R. v. Sinclair

R. v. Sinclair
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2010-10-08
Neutral citation
2010 SCC 35
Report
[2010] 2 SCR 310
Case number
32537
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; Binnie, William Ian Corneil; LeBel, Louis; Deschamps, Marie; Fish, Morris J.; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Charron, Louise; Rothstein, Marshall; Cromwell, Thomas Albert
On appeal from
British Columbia
Subjects
Constitutional law
Notes
SCC Case Information: 32537
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 310
Date: 20101008 Docket: 32537
Between:
Trent Terrence Sinclair
Appellant
and
Her Majesty The Queen
Respondent
‑ and ‑
Attorney General of Ontario, Director of Public Prosecutions of Canada,
Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario,
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association
and Canadian Civil Liberties Association
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ.
Reasons for Judgment: (paras. 1 to 75)
Dissenting Reasons: (paras. 76 to 122)
Dissenting Reasons: (paras. 123 to 227)
McLachlin C.J. and Charron J. (Deschamps, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. concurring)
Binnie J.
LeBel and Fish JJ. (Abella J. concurring)
______________________________
R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 310
Trent Terrence Sinclair Appellant
v.
Her Majesty The Queen Respondent
and
Director of Public Prosecutions of Canada,
Attorney General of Ontario, Criminal Lawyers’ Association
of Ontario, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association
and Canadian Civil Liberties Association Interveners
Indexed as: R. v. Sinclair
2010 SCC 35
File No.: 32537.
2009: May 12; 2010: October 8.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for british columbia
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Right to counsel — Custodial interrogation — Presence of counsel — Renewed opportunity to consult counsel — Accused spoke to counsel of choice prior to police interrogation — Repeated requests for further consultation — Incriminating statements made during interrogation — Whether detainee who has been properly accorded right to counsel at outset of detention has constitutional right to further consultations with counsel during course of interrogation — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 10(b) .
After being arrested for murder, S was advised of his right to counsel, and twice spoke by telephone with a lawyer of his choice. He was later interviewed by a police officer for several hours. S stated on a number of occasions during the interview that he had nothing to say on matters touching the investigation and wished to speak to his lawyer again. The officer confirmed that S had the right to choose whether to talk or not, however, he refused to allow S to consult with his lawyer again. He also told S that he did not have the right to have his lawyer present during questioning. The officer continued the conversation. In time, S implicated himself in the murder. At the end of the interview, the police placed S into a cell with an undercover officer. While in the cell, S made further incriminating statements to that officer. S later accompanied the police to the location where the victim had been killed and participated in a re‑enactment. Following a voir dire, the trial judge ruled that the interview, the statements to the undercover officer, and the re‑enactment were admissible. The trial judge found that the Crown had proven their voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the police had not infringed S’s rights as guaranteed by s. 10( b ) of the Charter . The Court of Appeal agreed.
Held (Binnie, LeBel, Fish and Abella JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be dismissed.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Deschamps, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ.: Section 10( b ) of the Charter does not mandate the presence of defence counsel throughout a custodial interrogation. Precedent is against this interpretation and the language of s. 10(b) does not appear to contemplate this requirement. Moreover, the purpose of s. 10(b) does not demand the continued presence of counsel throughout the interview process. In most cases, an initial warning, coupled with a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel when the detainee invokes the right, satisfies s. 10(b). However, the police must give the detainee an additional opportunity to receive advice from counsel where developments in the course of the investigation make this necessary to serve the purpose underlying s. 10(b).
In the context of a custodial interrogation, the purpose of s. 10(b) is to support detainees’ right to choose whether to cooperate with the police investigation or not, by giving them access to legal advice on the situation they are facing. This is achieved by requiring that they be informed of the right to consult counsel and, if a detainee so requests, that he or she be given an opportunity to consult counsel. Achieving this purpose may require that the detainee be given an opportunity to reconsult counsel where developments make this necessary, but it does not demand the continued presence of counsel throughout the interview process. There is of course nothing to prevent counsel from being present at an interrogation where all sides consent, as already occurs. The police remain free to facilitate such an arrangement if they so choose, and the detainee may wish to make counsel’s presence a precondition of giving a statement.
A request to consult counsel, without more, is not sufficient to retrigger the s. 10(b) right. What is required is a change in circumstances that suggests that the choice faced by the detainee has been significantly altered, requiring further advice on the new situation, in order to fulfill the purpose of s. 10(b). Police tactics short of such a change may result in the Crown being unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a subsequent statement was voluntary, rendering it inadmissible. But it does not follow that the procedural rights granted by s. 10(b) have been breached.
Existing jurisprudence has recognized that changed circumstances may result from: new procedures involving the detainee; a change in the jeopardy facing the detainee; or reason to believe that the detainee may not have understood the initial advice of the right to counsel. The categories are not closed. However, additions to them should be developed only where necessary to ensure that s. 10(b) has achieved its purpose. The change of circumstances must be objectively observable in order to trigger additional implementational duties for the police. It is not enough for the detainee to assert, after the fact, that he or she needed help, absent objective indicators that renewed legal consultation was required to permit him or her to make a meaningful choice as to whether to cooperate with the police investigation or refuse to do so.
S does not appear to fall into any of the categories where thus far a right to reconsultation has been recognized as necessary to fulfill the purpose of s. 10(b). The question is therefore whether the circumstances, viewed as a whole, indicate that S required further legal advice in order to fulfill the purpose of s. 10(b). Developments in the investigation that suggest that the detainee may be confused about his choices and right to remain silent may trigger the right to a renewed consultation with a lawyer under s. 10(b). That is not the case here. It is clear from the trial judge’s findings of fact that S never had any doubt about the choices the law allowed him and, in particular, his constitutional right to remain silent. S twice spoke with counsel of his choice. Both times, S told the police that he was satisfied with the call. At the beginning of the interview, S said to the officer that he had been told about some of the devices the police might use to obtain information from him, including lying to him, and that he had been advised not to discuss anything important with anyone. Later in the course of the interview, the police repeatedly confirmed that it was his choice whether he wished to speak with them or not. The police did not denigrate the legal advice he had received and repeatedly confirmed that it was his choice whether he wished to speak or not. There were no changed circumstances requiring renewed consultation with a lawyer. No s. 10( b ) Charter breach has therefore been established.
This interpretation of s. 10(b) does not give carte blanche to the police as contended. This argument overlooks the requirement that confessions must be voluntary in the broad sense now recognized by the law. The police must not only fulfill their obligations under s. 10(b), they must conduct the interview in strict conformity with the confessions rule. In defining the contours of the s. 7 right to silence and related Charter rights, however, consideration must also be given to the societal interest in the investigation and solving of crimes. Any suggestion that the questioning of a suspect, in and of itself, runs counter to the presumption of innocence and the protection against self‑incrimination is clearly contrary to settled authority and practice. The police are charged with the duty to investigate alleged crimes and, in performing this duty, they necessarily have to make inquiries from relevant sources of information, including persons suspected of, or even charged with, committing the alleged crime. While the police must be respectful of an individual’s Charter rights, a rule that would require the police to automatically retreat upon a detainee stating that he or she has nothing to say would not strike the proper balance between the public interest in the investigation of crimes and the suspect’s interest in being left alone.
Per Binnie J. (dissenting): A detainee is entitled to a further opportunity or opportunities to receive advice from counsel during a custodial interview where his or her request falls within the purpose of the s. 10(b) right (i.e. to satisfy a need for legal assistance rather than delay or distraction), and such request is reasonably justified by the objective circumstances that were or ought to have been apparent to the police during the interrogation.
In this case, the initial refusal to allow S to consult further with his counsel did not constitute a Charter breach. The breach occurred when, after several hours or so of suggestions (subtle and not so subtle) and argument, the officer confronted S with evidence linking him to the crime and S repeated five times his desire to consult with his counsel before going further. Police use of moral suasion is, of course, absolutely acceptable, but S was clearly concerned (manifested by his five separate requests to consult his lawyer again) whether the lawyer’s initial advice (whatever it was) remained valid. S faced a second degree murder charge. It cannot reasonably be said that the 360 seconds of legal advice he received in two initial phone calls before the police began their interrogation was enough to exhaust his s. 10(b) guarantee. Given the unfolding of new information up to that point in the interview, S’s request to speak again to counsel was reasonable, and the police refusal of that further consultation was a breach of s. 10(b).
What now appears to be licenced as a result of the “interrogation trilogy” — Oickle, Singh, and the present case — is that an individual (presumed innocent) may be detained and isolated for questioning by the police for at least five or six hours without reasonable recourse to a lawyer, during which time the officers can brush aside assertions of the right to silence or demands to be returned to his or her cell, in an endurance contest in which the police interrogators, taking turns with one another, hold all the important legal cards.
Communication between solicitor and client is the condition precedent to the lawyer’s ability to assist. The advice will only be as good as the information on which it is based. In the case of s. 10(b), the lawyer cannot function effectively in an informational vacuum without the possibility of even a general idea of the unfolding situation in the interrogation room. Until aware of that situation, the lawyer may be in no position to render — and the detainee may not receive — meaningful assistance beyond what could be accomplished by a recorded message: “You have reached counsel; keep your mouth shut; press one to repeat this message.” In this case, the evolving situation produced information S’s lawyer needed to have to do his job.
In any case, justification for additional consultation(s) must find objective support in factors which would include (but are not limited to): the extent of prior contact with counsel; the length of the interview at the time of the request; the extent of other information (true or false) provided by the police to the detainee about the case during the interrogation, which may reasonably suggest to the detainee that the advice in the initial consultation may have been overtaken by events; the existence of exigent or urgent circumstances that militate against any delay in the interrogation; whether an issue of a legal nature has arisen in the course of the interrogation; and the mental and physical condition of the detainee to the extent that this is or ought to be apparent to the interrogator.
The detainee’s s. 10(b) request will be dealt with in the first instance by the police. In deciding whether to give effect to it the police will have to make a judgment call, but such a call is no more difficult than many arising in the course of their work. The police deal routinely with constitutional standards and other aspects of reasonableness, and there is no reason why they should not be capable of treating a demand for further consultation with counsel with the same level of professionalism. No doubt, a truncated interpretation of s. 10(b) would be easier for the police to administer. Rights during an interrogation will always be harder to administer than no rights. The Charter is framed in general language. Litigation is inevitable. The criminal justice system might well work more smoothly and efficiently from the crime‑stopper’s perspective if we had no Charter , but so long as we do have a Charter , s. 10( b ) like other Charter rights should be given a broad interpretation consistent with its purpose. If it takes time to work out its proper amplitude so be it.
Finally, S’s subsequent admissions to the undercover officer in the jail cell were part of the same transaction or course of conduct as the statement to the interrogation officer and were thus tainted, because S’s reason for confessing in the jail cell was explicitly linked to the fact that he had just given himself up in the interrogation room. The same is true of the re‑enactment. Without the initial statement to the interrogation officer, it would not have taken place. This causal connection is sufficient to establish the requisite link. The statement to the undercover officer and the evidence produced by the re‑enactment are linked to the earlier breach of s. 10(b) and were therefore obtained in breach of the Charter . That evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2) in light of the general presumption of exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained statements.
Per LeBel, Fish and Abella JJ. (dissenting): S’s right to counsel was infringed because the police prevented him from obtaining the legal advice to which he was entitled. His access to legal advice would have mitigated the impact of the police’s relentless and skilful efforts to obtain a confession from him. This breach of S’s right to counsel went to the core of the self‑incrimination interest that s. 10(b) is meant to protect. Under our system of criminal justice, the state bears the sole burden of proving the guilt of the accused. This basic precept finds expression in the presumption of innocence and the right to silence. Both rights are constitutionally protected. It follows inexorably that a detainee under police control is under no obligation to cooperate with a police investigation or to participate in an interrogation.
Both a straightforward reading and a purposive interpretation of s. 10(b) lend themselves to a broad conception of the right to counsel. The guarantee of “l’assistance d’un avocat” means more than a one‑time consultation with counsel, specifically when the brief consultation is followed by a lengthy interrogation, conducted by a skilled and experienced police interrogator.
The right to silence, the right against self‑incrimination, and the presumption of innocence work together to ensure that suspects are never obligated to participate in building the case against them. Confronted by bits and pieces of incriminating evidence, conjectural or real, the detainee may be wrongly persuaded that maintaining his or her right of silence is a futile endeavour: that the advice to remain silent originally provided by counsel is now unsound. Through ignorance of the consequences, the detainee may feel bound to make an incriminatory statement to which the police are not by law entitled. In what may seem counterintuitive to the detainee without legal training, it is often better to remain silent in the face of the evidence proffered, leaving it to the court to determine its cogency and admissibility, and forego the inevitable temptation to end the interrogation by providing the inculpatory statement sought by the interrogators. Access to counsel is therefore of critical importance at this stage to ensure, insofar as possible, that the detainee’s rights are respected and to provide the sense of security that legal representation is intended to afford. However, it is also in society’s interest that constitutional rights be respected at the pre‑trial stage, as doing so ensures the integrity of the criminal process from start to finish. In these circumstances, counsel’s advice is not simply a matter of reiterating the detainee’s right to silence, but also to explain why and how that right should be, and can be, effectively exercised.
The assistance of counsel is a right granted not only to detainees under s. 10( b ) of the Charter , but a right granted to every accused by the common law, the Criminal Code , and ss. 7 and 11( d ) of the Charter . It is not just a right to the assistance of counsel, but to the effective assistance of counsel, and one that this Court has characterized as a principle of fundamental justice. This right has not been granted to suspects and to persons accused of crime on the condition that it not be exercised when they are most in need of its protection — notably at the stage of custodial interrogation, when they are particularly vulnerable and in an acute state of jeopardy.
The right against self‑incrimination and the right to silence cannot be eroded by an approach to criminal investigations, and in particular to custodial interrogation, that would favour perceived police efficiency at the expense of constitutionally protected rights. The right to counsel, and by extension its meaningful exercise, cannot be made to depend on an interrogator’s opinion as to its opportunity or utility. The police are not empowered by the common law or by statute, and still less by our Constitution, to prevent or undermine the effective exercise by detainees of either their right to silence or their right to counsel, or to compel them against their clearly expressed wishes to participate in interrogations until confession.
In this case, both S’s statement to the undercover officer and his participation in the re‑enactment were inextricably linked to his original confession and were therefore obtained in violation of s. 10(b) as well.
That evidence should be excluded pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter . The violation of S’s constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel was significant, and not merely a technical breach. It is almost impossible to imagine a case where a Charter breach would have a greater impact on the protected interests of an individual. At a time when his freedom hung in the balance, S was denied access to the legal counsel that he desperately required. As a direct result of this unconstitutional deprivation, S relented in the face of unrelenting questioning and incriminated himself. Had he been provided with an opportunity to consult counsel, the outcome would likely have been very different. The impact of the breach, therefore, struck at the core of our most cherished legal protections: the right to silence and the protection against self‑incrimination. Finally, the offence at issue here — murder — is of the utmost severity. So too, however, is the right being protected. While society has an interest in the adjudication of a case on its merits, sometimes, as is the case here, that interest will be outweighed by the protection of the most fundamental rights in the criminal justice system.
Accordingly, the evidence should be excluded pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter .
Cases Cited
By McLachlin C.J. and Charron J.
Distinguished: R. v. Singh, 2007 SCC 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405; referred to: R. v. Evans, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869; R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151; R. v. Manninen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233; R. v. Tremblay, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 435; R. v. Black, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 138; R. v. Friesen (1995), 101 C.C.C. (3d) 167; R. v. Mayo (1999), 133 C.C.C. (3d) 168; R. v. Ekman, 2000 BCCA 414, 146 C.C.C. (3d) 346; R. v. Osmond, 2007 BCCA 470, 227 C.C.C. (3d) 375, leave to appeal refused, [2008] 1 S.C.R. xii; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004); R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353; Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004); R. v. Calder, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 660; R. v. Noël, 2002 SCC 67, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 433; R. v. Logan (1988), 46 C.C.C. (3d) 354; R. v. Wood (1994), 94 C.C.C. (3d) 193; R. v. Gormley (1999), 140 C.C.C. (3d) 110; R. v. Baidwan, 2001 BCSC 1412, [2001] B.C.J. No. 3073 (QL), aff’d 2003 BCCA 351 (CanLII); R. v. Bohnet, 2003 ABCA 207, 111 C.R.R. (2d) 131; R. v. Anderson, 2009 ABCA 67, 243 C.C.C. (3d) 134; R. v. Weeseekase, 2007 SKCA 115, 228 C.C.C. (3d) 117; R. v. R. (P.L.) (1988), 44 C.C.C. (3d) 174; R. v. Badgerow, 2008 ONCA 605, 237 C.C.C. (3d) 107; R. v. Burlingham, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206; R. v. Prosper, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236; R. v. Willier, 2010 SCC 37, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 429; R. v. Ross, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Smith, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 368; R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3.
By Binnie J. (dissenting)
R. v. Phillion, 2009 ONCA 202, 241 C.C.C. (3d) 193; Clarkson v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383; R. v. Bartle, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173; Dedman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2; R. v. Manninen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233; R. v. Ross, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151; R. v. McClure, 2001 SCC 14, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445; R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Singh, 2007 SCC 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405; Rothman v. The Queen, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640; R. v. Black, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 138; R. v. Brydges, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); R. v. Smith, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 368; R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265; R. v. Clayton, 2007 SCC 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725; R. v. Waugh, 2010 ONCA 100, 251 C.C.C. (3d) 139; R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659; R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59; R. v. Suberu, 2009 SCC 33, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 460; R. v. Wittwer, 2008 SCC 33, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 235; R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353.
By LeBel and Fish JJ. (dissenting)
R. v. Singh, 2007 SCC 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405; R. v. Logan (1988), 46 C.C.C. (3d) 354; R. v. Manninen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233; R. v. Rowbotham (1988), 41 C.C.C. (3d) 1; R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265; Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1935] A.C. 462; R. v. P. (M.B.), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 555; R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; Rothman v. The Queen, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640; R. v. Turcotte, 2005 SCC 50, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 519; R. v. Bartle, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173; Fortin v. Chrétien, 2001 SCC 45, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 500; Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 61, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 209; Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143; British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie, 2007 SCC 21, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 873; R. v. G.D.B., 2000 SCC 22, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 520; R. v. Smith, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 368; R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3; R. v. McCrimmon, 2010 SCC 36, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 402; R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659; Dedman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2; R. v. Orbanski, 2005 SCC 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Clayton, 2007 SCC 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725; R. v. Kang‑Brown, 2008 SCC 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456; R. v. Yeh, 2009 SKCA 112, 337 Sask. R. 1; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); R. v. Charron (1990), 57 C.C.C. (3d) 248; R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151; R. v. Wittwer, 2008 SCC 33, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 235; R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353; R. v. Harrison, 2009 SCC 34, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 494.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , ss. 1 , 7 , 8 , 10 , 11 , 13 , 24(2) .
Crimes Act 1914 (Austl.), Part IC, ss. 23G, 23L.
Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46 , s. 684(1) .
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (U.K.), 1994, c. 33.
Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (N.S.W.), s. 123.
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (U.K.), 1984, c. 60, ss. 58, 66.
Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld.).
Authors Cited
Allen, Ronald J. “Miranda’s Hollow Core” (2006), 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 71.
Cassell, Paul G. “Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment” (1996), 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 387.
Cassell, Paul G., and Bret S. Hayman. “Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda” (1995-1996), 43 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 839.
Cassell, Paul G., and Richard Fowles. “Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty‑Year Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement” (1997‑1998), 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1055.
Collins‑Robert French‑English, English‑French Dictionary, 2nd ed. London: Collins, 1987, “cas”.
Godsey, Mark A. “Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary Law and Understandings” (2006), 90 Minn. L. Rev. 781.
Leo, Richard A. “Inside the Interrogation Room” (1995‑1996), 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 266.
Newfoundland and Labrador. The Lamer Commission of Inquiry into the Proceedings Pertaining to: Ronald Dalton, Gregory Parsons and Randy Druken: Report and Annexes. St. John’s: Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2006.
Schulhofer, Stephen J. “Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs” (1996), 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 500.
Stewart, Hamish. “The Confessions Rule and the Charter ” (2009), 54 McGill L.J. 517.
Stuesser, Lee. “The Accused’s Right to Silence: No Doesn’t Mean No” (2002), 29 Man. L.J. 149.
Weisselberg, Charles D. “Mourning Miranda” (2008), 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1519.
Younger, Evelle J. “Results of a Survey Conducted in the District Attorney’s Office of Los Angeles County Regarding the Effect of the Miranda Decision upon the Prosecution of Felony Cases” (1966‑1967), 5 Am. Crim. L.Q. 32.
APPEAL from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (Hall, Lowry and Frankel JJ.A.), 2008 BCCA 127, 252 B.C.A.C. 288, 422 W.A.C. 288, 169 C.R.R. (2d) 232, [2008] B.C.J. No. 502 (QL), 2008 CarswellBC 573, affirming a decision of Powers J., 2003 BCSC 2040, [2003] B.C.J. No. 3258 (QL), 2003 CarswellBC 3841. Appeal dismissed, Binnie, LeBel, Fish and Abella JJ. dissenting.
Gil D. McKinnon, Q.C., and Lisa J. Helps, for the appellant.
M. Joyce DeWitt‑Van Oosten and Susan J. Brown, for the respondent.
David Schermbrucker and Christopher Mainella, for the intervener the Director of Public Prosecutions of Canada.
John S. McInnes and Deborah Krick, for the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario.
P. Andras Schreck and Candice Suter, for the intervener the Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario.
Warren B. Milman and Michael A. Feder, for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.
Jonathan C. Lisus, Alexi N. Wood and Adam Ship, for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Deschamps, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. was delivered by
The Chief Justice and Charron J. —
I. Overview
[1] This appeal and its companion cases are about the nature and limits of the right to counsel under s. 10( b ) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . The issue is whether a detainee who has been properly accorded his or her s. 10(b) rights at the outset of the detention has the constitutional right to further consultations with counsel during the course of the interrogation.
[2] We conclude that s. 10(b) does not mandate the presence of defence counsel throughout a custodial interrogation. We further conclude that in most cases, an initial warning, coupled with a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel when the detainee invokes the right, satisfies s. 10(b). However, the police must give the detainee an additional opportunity to receive advice from counsel where developments in the course of the investigation make this necessary to serve the purpose underlying s. 10(b) of providing the detainee with legal advice relevant to his right to choose whether to cooperate with the police investigation or not. To date, this principle has led to the recognition of the right to a second consultation with a lawyer where changed circumstances result from: new procedures involving the detainee; a change in the jeopardy facing the detainee; or reason to believe that the first information provided was deficient. The categories are not closed.
[3] In this case, the test for a second legal consultation is not met. Before the interview took place, Mr. Sinclair was advised of his right to counsel and twice spoke with counsel of his choice. At the beginning of the interview, he said to the officer that he had been told about some of the devices the police might use to obtain information from him, including lying to him, and that he had been advised not to discuss anything important with anyone. Later in the course of the interview, the police repeatedly confirmed that it was his choice whether he wished to speak with them or not. There were no changed circumstances requiring renewed consultation with a lawyer. We therefore conclude that breach of the right to counsel under s. 10( b ) of the Charter has not been established, and would dismiss the appeal.
II. Facts
[4] The appellant, Mr. Sinclair, was charged with second degree murder in the November 21, 2002 killing of Gary Grice and ultimately convicted by a jury of manslaughter. The events that concern us on this appeal took place following Mr. Sinclair’s arrest early in the morning of Saturday, December 14, 2002, by members of the RCMP detachment in Vernon, B.C.
[5] Upon arrest, Mr. Sinclair was advised that he was being arrested for the killing of Mr. Grice, that he had the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay, that he could call any lawyer he wanted, and that a Legal Aid lawyer would be available free of charge. When asked whether he wanted to call a lawyer, Mr. Sinclair responded: “Not right this second” (A.R., at p. 524). He was then taken to the RCMP detachment, with assurances that he would have another opportunity to contact counsel once they got there.
[6] After booking, Mr. Sinclair was again asked whether he wanted to exercise his right to counsel. This time he told the officer, Cpl. Leibel, that he wanted to speak with a lawyer named Victor S. Janicki, whom he had retained to defend him on an unrelated charge. The police placed the call and the appellant spoke with Mr. Janicki by phone in a private room for about three minutes. Cpl. Leibel asked the appellant whether he was satisfied with the call, to which Mr. Sinclair replied: “Yeah, he’s taking my case” (A.R., at p. 126).
[7] About three hours later, Cpl. Leibel called Mr. Janicki to find out if he was coming to the police station to meet with the appellant. Mr. Janicki said he would not be attending at the station because he did not yet have a Legal Aid retainer, but he asked to speak with the appellant again by phone. Another three-minute phone call ensued, again with the appellant in a private room. And again the appellant told Cpl. Leibel that he was satisfied with the call.
[8] Later that day, Mr. Sinclair was interviewed by Sgt. Skrine for approximately five hours. Before the interview began, Sgt. Skrine confirmed with Mr. Sinclair that he had been advised of and had exercised his right to counsel. The officer also warned Mr. Sinclair that he did not have to say anything and informed him that the interview was being recorded and could be used in court. Shortly thereafter, as Sgt. Skrine began to ask the appellant innocuous questions about his background and upbringing, Mr. Sinclair stated that he had nothing to say “until my lawyer’s around and he tells me what’s going on and stuff, like . . .” (Supp. A.R., at p. 3). Sgt. Skrine responded “fair enough”, and confirmed that Mr. Sinclair indeed had the right not to speak. Sgt. Skrine also said that, as he understood the law in Canada, Mr. Sinclair had the right to consult his lawyer but did not have the right to have the lawyer present during questioning. The appellant appeared to accept this proposition, and the interview continued with Sgt. Skrine attempting to build trust with Mr. Sinclair while eliciting some preliminary information.
[9] Shortly thereafter, Mr. Sinclair again expressed discomfort with being interviewed in the absence of his lawyer. Sgt. Skrine reiterated to the appellant that he had the right to choose whether to talk or not. He also expressed the view that Mr. Sinclair’s right to counsel had already been satisfied by the prior telephone calls. This explanation seemed to satisfy Mr. Sinclair for the time being, and the preliminary questioning continued.
[10] Later, when Sgt. Skrine started to ask questions about the crime scene, telling the appellant for the first time that they knew it was Mr. Grice’s blood on the carpet in his hotel room, Mr. Sinclair stated: “Well I choose to say nothing at the moment” (Supp. A.R., at p. 43). Sgt. Skrine stated: “Fair enough”, and continued to reveal details about the investigation. Shortly after, Mr. Sinclair reiterated that he was “not talking right now” and that he wanted to speak to his lawyer about all this. Sgt. Skrine told him that it was his decision whether to speak or not. The interview continued in this manner for some time. Altogether, Mr. Sinclair alternately expressed his desire to speak with his lawyer and his intention to remain silent on matters touching his involvement in the killing four or five times. Each time, Sgt. Skrine emphasized that it was Mr. Sinclair’s choice to make. On one of these occasions, Mr. Sinclair expressed uncertainty about what he should do, stating the following:
Just don’t know what to do right now. And that’s why I say I wanna wait and think and muddle things through my mind and talk to my lawyer and talk to people I . . . and you don’t seem to understand that either. It’s like okay that’s fine. I know you’re trying to do your job. And I do think you’re doing a good job, it’s just I just don’t know what to say at the moment. [Supp. A.R., at p. 77]
[11] Eventually, Sgt. Skrine began to get the kind of answers he was looking for. Mr. Sinclair commented: “You already knew all the answers before you even brought me into the room”, and he began to describe what transpired between him and Mr. Grice (Supp. A.R., at p. 85). According to the appellant, the two men had been drinking liquor and Mr. Grice had been using cocaine in Mr. Sinclair’s hotel room. They were both intoxicated. At one point, Mr. Grice approached the appellant holding a knife. The appellant thought that Mr. Grice wanted money for another fix and reacted by hitting him over the head with a frying pan. A struggle ensued, and the appellant ended up stabbing Mr. Grice several times and slitting his throat. He disposed of the body and the bloodied bedding in a dumpster.
[12] Later, the police placed Mr. Sinclair in a cell with an undercover officer. When the officer observed that Mr. Sinclair had been under questioning for a long time, Mr. Sinclair responded: “They’ve got me, the body, the sheets, the blood, the fibres on the carpet, witnesses. I’m going away for a long time but I feel relieved” (A.R., at p. 14). He explained that he would not have to keep looking over his shoulder for the police.
[13] Mr. Sinclair also accompanied the police to where Mr. Grice had been killed and participated in a re‑enactment.
III. Judicial History
A. Supreme Court of British Columbia (Powers J.), 2003 BCSC 2040 (CanLII)
[14] At trial, a voir dire was conducted to determine the admissibility of Mr. Sinclair’s statements on common law and Charter grounds.
[15] The trial judge held that the three statements (the initial interview, the exchange with the undercover officer, and the re-enactment) had been proven by the Crown to be voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, he noted that their voluntariness was not seriously contested. They were therefore admissible at common law. On the s. 10( b ) Charter application, the trial judge held that Mr. Sinclair’s right to counsel had been satisfied by the telephone calls prior to the interview. The trial judge explained that “once the person has been advised of their rights under Section 10(b), exercised those rights to retain and instruct counsel, . . . the police can then continue to interview them” (para. 115). In the absence of any change in circumstances, such as a change in jeopardy or an indication that the detainee does not understand his rights, the appropriate question that arises where a person’s repeated requests for additional contact with counsel have been ignored is whether the detainee’s will had been overborne within the meaning of the confessions rule. Section 10(b) offers no further protection in such circumstances. The statements were admitted and Mr. Sinclair was convicted of manslaughter.
B. British Columbia Court of Appeal (Hall, Lowry and Frankel JJ.A.), 2008 BCCA 127, 169 C.R.R. (2d) 232
[16] On appeal, Mr. Sinclair argued that the trial judge erred in holding that his right to counsel had not been violated. According to Mr. Sinclair, Sgt. Skrine’s refusal to facilitate the appellant’s repeated requests to speak with his lawyer during the course of the interview constituted a breach of s. 10(b). Mr. Sinclair did not contest the trial judge’s finding that his statements were voluntary.
[17] Writing for a unanimous Court of Appeal, Frankel J.A. endorsed the trial judge’s statement of the law and his application of it in this case. Relying on this Court’s recent decision in R. v. Singh, 2007 SCC 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405, he stressed that the right to counsel needs to be understood in tandem with the right to silence, which it is meant to help protect. If, as held in Singh, there is no right to unilaterally cut off questioning by asserting the right to silence, no such right can be found under s. 10(b) either. Frankel J.A. explained:
The right to counsel is intended to ensure that detainees receive immediate legal advice so that they will be able to make informed choices in their dealings with the police. As discussed in Hebert and Singh, once a detainee has exercised his or her right to counsel, the police are entitled to use legitimate means to persuade him or her to speak. I see no policy reason for providing a detainee, who does not have the right to terminate an interview by stating “I wish to remain silent”, the peremptory righ