Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop

Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2007-03-01
Neutral citation
2007 SCC 10
Report
[2007] 1 SCR 429
Case number
30755
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; Bastarache, Michel; Binnie, William Ian Corneil; LeBel, Louis; Deschamps, Marie; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Rothstein, Marshall
On appeal from
Ontario
Subjects
Constitutional law
Notes
SCC Case Information: 30755
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429, 2007 SCC 10
Date: 20070301
Docket: 30755
Between:
Attorney General of Canada
Appellant/Respondent on cross-appeal
and
George Hislop, Brent E. Daum, Albert McNutt, Eric Brogaard
and Gail Meredith
Respondents/Appellants on cross-appeal
‑ and ‑
Attorney General of Ontario, Attorney General of Quebec,
Attorney General of Alberta and Egale Canada Inc.
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Abella and Rothstein JJ.
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 136)
Concurring Reasons:
(paras. 137 to 165)
LeBel and Rothstein JJ. (McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, Deschamps and Abella JJ. concurring)
Bastarache J.
______________________________
Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429, 2007 SCC 10
Attorney General of Canada Appellant/Respondent on cross‑appeal
v.
George Hislop, Brent E. Daum,
Albert McNutt, Eric Brogaard
and Gail Meredith Respondents/Appellants on cross‑appeal
and
Attorney General of Ontario, Attorney General of Quebec,
Attorney General of Alberta and Egale Canada Inc. Interveners
Indexed as: Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop
Neutral citation: 2007 SCC 10.
File No.: 30755.
2006: May 16; 2007: March 1.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Abella and Rothstein JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for ontario
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Equality rights — Sexual orientation — Survivorship pensions — Whether provisions of Canada Pension Plan limiting eligibility for survivor benefits to same‑sex partners of deceased contributors who died on or after January 1, 1998 infringe right to equality — If so, whether infringement justified — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1 , 15(1) — Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑8, ss. 44(1.1) , 72 .
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Equality rights — Sexual orientation — Survivorship pensions — Whether estate has standing to advance equality rights claim on behalf of deceased survivor — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 15(1) — Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑8, s. 60(2) .
Constitutional law — Remedy — Retroactive remedy — Circumstances under which courts may limit retroactive remedy — Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52 .
Following the 1999 decision of this Court in M. v. H., the federal government amended the Canada Pension Plan (“CPP ”) in 2000 to extend survivor benefits to same‑sex partners by changing the definition of “spouse” to conform with the equality rights provisions of s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and by adding new provisions. However, under s. 44(1.1) of the CPP , eligibility was limited to same‑sex partners whose “spouse” died on or after January 1, 1998. Benefits were not retroactive to April 17, 1985, when s. 15(1) came into force, or the date of death of the “spouse”, whichever occurred later. Section 72(2) of the CPP precluded payments to same‑sex survivors for any month before July 2000, the month s. 72(2) came into force. The effect of s. 72(2) came to an end as of June 2001, because after that month, same‑sex and opposite‑sex survivors benefited from application of the general rule in s. 72(1) , which limits survivors’ arrears benefits to not more than 12 months prior to the month in which the application is received. Finally, s. 60(2) of the CPP , a general provision not affected by the 2000 amendments, limits the right of estates of survivors from obtaining benefits if the application for the benefits is not made within 12 months after the death of the survivor. A class action was commenced by same‑sex survivors (“Hislop class”), challenging the constitutionality of the four sections. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice held that ss. 44(1.1) and 72(2) violated s. 15(1) and were not justified under s. 1 of the Charter . Same‑sex survivors were granted a constitutional exemption from ss. 60(2) and 72(1) . Survivors were entitled to benefits retroactive to the later of the date of death of their partner and April 17, 1985, with interest. The Court of Appeal affirmed the finding that ss. 44(1.1) and 72(2) were unconstitutional, but held that ss. 60(2) and 72(1) did not infringe s. 15(1) . Sections 44(1.1) and 72(2) were struck down, leaving a same‑sex surviving spouse entitled to survivor benefits subject only to the 12‑month cap on arrears and the limitation on estate claims (as were all benefits claimants).
Held: The appeal and cross‑appeal should be dismissed.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Abella and Rothstein JJ.: Essential to the question of differential treatment in the s. 15(1) analysis is the choice of comparator group. Under s. 44(1.1), the appropriate comparison is between same‑sex and opposite‑sex survivors whose partners died before January 1, 1998; under s. 72(2) , it is between same‑sex and opposite‑sex survivors who applied for survivor’s pensions between July 2000 and June 2001. To frame, as suggested by the government, the comparator group in terms of the express distinction made in ss. 44(1.1) and 72(2) between two groups of survivors of same‑sex relationships, based on the date on which the relationship ended as a result of the death of one of the partners, would be to miss the fundamental reason for the 2000 CPP amendments — namely, to remedy unequal treatment between same‑sex and opposite‑sex couples. Here, the Court of Appeal was right to conclude that ss. 44(1.1) and 72(2) infringe s. 15(1) of the Charter . Both provisions treat same‑sex survivors differently from their comparator group; sexual orientation is recognized as an analogous ground of discrimination under s. 15(1) , and the differential treatment discriminated in a substantive sense. [24] [37‑38] [60]
Section 44(1.1) is not saved under s. 1 of the Charter . In an appropriate case, the matching of benefits conferred under the CPP with obligations imposed on same‑sex partners under other legislation may be a pressing and substantial objective of limits on the extension of social benefit legislation as there are complex relationships between income tax credits, pensions, supplements and other entitlements, often based on conjugal relationships. It is not enough, however, to only make general reference to these relationships. There must be an explanation supported by relevant evidence as to what those relationships are, why they are relevant and why they justify the limit on the Charter right that has been found to be violated. In the absence of such evidence in this case, matching cannot be considered to be a pressing and substantial objective of s. 44(1.1) . The absence of evidence also precludes a finding of rational connection between s. 44(1.1) and its objective and of minimal impairment of a Charter right. [47] [52‑54]
Likewise, the government has failed to establish a s. 1 justification for s. 72(2) . Where the issue is solely whether Charter relief claimants should be entitled to the same retroactive benefits expressly available to their comparator group, absent cost considerations, it is difficult to see how denial of these benefits has a pressing and substantial objective. Here, there is an absence of evidence of cost justifying the provision. In the circumstances, there is no rational connection between s. 72(2) and its objective, nor does s. 72(2) minimally impair the Charter rights of the Hislop class. [65‑66]
With respect to s. 60(2) of the CPP , the estates of those survivors who died more than 12 months before the coming into force of the 2000 amendments do not have standing to claim a s. 15(1) Charter right on behalf of the deceased survivor. The use of the term “individual” in s. 15(1) was intentional and indicates that s. 15(1) applies to natural persons only. In the context in which the claim is made here, an estate is just a collection of assets and liabilities of a person who has died. It is not an individual and it has no dignity that may be infringed. Mr. Hislop’s situation, however, is different. Although he died between the time his notice of appeal was filed in this Court and the hearing of this appeal, he obtained judgment while he was still alive. When a judgment is obtained, the cause of action upon which the judgment is based is merged in the judgment. Therefore, where a party dies pending appeal, the appeal survives even if the original cause of action would not. Although s. 15(1) rights are personal, the constitutional issues raised here are issues of public importance. Given the public interest in ensuring that questions of law related to such rights be correctly decided, an appeal from a judgment raising such issues must be allowed to survive the party’s death pending the appeal. Moreover, it is a long‑standing principle of law that a litigant should not be prejudiced by an act of the court. Accordingly, the estate of any class member who was alive on the date that argument concluded in the Superior Court of Justice and who otherwise met the requirements under the CPP is entitled to the benefit of this judgment. [71‑77]
Although the Hislop class frames its s. 72(1) argument as an adverse effect discrimination claim, what it is seeking is a retroactive Charter relief. Since such a relief is unavailable in this case, it is not necessary to undertake a s. 15(1) analysis in respect of s. 72(1) . Because courts are adjudicative bodies that, in the usual course of things, are called upon to decide the legal consequences of past happenings, they generally grant remedies that are retroactive to the extent necessary to ensure that successful litigants will have the benefit of the ruling. However, where the law changes through judicial intervention, it may be appropriate for a court to limit the retroactive effect of its judgment. While a substantial change in the law is necessary, it is not sufficient to justify purely prospective remedies. Once the “substantial change” threshold is met, factors such as good faith reliance by governments, fairness to the litigants and the need to respect the constitutional role of legislatures must be considered to determine whether it is appropriate to limit the retroactive effect of the remedy. Here, the M. v. H. decision marked a departure from pre‑existing jurisprudence on same‑sex equality rights, and all the other relevant factors also weigh in favour of limiting retroactive relief. First, given the state of the jurisprudence prior to M. v. H., the exclusion of same‑sex partners from the former CPP was based on a reasonable understanding of the state of s. 15(1) jurisprudence as it existed at the relevant time. Second, the government did not act in bad faith in failing to extend survivors’ benefits to same‑sex couples prior to M. v. H. Third, in seeking payment of arrears back as far as 1985, the Hislop class effectively overlooks the evolution in the jurisprudence of same‑sex equality rights. Its claim for a retroactive remedy is tantamount to a claim for compensatory damages flowing from the underinclusiveness of the former CPP . Imposing that sort of liability on the government, absent bad faith, unreasonable reliance or conduct that is clearly wrong, would undermine the important balance between the protection of constitutional rights and the need for effective government that is struck by the general rule of qualified immunity. [69] [86] [99‑100] [107‑117]
With respect to ss. 44(1.1) and 72(2) , the appropriate remedy under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is to strike down both provisions. Here, the extent of the inconsistency with the equality guarantee is co‑extensive with the scope of these two provisions. As such, the inconsistency can be cured without distorting or interfering with the rest of the legislative scheme. A declaration that ss. 44(1.1) and 72(2) are of no force and effect is in keeping with the scheme and obvious purpose of the 2000 amendments to extend the survivors’ benefit to same‑sex survivors. Finally, a temporary suspension of the declaration of invalidity is not appropriate in the present case. Suspensions should only be used where striking down the legislation without enacting something in its place would pose a danger to the public, threaten the rule of law or where it would result in the deprivation of benefits from deserving persons without benefiting the rights claimant. None of these factors are present here. As a result, a class member who was precluded by s. 44(1.1) or s. 72(2) from receiving the survivor’s benefit and who otherwise meets the eligibility requirements, will be entitled to payment of that benefit. The relevant date for the purpose of that payment is the date on which application was received or where no application was made because of the unconstitutional provisions, the date on which the statement of claim was filed. In no event are benefits payable in respect of a month prior to August 1999, which is the earliest month in respect of which a class member who applied for the survivor’s benefit on the day the 2000 amendments came into force could have been eligible. [121] [134]
Lastly, pre‑judgment interest is available in the instant case. The CPP is silent on the issue of pre‑judgment interest and cannot, as such, reasonably be interpreted as creating an exception to the entitlement created by s. 31 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act . [135]
Per Bastarache J.: Retroactivity of a constitutional remedy granted under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 is generally the norm in our constitutional jurisprudence, and a decision to deny such remedy — and the Hislop class’s challenge to s. 72(1) of the CPP in this case — should be based on the balancing of interests that must take place in any claim for relief from an unconstitutional law. Reliance on the existence of a substantial change of law is not an appropriate consideration in the context of Charter rights. Such an approach implies that these rights depend on judicial recognition of a new or newly recognized social environment for their genesis. By attaching importance to changing social conditions, it makes Charter rights dependent on how the majority of Canadians perceive the claimants’ rights. Society’s views of Charter claimants — especially in the context of vulnerable minorities — should not be a factor for determining whether a Charter right was part of the Constitution in 1985, or whether it sprung into existence later and thereby be a basis for denying retroactive relief. Our Constitution may change to correspond to new realities, but that does not mean that every time a new constitutional interpretation is adopted or a previous decision is overturned that the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed in our Charter have changed or that new ones have been created. There is a difference between changes in constitutional interpretation and actual constitutional change. Even if the existence of a substantial change in the law was an appropriate threshold criterion, no such change actually occurred in this case. A review of the case law after 1985 suggests that this Court did not upset established law when it handed down its decision in M. v. H. [137] [140] [143‑147] [157]
The normal retroactive effect of judgments, however, may need to be tempered in certain circumstances in order to protect other legitimate interests. Reasonable reliance, good faith, fairness to litigants and Parliament’s role are important considerations to be taken into account in deciding whether a retroactive constitutional remedy should be denied. Different considerations apply when deciding whether a suspended declaration of invalidity should be granted. A suspended declaration is a valid measure when a declaration of invalidity would pose a danger to the public, threaten the rule of law or deprive deserving persons of benefits without thereby benefiting the individual whose rights had been violated. A suspended declaration of invalidity is ultimately only a temporary limit on retroactivity; it does not determine whether governments are entitled to deny retroactive relief. It will not always be necessary to establish reasonable reliance in order to deny retroactive relief. In this case, given the state of the law pre‑M. v. H., it would be more accurate to emphasize the fact that the government was acting in good faith in the face of jurisprudential uncertainty. Finally, the nature of the constitutional violation is not relevant to deciding whether to deny a retroactive remedy. Subject to these clarifications, there is general agreement with how the majority has applied the other factors to this case. [159‑164]
Cases Cited
By LeBel and Rothstein JJ.
Distinguished: Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2007 SCC 1; considered: R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295; Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679; Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, 2003 SCC 54; referred to: M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3; Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497; Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513; Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358; R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; Stinson Estate v. British Columbia (1999), 70 B.C.L.R. (3d) 233, 1999 BCCA 761; Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326; Lew v. Lee, [1924] S.C.R. 612, aff’d [1925] A.C. 819; Reid v. Batty, [1933] O.W.N. 496, aff’d [1933] O.W.N. 817; Turner v. London and South‑Western Railway Co. (1874), L.R. 17 Eq. 561; Gunn v. Harper (1902), 3 O.L.R. 693; Hubert v. DeCamillis (1963), 41 D.L.R. (2d) 495; Monahan v. Nelson (2000), 186 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 2000 BCCA 297; In re Spectrum Plus Ltd. (in liquidation), [2005] 2 A.C. 680, [2005] UKHL 41; Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Demers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 489, 2004 SCC 46; Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721; Edwards v. Attorney‑General for Canada, [1930] A.C. 124; Reference re Same‑Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, 2004 SCC 79; Attorney General of Quebec v. Blaikie, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016; Re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714; Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357; Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145; United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971); Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405, 2002 SCC 13; Guimond v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 347; Tétreault‑Gadoury v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 22.
By Bastarache J.
Referred to: Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, 2003 SCC 54; Jim Pattison Industries Ltd. v. The Queen, [1984] 2 F.C. 954; Davidson v. Davidson (1986), 33 D.L.R. (4th) 161, leave to appeal refused, [1987] 1 S.C.R. vii; Rath v. Kemp (1996), 46 Alta. L.R. (3d) 1; Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721; Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418; R. v. Hess, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906; Reference re Same‑Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, 2004 SCC 79; M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, aff’g (1996), 96 O.A.C. 173; Andrews v. Ontario (Minister of Health) (1988), 64 O.R. (2d) 258; Vogel v. Manitoba (1992), 90 D.L.R. (4th) 84, rev’d (1995), 126 D.L.R. (4th) 72; Veysey v. Canada (Commissioner of the Correctional Service), [1990] 1 F.C. 321; Knodel v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission) (1991), 58 B.C.L.R. (2d) 356; Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554; Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513; McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229; Kane v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1997), 152 D.L.R. (4th) 738; Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493; Rosenberg v. Canada (Attorney General) (1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 577; Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679; Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2007 SCC 1.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Amendments Because of the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in M. v. H. Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 6, s. 68(2).
Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑8, ss. 2(1) “common-law partner” [ad. 2000, c. 12, s. 42(2)], “spouse” [ad. c. 30 (2nd Supp.), s. 1(3) ; rep. 2000, c. 12, s. 42(1)], 42(1) “survivor” [ad. 2000, c. 12, s. 44(3)], 44(1)(d) [repl. idem, s. 45(1) ], 44(1.1) [ad. idem, s. 45(2) ], 60(2), 72 [am. idem, s. 54 ].
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1 , 15(1) , 24(1) .
Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52(1) .
Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑50, s. 31 .
Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp .).
Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, S.C. 2000, c. 12, ss. 42 , 45(2) .
Authors Cited
Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765.
Canada. Parliament. Special Joint Committee on the Constitution of Canada. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada (1980-81), Issue No. 43, January 22, 1981, pp. 43:39‑43:44; Issue No. 44, January 23, 1981, pp. 44:6‑44:10; Issue No. 47, January 28, 1981, p. 47:88; Issue No. 48, January 29, 1981, pp. 48:4‑48:49.
Choudhry, Sujit, and Kent Roach. “Putting the Past Behind Us? Prospective Judicial and Legislative Constitutional Remedies” (2003), 21 S.C.L.R. (2d) 205.
Driedger, Elmer A. Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. Toronto: Butterworths, 1983.
Driedger, Elmer A. “Statutes: Retroactive Retrospective Reflections” (1978), 56 Can. Bar Rev. 264.
Fisch, Jill E. “Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach” (1997), 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1055.
Hogg, Peter W. Constitutional Law of Canada, vol. 2, loose‑leaf ed. Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1992 (updated 2005, release 1).
Lord Reid. “The Judge as Law Maker” (1972-1973), 12 J.S.P.T.L. 22.
Roach, Kent. Constitutional Remedies in Canada. Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1994 (loose-leaf updated 2006, release 13).
Sampford, Charles. Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
APPEAL and CROSS‑APPEAL from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (Charron, Feldman and Lang JJ.A.) (2004), 73 O.R. (3d) 641, 246 D.L.R. (4th) 644, 192 O.A.C. 331, 124 C.R.R. (2d) 1, 12 R.F.L. (6th) 71, [2004] O.J. No. 4815 (QL), setting aside in part a decision of Macdonald J. (2003), 234 D.L.R. (4th) 465, 114 C.R.R. (2d) 303, 50 R.F.L. (5th) 26, [2003] O.J. No. 5212 (QL). Appeal and cross‑appeal dismissed.
Roslyn J. Levine, Q.C., and Paul Vickery, for the appellant/respondent on cross‑appeal.
J. J. Camp, Q.C., R. Douglas Elliott, Sharon D. Matthews, Patricia A. LeFebour, R. Trent Morris and Sean M. Grayson, for the respondents/appellants on cross‑appeal.
Daniel Guttman and Janet E. Minor, for the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario.
Hugo Jean, for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec.
Nick Parker, for the intervener the Attorney General of Alberta.
Written submissions only by Cynthia Petersen for the intervener Egale Canada Inc.
The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Abella and Rothstein JJ. was delivered by
LeBel and Rothstein JJ. —
I. Introduction
1 This is an appeal by the Attorney General of Canada (“government”) from a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal upholding in part the decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and a cross-appeal by the respondents (“Hislop class”). The government appeals the finding of unconstitutionality of ss. 44(1.1) and 72(2) of the Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8 (“CPP ”), as enacted by the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, S.C. 2000, c. 12 (“MBOA ”). The Hislop class cross-appeals the finding of constitutionality of ss. 72(1) and 60(2) of the CPP and the denial of a remedy with respect thereto. We propose to dismiss both the appeal and the cross-appeal.
II. Overview
2 Under the CPP , the spouse of a contributor was entitled to apply for a survivor’s pension after the death of the contributor. If the survivor’s pension was approved, it would be payable for each month following the death of the contributor.
3 However, if the application of the survivor was not received by the government within 12 months of the death of the contributor, the arrears that could be claimed by the survivor were limited to a 12-month period preceding the receipt of the application. For example, if the contributor died in January 1995, and the survivor’s application was not received by the government until March 1998, the maximum monthly pension arrears that could be claimed would be for 12 months preceding March 1998.
4 Until July 2000, for purposes of entitlement to a survivor’s pension under the CPP , the survivor had to have been married to the contributor or had to be a person of the opposite sex who was cohabiting with the contributor in a conjugal relationship at the time of the contributor’s death. Same-sex conjugal relationships were not recognized and the survivor of a same-sex conjugal relationship was not eligible to receive a survivorship pension under the CPP .
5 In M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, this Court struck down the opposite-sex definition of spouse in the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, as contrary to s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . The declaration of invalidity was suspended for six months to give the Ontario government time to review the legislation. As a consequence of M. v. H., the federal government and the governments of other provinces also amended a number of their statutes to address the constitutional deficiency. The federal government enacted the MBOA , which amended 68 pieces of legislation. This appeal involves a constitutional challenge to remedial amendments made to the CPP by the MBOA to recognize same-sex conjugal relationships for the purpose of entitlement to survivor’s pensions under the CPP .
6 The Hislop class commenced a class action claiming that the MBOA ’s remedial amendments to the CPP were contrary to s. 15(1) of the Charter as being underinclusive. There are four issues to consider. First, the amendments restricted eligibility for survivor benefits under the CPP to survivors of same-sex conjugal relationships whose partners died on or after January 1, 1998. The Hislop class argued that survivors of contributing partners of same-sex conjugal relationships who died anytime after s. 15(1) of the Charter became effective (April 17, 1985) should be eligible to make an application for CPP survivorship benefits. The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed with the Hislop class and found that the eligibility restriction violated s. 15(1) of the Charter and that the restriction could not be justified under s. 1 . In other words, survivors of same-sex conjugal relationships in which the contributors died any time after April 17, 1985 should be eligible to receive survivor’s pensions. We agree with that conclusion.
7 Second, for eligible same-sex survivors, the MBOA remedial amendments granted monthly pension payments commencing in July 2000, when the amendments came into force. As such, the amendments did not grant benefits retroactively. Irrespective of when the same-sex survivor became eligible, the monthly pension payments would not commence before July 2000.
8 The Hislop class argued that survivors of same-sex conjugal relationships should be entitled to retroactive benefits from the time of death of the same-sex conjugal contributing partner. The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the Hislop class’s claim for retroactive benefits.
9 The third and fourth issues are of less pervasive significance. In respect of the third issue, as explained earlier, general provisions of the CPP unaffected by MBOA amendments allowed for monthly pension arrears for up to 12 months preceding the receipt by the government of an application for benefits. The Ontario Court of Appeal found that the MBOA amendments that granted benefits commencing in July 2000, without entitling a same-sex survivor the opportunity of up to 12 months of arrears as was available to opposite-sex survivors, were contrary to s. 15 of the Charter and could not be justified under s. 1 .
10 As to the fourth issue, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that estates of same-sex survivors have no standing to claim a remedy for breach of s. 15(1) of the Charter .
III. Statutory Provisions at Issue
11 Prior to the MBOA , “spouse” was defined in the CPP as:
Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8
2. (1) . . .
“spouse”, in relation to a contributor, means,
(a) except in or in relation to section 55,
(i) if there is no person described in subparagraph (ii), a person who is married to the contributor at the relevant time, or
(ii) a person of the opposite sex who is cohabiting with the contributor in a conjugal relationship at the relevant time, having so cohabited with the contributor for a continuous period of at least one year, and
(b) in or in relation to section 55, a person who is married to the contributor at the relevant time,
and, in the case of a contributor’s death, the “relevant time”, for greater certainty, means the time of the contributor’s death;
12 The MBOA came into force on July 31, 2000. Section 42(1) of the MBOA repealed the definition of spouse in the CPP . Section 42(2) of the MBOA substituted a definition of “common-law partner”. In that definition there is no express or implied reference to the gender of the partners. The definition of “common-law partner” reads:
2. (1) In this Act,
. . .
“common-law partner”, in relation to a contributor, means a person who is cohabiting with the contributor in a conjugal relationship at the relevant time, having so cohabited with the contributor for a continuous period of at least one year. For greater certainty, in the case of a contributor’s death, the “relevant time” means the time of the contributor’s death.
13 By a series of other MBOA amendments to the CPP , survivors of same-sex conjugal relationships became entitled to receive benefits under the CPP . However, by s. 45(2) of the MBOA , s. 44(1.1) of the CPP was added whereby no survivorship pension would be payable to survivors of same-sex conjugal relationships unless they became survivors on or after January 1, 1998. In other words, if the partner of the same-sex survivor died before January 1, 1998, the survivor would not be eligible for a survivorship pension under the CPP . Section 44(1.1) provides:
44. . . .
(1.1) In the case of a common-law partner who was not, immediately before the coming into force of this subsection, a person described in subparagraph (a)(ii) of the definition “spouse” in subsection 2(1) as that definition read at that time, no survivor’s pension shall be paid under paragraph (1)(d) unless the common-law partner became a survivor on or after January 1, 1998.
14 A second provision added by the MBOA was s. 72(2) of the CPP . Section 72(2) operated to preclude payments to same-sex survivors for any month before July 2000, the month s. 72(2) came into force. Section 72(2) provides:
72. . . .
(2) In the case of a survivor who was the contributor’s common-law partner and was not, immediately before the coming into force of this subsection, a person described in subparagraph (a)(ii) of the definition “spouse” in subsection 2(1) as that definition read at that time, no survivor’s pension may be paid for any month before the month in which this subsection comes into force.
15 The effect of s. 72(2) was to entirely preclude retroactive pension benefits to same-sex survivors. The Hislop class’s position is that same-sex survivors should be entitled to retroactive benefits to the month following the death of their same-sex conjugal partner.
16 The incidental effect of s. 72(2) was to preclude for same-sex survivors the opportunity to seek up to 12 months of pension arrears prior to July 2000, an opportunity that was available to opposite-sex survivors under s. 72(1). Section 72(1) provides in relevant part:
72. (1) Subject to subsection (2) and section 62, where payment of a survivor’s pension is approved, the pension is payable for each month commencing with the month following
. . .
but in no case earlier than the twelfth month preceding the month following the month in which the application was received.
The effect of s. 72(2) came to an end as of June 2001, because after that month, same-sex and opposite-sex survivors benefited from the application of the general rule in s. 72(1).
17 As indicated, s. 72(1) limits survivors’ arrears benefits to not more than 12 months prior to the month in which the application is received. The Hislop class says that s. 72(1) imposes adverse effect discrimination on survivors of same-sex conjugal relationships. While s. 72(1) is facially neutral, access to survivorship pensions for same-sex survivors was not recognized until the enactment of the MBOA . Thus, even if s. 72(2) was struck down, the effect of s. 72(1) is to limit same-sex survivors from claiming benefits for more than 12 months prior to when their application was made. The Hislop class argues that s. 72(1) should be suspended to enable same-sex survivors to obtain payment of pension benefits back to when their same-sex partner died.
18 Finally, s. 60(2) of the CPP , a general provision not affected by the MBOA , limited the right of estates of survivors from obtaining benefits if the application for the benefits is not made within 12 months after the death of the survivor. Section 60(2) provides:
60. . . .
(2) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, but subject to subsections (2.1) and (2.2), an application for a benefit, other than a death benefit, that would have been payable in respect of a month to a deceased person who, prior to the person’s death, would have been entitled on approval of an application to payment of that benefit under this Act may be approved in respect of that month only if it is made within 12 months after the death of that person by the estate, the representative or heir of that person or by any person that may be prescribed by regulation.
19 The Hislop class says that s. 60(2) should be suspended to enable estates of survivors of same-sex conjugal relationships to claim retroactive benefits for the period during which the survivor would have been entitled to benefits had same-sex survivors been recognized by the CPP as of the date of the death of the contributor. The suspension of s. 60(2) would only avail to the benefit of estates if ss. 44(1.1) and 72(2) are found to be unconstitutional.
IV. Judicial History
A. Ontario Superior Court of Justice (2003), 234 D.L.R. (4th) 465
20 Macdonald J. found that all the respondents in this case were in conjugal relationships with their same-sex partners for a number of years. She considered whether ss. 44(1.1) and 72(2) of the CPP breached s. 15(1) of the Charter , using the three‑part analysis set out in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497. The comparator group chosen by the Hislop class was married heterosexual couples. The trial judge agreed and found that the legislation treats same-sex survivors differently than survivors of married or opposite-sex common-law relationships. She observed that in Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, at para. 13, it was found that “‘sexual orientation’ is an analogous ground under s. 15(1) ”. The judge also found that ss. 44(1.1) and 72(2) offended Hislop’s human dignity. She concluded that ss. 44(1.1) and 72(2) infringed s. 15(1) of the Charter .
21 Macdonald J. considered the government’s argument that the Hislop class’s claim amounted to an impermissible claim for retroactive benefits for a breach of the Charter . She held that this Court’s judgment in Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358, provided “a complete answer to the arguments raised by the Crown” (para. 99). In her view, “. . . discrimination was experienced after the coming into force of s. 15 of the Charter . The plaintiffs have actually experienced discrimination since before the passage of the Charter , but they seek to apply the Charter prospectively, to discrimination that took place after April 17, 1985” (ibid.). She held that the government had failed to demonstrate that the exclusion of same‑sex survivors’ pensions was a reasonable limit on the Hislop class’s Charter rights under s. 1 of the Charter .
22 Macdonald J. held that ss. 44(1.1) and 72(2) violated s. 15(1) of the Charter and were not justified under s. 1 . Under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 , she granted same‑sex survivors a constitutional exemption from the two general sections (ss. 60(2) and 72(1) ) of the CPP . She also awarded interest under s. 31 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50 , on the unpaid survivors’ pensions from February 1, 1992 or one month after the death of the contributor, whichever is later. She also awarded costs at approximately $1.3 million. She dismissed the Hislop class’s claims for symbolic damages of $20,000 for each class member under s. 24(1) of the Charter , and their claims for damages for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment.
B. Ontario Court of Appeal (Charron, Feldman and Lang JJ.A.) (2004), 73 O.R. (3d) 641
23 The Court of Appeal affirmed Macdonald J.’s decision with regard to the unconstitutionality of ss. 44(1.1) and 72(2) . However, the court queried why the trial judge considered ss. 60(2) and 72(1) in her analysis of remedy but did not review them in her s. 15(1) or s. 1 analysis. The court was informed that the trial judge’s remedy analysis followed the argument as presented at trial by the Hislop class’s counsel. The court invited written submissions as to the constitutional validity of ss. 60(2) and 72(1). The court then found that it had the necessary factual foundation and jurisdiction to consider the constitutional validity of these sections and that they must be subjected to a s. 15 and a s. 1 Charter analysis.
24 The court concluded that ss. 44(1.1) and 72(2) offended s. 15(1) of the Charter . The court found that the appropriate comparator group is opposite‑sex surviving partners and that, although the impugned sections contain temporal distinctions as the government argued, those distinctions apply only to same‑sex surviving partners and not to opposite‑sex survivors. Both ss. 44(1.1) and 72(2) treat same‑sex survivors differently from their comparator group. The court said that sexual orientation is now recognized as an analogous ground under s. 15(1) of the Charter . The differential treatment discriminated in a substantive sense, and the discrimination could not be justified under s. 1 .
25 In dealing with s. 60(2), the Court of Appeal held that estates could not make a s. 15(1) Charter application because s. 15(1) only applies to “[e]very individual”. Survivors’ estates enjoy no s. 15(1) rights and there was no basis to assess whether such rights were breached by s. 60(2) .
26 With respect to s. 72(1), the court held that it did not limit same-sex survivors’ rights. The court observed, at para. 106, that “[i]t is only once s. 44(1.1) and s. 72(2) are declared unconstitutional that s. 72(1) may have an adverse effect” on the Hislop class, by limiting pension entitlement to 12 months of arrears, no matter when the partner died. Most same-sex survivors did not apply for the survivor’s pension when their partners died, because they wer