Y.Z. v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)

Y.Z. v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2015-07-23
Neutral citation
2015 FC 892
File numbers
IMM-3700-13, IMM-5940-14
Notes
A correction was made on January 13, 2016
Reported Decision
Decision Content
Date: 20150723
Dockets: IMM-3700-13
IMM-5940-14
Citation: 2015 FC 892
Ottawa, Ontario, July 23, 2015
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Boswell
Docket: IMM-3700-13
BETWEEN:
Y.Z. AND THE CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF REFUGEE LAWYERS
Applicants
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION AND THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Respondents
Docket: IMM-5940-14
AND BETWEEN:
G.S. AND C.S.
Applicants
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTIONS:
PARAGRAPH #
I. Introduction
[1] – [6]
II. Overview of the Designated Countries of Origin Regime
[7] – [14]
III. Is section 109.1 directly in issue?
[15] – [23]
IV. Issues
[24]
V. Does CARL have standing as a public interest litigant?
[25]
A. CARL’s Arguments
[26] – [30]
B. Respondents’ Arguments
[31] – [35]
C. Analysis
[36] – [43]
VI. The Affidavit Evidence
[44] – [45]
A. The Applicants’ Affidavit Evidence
[46] – [68]
B. The Respondents’ Affidavit Evidence
[69] – [76]
C. Should the impugned affidavits be struck out?
(1) Respondents’ Arguments
[77] – [83]
(2) Applicants’ Arguments
[84] – [90]
(3) Analysis
[91] – [101]
VII. Does paragraph 110(2)(d.1) of the Act infringe subsection 15(1) of the Charter?
[102]
A. Applicants’ Arguments
[103] – [107]
B. Respondents’ Arguments
[108] – [114]
C. Analysis
[115] – [131]
VIII. Does paragraph 110(2)(d.1 of the IRPA infringe section 7 of the Charter?
[132]
A. Applicants’ Arguments
[133] – [138]
B. Respondents’ Arguments
[139] – [141]
C. Analysis
[142] – [143]
IX. If Charter rights are infringed, is paragraph 110(2)(d.1) of the IRPA justified by section 1 of the Charter?
[144]
A. Respondents’ Arguments
[145] – [151]
B. Applicants’ Arguments
[152] – [153]
C. Analysis
[154] – [170]
X. If paragraph 110(2)(d.1) of the IRPA is unconstitutional, what is an appropriate remedy?
[171] – [177]
XI. What questions should be certified?
[178] – [183]
XII. Conclusion
[184] – [185]
I. Introduction [1] As part of the reforms enacted by the Protecting Canada's Immigration System Act, SC 2012, c 17, Parliament added paragraph 110(2)(d.1) to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. This new paragraph became effective on December 10, 2012, the same date as when the Refugee Appeal Division [RAD] of the Immigration and Refugee Board [IRB] became operational under section 110 of the IRPA. (Order Fixing December 15, 2012 as the Day on which Certain Sections of the Act Come into Force, SI/2012-94, (2012) C Gaz II, 2980; IRPA s 275). Paragraph 110(2)(d.1) denies access to the RAD for all refugee claimants from any country designated by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration pursuant to section 109.1 of the IRPA.
[2] The present applications for judicial review challenge the constitutionality of paragraph 110(2)(d.1) and the mechanism for selecting which countries to designate. The Applicants allege that denying refugee claimants from designated countries of origin an appeal to the Refugee Appeal Division [RAD] violates sections 7 and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
[3] The primary Applicants are three refugee claimants from designated countries of origin [DCOs]. Y.Z. is a citizen of Croatia who fears persecution as a Serb and a gay man. G.S. and C.S. are a gay couple from Hungary whose fear is based on their sexual orientation; C.S. is also a national of Romania.
[4] The Refugee Protection Division [RPD] of the IRB found each of these three Applicants credible, but ultimately rejected their claims on the basis that there was adequate state protection in Croatia for Y.Z. and in Hungary for G.S. and C.S. They each obtained leave to apply for judicial review of those RPD decisions, and this Court determined that the RPD's conclusion about state protection was unreasonable in Y.Z.'s case and allowed his application for judicial review. That determination, however, does not impact Y.Z.'s status as a party to this matter. Unless and until the RPD determines him to be a refugee, there is still a live issue as to whether he is entitled to appeal to the RAD. The decision in G.S. and C.S.’s application for judicial review remains pending.
[5] Concurrently, the Applicants tried to challenge the constitutionality of the DCO regime by appealing to the RAD. On May 2, 2013, Y.Z.'s appeal to the RAD was dismissed before he even had time to perfect it, with the RAD simply stating that it did not have jurisdiction by virtue of paragraph 110(2)(d.1) of the IRPA. Y.Z. eventually withdrew an application to reopen his appeal. G.S. and C.S. did perfect their appeal, but it too was dismissed by the RAD on July 11, 2014. The RAD decided that it did not have jurisdiction to assess the constitutionality of any provisions in subsection 110(2) of the IRPA, and that it could only determine whether the conditions listed in this subsection were factually met (citing Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v Martin, 2003 SCC 54 at paragraphs 42 and 48, [2003] 2 SCR 504; Kroon v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 697 at paragraphs 9, 32-33 and 40, 252 FTR 257; and others).
[6] The Applicants now seek judicial review of the RAD's decisions pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the IRPA. The Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers [CARL] also applied with Y.Z. as a public interest litigant. The Respondents' motion opposing CARL's standing was not filed until December 16, 2014, more than 18 months after Y.Z and CARL filed their application for leave and for judicial review; that motion was dismissed by an order of the Court dated January 15, 2015, because it had not been brought in a diligent manner. Nonetheless, the Court's order dismissing the motion was made without prejudice to the Respondents raising the same arguments at the hearing of this matter, and they did so. The Respondents also moved to strike out many of the affidavits filed by the Applicants. That motion, which was filed on November 19, 2014, was deferred to the hearing of these consolidated applications.
II. Overview of the Designated Countries of Origin Regime [7] Teny Dikranian, one of the Respondents' witnesses, states in her affidavit that one of the principal goals of the DCO regime “is to deter abuse of [Canada's] refugee system by people who come from countries generally considered safe and 'non-refugee producing', while preserving the right of every eligible refugee claimant to have a fair hearing before the IRB.” To achieve that goal, Parliament created a separate procedure for refugee claims made by nationals of a DCO. They still have a full hearing before the RPD, but their claims are treated differently under the IRPA and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [Regulations]. The relevant legislative provisions are reproduced in Annex A to these reasons. They contemplate several unique consequences for claimants from DCOs. I will shortly review these consequences in more detail below; but for the moment the most significant consequences are summarized in the following chart:
[BLANK]
DCO Claimants
Non-DCO Claimants
IRPA and Regulations
Eligible for work permit under R206?
180 days after claim referred to RPD
Immediately after claim referred to RPD
A30(1.1); A32(d); R206(1); R206(2)
Time to RPD hearing?
Within 45 days (port of entry)
Within 30 days (inland)
Within 60 days
A100(4.1); A111.1(1)(b); A111.1(2); R159.9(1)
Eligible for RAD appeal?
No
Yes, unless otherwise precluded by A110(2)
A110(2)(d.1)
Removal order comes into force?
15 days after receiving written RPD decision
If appealed to RAD, 15 days after notice that RAD appeal rejected
Otherwise, 15 days after receiving written RPD decision
A49(2)(c); A110(2.1); R159.91(1)(a)
Automatic stay of removal until judicial review decided and any appeals exhausted?
No
Yes, if applying for judicial review of RAD decision
R231(1); R231(2)
Pre-Removal Risk Application bar?
36 months
12 months
A112(2)(b.1); A112(2)(c)
[8] The differential procedures faced by DCO claimants vis-à-vis non-DCO claimants under the IRPA are as follows:
1. Subsection 206(1) of the Regulations normally allows foreign nationals whose claims are referred to the RPD to get a work permit if they cannot support themselves without working and are subject to an unenforceable removal order. However, subsection 206(2) of the Regulations provides that a foreign national from a DCO cannot be issued a work permit unless 180 days have passed since his or her claim was first referred to the RPD.
2. Subsection 111.1(2) of the IRPA authorizes the creation of regulations that “provide for time limits [for claimants from DCOs] that are different from the time limits for other claimants” when scheduling a hearing pursuant to subsection 100(4.1) of the IRPA. This has been done by paragraph 159.9(1)(a) of the Regulations, which provides that a hearing for a DCO claimant must be scheduled within 45 days if he or she asks for protection at a port of entry, or within 30 days if he or she asks for protection inland. For claimants from non-DCOs, hearings are expected to be scheduled within 60 days no matter where they make their claim (Regulations, s 159.9(1)(b)). Subject to the availability of counsel, a hearing will be scheduled on “the date closest to the last day of the applicable time limit set out in the Regulations, unless the claimant agrees to an earlier date” (Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2012-256, ss 3(2), 3(3)(b), 54(5) [RPD Rules]). All claimants can apply to change the date of the hearing in exceptional circumstances (RPD Rules, s 54(1), 54(4)).
3. Subsection 161(1.1) of the IRPA permits the Chairperson of the IRB to differentiate between DCO and non-DCO claimants when making rules about “the information that may be required and the manner in which, and the time within which, it must be provided with respect to a proceeding before the Board” (Act, s 161(1)(c), 161(1.1)). To date, it appears that no rules which make such distinctions have yet been enacted. Claimants from any country must submit their basis of claim forms and other relevant documents as soon as their claims are referred to the RPD if their claims are made inland, or within 15 days if their claims are made at a port of entry (IRPA, ss 99(3.1), 100(4), 111.1(1)(a); Regulations, s 159.8; RPD Rules, s 7). All claimants can also ask for extensions of time (Regulations, s 159.8(3); RPD Rules, s 8).
4. DCO claimants cannot appeal a negative RPD decision to the RAD because of paragraph 110(2)(d.1):
110. … (2) No appeal [to the RAD] may be made in respect of any of the following:
110. … (2) Ne sont pas susceptibles d’appel [à la Section d’appel des réfugiés] :
…
…
(d.1) a decision of the Refugee Protection Division allowing or rejecting a claim for refugee protection made by a foreign national who is a national of a country that was, on the day on which the decision was made, a country designated under subsection 109.1(1);
(d.1) la décision de la Section de la protection des réfugiés accordant ou rejetant la demande d’asile du ressortissant d’un pays qui faisait l’objet de la désignation visée au paragraphe 109.1(1) à la date de la décision;
The same is not true of claimants from other non-DCO countries; they will only lose access to the RAD if one of the other conditions in subsection 110(2) is met (e.g., if a decision of the RPD “states that the claim has no credible basis or is manifestly unfounded” (Act, s 110(2)(c))).
5. Removal orders will typically come into force sooner for claimants from DCOs. Paragraph 49(2)(c) of the IRPA prevents a removal order for refugee claimants from coming into force until 15 days after any appeal to the RAD is rejected, which is something DCO claimants can never benefit from since they are denied an appeal to the RAD. Instead, their departure orders will come into force 15 days after they receive the RPD's written reasons for rejecting their claims, and their departure orders will become deportation orders 30 days after that unless they leave Canada before then (IRPA, ss 49(2)(c), 110(2.1); Regulations, ss 159.91(1)(a), 224(2), 240(1)(a-c); Affidavit of Christopher Raymond (20 November 2014) at paragraphs 3-5).
6. Subsection 231(1) of the Regulations grants an automatic stay of removal to refugee claimants who seek judicial review of a RAD decision, but not to those who seek judicial review of a RPD decision. Thus, DCO claimants cannot benefit from that subsection. Even if they had an appeal to the RAD because their country was only designated after the RPD had rejected their claim, subsection 231(2) ensures that these claimants will not get an automatic stay of removal if they subsequently apply for judicial review. Consequently, unless they can obtain a judicial stay of removal from this Court, DCO claimants may be removed from Canada before their applications for leave and for judicial review are even considered by this Court.
7. Unless certain exemptions are granted, paragraphs 112(2)(b.1) and (c) of the IRPA bar all refugee claimants from seeking a pre-removal risk assessment until 12 months have passed since their claim for protection was last rejected. DCO claimants, however, have to wait 36 months in the same circumstances.
[9] Designation as a DCO also affected the level of government-funded health care that claimants from DCOs received until the Order Respecting the Interim Federal Health Program, 2012, SI/2012-26, (2012) C Gaz II, 1135, was invalidated by Madam Justice Anne Mactavish in Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v Canada (AG), 2014 FC 651, 28 Imm LR (4th) 1 [Canadian Doctors].
[10] As for how a country is designated, this is governed by section 109.1 of the IRPA:
109.1 (1) The Minister may, by order, designate a country, for the purposes of subsection 110(2) and section 111.1.
109.1 (1) Le ministre peut, par arrêté, désigner un pays pour l’application du paragraphe 110(2) et de l’article 111.1.
(2) The Minister may only make a designation
(2) Il ne peut procéder à la désignation que dans les cas suivants :
(a) in the case where the number of claims for refugee protection made in Canada by nationals of the country in question in respect of which the Refugee Protection Division has made a final determination is equal to or greater than the number provided for by order of the Minister,
a) s’agissant d’un pays dont les ressortissants ont présenté des demandes d’asile au Canada sur lesquelles la Section de la protection des réfugiés a statué en dernier ressort en nombre égal ou supérieur au nombre prévu par arrêté, si l’une ou l’autre des conditions ci-après est remplie :
(i) if the rate, expressed as a percentage, that is obtained by dividing the total number of claims made by nationals of the country in question that, in a final determination by the Division during the period provided for in the order, are rejected or determined to be withdrawn or abandoned by the total number of claims made by nationals of the country in question in respect of which the Division has, during the same period, made a final determination is equal to or greater than the percentage provided for in the order, or
(i) le taux, exprimé en pourcentage, obtenu par la division du nombre total des demandes présentées par des ressortissants du pays en cause qui ont été rejetées par la Section de la protection des réfugiés en dernier ressort et de celles dont elle a prononcé le désistement ou le retrait en dernier ressort — durant la période prévue par arrêté — par le nombre total des demandes d’asile présentées par des ressortissants du pays en cause et sur lesquelles la Section a statué en dernier ressort durant la même période est égal ou supérieur au pourcentage prévu par arrêté,
(ii) if the rate, expressed as a percentage, that is obtained by dividing the total number of claims made by nationals of the country in question that, in a final determination by the Division, during the period provided for in the order, are determined to be withdrawn or abandoned by the total number of claims made by nationals of the country in question in respect of which the Division has, during the same period, made a final determination is equal to or greater than the percentage provided for in the order; or
(ii) le taux, exprimé en pourcentage, obtenu par la division du nombre total des demandes présentées par des ressortissants du pays en cause dont la Section de la protection des réfugiés a prononcé le désistement ou le retrait en dernier ressort — durant la période prévue par arrêté — par le nombre total des demandes d’asile présentées par des ressortissants du pays en cause et sur lesquelles la Section a statué en dernier ressort durant la même période est égal ou supérieur au pourcentage prévu par arrêté;
(b) in the case where the number of claims for refugee protection made in Canada by nationals of the country in question in respect of which the Refugee Protection Division has made a final determination is less than the number provided for by order of the Minister, if the Minister is of the opinion that in the country in question
b) s’agissant d’un pays dont les ressortissants ont présenté des demandes d’asile au Canada sur lesquelles la Section de la protection des réfugiés a statué en dernier ressort en nombre inférieur au nombre prévu par arrêté, si le ministre est d’avis que le pays en question répond aux critères suivants :
(i) there is an independent judicial system,
(i) il y existe des institutions judiciaires indépendantes,
(ii) basic democratic rights and freedoms are recognized and mechanisms for redress are available if those rights or freedoms are infringed, and
(ii) les droits et libertés démocratiques fondamentales y sont reconnus et il y est possible de recourir à des mécanismes de réparation pour leur violation,
(iii) civil society organizations exist.
(iii) il y existe des organisations de la société civile.
(3) The Minister may, by order, provide for the number, period or percentages referred to in subsection (2).
(3) Le ministre peut, par arrêté, prévoir le nombre, la période et les pourcentages visés au paragraphe (2).
(4) An order made under subsection (1) or (3) is not a statutory instrument for the purposes of the Statutory Instruments Act. However, it must be published in the Canada Gazette.
(4) Les arrêtés ne sont pas des textes réglementaires au sens de la Loi sur les textes réglementaires, mais sont publiés dans la Gazette du Canada.
[11] Pursuant to subsection 109.1(3), the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration [MCI] has issued an Order Establishing Quantitative Thresholds for the Designation of Countries of Origin, (2012) C Gaz I, 3378 [Thresholds Order], which prescribes the numbers used in subsection 109.1(2) as follows:
2. For the purposes of paragraphs 109.1(2)(a) and (b) of the Act, the number provided is 30 during any period of 12 consecutive months in the three years preceding the date of the designation.
2. Pour l’application des alinéas 109.1(2)a) et b) de la Loi, le nombre est de trente durant toute période de douze mois consécutifs au cours des trois années antérieures à la date de la désignation.
3. For the purposes of subparagraph 109.1(2)(a)(i) of the Act, the period provided is the same 12 months used in section 2, and the percentage is 75%.
3. Pour l’application du sous-alinéa 109.1(2)a)(i) de la Loi, la période est la même période de douze mois retenue aux termes de l’article 2 et le pourcentage est de 75 %.
4. For the purposes of subparagraph 109.1(2)(a)(ii) of the Act, the period provided is the same 12 months used in section 2, and the percentage is 60%.
4. Pour l’application du sous-alinéa 109.1(2)a)(ii) de la Loi, la période est la même période de douze mois retenue aux termes de l’article 2 et le pourcentage est de 60 %.
[12] One of the Respondents' witnesses, Eva Lazar, testifies that when a country meets the quantitative criteria set out in paragraph 109.1(2)(a) or the qualitative criteria set out in paragraph 109.1(2)(b), the Monitoring, Analysis and Country Assessment Division [MACAD] of the Refugee Affairs Branch at Citizenship and Immigration Canada [CIC] will conduct an in-depth review of the conditions in that country. This process requires a careful examination of publicly available and objective evidence from a range of credible sources such as the United States Department of State, the United Nations Human Rights Committee, Amnesty International, and local non-governmental organizations. The MACAD then prepares a report assessing nine human rights and state protection factors: (1) democratic governance; (2) protection of right to liberty and security of the person; (3) freedom of opinion and expression; (4) freedom of religion and association; (5) freedom from discrimination and protection of rights for groups at risk; (6) protection from non-state actors; (7) access to impartial investigations; (8) access to an independent judiciary system; and (9) access to redress [collectively, the Designation Factors]. This report is finalized through consultation with the Directors General Interdepartmental Committee on DCO, which includes representatives from: CIC; the Canada Border Services Agency [CBSA]; the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development; Public Safety; the Department of Justice; the Canadian Security Intelligence Service; and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. If designation is recommended, then that recommendation and the final DCO country review are sent to the MCI, who will then decide whether to designate the country.
[13] When this matter was heard, 42 countries had been designated by the MCI as DCOs. Croatia, Hungary and Romania have been designated on a quantitative basis under paragraph 109.1(2)(a). Other countries such as Andorra, Estonia and Slovenia have been designated on a qualitative basis under paragraph 109.1(2)(b). Of the 42 DCOs, country reviews were triggered on a quantitative basis under paragraph 109.1(2)(a) for 19 countries, and on a qualitative basis under paragraph 109.1(2)(b) for 23 countries.
[14] There is no express authority set out in the IRPA for removing a country’s designation, but Ms. Lazar testifies that the MCI approved a process for doing so on or about October 14, 2014. This process requires that all DCOs are regularly monitored for significant changes in country conditions and also reassessed annually against the Designation Factors. A review may be recommended if conditions appear to be deteriorating significantly in any five of the nine Designation Factors, or in any one of the three key criteria: democratic governance; protection of the rights to liberty and security of the person; and an independent judiciary. If there is a review, then a full country report will again be prepared and the MCI will decide whether the country should remain designated. At the time of the hearing of this matter, no DCO has been removed from the list of DCOs.
III. Is section 109.1 directly in issue? [15] The Applicants frame the issues arising from these applications more broadly than the Respondents. They say that the primary question to resolve is whether the combined effect of section 109.1, paragraph 110(2)(d.1) of the IRPA and the Thresholds Order violate section 7 or subsection 15(1) of the Charter. At the hearing of this matter, the Applicants challenged the entire DCO regime insofar as they argued that the designation process itself is not Charter-compliant.
[16] In contrast, the Respondents contend that the Applicants are seeking remedies which are not properly part of these applications, noting in particular that their applications for judicial review do not ask that the Thresholds Order be declared void and of no force and effect. According to the Respondents, if the declaratory relief sought with respect to paragraph 110(2)(d.1) is granted, declaring section 109.1 of the IRPA and the associated Thresholds Order to be void and of no force and effect would be superfluous because the individual Applicants would obtain the remedy they seek; that is, an appeal to the RAD.
[17] I agree with the Respondents that the relief sought by the Applicants has evolved over time. The application in Court file IMM-3700-13, dated May 27, 2013, requests only that the RAD's decision in Y.Z.'s case be set aside and that paragraph 110(2)(d.1) of the IRPA be declared to have no force and effect pursuant to subsection 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution Act, 1982]. The application in Court file IMM-5940-14, dated August 5, 2014, requests that the RAD's decision in the case of G.S. and C.S. be set aside and that both section 109.1 and paragraph 110(2)(d.1) of the IRPA be declared to have no force and effect pursuant to section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Most recently, the Notice of Constitutional Question, dated February 11, 2015, states the Applicants' intention to question the constitutional validity of “the effect of” section 109.1, paragraph 110(2)(d.1), and the Thresholds Order.
[18] I further agree with the Respondents that it would be inappropriate to assess whether the DCO regime as a whole, or any aspect of the regime other than paragraph 110(2)(d.1), is not compliant with the Charter. It is not appropriate in this case to directly assess the constitutionality of section 109.1 and the associated Thresholds Order for several reasons.
[19] First, a finding that paragraph 110(2)(d.1) is unconstitutional would be sufficient to grant the individual Applicants the substantive relief they seek in these applications; that is, an appeal to the RAD in respect of their claims which were rejected by the RPD. To go beyond this constitutional issue and also assess the constitutionality of other aspects of the DCO regime would be an unwarranted exercise because unnecessary constitutional pronouncements should generally be avoided (Phillips v Nova Scotia (Commission of Inquiry into the Westray Mine Tragedy), [1995] 2 SCR 97 at paragraphs 6-11, 124 DLR (4th) 129; Ishaq v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 156 at paragraph 66, 381 DLR (4th) 541).
[20] Second, there is insufficient evidence in the record to fully assess all of the consequences of a country being designated under section 109.1. As the Supreme Court stated in Mackay v Manitoba, [1989] 2 SCR 357 at 361-362, 61 DLR (4th) 385:
Charter decisions should not and must not be made in a factual vacuum. To attempt to do so would trivialize the Charter and inevitably result in ill-considered opinions. The presentation of facts is not, as stated by the respondent, a mere technicality; rather, it is essential to a proper consideration of Charter issues. … Charter decisions cannot be based upon the unsupported hypotheses of enthusiastic counsel.
For instance, there is not enough evidence to assess the potential disadvantages for DCO-claimants who are ineligible for a work permit until 180 days after their claim is referred to the RPD. G.S. states in his affidavit that he is upset that he cannot get a work permit and that, since social assistance is insufficient, he and C.S. needed to take unsafe jobs and work harder than their Canadian colleagues for the same amount of pay. However, this evidence alone is not sufficient to prove that either section 7 or subsection 15(1) of the Charter is violated by subsection 206(2) of the Regulations. Furthermore, G.S.’s affidavit was only filed on October 21, 2014, and this was the first indication that subsection 206(1) of the Regulations could be in peril. The Respondents were required to serve their own further affidavits one month later on November 21, 2014, and they did not have a reasonable opportunity to mount a section 1 Charter defence to this potential challenge prior to the hearing of this matter.
[21] Third, I am not convinced that this is a suitable case to decide whether the abbreviated timelines for DCO claimants are necessarily invalid or unconstitutional. Despite the Applicants' arguments to the contrary, the abbreviated timelines do not appear to be insurmountable. The difference between the hearing dates for DCO claimants and non-DCO claimants is not inordinate, and the RPD decisions in respect of the individual Applicants in this case show that they, as DCO claimants, were able to meet the deadlines. C.S. mentioned during his re-examination that he would have liked more time so that some evidence from Hungary could arrive, but that never formed a basis for his application. The individual Applicants did not ask to adjourn their hearings before the RPD; they were able to file substantial documentation (including medical reports); they presented their cases fully; and they did not allege in their applications for leave and for judicial review in this Court that they had insufficient time to prepare for the hearings before the RPD. The Applicants have presented evidence that some types of claimants may have a harder time than others meeting short deadlines; yet, a speedier process could also be considered a benefit to those claimants who are ultimately successful, since it could be stressful for genuine refugees to wait for years before their status is finally settled. These issues would be better decided in a case where the abbreviated timelines have actually made a difference to the applicants and the mechanisms for extending deadlines and re-opening cases have actually been tested.
[22] Fourth, none of the individual Applicants are yet affected by the 36-month ban on making a pre-removal risk assessment [PRRA] application under paragraphs 112(2)(b.1) and 112(2)(c) of the IRPA. The constitutionality of that ban should be decided in a factual matrix where the issue is directly and squarely raised. This is not the case here. The Court's decision in Peter v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2014 FC 1073, 13 Imm LR (4th) 169 [Peter], did not directly assess that ban; the decision in Peter was concerned with only the 12 month PRRA ban vis-à-vis section 7 of the Charter. Furthermore, the constitutionality of the ban against bringing a PRRA application until 36 months have passed, at least vis-à-vis section 7 of the Charter, will be considered by the Court of Appeal on the appeal of Al Atawnah v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2015 FC 774.
[23] In short, therefore, it is not appropriate in this case to assess the constitutionality of the DCO regime as a whole or, in particular, section 109.1, since any declaration that it is invalid would have effects that exceed the scope of the present applications and the evidentiary record.
IV. Issues [24] Since section 109.1 of the IRPA is not directly in issue on these applications, the issues to be addressed are as follows:
1. Does CARL have standing as a public interest litigant?
2. Should the impugned affidavits be struck out?
3. Does paragraph 110(2)(d.1) of the IRPA infringe subsection 15(1) of the Charter?
4. Does paragraph 110(2)(d.1) of the IRPA infringe section 7 of the Charter?
5. If Charter rights are infringed, is paragraph 110(2)(d.1) of the IRPA justified by section 1 of the Charter?
6. If paragraph 110(2)(d.1) of the IRPA is unconstitutional, what is an appropriate remedy?
7. What questions, if any, should be certified?
V. Does CARL have standing as a public interest litigant? [25] The parties acknowledge that the Court must consider three factors when deciding whether to grant public interest standing: “(1) whether there is a serious justiciable issue raised; (2) whether the plaintiff has a real stake or a genuine interest in it; and (3) whether, in all the circumstances, the proposed suit is a reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the courts” (Canada (AG) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45 at paragraph 37, [2012] 2 SCR 524 [Downtown]).
A. CARL’s Arguments [26] CARL argues that all of the principles of public interest standing are in its favour: there is no risk to scarce judicial resources because its application has already been consolidated with that of Y.Z., G.S. and C.S.; its involvement in the case has sharpened the arguments and ensured that they would be thoroughly presented; and it would be beneficial for the rule of law for it to be granted standing since constitutional cases are complex and CARL could carry on with the case if for any reason the individual Applicants cannot.
[27] In addition, CARL says that all of the factors set out in Downtown support a grant of public interest standing. The Respondents concede that there is a serious justiciable issue, and CARL contends that it has a real stake in the litigation. Relying on the affidavit of Mitchell Goldberg, CARL submits that it is an association of lawyers and academics with an interest in legal issues relating to refugees, asylum seekers, and the rights of immigrants, and one of its key mandates is to ensure that the human rights of refugees and vulnerable migrants are protected. Indeed, they raised their concerns about the DCO regime with Parliament while it was debating Bill C-31, which became the Protecting Canada's Immigration System Act, SC 2012, c 17 [PCISA]. These interests are broader than those held by the individual Applicants, and by having standing CARL says it has been able to raise the prejudicial consequences of the DCO regime that go beyond those that have affected the individual Applicants. Furthermore, it has participated in the matter from the outset, thus demonstrating its concern, and its standing has not altered the timelines in any way.
[28] CARL contends that granting it standing alongside three individual Applicants is a reasonable and effective means of bringing the issues in this case before the Court. CARL says the Court has already recognized that these issues are better litigated in one robust proceeding by consolidating Court File Nos. IMM-3700-13 and IMM-5940-14. Giving CARL standing promotes the continuity and viability of the present litigation while allowing it to present the full spectrum of issues raised by the DCO regime. Indeed, CARL points out that there is no guarantee that any of the individual Applicants would be able or willing to pursue an appeal if their applications are not successful. The matter could very well become moot if their applications for judicial review of their respective RPD decisions succeed. Furthermore, the stays of removal the individual Applicants have obtained only apply until the end of the present proceeding, and there is no guarantee that the Federal Court of Appeal would continue them.
[29] Applying the considerations set out in Downtown at paragraph 51, CARL submits that it clearly has the resources and expertise to bring this matter forward, and its members have already volunteered hundreds of hours to this litigation. It will not cost any additional judicial resources by affording CARL standing and it would forestall duplicative litigation and minimize the risk of inconsistent results. Furthermore, the DCO provisions affect significant numbers of refugee claimants; many of them lack the resources to challenge the legislation themselves and their interests could not be adequately advanced by the individual Applicants alone.
[30] CARL disputes the Respondents' argument that many other applicants, including G.S. and C.S., came forward without CARL’s assistance. G.S. and C.S. relied wholly on the record prepared by CARL and Y.Z, so it is misleading to say that they brought their application “without CARL.” As for other potential litigants, the Applicants note the Respondents have been promptly deporting them and challenging their arguments on technical grounds, trying to impose a complex and onerous procedure for bringing the issues to this Court that would exhaust the resources of many litigants and expose them to a greater risk of deportation. There is also no conflict between CARL's interests and those of the individual Applicants, so CARL submits it should be granted standing.
B. Respondents’ Arguments [31] The Respondents argue that CARL has no direct interest in this matter and should be denied public interest standing. Although the Respondents concede that there is a serious justiciable issue, they say CARL can offer no useful or distinct perspective on that issue because its arguments are identical to those put forward by the individual Applicants and it seeks the same relief. The Respondents say CARL's assertion that it raises distinct issues is nothing but a smokescreen to justify its participation.
[32] Indeed, the Respondents argue that litigation by individual litigants is an entirely effective means of raising the issues proposed by CARL. Even CARL acknowledges that there are potentially hundreds of such litigants, and there are already three of them in this matter alone, all of whom have received stays of removal ensuring that their applications will not become moot. In the Respondents' view, adding another useless party to the matter only increases cost and inconvenience. Although CARL says it helped prepare the record, the Respondents argue that it did not need party status to do that and there is no evidence about the degree to which it helped. The Respondents submit that, all other things being equal, the parties with standing as of right should be preferred to CARL.
[33] Furthermore, the Respondents submit there is no evidence that other applicants do not have the resources to bring their own challenges, nor does CARL's participation preclude those who would from making parallel applications which could create conflicting jurisprudence. The Respondents also contend that CARL has mischaracterized the Respondents' position in other cases. The Respondents did not argue that applicants must pursue a futile appeal to the RAD but, instead, disputed only an attempt to challenge the absence of an appeal right through a judicial review of a RPD decision. Had those applicants commenced a separate application raising the constitutional issues alone, the Respondents would have had no objection.
[34] The Respondents also point out that CARL has participated in most of its cases only as an intervener. Although CARL did have party status in Canadian Doctors, the Respondents say that case is distinguishable since: (1) the impugned provisions only refer to nationals of DCO countries, and there is no other affected category of persons who are not before the Court; (2) there is no evidence that CARL made concerted efforts to recruit other litigants; (3) persons affected by the impugned provisions have already had their claims denied, so they need not fear vindictiveness from the government if they challenge the constitutionality of the DCO regime; and (4) the evidentiary record compiled in Canadian Doctors exceeded what an individual refugee claimant could be expected to assemble, but in this case G.S. and C.S. were able to compile a virtually identical record without CARL's help.
[35] The Respondents also complain that it was improper for CARL to file its notice of application along with Y.Z. because the onus was on CARL to prove that it should get standing. The Respondents ask the Court to discourage this conduct since it unfairly put the burden upon the Respondents to bring a motion to deny public interest standing. Although that motion was ultimately dismissed for delay, the Respondents were nonetheless permitted to raise the same arguments at the hearing. They submit that it would be unfair to have their motion deferred to the application judge only to have it dismissed for mootness,