Société de l'assurance automobile du Québec v. Cyr

Société de l'assurance automobile du Québec v. Cyr
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2008-03-28
Neutral citation
2008 SCC 13
Report
[2008] 1 SCR 338
Case number
31657
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; Bastarache, Michel; Binnie, William Ian Corneil; LeBel, Louis; Deschamps, Marie; Fish, Morris J.; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Charron, Louise; Rothstein, Marshall
On appeal from
Quebec
Subjects
Administrative law
Notes
SCC Case Information: 31657
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Société de l'assurance automobile du Québec v. Cyr, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 338, 2008 SCC 13
Date: 20080328
Docket: 31657
Between:
Société de l’assurance automobile du Québec
Appellant
and
Yvan Cyr and 9052‑0479 Québec Inc. (Centre de vérification mécanique de Montréal)
Respondents
Official English Translation: Reasons of Deschamps J.
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ.
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 53)
Dissenting Reasons:
(paras. 54 to 94):
Bastarache J. (McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Fish and Rothstein JJ. concurring)
Deschamps J. (Abella and Charron JJ. concurring)
______________________________
Société de l’assurance automobile du Québec v. Cyr, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 338, 2008 SCC 13
Société de l’assurance automobile du Québec Appellant
v.
Yvan Cyr and 9052‑0479 Québec Inc. (Centre de vérification mécanique de Montréal) Respondents
Indexed as: Société de l’assurance automobile du Québec v. Cyr
Neutral citation: 2008 SCC 13.
File No.: 31657.
2007: October 18; 2008: March 28.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for quebec
Administrative law — Procedural fairness — Distinction between private and public actions of public administration — SAAQ entering into contract with mechanical inspection centre to carry out, on its behalf, inspection of road vehicles and to issue certificates of mechanical inspection — Contract appendix designating centre employee as accredited mechanic for purposes of execution of contract — Appendix signed by SAAQ, centre and employee — Employee’s accreditation subsequently revoked by SAAQ — Act respecting administrative justice requiring Quebec government bodies to comply with procedural fairness in their discretionary decision‑making processes — Whether centre employee entitled to procedural fairness with respect to SAAQ’s decision to revoke his accreditation — Whether relationship established by appendix between centre employee and SAAQ precluded application of principles of public law — Act respecting administrative justice, R.S.Q., c. J‑3, s. 5 — Highway Safety Code, R.S.Q., c. C‑24.2, s. 520.
Pursuant to s. 520 of the Highway Safety Code (“HSC”), the Société de l’assurance automobile du Québec (“SAAQ”) entered into a contract with CVMM to carry out, on its behalf, the mechanical inspection of road vehicles. Appendix A‑1 of the contract designated C, an employee of CVMM, as an “accredited mechanic” for the purpose of the SAAQ’s vehicle inspection program and holds C to certain regulatory standards. C did not sign the contract but his signature and that of the SAAQ and CVMM appear on the appendix. Following notices of breach for failure to apply the appropriate standards during certain inspections, C’s accreditation was revoked. As a result, he was unable to continue his employment with CVMM. C and CVMM filed a motion for judicial review, along with a motion for a suspension of the decision to revoke the accreditation. They argued that the revocation of C’s accreditation was illegal because the decision had not been rendered in a manner consistent with the Act respecting administrative justice (“AAJ”). The Superior Court concluded that the actions of the SAAQ in sending the notices of breach and subsequent revocation of accreditation were an exercise of contractual rights and dismissed the application. The majority of the Court of Appeal set aside the decision, holding that C had the right to procedural fairness with respect to the SAAQ’s decision to revoke his accreditation. The majority also held that the existence of a contract could not be used by the SAAQ to avoid the obligations codified by s. 5 of the AAJ, which applied to any unilateral decision taken pursuant to the administrative authority conferred by the HSC.
Held (Deschamps, Abella and Charron JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be dismissed.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Fish and Rothstein JJ.: C is entitled to procedural fairness under s. 5 of the AAJ. C cannot be considered a party to the contract. C signed the appendix to acknowledge his acceptance of the regulatory standards applicable to his designation as an “accredited mechanic”. While C, the SAAQ and CVMM have signed the appendix which defines C’s obligations, under the contract, CVMM is the mandatary of the SAAQ, not C. C is an employee of CVMM. The relationship between C and the SAAQ is described in the contract as a “formal agreement” by which C is simply authorized to carry out CVMM’s mandate. The agreement is clearly not a contract for services adopted pursuant to art. 2098 of the Civil Code of Québec. It is a mechanism under which C is appointed by the SAAQ subject to a number of conditions, including an employment contract with CVMM. This agreement is governed by public law in that C’s designation as an accredited mechanic for the purposes of the SAAQ’s mechanical inspection program constitutes an administrative authorization. Section 5 of the AAJ and its procedural requirements are applicable to the present matter because (1) the revocation of C’s designation is a “decision concerning a permit or licence or other authorization of like nature”, and (2) C is a “citizen” as contemplated by the AAJ. Delegations of government power are authorizations. In delegating to C the power to conduct vehicle inspections, the SAAQ was granting him the authorization to act on its behalf, as an employee of CVMM, in a manner that would otherwise contravene the law. That accreditation thus derives from the “police” powers of the state. The authorization in the present case is specifically provided for in s. 520 of the HSC. The legislative origin of the authorization further confirms its administrative nature. Not all acts of the SAAQ are subject to public law, but the act of authorization has specifically been deemed worthy of procedural fairness protection by the legislature. [26‑29] [33‑36] [42‑43] [52]
Per Deschamps, Abella and Charron JJ. (dissenting): The AAJ does not apply to decisions of the SAAQ that affect C. The parties are bound by contract and the remedies available to them are governed by the rules of private law. A mechanic appointed under s. 520 of the HSC is authorized to conduct the mechanical inspection of road vehicles on the SAAQ’s behalf. In every situation where a person acts as a mandatary of the SAAQ or is designated to act on its behalf, the HSC provides for no rules of procedural fairness. It can be seen from an analysis of the mechanisms established by the HSC that the legal rules applicable to mandataries of the SAAQ are those of private law, whereas the rules applicable to users are those of public law. [54] [56] [61] [64] [69] [91‑92]
In the instant case, the documents signed by the parties govern the SAAQ’s relationship with its mandataries. That relationship is a contractual one. The contract signed by the SAAQ and CVMM authorizes CVMM to act as a mandatary of the SAAQ. According to that contract, the appendixes, including Appendix A‑1 concerning the appointment of the mechanic, form part of the contract, and it is clear that all those who signed that appendix, the SAAQ, CVMM and C, were aware that the appointment of the mechanic was not made independently of any contractual relationships. Appendix A‑1 meets all the conditions for formation of a contract subject to the Civil Code of Québec and is an accessory contract to the contract between the SAAQ and CVMM. The mandate given to CVMM must be carried out by a natural person, and according to Appendix A‑1, the accredited mechanic who conducts the mechanical inspection of road vehicles carries out a “mandate”. The rules applicable to the mechanic appointed in Appendix A‑1 are therefore not different from those applicable to CVMM. [56] [70-73] [75]
Since the SAAQ chose to use a contract to appoint the persons authorized to conduct the mechanical inspection of road vehicles on its behalf, the rights and obligations of the parties are governed by the contract. There is no provision of the HSC that justifies resorting to the rules of public law in addition to the rules of contract law, nor is there any principle of administrative law that justifies requiring that the rules of public law be applied in addition to those of contract law. The contract between the SAAQ and CVMM sets out the conditions for resiliating or suspending the mandate, and Appendix A‑1 provides that the conditions for interrupting the contract apply to the appointment. The SAAQ gave C several warnings concerning breaches that appear to have been serious. If the SAAQ has not complied with the rules for interrupting the contract, all the remedies provided for in the Civil Code of Québec and the Code of Civil Procedure are available to C. There is no deficiency that would justify imposing rules of procedural fairness where C is protected by a contract and by the rules of the law of contract. [56] [70] [91]
Cases Cited
By Bastarache J.
Referred to: Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653; Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Quebec (Minister of the Environment), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 624, 2003 SCC 58; Desrochers v. Canada (Industry), [2007] 3 F.C.R. 3, 2006 FCA 374; Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199; Reilly v. The King, [1934] A.C. 176.
By Deschamps J. (dissenting)
Attorney General of Quebec v. Labrecque, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 1057; Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199; Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2008 SCC 9; Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Act respecting administrative justice, R.S.Q., c. J‑3, ss. 2, 4, 5.
Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, arts. 1385, 2098, 2130.
Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25, art. 846.
Highway Safety Code, R.S.Q., c. C‑24.2, ss. 1, 9, 69.1, 81-82, 162, 520, 520.2, 521, 538, 538.0.1, 543.13, 543.2, 543.3.1, 543.3.2, 546, 546.1, 547-555, 557, 560, 624, 628.1, 629.
Authors Cited
Garant, Patrice. Droit administratif, 5e éd. rev. et corr. Cowansville, Qué.: Yvon Blais, 2004.
Issalys, Pierre, et Denis Lemieux. L’action gouvernementale: Précis de droit des institutions administratives, 2e éd. rev. et augm. Cowansville, Qué.: Yvon Blais, 2002.
Lemieux, Denis. Justice administrative — Loi annotée, éd. rév. Brossard, Qué.: Publications CCH, 2001.
Longtin, Marie José. “La réforme de la justice administrative: genèse, fondements et réalités”. Dans Actes de la XIIIe Conférence des juristes de l’État. Cowansville, Qué.: Yvon Blais, 1998.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal (Baudouin, Doyon and Giroux JJ.A.), [2006] R.J.Q. 1743, [2006] Q.J. No. 6840 (QL), 2006 QCCA 932, reversing a decision of Chabot J., [2005] R.J.Q. 463, 29 Admin. L.R. (4th) 74, [2004] Q.J. No. 11871 (QL). Appeal dismissed, Deschamps, Abella and Charron JJ. dissenting.
Julie Baril and Josée Goupil, for the appellant.
Guy Régimbald, for the respondents.
The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Fish and Rothstein JJ. was delivered by
Bastarache J. —
1. Introduction
[1] This appeal raises the issue of distinguishing between the private and public actions of a public authority, the Société de l’assurance automobile du Québec (“SAAQ”), with a view to determining whether that public authority is subject to ss. 2, 4 and 5 of the Act respecting administrative justice, R.S.Q., c. J‑3 (“AAJ”), in its dealings with the respondent Yvan Cyr, who was designated as an “accredited mechanic” under s. 520 of the Highway Safety Code, R.S.Q., c. C-24.2 (“HSC”). More generally, the Court has to decide whether the SAAQ has insulated itself from the requirements of administrative law by implementing a contract‑based scheme to meet its statutory duties.
2. Facts
[2] This appeal arises from a motion to dismiss by the appellant, the SAAQ, in response to a motion for a suspension of proceedings and a motion for judicial review filed by the respondents Yvan Cyr and 9052‑0479 Québec Inc. (Centre de vérification mécanique de Montréal) (“CVMM” or “mandatary corporation”).
[3] Pursuant to s. 520 of the HSC, the SAAQ has an exclusive jurisdiction in Quebec to ensure the mechanical safety of certain road vehicles — including vehicles of public utility, such as buses and minibuses, taxis, and driving school vehicles (s. 521 of the HSC) — through mechanical inspections and the issuance of compliance certificates. Section 520 provides:
520. The Société shall have exclusive jurisdiction to carry out the mechanical inspection of road vehicles and to issue certificates of mechanical inspection and inspection stickers. For that purpose, the Société may, on the conditions it determines, appoint persons authorized to carry out, on its behalf, the inspection of the road vehicles it determines and authorize those persons to issue certificates of mechanical inspection and inspection stickers in respect of those vehicles.
As can be seen, s. 520 grants the SAAQ a wide discretion as to how to meet its statutory duty. The SAAQ chose to fulfill this duty by entrusting the inspections to private parties through a system of contracts of appointments coupled with professional accreditations.
2.1 The Contract
[4] Pursuant to s. 520, the SAAQ entered into a contract with the respondent CVMM. By necessity, this contract requires actual natural persons capable of carrying out the inspections. Appendix A‑1 of the contract (“Appendix”), signed by CVMM, the SAAQ, and Mr. Cyr, an employee of CVMM, designates Mr. Cyr as an “accredited mechanic” for the purpose of vehicle inspections and holds Mr. Cyr to certain regulatory standards.
[5] The body of the contract, signed only by the SAAQ and CVMM, primarily addresses the relationship between those two parties, but also addresses the relationship with mechanics themselves through discussion of the mandatary corporation’s responsibilities with regard to them.
[6] Clause 10.1 of the contract specifies that the mandatary corporation is responsible for the hiring of competent personnel to perform the contract. Clause 10.3 of the contract requires that the mandatary corporation obtain the SAAQ’s consent when replacing mechanics accredited for the purposes of the mechanical inspection program. The contract also specifies that mechanics must pass an exam offered by the SAAQ. The mechanics must further receive training from the SAAQ and sign the written engagement found in the Appendix.
[7] Article 11 of the contract is titled [translation] “Obligations of accredited mechanics”. Clause 11.1 requires that only those mechanics accredited by the SAAQ be assigned to the mechanical inspection program. Clause 11.2 further stipulates that accredited mechanics must conduct vehicle inspections pursuant to the policies and procedures defined in the “Guide du mandataire” (Mandatary’s Guide) as periodically modified by the SAAQ. The mechanic must also conform to all other directives and norms created by the SAAQ which were transmitted to him or her, as well as all other obligations established in the HSC, the Mechanical Inspection Guide, the “Guide du mandataire” and the contract itself.
[8] Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the contract address the suspension and resiliation. While the contract acknowledges that a breach of contract may arise due to an action of a mechanic, the steps provided for in the event of such an occurrence apply strictly to the mandatary corporation.
[9] As noted above, the Appendix designates Cyr as an accredited mechanic for the purposes of the execution of the contract established with CVMM. The duration of designation is stipulated as being the same as that of the contract, subject to the same conditions of renewal and suspension, so long as the mechanic remains an employee of CVMM. The Appendix further re-stipulates the obligations of accredited mechanics found at art. 11 of the main contract.
2.2 Alleged Breach by Cyr
[10] In November 2003, the SAAQ forwarded a notice of breach to Cyr, relating to an inspection that he had conducted. The notice informed Cyr that he had failed to apply the standards delineated in the Mechanical Inspection Guide. The notice further stipulated that in the event of subsequent breaches of the same nature, Cyr’s accreditation could be revoked. In 2004, three other notices of breach were given to Cyr.
[11] On July 21, 2004, the SAAQ advised Cyr that his accreditation had been revoked. In its letter, the SAAQ did not refer to the contract or state that it had been terminated. Instead, the SAAQ informed Cyr that his accreditation as mechanic for the vehicle inspection program of the SAAQ had been revoked.
[12] As a result of the loss of his accreditation, Cyr was unable to continue his employment with CVMM.
[13] Counsel for the respondents Cyr and CVMM requested in writing that the decision to revoke Cyr’s accreditation be reconsidered. The letter went unanswered. On August 2, 2004, the respondents brought a motion for judicial review before the Administrative Tribunal of Québec, which they subsequently withdrew following a motion for dismissal filed by the SAAQ. On August 19, 2004, the respondents filed a motion for judicial review in the Superior Court, along with a motion for a suspension of the decision to revoke Cyr’s accreditation.
[14] It is worth noting that the SAAQ also terminated its contract with CVMM. This resiliation is being addressed in a separate case.
3. Judicial History
3.1 Superior Court of Quebec, [2005] R.J.Q. 463
[15] The respondents argued that the decision of the SAAQ to revoke Cyr’s accreditation was illegal because the decision had not been rendered in a manner consistent with the AAJ. The case was heard by Chabot J.
[16] Chabot J. first noted that nothing in the AAJ defined or limited the appointment power accorded to the SAAQ by s. 520. He therefore held that the SAAQ had complete discretion to establish conditions of appointment. The contract was the means through which this power was exercised.
[17] Pursuant to this finding, Chabot J. held that any remedy available to the respondent Cyr was to be found in the private law of contract, not in administrative law. He held that the actions of the SAAQ in sending the notices of breach and subsequent revocation of accreditation were an exercise of contractual rights, as opposed to any administrative power. Despite the status of the SAAQ as a public entity, its contract with Cyr originates not from its public nature, but from its role as contracting party. Consequently, Chabot J. held that the SAAQ was not subject to a duty of fairness. Any obligations owed by the SAAQ were defined in the contract.
[18] Chabot J. further rejected the application of this Court’s decision in Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653, holding that the present relationship is purely contractual, as opposed to the contractual relationship incorporating certain aspects of public law in Knight.
3.2 Quebec Court of Appeal, [2006] R.J.Q. 1743, 2006 QCCA 932
[19] The majority at the Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the regime to which Cyr was subject incorporated aspects of public law and could not be considered to be purely contractual. Giroux J.A. (Doyon J.A. concurring) noted that s. 520 gave the SAAQ exclusive jurisdiction to carry out mechanical inspections. The task of conducting vehicle inspections is consistent with the “police” mission of the state. Section 520 establishes powers of appointment and authorization so that others may carry out the task that is otherwise exclusively within the competence of the SAAQ.
[20] Giroux J.A. noted that it was difficult to characterize the contractual relationship that, according to the SAAQ, existed between it and Cyr. He further observed that it would be difficult to view the Appendix as a contract of service between Cyr and the SAAQ pursuant to art. 2098 of the Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, in light of the absence of autonomy of Cyr, who must, on top of respecting the requirements of his employer, CVMM, conform to the policies and procedures of the SAAQ. Furthermore, according to clause 9.9 of the contract, the respondent mandatary must assume all responsibility for the exercise of the activities described in the contract and is responsible for its directors, staff and representatives.
[21] The majority noted that not only is Cyr performing a function clearly defined in the HSC, but that his responsibilities under the scheme relate directly to the protection of the public. As such, the majority held that when Cyr conducted vehicle inspections, he held a public office of sorts. Consequently, the majority held that the relationship established between Cyr and the SAAQ by the Appendix did not preclude the application of the principles of public law, most notably that of procedural fairness.
[22] With respect to procedural fairness, the majority first applied this Court’s test in Knight and found that Cyr did have a right to procedural fairness with respect to the SAAQ’s decision to revoke his accreditation. The majority also held that the existence of a contract could not be used by the SAAQ to avoid the obligations codified by s. 5 of the AAJ which applied to any unilateral decision taken pursuant to the administrative authority conferred by the HSC. It would be up to the trial judge to decide whether or not the SAAQ had observed these requirements.
[23] Finally, on a question of procedure, the majority noted that art. 846 of the Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25, invoked by the respondents, was not the proper recourse in this case. Instead, the matter should proceed as a direct action in nullity.
[24] Baudouin J.A., dissenting, acknowledged that the SAAQ is a public entity and, in certain capacities, is clearly subject to the AAJ. However, in this case, he agreed with the trial judge that the performance of the contract derived from the SAAQ’s capacity as a contracting party as opposed to as an administrative body. In revoking Cyr’s accreditation, the SAAQ was merely exercising a right to resiliation which was permitted by the contract.
4. Analysis
[25] In an era of increased privatization of public services and the rise of public-private partnerships, this case provides an opportunity to consider whether a government body will avoid public law duties when delegating its functions by way of contract or other form of agreement.
4.1 The Relationship Between Cyr and the SAAQ
[26] Both Cyr and the SAAQ, as well as CVMM, have signed the Appendix which defines the obligations of Cyr in art. A-3. It must be noted, however, that the CVMM is the mandatary of the SAAQ, and not Cyr. The relationship between Cyr and the SAAQ is described in clause 4.1(h) of the main contract as [translation] “a formal agreement” by which Cyr is authorized to carry out CVMM’s mandate. The employment relationship is between Cyr and CVMM (see art. 10 of the main contract). Cyr cannot be considered a party to the main contract. The Appendix incorporates portions of that contract by reference, but does not render Cyr a party to it.
[27] The agreement is clearly not a contract for services adopted pursuant to art. 2098 of the Civil Code of Québec. It is a mechanism under which Cyr is appointed by the SAAQ subject to a number of conditions including an employment contract with CVMM. I view the Appendix as a unilateral exercise of the power of appointment of the SAAQ, Cyr’s signature simply being required because of the acknowledgment referred to in clause A-3.5.
4.2 Application of Public Law and Section 5 of the AAJ
[28] Given the relationship between Cyr and the SAAQ, defined in the “formal agreement”, the question remains as to whether this instrument defines all aspects of the relationship between the two parties. In my opinion, it does not.
[29] The agreement is governed by public law because it constitutes an administrative authorization. This authorization and its subsequent revocation are subject to the AAJ and its procedural requirements.
[30] The AAJ was conceived as a codification of the principles of administrative law, in part derived from the case law of this Court. In his annotated version of the Act, Me Denis Lemieux describes the relationship between the Act and the common law as follows (Justice administrative — Loi annotée (2001), at p. 71):
[translation] The Act respecting administrative justice recognizes certain legal principles, such as the duty of fairness and respect for basic procedural safeguards.
Insofar as these principles were established and developed by the courts, the case law will continue to be used to determine the meaning and scope of the provisions of the Act respecting administrative justice that came, in a way, to codify them.
In some cases, the Act provides guarantees that go beyond those required by the existing case law. This is true, for example, of the requirements that reasons be given for decisions and that a case be decided in a reasonable time. It would therefore be to the advantage of interested parties to rely on the wording of these provisions and to give them a liberal interpretation consistent with the general context of the Act and, more particularly, of its initial provision.
Where the Act respecting administrative justice and the related regulations and rules of procedure offer no solution on a given point, the general principles of administrative law can be applied to complement the legislature’s work.
In the event of conflicts between the Act and a general legal principle, the Act will prevail.
[31] Lemieux does emphasize (at p. 72) that the AAJ remains subject to both the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12.
[32] The AAJ requires Quebec government departments and bodies to comply with procedural fairness in their discretionary decision‑making processes. Section 5 describes the obligations with which an administrative authority must comply before making an unfavourable decision in respect of a citizen (Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Quebec (Minister of the Environment), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 624, 2003 SCC 58, at para. 26). The provision restates the requirement that the interested parties be given prior notice; it also sets out the right to present observations and produce documents concerning the proposed decision and reiterates that reasons must be given in support of the decision.
[33] Section 5 of the AAJ provides:
An administrative authority may not issue an order to do or not do something or make an unfavourable decision concerning a permit or licence or other authorization of like nature without first having
(1) informed the citizen of its intention and the reasons therefor;
(2) informed the citizen of the substance of any complaints or objections that concern him;
(3) given the citizen the opportunity to present observations and, where necessary, to produce documents to complete his file.
An exception shall be made to such prior obligations if the order or the decision is issued or made in urgent circumstances or to prevent irreparable harm to persons, their property or the environment and the authority is authorized by law to reexamine the situation or review the decision.
[34] The applicability of this provision to the present matter has been argued to depend primarily on (a) whether the revocation of Cyr’s designation constitutes an “unfavourable decision concerning a permit or licence or other authorization of like nature”, and (b) whether Cyr is a “citizen” as contemplated by the Act.
4.2.1 Was the Revocation of Cyr’s Accreditation a “Decision Concerning a Permit or Licence or Other Authorization of Like Nature”?
[35] As earlier mentioned, Cyr’s designation as an accredited mechanic for the purposes of the SAAQ’s mechanical inspection program constitutes an administrative authorization.
[36] In delegating to him the power to conduct vehicle inspections, the SAAQ was granting him the authorization to act on its behalf, as an employee of its mandatary, CVMM, in a manner that would otherwise contravene the law. That accreditation thus derives from the “police” powers of the state.
[translation] Authorization relates to the government’s policing activities. It consists in a permission, often subject to conditions, granted by the government to a natural or legal person, to perform an act or engage in an activity that would otherwise be unlawful. Requiring authorization of this act or activity by an administrative authority implies that the legislature considered it necessary, in the public interest, to limit the freedom of citizens in this regard.
(P. Issalys et D. Lemieux, L’action gouvernementale: Précis de droit des institutions administratives (2nd ed. 2002), at pp. 815-16 (emphasis deleted))
[37] In this case, the activity which Cyr is authorized to engage in, inspecting vehicles, is otherwise illicit. This is evidenced by s. 538 of the HSC which provides that “[n]o person may issue a certificate of mechanical inspection or affix an inspection sticker to a road vehicle unless he is authorized for such purpose by the Société in accordance with section 520”. Section 546 further provides that persons who contravene that section are guilty of an offence and liable to a fine of $300 to $600.
[38] Furthermore, as seen above, administrative authorizations are typically accompanied by conditions which much be observed. If the recipient of the authorization fails to observe these conditions, a common remedy is revocation:
[translation] The punitive effect of such a decision resides in the loss, either temporary or definitive, of the possibility of carrying out the authorized activity and, consequently, of reaping the material benefits of doing so. However, punishing the offender is not the main goal here: the purpose of compelling the offender . . . to cease carrying out the activity is above all to safeguard the public interest that was in issue when the authorization scheme was implemented . . . .
(Issalys and Lemieux, at pp. 870-71)
This passage describes well what happened in this case.
[39] The reference to permits and licences in the legislation along with authorizations is apposite in this instance. In the context of a licence, the licensee will often have to agree to abide by the applicable terms and conditions before being granted the licence. Where the granting body is governmental, the awarding and revocation of licences is nevertheless subject to the principles of administrative law.
[40] The authorization given in this case is of a similar character.
[41] The Federal Court of Appeal recently affirmed that delegations of government power are authorizations in Desrochers v. Canada (Industry), [2007] 3 F.C.R. 3, 2006 FCA 374, at para. 50:
[D]elegation . . . and ratification are both modes of authorization. The Nouveau Petit Robert defines “ratification” as a confirmation or approval (homologation) and “delegation” as a mandate or power of attorney (procuration). Synonyms of “authorization”, or having the same meaning as the verb “to authorize”, are accreditation, confirmation, agreement, approval, consent, acceptance and permission. This applies as well to a partnership, which evokes the notion of agreement and hence of reciprocal authorization.
[42] The authorization in the present case is specifically provided for in s. 520 of the HSC, which provides the SAAQ with the ability to both appoint and authorize mandataries to act on its behalf. The legislative origin of the AAJ further confirms its administrative nature. It is also useful to look at the revocation letter sent by the SAAQ. The letter makes no reference to Cyr’s obligations under the contract or the Appendix; instead, the SAAQ points out that Cyr’s negligence would endanger public road safety. This should be contrasted with the letter in which the SAAQ terminates its contract with CVMM, and refers to its contractual right of termination.
[43] None of this is to suggest that all acts by the SAAQ are subject to public law. However, the act of authorization has specifically been deemed worthy of procedural fairness protection by the legislature and was thus made subject to s. 5 of the AAJ.
[44] I also note at this point that the characterization of Cyr’s designation as an authorization in no way implies that he is a “public office holder”, as argued by the respondents. While the mechanical inspection does involve some degree of delegated discretion, it is not the kind of responsibility discussed in this Court’s decision in Knight. That decision is of no moment in this case, there being no “public office” and no contract of employment between the SAAQ and Cyr.
[45] In Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199, Major J. explains, at para. 26:
Traditionally, the Crown’s relationship with its servants was not characterized as contractual: Lucas v. Lucas, [1943] p. 68; Washer v. British Columbia Toll Highways and Bridges Authority (1965), 53 D.L.R. (2d) 620 (B.C.C.A.); L. Blair, “The Civil Servant — A Status Relationship” (1958), 21 Mod. L. Rev. 265. The Crown appointed individuals to positions which they fulfilled until the Crown directed that they be dismissed. As a result, appointments were unilateral and subject to arbitrary dismissal: cf. Reilly, supra; J. Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown (1820).
This approach was rejected in Reilly v. The King, [1934] A.C. 176, where the Privy Council resolved that whether there was a contractual relationship or not, the Crown could be relieved of its obligation by abolishing the statute which provided for the creation of the office.
[46] Citing Knight, the Supreme Court held in Wells that the Crown was still required to act fairly in dismissing a civil servant in the absence of contractual rights (para. 24).
[47] What is at issue in these cases, is the state’s role and obligations in dealing with its employees (Wells, at para. 29), and not its responsibilities regarding holders of licences and permits.
4.2.2 Is Cyr a “Citizen” or “Administr_” Pursuant to Section 5 of the AAJ?
[48] The French term “administr_” and its English equivalent “citizen” are not defined within the legislation, or in the case law. One author has provided a definition of “administré”:
Administré: [translation] This expression designates any legal or natural person to whom the law applies. It is a term borrowed from French administrative law, although it has been dropped in favour of the word “citoyen” in recent French legislation. [Emphasis added.]
(Lemieux, at p. 89)
[49] This definition is extremely broad. The choice of the legislature to use the term “administr_” in French as opposed to “citoyen” arguably suggests a desire to encompass a greater number of subjects. That said, the English version of the Act uses the term “citizen”. In any event, Cyr is an individual citizen and, in my opinion, fits within the scope of either term.
[50] The appellant relies on comments in the literature on the nature of what is an administrative function to argue that Cyr is not an “administr_”.
[translation] Decisions that are considered to have been made in performing an administrative function include front-line decisions made by various government officials in applying standards and implementing social programs in the context of the regulation or supervision of economic activities. Such decisions are primarily individual in nature and concern, first and foremost, the citizen . . . .
For the most part, these organizations perform functions of the executive that the legislature has, for reasons relating to volume, to the specificity of programs, to a need to distance them from political involvement, removed from the executive. These are functions of management, regulation, supervision and monitoring of an area of activity, investigation, study and research involving, among other things, the granting, management and monitoring of authorizations, privileges, permits, benefits or other advantages.
(M. J. Longtin, “La réforme de la justice administrative: genèse, fondements et réalités”, in Actes de la XIIIe Conférence des juristes de l’État (1998), at pp. 80-81)
[51] These paragraphs do not persuade me that there is cause to reject the application of the AAJ to Cyr. The scheme established by the HSC fits well within the scope of the second paragraph above. As noted, the accreditation granted to Cyr can be considered an administrative authorization.
5. Conclusion
[52] In light of the foregoing analysis, I conclude that the respondent Cyr is entitled to procedural fairness under s. 5 of the AAJ.
[53] I would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs.
English version of the reasons of Deschamps, Abella and Charron JJ. delivered by
[54] Deschamps J. (dissenting) — I have read the reasons of the majority and am unable to agree with them. In my opinion, the parties are bound by contract and the remedies available to them are governed by the rules of private law. As a result, I would have allowed the appeal and, like the dissenting judge of the Court of Appeal, would have restored the judgment of the Superior Court.
[55] The sole issues in this appeal relate to the forum where the respondents must present their case and the rules that apply to their relationship with the appellant, the Société de l’assurance automobile du Québec (“Société”). The Court has not been asked to rule on the merits of the case.
[56] The purpose of the Highway Safety Code, R.S.Q., c. C‑24.2 (“Code”), is to establish “the rules relating to highway safety, to the registration of road vehicles, to licences and permits which are under the administration of the Société de l’assurance automobile du Québec, and to the control of highway transportation of persons and goods” (s. 1). The Code forms a consistent body of rules. To understand its workings, the Société’s role and the rules applicable to users (i.e., users of road vehicles), it will be necessary to consider all the Code’s provisions. Only by doing so will it be possible to fully understand the various mechanisms adopted by the legislature to achieve this statute’s objectives. It will be seen from this review that the legal rules applicable to mandataries of the Société are those of private law, whereas the rules applicable to users are those of public law. The documents signed by the parties in the instant case govern the Société’s relationship with its mandataries. That relationship is a contractual one. It falls within the realm of private law, which has its own remedies. There is no provision of the Code that justifies resorting to the rules of public law in addition to the rules of contract law. Nor is there any principle of administrative law that justifies requiring that the rules of public law be applied in addition to those of contract law.
1. Internal Consistency of the Code
[57] The Code is divided into several titles. I will be referring to provisions from virtually every one of the Code’s titles. The provisions are set out as follows: scope and definitions (ss. 1 to 5.2); registration of road vehicles (ss. 6 to 60); licences to drive road vehicles (ss. 60.1 to 146.1); special obligations of dealers and recyclers (ss. 151 to 166); obligations in case of accident (ss. 166.1 to 179); cancellation and suspension (ss. 180 to 209.26); rules respecting vehicles and their equipment (ss. 210 t