Coors Brewing Company v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC

Coors Brewing Company v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2014-07-18
Neutral citation
2014 FC 716
File numbers
T-1416-13
Decision Content
Date: 20140718
Docket: T-1416-13
Citation: 2014 FC 716
Ottawa, Ontario, July 18, 2014
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Gleason
BETWEEN:
COORS BREWING COMPANY AND MOLSON CANADA 2005
Applicants
and
ANHEUSER-BUSCH, LLC
Respondent
REASONS AND JUDGMENT
[1] The respondent, Anheuser-Busch, LLC [Anheuser], is the owner of the trade-mark “GRAB SOME BUDS”. On February 24, 2010, the Canadian Intellectual Property Office [CIPO] issued Registration No. TMA 818,398 [the 398 Registration] to Anheuser for the GRAB SOME BUDS mark. The applicants, Coors Brewing Company and Molson Canada 2005 [Molson Coors] own a competing mark, “GRAB SOME STONES”. Both parties use their respective trade-marks in association with beer.
[2] In an action that is currently pending before the Ontario Superior Court, Anheuser has sued Molson Coors, alleging, among other things, that Molson Coors’ use in Canada of the GRAB SOME STONES trade-mark infringes Anheuser’s 398 Registration.
[3] In addition to defending the Ontario action, Molson Coors took the offensive and made an application to this Court, seeking expungement of the 398 Registration under subsection 57(1) of the Trade-marks Act, RSC 1985, c T-13 [the Trade-marks Act or the Act]. Although Anheuser followed what appears to have been a relatively common practice in seeking the registration, Molson Coors argues that the recent decision of my colleague, Justice Manson, in The Thymes, LLC v Reitmans Canada Limited, 2013 FC 127 [Thymes] should result in the expungement of the 398 Registration. It asserts in this regard that it was not open to Anheuser to make its initial application based on intended use in Canada and then to subsequently amend its application to rely on a pending U.S. Registration for the GRAB SOME BUDS mark in the United States in circumstances where it had not yet started to use the mark in the U.S. at the date it originally made its Canadian application. Although it appears that it is not uncommon for applicants to proceed in this fashion, Molson Coors argues that this process is not viable and that the decision in Thymes requires the expungement of the GRAB SOME BUDS registration.
[4] I disagree that the ruling in Thymes stands for any such thing and have accordingly dismissed this application, with costs, for the reasons set out below.
I. Background [5] To put the issues in context, the background to the registration at issue may be described as follows.
[6] On August 16, 2010 Anheuser filed a U.S. trade-mark application to register the GRAB SOME BUDS trade-mark in the U.S. The application was premised on intended use. Anheuser commenced using the GRAB SOME BUDS trade-mark in the U.S. on September 24, 2010. It thereafter filed the requisite proof of use of the mark in the U.S. with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and on March 8, 2011 received a U.S. registration for the GRAB SOME BUDS mark.
[7] As is frequently done, Anheuser pursued registration for the mark concurrently in Canada. It filed its Canadian application with CIPO on September 14, 2010, under subsection 30(e) of the Trade-marks Act, which allows an applicant to apply for registration based on its intent to use a trade-mark in Canada. (By virtue of subsection 40(2) of the Act, the registration may not issue in a paragraph 30(e) application until the applicant files a declaration of use of the mark in Canada with CIPO.)
[8] On January 18, 2011, CIPO approved Anheuser’s Canadian application under subsection 37(1) of the Act. Such “approval” is not synonymous with granting the registration. Rather, it is merely notice to the applicant that CIPO does not oppose the mark and that it will therefore be advertised in the Trade-marks Journal. Advertisement is intended to provide notice to potentially interested parties so as to afford them the opportunity to oppose the registration if they wish to do so.
[9] On February 9, 2011, before the application was advertised in the Trade-marks Journal, Anheuser amended its application to withdraw the proposed use basis and substitute subsection 30(d) of the Act as the basis for registration. Under that provision, an applicant may apply for registration of a trade-mark in Canada based upon prior registration or application for registration of a trade-mark in another country (that is party to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property or a member of the World Trade Organization) and use by the applicant of the mark in that country. In its amendment, Anheuser referenced its then still-pending U.S. application as the basis for registration in the U.S.
[10] On February 28, 2011, CIPO voided its earlier approval notice in light of Anheuser’s change of grounds and issued an office action, requiring Anheuser to file a certified copy of its U.S. registration. It did so on April 21, 2011, and on May 31, 2011 CIPO issued a further approval notice in respect of Anheuser’s Canadian application. On July 27, 2011, Anheuser’s Canadian application was advertised in the Trade-marks Journal. No one opposed the application, and on November 10, 2011, CIPO allowed Anheuser’s application. On February 24, 2012, CIPO issued the 398 Registration to Anheuser.
[11] Anheuser has used the GRAB SOME BUDS trade-mark in both Canada and the U.S. in association with its beer for the last several years. Molson Coors commenced this application for expungement in August of 2013.
[12] Finally, Anheuser filed evidence in this application from a title searcher showing that several other owners of U.S. registered trade-marks followed the same process as Anheuser took in this case, namely filing in Canada first based on proposed use of the mark in Canada and then amending the application to rely on an intervening U.S. registration or pending registration. In some of these cases, like here, the U.S. registration materials documented that use in the U.S. post-dated the Canadian application date.
II. Relevant Legislation [13] Before examining Molson Coors’ argument it is necessary to review the relevant provisions of the Trade-marks Act and Trade-marks Regulations, SOR/96-195 [the Regulations]. All these provisions are set out in full in the Appendix to these Reasons. I accordingly cite below only the most salient provisions.
[14] The first of these is section 57 of the Trade-marks Act, which allows for the expungement of registered trade-marks (or their removal from the Register) by this Court. Subsection 57(1) provides in relevant part as follows:
Exclusive jurisdiction of Federal Court
Juridiction exclusive de la Cour fédérale
57. (1) The Federal Court has exclusive original jurisdiction, on the application of the Registrar or of any person interested, to order that any entry in the register be struck out or amended on the ground that at the date of the application the entry as it appears on the register does not accurately express or define the existing rights of the person appearing to be the registered owner of the mark.
57. (1) La Cour fédérale a une compétence initiale exclusive, sur demande du registraire ou de toute personne intéressée, pour ordonner qu’une inscription dans le registre soit biffée ou modifiée, parce que, à la date de cette demande, l’inscription figurant au registre n’exprime ou ne définit pas exactement les droits existants de la personne paraissant être le propriétaire inscrit de la marque.
[15] Expungement proceedings are not the only way in which a challenge may be made to the registration of a trade-mark. The Act also provides in section 38 for opposition by any person to a proposed registration. The portions of section 38 relevant to this application provide as follows:
Statement of opposition
Déclaration d’opposition
38. (1) Within two months after the advertisement of an application for the registration of a trade-mark, any person may, on payment of the prescribed fee, file a statement of opposition with the Registrar.
38. (1) Toute personne peut, dans le délai de deux mois à compter de l’annonce de la demande, et sur paiement du droit prescrit, produire au bureau du registraire une déclaration d’opposition.
Grounds
Motifs
(2) A statement of opposition may be based on any of the following grounds:
(2) Cette opposition peut être fondée sur l’un des motifs suivants :
(a) that the application does not conform to the requirements of section 30;
a) la demande ne satisfait pas aux exigences de l’article 30;
(b) that the trade-mark is not registrable;
b) la marque de commerce n’est pas enregistrable;
(c) that the applicant is not the person entitled to registration of the trade-mark; or
c) le requérant n’est pas la personne ayant droit à l’enregistrement;
(d) that the trade-mark is not distinctive.
d) la marque de commerce n’est pas distinctive
[16] Section 18 of the Act governs validity of registrations and provides in relevant part as follows:
When registration invalid
Quand l’enregistrement est invalide
18. (1) The registration of a trade-mark is invalid if
18. (1) L’enregistrement d’une marque de commerce est invalide dans les cas suivants
(a) the trade-mark was not registrable at the date of registration,
a) la marque de commerce n’était pas enregistrable à la date de l’enregistrement;
(b) the trade-mark is not distinctive at the time proceedings bringing the validity of the registration into question are commenced, or
b) la marque de commerce n’est pas distinctive à l’époque où sont entamées les procédures contestant la validité de l’enregistrement;
(c) the trade-mark has been abandoned,
and subject to section 17, it is invalid if the applicant for registration was not the person entitled to secure the registration.
c) la marque de commerce a été abandonnée.
Sous réserve de l’article 17, l’enregistrement est invalide si l’auteur de la demande n’était pas la personne ayant droit de l’obtenir.
[17] Section 12 of the Act deals with the types that are marks are registrable. It is concerned with issues surrounding the nature of the proposed mark as opposed to whether it has been used.
[18] As noted, subsection 40(2) of the Trade-marks Act requires that an applicant who has based his application on proposed use in Canada to file proof of that use before registration may issue. Likewise, section 31 of the Act requires an applicant who has based its application on registration or pending registration and use abroad to file the foreign registration before the applicant’s Canadian application is advertised.
[19] Section 16 of the Trade-marks Act governs entitlement to registration. Subsection 16(2) is of particular importance in this application. It states:
Marks registered and used abroad
Marques déposées et employées dans un autre pays
(2) Any applicant who has filed an application in accordance with section 30 for registration of a trade-mark that is registrable and that the applicant or the applicant’s predecessor in title has duly registered in or for the country of origin of the applicant and has used in association with wares or services is entitled, subject to section 38, to secure its registration in respect of the wares or services in association with which it is registered in that country and has been used, unless at the date of filing of the application in accordance with section 30 it was confusing with
(2) Tout requérant qui a produit une demande selon l’article 30 en vue de l’enregistrement d’une marque de commerce qui est enregistrable et que le requérant ou son prédécesseur en titre a dûment déposée dans son pays d’origine, ou pour son pays d’origine, et qu’il a employée en liaison avec des marchandises ou services, a droit, sous réserve de l’article 38, d’en obtenir l’enregistrement à l’égard des marchandises ou services en liaison avec lesquels elle est déposée dans ce pays et a été employée, à moins que, à la date de la production de la demande, en conformité avec l’article 30, elle n’ait créé de la confusion :
(a) a trade-mark that had been previously used in Canada or made known in Canada by any other person;
(b) a trade-mark in respect of which an application for registration had been previously filed in Canada by any other person; or
(c) a trade-name that had been previously used in Canada by any other person.
a) soit avec une marque de commerce antérieurement employée ou révélée au Canada par une autre personne;
b) soit avec une marque de commerce à l’égard de laquelle une demande d’enregistrement a été antérieurement produite au Canada par une autre personne;
c) soit avec un nom commercial antérieurement employé au Canada par une autre personne.
[20] The required contents of a trade-mark application are set out in section 30 of the Act. Subsections 30(b) and (d), which Anheuser relied on, provide:
Contents of application
Contenu d’une demande
30. An applicant for the registration of a trade-mark shall file with the Registrar an application containing
[…]
30. Quiconque sollicite l’enregistrement d’une marque de commerce produit au bureau du registraire une demande renfermant :
[…]
(b) in the case of a trade-mark that has been used in Canada, the date from which the applicant or his named predecessors in title, if any, have so used the trade-mark in association with each of the general classes of wares or services described in the application;
[…]
b) dans le cas d’une marque de commerce qui a été employée au Canada, la date à compter de laquelle le requérant ou ses prédécesseurs en titre désignés, le cas échéant, ont ainsi employé la marque de commerce en liaison avec chacune des catégories générales de marchandises ou services décrites dans la demande;
[…]
(d) in the case of a trade-mark that is the subject in or for another country of the Union of a registration or an application for registration by the applicant or the applicant’s named predecessor in title on which the applicant bases the applicant’s right to registration, particulars of the application or registration and, if the trade-mark has neither been used in Canada nor made known in Canada, the name of a country in which the trade-mark has been used by the applicant or the applicant’s named predecessor in title, if any, in association with each of the general classes of wares or services described in the application;
d) dans le cas d’une marque de commerce qui est, dans un autre pays de l’Union, ou pour un autre pays de l’Union, l’objet, de la part du requérant ou de son prédécesseur en titre désigné, d’un enregistrement ou d’une demande d’enregistrement sur quoi le requérant fonde son droit à l’enregistrement, les détails de cette demande ou de cet enregistrement et, si la marque n’a été ni employée ni révélée au Canada, le nom d’un pays où le requérant ou son prédécesseur en titre désigné, le cas échéant, l’a employée en liaison avec chacune des catégories générales de marchandises ou services décrites dans la demande;
[21] Section 37 of the Act sets out the situations where registration applications must be refused; these include situations where the mark is not registrable or where the applicant has not complied with section 30 of the Act.
[22] Sections 30 to 33 of the Regulations govern amendments to trade-mark applications. Amendments like that made in this case are specifically foreseen by section 32 of the Regulations, which provides in relevant part as follows:
32. No application for the registration of a trade-mark may be amended, after it has been advertised in the Journal, to change
32. La modification d’une demande d’enregistrement d’une marque de commerce n’est pas permise après l’annonce de la demande dans le Journal, si elle vise, selon le cas :
(a) the trade-mark in any manner whatsoever;
a) à modifier la marque de commerce, à quelque égard que ce soit;
(b) the date of first use or making known in Canada of the trade-mark;
b) à changer la date de premier emploi ou de révélation, au Canada, de la marque de commerce;
(c) the application from one alleging use or making known to one for a proposed trade-mark;
c) à modifier la demande qui allègue que la marque de commerce a été employée ou révélée en une demande alléguant qu’il s’agit d’une marque de commerce projetée;
(d) the application from one that does not allege that the trade-mark has been used and registered in or for a country of the Union to one that does so allege; or
d) à modifier la demande n’alléguant pas que la marque a été employée et enregistrée dans un pays de l’Union ou pour un pays de l’Union en une demande alléguant ce fait;
(e) the statement of wares or services so as to be broader than the statement of wares or services contained in the application at the time of advertisement.
e) à modifier l’état déclaratif des marchandises ou services pour étendre la portée de celui qui figurait dans la demande au moment de l’annonce.
[23] Finally, section 19 of the Act sets out a presumption of validity of a trade-mark that flows from registration.
[24] As is more fully discussed below, these provisions have been collectively interpreted as providing that there are fewer issues that may give rise to a successful expungement claim as opposed to a successful opposition claim.
III. The Decision in Thymes [25] I turn next to the decision in Thymes, which provides the underpinning for Molson Coors’ argument in this case. That case involved an appeal from the Trade-Marks Opposition Board [the TMOB] in the context of an opposition under section 38 of the Act. In addition, there, unlike here, the applicant had not amended its application. Rather, it based its application on a foreign registration, noting in its application that it had made the foreign application and intended to use the trade-mark in question in the other jurisdiction. The TMOB allowed the opposition, holding that the material date for assessment of compliance with subsection 30(d) of the Act in that case was the application date, and that, since the applicant had not used the mark as of that date, the application was refused. In upholding the decision of the TMOB, Justice Manson wrote as follows at paras 18-20 of Thymes:
A. Was Use of the Applicant’s THYMES Mark in the United States Required as of the Filing Date of the Application in Canada?
18. I will deal with the applicant’s first ground of appeal. There is no doubt a proper reading of that section requires that, at the time of filing the application, if an applicant relies on registration or application and use abroad pursuant to that section, there must have been use of the trade-mark at the time of the application to rely on this section as a valid basis to obtain registration in Canada.
19. It is clear that section 16(2) of the Act emphasizes that use of the mark in the country of origin of the applicant is a requirement for registration in Canada.
20. Further, the last portion of section 16(2) of the Act, namely: “unless at the date of filing of the application in accordance with section 30”, also supports the view that both section 16 and section 30 requirements must exist and be reviewed as at the date of filing of the application.
IV. Does Thymes Require the Expungement of the 398 Registration? [26] Molson Coors argues that the decision in Thymes must necessarily result in the expungement of the 398 Registration in this case because at the date the Canadian application was filed Anheuser had not yet used the trade-mark in the U.S. and commenced doing so only ten days later. It asserts that the foregoing passage from Justice Manson’s decision must be taken as meaning that in all cases where an application is filed under subsection 30(d) of the Trade-marks Act there must have been actual use in the foreign jurisdiction of the foreign-registered mark as of the Canadian application date. It thus asserts that Anheuser’s application did not conform to subsection 30(d) of the Act and that the 398 Registration ought to have been refused under section 37 of the Act.
[27] Molson Coors further contends that in such circumstances it is entitled to have the GRAB SOME BUDS registration expunged because the jurisprudence recognises that a false statement in a trade-mark application will warrant expungement where there was fraudulent misrepresentation or where the inclusion of a material false statement of use was fundamental to the registration (relying on WCC Containers Sales Ltd v Haul-All equipment Ltd, 2003 FC 962 at para 25 [WCC] and General Motors of Canada v Décarie Motors Inc, [2001] 1 FC 665 (FCA) at paras 17-18 [General Motors]). It argues that a misstatement was made in this case as Thymes requires that there be actual foreign use as of the Canadian application date, but this did not occur. It says that such lack of use would have been sufficient to refuse registration after the decision in Thymes, and accordingly that the GRAB SOME BUDS registration should be expunged, as occurred in Unitel Communications Inc v Bell Canada (1995), 61 CPR (3d) 12 (FCTD) [Unitel], a case cited by the Court in both WCC and General Motors. (In both WCC and General Motors, the Court accepted the misstatement doctrine but found there was no such misstatement warranting invalidation.)
[28] In response, Anheuser makes two principal arguments. First, it asserts that Thymes should not be understood so as to require there to have been both foreign use and registration or application for registration as of the Canadian application date in all cases. It notes in this regard that the TMOB in Thymes, whose decision Justice Manson upheld, premised its determination as to the material date for the assessment of compliance with subsection 30(d) of the Act in that case on the earlier TMOB decision in Georgia-Pacific Corp v Scott Paper Ltd (1984), 3 CPR (3d) 469 [Georgia-Pacific]. There, the TMOB noted that the material date for assessing compliance with section 30 of the Act may not always be the application date, and suggested that it may well be the date an amendment is made in a case like the present. The TMOB wrote in this regard in Georgia-Pacific at 475 as follows:
16. In assessing the issue arising pursuant to s. 29(b) [now s. 30(b)] of the Act, I consider that the material time for considering the circumstances relating to that issue to be the filing date of the applicant’s application (although this may change if the application is amended).
[29] Secondly, Anheuser argues that even if the material date for assessing compliance with section 30 of the Act in this case were the date of its original Canadian application – i.e. September 14, 2010 – the issue of compliance with section 30 of the Act does not govern as this is an expungement application and not an opposition. Thus, Anheuser claims that even if the mark could have been successfully opposed, it cannot be expunged. It argues in this regard that both the relevant case law and doctrine require there to have been a material or fraudulent misrepresentation made by the applicant in the registration application before a registered – and presumptively valid – trade-mark registration can be expunged. It relies in this regard on Harold G. Fox, Canadian Law of Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 3rd ed (Scarborough: Carswell, 1972) [Fox], where Dr. Fox stated at 252-253:
There is … no provision in the Act under which mis-statements in an application for registration … become grounds for invalidating the registration unless the mis-statements had the effect of making the trade-mark not registrable under s. 12 of the Act or unless there was a fraudulent misrepresentation.
[30] Anheuser notes that the foregoing passage from Dr. Fox was endorsed by the Court in WCC. It also relies on Parfums de Coeur, Ltd v Asta, 2009 FC 21 and Miranda Aluminum Inc v Miranda Windows & Doors Inc, 2010 FCA 104 in support of the argument that Canadian trade-mark law does not favour the striking of registrations based on mere technical irregularities, but rather takes a more nuanced and balanced approach.
[31] Anheuser argues that this case is distinguishable from Unitel and Marchands Ro-Na Inc v Tefal SA (1981), 55 CPR (2d) 27 [Marchands] because it made no misrepresentation, unlike the trade-mark registrants in those cases. It asserts in this regard that its “use and application for registration abroad” claim was correct at the time that it was made because it commenced use of the mark in the U.S. on September 24, 2010 and did not amend its application to allege use and application abroad until over four months later on February 9, 2011. It also notes that its amendment was in accordance with the applicable requirements of the Regulations and common practice. It thus argues that there is no basis for expungement in this case in the absence of a misrepresentation.
[32] As counsel for Anheuser noted during oral argument, it is not necessary for me to rule on his first argument, which might well involve disagreeing with the reasoning in Thymes. I instead believe that Anheuser’s second argument is a complete answer to Molson Coors’ application in this case. In this regard, as noted, the authorities do recognise that the bases for expungement under section 57 of the Trade-marks Act are narrower than those which might give rise to a successful opposition under section 38 of the Act, and under these narrower grounds, there is no basis for expungement in this case.
[33] Section 18 of the Trade-marks Act provides four statutory grounds for invalidating a registration: (a) non-registrability (which invokes the issues in section 12), (b) non-distinctiveness; (c) abandonment, and (d) non-entitlement. It is common ground between the parties that none of these statutory grounds applies in the present case.
[34] In terms of non-statutory grounds for expungement, the case law originally limited those situations to ones of fraudulent misrepresentation by a trade-mark applicant or innocent misrepresentation as to one of the matters listed in section 12 of the Act, as Dr. Fox noted in his text, referred to by Anheuser. In General Motors, Justice Desjardins summarised these principles as follows at paras 16-18:
16. The appellants claim that the Trial Judge failed to consider the incomplete and misleading nature of the Segal affidavit which, they claim, renders the registration invalid ab initio.
17. They rely on the case of Unitel Communications Inc. v. Bell Canada and Marchands Ro-Na Inc. v. Tefal S.A., but more specifically on the following statement of Harold G. Fox referred to with approval in these cases:
There is . . . no provision in the Act under which mis-statements in an application for registration . . . become grounds for invalidating the registration unless the mis-statements had the effect of making the trade mark not registrable under s. 12 of the Act or unless there was a fraudulent misrepresentation.
[Emphasis added]
18. A registration can be invalidated by two kinds of misstatements: (i) fraudulent, intentional misstatements, and (ii) those that may be innocent but that are material in the sense that, without them, the section 12 barriers to registration would have been insurmountable.
[Emphasis in original]
[35] In Unitel, Justice Gibson interpreted the second form of misstatement to include those which do not go to section 12 of the Act, but are nonetheless fundamental to the registration. In that case, he found that the respondent’s statement of intent to use in its application for a proposed trade-mark, as well as its declaration of use, were “simply false”, but did not link these misstatements to any of the factors listed in section 12 of the Trade-marks Act. Nevertheless, he held that “the statement of intent in the application and the declaration of use were both fundamental to the registration of the trade-marks”, and so voided the registrations ab initio (at para 131).
[36] In WCC, Justice Kelen interpreted Unitel in this manner, at para 23:
23. When these statements are put side by side it is apparent that Gibson J. was not overruling Bonus Foods or Biba Boutique Ltd., but limiting their applicability in cases where the application contains “material false statements” of use that are “fundamental to the registration” of the mark. Gibson J.’s conclusion is also consistent with the paragraph from Dr. Fox set out above. In addition to fraudulent misrepresentation, Dr. Fox stated that a registration could be invalidated if “the mis-statements had the effect of making the trade mark not registrable under s. 12 of the Act.” Gibson J. in effect extended this reasoning beyond section 12 to include other circumstances where a registration could not have been secured without a misstatement.
[Emphasis added]
[37] Thus, in Unitel and WCC, this Court expanded the situations where expungement is available in cases of innocent misrepresentation beyond misrepresentations on issues under section 12 of the Act to any circumstance where the misrepresentation allowed for the issuance of a registration that otherwise would not have issued (although in truth this was not so much an expansion as a reaffirmation of the principle set out by Justice Addy in Marchands, decided in 1981, where the Court invalidated a registration based on a false declaration of use).
[38] From the foregoing, the law on invalidity of trade-mark registrations can be summarised as follows:
There are four statutory grounds for invalidity: (a) non-registrability, (b) non-distinctiveness; (c) abandonment, and (d) non-entitlement (Trade-marks Act, s. 18). In addition, misstatements in the trade-mark application may serve to invalidate a registered trade-mark in two circumstances: (a) where the misstatement was intentional and fraudulent, and (b) where the misstatement was innocent but fundamental to the registration, in the sense that the registration could not have been secured without the misstatement (Fox; General Motors; Unitel; WCC). Where, but for the misstatement in the application, the trade-mark would not have been registrable under section 12, that misstatement is fundamental and thus grounds to invalidate the registration (Fox; General Motors; WCC). Where the trade-mark application was based on proposed use under subsection 30(e) of the Act, and the statement of intent to use (required under subsection 30(e)) and the declaration of use (required under subsection 40(2)) are shown to have been false, the Court has found that to be a fundamental misstatement warranting invalidation of the registration (Marchands; Unitel). There may be other situations where an innocent misstatement not linked to section 12 of the Act is nonetheless fundamental to the registration and thus grounds to invalidate the registration, but the parties have not presented another example of such in the case law.
[39] When these principles are applied to the present case, it is my view that there is no misstatement (let alone a fundamental one) that can form the basis of a ground of invalidity.
[40] In this regard, subsection 30(d) of the Act requires that an application for registration based on use and registration abroad contain particulars of the application or registration, and, if the trade-mark has neither been used nor made known in Canada, the name of a country in which the trade-mark has been used by the applicant (or the applicant’s named predecessor in title) in association with each of the general classes of wares or services described in the application. Anheuser provided this information in connection with its application for the 398 Registration and did not at any point make a misstatement in the Canadian application.
[41] More specifically, on the filing date of September 14, 2010, the Canadian application was based on proposed use, so there was no statement that Anheuser had used the trade-mark GRAB SOME BUDS in the U.S. when in fact it had not. On February 9, 2011, Anheuser amended its application to withdraw the proposed use basis and add a claim of ‘use and registration abroad’ under subsection 30(d), and filed a statement indicating that it “has used the trade-mark in association with (1) beer in UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” (Applicant’s Record, Vol 1, Tab 3A at 000028). At the time of this declaration, this statement was true, as Anheuser had commenced actual use of the GRAB SOME BUDS trade-mark in the U.S. as of September 24, 2010.
[42] Therefore, Anheuser did not make any misstatement in the Canadian application. As the presence of a misstatement is a necessary precondition for expungement, it follows that this application for expungement must be dismissed.
[43] The parties concur that costs should follow the event in this matter and should be fixed at the mid-point of Column III of Tariff B of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 [the Rules]. I agree that this is appropriate and accordingly so award.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:
This application is dismissed, with costs at the mid-point of Column III to Tariff B to the Rules.
"Mary J.L. Gleason"
Judge
APPENDIX
Trade-marks Act, RSC 1985, c T-13
When trade-mark registrable
Marque de commerce enregistrable
12. (1) Subject to section 13, a trade-mark is registrable if it is not
12. (1) Sous réserve de l’article 13, une marque de commerce est enregistrable sauf dans l’un ou l’autre des cas suivants :
(a) a word that is primarily merely the name or the surname of an individual who is living or has died within the preceding thirty years;
a) elle est constituée d’un mot n’étant principalement que le nom ou le nom de famille d’un particulier vivant ou qui est décédé dans les trente années précédentes;
(b) whether depicted, written or sounded, either clearly descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive in the English or French language of the character or quality of the wares or services in association with which it is used or proposed to be used or of the conditions of or the persons employed in their production or of their place of origin;
b) qu’elle soit sous forme graphique, écrite ou sonore, elle donne une description claire ou donne une description fausse et trompeuse, en langue française ou anglaise, de la nature ou de la qualité des marchandises ou services en liaison avec lesquels elle est employée, ou à l’égard desquels on projette de l’employer, ou des conditions de leur production, ou des personnes qui les produisent, ou du lieu d’origine de ces marchandises ou services;
(c) the name in any language of any of the wares or services in connection with which it is used or proposed to be used;
c) elle est constituée du nom, dans une langue, de l’une des marchandises ou de l’un des services à l’égard desquels elle est employée, ou à l’égard desquels on projette de l’employer;
(d) confusing with a registered trade-mark;
d) elle crée de la confusion avec une marque de commerce déposée;
(e) a mark of which the adoption is prohibited by section 9 or 10;
e) elle est une marque dont l’article 9 ou 10 interdit l’adoption;
(f) a denomination the adoption of which is prohibited by section 10.1;
f) elle est une dénomination dont l’article 10.1 interdit l’adoption;
(g) in whole or in part a protected geographical indication, where the trade-mark is to be registered in association with a wine not originating in a territory indicated by the geographical indication;
g) elle est constituée, en tout ou en partie, d’une indication géographique protégée et elle doit être enregistrée en liaison avec un vin dont le lieu d’origine ne se trouve pas sur le territoire visé par l’indication;
(h) in whole or in part a protected geographical indication, where the trade-mark is to be registered in association with a spirit not originating in a territory indicated by the geographical indication; and
h) elle est constituée, en tout ou en partie, d’une indication géographique protégée et elle doit être enregistrée en liaison avec un spiritueux dont le lieu d’origine ne se trouve pas sur le territoire visé par l’indication;
(i) subject to subsection 3(3) and paragraph 3(4)(a) of the Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act, a mark the adoption of which is prohibited by subsection 3(1) of that Act.
i) elle est une marque dont l’adoption est interdite par le paragraphe 3(1) de la Loi sur les marques olympiques et paralympiques, sous réserve du paragraphe 3(3) et de l’alinéa 3(4)a) de cette loi.
Idem
Idem
(2) A trade-mark that is not registrable by reason of paragraph (1)(a) or (b) is registrable if it has been so used in Canada by the applicant or his predecessor in title as to have become distinctive at the date of filing an application for its registration.
[…]
(2) Une marque de commerce qui n’est pas enregistrable en raison de l’alinéa (1)a) ou b) peut être enregistrée si elle a été employée au Canada par le requérant ou son prédécesseur en titre de façon à être devenue distinctive à la date de la production d’une demande d’enregistrement la concernant.
[…]
Registration of marks used or made known in Canada
Enregistrement des marques employées ou révélées au Canada
16. (1) Any applicant who has filed an application in accordance with section 30 for registration of a trade-mark that is registrable and that he or his predecessor in title has used in Canada or made known in Canada in association with wares or services is entitled, subject to section 38, to secure its registration in respect of those wares or services, unless at the date on which he or his predecessor in title first so used it or made it known it was confusing with
16. (1) Tout requérant qui a produit une demande selon l’article 30 en vue de l’enregistrement d’une marque de commerce qui est enregistrable et que le requérant ou son prédécesseur en titre a employée ou fait connaître au Canada en liaison avec des marchandises ou services, a droit, sous réserve de l’article 38, d’en obtenir l’enregistrement à l’égard de ces marchandises ou services, à moins que, à la date où le requérant ou son prédécesseur en titre l’a en premier lieu ainsi employée ou révélée, elle n’ait créé de la confusion :
(a) a trade-mark that had been previously used in Canada or made known in Canada by any other person;
a) soit avec une marque de commerce antérieurement employée ou révélée au Canada par une autre personne;
(b) a trade-mark in respect of which an application for registration had been previously filed in Canada by any other person; or
b) soit avec une marque de commerce à l’égard de laquelle une demande d’enregistrement avait été antérieurement produite au Canada par une autre personne;
(c) a trade-name that had been previously used in Canada by any other person.
c) soit avec un nom commercial qui avait été antérieurement employé au Canada par une autre personne.
Marks registered and used abroad
Marques déposées et employées dans un autre pays
(2) Any applicant who has filed an application in accordance with section 30 for registration of a trade-mark that is registrable and that the applicant or the applicant’s predecessor in title has duly registered in or for the country of origin of the applicant and has used in association with wares or services is entitled, subject to section 38, to secure its registration in respect of the wares or services in association with which it is registered in that country and has been used, unless at the date of filing of the application in accordance with section 30 it was confusing with
(2) Tout requérant qui a produit une demande selon l’article 30 en vue de l’enregistrement d’une marque de commerce qui est enregistrable et que le requérant ou son prédécesseur en titre a dûment déposée dans son pays d’origine, ou pour son pays d’origine, et qu’il a employée en liaison avec des marchandises ou services, a droit, sous réserve de l’article 38, d’en obtenir l’enregistrement à l’égard des marchandises ou services en liaison avec lesquels elle est déposée dans ce pays et a été employée, à moins que, à la date de la production de la demande, en conformité avec l’article 30, elle n’ait c