Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc.

Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc.
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2005-11-03
Neutral citation
2005 SCC 62
Report
[2005] 3 SCR 141
Case number
29413
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; Bastarache, Michel; Binnie, William Ian Corneil; LeBel, Louis; Deschamps, Marie; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Charron, Louise
On appeal from
Quebec
Subjects
Constitutional law
Municipal law
Notes
SCC Case Information: 29413
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141, 2005 SCC 62
Date: 20051103
Docket: 29413
Between:
City of Montreal
Appellant
and
2952‑1366 Québec Inc.
Respondent
‑ and ‑
Attorney General of Ontario
Intervener
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Abella and Charron JJ.
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 101)
Dissenting reasons:
(paras. 102 to 177)
McLachlin C.J. and Deschamps J. (Bastarache, LeBel, Abella and Charron JJ. concurring)
Binnie J.
______________________________
Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141, 2005 SCC 62
City of Montréal Appellant
v.
2952-1366 Québec Inc. Respondent
and
Attorney General of Ontario Intervener
Indexed as: Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc.
Neutral citation: 2005 SCC 62.
File No.: 29413.
2004: October 14; 2005: November 3.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Abella and Charron JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for quebec
Municipal law — By-laws — Validity — Nuisances — Loudspeaker set up by business in entrance to its club so that passers-by would hear sound of show under way inside — Business convicted under municipal by-law prohibiting noise produced by sound equipment that can be heard from outside — Scope of by-law — Whether by‑law exceeding jurisdiction conferred on municipality by its enabling legislation — Charter of the city of Montreal, 1960, S.Q. 1959-60, c. 102, arts. 516, 517(l), 520(72) — By‑law concerning noise, R.B.C.M. 1994, c. B‑3, art. 9(1).
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Freedom of expression — Municipal by‑law prohibiting noise produced by sound equipment that can be heard from outside — Whether by-law infringing freedom of expression — If so, whether infringement can be justified — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1 , 2 (b) — By-law concerning noise, R.B.C.M. 1994, c. B‑3, art. 9(1).
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Freedom of expression — Public property — Approach for application of s. 2 (b) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to public property.
A business operating a club featuring female dancers in downtown Montréal set up, in the entrance to its establishment, a loudspeaker that amplified the music and commentary accompanying the show under way inside so that passers-by would hear them. The business was found guilty in the Municipal Court of an offence under s. 9(1) of the City of Montréal’s By-law concerning noise, which provides that “the following noises, where they can be heard from the outside, are specifically prohibited: (1) noise produced by sound equipment, whether it is inside a building or installed or used outside”. The Superior Court quashed the conviction on the basis that the By‑law infringed the respondent’s freedom of expression and that this infringement could not be justified. The Court of Appeal upheld that decision. It held that the City could not define an activity as a nuisance if it was not a nuisance and that the prohibition constituted an unjustified violation of the right to freedom of expression.
Held (Binnie J. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed. The municipal by-law is valid.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, LeBel, Deschamps, Abella and Charron JJ.: Article 9(1) of the By‑law is not overbroad, and it applies only to sounds that stand out over the environmental noise. Although this provision, drafted using general language, is ambiguous, a contextual interpretation resolves the ambiguity and enables the scope of art. 9(1) to be determined. The history of the By-law shows that the lawmakers’ purpose was to control noises that interfere with peaceful enjoyment of the urban environment. It is clear from the legislative purpose that the scope of art. 9(1) does not include sounds resulting solely from human activity that is peaceable and respectful of the municipal community. The immediate context of art. 9 supports this interpretation. It indicates that the concept of noise that adversely affects the enjoyment of the environment is implicit in art. 9 and that the activities prohibited under it are activities that produce noises that can be detected as separate from the environmental noise. [11] [16] [26] [34]
The City has the power to adopt art. 9(1) of the By-law by virtue of its power to define and regulate nuisances pursuant to arts. 517(l) and 520(72) of the Charter of the city of Montreal, 1960. Only an exercise of this regulatory power in bad faith or for improper or unreasonable purposes will justify judicial review. To control noise, the City did not establish an absolute prohibition, but chose to target certain types of sounds that are more likely to stand out over other environmental noise. This choice is of course consistent with its delegated power and in no way constitutes an unreasonable or improper exercise of that power. [41] [45] [48] [54]
Article 9(1) infringes s. 2 (b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . The noise emitted by a loudspeaker onto the public street had expressive content, and the method and location of the expression did not exclude it from the scope of s. 2 (b). The form of the expression is non-violent and the evidence did not establish that the method or location of the expression impedes the function of city streets or fails to promote the values that underlie the free expression guarantee. The ban on emitting amplified noise onto public streets constitutes a limit on free expression because it has the effect of restricting expression which promotes the value of self-fulfilment and human flourishing. [58] [60-68] [84-85]
While the conclusion that the expression on public property at issue in this case falls within the protected sphere of s. 2 (b) is consistent with the divergent approaches set out in Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139, the test for the application of s. 2 (b) to public property should be clarified and the following approach adopted. The basic question is whether the place is a public place where one would expect constitutional protection for free expression on the basis that expression in that place does not conflict with the purposes s. 2 (b) is intended to serve — namely democratic discourse, truth finding and self-fulfilment. To answer this question, one should consider the historical or actual function of the place and whether other aspects of the place suggest that expression within it would undermine the values underlying free expression. Applying this approach confirms the conclusion that the expression at issue falls within the scope of s. 2 (b). [70] [74] [81]
Article 9(1) is justified under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter . The objective of combatting pollution of the environment by noise is pressing and substantial, and the impugned measure also meets the proportionality test. First, the limit on noise produced by sound equipment is rationally connected to the City’s objective. Second, the measure impairs freedom of expression in a reasonably minimal way. Elected officials must be accorded a measure of latitude, particularly on environmental issues, where views and interest conflict and precision is elusive. Here, the City contended there was no other practical way to deal with the complex problem the City was facing. To regulate the volume of noise measurable by sound level meter would be unrealistic and would not achieve the City’s goal of eliminating, subject to exception, a certain type of sound. Lastly, the prejudicial effects on free expression flowing from the regulation of noise produced by sound equipment that interferes with the peaceful use and enjoyment of the urban environment are proportionate to the beneficial effects of reducing noise pollution on the street and in the neighbourhood. [89-99]
Per Binnie J. (dissenting): Article 9(1), when construed in accordance with the modern “contextual” rules of statutory interpretation, still means what it says. It imposes a general ban on “noise produced by sound equipment”. Anti-noise by‑law measures are of three types. The first prohibits noise that exceeds objective measurable limits (e.g., a set level of decibels). The second prohibits noise by subjective criteria (e.g., noise that interferes with the quality of life). The third prohibits noise by source (e.g., sounding car horns in a hospital zone). The majority judgment converts a type 3 provision into a type 2 provision, an interpretation that contradicts the City’s intent both as expressed in the By-law and as submitted to this Court in written and oral argument. Interpreted as the City intended it to be interpreted, art. 9(1) is ultra vires. [102-103]
On a grammatical reading, art. 9(1) imposes a general ban on noise classified only by source and includes noise which is not a nuisance. In this case, the context reinforces the ordinary grammatical meaning of the words used by the legislators and shows that there is no ambiguity in art. 9(1), latent or otherwise. While the courts cannot insist on a greater level of drafting precision than the subject matter permits, such indulgence is not applicable to this By‑law, which shows in its own provisions other than art. 9(1) that a sensible level of precision can be achieved. The City could have employed level, place, type and source limitations, as well as qualitative standards in art. 9(1). There is a massive amount of municipal experience in Quebec crafting anti-noise by‑laws which the City of Montréal must be taken to have known about. The City obviously intended to strike out in a new direction. The legislators clearly state that the prohibitions in art. 9(1) are “[i]n addition to the noise referred to in article 8” which prohibits, with respect to inhabited places, “disruptive noise whose sound pressure level is greater than the maximum standardized noise level determined by ordinance”. This can only mean that in art. 9(1) the “noise produced by sound equipment” need not be disruptive, need not rise to the level fixed by ordinance and need not occur in an inhabited place. The City is entitled to have the validity of that new direction considered by the Court, rather than have its enactment essentially modified to reflect the legislative model the City evidently wished to depart from. [115] [117] [122] [124] [139] [143]
To read words into art. 9(1), and then to read other words out, then to read up a phrase to require an “essential connexion with a building” and finally to read down the effect of s. 9(1), goes beyond what a court is authorized to do by way of interpretation and amounts to impermissible judicial amendment. While such radical surgery is sometimes done as a matter of constitutional remedy in a proper case, here it is being imposed at the prior stage of statutory interpretation when the Court’s mandate is simply to ascertain the intention of the legislators, not to remedy wrongs. [110] [147]
Article 9(1) is ultra vires and oppressive. The legislative power to define and prohibit nuisances conferred to City Hall by the Charter of the city of Montréal, 1960 does not extend to defining some activity or thing as a nuisance “if it has no harmful qualities, causes no injury and hurts no one”. Noise is not by nature a nuisance. There must therefore be a specification of abuse. Even if art. 9(1) were intra vires the City’s legislative power to define and prohibit nuisances, it would be a patently unreasonable exercise of it. Instead of declaring that the legislators cannot mean what they said in art. 9(1), it would be more respectful of the Court’s place in the constitutional scheme to send the defective provision back to the legislators for consideration and possible re-enactment in modified form. [150] [157‑158] [160‑161] [165]
Article 9(1) infringes freedom of expression under s. 2 (b) of the Canadian Charter and this infringement is not justified. Reliance on prosecutorial discretion is not a solution to the problem of overbreadth and overinclusiveness of art. 9(1) because such discretion is not governed by criteria “prescribed by law”. Article 9(1) is also a disproportionate response to the legitimate problem of noise pollution because it goes beyond what could be considered minimal impairment of the expressive rights of Montrealers. The status of the defence of de minimis from which potential offenders might hope to benefit is not clear in Canada and the permit procedure does little to relieve from the bad effects of the prohibition. Article 9(1) cannot be justified just because there are other ways in which the accused could have advertised its wares. The key issue is not the effects of the infringing law in relation to a particular accused, but whether applied to Montrealers generally the means chosen by the legislators are proportionate to the City’s legislative objective. [166-174]
Cases Cited
Cited by McLachlin C.J. and Deschamps J.
Applied and explained: Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139; referred to: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, 2002 SCC 42; Cheema v. Ross (1991), 82 D.L.R. (4th) 213; R. v. Luciano (1986), 34 M.P.L.R. 233; R. v. Hadden, [1983] 3 W.W.R. 661, aff’d [1984] 1 W.W.R. 384; Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031; R. v. Hydro‑Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213; McBratney v. McBratney (1919), 59 S.C.R. 550; Canadian Fishing Co. v. Smith, [1962] S.C.R. 294; Sidmay Ltd. v. Wehttam Investments Ltd., [1968] S.C.R. 828; Berardinelli v. Ontario Housing Corp., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 275; Demers v. St‑Laurent (Ville de), [1997] R.J.Q. 1892; Kruse v. Johnson, [1898] 2 Q.B. 91; Hamilton (City of) v. Hamilton Distillery Co. (1907), 38 S.C.R. 239; Shell Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver (City), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 231; Montréal (City of) v. Beauvais (1909), 42 S.C.R. 211; Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., [1947] 2 All E.R. 680; Juneau v. Québec (Ville de), [1991] R.J.Q. 2781; Montréal (City of) v. Arcade Amusements Inc., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 368; Saint‑Michel‑Archange (Municipalité de) v. 2419‑6388 Québec Inc., [1992] R.J.Q. 875; Laval (Ville) v. Prince, [1996] Q.J. No. 58 (QL); Sablières Laurentiennes Ltée v. Ste‑Adèle (Ville de), [1989] R.L. 486; R. v. Greenbaum, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 674; Morrison v. Kingston (1937), 69 C.C.C. 251; 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241, 2001 SCC 40; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927; Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712; R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; Ramsden v. Peterborough (City), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1084; MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson (1994), 89 C.C.C. (3d) 217; R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452; R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
Cited by Binnie J. (dissenting)
Attorney General of Quebec v. Carrières Ste‑Thérèse Ltée, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 831; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, 2002 SCC 42; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27; R. v. Goltz, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, 2005 SCC 26; Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031; R. v. L’Heureux, [1996] Q.J. No. 2135 (QL); Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145; Anctil v. Cour municipale de Ville de La Pocatière, [1973] C.S. 238; Laval (Ville) v. Prince, [1996] Q.J. No. 58 (QL); Métabetchouan‑Lac-à-La‑Croix (Ville de) v. Restaurant‑Bar Chez Miville inc., Sup. Ct. Alma, No. 160‑36‑000006‑995, May 8, 2000; Baie‑Comeau (Ville) v. Bar le Broadway, 1999 CarswellQue 1472; Beloeil (Ville) v. Pergola 2000, [2003] Q.J. No. 12782 (QL); Nutrichef Ltée v. Brossard (Ville), Sup. Ct. Longueuil, No. 505‑36‑000006‑876, April 12, 1988; Sévigny v. Alimentation G. F. Robin inc., SOQUIJ AZ‑99021251; Shell Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver (City), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 231; Nanaimo (City) v. Rascal Trucking Ltd., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 342, 2000 SCC 13; Pacific National Investments Ltd. v. Victoria (City), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 919, 2000 SCC 64; United Taxi Drivers’ Fellowship of Southern Alberta v. Calgary (City), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 485, 2004 SCC 19; Kirkland (Ville) v. Phares (1993), 19 M.P.L.R. (2d) 314; Saint‑Michel‑Archange (Municipalité de) v. 2419‑6388 Québec Inc., [1992] R.J.Q. 875; Sablières Laurentiennes Ltée v. Ste‑Adèle (Ville de), [1989] R.L. 486; Sambault v. Mercier (Corp. mun. de Ville), [1983] C.S. 147; Beach v. Perkins (Municipalité de), [1975] C.S. 85; Montréal (City of) v. Arcade Amusements Inc., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 368; Kruse v. Johnson, [1898] 2 Q.B. 91; R. v. Greenbaum, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 674; Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679; R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045; R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371; R. v. Hinchey, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1128; Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, 2004 SCC 4; R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139; R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Act to amend and consolidate the provisions of the Ordinance to incorporate the City and Town of Montreal, S. Prov. C. 1851, 14 & 15 Vict., c. 128, s. LVIII.
Act to revise and consolidate the charter of the city of Montreal, S.Q. 1899, c. 58, art. 299, para. 1, 299, para. 2(7), 299, para. 2(12), 300(50).
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1 , 2 (b).
Charter of human rights and freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C‑12, arts. 3, 9.1.
Charter of the city of Montreal, 1960, S.Q. 1959-60, c. 102, arts. 516, 517(l), 520(72).
City of Montréal, By‑law concerning noise, R.B.C.M. 1994, c. B‑3, arts. 1 “disruptive noise”, “environmental noise”, “noise with audible pure sounds”, 2, 6(3), 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 20.
City of Montréal, By‑law No. 1448, By‑law concerning noise and to repeal, in whole or in part, certain by‑laws, August 18, 1937, art. 5.
City of Montréal, By-law No. 4996, By‑Law concerning noise, June 21, 1976, art. 15.1.1.
City of Montréal, By Law to Preserve Public Peace and Good Order (in Charter and By-Laws of the City of Montreal (1865), c. 23), s. 3.
Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 976.
Interpretation Act, R.S.Q., c. I‑16, s. 41.1.
Authors Cited
Côté, Pierre‑André. The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 3rd ed. Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 2000.
Driedger, Elmer A. Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. Toronto: Butterworths, 1983.
Giroux, Lorne. “Retour sur les compétences municipales en matière de nuisance”. Dans Service de formation permanente du Barreau du Québec, Développements récents en droit de l’environnement. Cowansville, Qué.: Yvon Blais, 1999, 299.
L’Heureux, Jacques. Droit municipal québécois, t. II. Montréal: SOREJ, 1984.
Langlois, Denis. “Le bruit et la fureur: les réglementations municipale et provinciale en matière de bruit”. Dans Service de formation permanente du Barreau du Québec, Développements récents en droit municipal. Cowansville, Qué.: Yvon Blais, 1992, 163.
Moon, Richard. The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Expression. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000.
Mullan, David J. Administrative Law. Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001.
Nouveau Larousse Encyclopédique, vol. 1. Paris: Larousse, 2001, “bruit”.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal (Fish and Chamberland JJ.A. and Letarte J. (ad hoc)), [2002] R.J.Q. 2986, 217 D.L.R. (4th) 674, 167 C.C.C. (3d) 356, [2002] Q.J. No. 3376 (QL), affirming a decision of Boilard J., [2000] Q.J. No. 7289 (QL), reversing a judgment of the Montréal Municipal Court, [1999] Q.J. No. 2890 (QL). Appeal allowed, Binnie J. dissenting.
Serge Barrière, for the appellant.
No one appeared for the respondent.
Daniel Paquin, as amicus curiae.
Shaun Nakatsuru, for the intervener.
The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, LeBel, Deschamps, Abella and Charron JJ. was delivered by
The Chief Justice and Deschamps J. —
1. Introduction
1 This appeal concerns the power of the city of Montréal (“City”) to prohibit noise produced in the street by a loudspeaker located in the entrance of an establishment. Two arguments are raised, one based on the limits on the power to regulate and the other on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Canadian Charter ”). For the reasons that follow, these arguments must be rejected.
2 In light of its scope, art. 9(1) of the By‑law concerning noise, R.B.C.M. 1994, c. B‑3 (“By‑law”), was validly adopted by the City pursuant to its regulatory powers. Although this provision limits the freedom of expression guaranteed by s. 2 (b) of the Canadian Charter , the limit is reasonable and can be justified within the meaning of s. 1 of the Canadian Charter .
2. Origins of the Case
3 The respondent operates a club featuring female dancers in a commercial zone of downtown Montréal, in a building fronting Ste‑Catherine Street. To attract customers and compete with a similar establishment located nearby, the respondent set up, in the main entrance to its club, a loudspeaker that amplified the music and commentary accompanying the show under way inside so that passers‑by would hear them. Around midnight on May 14, 1996, a police officer on patrol on Ste‑Catherine Street heard the music from a nearby intersection. The respondent was charged with producing noise that could be heard outside using sound equipment, in violation of arts. 9(1) and 11 of the By‑law. These provisions read as follows:
9. In addition to the noise referred to in article 8, the following noises, where they can be heard from the outside, are specifically prohibited:
(1) noise produced by sound equipment, whether it is inside a building or installed or used outside;
. . .
11. No noise specifically prohibited under articles 9 or 10 may be produced, whether or not it affects an inhabited place.
4 Summoned before the Municipal Court, the respondent contested the charge on the ground that arts. 9(1) and 11 of the By‑law were invalid. According to the respondent, the City, in adopting these provisions, exceeded its delegated power in respect of nuisances because the provisions defined as a nuisance an activity that was not a nuisance. The respondent also alleged that the provisions infringed its freedom of expression and that the infringement could not be justified.
5 Judge Massignani of the Municipal Court ruled that the noise emitted by the respondent’s establishment constituted a nuisance, that the city council had the power to define and prohibit nuisances under art. 520(72) of the Charter of the city of Montreal, 1960, S.Q. 1959‑60, c. 102 (“Charter of the City”), and that neither the purpose nor the effect of the By‑law was to restrict freedom of expression ([1999] Q.J. No. 2890 (QL)). In the Superior Court, Boilard J. quashed the conviction on the basis that the impugned provisions infringed the respondent’s freedom of expression; in his view, the By‑law impaired the underlying value of self‑fulfilment, and this infringement could not be justified ([2000] Q.J. No. 7289 (QL)). The majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the decision to quash the conviction ([2002] R.J.Q. 2986). Writing for the majority, Fish J.A., as he then was, concluded that the City had not shown the prohibited activity to be contrary to peace and order. He was also of the view that the City could not define an activity as a nuisance if it was not a nuisance and that the prohibition constituted an unjustified violation of the right to freedom of expression. Chamberland J.A., dissenting, would have set aside the Superior Court’s judgment because the City had the authority to adopt the provisions in issue pursuant to its powers to ensure peace and public order within its territory and to regulate nuisances. In his view, the infringement of the respondent’s freedom of expression was justified, since there were no less‑restrictive ways for the City to achieve its objective of eliminating noises that are harmful to the urban soundscape.
6 The debate is now before this Court. We will first address the administrative law argument before turning to the constitutional argument.
3. Analysis
3.1 Does the City Have the Power to Adopt Article 9(1) of the By‑law?
7 A two‑stage analysis must be carried out to establish whether the City has the power to adopt art. 9(1) of the By‑law. First, the scope of the provision must be defined. Second, it must be determined whether the City’s power includes the authority to adopt such a provision.
8 We find art. 9(1) of the By‑law to be valid. Our analysis will be based on our interpretation of the provision. The points on which we disagree with Binnie J., dissenting, explain how he arrives at a different result. We will begin by delimiting the scope of the impugned provision before considering the submissions based on the scope of the regulatory power.
3.1.1 Scope of Article 9(1) of the By‑law
9 As this Court has reiterated on numerous occasions, “[t]oday there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament” (Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21, quoting E. A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87; see also Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, 2002 SCC 42, at para. 26). This means that, as recognized in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes “statutory interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the legislation alone” (para. 21).
10 Words that appear clear and unambiguous may in fact prove to be ambiguous once placed in their context. The possibility of the context revealing a latent ambiguity such as this is a logical result of the modern approach to interpretation. The fact that a municipal by‑law is in issue rather than a statute does not alter the approach to be followed in applying the modern principles of interpretation: P.‑A. Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (3rd ed. 2000), at p. 24.
11 Binnie J. concludes that the provision is unlawful for being overbroad. We do not share his view regarding the scope of the By‑law. Even though he discusses the recognized principles of interpretation, Binnie J. bases his analysis on the premise that art. 9(1) of the By‑law is clear and unambiguous.
12 In our view, although it appears to be clear, the provision is in fact ambiguous. In interpreting legislation, the guiding principle is the need to determine the lawmakers’ intention. To do this, it is not enough to look at the words of the legislation. Its context must also be considered.
13 Although he claims to follow the modern approach to the interpretation of legislative provisions, Binnie J. actually relies on the literal interpretation advocated by counsel for the City when questioned at the hearing. In our view, the Court must not limit itself to the submissions of counsel for the appellant. There are by‑laws like this one in force across Canada. Several have already been reviewed by appellate courts from angles that mirror in many respects the arguments raised in the case at bar: Cheema v. Ross (1991), 82 D.L.R. (4th) 213 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Luciano (1986), 34 M.P.L.R. 233 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Hadden, [1983] 3 W.W.R. 661 (Sask. Q.B.), aff’d [1984] 1 W.W.R. 384 (Sask. C.A.).
14 What must be done in the case at bar is not to read down art. 9(1), but to determine whether, on a proper interpretation of the provision, it is limited to prohibiting noises that interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of the urban environment. In our view, taking the wording of the provision into account together with its purpose and its context, as is required by the established principles of statutory interpretation, resolves its ambiguity and enables its scope to be determined. Soft and inoffensive sounds are not prohibited, as Binnie J. contends.
3.1.1.1 Wording of Article 9(1) of the By‑law
15 Any act of communication presupposes two distinct but inseparable components: text and context (Côté, at p. 280). Some spheres of government activity are more conducive to precisely worded texts, while others lend themselves more to general language. The use of general language in environmental matters was approved by the Court in Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031, and R. v. Hydro‑Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213. The subject matter does not lend itself well to precise language. In the interpretation process, the more general the wording adopted by the lawmakers, the more important the context becomes. The contextual approach to interpretation has its limits. Courts perform their interpretative role only when the two components of communication converge toward the same point: the text must lend itself to interpretation, and the lawmakers’ intention must be clear from the context.
16 The wording of art. 9(1) is ambiguous. The words used are very general. What exactly is a “noise”? Is it a sound that could disturb the public peace? Or is it any sound that can be imagined? What does “can be heard from the outside” mean? Is a connection with a building necessary? Or would a cellular telephone constitute sound equipment? The general language used by the lawmakers can be interpreted in many ways. This ambiguity can be resolved only by reviewing the context of art. 9(1).
3.1.1.2 Context of Article 9(1) of the By‑Law
17 Having identified the ways in which the wording of art. 9(1) is ambiguous, we must now consider its context. The context of legislation involves a number of factors. The overall context in which a provision was adopted can be determined by reviewing its legislative history and inquiring into its purpose. The immediate context of art. 9(1) can be determined by analysing the By‑law itself. This review will enable us to determine whether the City has the power to adopt the impugned provision. We will accordingly address each of these contextual indicia: history, purpose and the By‑law itself.
18 We will begin our contextual analysis with the history of the By‑law. Noise affects city dwellers in their everyday lives and was one of the earliest concerns of municipal governments. It has long been recognized that noise falls within the jurisdiction over nuisances: D. Langlois, “Le bruit et la fureur: les réglementations municipale et provinciale en matière de bruit”, in Développements récents en droit municipal (1992), 163. The regulation of noise has even been characterized as a primary focus of the municipal control of nuisances: L. Giroux, “Retour sur les compétences municipales en matière de nuisance”, in Développements récents en droit de l’environnement (1999), 299, at p. 303.
19 The City has had the authority to regulate nuisances since before Confederation. At that time, it could adopt by‑laws “[f]or the good rule, peace, welfare . . . and for the prevention and suppression of all nuisances” (Act to amend and consolidate the provisions of the Ordinance to incorporate the City and Town of Montreal, S. Prov. C. 1851, 14 & 15 Vict., c. 128, s. LVIII). Noises were specifically regulated by reference to the preservation of public peace and good order (“No person shall wilfully . . . use . . . any bell, horn, or bugle, or other sounding instrument”, By‑Law to Preserve Public Peace and Good Order (in Charter and By‑laws of the City of Montreal (1865), c. 23), s. 3). In 1899, in addition to its general power to maintain peace and order (Act to revise and consolidate the charter of the city of Montreal, S.Q. 1899, c. 58, art. 299, para. 1, and art. 299, para. 2(7)) and its power to prohibit nuisances (art. 299, para. 2(12)), the City was given the power to define what constituted a nuisance (art. 300(50)).
20 The first by‑law encompassing all the provisions respecting noise was passed in 1937: By‑law concerning noise and to repeal, in whole or in part, certain by‑laws (By‑law 1448, August 18, 1937). Article 5 of By‑law 1448 prohibited sounds produced by sound equipment and projected outside buildings toward streets or public places. Given the time when the provision was adopted and the fact that it concerned sounds projected from a building into a public space, it is reasonable to conclude that the equipment to which the provision applied was equipment connected with the building. The purpose of the provision was apparently to prohibit sounds produced by equipment located inside a building at a volume such that a court could conclude that the person in control of the building intended the sounds to be heard by people in public spaces. The purpose of the prohibition was to preserve the peaceful nature of public spaces.
21 Article 5 of By‑law 1448 was clearly the predecessor of art. 15.1.1 of the By‑law concerning noise of 1976 (By‑law 4996, June 21, 1976), which prohibited noise produced by an apparatus emitting sound outside a building. This provision, which was drafted more concisely, targeted equipment projecting sounds outside buildings. Article 15.1.1 of By‑law 4996 is the predecessor of art. 9 of the By‑law at issue in the instant case.
22 As can be seen from this brief overview of the By‑law’s historical background, the City has been regulating noise for over a hundred years. Although the wording has been modified over the years, all the provisions adopted since 1937 have had as their purpose the elimination of sounds emitted by sound equipment inside or outside a building at a volume such that they are audible and thus interfere with citizens’ peaceful enjoyment of public spaces. The underlying objective of all these by‑laws has been to preserve the peaceful nature of public spaces.
23 Having considered the historical context of art. 9(1) of the By‑law, we will now turn to its purpose. Identifying the purpose of a regulation can be helpful in determining the meaning of a given word or expression. The Court has frequently done so to extend or restrict the apparent or literal scope of a provision: McBratney v. McBratney (1919), 59 S.C.R. 550; Canadian Fishing Co. v. Smith, [1962] S.C.R. 294; Sidmay Ltd. v. Wehttam Investments Ltd., [1968] S.C.R. 828; Berardinelli v. Ontario Housing Corp., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 275; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes. Moreover, the Quebec Court of Appeal engaged in the same exercise in Demers v. Saint‑Laurent (Ville de), [1997] R.J.Q. 1892, when it concluded that [translation] “the ‘nuisance’ referred to in s. 76 [of the Environment Quality Act, R.S.Q., c. Q‑2] is limited to nuisances that are likely to affect the life, health, safety or welfare of the community” (p. 1895).
24 This approach is consistent with the approach to be followed in analysing a word or expression containing a latent ambiguity. “Noise” is one such word. The definitions of “noise” in dictionaries are broad, although they tend to mention that the word is often, but not necessarily, used in respect of unpleasant sounds. In French, the word “bruit” has an even broader meaning. It is defined as a [translation] “[c]ombination of sounds produced by vibrations that can be perceived by hearing” (Nouveau Larousse Encyclopédique (2001), vol. 1, at p. 233). Hence, noise in itself is not necessarily a nuisance, but there is no contesting that it can be a nuisance.
25 The general expressions used in art. 9(1), namely “noise” and “can be heard from the outside”, have an “open texture” (Côté, at p. 279), and their meaning is affected both by the underlying legislative objective and by their legal environment. The legal environment includes “all ideas related to the wording that Parliament can reasonably consider to be sufficiently common knowledge as to obviate mention in the enactment” (Côté, at p. 281).
26 It is in no municipality’s interest to place limits on activities engaged in by citizens that do not in any way interfere with their fellow citizens’ peaceful enjoyment. The purpose pursued by the municipality can only be to protect against noise pollution. This purpose gives content to the general language of the provision and makes the implicit component of legal communication explicit. In the case at bar, it is clear from the legislative purpose that the scope of art. 9(1) of the By‑law does not include sounds resulting solely from human activity that is peaceable and respectful of the municipal community. This interpretation is the same as the one that flows from our historical analysis of the provision.
27 Bearing the legislative purpose in mind, we must now consider the By‑law itself. The immediate context of the impugned provision, namely the other provisions of the By‑law, is as important as its overall context. On this point, it should be noted that Quebec’s Interpretation Act, R.S.Q., c. I‑16, entrenches the rule of contextual interpretation and specifies how it is to be applied:
41.1 The provisions of an Act are construed by one another, ascribing to each provision the meaning which results from the whole Act and which gives effect to the provision.
Thus, the immediate context thus also serves to clarify the scope or meaning of a word, expression or provision.
28 In art. 9, the provision at issue in the instant case, the two words or expressions requiring interpretation, “noise” and “where they can be heard from the outside”, are framed by their context, which enables their meaning to be determined.
29 The noise to which art. 9 applies is already qualified as being (1) produced by sound equipment, (2) inside a building or installed or used outside it and (3) audible from the outside. These three characteristics are cumulative.
30 Does the provision cover all noises produced by sound equipment that are heard from the outside? Obviously not, since this would not cover all three characteristics. The example given by Binnie J. of noise from a cellular phone is therefore outside the scope of art. 9(1), since it disregards the essential connection with a building, and therefore with the very text on which he claims to rely. An interpretation that did not take this connection into account would make the words “whether it is inside a building or installed or used outside” unnecessary, contrary to the principle of interpretation known as the rule of effectivity (Côté, at p. 277; s. 41.1 of the Interpretation Act). If the lawmakers went to the trouble of specifying the location of the sound equipment in relation to the building in art. 9(1) of the By‑law, their intention was not to prohibit all noise produced by sound equipment without regard for this connection.
31 Other provisions of the By‑law are also helpful in determining the lawmakers’ intention. The By‑law (reproduced in the Appendix) contains a number of definitions that permit various types of noises to be identified. For example, a “noise with audible pure sounds” is defined as a “disruptive noise whose sound energy is concentrated around certain frequencies”. The expression “disruptive noise” is found in most of the definitions of types of noise. This explicit reference to the concept of disruption is consistent with the purpose identified above. The expression “disruptive noise” is itself defined as “a noise that can be detected as separate from the environmental noise and considered as a source for analysis purposes, and includes a noise defined as such in this article”. “Environmental noise” is the norm against which disruptive noise can be measured. “Environmental noise” is “a combination of usual noises from various sources,