X (Re)

X (Re)
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2017-09-27
Neutral citation
2017 FC 1047
Notes
A correction was made on July 6, 2018.
Reported Decision
Decision Content
TOP SECRET
Date: 20170927
Docket: CONF-2-17
Citation: 2017 FC 1047
Ottawa, Ontario, September 27, 2017
PRESENT: THE CHIEF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| FOR WARRANTS PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 12 AND 21 OF THE CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ACT, RSC 1985, c C-23
and
IN THE MATTER OF ISLAMIST TERRORISM AND ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
PUBLIC JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Introduction 3
II. Background 6
III. This Proceeding 10
IV. Preliminary Issue Regarding the Openness of the Hearing on the Legal Arguments 14
V. CSS technology 21
VI. CSIS’s Policy Regarding the Collection and Retention of Electronic Identifiers 29
VII. Assessment of Legal Submissions 31
A. The Radiocommunication Act 31
B. The Criminal Code 36
C. Section 8 of the Charter 39
(1) Legal principles 39
(a) What Constitutes a Search or Seizure? 40
(b) What Constitutes an Unreasonable Search or Seizure? 46
(2) Application of the Legal Principles to the Facts of this Application 49
(a) Did CSIS’s Use of CSS Technology Constitute a “Search”? 49
(i) The Subject Matter of the Intrusive Activity 50
(ii) Individuals’ Interest in the Subject Matter 53
(iii) Do Individuals Have a Subjective Expectation of Privacy in the Subject Matter? 53
(iv) If So, Are Such Expectations Objectively Reasonable? 54
The Nature of the Privacy Interest at Stake 54
The Circumstances in which IMSI and IMEI Identifiers Are Obtained 55
The Manner and Place of the Capture of IMSI and IMEI Identifiers 55
Whether the IMSI/IMEI Identifiers have been Abandoned or Disclosed to One or More Third Parties 57
The Extent to which the Search Technique is Intrusive in Relation to the Identified Privacy Interest 59
The Relevant Statutory and Contractual Framework 60
Is the Use of CSS Technology Objectively Unreasonable? 68
Conclusion Regarding the Objective Reasonableness of Individuals’ Subjective Expectations of Privacy in Relation to the IMSI and IMEI Identifiers of their Mobile Devices 69
(v) Conclusion Regarding Whether the Capture of IMSI and IMEI Identifiers Constitutes a “Search.” 71
(b) Is CSIS’s Interception of IMSI and IMEI Numbers Unreasonable? 72
(i) Was the “Search” Authorized by Law? 73
(ii) Is Section 12 of the Act a Reasonable Law? 77
The Nature and Purpose of Section 12 78
The Degree of Intrusiveness Authorized by Section 12 82
The Extent to Which the Act Provides for Judicial Supervision 83
The Presence of Other “Checks and Balances” or Accountability Measures 87
Conclusion Regarding the Reasonableness of Section 12 89
(iii) Was the Manner in Which the Search was Carried Out Unreasonable? 91
(iv) Conclusion regarding the reasonableness of CSIS’s use of CSS technology 94
VIII. Conclusion 95
APPENDIX I 100
APPENDIX II 101
APPENDIX III 103
I. Introduction
[1] In a free and democratic society, it can be expected that citizens will not want the identifying characteristics of their mobile telephones to be surreptitiously obtained by anyone, including the Canadian Security Intelligence Service [CSIS], for the purpose of assisting to build a profile about them.
[2] However, unless it is unlawful for CSIS to engage in such activity, it is free to do so within the parameters established by its enabling legislation and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [the Charter]. The question to be decided in this case is whether the activity in which CSIS engaged to obtain such information from the mobile devices of a known subject of investigation, |||||||||||||||||||||||||||| was in fact unlawful. That activity was conducted without a warrant and involved CSIS’s use of a cellular-site simulator [CSS] to capture the identifying characteristics of his mobile devices.
[3] Those identifying characteristics consisted of the International Mobile Subscriber Identity [IMSI] and International Mobile Equipment Identity [IMEI] numbers that were emitted by |||||||||||||||||| mobile devices when they attempted to communicate with the cellular network of his telecommunications service providers [TSP]. The IMSI number identified the country in which |||||||||||||||||| cellular account is located, the network code of his TSP, and the unique subscriber identifying number given to him by the TSP. The IMEI identified the make, model and unique serial number of his mobile devices.
[4] In my view, CSIS’s use of a CSS without a warrant, and solely to obtain the identifying characteristics of |||||||||||||||||| mobile devices, was not unlawful. This is in part because of a number of measures that were taken to ensure that the activity was minimally intrusive. So long as similar measures are followed by CSIS in the future, its CSS operations would also be lawful. In other words, they would not contravene the Radiocommunication Act, RSC 1985, c R-2, the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, or the Charter.
[5] Generally speaking, the measures adopted by CSIS in carrying out CSS operations should strictly limit its intrusion on the privacy rights of the subjects of its investigations. In addition, these measures should ensure that CSIS does not capture the contents of any communications or any of the contents stored on, or available through, anyone’s mobile device(s). They should also ensure that the incidentally captured information pertaining to the mobile devices of third parties is quickly destroyed and is not subject to any analysis whatsoever, once it has been confirmed that those devices are not the mobile device(s) used by the subject of investigation ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| Furthermore, CSS technology should not be used to geo-locate anyone without a warrant.
[6] CSIS’s use of a CSS against |||||||||||||| constituted a “search” within the meaning of section 8 of the Charter. This is because |||||||||||||| had a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the information that CSIS was in a position to begin to gather about him, or about which it was able to make informed inferences, upon gaining access to the IMSI and IMEI numbers of his mobile devices. In brief, those numbers assisted CSIS to begin building a profile on |||||||||||||||| including by potentially helping CSIS to determine his ||||||[contacts]|||||||||||||||||||||||| and communication patterns” with the aid of information already available to CSIS. To the extent that this enabled CSIS to begin to gain an understanding of, or to make reasoned inferences about, certain aspects of |||||||||||||||||| core biographic personal information, it engaged his rights under s. 8 of the Charter.
[7] Nevertheless, the search was not “unreasonable,” because it was narrowly targeted, highly accurate and minimally intrusive. The CSS operations conducted by CSIS were even more minimally intrusive with respect to the information that was incidentally captured from the wireless devices of third parties, because that information was quickly destroyed and was not subject to any analysis whatsoever, after it was determined that the information did not pertain to |||||||||||||||||| wireless devices.
[8] More generally, the evidence in this proceeding establishes that the CSS technology used by CSIS does not permit it to identify the individual whose mobile devices are targeted by the CSS operation, or to gain access to billing or other intrusive information. Indeed, the identity of targets of CSIS’s CSS operations, as well as their location and other information, typically is already known at the time such operations are conducted. Where CSIS requires detailed billing or subscriber information from a TSP, it will require a warrant. This is because of the more highly intrusive nature of such information, which can include a listing of all calls made during a billing period, the duration of those calls, and the locations of the parties to those calls.
[9] Agents of the state who are responsible for the safety and security of the general public may engage in minimally intrusive activities without violating section 8 of the Charter so long as those activities are authorized by law, the law is reasonable, and the activity is carried out in a reasonable fashion. Such minimally intrusive activities can include the physical surveillance of people in public, and even the monitoring of the level of heat emanating from their homes. In this case, CSIS’s use of CSS technology was authorized by section 12 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, RSC 1985, c C-23 [Act], section 12 is a reasonable law, and CSIS’s search was conducted in a reasonable manner.
II. Background
[10] This is the first proceeding in which CSIS has explicitly sought the Court’s views regarding its use of CSS technology to obtain information or intelligence in the course of an investigation, without a warrant.
[11] CSIS has used CSS technology for that purpose for several years. However, prior to February 10, 2016, the Court was unaware of this fact. On that date, CSIS provided the Court with a copy of the classified report of the Security Intelligence Review Committee [SIRC], entitled, SIRC Review 2014-03—Review of CSIS’s use of Metadata. Among other things, that report referred to two case studies. The first was entitled The Use of Metadata by the Operational Data Analysis Centre (ODAC) and ultimately led to a decision by my colleague, Justice Simon Noël, concerning CSIS’s program of collection and retention of such information (X (Re), 2016 FC 1105 [X (Re)]). The second case study was entitled The Service’s Collection of International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) Data, and provided a brief overview of the history of CSIS’s use of CSS technology. In brief, after getting introduced to the technology |||||||||||||| CSIS gradually increased its use of the technology to the point that it has now been used across the country, ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
[12] According to SIRC’s report and the evidence provided in this proceeding, CSIS currently only uses CSS technology for two purposes, which are described in greater detail in Part V of these reasons below. The first such purpose is to attribute a cellular device to a subject of investigation whose identity is often already known. This was the case with |||||||||||||||| Such attribution is done by obtaining, through CSS technology, the IMSI associated with a subject of investigation’s SIM card, as well as the IMEI that is associated with a specific mobile device. Based on the information available to SIRC at the time it prepared its report, SIRC concluded that this activity alone does not require a warrant from this Court. However, SIRC added that any change to the uses of the information captured by the use of CSS technology would require further legal consideration.
[13] The second use that CSIS makes of CSS technology is to “geo-locate” a subject of investigation’s cellular device. SIRC observed, and CSIS has since conceded, that this use of CSS technology must be sanctioned by a warrant issued by this Court.
[14] Before receiving SIRC’s report in February 2016, Justice Mosley inquired about CSIS’s use of the “Stingray” technology in the context of an ex parte hearing that took place on |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| and that concerned proposed changes to the template language of certain of this Court’s warrants. However, CSIS’s legal counsel was not in a position to provide a response to his general inquiry at that time.
[15] Shortly after having had an opportunity to review SIRC’s above-mentioned report, Justice Mosley again inquired about the use of CSS technology. The affiant in that hearing |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| testified that the technology had been used in the investigation that led to that application for warrants, and explained how the technology had been used. The affiant undertook to confirm that data from the mobile devices of third parties which is collected at the time of a CSS operation is destroyed by CSIS. That confirmation ultimately was provided on |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| and again by a senior employee of CSIS, |||||||||||||||||| during the evidentiary hearing in this application.
[16] A similar inquiry was made by Justice Mosley, and a similar response was provided by another affiant, during the hearing of another application ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
[17] At a subsequent case management meeting that I co-presided with Justice Noël on |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| Justice Noël inquired about the “Stingray” technology, how it operates, and whether it was being used under this Court’s warrants. [1] In response to Justice Noël’s request, the Deputy Director Operations [DDO] of CSIS, Mr. Jeff Yaworski, undertook to obtain the relevant details and to provide them to the Court. It was only as a result of information subsequently provided by CSIS that the Court began to gain a more fulsome appreciation of the nature and extent of CSIS’s use of CSS technology.
[18] On |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| counsel to CSIS confirmed in a letter to the Court that there were no other instances, apart from those mentioned above, in which references were made to CSS or similar technology, in exchanges between the Court and CSIS or its counsel. At the end of that letter, the Court was informed that |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| This was the first time that the Court had been informed that CSIS was using CSS or similar technology pursuant to its warrants.
[19] ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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[20] On |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| Justice Noël directed CSIS and the Attorney General “to provide information and evidence regarding the nature, scope, usage and minimization of the investigative technique called Stingray.” Justice Noël’s Direction added that “[t]he Court requires the information and evidence in order to fully and clearly understand the investigative technique; and, to assess whether |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| or any other warrant provides lawful authority for the technique.” Ultimately, CSIS decided to provide that information and evidence in the context of this proceeding.
III. This Proceeding
[21] In this proceeding, CSIS sought a number of warrants from the Court pursuant to sections 12 and 21 of the Act to permit it to continue to investigate the activities of |||||||||||||| in connection with Islamist terrorism. As explained below, I granted those warrants with two amendments, for the period commencing on |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| and ending on ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
[22] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
[23] The IMSI and IMEI numbers that were obtained from |||||||||||||||||| wireless devices in |||||||||||||||||||||||| assisted CSIS to execute interception powers that this Court authorized in |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| by ensuring that those powers were exercised against the wireless devices described in this Court’s warrants.
[24] In support of its application for warrants in this proceeding, CSIS relied on two affidavits, provided by |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| Affidavit] and |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| Affidavit]. In addition, CSIS and the Amici submitted a number of documents, including responses to undertakings given to me during the proceeding, that were marked as exhibits.
[25] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
[26] With two exceptions, the operative language of the warrants granted in this proceeding was identical to the language of the warrants that had previously been granted by Justice |||||| in respect of |||||||||||||||| and that had been scheduled to expire on |||||||||||||||||||||||||| The first exception was that I included language which prohibits the use of CSS |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| in paragraph |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| Warrant. That prohibition has been included in several other warrants since the Court learned that CSIS had been relying on paragraph |||||| in using CSS |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| against targets of the Court’s warrants. In including that prohibition, I made it clear to CSIS and the Attorney General that this amendment to the warrant should not be taken as any pronouncement by the Court with respect to the legality of the CSS technology, whether or not used pursuant to a warrant, as these remained “live” issues in this application |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
[27] The second amendment that I made to the warrant powers sought in this proceeding was to delete the requested authorization to obtain |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| That amendment was made after I determined that the evidence adduced by CSIS did not establish reasonable grounds to believe that |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
[28] On |||||||||||||||||||||||||||| at the end of the evidentiary hearing in this proceeding, I granted the warrants sought by CSIS, with the two amendments described above. I did so after satisfying myself that, among other things, CSIS had established that there were reasonable grounds to believe that |||||||||||||||||| activities constitute a threat to the security of Canada, as defined in paragraph 2(c) of the Act, and that CSIS required the warrants to investigate that threat.
[29] In making my decision to grant those warrants, I relied on the evidence provided by |||||||||||||||| which included considerable information obtained in the course of CSIS’s investigation of Islamist terrorism as well as more specific information concerning |||||||||||||||| That information was obtained through various methods of investigation, including physical surveillance and warranted intercepts involving |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| Additional information was also collected from human sources, interviews, open information, government agencies in Canada and foreign agencies that are investigating Islamist terrorism. I did not rely on the very limited information that was obtained by CSIS using CSS technology against |||||||||||||| without a warrant. That information was obtained through the use of the technology during a two-day period, and simply consisted of the attribution of three devices to |||||||||||||||| namely,|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| According to one of the affiants in this proceeding, that information has now been destroyed. For greater certainty, I also did not rely on any information that was derived from the IMSI and IMEI numbers obtained through CSIS’s use of CSS technology, including communications over any of those devices that were subsequently intercepted by CSIS.
[30] In issuing the most recent warrants against |||||||||||||||| I made it clear that I would remain seized of this application in order to (i) take notice of the amendments to this Court’s warrant templates that are ultimately made as a result of the decision that Justice Simon Noël issued on October 4, 2016, in X (Re), above, (ii) make corresponding amendments to the warrants that I have provisionally issued in this proceeding, and (iii) make any further amendments to those warrants that I consider appropriate, after having had an opportunity to consider the legal submissions made in this proceeding.
[31] As an aside, and for completeness, it is relevant to note that the Attorney General confirmed in a letter dated |||||||||||||||||||||||||| that the only instances in which the language of |||||||||||||||||||||||||| was relied on were |||||| geo-location CSS operations. The Attorney General added that CSIS did not rely on any warrants issued by this Court to conduct any of its other past CSS operations, because it does not consider that it requires a warrant to capture IMSI and IMEI numbers for the purposes of attributing a device to a subject of investigation.
[32] This proceeding was organized as an en banc hearing because it involves the first application to the Court in which CSIS has (i) explicitly stated that it had resorted to CSS technology in the course of investigating the activities of its subject of investigation, (ii) made submissions on the lawfulness of its use of the technique in that investigation, and (iii) provided evidence regarding its use of that technology. I considered it appropriate to convene the other designated judges of the Court to join me on the bench, so that they would have the benefit of the evidence provided by |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| including on cross-examination by the Amici. I also considered it to be important that they have the benefit of responses provided by |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| to questions that any of them, or I, might pose. This should assist each of the designated judges of the Court in future applications involving CSS technology, and may reduce the need for similar evidence in such applications.
[33] Notwithstanding the presence of other designated judges of this Court in this proceeding, I assured CSIS and representatives of the Attorney General at the outset of the hearing that was held on |||||||||||||||||||||||||||| that my judicial independence would not thereby be compromised in any way. I, and I alone, have decided the issues that have been raised in this application.
[34] Given the importance of the legal issues raised in this application, the Court retained Mr. Gordon Cameron and Mr. Owen Rees to act as amici curiae.
IV. Preliminary Issue Regarding the Openness of the Hearing on the Legal Arguments
[35] During the evidentiary hearing on |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| I learned that there is more information in the public domain regarding CSS technology and its use by law enforcement agencies than I had previously appreciated. With that in mind, and having regard to the recent significant increase in public interest concerning the oversight of CSIS’s activities by the Court, I invited the Attorney General’s views as to whether it was necessary for the hearing of legal arguments concerning the CSS technology to be held in camera.
[36] Counsel to the Attorney General undertook to seek instructions and get back to the Court on this matter. However, she observed that CSIS likely would be reluctant to participate in a public hearing on this issue, given that its use of CSS technology had never been publicly acknowledged.
[37] Subsequently, in a letter dated |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| the Attorney General took the position that a public hearing of the legal submissions in this hearing would not be suitable. In brief, the Attorney General submitted that such a public hearing would be contrary to section 27 of the Act and could cause serious injury to Canada’s national security interests. Among other things, the Attorney General maintained that a public hearing would adversely impact |||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| Instead of a public hearing, the Attorney General proposed that a public decision be issued, subject to appropriate redactions.
[38] Section 27 of the Act states:
Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, RSC 1985, c C-23
Loi sur le Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité, LRC (1985), ch C-23
27. An application under section 21, 21.1 or 23 for a warrant, an application under section 22 or 22.1 for the renewal of a warrant or an application for an order under section 22.3 shall be held in private in accordance with regulations made under section 28. (Emphasis added)
27. Une demande de mandat faite en vertu des articles 21, 21.1 ou 23, de renouvellement de mandat faite en vertu des articles 22 ou 22.1 ou d’ordonnance présentée au titre de l’article 22.3 est entendue à huis clos en conformité avec les règlements d’application de l’article 28. (Je souligne)
[39] In support of its position that a public hearing of the legal arguments in this proceeding would be contrary to the explicit terms of section 27, the Attorney General relied on the following passage from Justice Noël’s decision in Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (Re), 2008 FC 300, at para 34:
[34] Section 27 provides that applications for warrant “shall be heard in private” (“huis clos” in French). “Private” is defined as “confidential; secret” in Brian A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed. (St-Paul: Thomson West 2004), s.v. “private” In Hubert Reid, Dictionnaire de droit québécois et canadien, (Montréal, Wilson & Lafleur, 1994), s.v. “huis clos”, the expression “huis clos” is described as being “une exception au principe de la publicité des débats, qui consiste à interdire au public l’accès à la salle d’audience”. Again, the main aims of the privacy of applications for a warrant are to preserve the secrecy of sensitive information in general and to ensure the execution of warrant [sic]. The interested person(s) (targets) must not be present or aware of the warrant application; otherwise its purpose would become academic. The public should not have access to the information because it is related to national security and because of the effectiveness of the CSIS depends on the secrecy of its methods and operations. Finally, third party information is often transmitted under the caveat that it would not be released. If warrants were debated in public, sensitive information would likely be released advertently or inadvertently. It would prevent the CSIS from being informed about threats to Canada’s security, would render useless the investigation, would be dangerous to human sources involved and could endanger Canada’s relationship with allied countries.
[40] However, the Attorney General failed to note that Justice Noël proceeded to observe, at paragraph 46 of his decision, that “issues that are ‘collateral’ to a warrant application, such as jurisdictional issues, could be heard in open courts in some circumstances.” In this regard, Justice Noël emphasized that “each case turns on its facts keeping in mind the clear wording of section 27 of the [Act] and the necessary balance between national security and fundamental rights” (para 47). Ultimately, Justice Noël concluded that the issues of law and of fact in the particular case that was before him were so intertwined that the jurisdiction issue that had been raised could not be dealt with in public.
[41] In the present proceeding, it was not initially apparent to me that the factual and legal issues were similarly intertwined. However, it subsequently transpired that the factual evidence adduced was critical to the findings I ultimately made in respect of the issue of whether CSIS’s use of CSS technology constituted a search, as well as the issue of whether that search was “unreasonable,” within the meaning of section 8 of the Charter.
[42] The Attorney General’s stated reasons for opposing a public hearing were significantly undermined by two important developments that occurred between the time of the evidentiary hearing and the hearing of the parties’ legal submissions. The first of those developments was that the Minister was reported to have publicly confirmed the use of CSS technology by CSIS and the RCMP, but only “within the four corners of the law” (“RCMP, CSIS launch investigations into phone spying on Parliament Hill after CBC story,” CBC News (April 4, 2017) online: ˂ www.cbc.ca ˃.) The Attorney General confirmed this fact in a letter to the Court dated April 5, 2017, yet continued to maintain that “the hearing [of the legal] submissions concerning the Service’s use of CSS must continue to be held in camera in order to comply with section 27 of the [Act] and to avoid serious injury to national security interests.”
[43] The second important intervening development consisted of a CBC news article, published the day before the hearing of the legal submissions in this proceeding, in which CSIS was reported to have “confirmed that it has used the cellphone identification and tracking technology in recent years, both with and without a warrant” (“Spies’ use of cellphone surveillance technology suspended in January, pending review,” CBC News (May 3, 2017) online: ˂ www.cbc.ca ˃.)
[44] In light of that reported confirmation by CSIS of its use of CSS technology, the Amici sent a short letter to the Court suggesting that the circumstances were such that the hearing of the legal submissions in this proceeding should be made open to the public. While recognizing the requirement in section 27 that warrant applications be heard in private, they observed that certain statements made by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Harkat, 2014 SCC 37 [Harkat], “would support a decision by the Court to make the legal argument on the Service’s use of cell site simulators open to the public.” At paragraph 25 of that decision, the Supreme Court observed that the issues in that case did “not turn on confidential information and could have been debated fully in public without any serious risk of disclosure, supplemented where necessary by brief closed written submissions and by the closed record.” The Court proceeded to add, at para 26, that the content of the closed part of the hearing in that case did not assist the Court in deciding the issues before it, and “served only to foster an appearance of opacity of these proceedings, which runs contrary to the fundamental principles of transparency and accountability.” The Amici did not address the differences between the case that was before the Supreme Court and the application that is before this Court in the current proceeding.
[45] In response to the Amici’s suggestion, the Attorney General sent a short letter to the Court later that day in which she agreed to discuss the possibility of holding a public hearing. However, the Attorney General noted that an adjournment might be required in order to identify which elements could be heard in a public hearing and which would require consideration in camera. The Attorney General also “urge [d] consideration of section 27 of the [Act].”
[46] At the outset of the hearing of the legal arguments in this application the following morning, the Amici once again suggested that the Court adjourn the hearing to permit them to work with the Attorney General to devise a means to have at least part of the oral legal submissions made in a public forum.
[47] However, given the last-minute nature of the Amici’s suggestion, and in the absence of additional submissions from the Amici and the Attorney General as to how a public hearing could occur given the express language of section 27, I decided to proceed with the hearing, as previously scheduled.
[48] In reaching that decision, I was cognizant of the decision in Ruby v Canada (Solicitor General), 2002 SCC 75, at paras 57–58, where the Supreme Court of Canada observed that it was not open to the parties, even on consent, to bypass the mandatory in camera requirement set forth in paragraph 51(2)(a) of the Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c P-21. The Court added that, constitutional issues aside, it was also not open to a judge to conduct an open hearing, even if only in respect of legal issues, in direct contradiction of the statute, regardless of the proposal put forth by the parties. (For constitutional reasons, the Court then proceeded to “read down” certain provisions of the Privacy Act to apply only to certain types of ex parte submissions, thereby permitting a court to conduct other parts of a hearing in public (Ruby, above, at paras 58-60).)
[49] I also considered the practical difficulty that would have been associated with reconvening an appropriate number of the Court’s designated judges any time prior to October or November of this year. In addition, I was sensitive to the fact that the Attorney General’s legal submissions had already been filed with the Court when I initially expressed an interest in the possibility of having an open hearing of all or part of the oral legal submissions in this proceeding. I was also mindful of the fact that it would have been unprecedented to have such an open hearing in respect of an application for warrants under section 21 of the Act. Assuming that section 27 does not preclude the holding of a public hearing in some circumstances, I considered that it would be preferable for such a hearing to be held in a proceeding that had been better planned for that purpose. Finally, at the time I was not entirely convinced that the factual and legal issues were intimately linked. As I have already noted, it subsequently became apparent that they were indeed so linked.
[50] In the meantime, I considered it appropriate to considerably reduce the opacity that otherwise would be associated with this proceeding by issuing public redacted versions of both this decision and the written versions of the parties’ arguments. In my view, those measures, taken together, will represent an important additional step by this Court to foster greater openness with respect to the ex parte proceedings that are brought before it under the Act. Stated differently, these measures will increase the principles of transparency and accountability to which the Supreme Court referred in Harkat, above, at para 26.
V. CSS technology
[51] Information regarding the manner in which the CSS technology functions was provided to the Court by |||||||||||||||||| both through the |||||||| Affidavit and orally during the evidentiary hearing on ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
[52] |||||||||||||||| is employed by CSIS as a |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| He did not testify on what was done specifically in the case of |||||||||||||| but rather spoke of the CSS technique generally. Among other things, he described himself as a subject-matter expert with respect to the CSS technology. |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| His evidence was provided for the purpose of assisting the Court to determine whether information obtained without a warrant that specifically sanctioned the use of a CSS, had been obtained lawfully and may be relied upon in an application by CSIS for warrants under section 21 of the Act.
[53] |||||||||||||||| explained that CSS is an umbrella term that encompasses both generic terms that a