Daoust, Lalonde & Cie., Ltée v. Ferland

Daoust, Lalonde & Cie., Ltée v. Ferland
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
1932-03-15
Report
[1932] SCR 343
Judges
Anglin, Francis Alexander; Duff, Lyman Poore; Rinfret, Thibaudeau; Smith, Robert; Cannon, Lawrence Arthur Dumoulin
On appeal from
Quebec
Subjects
Family law
Decision Content
Supreme Court of Canada
Daoust, Lalonde & Cie., Ltée v. Ferland, [1932] S.C.R. 343
Date: 1932-03-15.
Daoust, Lalonde & Cie. Ltee (Defendant) Appellant;
and
Dame Rose A. Ferland (Plaintiff) Respondent;
and
New York Life Insurance Co. (Mise-en-cause)
1931: November 10; 1932: March 15.
Present:—Anglin C.J.C. and Duff, Rinfret, Smith and Cannon JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC
Husband and wife—Life insurance policy—Wife as beneficiary—Transfer by husband and wife as security for debts of husband—Validity—Doctrine of stare decisis—Finding of fact—Art. 1301 C.C.
When a transfer by a married woman of an insurance policy on her husband’s life, under which she is the beneficiary, has been found by the trial judge, which judgment was affirmed by the appellate court, to have been made as collateral security for the husband’s debt, such transfer will be held to be null and void as being in contravention of the provisions of article 1301 C.C. Klock v. Chamberlin (1887) 15 Can. S.C.R. 325; Laframboise v. Vallières [1927] Can. S.C.R. 193; Rodrigue v. Dostie [1927] Can. S.C.R. 563; Banque Canadienne Nationale v. Carette [1931] Can. S.C.R. 33; Banque Canadienne Nationale v. Audet [1931] Can. S.C.R. 293.
Cannon J., dubitante, as to whether the evidence had clearly established that the transfer, being absolute on its face, had been made by the wife to secure the husband’s debt, and also, whether the appellant, being a creditor contracting in good faith and having paid the premiums, should not be entitled to receive the benefit of the amendment to art. 1301 C.C., enacted in 1904 by 4 Ed. VII, c. 42.
Judgment of the Court of King’s Bench (Q.R. 51 KB. 193) aff., Cannon J. dubitante. APPEAL from the decision of the Court of King’s Bench, appeal side, province of Quebec[1], affirming the judgment of the Superior Court, Tessier J., and maintaining the respondent’s action.
On the 23rd December, 1907, Joseph A. Bilodeau, the respondent’s husband, took out a policy of insurance upon his life with the New York Life Insurance Company in the sum of $5,000, and the policy itself indicated as beneficiaries the wife of the assured, the present respondent, together with a daughter of the assured by a previous marriage in equal shares. The policy provided that it would lapse in the event of failure to pay the premiums within thirty days of their maturity, and would then have no cash surrender value. The assured was engaged in business, and in course of time became indebted to the appellant company to a considerable extent. On the 15th December, 1925, the assured, together with the two-named beneficiaries, executed a transfer of the policy to the appellant company to which, at that date, the assured was indebted in the sum of $7,500. During the year 1926 the assured made an authorized assignment in favour of his creditors and in the month of August, 1929, he died. The premiums of insurance payable in respect to this policy, for the last three years prior to the death of the assured, were paid by the appellant company. The insurance company, on or about the 31st August, 1929, paid to the appellant company, in virtue of the transfer above referred to, the sum of $5,026.62. In the month of October of that year, the respondent instituted proceedings against the appellant company, asking that she be declared the beneficiary under this policy and entitled to the proceeds thereof; that the transfer in favour of the appellant be declared illegal, null and void; that the payment made by the insurance company to the appellant be declared null and void; and that the appellant be condemned to pay to her the sum of $5,200.
L. E. Beaulieu K.C. for the appellant.
E. J. Flynn for the respondent. Anglin C.J.C.—Although impressed by the views of Mr. Justice Howard in the Court of King’s Bench, I find it impossible to follow him to his conclusions. To give effect to them here, I think, would be to exhibit a vacillation in the opinion expressed by this court on the subject of the scope and application of Art. 1301 C.C., which could not fail to be disastrous. We might as well at once forego any idea that the doctrine of stare decisis (Stuart v. Bank of Montreal)[2] forms part of our jurisprudence.
As Mr. Justice Howard, the dissenting judge in the Court of King’s Bench, points out, parol evidence given to shew the true purpose and character of the instrument,— which, in form, is as absolute as a transfer can be made, and was executed by Mr. and Mrs. Bilodeau and their daughter, Marie Antoinette Bilodeau, the interest of the latter being similar to that of Mrs. Bilodeau,—was clearly admissible (Rodrigue v. Dostie)[3]; although that learned judge differs from the majority in his court as to the effect of such evidence. The learned dissenting judge seems to agree, however, that this latter question depends largely on the view taken as to the meaning and effect of the testimony of the appellant Daoust. As put by him, “this document is in terms an absolute alienation” by the respondent Rose-Anna Ferland (Bilodeau) of all her interest in the policy to the appellant, a document which, if intended to operate according to its form, it was entirely competent for her to execute (Laframboise v. Vallières[4]; Banque Canadienne Nationale v. Carette[5]). However, it is open, in any case where the validity of a document is challenged on a ground of public policy (as it is here under Art. 1301 C.C.), for the person so challenging to adduce oral evidence at the trial to shew what was the true and real purpose or intention of the transaction which resulted in its being given. The respondent having pledged her oath that, when she executed the document in question, she did so on the understanding that it was to be used as collateral security to her husband’s debt, and in no sense for her own benefit, and that she had, in fact, derived no benefit whatever from the transaction—testimony fully corroborated, quantum valeat, by her son-in-law, Charles Caron,—as put by Mr. Justice Howard,
there remains to be considered only the testimony of Mr. Daoust,
a small portion of which he quotes, commenting thus:—
The respondent has analyzed it, pointing out that, though Mr. Daoust under examination-in-chief took the position that the transfer of the policy to the appellant was absolute, he admitted under cross-examination that it was in reality a transfer for security. With respect, I do not think that that is the correct conclusion to be drawn from Mr. Daoust’s evidence. As I read it he maintained throughout that the transfer conveyed to the appellant the absolute ownership of the policy and that it was accepted and retained by the appellant as such. He does say that, on a subsequent occasion, Mr. Bilodeau assured him, that he would pay his debt to the appellant in full and promised to keep the policy in force in the meantime, and he adds that, if Mr. Bilodeau had done so, the policy would have been transferred back to him, because he (Daoust) was unwilling to keep what was not due to him.
“Q. Et s’il vous avait payé, je comprends que vous lui auriez remis, avec plaisir, sa police que vous déteniez?
R. Oui, même s’il avait payé les cinq mille piastres, s’il avait payé * * * disons qu’il nous devait seulement que deux mille piastres, les héritiers de Bilodeau auraient retiré la différence. Comprenez-vous? Je ne veux pas avoir ce qui ne m’est pas du.”
I cannot see in that any admission, direct or indirect, that the transfer of the policy was anything but an absolute alienation of it.
The way the appellant subsequently dealt with this policy is quite consistent with its submission that the policy by the transfer became its absolute property. It is true that it did not give any tangible consideration—did not pay anything—for the transfer of the policy even by way of credit; it did not enter the policy on either side of the ledger in its account with Mr. Bilodeau;
“R. Il n’a jamais été appliqué comme garantie collatérale.
Q. Mais il n’a jamais été appliqué non plus comme paiement?
R. Comme paiement, évidemment que non, tant qu’il ne 6erait pas mort.”
Personally, although the learned appellate judge, who dissented, declined to accept this testimony, I am prepared to do so at its face value, in accord with the view of the learned trial judge and with that of the majority of the Court of King’s Bench. For me, these questions of the meaning and effect of Daoust’s testimony and of his credibility are purely matters of fact, on which I am not prepared to reverse the judgment of the Superior Court, confirmed by that of the Court of King’s Bench.
This case resembles Banque Canadienne Nationale v. Carette[6], where Rinfret J., delivering the judgment of this court, said, En plus, la banque, dans son factum, admet “que les polices d’assurance en question ont été données à la Banque Canadienne Nationale par J.-Ed. Poulin, le mari de l’intimé, pour garantir son compte général.”
Il en résulte que le litige doit être envisagé du point de vue d’un transport par une femme mariée en garantie des dettes de son mari, et non pas, ainsi que la plaidoirie écrite l’avait d’abord soumis, comme un transport pur et simple d’une femme mariée en paiement des dettes de son mari.
Cette distinction est très importante; car, comme nous l’avons fait remarquer entre autres dans la cause de Laframboise v. Vallières[7], “l’on est d’accord, en effet, pour interpréter l’article 1301 du code civil comme une prohibition à la femme mariée de cautionner, de garantir, de s’engager pour l’avenir ‘avec ou pour son mari’; et il est admis que l’acte juridique ainsi proscrit par le législateur est le contrat de garantie ou de sûreté. Le mot ‘s’obliger’, dans cet article, doit s’entendre comme indiquant seulement le contrat de cautionnement. (Lebel v. Bradin[8].” Par conséquent, si l’intimée avait cédé purement et simplement ses droits dans les polices, la question de l’application de l’article 1301 C.C. se présenterait sous un jour tout différent.
See, too, page 39 of the Carette judgment[9], from which I take the following extract:
Cependant, l’admission que les transports des polices d’assurance ont été faits par l’intimée non pas en cession pure et simple à la banque, mais seulement en garantie collatérale des dettes du mari, entraîne comme conséquence l’application de l’article 1301 du code civil en vertu duquel
“La femme ne peut s’obliger avec ou pour son mari qu’en qualité de commune; toute autre obligation qu’elle contracte ainsi en autre qualité est nulle et sans effet, sauf les droits des créanciers qui contractent de bonne foi.”
La banque a prétendu que la prohibition contenue dans cet article ne visait que la garantie personnelle de la femme mariée et ne comprenait pas la garantie réelle. L’honorable juge Lafontaine, le présent juge-en-chef de la province de Québec, dans la cause de Joubert et Turcotte v. Kieffer[10], a fait de cette question une étude approfondie, à laquelle nous ne saurions rien ajouter, et où il a démontré que par le mot “s’obliger” il faut entendre “tout engagement quelconque par lequel une femme mariée prend à sa charge le paiement d’une dette de son mari, soit qu’elle contracte une obligation personnelle, comme dans le cautionnement, ou qu’elle engage ses biens seulement, comme dans le contrat d’hypothèque ou de gage.”
C’est ce que cette cour a décidé dans la cause de Klock v. Chamberlin[11], et de nouveau dans la cause de Rodrigue v. Dostie[12].
As I read the facts and Mr. Daoust’s testimony, they admit of only one conclusion, viz., that his company never had any absolute power over the policy, or any unqualified interest in it, but that interest was always in the nature of collateral security for the indebtedness of Mr. Bilodeau to his company. For instance, when Bilodeau became insolvent, this policy was not included as part of his estate, and in making claim as creditor, the appellant “put in” for the whole amount thereof, not taking anything off on account of the policy, neither making any reduction for it in the amount of its claim as presented to the assignee, nor making any reference to its being hold by the company as security or otherwise. Daoust had admitted in his evidence at the trial that “it had never been applied by him in any way as a payment”. I agree with the learned trial judge and with the majority of the Court of King’s Bench that Daoust’s testimony, taken as a whole, is consistent only with the appellant having had no real title to the policy in question as owner, but that it held the same always merely as colateral security for Bilodeau’s debt.
I refer again, for an instant to the judgment of this court in Banque Canadienne Nationale v. Carette[13],
Il faut dire, par conséquent, que les transports d’assuranee dont l’intimé demande la nullité tombent sous le coup de l’article 1301 du code civil; * * * L’article 1301 du code civil a pour but la protection de la femme mariée contre le danger d’engager ses biens ou sa responsabilité personnelle, où elle pourrait se laisser entraîner sous l’influence de son mari ou même par simple affection pour lui.
In La Banque Canadienne Nationale v. Audet[14], my brother Rinfret excludes all cases in which a married woman had been held not responsible (although she had contracted with (avec) her husband), where it was demonstrated that she had herself obtained the benefit of any advance made on her obligation (such as Banque d’Hochelaga v. Jodoin[15]), and he proceeds (at pp. 307-8)
Tous ces jugements peuvent s’expliquer par le motif que ces cas ne tombent vraiment pas sous l’article 1301 du code civil. * * * Il est conforme à l’histoire de cette législation, depuis le droit romain jusqu’aux statuts antérieurs au code, de comprendre, par l’expression “s’obliger” de l’article 1301 CC, uniquement le cautionnement de la femme avec ou pour son mari.
Cette interprétation est maintenant fixée dans la jurisprudence Lebel v. Bradin, Cour du Banc du Roi[16]; Laframboise v. Vallières[17]; Banque Canadienne v. Carette[18]. (Voir 4 Ed. VII, c. 42, qui déclare que l’article 1301 C.C. ne s’est jamais appliqué aux achats, ventes ou échanges d’immeubles, ni aux baux emphythéotiques faits par la femme mariée.) Il en résulte que l’obligation de la femme mariée pour ses propres affaires ou pour son propre compte, qu’elle soit ou non commune avec son mari, n’étant jamais, à proprement parler, un cautionnement de sa part, ne constitue pas un acte où elle “s’oblige” au sens de l’article 1301 C.C., et ne tombe pas sous le coup de cet article.
I accept, as applicable to the case now before us, the following passage from La Banque Canadienne Nationale v. Audet[19], where Rinfret J., delivering the judgment of this court, says,
Le premier élément dans la présente cause est que l’intimée s’est portée caution avec son mari pour la dette d’un tiers en une autre qualité que celle de commune en biens. De ce chef, la cause paraît donc de prime abord être réglée par le principe général posé dans l’article 1301 du code civil (Lebel v. Bradin[20].
and also this passage, from p. 310,
D’autre part, la preuve ne laisse aucun doute sur le fait qu’elle n’a certainement tiré aucun profit de l’obligation qu’elle a contractée.
In Trust and Loan v. Gauthier[21], Lord Lindley, in giving the judgment of the Judicial Committee, said,
Except in dealing with their common property, she is not to bind herself with him, i.e., she is not to join in any obligation which affects him.
and, at p. 101,
Their Lordships gather from the decisions referred to in the argument and in the published commentaries on the Code Civil that the words “for her husband” are now judicially held to mean generally in any way for his purposes as distinguished from those of his wife; and that ignorance on the part of her obligee (créancier) cannot avail him, if it is proved that she in fact bound herself for her husband. These conclusions are, in their Lordship’s opinion, sound and in accordance with the language of art. 1301 and with its evident object.
As to the history, purpose and purport of the amendment to article 1301 C.C., enacted in 1904 (4 Ed. VII, c. 42), and said to have been passed in consequence of the judgment of the Privy Council in Trust and Loan v. Gauthier[22], I cannot do better than refer again to the following passage from the decision of this court in Banque Canadienne Nationale v. Audet[23], in which my brother Rinfret deals, entirely to my satisfaction, with that amendment and its effect. He says,
Dans la cause de Leclerc v. Bédard[24], la Cour de Révision à Québec (Dorion J.) s’est demandé quelle était la portée de cet amendement. Elle fait remarquer avec justesse qu’il “ne peut pas être question de bonne foi lorsque le contrat prend la forme d’un cautionnement par la femme de l’obligation du mari. C’est là ce qui est expressément prohibé par la loi.”
Lorsque l’obligation a été contractée avec le mari, l’amendement vient certainement confirmer le droit du créancier de prouver que la femme s’est obligée pour sa propre affaire. Mais ce droit avait déjà été reconnu au créancier par la jurisprudence.
Il reste le cas où la femme mariée s’oblige seule avec l’autorisation de son mari. Les tribunaux ont toujours annulé cette obligation lorsqu’il était démontré à leur satisfaction que nonobstant ses termes apparents, l’obligation avait été assumée par la femme, suivant l’expression du Conseil Privé “in any way for her husband’s purposes”. Mais le jugement du Conseil Privé dans lequel cette expression se rencontre (Trust & Loan v. Gauthier)[25] ajoutait:
“Ignorance on the part of the lender that the money was borrowed for the husband’s purposes is of no avail, and the burden is on him to prove that it was not so borrowed.”
Leclerc v. Bédard[26] a donc décidé que l’amendement de la loi 4 Ed. VU, c. 42, s. 1, fait naître la présomption que le prêt fait à la femme séparée seule, quoique autorisée de son mari, lui a profité à elle-même. Par suite, si elle invoque la nullité de son obligation pour violation de l’article 1301 C.C., c’est sur elle que tombe le fardeau de la preuve que le prêt a profiité à son mari à la connaissance du prêteur.
The learned judge says, at p. 312,
Le jugement de la Cour du Banc du Roi dans la cause de Lebel v. Bradin[27], dont nous avons déjà parlé, contient une étude très complète de toutes les questions qui se soulèvent en vertu de l’article 1301 C.C., et de l’amendement de 1904. Sa conclusion est que, sous l’effet de cet amendement, le créancier qui prête à la femme mariée séparée de biens seule, pour être réputé de bonne foi, doit verser le produit de l’emprunt à la femme elle-même, et il doit ignorer et n’avoir aucune raison de croire que cet argent pourra servir les intérêts du mari. Le créancier, dans ce cas, n’est pas responsable si subséquemment la femme remet les fonds empruntés à son mari; car depuis l’amendement il n’est plus tenu de surveiller l’emploi des deniers provenant du prêt qu’il lui a fait.
Rinfret J. then condudes as follows:
Il n’est pas nécessaire de dire que les définitions que nous venons de rapporter épuisent tous les cas où le créancier pourra, en vertu de l’amendement, établir une bonne foi suffisante pour sauvegarder ses droits à l’encontre de la nullité édictée par l’article 1301 C.C. Mais à la suite de ces définitions, l’on doit sûrement décider qu’il ne peut être question de bonne foi dans le cas d’une obligation contractée expressément par la femme séparée pour son mari. Dans le cas d’une obligation contractée par la femme mariée seule, soit expressément soit apparemment pour elle-même, les droits du créancier seront sauvegardés même si l’argent est subséquemment employé pour les fins du mari, lorsque les circonstances établiront les éléments de bonne foi indiqués par la Cour du Banc du Roi dans la cause de Lebel v. Bradin[28].
Dans le cas où la femme s’oblige avec son mari, l’amendement permet d’établir la bonne foi du créancier. Mais la loi présume contre lui; et c’est donc à lui qu’il incombe de la prouver. Nous ne trouvons pas, en l’espèce, la rencontre des éléments nécessaires pour arriver à la conclusion que rappelante peut invoquer le bénéfice de l’amendement. Dès l’époque où furent signés les deux actes de garantie, elle connaissait toutes les circonstances qui entraînent la nullité de ces actes: le fait que l’intimée était mariée à l’un des cosignataires et le fait que son mari était actionnaire dans la compagnie pour laquelle elle se portait caution. Par suite, il est impossible de dire que l’appelante a contracté de bonne foi. Il s’agit, bien entendu, de la bonne foi au sens légal et suivant le texte de l’article 1301 du code civil.
I agree with Mr. Justice Hall’s view in the case at bar, who, concurring in the judgment of Mr. Justice Bond, says,
Further, it is, in my opinion, evident that Bilodeau always intended to pay his debt during his life time. He was perhaps over-optimistic in his expectation that he would be able to do so, because, shortly afterwards, he went into bankruptcy. Nevertheless, there is nothing to suggest that either Mr. Daoust or Bilodeau himself anticipated that the company-appellant would be obliged to hold the policy and keep it in force until the latter’s death, at which time only would it acquire any definite value. This view is borne out by Mr. Daoust’s own admission that he was always ready and willing to return the policy at any time on the payment of the debt, and it is further borne out by the fact that he made several demands upon Bilodeau for the payment of the premiums which matured subsequent to the assignment. He even goes so far as to say that it was agreed that the premiums should be paid by Bilodeau.
That agreement was entirely incompatible with Mr. Daoust’s contention that his company had become the absolute owner of the policy, as a payment, rather than as security for the debt.
In the case at bar, being perfectly satisfied that the document in question was a violation of Art. 1301 C.C., it would never do, because of the extremely high character of the appellant Daoust, or of the patent honesty of the respondent’s husband, to make an exception from the clear rule laid down by this court in Carette’s case[29]. Nor will it do to say that, although stare decisis may be a good enough doctrine for the rest of Canada, it forms no part of Quebec jurisprudence and it, therefore, should not be applied in this court to cases from that province. Here, the old idea, ubi jus est aut vagum aut incertum, ibi maxima servitus praevalebit, still obtains. In my opinion, the doctrine of stare decisis must equally apply in the determination of any case which comes before this court, whatever may be the province of its origin.
For the foregoing reasons, I would dismiss this appeal with coste Duff and Rinfret JJ.—We agree with the conclusion of our brother Smith, and with his reasons. It is settled by-several decisions of this court that the ambit of article 1301 is not restricted to personal obligations; a real guaranty falls within its scope. Only one question can be regarded as susceptible of debate. That question is, whether or not the instrument of 15th December, 1925, would, but for the disability imposed by that article, have effected a transfer of the respondent’s rights under the policy of insurance to the appellants, as security for her husband’s debt.
It seems to us to be a case of res ipsa loquitur. By the policy, the New York Life Insurance Company promised to pay, on proof of the death of the husband, at the expiration of a stipulated period, the sum of $5,000, less any moneys due the company, to the respondent and to Marie-Antoinette Bilodeau, the respondent’s daughter, in equal shares. By the document of 15th December, 1925, the husband, the wife and the daughter executed a transfer in these terms:
Pour valeur reçue, nous majeurs, cédons, transfère et abandonne par les présentes à Daoust, Lalonde et Cie de Montréal, Carré Victoria, Qué., la police d’assurance portant le numéro 4050533, émise par la New York Life Insurance Company sur la vie de Joseph Aliace Bilodeau, de Québec, Qué., 161 Grande-Allée, ainsi que tous droits, titres, bénéfices et intérêts qui s’y rattachent ou qui résultent, et ce, sous réserve des conditions de ladite police et sans préjudice des règles de la compagnie.
This transfer, with the policy, was delivered to the appellants, to whom the husband was indebted in some $7,500, and who, thereafter, paid the premiums, and, on the death of the husband, collected the proceeds.
Let it here be observed, that it was in virtue of the respondent’s transfer of her rights under the policy to them, that the appellants were entitled to demand, and did in fact demand, from the insurance company, the moneys which, by the terms of the policy, had, in the event which happened, become payable to her. It was the transfer which enabled them to obtain payment to themselves of these moneys. It is self-evident that they must have accepted the transfer either in payment or in part payment of the debt, or as security. It is, of course, not suggested that it was given or accepted as a gift. It is, moreover, admitted, and it is indisputable, in fact, that it was not accepted as payment in whole or in part. Indeed, it is plain, on the face of the facts, that the appelants accepted the transfer with the intention of making use of it just as they did— namely, to collect any moneys which might, during the currency of the debt, become payable under the policy to any of the transferors, and to apply these moneys in payment, or part payment, of the debt. This is really not disputed. They ‘accepted, that is to say, the transfer of the respondents’ rights under the policy, as security for the payment of the husband’s debt.
It is argued that the appellants are protected by the reservation, in the article, in favour of creditors dealing in good faith. The onus is, of course, upon the creditor who takes refuge under that reservation, to shew that the circumstances bring his case within it. Knowledge must be imputed to him of the facts appearing plainly on the face of the transaction. In the present case these included, first, the fact that the debt was the debt of the husband, and second, the fact that the rights which were transferred by the respondent as security for that debt (and of which the appelants now claim the benefit), were her personal rights. In these circumstances, and in the absence of some evidence shewing that they were under some delusion touching the actual facts, they cannot escape from the operation of the articles. It is to be noted, moreover, that Daoust was called as a witness, and that he did not state that he was ignorant of a single fact necessary to bring the transfer within the article. His defence, as put by himself, was a justly unsuccessful attempt to convince the court that he had not accepted the transfer as security.
The appeal should be dismissed with cost.
Smith J.—On the 23rd December, 1907, Mr. Joseph A. Bilodeau took out a policy of life insurance with the New York Life Insurance Co. in the sum of $5,000—the beneficiaries named being, his wife, the respondent, and a daughter of the assured by a previous marriage.
On the 15th December, 1925, Bilodeau was indebted to the appellant company in the sum of $7,500, and on that date he, his wife the respondent, and the daughter Marie-Antoinette Bilodeau, joined in a transfer of the policy, which was then in fonce, to the appellant, the operative words of which are as follows:—
Pour valeur reçue, nous majeurs, cédons, transfère et abandonne par les présentes à Daoust, Lalonde et Cie de Montréal, Carré Victoria, Qué., la police d’assurance portant le numéro 4050533, émise par la New York Life Insurance Company, sur la vie de Joseph Aliace Bilodeau, de Québec, Qué., 161 Grande-Allée, ainsi que tous droits, titres, bénéfices et intérêts qui s’y rattachent ou qui résultent, et ce, sous réserve des conditions de ladite police et sans préjudice des règles de la compagnie.
En foi de quoi ma signature; fait ce quinze décembre mil neuf cent vingt-cinq.
(Sgd.) Joseph Aliace Bilodeau,
(Sgd.) Rose-Anna Ferland-Bilodeau,
(Sgd.) Marie-Antoinette Bilodeau.
In the year 1926 the assured, Joseph A. Bilodeau, made an authorized assignment in favour of his creditors and the appellant filed with the assignee a claim for the full amount of his account, upon which the liquidator awarded him a dividend of $209.85.
The assured Bilodeau died in August, 1929. He had failed to pay the annual premiums subsequent to the assignment of the policy and these were paid by the appellant.
The insurance company paid the amount of policy to the appellant in virtue of the transfer referred to, and the respondent then brought this action, claiming to be declared beneficiary under the policy and entitled to the proceeds thereof and asking that the transfer in favour of the appellant, as against her, be declared null and void under the provisions of Article 1301 C.C., which provides as follows:
A wife cannot bind herself either with or for her husband, otherwise than as being common as to property; any such obligation contracted by her in any other quality is void and of no effect, saving the rights of creditors who contract in good faith.
Evidence was adduced at the trial on behalf of the respondent to shew that the real object of the transaction was to guarantee an existing debt of the respondent’s husband and, on objection taken to this evidence, the trial judge held that, a matter of public order being at stake, evidence was admissible to shew the true nature of the transaction notwithstanding that the assignment was in form absolute, and this ruling seems not to be seriously challenged.
Coupling the document with the evidence of the surrounding circumstances connected with the making and delivery of the document, and the other evidence, the trial judge held that the transfer was made to secure the debt of the husband owing to the appellant, and this finding is concurred in by four of the five judges of the Court of King’s Bench of Quebec. It seems to me that the only question involved in the present appeal is whether or not this finding should be upheld or reversed.
I am unable to discover any ground upon which it should be reversed. Daoust himself testifies that the assignment was not made in payment of the debt or in payment of any part of it. It was not made in consideration of an extension of time for payment of the debt, and it cannot be contended that it was made as a gift to the appellant.
What, then, was the object of the transfer? The appellant did not release his debt against the deceased Bilodeau, or any part of it, but retained all his rights to collect the full amount of the debt against the deceased, just as if no assignment of the policy had been made. He filed his claim with the assignee for $7,494.71, without making any mention of the policy or giving any credit on the account, by reason of the transfer to him of the policy and received a dividend on that full amount.
If the dividend paid by the liquidator had reduced the indebtedness to less than the amount of the moneys received on the policy, it seems clear that the appellant could not have retained the surplus as his own but would have been obliged to account for it to the assignors of the policy.
It is argued that he would, in such a case, have been obliged to account to the deceased Bilodeau or his estate only, and that because of having joined in the absolute transfer, the respondent would have no right to call for such accounting.
The transfer is made by all three parties to the policy and if it was made as a security for the account by one of these parties, it was to the same effect as to all three. It seems to me impossible to say that this single document, signed by the three parties, took effect as an absolute assignment by one and an assignment as security by the others.
I am of opinion that the trial court and the Court of King’s Bench properly found that the transfer was made by all three parties as a security for the debt of the husband Bilodeau and, that being the fact, article 1301 C.C. applies as was held by this court in La Banque Canadienne Nationale v. Carette[30]. There, as here, the transfers of four policies were absolute in terms, on their face, and imposed no personal liability on the wife. The assignee, however, admitted that they were, in fact, given as security for the husband’s debt. It was because of the fact established by the admission that it was held that article 1301 C.C. applied. The only difference here is that the fact is established by evidence instead of by admission.
In my opinion the appeal should be dismissed with oosts.
Cannon J. (dubitante).—L’appelante se plaint d’un jugement en date du 7 octobre 1930 de la Cour Supérieure du district de Québec, confirmé, sauf le dissentiment de l’Honorable Juge Howard, par un arrêt de la Cour du Banc du Roi du 31 mars 1931, annulant le transport-cession d’une police d’assurance qui lui avait été consenti par les bénéficiaires, l’intimée et une fille de l’assuré, conjointement avec ce dernier, feu Aliace Bilodeau, en son vivant marchand, de la cité de Québec, client de l’appelante, compagnie manufacturière de chaussures. Le jugement annula et mit à néant, quant à l’intimée, le transport consenti par elle en faveur de l’appelante et condamna cette dernière à payer à l’intimée la somme de $2,031.96 avec intérêt et les dépens.
I.
Il serait inutile d’exposer de nouveau la doctrine que cette cour a adoptée dans plusieurs arrêts: Klock v. Chamberlin[31]; Laframboise v. Vallières[32]; Rodrigue v. Dostie[33]; Banque Canadienne Nationale v. Carette[34]; Banque Canadienne Nationale v. Audet[35]. Je ne saurais rien ajouter à ce qui a été dit, et je me contente, pour éviter les répétitions, d’y référer. Il ressort de ces décisions que si le transport de cette police d’assurance a été fait par l’intimée, non pas en cession pure et simple à l’appelant, mais seulement en garantie collatérale des dettes du mari, cela entraînerait comme conséquence l’application de l’article 1301, en vertu duquel
la femme ne peut s’obliger avec ou pour son mari qu’en qualité de commune; toute obligation qu’elle contracte ainsi en autre qualité est nulle et sans effet, sauf les droits des créanciers qui contractent de bonne foi. Cette cour a déjà adopté l’opinion de l’honorable jugeen-chef Lafontaine, de la province de Québec, dans la cause de Joubert et Turcotte v. Kieffer[36], démontrant que par le mot “s’obliger” il faut entendre
tout engagement quelconque par lequel une femme mariée prend à sa charge le paiement d’une dette de son mari, soit qu’elle contracte une obligation personnelle, comme dans le cautionnement, ou qu’elle engage ses biens seulement, comme dans le contrat d’hypothèque ou de gage.
D’après la preuve, sommes-nous en présence d’une renonciation de la part de l’épouse, d’un abandon et d’une cession de ses droits, suivant le texte du document, ou, au contraire, ce texte est-il simulé et l’intimée a-t-elie, en réalité, engagé ses biens avec l’idée de retour? Avait-il été convenu entre les parties que les biens transportés devaient revenir à l’intimée si les dettes du mari étaient par ailleurs payées? Enfin, l’appelante a-t-elle contracté de bonne foi?
Examinons le dossier pour déterminer la réponse à ces questions dont dépend le sort de l’action.
Le 13 décembre 1907, Joseph Aliace Bilodeau obtint de la New York Insurance Company une assurance de $5,000 et désigna comme bénéficiaires sa femme séparée de biens, la présente intimée, et sa fille, Marie-Antoinette Bilodeau, à parts égales, sous réserve du droit de révocation, ce qui permettait à l’assuré de désigner un nouveau bénéficiaire aux lieu et place de l’intimée, sujet aux restrictions de la loi concernant l’assurance sur la vie des maris et parents, devenus le chapitre 244 des Statuts Refondus de Québec, 1925.
Une autre condition de cette police, qui ne pouvait être remise pour être payée comptant du vivant de l’assurée (no cash surrender value), exigeait le paiement à l’avance des primes, à peine de déchéance après un délai de trente jours.
Bilodeau, l’assuré, semble avoir payé ses primes régulièrement jusqu’au 13 décembre 1925 inclusivement. A cette dernière date, l’intimée avait certains droits éventuels pour une période d’une année en vertu de la police, sujet aux conditions suivantes: 1o que Bilodeau ne révoquât pas, en faveur de sa fille, ce bénéfice éventuel de l’intimée pour la moitié du produit de l’assurance; 2° que l’intimée survécût à son mari, s’il décédait pendant l’année. Jusqu’à 1898, le statut qui permettait, contrairement au principe général posé à l’article 1265 du code civil, à un mari d’avantager sa femme durant le mariage au moyen d’une police d’assurance, décrétait que les polices d’assurances régies par la loi ne seraient pas saisissaibles pour dettes dues soit par la personne assurée, soit par la personne devant bénéficier de la police, et seraient incessibles par toutes telles personnes. La loi 61 Victoria, c 40, a permis la cession et a ajouté à l’article 5604 des Statuts Refondus de 1888 les mots
L’assuré et les parties avantagés peuvent de concert transporter la police.
Cette loi est maintenant l’article 30 du chapitre 244 des Statuts Refondus de 1925.
Le 15 décembre 1925, l’intimée signa le document suivant:
Pour valeur reçue, nous majeurs, cédons, transfère et abandonne (sic) par les présentes à Daoust Lalonde et Cie de Montréal, Carré Victoria, Qué., la police d’assurance portant le numéro 4050533, émise par la New York Life Insurance Company, sur la vie de Joseph Aliace Bilodeau, de Québec, Qué., 161 Grande-Allée, ainsi que tous droits, titres, bénéfices et intérêts qui s’y rattachent ou qui résultent, et ce, sous réserve des conditions de ladite police et sans préjudice des règles de la compagnie.
En foi de quoi ma signature: fait ce quinze décembre mil neuf cent vingt-cinq.
Joseph Aliace Bilodeau
Rose-Anna Ferland Bilodeau
Marie-Antoinette Bilodeau
lequel fut accepté par la mise-en-cause et transmis à l’appelante. Comme la demanderesse-intimée l’admet, ce document constitue, à sa face même, une renonciation par l’intimée à ses droits comme bénéficiaire.
Mais peut-on dire, comme elle l’allègue et comme les jugements le décident, que la preuve verbale faite par l’intimée et M. Daoust, président de la compagnie appelante, démontre que cet abandon ou renonciation fut simulé et ne fut consenti par elle que pour garantir la dette de son mari? La demanderesse, après avoir allégué que ce document fut signé et consenti sur les instances du gérant de l’appelante, a seulement prouvé, par son propre témoignage, que son mari lui aurait dit qu’il voulait sa signature pour garantir ce qu’il devait à Daoust, Lalonde et Cie. Elle ajoute que son mari lui disait: “Je rembourserai et je te retournerai la police.” Cette preuve verbale a été admise, malgré l’objection des procureurs de rappelante, bien qu’elle semblât contredire l’écrit signé par la défenderesse; et je crois, vu qu’il s’agit de l’application possible d’une loi d’exception, mais d’ordre public, que le juge de première instance a probablement eu raison d’accueillir cette preuve testimoniale. Mais ces conversations entre mari et femme, en l’absence de M. Daoust et en dehors de la connaissance de l’appelante, ne sauraient lier cette dernière, qui a simplement reçu, sans l’avoir sollicitée de son débiteur, la police d’assurance avec le transport pur et simple et l’acceptation de l’assureur. M. Daoust, dans son témoig