Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General)

Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General)
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2015-05-14
Neutral citation
2015 SCC 25
Report
[2015] 2 SCR 282
Case number
35823
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Rothstein, Marshall; Moldaver, Michael J.; Karakatsanis, Andromache; Wagner, Richard; Gascon, Clément
On appeal from
Yukon
Subjects
Constitutional law
Courts
Notes
SCC Case Information: 35823
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 282
Date: 20150514
Docket: 35823
Between:
Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23
Appellant
and
Attorney General of the Yukon Territory
Respondent
- and -
Attorney General of Quebec, Attorney General of British Columbia, Attorney General for Saskatchewan, Attorney General of the Northwest Territories, Commissioner of Official Languages of Canada, Conseil scolaire francophone de la Colombie-Britannique, Fédération des parents francophones de Colombie-Britannique, Fédération des parents francophones de l’Alberta, Fédération nationale des conseils scolaires francophones and Fédération des communautés francophones et acadienne du Canada
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Rothstein, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner and Gascon JJ.
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 78)
Abella J. (McLachlin C.J. and Rothstein, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner and Gascon JJ. concurring)
Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 282
Yukon Francophone School Board,
Education Area #23 Appellant
v.
Attorney General of the Yukon Territory Respondent
and
Attorney General of Quebec,
Attorney General of British Columbia,
Attorney General for Saskatchewan,
Attorney General of the Northwest Territories,
Commissioner of Official Languages of Canada,
Conseil scolaire francophone de la Colombie-Britannique,
Fédération des parents francophones de Colombie-Britannique,
Fédération des parents francophones de l’Alberta,
Fédération nationale des conseils scolaires francophones and
Fédération des communautés francophones
et acadienne du Canada Interveners
Indexed as: Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General)
2015 SCC 25
File No.: 35823.
2015: January 21; 2015: May 14.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Rothstein, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner and Gascon JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for yukon
Courts — Judges — Impartiality — Reasonable apprehension of bias — Allegation that judge’s comments and interventions at trial as well as his community involvement before and after appointment as a judge gave rise to reasonable apprehension of bias — Whether judge’s conduct and community involvement raised reasonable apprehension of bias.
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Whether school board can unilaterally decide to admit students who are not covered by s. 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms .
The Yukon Francophone School Board is the first and only school board in the Yukon. It has responsibility for one school, École Émilie-Tremblay, a French-language school founded in 1984. In 2009, the Board sued the Yukon government for what it claimed were deficiencies in the provision of minority language education. The trial judge ruled in the Board’s favour on most issues.
The Court of Appeal concluded that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the trial judge based on a number of incidents during the trial as well as the trial judge’s involvement as a governor of a philanthropic francophone community organization in Alberta. Accordingly, it ordered a new trial except on three issues, only two of which were appealed to this Court: the trial judge’s conclusion that, under s. 23 of the Charter , the Board had the unilateral right to set admission criteria so as to include students who are not covered by s. 23 ; and the trial judge’s decision that the Yukon is required to communicate with the Board in French.
Held: The appeal from the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias requiring a new trial is dismissed, but the Board’s claims pursuant to the Languages Act should be joined with the other issues remitted by the Court of Appeal for determination at a new trial.
The test for a reasonable apprehension of bias is what would a reasonable, informed person think. The objective is to protect public confidence in the legal system by ensuring not only the reality, but the appearance of a fair adjudicative process. Impartiality and the absence of bias have developed as both legal and ethical requirements. Judges are required — and expected — to approach every case with impartiality and an open mind. Because there is a presumption of judicial impartiality, the test for a reasonable apprehension of bias requires a real likelihood or probability of bias. Judicial impartiality and neutrality do not mean that a judge must have no prior conceptions, opinions or sensibilities. Rather, they require that the judge’s identity and experiences not close his or her mind to the evidence and issues. The reasonable apprehension of bias test recognizes that while judges must strive for impartiality, they are not required to abandon who they are or what they know. A judge’s identity and experiences are an important part of who he or she is, and neither neutrality nor impartiality is inherently compromised by them. Judges should be encouraged to experience, learn and understand “life” — their own and those whose lives reflect different realities. The ability to be open-minded is enhanced by such knowledge and understanding. Impartiality thus demands not that a judge discount or disregard his or her life experiences or identity, but that he or she approach each case with an open mind, free from inappropriate and undue assumptions.
In the present case, the threshold for a finding of a reasonable apprehension of bias has been met. In addition to several disparaging and disrespectful remarks made by the trial judge and directed at counsel for the Yukon, several incidents occurred which, when viewed in the circumstances of the entire trial, lead inexorably to this conclusion.
The first was the trial judge’s conduct during an incident where counsel for the Yukon attempted to cross-examine a witness based on confidential information contained in student files. After hearing some argument on the confidentiality issue, the trial judge told counsel he would entertain additional arguments on the matter the following day. However, he started the next day’s proceedings with a ruling unfavourable to the Yukon and without giving the parties an opportunity to present further argument. While this by itself is unwise, the trial judge’s refusal to hear the Yukon’s arguments after his ruling, and his reaction to counsel, are more disturbing. He both characterized the Yukon’s behaviour as reprehensible and accused counsel for the Yukon of playing games. Viewed in the context of the entire record, the trial judge’s conduct was troubling and problematic.
The trial judge’s treatment of the Yukon’s request to submit affidavit evidence from a witness who had suffered a stroke was also improper. The judge accused counsel for the Yukon of trying to delay the trial, criticized him for waiting half-way through the trial to make the application, suggested that the incident amounted to bad faith on the part of the government, and warned counsel for the Yukon that he could be ordered to pay costs personally if he brought the application. There was no basis for the accusations and criticism levelled at counsel and, viewed in the context of the rest of the trial, this incident provides further support for a finding of a reasonable apprehension of bias.
Moreover, the trial judge’s refusal to allow the Yukon to file a reply on costs is highly problematic in the overall context of the trial. After the release of his reasons on the merits, the trial judge required each party to file their costs submissions on the same day. To the Yukon’s surprise, the Board sought not only solicitor-client costs, but also punitive damages and solicitor-client costs retroactive to 2002. The trial judge’s refusal to allow the Yukon to file a reply factum is questionable, particularly in light of the fact that the Yukon could not have known the quantum of costs sought by the Board at the time it filed its factum. The judge’s refusal is made all the more worrisome by his decision to award a lump-sum payment to the Board, in addition to retroactive costs.
All of these incidents, taken together and viewed in their context, would lead a reasonable and informed person to see the trial judge’s conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
However, the Court of Appeal erred when it concluded that the trial judge’s current service as a governor of the Fondation franco-albertaine substantially contributed to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Membership in an association affiliated with the interests of a particular race, nationality, religion, or language is not, without more, a basis for concluding that a perception of bias can reasonably be said to arise. Canada has devoted a great deal of effort to creating a more diverse bench. That very diversity should not operate as a presumption that a judge’s identity closes the judicial mind.
In the present case, it is difficult to see how, based on the evidence, one could conclude that the Fondation franco-albertaine’s vision could be said to “clearly align” with certain positions taken by Board in this case or that the trial judge’s involvement in the organization foreclosed his ability to approach this case with an open mind. Standing alone, vague statements about the organization’s mission and vision do not displace the presumption of impartiality. Although consideration of the trial judge’s current role as governor of the Fondation franco-albertaine was a valid part of the contextual bias inquiry in this case, his involvement with an organization whose functions are largely undefined on the evidence cannot be said to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
The Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the Board could not unilaterally decide whom to admit to its school should not be disturbed. There is no doubt that a province or territory can delegate the function of setting admission criteria for children of non-rights holders to a school board. This delegation can include granting a minority language school board wide discretion to admit the children of non-rights holders. In this case, however, the Yukon has not delegated the function of setting admission criteria for the children of non-rights holders to the Board. In the absence of any such delegation, there is no authority for the Board to unilaterally set admission criteria which are different from what is set out in the territorial regulation applicable to French-language instruction.
This, however, does not preclude the Board from claiming that the Yukon has insufficiently ensured compliance with s. 23 , and nothing stops the Board from arguing that the Yukon’s approach to admissions prevents the realization of s. 23 ’s purpose.
Finally, it is unclear why the Court of Appeal decided that this case was not a suitable vehicle for determination of rights under the Yukon’s Languages Act. The Board’s claims raise significant factual issues that may well lead to a finding that parts of the claims were justified and should be determined at the new trial with the benefit of a full evidentiary record.
Cases Cited
Discussed: R. v. S. (R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484; referred to: Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369; Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2003 SCC 45, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 259; C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539; Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, rev’g on other grounds (2001), 53 O.R. (3d) 641; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817; Ruffo v. Conseil de la magistrature, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 267; R. v. Lippé, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114; Valente v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673; Cojocaru v. British Columbia Women’s Hospital and Health Centre, 2013 SCC 30, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 357; Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 851; Brouillard v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 39; Jones v. National Coal Board, [1957] 2 All E.R. 155; Take and Save Trading CC v. Standard Bank of SA Ltd., 2004 (4) S.A. 1; South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union v. Irvin & Johnson Ltd. (Seafoods Division Fish Processing), 2000 (3) S.A. 705; Locabail (U.K.) Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd., [2000] Q.B. 451; Mahe v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342; Quebec (Education, Recreation and Sports) v. Nguyen, 2009 SCC 47, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 208; Attorney General of Quebec v. Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66; Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 14, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 201; Conseil scolaire francophone de la Colombie-Britannique v. British Columbia, 2013 SCC 42, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 774.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 1.
Alberta Act, S.C. 1905, c. 3 (reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 20), s. 17.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 23 .
Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 93 , 93A .
Constitution Act, 1982, s. 59 .
Constitution Amendment, 1997 (Quebec), SI/97-141, s. 1.
Constitution Amendment, 1998 (Newfoundland Act), SI/98-25, s. 1(2).
Education Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.2, s. 293.
Education Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 61.
Education Act, 1995, S.S. 1995, c. E-0.2, s. 144.
French First Language Instruction Regulations, P.E.I. Reg. EC480/98, s. 10.
French Language Instruction Regulation, Y.O.I.C. 1996/99, ss. 2, 9.
Languages Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 133, s. 6.
Manitoba Act, 1870, S.C. 1870, c. 3 (reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 8), s. 22.
Northwest Territories Act , S.C. 2014, c. 2 [as en. by the Northwest Territories Devolution Act , S.C. 2014, c. 2, s. 2 ], s. 18(1) (o).
Nunavut Act, S.C. 1993, c. 28, s. 23(1) (m).
Public Schools Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. P250, s. 21.15(5).
Saskatchewan Act, S.C. 1905, c. 42 (reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 21), s. 17.
School Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 412, s. 166.24.
Yukon Act, S.C. 2002, c. 7, s. 18(1)(o).
Authors Cited
Barak, Aharon. The Judge in a Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.
Canadian Judicial Council. Commentaries on Judicial Conduct. Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 1991.
Canadian Judicial Council. Ethical Principles for Judges. Ottawa: The Council, 1998.
Cardozo, Benjamin N. The Nature of the Judicial Process. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921.
Laskin, Bora. “The Common Law is Alive and Well — And, Well?” (1975), 9 L. Soc’y Gaz. 92.
Minow, Martha. “Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors” (1992), 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1201.
Webber, Jeremy. “The Limits to Judges’ Free Speech: A Comment on the Report of the Committee of Investigation into the Conduct of the Hon. Mr Justice Berger” (1984), 29 McGill L.J. 369.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Yukon Court of Appeal (Groberman, Bennett and MacKenzie JJ.A.), 2014 YKCA 4, 351 B.C.A.C. 216, 599 W.A.C. 216, [2014] Y.J. No. 6 (QL), 2014 CarswellYukon 10 (WL Can.), setting aside a decision of Ouellette J., 2011 YKSC 57, [2011] Y.J. no132 (QL), 2011 CarswellYukon 67 (WL Can.), and ordering a new trial. Appeal largely dismissed.
Roger J. F. Lepage, Francis P. Poulin and André Poulin-Denis, for the appellant.
François Baril, Maxime Faille and Mark Pindera, for the respondent.
Dominique A. Jobin, for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec.
Karrie Wolfe, for the intervener the Attorney General of British Columbia.
Alan F. Jacobson and Barbara C. Mysko, for the intervener the Attorney General for Saskatchewan.
Guy Régimbald, for the intervener the Attorney General of the Northwest Territories.
Pascale Giguère and Mathew Croitoru, for the intervener the Commissioner of Official Languages of Canada.
Robert W. Grant, Q.C., Maxine Vincelette and David P. Taylor, for the interveners Conseil scolaire francophone de la Colombie-Britannique and Fédération des parents francophones de Colombie-Britannique.
Nicolas M. Rouleau and Sylvain Rouleau, for the intervener Fédération des parents francophones de l’Alberta.
Mark C. Power and Justin Dubois, for the interveners Fédération nationale des conseils scolaires francophones and Fédération des communautés francophones et acadienne du Canada.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
[1] Abella J. — After a trial involving claims by the Yukon Francophone School Board about minority language education rights, the trial judge found that the Yukon government had failed to comply with its obligations under s. 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . Based largely on the conduct of the trial judge, the Court of Appeal concluded that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias and ordered a new trial. That conduct is at the centre of this appeal.
Background
[2] The Yukon Francophone School Board was established in 1996 and is the first and only school board in the Yukon. Public schools are generally administered directly by the Yukon government in consultation with school councils. Under the Education Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 61, school boards have considerably more authority than school councils. The Yukon Francophone School Board has responsibility for one school, École Émilie-Tremblay, a French-language school founded in 1984.
[3] In 2009, the Board sued the Yukon government for what it claimed were deficiencies in the provision of minority language education. The trial took place in two phases. A number of incidents occurred during the trial which set the stage for the bias argument in the Court of Appeal. It is worth noting that, even during the course of the trial, the Yukon was concerned about bias and brought a recusal motion on the ground that certain comments and decisions by the trial judge, as well as his involvement in the francophone community in Alberta both before and during his time as a judge, gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The trial judge dismissed the motion, finding that many of the acts complained of by the Yukon were procedural in nature and involved decisions of a discretionary nature. He also concluded that his involvement in the francophone community created no reasonable apprehension of bias, observing that counsel for the Yukon did not raise the issue when the case was assigned nor at an earlier point in the proceedings.
[4] The trial judge’s decision on the merits touched on a number of issues, only two of which remain relevant in this appeal. He concluded that the Yukon had failed to give the Board adequate management and control of French-language education in accordance with s. 23 of the Charter and the Education Act, and that the Board had the authority to determine which students would be admitted to the French school, including those not expressly contemplated by s. 23 of the Charter . He also ordered the Yukon to communicate with and provide services to the Board in French, in compliance with s. 6 of the Languages Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 133. The Yukon government appealed.
[5] On appeal, the Court of Appeal noted that an apprehension of bias can arise either from what a judge says or does during a hearing, or from extrinsic evidence showing that the judge is likely to have strong predispositions preventing him or her from impartially considering the issues in the case. After reviewing the transcript and the trial judge’s written rulings, the Court of Appeal concluded that, based on a number of incidents as well as on the trial judge’s involvement in the francophone community, the threshold for a finding that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias had been met. It referred to a number of problematic occurrences during the trial.
[6] The first related to an incident involving the confidentiality of student files. At one point during the trial, counsel for the Yukon, using information in student files, attempted to cross-examine a parent who testified that his children had transferred from the French school because it lacked special needs resources. Counsel for the Board objected, arguing in part that the files were confidential.
[7] The trial judge heard general submissions on the issue and expressed concern that the Yukon may have breached its confidentiality obligations by sharing the files with its counsel. He indicated, however, that the issue was very important and that he would entertain additional arguments the following morning. The next morning, rather than invite further submissions, the trial judge instead immediately commenced the proceedings by ruling that, by sharing the files, the Yukon appeared to have violated the Education Act and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 1. In the trial judge’s view, such conduct was [translation] “objectionable and reprehensible”.
[8] After the ruling, counsel for the Yukon, who had intended to present further argument on the issue, reminded the trial judge that he had indicated the previous day that he would entertain additional submissions. The trial judge, however, refused to hear further argument, instead repeatedly asking counsel whether he had obtained consent to use the files. When counsel reminded the judge that both parties had disclosed many student records during the discovery process, the trial judge accused him of playing games.
[9] In reviewing the incident, the Court of Appeal found that although there was no obvious explanation for the trial judge’s decision to start the proceedings before hearing from counsel with a ruling suggesting that the Yukon had breached its confidentiality obligations by sharing the files, this by itself did not necessarily reflect an animus against the Yukon and its counsel. But his reaction to counsel’s subsequent attempt to raise concerns and draw his attention to statutory provisions which had been overlooked, was more troubling. In the Court of Appeal’s view, “[i]t [did] not appear that the judge’s questions were genuinely directed at obtaining information; rather the impression left by the transcript is that the judge was, in effect, taunting counsel.”
[10] Similarly, when another issue involving the confidentiality of student files arose again later in the trial, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge’s criticism that counsel’s submissions lacked conviction and sincerity, was not justified. It was also concerned more generally that the trial judge’s treatment of counsel “with a lack of respect on many occasions during the trial” contributed to the conclusion that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.
[11] In another rebuke, the Court of Appeal was of the view that the trial judge’s treatment of the Yukon’s request to submit affidavit evidence from one of its witnesses was unwarranted. The Yukon anticipated calling Gordon DeBruyn, an employee with the Department of Education, to testify at the trial. Mr. DeBruyn, however, suffered a stroke just before the trial was to begin. The trial judge refused to grant the Yukon an adjournment, deciding instead to divide the trial into two phases, with the issues related to Mr. DeBruyn’s anticipated evidence deferred to the second phase.
[12] Shortly after the second phase of the trial began, counsel for the Yukon told the trial judge that he would be seeking to submit the evidence of Mr. DeBruyn by affidavit because he had not yet fully recovered from his stroke. A letter from a speech pathologist confirmed that Mr. DeBruyn continued to experience mild residual aphasia and that being confronted with questions during cross-examination could cause stress that would exacerbate his communication difficulties.
[13] Criticizing counsel for not having determined the witness’s condition earlier, the trial judge saw no basis for granting the request based on the letter from the speech pathologist. He noted that Mr. DeBruyn had returned to work and was present in the courtroom, and questioned whether he was, in fact, a necessary witness. While he told counsel that he could still bring the application, he also warned him that it could be viewed as an attempt to cause a delay in the proceedings which could result in an order for costs against him personally. Counsel accordingly decided not to make the application and Mr. DeBruyn did not testify. In describing the situation in his subsequent costs ruling, the trial judge found that the incident amounted to bad faith on the Yukon’s part.
[14] The Court of Appeal disagreed. It found that there was no basis for concluding that Mr. DeBruyn was not an important witness or, given Mr. DeBruyn’s ongoing recovery from his stroke, for criticizing counsel for waiting until the beginning of the second phase before indicating that he would be seeking to submit affidavit evidence. In accusing counsel of engaging in delaying tactics and threatening him with a personal order for costs, the trial judge’s conduct was suggestive of bias.
[15] Moreover, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge’s refusal to allow the Yukon to file reply costs submissions and his procedure for awarding costs to be “grossly unfair”. After the release of his reasons on the merits, the trial judge gave each party 14 days to make costs submissions, to be submitted at the same time. When the Yukon got the Board’s submissions, it asked the trial judge if it could file a reply because the Board sought not only solicitor-client costs, but, in addition, [translation] “punitive costs” and costs retroactive to 2002. The trial judge refused the request to make further submissions, instead asking the government provide him with [translation] “the details of and schedule for the concessions [the Yukon] will still make to the [Board]”. Based in part on his view that the evidence demonstrated bad faith and numerous breaches of s. 23 of the Charter , the trial judge awarded the Board $969,190 in costs on a solicitor-client basis as well as an additional “lump sum” of $484,595 (50% of the solicitor-client costs).
[16] The Court of Appeal set aside the costs order. Acknowledging that a reasonable apprehension of bias with respect to the costs proceeding did not necessarily amount to a reasonable apprehension of bias at trial, it was nonetheless of the view that the Yukon should have been given the opportunity to reply because it could not reasonably have anticipated the unusually expansive costs claim advanced by the Board.
[17] As for the Yukon’s bias argument about the trial judge’s involvement in the francophone community in Alberta, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge’s background before becoming a judge did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias:
The fact that the judge in this case had experience in the provision of minority language education was, in fact, a positive attribute. He was able to approach the issues with important insights gained from his experience. [para. 181]
[18] On the other hand, the Court of Appeal found his involvement as a governor of the Fondation franco-albertaine while he was a judge on this case to be inappropriate. The Fondation franco-albertaine promoted a particular vision of the francophone community which, according to the Court of Appeal, would “clearly align it with some of the positions taken by the [Board] in this case”. If the trial judge wanted to remain involved in the Fondation franco-albertaine, he had to refrain from sitting on cases such as the one under appeal. While there was nothing in the record suggesting that the Yukon knew or ought to have known about the judge’s background, in the Court of Appeal’s view, parties are not expected to research a judge’s history and are entitled to assume that the judge will disclose anything of relevant concern about his or her background.
[19] Ultimately, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge’s conduct during the trial and his association with the Fondation franco-albertaine gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. A new trial was therefore ordered on most issues. The Court of Appeal, however, did not send back all the legal issues, making determinations about two of them which were appealed to this Court. First, it held that the trial judge erred in interpreting s. 23 of the Charter to give the Board the unilateral right to set admission criteria so as to include students who are not covered by s. 23 . Second, it concluded that the trial judge erred in ordering all of the Yukon’s communications with the Board to be in French since, in its view, the s. 6 Languages Act claims were not appropriately part of the litigation.
Analysis
[20] The test for a reasonable apprehension of bias is undisputed and was first articulated by this Court as follows:
. . . what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically — and having thought the matter through — conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly. [Citation omitted.]
(Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, at p. 394, per de Grandpré J. (dissenting))
[21] This test — what would a reasonable, informed person think — has consistently been endorsed and clarified by this Court: e.g., Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 259, at para. 60; C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539, at para. 199; Miglin v. Miglin, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, at para. 26; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at para. 46; R. v. S. (R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, at para. 11, per Major J., at para. 31, per L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin JJ., at para. 111, per Cory J.; Ruffo v. Conseil de la magistrature, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 267, at para. 45; R. v. Lippé, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114, at p. 143; Valente v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, at p. 684.
[22] The objective of the test is to ensure not only the reality, but the appearance of a fair adjudicative process. The issue of bias is thus inextricably linked to the need for impartiality. In Valente, Le Dain J. connected the dots from an absence of bias to impartiality, concluding “[i]mpartiality refers to a state of mind or attitude of the tribunal in relation to the issues and the parties in a particular case” and “connotes absence of bias, actual or perceived”: p. 685. Impartiality and the absence of the bias have developed as both legal and ethical requirements. Judges are required — and expected — to approach every case with impartiality and an open mind: see S. (R.D.), at para. 49, per L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin JJ.
[23] In Wewaykum, this Court confirmed the requirement of impartial adjudication for maintaining public confidence in the ability of a judge to be genuinely open:
. . . public confidence in our legal system is rooted in the fundamental belief that those who adjudicate in law must always do so without bias or prejudice and must be perceived to do so.
The essence of impartiality lies in the requirement of the judge to approach the case to be adjudicated with an open mind. [Emphasis added; paras. 57-58.]
[24] Or, as Jeremy Webber observed, “impartiality is a cardinal virtue in a judge. For adjudication to be accepted, litigants must have confidence that the judge is not influenced by irrelevant considerations to favour one side or the other”: “The Limits to Judges’ Free Speech: A Comment on the Report of the Committee of Investigation into the Conduct of the Hon. Mr Justice Berger” (1984), 29 McGill L.J. 369, at p. 389.
[25] Because there is a strong presumption of judicial impartiality that is not easily displaced (Cojocaru v. British Columbia Women’s Hospital and Health Centre, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 357, at para. 22), the test for a reasonable apprehension of bias requires a “real likelihood or probability of bias” and that a judge’s individual comments during a trial not be seen in isolation: see Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 851, at para. 2; S. (R.D.), at para. 134, per Cory J.
[26] The inquiry into whether a decision-maker’s conduct creates a reasonable apprehension of bias, as a result, is inherently contextual and fact-specific, and there is a correspondingly high burden of proving the claim on the party alleging bias: see Wewaykum, at para. 77; S. (R.D.), at para. 114, per Cory J. As Cory J. observed in S. (R.D.):
. . . allegations of perceived judicial bias will generally not succeed unless the impugned conduct, taken in context, truly demonstrates a sound basis for perceiving that a particular determination has been made on the basis of prejudice or generalizations. One overriding principle that arises from these cases is that the impugned comments or other conduct must not be looked at in isolation. Rather it must be considered in the context of the circumstances, and in light of the whole proceeding. [Emphasis added; para. 141.]
[27] That said, this Court has recognized that a trial judge’s conduct, and particularly his or her interventions, can rebut the presumption of impartiality. In Brouillard v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 39, for example, the trial judge had asked a defence witness almost sixty questions and interrupted her more than ten times during her testimony. He also asked the accused more questions than both counsel, interrupted him dozens of times, and subjected him and another witness to repeated sarcasm. Lamer J. noted that a judge’s interventions by themselves are not necessarily reflective of bias. On the contrary,
it is clear that judges are no longer required to be as passive as they once were; to be what I call sphinx judges. We now not only accept that a judge may intervene in the adversarial debate, but also believe that it is sometimes essential for him to do so for justice in fact to be done. Thus a judge may and sometimes must ask witnesses questions, interrupt them in their testimony and if necessary call them to order. [p. 44]
[28] On the other hand, Lamer J. endorsed and applied the following cautionary comments of Lord Denning in Jones v. National Coal Board, [1957] 2 All E.R. 155 (C.A.):
Nevertheless, we are quite clear that the interventions, taken together, were far more than they should have been. In the system of trial which we have evolved in this country, the judge sits to hear and determine the issues raised by the parties, not to conduct an investigation or examination on behalf of society at large . . . . [p. 159]
(See also Take and Save Trading CC v. Standard Bank of SA Ltd., 2004 (4) S.A. 1 (S.C.A.), at para. 4.)
[29] Although Lamer J. was not convinced that the trial judge was actually biased, there was enough doubt in his mind to conclude that a new trial was warranted in the circumstances of the case.
[30] In Miglin, another case where the allegation of bias arose because of the trial judge’s interventions, this Court agreed with the Court of Appeal for Ontario that while many of the trial judge’s interventions were unfortunate and reflected impatience with one of the witnesses, the high threshold necessary to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias had not been met. The Court of Appeal observed:
The principle [that the grounds for an apprehension of bias must be substantial] was adopted and amplified in R. v. S. (R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, . . . to reflect the overriding principle that the judge’s words and conduct must demonstrate to a reasonable and informed person that he or she is open to the evidence and arguments presented. The threshold for bias is a high one because the integrity of the administration of justice presumes fairness, impartiality and integrity in the performance of the judicial role, a presumption that can only be rebutted by evidence of an unfair trial. Where, however, the presumption is so rebutted, the integrity of the justice system demands a new trial.
The assessment of judicial bias is a difficult one. It requires a careful and thorough review of the proceedings, since the cumulative effect of the alleged improprieties is more relevant than any single transgression . . . . [Citations omitted; (2001), 53 O.R. (3d) 641, at paras. 29-30.]
[31] As for how to assess the impact of a judge’s identity, experiences and affiliations on a perception of bias, Cory J.’s comments in S. (R.D.) helpfully set the stage:
Regardless of their background, gender, ethnic origin or race, all judges owe a fundamental duty to the community to render impartial decisions and to appear impartial. It follows that judges must strive to ensure that no word or action during the course of the trial or in delivering judgment might leave the reasonable, informed person with the impression that an issue was predetermined or that a question was decided on the basis of stereotypical assumptions or generalizations. [para. 120]
[32] But it is also important to remember the words of L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin JJ. in S. (R.D.), where they compellingly explained the intersecting relationship between a judge’s background and the judicial role:
. . . judges in a bilingual, multiracial and multicultural society will undoubtedly approach the task of judging from their varied perspectives. They will certainly have been shaped by, and have gained insight from, their different experiences, and cannot be expected to divorce themselves from these experiences on the occasion of their appointment to the bench. In fact, such a transformation would deny society the benefit of the valuable knowledge gained by the judiciary while they were members of the Bar. As well, it would preclude the achievement of a diversity of backgrounds in the judiciary. The reasonable person does not expect that judges will function as neutral ciphers; however, the reasonable person does demand that judges achieve impartiality in their judging.
It is apparent, and a reasonable person would expect, that triers of fact will be properly influenced in their deliberations by their individual perspectives on the world in which the events in dispute in the courtroom took place. Indeed, judges must rely on their background knowledge in fulfilling their adjudicative function. [paras. 38-39]
[33] Judicial impartiality and neutrality do not mean that a judge must have no prior conceptions, opinions or sensibilities. Rather, they require that the judge’s identity and experiences not close his or her mind to the evidence and issues. There is, in other words, a crucial difference between an open mind and empty one. Bora Laskin noted that the strength of the common law lies in part in the fact that
the judges who administer it represent in themselves and in their work a mix of attitudes and a mix of opinions about the world in which they live and about the society in which they carry on their judicial duties. It is salutary that this is so, and eminently desirable that it should continue to be so.
(“The Common Law is Alive and Well — And, Well?” (1975), 9 L. Soc’y Gaz. 92, at p. 99)
[34] The reasonable apprehension of bias test recognizes that while judges “must strive for impartiality”, they are not required to abandon who they are or what they know: S. (R.D.), at para. 29, per L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin JJ.; see also S. (R.D.), at para. 119, per Cory J. A judge’s identity and experiences are an important part of who he or she is, and neither neutrality nor impartiality is inherently compromised by them. Justice is the aspirational application of law to life. Judges should be encouraged to experience, learn and understand “life” — their own and those whose lives reflect different rea