Province make its best efforts to provide homogeneous French-language facilities and programs by particular dates, did the Nova Scotia Supreme Court have the authority to retain jurisdiction to hear reports from the Province on the status of those efforts as part of its remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter ?
13 Strictly speaking, only the retention of jurisdiction to hear reports, and not the “best efforts” order itself, is at issue in the present appeal. Nonetheless, the best efforts order and the retention of jurisdiction were conceived by the trial judge as two complementary parts of a whole. A full appreciation of the balance and moderation of the trial judge’s approach to crafting this remedy requires that the reports respecting the respondents’ compliance with the order be viewed and evaluated in the context of the remedy as a whole.
III. Charter Provisions
14 LeBlanc J.’s order was designed to remedy a breach of s. 23 of the Charter which provides:
23. (1) Citizens of Canada
(a) whose first language learned and still understood is that of the English or French linguistic minority population of the province in which they reside, or
(b) who have received their primary school instruction in Canada in English or French and reside in a province where the language in which they received that instruction is the language of the English or French linguistic minority population of the province,
have the right to have their children receive primary and secondary school instruction in that language in that province.
(2) Citizens of Canada of whom any child has received or is receiving primary or secondary school instruction in English or French in Canada, have the right to have all their children receive primary and secondary school instruction in the same language.
(3) The right of citizens of Canada under subsections (1) and (2) to have their children receive primary and secondary school instruction in the language of the English or French linguistic minority population of a province
(a) applies wherever in the province the number of children of citizens who have such a right is sufficient to warrant the provision to them out of public funds of minority language instruction; and
(b) includes, where the number of those children so warrants, the right to have them receive that instruction in minority language educational facilities provided out of public funds.
15 LeBlanc J. ordered the remedy challenged in this case pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter which provides:
24. (1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter , have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.
IV. Analysis
A. Mootness
16 Before considering the main issue in this case, it is necessary to consider the respondent’s argument that this appeal should not be heard because it is moot.
17 The doctrine of mootness reflects the principle that courts will only hear cases that will have the effect of resolving a live controversy which will or may actually affect the rights of the parties to the litigation except when the courts decide, in the exercise of their discretion, that it is nevertheless in the interest of justice that the appeal be heard (see Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342, at p. 353). In our view, the instant appeal is moot. The parties attended several reporting hearings, presented evidence and allowed the deponents of affidavits to be cross-examined. The desired effect has been achieved: the schools at issue have been built. Restoring the validity of the trial judge’s order would have no practical effect for the litigants in this case and no further reporting sessions are necessary.
18 Although this appeal is moot, the considerations in Borowski, supra, suggest that it should be heard. Writing for the Court, Sopinka J. outlined the following criteria for courts to consider in exercising discretion to hear a moot case (at pp. 358-63):
(1) the presence of an adversarial context;
(2) the concern for judicial economy; and
(3) the need for the Court to be sensitive to its role as the adjudicative branch in our political framework.
19 In this case, the appropriate adversarial context persists. The litigants have continued to argue their respective sides vigorously.
20 As to the concern for conserving scarce judicial resources, this Court has many times noted that such an expenditure is warranted in cases that raise important issues but are evasive of review (Borowski, supra, at p. 360; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 2085 v. Winnipeg Builders’ Exchange, [1967] S.C.R. 628; New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46). The present appeal raises an important question about the jurisdiction of superior courts to order what may be an effective remedy in some classes of cases. To the extent that the reporting order is effective, it will tend to evade review since parties may rapidly comply with orders before an appeal is heard.
21 Moreover, in deciding whether to hear a moot case, courts must weigh the exp