Société des casinos du Québec inc. v. Association des cadres de la Société des casinos du Québec

Société des casinos du Québec inc. v. Association des cadres de la Société des casinos du Québec
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2024-04-19
Neutral citation
2024 SCC 13
Case number
40123
Judges
Wagner, Richard; Karakatsanis, Andromache; Côté, Suzanne; Rowe, Malcolm; Kasirer, Nicholas; Jamal, Mahmud; O’Bonsawin, Michelle
On appeal from
Quebec
Subjects
Administrative law
Constitutional law
Notes
Case in Brief SCC Case Information
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Société des casinos du Québec inc. v. Association des cadres de la Société des casinos du Québec, 2024 SCC 13
Appeals Heard: April 20, 2023 Judgment Rendered: April 19, 2024 Docket: 40123
Between:
Société des casinos du Québec inc. Appellant
and
Association des cadres de la Société des casinos du Québec Respondent
- and -
Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General of Ontario, Attorney General of Quebec, Attorney General of Alberta, Administrative Labour Tribunal, Canadian Association of Counsel to Employers, National Police Commissioned Officers Professional Association, Canadian Labour Congress, Ontario Principals’ Council, Catholic Principals’ Council of Ontario, Association des directions et des directions adjointes des écoles franco-ontariennes, Directors Guild of Canada – Ontario, Canadian Lawyers for International Human Rights, Public Service Alliance of Canada, Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Syndicat professionnel des ingénieurs d’Hydro-Québec inc., Association des cadres des collèges du Québec, Association des cadres municipaux de Montréal, Association des conseillers en gestion des ressources humaines du gouvernement du Québec, Association des cadres scolaires du Grand Montréal, Association des cadres supérieurs de la santé et des services sociaux, Association des directeurs et directrices de succursale de la Société des alcools du Québec, Association professionnelle des cadres de premier niveau d’Hydro-Québec, Association québécoise des cadres scolaires, Association québécoise du personnel de direction des écoles and Fédération québécoise des directions d’établissement d’enseignement Interveners
And Between:
Attorney General of Quebec Appellant
and
Association des cadres de la Société des casinos du Québec Respondent
- and -
Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General of Ontario, Attorney General of Alberta, Administrative Labour Tribunal, Société des casinos du Québec inc., Canadian Association of Counsel to Employers, National Police Commissioned Officers Professional Association, Canadian Labour Congress, Ontario Principals’ Council, Catholic Principals’ Council of Ontario, Association des directions et des directions adjointes des écoles franco-ontariennes, Directors Guild of Canada – Ontario, Canadian Lawyers for International Human Rights, Public Service Alliance of Canada, Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Syndicat professionnel des ingénieurs d’Hydro-Québec inc., Association des cadres des collèges du Québec, Association des cadres municipaux de Montréal, Association des conseillers en gestion des ressources humaines du gouvernement du Québec, Association des cadres scolaires du Grand Montréal, Association des cadres supérieurs de la santé et des services sociaux, Association des directeurs et directrices de succursale de la Société des alcools du Québec, Association professionnelle des cadres de premier niveau d’Hydro-Québec, Association québécoise des cadres scolaires, Association québécoise du personnel de direction des écoles and Fédération québécoise des directions d’établissement d’enseignement Interveners
Official English Translation: Reasons of Côté J.
Coram: Wagner C.J. and Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Kasirer, Jamal and O’Bonsawin JJ.
Reasons for Judgment: (paras. 1 to 58)
Jamal J. (Karakatsanis, Kasirer and O’Bonsawin JJ. concurring)
Concurring Reasons: (paras. 59 to 198)
Côté J. (Wagner C.J. concurring)
Concurring Reasons: (paras. 199 to 221)
Rowe J.
Note: This document is subject to editorial revision before its reproduction in final form in the Canada Supreme Court Reports.
Société des casinos du Québec inc. Appellant
v.
Association des cadres de la Société des casinos du Québec Respondent
and
Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General of Ontario,
Attorney General of Quebec, Attorney General of Alberta,
Administrative Labour Tribunal,
Canadian Association of Counsel to Employers,
National Police Commissioned Officers Professional Association,
Canadian Labour Congress, Ontario Principals’ Council,
Catholic Principals’ Council of Ontario,
Association des directions et des directions adjointes
des écoles franco-ontariennes,
Directors Guild of Canada – Ontario,
Canadian Lawyers for International Human Rights,
Public Service Alliance of Canada, Canadian Civil Liberties Association,
Syndicat professionnel des ingénieurs d’Hydro-Québec inc.,
Association des cadres des collèges du Québec,
Association des cadres municipaux de Montréal,
Association des conseillers en gestion des ressources humaines du
gouvernement du Québec,
Association des cadres scolaires du Grand Montréal,
Association des cadres supérieurs de la santé et des services sociaux,
Association des directeurs et directrices de succursale de la Société des
alcools du Québec,
Association professionnelle des cadres de premier niveau d’Hydro-Québec,
Association québécoise des cadres scolaires,
Association québécoise du personnel de direction des écoles and
Fédération québécoise des directions d’établissement
d’enseignement Interveners
‑ and ‑
Attorney General of Quebec Appellant
v.
Association des cadres de la Société des casinos du Québec Respondent
and
Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General of Ontario,
Attorney General of Alberta, Administrative Labour Tribunal,
Société des casinos du Québec inc.,
Canadian Association of Counsel to Employers,
National Police Commissioned Officers Professional Association,
Canadian Labour Congress, Ontario Principals’ Council,
Catholic Principals’ Council of Ontario,
Association des directions et des directions adjointes
des écoles franco-ontariennes,
Directors Guild of Canada – Ontario,
Canadian Lawyers for International Human Rights,
Public Service Alliance of Canada, Canadian Civil Liberties Association,
Syndicat professionnel des ingénieurs d’Hydro-Québec inc.,
Association des cadres des collèges du Québec,
Association des cadres municipaux de Montréal,
Association des conseillers en gestion des ressources humaines du
gouvernement du Québec,
Association des cadres scolaires du Grand Montréal,
Association des cadres supérieurs de la santé et des services sociaux,
Association des directeurs et directrices de succursale de la Société des
alcools du Québec,
Association professionnelle des cadres de premier niveau d’Hydro-Québec,
Association québécoise des cadres scolaires,
Association québécoise du personnel de direction des écoles and
Fédération québécoise des directions d’établissement
d’enseignement Interveners
Indexed as: Société des casinos du Québec inc. v. Association des cadres de la Société des casinos du Québec
2024 SCC 13
File No.: 40123.
2023: April 20; 2024: April 19.
Present: Wagner C.J. and Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Kasirer, Jamal and O’Bonsawin JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for quebec
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Freedom of association — Statutory exclusion — Casino managers excluded from provincial statutory labour relations regime — Whether exclusion infringes managers’ guarantee of freedom of association — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2(d) — Charter of human rights and freedoms, CQLR, c. C‑12, s. 3 — Labour Code, CQLR, c. C‑27, s. 1(l)(1).
Administrative law — Judicial review — Standard of review — Standard of review applicable to findings of fact and findings of mixed fact and law made by administrative decision maker in connection with constitutional question.
The Association des cadres de la Société des casinos du Québec (“Association”) represents certain first‑level managers working at four casinos run by the Société des casinos du Québec inc. (“Société”). The Association applied to the Commission des relations du travail (now the Administrative Labour Tribunal (“ALT”)) to be recognized as a certified association representing first‑level managers in the gaming sector at the Casino de Montréal in order to benefit from the protections of the Quebec Labour Code. Because s. 1(l)(1) of the Labour Code excludes managers from its statutory labour relations regime, including from the ability to obtain association certification, the Association sought a ruling that this statutory exclusion unjustifiably infringed its members’ freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter and s. 3 of the Quebec Charter.
The Association succeeded at first instance before the ALT. The ALT characterized the Association’s claim as a negative rights claim and applied the two‑part substantial interference test for analyzing an alleged infringement of freedom of association articulated in Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 1, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 3. It concluded that the exclusion of managers unjustifiably infringed their freedom of association. On judicial review, the Superior Court quashed the ALT’s decision. In the Superior Court’s view, the Association sought to impose a positive obligation on the state, which must be analyzed under the framework in Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016. The court ruled that the Association did not establish an infringement of its members’ freedom of association. On further appeal by the Association, the Court of Appeal followed Mounted Police and applied the two‑part substantial interference test as the proper framework under s. 2(d), and restored the ALT’s decision.
Held: The appeals should be allowed.
Per Karakatsanis, Kasirer, Jamal and O’Bonsawin JJ.: Section 1(l)(1) of the Labour Code applies to the Association in its application for accreditation. The Association has not shown that, when the two‑part substantial interference test, established in Dunmore and refined in Health Services and Support — Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3, and Mounted Police, is applied, the legislative exclusion of first‑level managers from Quebec’s general collective labour relations regime infringes its members’ freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter or s. 3 of the Quebec Charter.
There is only one framework for determining whether legislation or government action infringes s. 2(d) of the Charter. That two‑step framework was established by the Court in Dunmore and examines, first, whether activities fall within the scope of the freedom of association guarantee, and second, whether the government action interferes with the protected activities in purpose or effect. Three factors circumscribing the possibility of successfully challenging underinclusive legislation under s. 2(d) of the Charter were also set out in Dunmore. They relate to whether the claim of underinclusion is grounded in a fundamental Charter freedom, rather than access to a particular statutory regime; the evidentiary threshold for showing an interference with such a fundamental freedom; and whether the state can be held accountable for the claimant’s inability to exercise the fundamental freedom. These three factors are relevant considerations when evaluating s. 2(d) claims, but they do not constitute a separate test or a distinct framework for evaluating constitutional challenges to underinclusive legislation under s. 2(d). There is also only one threshold for evaluating all s. 2(d) claims — the threshold of substantial interference. A claimant alleging that underinclusive legislation infringes s. 2(d) need not meet an elevated threshold.
In Toronto (City) v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2021 SCC 34, a s. 2(b) freedom of expression case, a majority of the Court refrained from deciding whether Dunmore continues to apply to s. 2(d) claims after the Court’s decisions in Mounted Police and Fraser. The Court’s s. 2(d) jurisprudence reveals that the Court has consistently applied a two‑part framework that examines whether activities fall within the scope of s. 2(d) and whether government action has substantially interfered with those activities, in purpose or effect. The Court has also highlighted that its s. 2(d) jurisprudence since Dunmore should be viewed as a consistent body of case law. Dunmore was not overturned by the Court’s decisions in Mounted Police or Fraser. Nor does the Court’s jurisprudence create two tests, one for claims seeking positive intervention from the state and another for claims seeking negative protection against state interference. Although the Dunmore factors have not been identified and analyzed each time the Court has been asked to determine whether legislation or government action infringed s. 2(d) of the Charter, the underlying principles have been consistently reaffirmed. It is not always necessary to consider each Dunmore factor expressly. Sometimes, the state’s responsibility in causing the substantial interference is self‑evident.
The frameworks under ss. 2(b) and 2(d) of the Charter have evolved differently in the Court’s jurisprudence. In the context of claims under s. 2(b) of the Charter, the threshold for proving positive freedom claims is substantial interference with freedom of expression. However, the threshold for negative rights claims involving freedom of expression is whether the purpose or effect of the government action merely restricts freedom of expression. In the freedom of association context, by contrast, the elevated threshold of substantial interference in the second Dunmore factor already applies to all claims involving both positive and negative duties. This helps explain why the distinction between positive freedoms and negative rights is not relevant in determining the applicable framework for s. 2(d) claims, even though it has been affirmed in the s. 2(b) context.
In applying the two-part substantial interference test to the Association’s claim, the standard of correctness applies to the questions of law and mixed fact and law at issue. At the first step of the s. 2(d) framework, the Court must determine whether the activities that the members of the Association seek to engage in fall within the scope of s. 2(d) of the Charter, and therefore consider whether the Association can plausibly ground its action in a fundamental Charter freedom. The Association’s claim does involve activities protected under s. 2(d) of the Charter, including the right to form an association with sufficient independence from the employer, to make collective representations to the employer, and to have those representations considered in good faith.
At the second step of the s. 2(d) framework, the Court must determine whether the legislative exclusion, in purpose or effect, substantially interferes with the protected s. 2(d) activities of the Association’s members. In addressing this issue, the Court must consider whether the state is responsible for the members’ inability to exercise their fundamental freedoms under s. 2(d). In the instant case, the purpose of the legislative exclusion is not to interfere with managers’ associational rights. The legislature’s purposes in excluding managers from the definition of “employee” under the Labour Code were to distinguish between management and operations in organizational hierarchies; to avoid placing managers in a situation of conflict of interest between their role as employees in collective bargaining and their role as representatives of the employer in their employment responsibilities; and to give employers confidence that managers would represent their interests, while protecting the distinctive common interests of employees. The Association has also failed to show, on the record before the Court, that the effect of the legislative exclusion is to substantially interfere with its members’ rights to meaningful collective bargaining.
Per Wagner C.J. and Côté J.: The Dunmore framework remains applicable to constitutional challenges to the exclusion of workers from a labour relations regime. While in each case substantial interference is the applicable standard for finding an infringement of freedom of association and is at the heart of the analysis, the framework for analyzing freedom of association varies depending on whether the party is asking the state to refrain from interfering with a protected activity or is instead seeking state action to remedy its inability to engage in that activity without support or enablement. The three‑step Dunmore framework is better suited to the context of a positive claim and to the type of remedy sought in such cases. In this case, the application of the framework leads to the conclusion that the impugned legislative exclusion does not limit the freedom of association guaranteed by the Canadian and Quebec charters. Section 1(l)(1) of the Labour Code is therefore operable against the Association in the context of its petition for certification.
An overview of the Court’s jurisprudence reveals that freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter and s. 3 of the Quebec Charter protects against any substantial interference with the right of employees to meaningfully associate with others in the pursuit of collective goals relating to conditions of employment. This protection encompasses the right of employees to a meaningful process of collective bargaining, a process that includes the right to make collective representations to their employer and to have those representations considered in good faith, freedom of choice with respect to their representation, the independence of their association from their employer, and the right to strike. However, the Court has emphasized since Dunmore that s. 2(d) guarantees a process, not an outcome or access to a particular model of labour relations. Freedom of association is indeed non‑statutory, but the manner of its exercise may be spelled out in legislation.
The three‑step Dunmore framework applies in determining the circumstances in which positive state action may be required under s. 2(d) of the Charter, such that the legislature will be obliged to enact a particular labour relations regime. First, claims made against the exclusion must be grounded in an activity protected by s. 2(d) itself and not in access to a particular statutory regime. Second, the exclusion must have the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with that activity. Third, it must be possible for the state to be held accountable for the substantial interference. When these three steps are satisfied, it must be concluded that the legislature’s failure to provide a particular regime constitutes an infringement of s. 2(d) of the Charter.
Although the Court suggested in obiter in Toronto (City) that the applicability of the Dunmore framework was now uncertain in light of Mounted Police and Fraser, those decisions must not be read as overturning this framework sub silentio. The Court’s jurisprudence has relied on Dunmore to develop the substantial interference framework, without ever reversing the higher threshold to be met for positive rights claims. The Dunmore approach therefore remains applicable to challenges relating to exclusion from a statutory regime.
The three‑step Dunmore framework should not be set aside, because this framework better addresses positive claims and reflects the exceptional nature of the remedy sought. Distinguishing between the various steps of the framework, rather than incorporating them into the substantial interference standard, is preferable in several respects. Such an approach involves conceptual clarity based on the structure and language of the Charter and provides clear direction regarding the burden of proof to be met at each step. The first step excludes the possibility of seeking access to a particular regime, given the distinction between s. 2(d) and s. 15; the second step requires that substantial interference be shown, as in any constitutional challenge under s. 2(d); and the third step, based on s. 32 of the Charter, takes into account the specific nature of the claim by requiring a causal link between the substantial interference and the legislative exclusion. This approach serves to maintain substantial interference as a single standard while necessitating legislative action only in exceptional circumstances, and it is therefore consistent with the separation of powers. Distinguishing between the three steps of the framework also avoids the risk that a constitutional challenge under s. 2(d) to a legislative exclusion will be transformed into a balancing of various factors or considerations, which would amount to overturning the Dunmore framework sub silentio. Under the three‑step framework, it is quite possible that a group of employees excluded from a statutory labour relations regime will be able to demonstrate substantial interference with the exercise of freedom of association but will be unable to establish a causal link with the state’s failure to legislate.
In this case, no deference is owed to the ALT’s findings of law and findings of mixed fact and law, but only to its findings of pure fact. In Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653, the Court established a presumption that the standard of reasonableness applies to the judicial review of an administrative decision maker’s decision. However, this presumption can be rebutted when the rule of law requires a consistent, determinate and final answer from the courts, which is the case with constitutional questions. The standard of correctness therefore applies to the findings of law made by the ALT in the context of analyzing the constitutional question before it. The standard of correctness also applies to findings of mixed fact and law made in connection with a constitutional question, because it is important that constitutional questions be answered correctly. As for findings of pure fact that can be isolated from the constitutional analysis, a reviewing court must show deference to them. Such deference is based on considerations related to judicial efficiency, the importance of preserving certainty and public confidence, and the relatively advantageous position of the first instance decision maker. The rule of law does not require that there be a determinate and final answer to questions of pure fact, as they will vary from case to case.
To determine whether an infringement of s. 2(d) of the Charter and s. 3 of the Quebec Charter has been established, it is important to characterize the nature of the Association’s claim, because the nature of the claim may affect the framework that applies. The content of several Charter freedoms has both positive and negative dimensions. A right’s positive dimensions require government to act in certain ways, whereas its negative dimensions require government to refrain from acting in other ways. The characterization exercise is concerned with the nature of the obligation that the claim seeks to impose upon the state. In this case, the Association’s claim seeks the recognition and enforcement of a positive state obligation, since any claim that seeks to eliminate the exclusion of a class of workers from the application of a general collective relations regime is essentially a claim for inclusion in a particular regime. The three‑step Dunmore framework must therefore be applied to determine whether, in light of this framework, the exclusion of the Association’s members from the Labour Code regime infringes s. 2(d) of the Charter and s. 3 of the Quebec Charter.
The application of the first step of the Dunmore framework to the facts of this case shows that the Association and its members are seeking access to a particular statutory regime, that is, the regime provided for in the Labour Code. The Association’s choice to proceed by way of a petition for certification shows that its ultimate goal is for its members to be subject to the collective labour relations regime in the Labour Code, especially since the ALT, which can neither make a formal declaration of unconstitutionality nor suspend the effects of its decision, would have no choice but to give the Association’s members access to all of the rights and privileges flowing from the Labour Code if it granted the Association’s claim. This conclusion is sufficient to allow the appeals. However, even if this step of the Dunmore framework were satisfied, the Association’s claim would fail at the second and third steps of the framework.
With regard to the second step, the exclusion in s. 1(l)(1) of the Labour Code does not have the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with the freedom of association of the Association’s members. Firstly, the Association has not shown that such a purpose existed in 1964 when the Labour Code was enacted. The record does not show that there was distrust of any association of first‑level managers, and there is no basis for concluding that the Quebec legislature considered the role of manager to be fundamentally incompatible with the collective bargaining protected by freedom of association. Secondly, not every difference between the situation of the Association’s members and the situation they would be in if they were not excluded from the Labour Code regime constitutes substantial interference. It must be recognized that they have been able to associate. While certain aspects of the Société’s conduct, in the absence of the protections conferred by the Labour Code’s provisions, do seem to interfere substantially with the freedom of association of the Association’s members, the existence of alternative recourses is another important consideration in concluding that they are not unable to exercise their freedom of association. Furthermore, the Association is not without recourse in the event that the Société interferes with the conduct of its activities.
Finally, even on the assumption that the Société’s impugned conduct constitutes substantial interference with the exercise of the freedom of association of the Association’s members, this interference is not attributable to the state at the third step of the Dunmore framework. Establishing a link is crucial, as what is being challenged when the Dunmore framework is applied is the state’s legislative action, not the employer’s action alone. The analysis must be based on the factual context of the case. In this case, there is no link between the legislative exclusion being challenged and the Société’s impugned conduct, which is due to its alleged failure to comply with its contractual undertakings and which can be sanctioned by the ordinary courts.
Per Rowe J.: The Dunmore framework should remain applicable to assess positive claims. While s. 2(d) can require positive actions from the state in order to make the freedom to organize meaningful, claims of this nature must be analyzed under a distinct framework that takes into account the nature of this fundamental freedom, the necessary link to state action, and the separation of powers.
Under the purposive approach articulated in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, a freedom has both positive and negative dimensions. However, the distinction between these dimensions remains important when considering the nature of the obligation that the claim seeks to impose upon the state. A freedom, by nature, does not encompass the obligation for the state to facilitate its exercise. This is why a higher burden forces the claimants to demonstrate why, in their circumstances, a posture of restraint from the state is not enough. In effect, any positive obligation requiring the state to protect the freedom should arise only where the claimant would otherwise be substantially incapable of exercising the freedom. The Court has consistently described s. 2(d) as reflecting a right that is largely “negative” in nature. Thus, in most circumstances, it does not impose “positive” obligations of protection or assistance on the state. It is only in exceptional circumstances, identified under a distinct framework set out in Dunmore that s. 2(d) of the Charter can impose positive obligations on the state.
The infringement giving rise to a negative claim under s. 2(d) is fundamentally different than the infringement leading to a positive claim. Given this difference, the standard to analyze positive claims should not be the same as for negative claims. The Dunmore framework was specifically designed to take into account the absence of direct state action giving rise to the infringement in the case of positive claims, where the state has only failed to adequately protect the freedom from infringement by third parties, notably private actors. Under this framework, it remains part of the test to demonstrate that the freedom of association has been substantially impeded by the exclusion from the protective legislation. However, the claimant also has the burden of demonstrating that the claim is grounded in fundamental Charter freedoms rather than in access to a particular statutory regime and, more importantly, that the state can be held accountable in some ways for the inability to exercise these fundamental freedoms. The contribution of private actors to a violation is part of the factual context in which the review takes place but cannot in itself justify the imposition of a positive obligation on the state. Thus, this framework is particularly important in order to distinguish cases where the intervention of the state is warranted.
The elevated evidentiary threshold provided in the Dunmore framework also ensures that the adjudication of positive claims respects the separation of powers. It is not the proper role of the Court to confer constitutional status on a particular statutory regime. Labour relations regimes are a policy choice, designed to promote labour peace and bring certainty to the employment relationship, but they are not a constitutional imperative.
Cases Cited
By Jamal J.
Applied: Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016; considered: Health Services and Support — Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391; Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3; Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 1, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 3; Toronto (City) v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2021 SCC 34; Meredith v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 2, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 125; Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 245; referred to: Alliance des professionnels et des professionnelles de la Ville de Québec v. Procureur général du Québec, 2023 QCCA 626, 75 C.C.P.B. (2nd) 1; Procureur général du Québec v. Les avocats et notaires de l’État québécois, 2021 QCCA 559; Quebec (Commission des normes, de l’équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du travail) v. Caron, 2018 SCC 3, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 35; Baier v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
By Côté J.
Applied: Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653; distinguished: Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3; Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 1, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 3; Health Services and Support — Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391; Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 245; considered: Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989; Meredith v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 2, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 125; In re The Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Labor Board, 330 U.S. 485 (1947); referred to: Syndicat canadien de la fonction publique, section locale 3939 v. Société des casinos du Québec inc., 1995 CanLII 15922; Toronto (City) v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2021 SCC 34; Baier v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673; Westcoast Energy Inc. v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 322; Consolidated Fastfrate Inc. v. Western Canada Council of Teamsters, 2009 SCC 53, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 407; Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; PSAC v. Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460; Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367; Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157; Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211; R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., 2001 SCC 70, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209; Québec (Procureur général) v. Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN), 2011 QCCA 1247; Doré v. Verdun (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862; Noël v. Société d’énergie de la Baie James, 2001 SCC 39, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 207; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Guérin, 2017 SCC 42, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 3; Isidore Garon ltée v. Tremblay, 2006 SCC 2, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 27; Haig v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995; Canada v. Craig, 2012 SCC 43, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 489; Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, 2003 SCC 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504; Okwuobi v. Lester B. Pearson School Board, 2005 SCC 16, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 257; Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3; Ontario (Attorney General) v. G, 2020 SCC 38, [2020] 3 S.C.R. 629; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295; NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001); Labor Board v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); Mills v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863; Doucet‑Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3; Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Communauté urbaine de Montréal, 2004 SCC 30, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 789; Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 789; Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134; Vancouver (City) v. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28; Hinse v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 35, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 621; de Montigny v. Brossard (Succession), 2010 SCC 51, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 64; R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96; Quebec (Attorney General) v. 9147‑0732 Québec inc., 2020 SCC 32, [2020] 3 S.C.R. 426.
By Rowe J.
Referred to: Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016; Baier v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673; Toronto (City) v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2021 SCC 34; Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989; Haig v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995; Health Services and Support — Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391; Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 245; Native Women’s Assn. of Canada v. Canada, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627; Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of Students — British Columbia Component, 2009 SCC 31, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 295; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295; Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3; McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229; Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St‑Jérôme‑Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village), 2004 SCC 48, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650; Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1997), 155 D.L.R. (4th) 193.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2018).
Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases, CQLR, c. A‑3.001, s. 2.
Act respecting labour standards, CQLR, c. N‑1.1, ss. 3(6), 128.
Act to establish the Administrative Labour Tribunal, CQLR, c. T‑15.1, s. 1.
Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L‑2, s. 3(1).
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 2(b), (d), 15, 24(1), 32.
Charter of human rights and freedoms, CQLR, c. C‑12, ss. 3, 9.1, 49.
Civil Code of Québec, preliminary provision.
Civil Service Collective Bargaining Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 71, ss. 2(f), 11(1)(e).
Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52(1).
Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act, 1993, S.O. 1993, c. 38, s. 1.1(3) 9.
Labour Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. L‑1, s. 7(2)(b).
Labour Code, CQLR, c. C‑27, s. 1(l).
Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. L‑1, s. 2(1)(m).
Labour Relations Act, S.Q. 1944, c. 30, s. 2(a)1.
Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sch. A, s. 1(3)(b).
Labour Relations Code, R.S.A. 2000, c. L‑1, s. 1(1)(l)(i).
Managerial Exclusion Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M‑3, s. 2(1).
National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74‑198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151‑169).
Pay Equity Act, CQLR, c. E‑12.001, s. 8.
Professional Syndicates Act, R.S.Q., c. S-40 (now CQLR, c. S‑40), s. 6.
Public Service Employee Relations Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P‑43, s. 12(1)(a).
Public Service Labour Relations Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22 [as en. by Public Service Modernization Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22, s. 2], s. 2(1).
School Boards Collective Bargaining Act, 2014, S.O. 2014, c. 5, s. 8.
Trade Union Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 475, s. 2(2)(a).
Treaties and Other International Instruments
Convention (No. 87) concerning freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, 68 U.N.T.S. 17.
Convention (No. 98) concerning the application of the principles of the right to organise and to bargain collectively, 96 U.N.T.S. 257.
Authors Cited
Barrett, Steven M. “Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General): Freedom of Association at the Crossroads” (2003), 10 C.L.E.L.J. 83.
Barrett, Steven, and Ethan Poskanzer. “What Fraser Means For Labour Rights in Canada”, in Fay Faraday, Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, eds., Constitutional Labour Rights in Canada: Farm Workers and the Fraser Case. Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012, 190.
Blouin, Rodrigue. “La qualification des cadres hiérarchiques par le Code du travail” (1975), 30 I.R. 478.
Bogg, Alan, and Keith Ewing. “A (Muted) Voice at Work? Collective Bargaining in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2012), 33 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 379.
Brun, Henri, Guy Tremblay et Eugénie Brouillet. Droit constitutionnel, 6e éd. Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 2014.
Cameron, Jamie. “Due Process, Collective Bargaining, and s. 2(d) of the Charter: A Comment on B.C. Health Services” (2006), 13 C.L.E.L.J. 233.
Cameron, Jamie, and Nathalie Des Rosiers. “The Right to Protest, Freedom of Expression, and Freedom of Association”, in Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem and Nathalie Des Rosiers, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, 737.
Chartier, Roger. “Le syndicalisme de cadres et la législation québécoise du travail” (1965), 20 I.R. 278.
Coutu, Michel, et autres, avec la collaboration de Florence Laporte-Murdock. Droit des rapports collectifs du travail au Québec, vol. 1, Le régime général, 3e éd. Montréal: Yvon Blais, 2019.
Daykin, Walter L. “The Status of Supervisory Employees Under the National Labor Relations Act” (1944), 29 Iowa L. Rev. 297.
Faraday, Fay. “Taking a Mulligan: Freedom of Association”, in Howard Kislowicz, Kerri A. Froc and Richard Moon, eds., Canada’s Surprising Constitution: Unexpected Interpretations of the Constitution Act, 1982. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2024 (forthcoming), 335.
Fudge, Judy. “Freedom of Association”, in Errol Mendes and