Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials)

Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials)
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2007-07-24
Neutral citation
2009 FC 1317
File numbers
DES-4-06
Notes
Reported Decision
Decision Content
Federal Court
Cour fédérale
Date: 20070724
Docket: DES-4-06
Citation: 2009 FC 1317
Ottawa, Ontario, July 24, 2007
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Simon Noël
BETWEEN:
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Applicant
and
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS
IN RELATION TO MAHER ARAR
and MAHER ARAR
Respondents
PUBLIC REASONS FOR ORDER (Top Secret Reasons for Order issued July 24, 2007)
(Public Reasons for Order issued July 9, 2009)
1. Initial comments
[1] These are my ex parte (in camera) reasons and order pursuant to the obligations imposed on a designated judge sitting on matters involving international relations, national defence and national security, as contained in sections 38.04 and following of the Canada Evidence Act, (R.S.C. c. C-5) (“the Act or CEA”). They are to be read as a complement to the public judgment issued with this decision. As the order provides, some of the information contained in the redaction will remain subject to the prohibition of disclosure, while other information can be disclosed. In coming to this conclusion, I applied the recipe as described by the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada (Attorney General) v. Ribic, 2003 FCA 246, [2005] 1 F.C. 33. For this purpose, I have read the report of the Commissioner (3 volumes) (and reviewed his confidential report (2 volumes)), the records of the Applicant and the Respondent, including the examinations and cross-examinations of witnesses (of the Commission) and affiants, the documentary evidence and the written submissions. I also interviewed in camera the affiants of each party (except for one, which mainly filed exhibits) and heard the oral submissions of each party (including Mr. Arar) in public and ex parte. These ex parte (in camera) reasons cover the sensitive evidence as filed by the parties. Initially, I had hope that these Reasons for Order would be kept to a minimum in favour of the public judgment. However, in the course of drafting, it soon became apparent that keeping these Reasons for order to a minimum would prove arduous as I wanted to expand by providing sufficient background context which is more difficult to do when writing a public judgment as one has to be mindful not to prejudice sensitive information. Having said this, at some time, I hope that parts of these Reasons will be made public. In due course, this objective can be achieved in collaboration with all parties concerned and with the consent of the Court. Finally, as this order shows, I have summarized my reasons (analysis) in the form of a table (using the tables prepared by some of the Affiants of the Attorney General), for ease of reference in understanding a complex determination. This table contains page references to redacted or unredacted passages in the report and a brief explanation of the conclusions for each protected passage. I have also added an annex (which provides the matching pages of the redacted version of the public report (on the left side) and the unredacted
version of the public report (on the right hand side). xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
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[2] My analysis of the redacted passages will proceed as follows. First, I will deal with a preliminary issue, xxx xxxxxxxxx as it was presented by the Applicant, and then proceed with the analysis of the redacted passages, keeping in mind the steps suggested by the Court of Appeal in Ribic, supra. The relevancy criterion has already been dealt with in the public judgment but I will deal with it in the present judgment for the sake of consistency. I will refer to it in some instances when dealing with the public interest in disclosure versus non-disclosure. I propose to proceed with the analysis in the following order and review and analyze some of the redacted passages:
a) passages referring to a country with a poor human rights record, Syria, a “confession” by Mr. El‑Maati referred to in the search and in telephone warrants, which triggered recommendations by the Commissioner (page 9);
b) passages referring to the CIA’s and the FBI’s interest in project A‑O Canada and the interaction with the RCMP and to a lesser degree CSIS (page 18);
c) passages referring to the contents of exchanges or parts thereof and assessments made by identified US agencies (page 24);
d) passages referring to CSIS’s interest in and knowledge and assessment of Mr. Arar (page 43);
e) passages referring to CSIS’s interest in Mr. Almalki and Mr. El-Maati (page 53);
f) passages referring to the RCMP’s use of information obtained from Syrian Military Intelligence (“SMI”) (page 61);
g) passages referring to Syria’s assessment of Mr. Arar (page 64);
h) passages referring to CSIS’s and Mr. Hooper’s comments on US rendition of prisoners (page 66).
I have included each of the redacted passages in one of these categories. They were selected as they were used in good part by the Commissioner in his ex parte (in camera) decisions dated December 2, 2004, April 4, 2006 and July 6, 2006. I have to say that this exercise does not involve black-and-white decisions. Rather, it is mostly a grey area where principles are at stake and refined good judgment has to be exercised. This is what I have tried to do, keeping in mind the high interests at stake.
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[5] xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxonly persons cleared through established security clearance procedures would receive the information on a need-to-know basis and that there would be no disclosure other than to the Commission, all subject to Canadian laws such as the Canada Evidence Act and also the Commission’s terms of reference.
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[9] The evidence has shown that neither the Commissioner nor the staff of the Commission were involved in these discussions. The evidence informs that it is only on June 26, 2006, hence two years after the inquiry was established and after the report was drafted, that knowledge of such meetings was ever communicated to the Commission.
[10] Having dealt with this preliminary matter, I now turn to the analysis of the redacted passages.
3. The relevancy of the redacted parts
[11] As in Ribic, supra, the first criterion to be met is the relevancy of the protected information. As we have seen, unlike the Ribic case, which was a criminal case, the present application involves a commission of inquiry, a fact-finding body, not a proceeding having to deal with questions of criminal law and facts, and the possibility of compelling potentially injurious information. The Commission of Inquiry is in a different position. The terms of reference provide a detailed procedure on how to deal with such information and the Commission can receive sensitive information under paragraph 38.01(6)(d) and subsection 38.01(8) of the Canada Evidence Act. Therefore, the relevancy factor is to be applied to a Commission of Inquiry by considering its uniqueness and utility to the Canadian government and public in providing remedies, often in situations of crisis, and acting in the public interest.
[12] The terms of reference of the Commission of Inquiry at section K and the subparagraphs thereunder give the Commissioner a mandate to ensure non-disclosure of sensitive information and the procedure to follow in considering disclosure of such information, all in accordance with section 38 of the CEA. To that end, the Commissioner may consider releasing a summary of the evidence heard in camera and if such a summary is not sufficient in the Commissioner’s opinion, he may inform the Applicant and such opinion constitutes notice under section 38.01 of the CEA. That was the route whereby the Applicant filed the present proceeding with this Court.
[13] The Attorney General submits that the contents of the redacted parts are not relevant to the terms of reference of the Commission of Inquiry and that the Commissioner has never explained the relevancy of the information.
[14] The Attorney General adds that some of the protected passages are not related to the actions of Canadian officials, which are the subject of the terms of reference. It categorizes the sensitive information as being about other countries, their activities or the fact that they share information in confidence with Canada on subjects that CSIS investigates, which information is not pertinent to the terms of reference.
[15] The Commissioner in his ex parte (in camera) decisions addressed the relevancy factor when discussing the public interest in disclosure in general and when he commented that some of the information subject to disclosure would help understand the recommendations, and furthermore, that some of the information concerned torture and was already in the public domain. A reading of the Commissioner’s three volumes shows that the inquiry dealt with a good number of public interest issues such as human rights when dealing with other countries, the Canadian treatment of information obtained through questionable means such as torture, the use of it, international sharing practices post-9/11, etc. Having reviewed each of the redacted portions and knowing that the threshold to establish relevancy is low and having in mind the words of Cory J. of the Supreme Court on the importance of commissions of inquiry in Philips v. Nova Scotia (Commission of Inquiry into the Westray Mine Tragedy) [1995] 2 S.C.R. 97, I do find relevancy in the redacted passages for reference purposes. I cite the following paragraph of the Supreme Court decision:
In times of public questioning, stress and concern they provide the means for Canadians to be apprised of the conditions pertaining to a worrisome community problem and to be a part of the recommendations that are aimed at resolving the problem. Both the status and high public respect for the Commissioner and the open and public nature of the hearing help to restore public confidence not only in the institution or situation investigated but also in the process of government as a whole. They are excellent means of informing and educating members of the public.
After all, the Commissioner clearly identified redacted information as being relevant for the purposes of his report. Surely such an opinion carries some weight. When dealing with the analysis for each redacted part, the relevance thereof in relation to the particulars in question might be commented on and it may be of some significance when considering the public interest in disclosure versus the public interest in non-disclosure, if the disclosure of the information were found to be injurious.
A) Passages referring to a country with a poor human rights record, Syria, a “confession” by Mr. El‑Maati where the information was used in applications for search and telephone warrants and recommendations made by the Commissioner (analysis and recommendations), (xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[16] In the following analysis, I shall deal with three redacted passages, two of which are of a substantial nature, dealing with a search warrant application (January 2002) and a telephone warrant application (September 2002). The third passage only refers to a title in the table of contents of the analysis and recommendations, Volume III, and shall be included by reference to the conclusions of the two main passages.
[17] In summary, the first passage refers to search warrant applications (January 2002) sought and obtained by the RCMP, which referred to an unnamed country with a poor human rights record and contained damaging information collected from a confession of Mr. El‑Maati while in Syrian custody. In the Commissioner’s comment, the warrant application did not mention Syria’s human rights record or the fact that the information might have been obtained from torture and no reliability evaluation of such information was done.
[18] First, the question at issue is whether disclosing this information would be injurious to international relations, national security or national defence. As noted, the information in question refers to a confession made by Mr. El‑Maati to Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI). The Attorney General objects to disclosure of this information on the following grounds:
- The information relied on to obtain search warrants originated with SMI. Therefore, such information could affect our international relations and is protected by the third-party rule.
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[19] As an aside, the evidence shows that the confession was obtained by the RCMP directly
from the head of SMI in July 2002 without a caveat not to disclose. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[20] The Attorney General also submits that disclosing such limited factual information would not give the big picture of the actions of Canadian officials, since other factual information which cannot be disclosed for national security reasons would give the public a more realistic picture. The protected factual information is the following:
- Mr. El‑Maati was independently identified by CSIS as a potential threat to Canada’s national security.
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- The RCMP was able to confirm that Mr. El‑Maati took flying lessons at Buttonville Airport.
- Mr. El‑Maati’s last will and testament was subsequently seized from his residence and made reference to seeking a certificate of martyrdom.
- The time frame in which Mr. El‑Maati prepared his last will and testament was consistent with the events described in his alleged confession, such as the receipt of instructions from his brother Amar to start training for the mission.
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- Intelligence received in confidence from US authorities regarding the circumstances of Mr. El‑Maati’s attempt to enter the United States in August 2001 (beyond what was already in the public domain), when he was found in possession of a map of Tunney’s Pasture, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
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[21] There is evidence on the public record that Syria (SMI) used torture to obtain confessions
and that in August 2002 Mr. El‑Maati told a Canadian consular officer in Egypt that he was tortured
and forced to give a false confession while detained in Syria. The record also shows that the
Commission appointed a fact-finder, Professor S.J. Toope, who concluded in 2004 in a report for
the Commissioner (“the Toope Report”) that Mr. Arar and Mr. El‑Maati had been tortured while
detained by SMI. It found that Mr. El-Maati’s description of torture while detained by the SMI was
“convincing”. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxFurthermore, after this report was published, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was then
Mr. Pierre Pettigrew, publicly called the Syrian Ambassador to express concerns about the mistreatment of Canadians, pressed Syria to prosecute the ones responsible for “torturing Arar” and said that “all those people should be convicted.”
[22] In his decision dated April 4, 2006, the Commissioner explains his reasons for concluding that the release of such a carefully worded passage would not be injurious. Among his reasons, he considers this information important for a recommendation in his report. In Chapter IX of Volume III, Analysis and Recommendations, the Commissioner recommends that when information is obtained from a country with a poor human rights record, the information should be identified as such and steps should be taken to assess its reliability. Furthermore, he recommends that reliability assessments should be updated from time to time and the most current assessments should be used by all Canadian agencies that handle such information or share it with other agencies.
[23] On this redaction, I come to the same conclusion as the Commissioner. I do not think that disclosing such information would be injurious to Canada’s international relations, national security or national defence. Even if it were found to be injurious, I think that the public interest in disclosure prevails over the public interest in non-disclosure. My reasons are to be found in the following paragraphs.
[24] I do not think that the third-party rule can help to justify an objection to disclosure. In July
2002, the head of SMI gave the information (the confession) to the RCMP without mentioning
verbally or in writing that non-disclosure should apply. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx On the other hand, they might have taken the position that a
caveat was no longer necessary.
[25] In any event, the presence or absence of a caveat has little meaning now because the redacted information is already in the public domain. The declaration of Mr. El-Maati about his detention and torture, the conclusions of the Toope Report, and the statement of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade commenting on the torture of Canadians, including Mr. Arar and Mr. El-Maati, all show that the redacted passage, as written, does not disclose any sensitive new information that is potentially injurious.
[26] In response to the argument of the Attorney General that releasing such limited information would not report this matter fully in that it would not give a complete depiction of the actions of the Canadian officials involved, and that it could mislead the public, my reading of the contents of the redaction is that the Commissioner, for the purposes of making recommendations, wants to show that a search warrant application did not contain pertinent information on the human rights record of a country and the reliability of the information collected by that country. The objective of the redaction is not to give information on Mr. El‑Maati’s factual situation but on the process followed to obtain the search warrant. If the purpose of the disclosure was of a different nature, it might be that a larger factual picture would be required, but this is not what is objectively being sought by the Commissioner. Having read the redaction as written, I conclude that it does not mislead the public but that it only informs sufficiently to meet the objective of the Commissioner’s recommendations. Careful readers will note the utility of the protected passage to a full understanding of the recommendations.
[27] Note as well that the wording of the redaction contains the opinion of the Commission, not the opinion of the Government of Canada, when it says that the country has a poor human rights record and that the information was possibly obtained from torture. On this, Mr. Daniel Livermore, an affiant for the Applicant, who was Director General, Bureau of Security and Intelligence in Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada from 2002 to 2006, saw no problem if the Commission expressed such an opinion.
Question: And if the Commission, in general terms, would say “a” country has a poor human rights record, without being specific about the name of the country, would that be a problem?
Answer: I don’t think that would be a problem, and I could make it more specific too. We would certainly not have a problem if the Commission were to say that Syria and Jordan had poor human rights records either.
[28] This is just what the redacted passage in question does. Therefore, the evidence as presented by the Attorney General does not permit a conclusion that the disclosure of this passage would be injurious to our international relations or national security or would breach the third-party rule. The burden has not been met.
[29] Having said that, even if the disclosure of the redaction caused some injury to our international relations or our national security, the interest in public disclosure prevails over the public interest in non-disclosure.
[30] The facts surrounding the contents of the redaction indicate that Syria may well not have
seen the information as requiring a protection not to disclose. Xxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx
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[31] The record also shows that Mr. El-Maati’s account of torture while detained in Syria was “convincing”, in the opinion of Professor Toope, and that it is public knowledge that Syria tortures detainees.
[32] Finally, as noted above, the Commission recommends that if Canada obtains information from a country with a poor human rights record, this fact must be made known and taken into account, and that the country’s condition and record must be assessed periodically. Although a recommendation in itself is not a justification to disclose protected information, it can certainly be taken into consideration.
[33] On the other hand, the public interest in non-disclosure is not supported by the facts of this case. The Syrians did not seek protection under the third-party rule when they gave the information to the Canadian agency. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx There is ample evidence of Syria’s poor human rights record. The Minister of Foreign Affairs criticized Syria for torturing two individuals in detention there. When weighing all these factors in favour of one interest over another, it is natural to conclude that there is a higher public interest in disclosure.
7.6.3.7.
Application for telephone warrant … in September 2002, the RCMP filed an application for telephone warrant …
Analysis and recommendations, Volume III p. 87 (127)
[34] As can be seen from this second redacted passage, it is more informative than the previous one. It refers to Syria, a country with a poor human rights record, to Mr. El‑Maati’s confession which included some damaging facts and to the telephone warrant application presented in September 2002. The RCMP stated that the information on Mr. El‑Maati was accurate and true, without any further comment; the fact that he stated that he was tortured was not documented and that important information was not given to the judge. In particular, the warrant application of September 2002 does not comment on:
- the human rights record of Syria;
- the public record of torture by SMI;
- Mr. El‑Maati being in good physical condition in August 2002, not November 2001, the time the confession was given to SMI.
[35] On this redaction, I come to the same conclusion as the previous one for the same reasons as before and the following reasons as well.
[36] This warrant application is for telephone intercepts, not searches. The application was made
in September 2002 and the RCMP had obtained Mr. El‑Maati’s confession from the head of SMI in
July 2002. As indicated before, the information was communicated without a non-disclosure caveat.
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xxx. This redaction is more detailed than the previous one. It refers to Mr. El‑Maati and some of his
confession, but his declaration that he was tortured while detained in Syria is not mentioned and
there is a statement by the RCMP that it had corroborating information to support the confession. It
remains that the application did not state whether or not Mr. El‑Maati was tortured when he made
his confession, but that when he was interviewed by Foreign Affairs in August 2002, he appeared to
be in good condition.
[37] For the reasons given before, the claim for the third-party non-disclosure rule with respect to Syria cannot stand since Mr. El‑Maati’s confession document was given by the head of SMI without a non-disclosure caveat (explicit or otherwise).
[38] No doubt, such a comment by the Commissioner can affect the RCMP’s reputation, but such a situation should not be seen as protection from disclosure on the grounds of international relations, the third-party rule or national security. Embarrassment may result from disclosing such information, but national security may not be invoked to protect one from such embarrassment.
[39] Finally, as the Commissioner explained, the Commission’s role under its terms of reference is to make recommendations based on facts gathered during the investigation. Without facts, there can be no meaningful recommendations. Unless strong considerations of international relations or national security indicate otherwise, the Commissioner must be able to associate facts with the pertinent recommendations. This is what he has done and this is what the contents of the redaction show. For the reasons given above for the previous and present redactions, no injury can be identified, and even if there were injury, the public interest in disclosure must prevail for the reasons already mentioned in the analysis of the previous redacted passage.
B) Passages referring to CIA and FBI interest in Project A‑O Canada and the interaction with the RCMP and to a lesser degree CSIS
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Volume II: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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Volume III: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[40] For the purpose of the following analysis and as an opening comment, this application is to be treated separately from other section 38 files. The establishment of the Commission by the Government has created an unusual situation which does not necessarily and automatically apply to other applications under section 38. Each case must be looked at individually, in light of the particular circumstances. A Commission of Inquiry, because of its fact-finding duties, does disclose facts that would not normally be revealed. The present application has to be assessed in that light, keeping in mind that in conventional circumstances certain principles sometimes have to be protected, such as the collaboration of intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
[41] It is the position of the Attorney General that there should be no mention of the CIA’s interaction with CSIS’s investigation or Project A‑O Canada, the RCMP and the FBI’s interest in such an investigation or the interaction with the two Canadian agencies.
[42] The Canadian public knows that there is some interaction between Canadian and American agencies. This is in the public domain, especially since 9/11. It is expected that they have some ongoing relations. It would not be in the interest of either country if they did not interact.
[43] A reading of the public report of the Commission shows numerous references to the CIA and the FBI, for many considerations and reasons. In fact, the CIA is mentioned 10 times in Vol. I, 9 times in Vol. 2 and 5 times in Vol. 3 of the report, while the FBI is mentioned 257 times in Vol. 1, 20 times in Vol. 2 and 77 times in Vol. III.
[44] As noted in the Commissioner’s decision of July 6, 2006, the interest of the CIA and the FBI in the Arar investigation and others is already officially in the public domain in such a way as to indicate a certain relationship of both American agencies with their Canadian counterparts. Through an access-to-information request, the Government released an expurgated briefing note to the Solicitor General dated June 27, 2003, approved by Assistant Commissioner R. Proulx of the RCMP. This briefing note deals with the circumstances of Mr. Arar’s deportation to Syria. Among other things, this document reveals that:
- Mr. Arar was one of the persons in the RCMP’s sights as part of a large national security investigation in partnership with other Canadian agencies following the September 11 incidents. He was a peripheral subject of investigation.
- The information developed by the Canadian investigation concerning US linkages was shared with American authorities.
- On October 3, 2002, both the CIA and the FBI requested the RCMP’s assistance in acquiring any information to support criminal charges against Mr. Arar in the United States.
- Mr. Arar was currently the subject of a national security investigation in Canada and a subject of interest.
[45] This information clearly indicates that the CIA and the FBI had an interest in Mr. Arar and that they were seeking information from the RCMP. Therefore, this indicates interest and interaction between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. This information is known publicly and the evidence indicates that at no time did the FBI or the CIA complain about such disclosure. During the cross-examinations of some of the affiants for the Attorney General, it was mentioned that such information should not have been made public and that it was an error to do so. The Government did not officially indicate that this disclosure was an error and that the privilege should remain. It is significant that this briefing note was filed as a public exhibit with the inquiry and that viva voce evidence was heard on this exhibit in a public hearing. It was disclosed through legal means and is now part of the public record.
[46] Deputy Commissioner Loeppky (now retired) of the RCMP also dealt with the relationship between the CIA, CSIS and the RCMP when he publicly testified for the Commission on July 6, 2004. He recognized that when information of criminal activity was at issue, the CIA had dealings with the RCMP, but that CSIS had the prime responsibility for liaising with the CIA. This information confirms the general perception of Canadians insofar as the CIA’s relationship to the RCMP and CSIS is concerned.
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