D.I.M.S. Construction inc. (Trustee of) v. Quebec (Attorney General)

D.I.M.S. Construction inc. (Trustee of) v. Quebec (Attorney General)
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2005-10-06
Neutral citation
2005 SCC 52
Report
[2005] 2 SCR 564
Case number
29822
Judges
Bastarache, Michel; Binnie, William Ian Corneil; LeBel, Louis; Deschamps, Marie; Fish, Morris J.; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Charron, Louise
On appeal from
Quebec
Subjects
Bankruptcy and insolvency
Constitutional law
Notes
SCC Case Information: 29822
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: D.I.M.S. Construction inc. (Trustee of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 564, 2005 SCC 52
Date: 20051006
Docket: 29822
Between:
Attorney General of Quebec,
Commission de la construction du Québec and
Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail
Appellants
v.
Raymond Chabot Inc., in its capacity as trustee in
the bankruptcy of D.I.M.S. Construction Inc.
Respondent
‑ and ‑
Attorney General of Ontario
Intervener
Official English Translation
Coram: Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ.
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 75)
Deschamps J. (Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ. concurring)
______________________________
D.I.M.S. Construction inc. (Trustee of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 564, 2005 SCC 52
Attorney General of Quebec,
Commission de la construction du Québec and
Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail Appellants
v.
Raymond Chabot inc., in its capacity as trustee in
the bankruptcy of D.I.M.S. Construction inc. Respondent
and
Attorney General of Ontario Intervener
Indexed as: D.I.M.S. Construction inc. (Trustee of) v. Quebec (Attorney General)
Neutral citation: 2005 SCC 52.
File No.: 29822.
2004: December 8; 2005: October 6.
Present: Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for quebec
Bankruptcy — Scheme of distribution — Right to compensation and right to retain — Provincial statutes requiring employer who retains services of contractor to pay amounts due from contractor to provincial bodies — Statutes entitling employer to be reimbursed by contractor or to retain amount paid out of sums employer owes contractor — Whether, in context of bankruptcy, provincial statutes incompatible with scheme of distribution established by federal bankruptcy legislation — Whether equitable set-off applicable in bankruptcy in Quebec — Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases, R.S.Q., c. A‑3.001, s. 316 — Act respecting labour relations, vocational training and manpower management in the construction industry, R.S.Q., c. R‑20, s. 54 — Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, ss. 97(3) , 136 to 147 .
Constitutional law — Division of powers — Bankruptcy — Scheme of distribution — Provincial statutes requiring employer who retains services of contractor to pay amounts due from contractor to provincial bodies — Statutes entitling employer to be reimbursed by contractor or to retain amount paid out of sums employer owes contractor — Whether provincial statutes inapplicable or inoperative by reason of being in conflict with scheme of distribution established by federal bankruptcy legislation — Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(21) — Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, ss. 97(3) , 136 to 147 — Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases, R.S.Q., c. A‑3.001, s. 316 — Act respecting labour relations, vocational training and manpower management in the construction industry, R.S.Q., c. R‑20, s. 54.
The Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail (“CSST”) established an assessment in respect of the activities of a contractor. The contractor did not pay the assessment and the CSST required three employers that had awarded contracts to the contractor to pay the assessment pursuant to s. 316 of the Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases (“AIAOD”). The Commission de la construction du Québec (“CCQ”) also demanded that the same employers pay unpaid wages owed by the contractor, pursuant to s. 54 of the Act respecting labour relations, vocational training and manpower management in the construction industry (“ALRCI”). One employer paid the CCQ before the contractor went bankrupt. After the bankruptcy, the trustee demanded that the three employers pay all amounts owing for work performed by the contractor. Two of the employers contested the claim, citing the demands for payment made by the CSST and the CCQ. The trustee applied to the Superior Court for a declaration that s. 316 AIAOD and s. 54 ALRCI do not apply in bankruptcy. The Superior Court dismissed the motion, but the Court of Appeal set aside that judgment.
Held: The appeal should be allowed. Section 316 AIAOD and s. 54 ALRCI do not alter the scheme of distribution under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA ”).
In light of art. 1656(3) C.C.Q., a payment made in performance of the obligation imposed by the first paragraph of s. 316 AIAOD allows the employer to be substituted for the CSST in order to claim the amount of the assessment from the contractor. The right to retain referred to in the third paragraph of s. 316 adds nothing to the rights arising out of the subrogatory payment. That paragraph eliminates any doubt as to the employer’s right to be reimbursed for the amount paid on the contractor’s behalf and, where applicable, to effect compensation between the amount the employer owes the contractor and the amount the contractor owes the employer. [27] [30-31]
The compensation mechanism authorized by s. 316 AIAOD does not go beyond the framework of s. 97(3) BIA , which expressly recognizes certain cases of compensation. If the employer pays the CSST before the bankruptcy, and if the mutual debts of the employer and the contractor are certain, liquid and exigible, legal compensation is effected by operation of law and the debts are extinguished up to the amount of the lesser debt (arts. 1672 and 1673 C.C.Q.). Since the bankruptcy has not yet occurred when legal compensation is effected, the scheme of distribution under the BIA is not affected, because the claim against the employer is not part of the property vested in the trustee. If the employer’s payment is made before the bankruptcy but the claim is not liquid at the time of the bankruptcy, the employer may, once the claim has been appraised, rely on s. 97(3) BIA , which dispenses with the trustee’s status as a third party for the purposes of compensation and allows compensation to be set up as if the bankrupt were the plaintiff. The right to compensation thus has its basis in the BIA , not the civil law, which is more restrictive. If the payment is made after the bankruptcy, this subrogatory payment cannot give rise to compensation. Since s. 97(3) is an exception to the rule of equality between creditors, it must be interpreted narrowly. It must therefore be read in conjunction with ss. 121 , 136(3) and 141 BIA as implicitly requiring that the mutual debts come into existence before the bankruptcy. The BIA does not depart from the rules established by arts. 1651 and 1681 C.C.Q., which provide that subrogation does not give the subrogated person any more rights than the subrogating creditor and that compensation may not be effected to the prejudice of third persons. The employer may nevertheless file a proof of claim to avail him or herself of subrogation to be reimbursed as an ordinary creditor for the amount paid to the CSST (s. 121 BIA ). [43‑45] [49] [54-57] [72]
Section 316 AIAOD does not subvert the scheme of distribution under the BIA . First, the right to be reimbursed is compatible with the BIA and, second, the right to retain can be exercised only in the circumstances provided for in the BIA , which is more open to compensation than Quebec civil law. Furthermore, from the perspective of Husky Oil, the s. 316 mechanism is compatible with the BIA . This is not a case involving a deemed payment or an employer acting as a mere agent. The claim accrues to the employer at the time of payment, and not by reason of the fact that the employer might be liable to pay should the contractor fail to do so. No right is granted to the CSST, as a third party, to the detriment of the body of creditors. Only an employer who has paid may exercise the right to retain, and the CSST is not affected by the employer’s right to collect. Finally, because s. 97(3) BIA must be applied in Quebec on the basis of civil law and not common law rules, equitable set-off is inapplicable in bankruptcy in Quebec. [58] [62-64]
Nor does s. 54 ALRCI subvert the scheme of distribution under the BIA . In the case of s. 54, the wages due from a contractor constitute a solidary obligation between the contractor and the employer. The employer who pays the wages may demand to be reimbursed by the contractor pursuant to art. 1536 C.C.Q. or may rely on legal subrogation pursuant to art. 1656(3) C.C.Q. The principles stated in relation to s. 316 AIAOD also apply to s. 54. [66-73]
Cases Cited
Applied: Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 453; not followed: Structal (1982) inc. v. Fernand Gilbert ltée, [1998] R.J.Q. 2686; referred to: Deputy Minister of Revenue v. Rainville, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 35; Deloitte Haskins and Sells Ltd. v. Workers’ Compensation Board, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 785; Federal Business Development Bank v. Quebec (Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1061; British Columbia v. Henfrey Samson Belair Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 24; Prévost‑Masson v. General Trust of Canada, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 882, 2001 SCC 87; Salama v. Placements Triar inc., [2002] Q.J. No. 3372 (QL); Civ., March 2, 1829, D.1829.I.163 (Assurances v. Lanquetin); Civ., January 10, 1923, S.1924.I.257 (Chem. de fer du Midi v. Comp. d’assur. marit. l’Alborada); Sherwin-Williams Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Boiler Inspection and Insurance Co. of Canada, [1949] S.C.R. 187; Trépanier v. Plamondon, [1985] C.A. 242; Agricultural Insurance Co. v. Cité de Montréal, [1943] R.L. 151; Compagnie d’Assurance du Québec v. Dufour, [1973] C.S. 840; Forage Mercier inc. v. Société de Construction Maritime Voyageurs ltée, [1998] Q.J. No. 2190 (QL); Lefebvre (Trustee of), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 326, 2004 SCC 63; Mercure v. Marquette & Fils, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 547; In re Hil‑A‑Don Ltd.: Bank of Montreal v. Kwiat, [1975] C.A. 157; In re Le syndicat d’épargne des épiciers du Québec: Laviolette v. Mercure, [1975] C.A. 599; Goldstein v. Auerbach (1991), 51 Q.A.C. 292; Trib. corr. Auxerre, February 24, 1953, Rev. gén. ass. terr. 1953.190 (Mayet et Destoumieux v. Faillot).
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Act respecting financial assistance for education expenses, R.S.Q., c. A-13.3, s. 29.
Act respecting financial services cooperatives, R.S.Q., c. C-67.3, s. 69.
Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases, R.S.Q., c. A‑3.001, ss. 306, 315, 316.
Act respecting insurance, S.Q. 1974, c. 70.
Act respecting labour relations, vocational training and manpower management in the construction industry, R.S.Q., c. R‑20, ss. 54, 82(c)(4).
Act to promote good citizenship, R.S.Q., c. C-20, s. 11.
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, ss. 30(1) (d), 67(1) , 71(2) , 97(3) , 121 , 135 , 136 to 147 .
Building Act, R.S.Q., c. B-1.1, s. 79.2.
Civil Code of Lower Canada, arts. 1156, 2576.
Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, arts. 1523, 1525, 1536, 1651, 1652, 1656, 1671, 1672, 1673, 1680, 1681, 2333, 2334, 2474, 2644.
Code Napoléon, art. 1251.
Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(21) .
Crop Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A-30, s. 78.1.
Education Act for Cree, Inuit and Naskapi Native Persons, R.S.Q., c. I‑14, s. 13.
Federal Law–Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1, S.C. 2001, c. 4 .
Health Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A-29, s. 18(1).
Authors Cited
Baudouin, Jean-Louis, et Pierre-Gabriel Jobin. Les obligations, 5e éd. Cowansville, Qué.: Yvon Blais, 1998.
Bélanger, André. Essai d’une théorie juridique de la compensation en droit civil québécois. Cowansville, Québec: Yvon Blais, 2004.
Bélanger, André. “L’application en droit civil québécois de l’inapplicable equitable set-off de common law” (1999), 78 Can. Bar Rev. 486.
Bergeron, Jean-Guy. Les contrats d’assurance (terrestre) — lignes et entre-lignes, t. 1. Sherbrooke: Éditions SEM, 1989.
Bertrand, Charles-Auguste. “Effets des subrogations et des transports aux assureurs” (1953), 13 R. du B. 285.
Ciotola, Pierre. Droit des sûretés, 3e éd. Montréal: Éditions Thémis, 1999.
Deslauriers, Jacques. Précis de droit des sûretés. Montréal: Wilson et Lafleur, 1990.
Droit civil québécois, t. 6. Comité de rédaction, Denys-Claude Lamontagne et autres. Montréal: Dacfo, 1993 (feuilles mobiles mises à jour mai 2003).
Duboc, Guy. La compensation et les droits des tiers. Paris: L.G.D.J., 1989.
Lemieux, Marc. “La compensation dans un contexte de proposition et de faillite” (1999), 59 R. du B. 321.
Lluelles, Didier. Précis des assurances terrestres, 3e éd. Montréal: Thémis, 1999.
Mestre, Jacques. La subrogation personnelle. Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1979.
Pineau, Jean, Danielle Burman et Serge Gaudet. Théorie des obligations, 4e éd. par Jean Pineau et Serge Gaudet. Montréal: Thémis, 2001.
Tancelin, Maurice. Des obligations: actes et responsabilités, 6e éd. Montréal: Wilson et Lafleur, 1997.
Traité de droit civil du Québec, t. 13. Par Hervé Roch et Rodolphe Paré. Montréal: Wilson et Lafleur, 1952.
Wood, Roderick J. “Turning Lead into Gold: The Uncertain Alchemy of ‘All Obligations’ Clauses” (2003), 41 Alta. L. Rev. 801.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal (Robert, Nuss and Lemelin JJ.A.), [2003] R.J.Q. 1104, 227 D.L.R. (4th) 629, 30 C.L.R. (3d) 81, [2003] Q.J. No. 3660 (QL), affirming a decision of Trudeau J., [2000] R.J.Q. 3056, 2000 CarswellQue 2924. Appeal allowed.
Hugo Jean, for the appellant the Attorney General of Quebec.
Martine Sauvé, for the appellant Commission de la construction du Québec.
René Napert, for the appellant Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail.
Bernard Boucher et Sébastien Guy, for the respondent.
Robin K. Basu and Sarah Wright, for the intervener.
English version of the judgment of the Court delivered by
Deschamps J. —
1. Introduction
1 The issue raised in the case at bar is whether the rights provided for in s. 316 of the Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases, R.S.Q., c. A‑3.001 (“AIAOD”), and s. 54 of the Act respecting labour relations, vocational training and manpower management in the construction industry, R.S.Q., c. R‑20 (“ALRCI”), subvert the scheme of distribution provided for in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B‑3 (“BIA ”).
2 Under s. 316 AIAOD, the Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail (“CSST”) may, where a contractor’s services are retained by an employer to whom the AIAOD applies, require the employer to pay an assessment due from the contractor. The same section provides that once the employer has paid the assessment, the employer is entitled to be reimbursed by the contractor and may retain the amount paid to the CSST out of any sums he or she owes the contractor. Section 54 ALRCI establishes a mechanism that, although based on solidarity, has the same effect; it permits the Commission de la construction du Québec (“CCQ”) to bring claims against employers for unpaid wages owed by contractors with whom they have contracted.
3 On November 4, 1998, the CSST established an assessment in respect of the activities of D.I.M.S. Construction inc. (“DIMS”), a contractor. DIMS did not pay the assessment. The CSST then demanded that three employers that had awarded contracts to DIMS pay the assessment in the proportion provided for in s. 316 AIAOD. It claimed amounts from the Ministère des Transports du Québec (“MTQ”) on November 26, 1998, Pavage Chenail inc. (“Chenail”) on November 30, 1998, and Compagnie de pavage d’asphalte Beaver (“Beaver”), a division of Groupe Devesco ltée, on February 10, 1999. According to the evidence in the record, none of the employers had paid the CSST when DIMS went bankrupt on April 1, 1999, after its creditors refused a proposal.
4 The CCQ demanded that the same employers pay unpaid wages owed by DIMS in respect of contracts performed for those employers. The exact dates these demands were made do not appear in the record, except in the case of Beaver, to which one was sent on February 12, 1999. According to one document in the record, Chenail paid the CCQ before DIMS went bankrupt.
5 On April 23 and 29, 1999, Raymond Chabot inc., the trustee in the bankruptcy of DIMS, demanded that the three employers pay all amounts owing for work performed by DIMS. Chenail paid the trustee subject to a special indemnification agreement. The MTQ and Beaver contested the trustee’s claim, citing the demands for payment made by the CSST and the CCQ. The trustee applied to the Superior Court for a declaration that s. 316 AIAOD and s. 54 ALRCI do not apply in bankruptcy. The trustee relied on Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 453, in which it was held that the withholding mechanism available to employers under Saskatchewan’s Workers’ Compensation Act, 1979 had the effect of creating a priority that subverted the scheme of distribution under the BIA .
6 The Superior Court dismissed the trustee’s case on the ground that Quebec’s scheme differed from Saskatchewan’s scheme: [2000] R.J.Q. 3056. The Court of Appeal came to the opposite conclusion, finding that s. 316 AIAOD and s. 54 ALRCI violated the principles stated in Husky Oil: [2003] R.J.Q. 1104. The Attorney General of Quebec, the CSST and the CCQ appealed, contending that the provision authorizing the CSST and the CCQ to demand that employers pay contractors’ unpaid assessments was valid. They raised no arguments concerning the right of employers to be reimbursed or to set up compensation. Even though the employers are not parties to the case, both the right of the CSST and the CCQ to collect and the right to reimbursement are in issue here, because the trustee impugns s. 316 AIAOD and s. 54 ALRCI in their entirety. However, no specific arguments based on the contracts between the employers and the contractor are in issue, nor are the rights of any third parties, such as financial institutions or surety companies, that have rights in the amounts owed by the bankrupt under its contracts.
7 The constitutional questions stated by this Court reflect the questions submitted to the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal:
1. Is s. 54 of An Act respecting labour relations, vocational training and manpower management in the construction industry, R.S.Q., c. R‑20, inapplicable or inoperable in whole or in part, by reason of being in conflict with the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B‑3 , and in particular s. 136 thereof?
2. Is s. 316 of An Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases, R.S.Q., c. A‑3.001, inapplicable or inoperable in whole or in part, by reason of being in conflict with the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B‑3 , and in particular s. 136 thereof?
8 The appellants contest the Court of Appeal’s decision, arguing that Quebec’s scheme can be distinguished from Saskatchewan’s scheme. They submit that the first and third paragraphs of s. 316 AIAOD set up two successive, distinct and independent steps: one establishing an obligation to pay, and the other setting out the rights of an employer who pays a contractor’s assessment. The appellants point out that it was the right to withhold payment in respect of a deemed debt that led the Court to conclude in Husky Oil that the debt was indivisible, and that no such right exists in Quebec law. They contend that neither the first paragraph of s. 316 AIAOD nor the civil law mechanisms upon which s. 54 ALRCI is based subvert the scheme of distribution under the BIA .
9 The trustee argues that the mechanisms set out in the Quebec provisions are essentially identical to the one provided for in Saskatchewan’s legislation. The trustee adds that it would not be enough to declare that the third paragraph of s. 316 AIAOD is inapplicable, since the rules of the Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64 (“C.C.Q.”), give the first paragraph of this section the same effect as the third and make it inapplicable in bankruptcy. To show that such a declaration would be insufficient, the trustee also submits that equitable set‑off would enable an employer who has paid the CSST or the CCQ to refuse to pay the trustee.
10 For the reasons that follow, I am of the view that s. 316 AIAOD and s. 54 ALRCI do not subvert the scheme of distribution established by s. 136 BIA . I would allow the appeal and restore the judgment of the Superior Court.
2. Analysis
11 Section 91(21) of the Constitution Act, 1867 , gives Parliament jurisdiction over bankruptcy and insolvency. Parliament has exercised this jurisdiction to establish a scheme for distributing the property of bankrupts (ss. 136 to 147 BIA ).
12 This Court has on many occasions ruled on conflicts between the BIA ’s order of priority and the orders resulting from various provincial statutes: see, inter alia, Deputy Minister of Revenue v. Rainville, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 35; Deloitte Haskins and Sells Ltd. v. Workers’ Compensation Board, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 785; Federal Business Development Bank v. Quebec (Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1061; British Columbia v. Henfrey Samson Belair Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 24; and Husky Oil. Those decisions established that statutory provisions enacted by the provinces, although valid in the context of provincial law, are inapplicable in bankruptcy if they conflict with the BIA . It is well established that the BIA will prevail regardless of a province’s intention. Given these principles, it is necessary to determine the effect of s. 316 AIAOD and s. 54 ALRCI. Since there are differences between the two mechanisms, I will consider them separately.
13 I will begin by analysing the mechanism of s. 316 AIAOD, which is based on legal subrogation and compensation. The first step will be to review these concepts. Next, I will discuss the interaction between the right to retain under s. 316 AIAOD and the scheme of distribution under the BIA , and will distinguish the instant case from Husky Oil. I will also consider the application of equitable set‑off in the case at bar. Lastly, I will discuss the mechanism of s. 54 ALRCI, which incorporates solidarity.
2.1 The Mechanism of Section 316 AIAOD
14 Only the first and third paragraphs of s. 316 AIAOD are relevant to the proceeding before the Court. The second paragraph merely sets out the method for calculating the amount owed by the employer. The section reads as follows:
316. The Commission may demand payment of the assessment due by a contractor from the employer who retains his services.
In the case of the first paragraph, the Commission may establish the amount of the assessment according to the proportion of the price agreed upon for the work corresponding to the cost of labour, rather than the wages indicated in the statement made according to section 292.
The employer who has paid the amount of the assessment is entitled to be reimbursed by the contractor concerned and the employer may retain the amount due out of the sums that he owes the contractor.
15 The first paragraph of s. 316 AIAOD gives the CSST a recourse against an employer for an assessment due from a contractor whose services the employer has retained. The condition that must be met for the CSST to exercise this right is that the assessment be due from the contractor. For an assessment to be due, the CSST must establish the assessment (s. 306 AIAOD) and send the notice (s. 315 AIAOD). Under the AIAOD, the employer is the warrantor of the assessment due from the contractor to the CSST.
16 The parties disagree as to the real scope of the first paragraph. The trustee submits that the third paragraph adds nothing to the rights arising out of the employer’s payment of the contractor’s debt in accordance with the first paragraph of s. 316 AIAOD. The appellants contend that the two paragraphs have different functions: the first deals with the right to collect and could survive even if the third paragraph, which grants a right to be reimbursed and to retain, were to be found inapplicable. Does this last right arise automatically out of the payment of the assessment, as the trustee claims? To answer this question, it will be necessary to review the scope of the first paragraph of s. 316 AIAOD. After doing this, I will consider whether the right to retain subverts the scheme of distribution under the BIA and will conclude by explaining the differences between the provisions at issue in Husky Oil and s. 316 AIAOD, and the reasons why equitable set‑off does not apply in Quebec.
2.1.1 Scope of the First Paragraph of Section 316 AIAOD
17 While the purpose of the first paragraph of s. 316 AIAOD is to give the CSST a recourse against employers, the consequences of exercising this recourse cannot be disregarded. The employer’s payment has consequences not only for the CSST, but also for the employer and the contractor. As a result of art. 1671 C.C.Q., paying the assessment has the effect of extinguishing the contractor’s obligation to the CSST. Subrogation to the rights of the paid creditor is incidental to the payment and accordingly extinguishes the subrogating creditor’s rights as regards the debtor. Under the general rules of civil law, those rights are then transferred to the person who made the payment. Article 1651 C.C.Q. reads as follows:
1651. A person who pays in the place of a debtor may be subrogated to the rights of the creditor.
He does not have more rights than the subrogating creditor.
18 The first paragraph of s. 316 AIAOD appears to make the application of subrogation possible, since the employer is obliged to pay when the assessment is due from the contractor. In this context, the employer is required to pay in the place of the original debtor and should be able to be subrogated to the rights of the creditor.
19 The C.C.Q. provides for two types of subrogation: conventional subrogation and legal subrogation (art. 1652 C.C.Q.). The case at bar does not involve conventional subrogation. The only possibility is legal subrogation. Article 1656 C.C.Q. provides that subrogation takes place by operation of law in the following five situations:
1656. Subrogation takes place by operation of law
(1) in favour of a creditor who pays another creditor whose claim is preferred to his because of a prior claim or a hypothec;
(2) in favour of the acquirer of a property who pays a creditor whose claim is secured by a hypothec on the property;
(3) in favour of a person who pays a debt to which he is bound with others or for others and which he has an interest in paying;
(4) in favour of an heir who pays with his own funds a debt of the succession for which he was not bound;
(5) in any other case provided by law.
20 The legislature has explicitly spelled out the right to subrogation in a number of statutes, sometimes departing from the conditions set out in the Civil Code, sometimes not: see, inter alia, the Act to promote good citizenship, R.S.Q., c. C‑20, s. 11; the Health Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A‑29, s. 18(1); the Act respecting financial assistance for education expenses, R.S.Q., c. A‑13.3, s. 29; the Building Act, R.S.Q., c. B‑1.1, s. 79.2. Because the express right to subrogation is not dealt with consistently, I conclude that the failure to mention subrogation explicitly in the first paragraph of s. 316 AIAOD does not mean that legal subrogation is unavailable under it. Of the five cases mentioned in art. 1656 C.C.Q., the third might apply.
21 While acknowledging the general scope of para. (3) of art. 1656 C.C.Q., Quebec commentators link this paragraph in particular to solidary or in solidum debts and to debts secured by suretyship: J.‑L. Baudouin and P.‑G. Jobin, Les obligations (5th ed. 1998), Nos. 916 to 918; J. Pineau, D. Burman and S. Gaudet, Théorie des obligations (4th ed. 2001), at p. 603, No. 336. In the case at bar, solidarity is not mentioned in s. 316 AIAOD and cannot be presumed (art. 1525 C.C.Q.). Nor can the employer’s obligation be characterized as being in solidum with the contractor, since the instant case does not involve two concurrent debts having the same object: Prévost‑Masson v. General Trust of Canada, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 882, 2001 SCC 87, at para. 27. The contractor must first be obliged to pay. It might be thought that this is a legal suretyship under art. 2334 C.C.Q., but the suretyship referred to in that article is one that a debtor must furnish when obliged to do so by the legislature: Traité de droit civil du Québec, vol. 13, by H. Roch and R. Paré, 1952, at p. 594; Droit civil québécois (loose-leaf), vol. 6, by D.‑C. Lamontagne et al., § 2334 500, at p. 1256 602; J. Deslauriers, Précis de droit des sûretés (1990), at p. 23; P. Ciotola, Droit des sûretés (3rd ed. 1999), at p. 21. In the case of s. 316 AIAOD, the obligation is imposed directly on the warrantor, not on the debtor. This cannot be a true case of suretyship, since a warrantor under the AIAOD has no choice in taking on the obligation, whereas consent is an essential aspect of suretyship, which is by definition a contract (art. 2333 C.C.Q.). The Superior Court judge’s statement of the law to the effect that s. 316 AIAOD establishes a legal suretyship is therefore wrong.
22 To conclude that the employer’s payment to the CSST confers the benefit of legal subrogation, it would be necessary to rely on the generality of the words “bound . . . for others” used in para. (3) of art. 1656 C.C.Q. In Salama v. Placements Triar inc., [2002] Q.J. No. 3372 (QL), the Quebec Court of Appeal, citing a passage from the work of Baudouin and Jobin, raised the possibility of giving para. (3) of art. 1656 C.C.Q. a broad scope (see also M. Tancelin, Des obligations: actes et responsabilités (6th ed. 1997), No. 1235). The historical evolution of this provision persuades me that such an interpretation is justified.
23 The wording of para. (3) of art. 1656 C.C.Q. is derived from art. 1156 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada, which was itself based on art. 1251 of the Code Napoléon. The Code Napoléon restated a principle of old French law to the effect that marine underwriters were subrogated to the rights of the insured: J. Mestre, La subrogation personnelle (1979), at p. 277, No. 240. It was only after a century of equivocation that French courts finally conceded that subrogation could operate in cases in which the person making the payment was bound to make payment owing to a distinct source of obligation. It was in the context of the law of damage insurance that the French case law evolved. At first, in an 1829 decision, the Cour de cassation refused to recognize an insurer’s right to legal subrogation: Civ., March 2, 1829, D.1829.I.163 (Assurances v. Lanquetin).
24 Despite ruling out legal subrogation, the French courts did, however, allow insurers of damage to sue persons who caused damage, on the basis that they had committed a delictual fault causing damage to the insurer. The Cour de cassation came full circle nearly a hundred years later, noting that subrogation in favour of insurers was accepted in maritime law: Civ., January 10, 1923, S.1924.I.257 (Chem. de fer du Midi v. Comp. d’assur. marit. l’Alborada). This evolution caused one French commentator to remark that the French courts had in so doing [translation] “embarked on a creative tack, not hesitating to gradually break away from an overly ossified analysis of the Civil Code”: Mestre, at p. 280, No. 245.
25 In Quebec insurance law, the issue remained contentious until the 1974 reform, which explicitly granted the right to subrogation (Act respecting insurance, S.Q. 1974, c. 70 (which came into force on October 20, 1976), incorporated into the Civil Code of Lower Canada, art. 2576, now art. 2474 C.C.Q.): D. Lluelles, Précis des assurances terrestres (3rd ed. 1999), at p. 337; Sherwin‑Williams Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Boiler Inspection and Insurance Co. of Canada, [1949] S.C.R. 187, at p. 191; Trépanier v. Plamondon, [1985] C.A. 242; contra: J.‑G. Bergeron, Les contrats d’assurance (terrestre) (1989), vol. 1, at p. 423; C.‑A. Bertrand, “Effets des subrogations et des transports aux assureurs” (1953), 13 R. du B. 285; Agricultural Insurance Co. v. Cité de Montréal, [1943] R.L. 151 (Sup. Ct.); Compagnie d’Assurance du Québec v. Dufour, [1973] C.S. 840.
26 It must be recognized that the wording of para. (3) of art. 1656 C.C.Q. does not limit the paragraph’s scope to obligations arising out of solidary or in solidum debts or debts secured by suretyship. To exclude statute‑based obligations from its ambit is justified neither by the wording of the C.C.Q. nor by the historical evolution of the scope of the analogous provision in French law. Consequently, employers who pay a contractor’s debt under s. 316 AIAOD may be subrogated to the rights of the CSST. As a result of subrogation, the CSST’s right against the contractor is transferred to the employer. On making the payment, the employer takes the place of the CSST: Forage Mercier inc. v. Société de Construction Maritime Voyageurs ltée, [1998] Q.J. No. 2190 (QL) (C.A.). The employer acquires the claim from the time of payment, up to the amount paid: Pineau, Burman and Gaudet, at p. 604, No. 337, and at p. 606, No. 338. Thus, the employer may demand that the contractor pay the amount of the assessment paid to the CSST.
27 But if the payment made in performance of the obligation imposed by the first paragraph of s. 316 AIAOD allows the employer to be substituted for the CSST in order to claim the amount of the assessment from the contractor, what does the third paragraph of the same section add? It enunciates the right to be reimbursed and to retain. The right to be reimbursed is nothing more than the right to demand payment. Thus, the right to reimbursement does not add to the claim accruing to the employer by reason of legal subrogation. What about the right to retain? It requires a more nuanced analysis.
28 The Quebec legislature has used the right to retain in ways that are disparate. In some situations, it may be a right granted to a body to set off an amount owing to a person against an amount owed by that person without actually mentioning the right to compensation: Crop Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A‑30, s. 78.1. In other cases, the provision establishing the right to retain clearly states that the right is based on compensation: Act respecting financial services cooperatives, R.S.Q., c. C‑67.3, s. 69. At times, the right to retain is a means of collecting an assessment out of the wages owed to an employee: s. 82(c)(4) ALRCI. In still other cases, a body is authorized to retain an amount until an obligation to do something has been performed: Education Act for Cree, Inuit and Naskapi Native Persons, R.S.Q., c. I‑14, s. 13. Context is therefore essential to determining the legal nature of the right to retain granted by a given statutory provision in Quebec.
29 The right described in the third paragraph of s. 316 AIAOD is not a general right allowing an employer to refuse to pay a debt or retain an amount until a condition imposed on another person is met. The paragraph specifies that the right held by the employer is to retain “out of the sums that he owes the contractor” an amount equal to the amount paid by the employer to the CSST. This right presupposes a mutual creditor‑debtor relationship between the employer and the contractor. It also presupposes pecuniary obligations on the parts of both the employer and the contractor. When exercising the right to retain, the employer indicates that the debt owed to him or her by the contractor is being deducted from the amount the employer owes the contractor. In this way, the employer pays him or herself with the sums he or she owes. The two debts are discharged. The right to retain therefore corresponds to the right to compensation provided for in art. 1672 C.C.Q.:
1672. Where two persons are reciprocally debtor and creditor of each other, the debts for which they are liable are extinguished by compensation, up to the amount of the lesser debt.
Compensation may not be claimed from the State, but the State may claim it.
30 The right to retain referred to in the third paragraph of s. 316 AIAOD is thus merely a reiteration of the right to compensation arising out of the fact that the employer and the contractor have become both creditor and debtor to one another as a result of the subrogatory payment to the CSST.
31 This analysis leads necessarily to the conclusion, which means the trustee was correct on this point, that dividing up s. 316 AIAOD and retaining only the first paragraph is not a basis for distinguishing the Quebec scheme from Saskatchewan’s scheme. If Husky Oil is to be distinguished in this case, it is not because the rights resulting from the first and third paragraphs are distinct from and independent of one another, as the appellants contend. What the third paragraph does is to eliminate any doubt as to the employer’s right to be reimbursed for the amount paid on the contractor’s behalf and, where applicable, to effect compensation between the amount the employer owes the contractor and the amount the contractor owes the employer.
32 Having completed this part of the analysis, I must now determine whether the right to retain subverts the scheme of distribution under the BIA .
2.1.2 Does the Right to Retain Subvert the Scheme of Distribution Under the BIA ?
33 The trustee submits that the right to retain effectively guarantees the payment of amounts owed and in so doing subverts the scheme of distribution under the BIA . The syllogism put forward by the trustee is misleading. The scheme of distribution does not operate in a vacuum. If the BIA recognizes the right of creditors or debtors to avail themselves of mechanisms other than the one provided for in s. 136 BIA , which sets out the scheme of distribution, a provincial statute implementing such an alternative mechanism cannot be found to be inapplicable, because it would be perfectly compatible with the BIA . In discussing the scope of the first paragraph, we concluded that the right to retain is in fact a right to compensation. Since the BIA expressly recognizes certain cases of compensation, the real issue is whether the compensation mechanism authorized by the C.C.Q. and sanctioned by s. 316 AIAOD confers rights going beyond the framework of s. 97(3) BIA , which reads as follows:
97. . . .
(3) The law of set‑off applies to all claims made against the estate of the bankrupt and also to all actions instituted by the trustee for the recovery of debts due to the bankrupt in the same manner and to the same extent as if the bankrupt were plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be, except in so far as any claim for set‑off is affected by the provisions of this Act respecting frauds or fraudulent preferences.
34 The BIA thus incorporates, although without defining it, a compensation mechanism. To delimit this mechanism, it is necessary to refer not only to the BIA itself, but also to provincial law. Since the enactment of the Federal Law–Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1, S.C. 2001, c. 4 , it has been clear that in the province of Quebec, the civil law of Quebec is the suppletive law in bankruptcy matters. This means that in respect of aspects not governed by the BIA , the civil law rules of compensation apply. What are those rules?
35 Article 1672 C.C.Q. has already been quoted. Mutual debts are extinguished up to the amount of the lesser debt. Article 1673 C.C.Q. adds that when debts are certain, liquid and exigible, their mutual ext