Béliveau St-Jacques v. Fédération des employées et employésde services publics inc.

Béliveau St-Jacques v. Fédération des employées et employésde services publics inc.
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
1996-06-20
Report
[1996] 2 SCR 345
Case number
22339
Judges
La Forest, Gérard V.; L'Heureux-Dubé, Claire; Sopinka, John; Gonthier, Charles Doherty; McLachlin, Beverley; Iacobucci, Frank; Major, John C.
On appeal from
Quebec
Subjects
Constitutional law
Labour law
Notes
SCC Case Information: 22339
Decision Content
Béliveau St‑Jacques v. Fédération des employées et employésde services publics inc., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 345
Louisette Béliveau St‑Jacques Appellant
v.
The Fédération des employées et employés
de services publics inc. (CSN) and the
Confederation of National Trade Unions Respondents
and
Pierre Gendron and the Syndicat des travailleuses
et travailleurs de la Confédération des
syndicats nationaux (CSN) Mis en cause
and
The Commission de la santé et de la sécurité
du travail Intervener
Indexed as: Béliveau St‑Jacques v. Fédération des employées et employésde services publics inc.
File No.: 22339.
1995: November 3; 1996: June 20.
Present: La Forest, L'Heureux‑Dubé, Sopinka, Gonthier, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for quebec
Workers’ compensation — Harassment — Employee, victim of sexual harassment and harassment in the workplace, receiving compensation under Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases — Whether employee may in addition bring civil liability action based on Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms against her employers — Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases, R.S.Q., c. A‑3.001, s. 438 — Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C‑12, ss. 49, 51, 52.
Civil rights — Prohibited harassment — Remedy — Compensatory and exemplary damages — Employee, victim of sexual harassment and harassment in the workplace, receiving compensation under Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases — Whether employee may in addition bring civil liability action based on Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms against her employers — Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases, R.S.Q., c. A‑3.001, s. 438 — Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C‑12, ss. 49, 51, 52.
The appellant, who alleged that she had been the victim of harassment in the workplace and sexual harassment by one of her supervisors, instituted a liability action based on the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms against her employers and the alleged harasser in the Superior Court. The appellant subsequently obtained compensation under the Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases (“AIAOD”), for having suffered an employment injury as a result of the same events. The employers then filed a motion to dismiss in which they argued that, because the appellant had obtained compensation from the competent industrial accident authorities, the effect of s. 438 AIAOD and art. 1056a C.C.L.C. was to deprive the Superior Court of jurisdiction in respect of the appellant's civil liability action. They also maintained that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction ratione materiae, which was reserved to the grievance arbitrator under the collective agreement. The Superior Court dismissed the motion and the Court of Appeal, in a majority decision, affirmed this judgment. The employers obtained leave to appeal to this Court but subsequently discontinued their appeal. The appellant then brought a motion to continue the appeal, which was treated as an application for leave to appeal. The motion was granted, which explains her status as appellant. This appeal is to determine whether the victim of an industrial accident who has received compensation under the AIAOD may in addition bring a civil liability action based on the Charter. The employers argued, by way of cross‑appeal, that if such an action was not barred, it had to be decided by the grievance arbitrator. The issue of whether the AIAOD applies to sexual harassment and harassment in the workplace is not before this Court.
Held (La Forest and L'Heureux‑Dubé JJ. dissenting in part): The appeal and the cross-appeal should be dismissed.
Per Sopinka, Gonthier, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major JJ.: The object of the AIAOD is to provide compensation for employment injuries and the consequences they entail for beneficiaries. It establishes a compensation system that is based on the principles of insurance and no‑fault collective liability, the main purpose of which is compensation and thus a form of final liquidation of remedies. The victim of an employment injury receives partial, fixed-sum compensation, and a civil liability action against the victim's employer (s. 438) or against a co‑worker who is alleged to have committed a fault in the performance of his or her duties (s. 442) is prohibited. The civil immunity of employers and co‑workers under ss. 438 and 442 is broad in scope and applies to an action under s. 49 of the Charter based on the events that gave rise to the employment injury, because this remedy, in so far as it authorizes a claim of compensatory and exemplary damages, is a civil liability remedy.
The violation of a right protected by the Charter is equivalent to a civil fault. Before the advent of the Charter, art. 1053 C.C.L.C. could provide the basis for a liability action for a violation of fundamental rights. The Charter now formalizes standards of conduct that apply to all individuals but the Charter's recognition of specific and perhaps still unexplored aspects of the standard of good conduct under the Civil Code does not in itself justify a new characterization of the liability resulting from its violation. As is the case with art. 1053, the liability associated with the action for compensatory damages provided for in the first paragraph of s. 49 of the Charter is directed to the reparation of harm caused to others by wrongful conduct and must therefore be characterized as civil liability. The violation of a guaranteed right does not change the general principles of compensation or in itself create independent prejudice. The Charter does not create a parallel compensation system and cannot authorize double compensation for a given fact situation. An action for exemplary damages based on the second paragraph of s. 49 of the Charter cannot be dissociated from the principles of civil liability. Such an action can only be incidental to a principal action seeking compensation for moral or material prejudice. The wording of the second paragraph of s. 49 clearly shows that, even if it were admitted that an award of exemplary damages is not dependent upon a prior award of compensatory damages, the court must at least have found that there was an unlawful interference with a guaranteed right. This necessary connection with the wrongful conduct that gives rise to civil liability leads one to associate the remedy of exemplary damages with the principles of civil liability.
The appellant therefore may not bring a civil liability action based on the Charter. The action she brought in the Superior Court, in so far as it involved the employers, was prohibited by s. 438. The motion to dismiss the action should /have been allowed since the events relied on by the appellant in support of her action had already been characterized by the competent authorities as an employment injury within the meaning of the AIAOD and made compensation payable under that Act. This solution is consistent with s. 51 of the Charter, which states that the Charter must not, as a general rule, be interpreted so as to extend or amend the scope of a provision of law. Allowing the victim of an employment injury to bring a civil liability action based on the Charter against his or her employer or a co‑worker would necessarily call into question the compromise formalized by the AIAOD. Although s. 52 of the Charter affirms the relative preponderance of the Charter, this section does not include s. 49 in the group of privileged provisions. Only ss. 1 to 38 of the Charter prevail over other statutes, which may not derogate from the Charter unless they do so expressly. Read together, ss. 51 and 52 show that the legislature did not intend to impose the same formal requirements for derogations from s. 49. That provision, even when invoked because of a violation of one of the rights guaranteed in ss. 1 to 38, does not have the same relative preponderance that they have. In any event, while the exclusion is not express, the language of s. 438 AIAOD hardly leaves any doubt as to the legislature's intention, owing to the characteristics of the remedy provided for in s. 49. Section 438 AIAOD, which came into effect after the Charter, unambiguously indicates that s. 49 of the Charter must give way.
Given the conclusion regarding the availability of a civil liability action, it is not necessary to determine whether a grievance could have been filed under the collective agreement. If that had been the case, however, the arbitrator could not have awarded damages for the prejudice suffered as a result of the employment injury. The exclusion of a civil liability action also applies to the grievance arbitrator.
Per La Forest and L'Heureux‑Dubé JJ. (dissenting in part): As regards liability and for the purposes of s. 438 AIAOD, the Charter does not create a parallel system. The overlap between the general law system and that of the Charter, however, is limited to the elements of liability and the compensatory remedy provided for in the first paragraph of s. 49 of the Charter. The conditions for establishing a liability‑related right — namely fault, prejudice and a causal connection — and the compensatory remedy derive for both systems from general civil law principles. The two sources of compensation merge, which makes it possible to avoid double compensation for prejudice. However, the second paragraph of s. 49 of the Charter, which provides for an exemplary remedy where there has been “unlawful and intentional” interference with the fundamental rights guaranteed therein, differs from the general law in that it establishes a remedy that is autonomous and distinct from compensatory remedies. This exceptional concept in Quebec law, which is related to the law’s role of punishment and deterrence, is unrelated to the overlap of the general law system with that of the Charter. In short, although in order to claim exemplary damages under the second paragraph of s. 49, the elements of liability must be established in accordance with the general law rules, the remedy available for a violation of that law derives from a specific statute, the Quebec Charter.
The no‑fault employment injury compensation system under the AIAOD does not preclude the awarding of exemplary damages under the second paragraph of s. 49 of the Charter because of the employers’ civil immunity clause in s. 438 AIAOD. Section 438 AIAOD is limited to civil liability “actions” (art. 1056a C.C.L.C., which recognizes this civil immunity as part of the general law, speaks of “recourse”). Section 438 therefore does not preclude the conditions for liability from being established. Moreover, s. 438 is limited to “civil liability” actions, that is, the power to sue to obtain compensation for prejudice suffered. Thus, s. 438 does not bar court actions to punish or deter certain types of behaviour. Section 438 AIAOD therefore applies only to compensatory actions and remedies and does not cover the exemplary remedy available under the second paragraph of s. 49 of the Charter.
Above and beyond the semantic arguments, the civil immunity clause under s. 438 AIAOD can be reconciled with the specific remedies provided for in the Charter. The right not to be harassed in the workplace, which is guaranteed in s. 10.1 of the Charter, is included among the rights that are given relative preponderance by s. 52 of the Charter . Even though s. 52 expressly mentions only ss. 1 to 38 of the Charter, s. 49 has the same relative preponderance because it is incidental to the rights specified in ss. 1 to 38. The precise purpose of the remedies provided for in s. 49 is to enforce those fundamental rights. It is therefore unnecessary for s. 52 to mention s. 49 specifically, since the latter provision simply sets out the possible remedies and does not guarantee a right. The application of s. 52 in this case also excludes the application of s. 51 of the Charter. Because s. 49 prevails over statutes that do not derogate expressly therefrom, the two types of remedies provided for in that section must prima facie take precedence over the compensation system under the AIAOD. However, although the compensation system under the AIAOD authorizes only partial, fixed‑sum compensation, it has precisely the same objective as the first paragraph of s. 49, namely providing compensation for prejudice. Since the AIAOD adequately attains the objective of the first paragraph of s. 49, there is no need to rely on the relative preponderance provided for in s. 52. The general law system and that of the Charter do not overlap, however, in respect of the punitive, deterrent remedy under the second paragraph of s. 49. This provision must be interpreted generously since its purpose is to enforce the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Charter. As regards harassment in the workplace, which is covered by s. 10.1 of the Charter, this exemplary remedy must therefore, in the event of inconsistency, take precedence over the civil immunity clause in s. 438 AIAOD because of the relative preponderance that must be given to s. 10.1. Since s. 438 does not mention exemplary damages, it does not explicitly derogate, as required by s. 52, from the possibility of ordering the payment thereof. The fact that the AIAOD came into force after the Charter does not show that there was an intention to derogate from the second paragraph of s. 49, since s. 52 expressly states that the Charter prevails over all statutory provisions, “even subsequent to the Charter”.
Although a number of forums are available in which victims of harassment in the workplace can obtain compensation, in this case it is the grievance arbitrator who has jurisdiction under the collective agreement to decide the appellant’s claim for exemplary damages from her employers under the second paragraph of s. 49 of the Charter. The power of a grievance arbitrator to apply the law extends to human rights legislation and an arbitrator can award remedies based on such legislation provided that he or she has, as in this case, jurisdiction over the parties (worker/employer), the subject matter of the dispute (harassment in the workplace) under the collective agreement, and the order sought. For an arbitrator to be able to deal with a grievance related to harassment in the workplace, there need not be a specific provision in the agreement to this effect. A general provision, such as the one in article 10 of the present collective agreement, authorizing the arbitrator to dispose of disputes about working conditions is sufficient. An arbitrator also has the power to order the payment of exemplary damages under the Charter where the employer has acted in an “unlawful and intentional” manner. Section 100.12(a) of the Labour Code provides that an arbitrator may interpret and apply any Act or regulation to the extent necessary to settle a grievance. Where the issue and the remedy sought come within the jurisdiction of grievance arbitrators under a collective agreement or statute, this jurisdiction is exclusive. The jurisdiction of the arbitrator in the present case means that the appellant can bring no action against her employers in the ordinary courts or before other agencies that would otherwise have jurisdiction. However, this does not preclude the appellant’s seeking relief under s. 47.2 of the Labour Code if, as she alleges, her union refused to take the grievance to arbitration.
Cases Cited
By Gonthier J.
Referred to: Chaput v. Romain, [1955] S.C.R. 834; Mongeau v. Fournier (1924), 37 Que. K.B. 52; Vincent & Co. v. Gallo, [1944] Que. K.B. 202; Bell Canada v. Quebec (Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749; Ontario Human Rights Commission and O'Malley v. Simpsons‑Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536; Rocois Construction Inc. v. Québec Ready Mix Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 440; Association des professeurs de Lignery v. Alvetta‑Comeau, [1990] R.J.Q. 130; Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 84; Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology v. Bhadauria, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181; Papadatos v. Sutherland, [1987] R.J.Q. 1020; Lemieux v. Polyclinique St‑Cyrille Inc., [1989] R.J.Q. 44; Reference re Workers' Compensation Act, 1983 (Nfld.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 922.
By L'Heureux‑Dubé J. (dissenting in part)
Anglade et Communauté urbaine de Montréal, D.T.E. 88T‑730; P. et X. (Ville de), [1990] C.A.L.P. 677; Gagnon et Commission administrative des régimes de retraite et d'assurances, [1989] C.A.L.P. 769; Blagoeva et Commission de contrôle de l'énergie atomique, [1992] C.A.L.P. 898; Langevin et Québec (Ministère du Loisir, de la Chasse et de la Pêche), [1993] C.A.L.P. 453; Lambert et Dominion Textile Inc., [1993] C.A.L.P. 1056; Chaput v. Romain, [1955] S.C.R. 834, 1 D.L.R (2d) 241; Lamb v. Benoit, [1959] S.C.R. 321; Roy v. Patenaude, [1994] R.J.Q. 2503; Papadatos v. Sutherland, [1987] R.J.Q. 1020; West Island Teachers' Association v. Nantel, [1988] R.J.Q. 1569; Lemieux v. Polyclinique St‑Cyrille Inc., [1989] R.J.Q. 44; Association des professeurs de Lignery v. Alvetta‑Comeau, [1990] R.J.Q. 130; Royal Trust Co. v. Tucker, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 250; Bell Canada v. Quebec (Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749; Insurance Corp. of British Columbia v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 145; Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 84; Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177; Ontario Human Rights Commission and O'Malley v. Simpsons‑Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536; Scowby v. Glendinning, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 226; Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114; University of British Columbia v. Berg, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 353; Gould v. Yukon Order of Pioneers, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 571; Thibault v. Corporation professionnelle des médecins du Québec, [1992] R.J.Q. 2029; Archambault v. Doucet, [1993] R.J.Q. 2389; Syndicat national des employés de l'Institut Doréa (C.S.N.) v. Conseil des services essentiels, [1987] R.J.Q. 925; B.C.G.E.U. v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214; Halkett v. Ascofigex Inc., [1986] R.J.Q. 2697; Roberge v. Bolduc, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 374; Joannette et Pièces d'auto Richard Ltée, [1993] C.T. 398; Girard v. Produits de viande Cacher Glatt Ltée, [1986] T.A. 304; Clarke et Université Concordia, D.T.E. 87T‑765; General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. Brunet, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 537; Shell Canada Ltd. v. United Oil Workers of Canada, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 181; St. Anne Nackawic Pulp & Paper Co. v. Canadian Paper Workers Union, Local 219, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 704; Gendron v. Supply and Services Union of the Public Service Alliance of Canada, Local 50057, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1298; Weber v. Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929; Mills v. The Queen [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863; Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570; Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5; Tétreault‑Gadoury v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 22; New Brunswick v. O'Leary, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 967; Mooring v. Canada (National Parole Board), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 75; Schokbéton Québec Inc. et Métallurgistes unis d'Amérique, section locale 15398, [1984] T.A. 176; Centre d'accueil du Haut St‑Laurent et Fédération des affaires sociales, [1985] T.A. 432; Syndicat des employées et employés de la Commission des droits de la personne du Québec et Commission des droits de la personne du Québec, D.T.E. 94T‑1166.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Act respecting Access to documents held by public bodies and the Protection of personal information, R.S.Q., c. A‑2.1.
Act respecting collective agreement decrees, R.S.Q., c. D‑2.
Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases, R.S.Q., c. A‑3.001, ss. 1, 2 “industrial accident”, “employment injury”, “occupational disease”, 25, 44 et seq., 83 et seq., 92 et seq., 112 et seq., 349, 438, 442.
Act respecting labour standards, R.S.Q., c. N‑1.1, ss. 124 [am. 1990, c. 73, s. 59], 128, para. 1(3).
Act respecting prearranged funeral services and sepultures, R.S.Q., c. A‑23.001.
Act respecting the Régie du logement, R.S.Q., c. R‑8.1.
Act respecting the responsibility for accidents suffered by workmen in the course of their work, and the compensation for injuries resulting therefrom, S.Q. 1909, c. 66, ss. 14, 15.
Act respecting the right of action in the cases covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1931, S.Q. 1933, c. 106.
Act respecting the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, S.Q. 1928, c. 80.
Act to amend the Civil Code respecting the right of action in the cases covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1931, S.Q. 1935, c. 91.
Act to amend the Civil Code, S.Q. 1941, c. 67, s. 1.
Automobile Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A‑25, s. 83.57 [ad. 1989, c. 15, s. 1].
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 15 , 24 .
Charter of human rights and freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C‑12, ss. 1 to 38, 10 [am. 1977, c. 6, s. 1; am. 1978, c. 7, s. 112; am. 1982, c. 61, s. 3], 10.1 [ad. 1982, c. 61, s. 4], 49, 51, 52 [repl. idem, s. 16], 53, 76(3) [repl. 1989, c. 51, s. 5], 77 [idem], 79 [idem], 80 [idem], 100 [idem, s. 16], 111 [idem], 134 [idem, s. 18], 135 [am. idem, ss. 19, 21].
Civil Code of Lower Canada, arts. 1053, 1054 [am. 1977, c. 72, s. 7; am. 1989, c. 54, s. 107], 1056a [repl. 1985, c. 6, s. 475], 1241 [am. 1978, c. 8, s. 47].
Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, arts. 1457, 1463, 1621, 2848.
Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C‑25.
Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52 .
Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P‑40.1, s. 272 [am. 1992, c. 58, s. 1].
Labour Code, R.S.Q., c. C‑27, ss. 1(f), 47.2 et seq., 100 [am. 1983, c. 22, s. 61], 100.12(a) [repl. idem, s. 74].
Tree Protection Act, R.S.Q., c. P‑37, s. 1.
Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1931, S.Q. 1931, c. 100, ss. 59 et seq., 73 et seq.
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APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal, [1991] R.J.Q. 279, affirming a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing a motion to dismiss. Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed, La Forest and L'Heureux‑Dubé JJ. dissenting in part.
Jacques Blanchette, for the appellant.
Pierre Bérubé and Annie Gerbeau, for the respondents.
Jean‑Claude Paquet, for the intervener.
Bernard Bélanger, for the mis en cause Gendron.
//L’Heureux-Dubé J.//
The reasons of La Forest and L’Heureux-Dubé and La Forest JJ. were delivered by
I. L’Heureux‑Dubé J. (dissenting in part) — I have had the benefit of the opinion of my colleague Justice Gonthier. Although I agree in part with his reasons, I cannot accept either his interpretation of the two legislative schemes in question, namely the Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases, R.S.Q., c. A‑3.001 (“AIAOD”), and the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C‑12 (“Charter”), or his conclusion that a victim of harassment in the workplace who has obtained a compensatory remedy under the AIAOD cannot obtain the exemplary remedy available under the second paragraph of s. 49 of the Charter for unlawful and intentional interference with a fundamental right provided for therein, in this case the right not to be harassed in the workplace, which is guaranteed in s. 10.1 of the Charter.
II. I need not discuss the facts of the case or the judgments of the courts below, as Gonthier J. has already done so. I will recall, however, that the appellant instituted an action in the Superior Court of Quebec claiming remedies for harassment suffered in the workplace, including the payment of exemplary damages under the second paragraph of s. 49 of the Charter. The respondents brought two motions to dismiss: the first alleged that, in view of s. 438 AIAOD, the Superior Court had no jurisdiction to hear an action by a worker against his or her employer in respect of an employment injury; the second, which was declinatory in nature, alleged that the Court lacked jurisdiction ratione materiae, which was reserved to the grievance arbitrator under the collective agreement.
III. These motions were dismissed by the Superior Court and the respondents’ appeal from that decision was also dismissed by the Quebec Court of Appeal, in a majority decision: [1991] R.J.Q. 279. The respondents filed an application for leave to appeal to this Court but later discontinued their appeal. The appellant’s motion to continue the appeal, which was treated as an application for leave to appeal, was granted.
IV. Section 49 of the Charter, which is central to this case, reads as follows:
49. Any unlawful interference with any right or freedom recognized by this Charter entitles the victim to obtain the cessation of such interference and compensation for the moral or material prejudice resulting therefrom.
In case of unlawful and intentional interference, the tribunal may, in addition, condemn the person guilty of it to exemplary damages.
V. The fundamental right not to be harassed in the workplace, which can serve as a basis for the remedies provided for in s. 49, is protected by ss. 10 and 10.1 of the Charter:
10. Every person has a right to full and equal recognition and exercise of his human rights and freedoms, without distinction, exclusion or preference based on race, colour, sex, pregnancy, sexual orientation, civil status, age except as provided by law, religion, political convictions, language, ethnic or national origin, social condition, a handicap or the use of any means to palliate a handicap.
Discrimination exists where such a distinction, exclusion or preference has the effect of nullifying or impairing such right.
10.1. No one may harass a person on the basis of any ground mentioned in section 10.
VI. Section 52 of the Charter , which confers relative preponderance on the Charter, reads as follows:
52. No provision of any Act, even subsequent to the Charter, may derogate from sections 1 to 38, except so far as provided by those sections, unless such Act expressly states that it applies despite the Charter.
VII. The main issue in this appeal is the relationship between the compensation system under the AIAOD and the Charter remedies for interference with a fundamental right. More specifically, the issue is whether the no‑fault employment injury compensation system precludes the awarding of remedies under s. 49 of the Charter because of the civil immunity clause in s. 438 AIAOD. The second issue is whether a grievance arbitrator has jurisdiction under the collective agreement to order the payment of exemplary damages under the second paragraph of s. 49 of the Charter for harassment in the workplace. Before considering these issues, however, the proceedings should be placed in their legislative and judicial context.
I. Legislative and Judicial Context
VIII. The agencies that apply the AIAOD, namely the Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail (“CSST”), the Bureau de révision paritaire and the Commission d’appel en matière de lésions professionnelles (“CALP”), appear to have jurisdiction over harassment in the workplace. That jurisdiction is relatively recent and results from a broad, and perhaps even expansive, interpretation of the term “employment injury”, which is defined as follows in s. 2 AIAOD: “an injury or a disease arising out of or in the course of an industrial accident, or an occupational disease, including a recurrence, relapse or aggravation”.
IX. On June 17, 1988, in Anglade et Communauté urbaine de Montréal, D.T.E. 88T‑730, a case involving a black police officer who had worked for the Montreal Urban Community for more than ten years, the CALP found for the first time that harassment in the workplace was an employment injury covered by the AIAOD. Later, in P. et X. (Ville de), [1990] C.A.L.P. 677, the CALP found that a firefighter diagnosed with situational anxiety/depression syndrome caused by nine months of continuous harassment by his co‑workers had suffered an employment injury within the meaning of the AIAOD. See also the CALP’s decisions in Gagnon et Commission administrative des régimes de retraite et d’assurances, [1989] C.A.L.P. 769; Blagoeva et Commission de contrôle de l’énergie atomique, [1992] C.A.L.P. 898; Langevin et Québec (Ministère du Loisir, de la Chasse et de la Pêche), [1993] C.A.L.P. 453; and Lambert et Dominion Textile Inc., [1993] C.A.L.P. 1056.
X. In the case at bar, the Bureau de révision paritaire decided that the harassment in the workplace and sexual harassment alleged by the appellant constituted an employment injury and therefore granted her claim for compensation under the AIAOD. In this Court, the parties did not challenge the validity of the Bureau de révision paritaire’s decision that harassment in the workplace is an “employment injury” or the finding that exemplary damages cannot be awarded under the AIAOD.
XI. However, it appears that the central issue in the instant case results precisely from that expansive interpretation of the term “employment injury”. When the CALP found that harassment in the workplace was covered by the AIAOD, the civil immunity provided for in s. 438 became applicable and, according to my colleague Gonthier J., this meant that victims of harassment in the workplace could no longer obtain any of the remedies provided for in s. 49 of the Charter.
XII. The sole object of the no‑fault employment injury compensation system is to provide compensation for injuries suffered (see s. 1 AIAOD). Sections 44 et seq. AIAOD provide that an income replacement indemnity will be paid when a worker becomes unable to carry on his or her employment by reason of an employment injury. Sections 83 et seq. provide that a worker who sustains permanent physical or mental impairment is entitled to compensation for bodily injury that takes into account any anatomicophysiological deficit and disfigurement. Finally, ss. 92 et seq. provide for compensation in the case of death and ss. 112 et seq. provide for other indemnities for damage to clothing, prostheses or ortheses. However, as noted by the Court of Appeal, the AIAOD does not seem to authorize the awarding of exemplary damages.
XIII. Nevertheless, according to my colleague, because of the civil immunity clauses applicable to employers (s. 438 AIAOD) and co‑workers (s. 442), a person who has obtained compensation under this system could not receive either a compensatory remedy for moral or material prejudice under the first paragraph of s. 49 of the Charter or an exemplary remedy under the second paragraph of s. 49. Thus, as he sees it, the combination of these two factors — the CALP’s decisions on harassment in the workplace and s. 438 AIAOD — means that no worker covered by this statute can obtain the exemplary remedy provided for in the second paragraph of s. 49 of the Charter from his or her employer, whereas any person other than a worker covered by the AIAOD can do so. In short, according to this interpretation, the second paragraph of s. 49 is for all practical purposes a dead letter in light of the scope of the no‑fault compensation system under the AIAOD.
XIV. Gonthier J. expresses the opinion that the AIAOD supplants not only the right of action that arises from the rules of liability in art. 1053 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada (in force at the time of the proceedings — now art. 1457 of the Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64), but also the remedies, both compensatory and exemplary, provided for in s. 49 of the Charter. He bases this conclusion mainly on the theory that there is a complete overlap between the general law system and that of the Charter as far as the conditions for liability are concerned: see L. Perret, “De l’impact de la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne sur le droit civil des contrats et de la responsabilité au Québec” (1981), 12 R.G.D. 121; P.‑G. Jobin, “La violation d’une loi ou d’un règlement entraîne‑t‑elle la responsabilité civile?” (1984), 44 R. du B. 222; M. Caron, “Le droit à l’égalité dans le Code civil et dans la Charte québécoise des droits et libertés” (1985), 45 R. du B. 345; and K. Delwaide, “Les articles 49 et 52 de la Charte québécoise des droits et libertés: recours et sanctions à l’encontre d’une violation des droits et libertés garantis par la Charte québécoise”, in Application des Chartes des droits et libertés en matière civile (1988), p. 95.
XV. This theory conflicts with the position taken by other authors that the remedies provided for in s. 49 of the Charter are in principle autonomous: see G. Otis, “Le spectre d’une marginalisation des voies de recours découlant de la Charte québécoise” (1991), 51 R. du B. 561; and M. Drapeau, “La responsabilité pour atteinte illicite aux droits et libertés de la personne” (1994), 28 R.J.T. 31.
XVI. I agree with Gonthier J. that, as regards liability and for the purposes of s. 438 AIAOD, the Charter does not create a parallel system. Unlike him, however, I am of the opinion that the overlap between the two systems is limited to the elements of liability and the compensatory remedy and does not extend to the exemplary remedy provided for in the second paragraph of s. 49 of the Charter.
II. Exemplary Damages and the Overlap Theory
XVII. The concept of exemplary damages has traditionally been, and still is, foreign to the civil law. The system of delictual liability under the Civil Code of Lower Canada and now the Civil Code of Québec is confined to the compensatory aspect of liability, which means that the remedy is calculated solely on the basis of the loss suffered and the earnings lost. Punishment and deterrence of certain types of conduct are almost exclusively within the domain of criminal liability. In Chaput v. Romain, [1955] S.C.R. 834, 1 D.L.R. (2d) 241, Taschereau J. (as he then was) stated this principle as follows (at pp. 246‑47 D.L.R.):
[translation] Under art. 1053 C.C., the obligation to compensate flows from two essential elements: an injury suffered by the victim, and fault on the part of the author of the delict or quasi‑delict. Even if no pecuniary damage is proven, there exists nevertheless, not a right to punitive or exemplary damages which the law of Quebec does not recognize, but without doubt a right to moral damages. Civil law never punishes the author of a delict or a quasi‑delict. It recognizes and provides for compensation to the victim for the injury suffered. Punishment is exclusively within the province of criminal Courts: French v. Hétu (1908), 17 Que. K.B. 429; Guibord v. Dallaire (1931), 53 Que. K.B. 123; [Goyer v. Duquette (1937), 61 Que. K.B. 503, at p. 512]; Duhaime v. Talbot (1937), 64 Que. K.B. 386 at p. 391. Moral damages, as any other damages awarded by the civil Court, have exclusively a compensatory character. [Emphasis in original.]
See also Lamb v. Benoit, [1959] S.C.R. 321, as well as the comments of Professor J.‑L. Baudouin (now of the Quebec Court of Appeal) in La responsabilité civile (4th ed. 1994), at pp. 148‑50; and those of A. Nadeau, Traité pratique de