Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness)

Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness)
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2010-04-29
Neutral citation
2010 FC 470
File numbers
T-1040-09
Notes
Reported Decision
Decision Content
Federal Court
Cour fédérale
Date: 20100429
Docket: T-1040-09
Citation: 2010 FC 470
Ottawa, Ontario, April 29, 2010
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Kelen
BETWEEN:
CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF
ELIZABETH FRY SOCIETIES
Applicant
and
MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY CANADA
and CORRECTIONAL SERVICE CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1] This is an application pursuant to section 41 of the Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21 as amended (the "Act") for a review of the decision of the Correctional Services of Canada (CSC) wherein it refused to disclose to the applicant access to certain personal information regarding Ms. Ashley Smith, a 19 year old prisoner who committed suicide in her cell.
FACTS
Background facts
[2] Ms. Ashley Smith was imprisoned in New Brunswick’s youth justice system at the age of 15. In custody, she committed a number of additional criminal offences and her sentence was extended. When she reached the age of majority (i.e. 18), she was transferred in October 2006 to New Brunswick’s adult correctional system, and then to the custody of the federal prison system operated by the respondent.
[3] The respondent allegedly moved Ms. Smith several times among a number of penitentiaries, treatment facilities and hospitals across Canada until her death by suicide in her cell on October 19, 2007 at the Grand Valley Institution for Women in Kitchener, Ontario.
[4] During her incarceration, Ms. Smith alleged to the applicant, the Elizabeth Fry Society, that she was being subjected to improper treatment including alleged assaults from the staff, alleged inadequate living conditions, alleged lack of psychiatric care or assessment, and alleged frequent segregation and transfers.
[5] The applicant, the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, is an umbrella organization of 25 Elizabeth Fry Societies across Canada. The applicant is a non-profit organization committed to raising public awareness with respect to decreasing the number of criminalized and imprisoned women in Canada, promoting the decarceration of women presently in prison, and increasing the availability of a publicly funded and community-based social system to care for women before they imprisoned.
[6] The respondent, the Correctional Services of Canada, is responsible for the care of imprisoned persons. Ms. Smith was in the custody and care of the respondent at the time she made the Privacy Act request which is the subject of this application.
Privacy Act request and subsequent denial
[7] Ms. Smith sought the assistance of the Elizabeth Fry Society. The Affidavit of
Ms. Kim Pate sets out the interaction between the Elizabeth Fry Society and Ms. Smith from the initial contact. Ms. Pate is the Executive Director of the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies (CAEFS) and a part-time professor at the University of Ottawa in the Faculty of Law.
[8] On May 31, 2007 Ms. Smith requested under the Privacy Act access to her personal records held by the respondent and consented to the release of her private CSC records to the Elizabeth Fry Society and Ms. Pate. The Consent for Disclosure of Personal Information Form states:
I hereby consent to the disclosure by the Correctional Services of Canada of the personal information pertaining to myself which may be described as segregation, transfer, charges, and other information related of my prison term to the following individual(s) or organization(s) Kim Pate (CAEFS) and lawyer for the purpose of assisting me.
[Emphasis added]
[9] Ms. Pate made the following specific request for information on Ashley’s behalf on June 14, 2007, which was received on June 18, 2007:
With respect to Ms. Ashley Smith, FPS #820435E (D.O.B. 29/01/88), please forward all information pertaining to:
a. the terms of reference and investigation report regarding the allegations of staff assault of and by Ms. Smith;
b. the various transfers of Ms. Smith to and from Nova, Pinel GVI,. St. Thomas;
c. security classification and re-assessments, including information utilized from the youth system, police reports and court decisions;
d. placement and retention of Ms. Smith in segregation, including segregation reviews;
e. all incident reports, charge sheets, and decisions regarding institutional behavioural issues, including institutional preventive security reports, et cetara;
f. psychological and psychiatric reports, assessments for decision;
g. internal CSC memoranda, electronic and other correspondence regarding the management and/or treatment of Ms. Smith, including, but not limited to activity and log sheets pertaining to staff assessments of her ongoing behaviour, et cetera.
[10] On July 18, 2007 Ms. Ginette Pilon, a Senior Analyst of the CSC’s Access to Information and Privacy Division, advised Ms. Pate that a 30-day extension beyond the statutory 30-day limit contained in section 14 of the Privacy Act would be required to process the request because meeting the original 30-day timeline would unreasonably interfere with the operations of the government institution. CSC did not disclose Ms. Smith’s records at the conclusion of the 30 day extension, which was August 17, 2007.
[11] Ms. Smith sent a second consent and request for release of her information on September 24, 2007. The form was written and signed by an Executive Director of the Elizabeth Fry Society and witnessed by a CSC staff person because Ms. Smith not allowed writing utensils. The Release of Information Form states:
I, Ashley Smith, hereby authorize CSC, to release to Kim Pate, CAEFS, the following information: All CSC, Police, Court, health records, reports et cetera, for the purpose(s) of assisting me. This release will be in effect from Sept 24/07 until Jan 30/09.
[12] Ms. Pate stated in her cross examination that the dates January 31, 2009 and January 30, 2009 were inserted into the consent and authorization forms respectively because those were the last days of Ms. Smith’s sentence.
[13] Ms. Smith committed suicide on October 19, 2007, 123 days after the first request for records was received, 62 days after the last day of the 30-day extension.
[14] On May 23, 2008 counsel for the applicant contacted the CSC by email to inquire about the status of the outstanding request for records. On May 26, 2008 CSC sent out the following reply by email:
Unfortunately, due to the incident that resulted in the death of this inmate on October 19, 2007, all files related to this individual are exempted in their entirety pursuant to section 22 and 26 of the Privacy Act.
Ms. Anne Rooke, Access to Information and Privacy Coordinator to the CSC reportedly instructed the author of this email.
[15] On the same day, May 26, 2008, CSC issued a short letter setting out the reasons for refusing to disclose the requested records:
This is in response to your request for access to the personal information contained in documentation held by Correctional Services of Canada pertaining to Ashley Smith (deceased).
Please note that the information has been exempted in its entirety pursuant to section 22 and 26 of the Privacy Act.
You are entitled to file a complaint with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada concerning this request. Should you wish to exercise this right, you complaint should be forward to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner Place de Ville, Tower “B”, 112 Kent Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 1H3.
Report of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
[16] The applicant filed a complaint against Ms. Rooke and CSC with the Privacy Commissioner on June 26, 2008.
[17] On May 15, 2009 the Privacy Commissioner determined that the complaint was well founded. The Commissioner held that the death of the individual did not vitiate their consent under the Act and that the CSC did not properly invoke the exemptions found in the Act. Part of the Commissioner’s reasons are reproduced below for convenience:
…
5. In order to determine the appropriateness of the application of section 26, our office needed to asses the validity of the consent upon the death of the individual providing the consent. After careful consideration, our office concluded that the individual’s death does not vitiate the consent provided to the Executive Director of the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies. Consequently, for CSC’s purposes, the death of the individual was only relevant to the extent that it may have affected the exemptions CSC was entitled to rely on. As a result, we are of the view that CSC could not rely on the application of section 26 to deny access to the entire personal information requested.
…
7. In this particular case, CSC advised the requester that the information requested was exempted in its entirety pursuant to section 22 of the Act without specifying the paragraph or paragraphs invoked to exempt the information requested. In the course of this investigation, we have reviewed the actions taken by the institution and its representations and concluded that CSC did not establish to our satisfaction that it properly invoked the provisions contained in section 22 to exempt the requested information in its entirety.
[Emphasis added]
[18] The Commissioner elected not to apply to the Federal Court to order the release of Ms. Smith’s records. However, the applicant applied to this Court to compel the release of Ms. Smith’s records under the Act.
Evidence before the Court
[19] The evidence before this Court consists of an affidavit sworn on behalf of the applicant by Ms. Pate and the public and confidential affidavits by Mr. Nick Fabiano on behalf of the respondent. Both affiants were cross examined on their affidavits and exhibits. Mr. Fabiano was not cross examined on his confidential affidavit which attaches as an exhibit Ms. Smith’s undisclosed records.
Ms. Pate’s Affidavit and cross examination
[20] The affidavit dated July 16, 2009 by Ms. Kim Pate, the Executive Director of the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies and a part-time professor at the University of Ottawa in the Faculty of Law deposes, inter alia:
a. the role of the applicant in assisting incarcerated women in Canada through direct action and advocacy;
b. allegations of mistreatment of Ms. Smith at the hands of CSC staff and Ms. Pate’s personal observations of Ms. Smith during her visits;
c. on May 31, 2007 and September 24, 2007, Ms. Smith requested and consented to the release of her CSC records to the applicant and Ms. Pate;
d. on June 14, 2007 a request was sent to CSC for specific release of records;
e. the applicant has since commenced an application in the Federal Court to compel the release of Ms. Smith’s records in order the understand “exactly what happened to Ashley, and to allow us to better assist other imprisoned women who are experiencing treatment similar to that to which Ashley was subjected, and to try to prevent similar treatment in the future”.
Mr. Fabiono’s Affidavit and cross examination
[21] The public affidavit dated August 28, 2009 by Mr. Nick Fabiano, the Director General, Rights, Redress and Resolution of CSC deposes:
a. on June 18, 2007 CSC received a request enclosing a copy of the Consent for Disclosure of Personal Information form for release of specific records belonging to Ms. Smith, ;
b. on July 18, 2007 the CSC’s Access to Information Division (also known as the “ATIP Division”) sent a notice of extension;
c. Ms. Smith died on October 19, 2007 before the ATIP Division completed a review of the documents in question;
d. Mr. Fabiano was advised by Ms. Anne Rooke, Director, Access to Information and Privacy at CSC that Ms. Smith’s consent for disclosure of her records ceased to be valid upon her death and that all her files were exempted pursuant to section 22 and 26 of the Act:
The confidential personal records of Ms. Smith filed with the Court
[22] The respondent CSC filed the confidential personal records of Ms. Smith with the Court attached to the confidential affidavit dated August 28, 2009 by Mr. Nick Fabiano. The confidential affidavit does not provide any elaboration on the events that led to denial of the applicant’s request for records. This affidavit attaches the personal records of the Ms. Smith, which I can describe in general, non-confidential terms as follows:
a. numerous assessments of Ashley Smith by CSC;
b. transfer records;
c. violent incident records in both CSC and provincial custody;
d. criminal code charge sheets;
e. at least one sentencing court transcript; and
f. security classification for Ms. Smith in the “Maximum” security risk category.
The records of Ms. Smith’s personal information contain 291 pages, and end in June 2007. There are no records for the last few months before her suicide, or records following her suicide.
Evidence from cross-examination
[23] The following points emerged from Mr. Fabiano’s cross-examination:
a. Ms. Anne Rooke, to whom Mr. Fabiano reports, made the decision to deny the requested disclosure of record;
b. Mr. Fabiano never reviewed Ms. Smith’s requested records and has no knowledge of their contents;
c. Mr. Fabiano could not answer who made the decision not to meet the original or extended deadline for releasing Ms. Smith’s records;
d. CSC has in the past disclosed the records of deceased inmates on a case by case basis;
e. the ongoing criminal investigation which was cited as a reason for exempting the records under section 22 of the Act had ended at the time of his affidavit; and
f. Ms. Rooke was not available to swear an affidavit at the time it was requested.
[24] At the conclusion of the cross examination counsel for the respondent undertook to provide the Court and the applicant with the respondent’s current grounds for refusing to release Ms. Smith’s information. The respondent’s current position is as follows:
a. Section 26 of the Act is no longer relied on;
b. Section 22(1)(b) of the Act is relied upon as a ground for refusal; and
c. Section 3 of the Act and section 10 of the Privacy Regulations form the basis of the respondent’s objection to the applicant’s standing to bring this application.
Judicial notice of Criminal Code charges
[25] The Court was asked by the parties to take judicial notice of the fact that a Royal Canadian Mounted Police investigation was initiated with respect to Ms. Smith’s death which led to Criminal Code charges of “criminal negligence causing death” against four CSC employees. This investigation was conducted in and around May 26, 2008. The Court was informed that those charges were later dismissed at the preliminary hearing stage.
Key dates and timelines
[26] The key dates and timelines with respect to this application are as follows:
a. request and consent for disclosure by Ms. Smith of her personal information was dated June 18, 2007;
b. the extension to the 30 day timeline for producing this personal information was made by the respondent on July 18, 2007;
c. the personal information was due from the respondent at the end of this extension, which was August 17, 2007. At that time, under the law, the respondent is deemed to have denied that the request and consent to produce the personal documents;
d. Ms. Smith and the applicant sent a second request for the release of her personal information on September 24, 2007 since the first request was not being complied with;
e. Ms. Smith committed suicide on October 19, 2007;
f. the decision of the respondent to deny the request for the disclosure was dated May 26, 2008; and
g. the date of the hearing before this Court was March 29, 2010.
LEGISLATION
[27] The purpose of the Privacy Act is set out at section 2:
2. The purpose of this Act is to extend the present laws of Canada that protect the privacy of individuals with respect to personal information about themselves held by a government institution and that provide individuals with a right of access to that information.
2. La présente loi a pour objet de compléter la législation canadienne en matière de protection des renseignements personnels relevant des institutions fédérales et de droit d’accès des individus aux renseignements personnels qui les concernent.
[28] Section 3 of the Act defines “personal information” as follows:
3. “personal information” means information about an identifiable individual that is recorded in any form including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing,
[…]
but, for the purposes of sections 7, 8 and 26 and section 19 of the Access to Information Act, does not include
[…]
(m) information about an individual who has been dead for more than twenty years;
3. « renseignements personnels » Les renseignements, quels que soient leur forme et leur support, concernant un individu identifiable, notamment :
[…]
toutefois, il demeure entendu que, pour l’application des articles 7, 8 et 26, et de l’article 19 de la Loi sur l’accès à l’information, les renseignements personnels ne comprennent pas les renseignements concernant :
[…]
m) un individu décédé depuis plus de vingt ans.
[29] Section 8 of the Act sets out the circumstances where personal information shall be disclosed:
8. (1) Personal information under the control of a government institution shall not, without the consent of the individual to whom it relates,
be disclosed by the institution except in accordance with this section.
(2) Subject to any other Act of Parliament, personal information under the control of a government institution may be disclosed
[…]
(j) to any person or body for research or statistical purposes if the head of the government
institution
(i) is satisfied that the purpose for which the information is disclosed cannot reasonably
be accomplished unless the information is provided in a form that would identify the individual to whom it relates, and
(ii) obtains from the person or body a written undertaking that no subsequent disclosure of the information will be made in a form that could reasonably be expected to identify the individual to whom it relates;
[…]
(m) for any purpose where, in the opinion of the head of the institution,
(i) the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that
could result from the disclosure, or
(ii) disclosure would clearly benefit the individual to whom the information relates.
8. (1) Les renseignements personnels qui relèvent d’une institution fédérale ne peuvent
être communiqués, à défaut du consentement de l’individu qu’ils concernent, que conformément au présent article.
(2) Sous réserve d’autres lois fédérales, la communication des renseignements personnels
qui relèvent d’une institution fédérale est autorisée dans les cas suivants :
[…]
j) communication à toute personne ou à tout organisme, pour des travaux de recherche ou de statistique, pourvu que soient réalisées les deux conditions suivantes :
(i) le responsable de l’institution est convaincu
que les fins auxquelles les renseignements sont communiqués ne peuvent
être normalement atteintes que si les renseignements sont donnés sous une forme qui permette d’identifier l’individu qu’ils concernent,
(ii) la personne ou l’organisme s’engagent par écrit auprès du responsable de l’institution à s’abstenir de toute communication ultérieure des renseignements tant que leur forme risque vraisemblablement de permettre l’identification de l’individu qu’ils concernent;
[…]
m) communication à toute autre fin dans les cas où, de l’avis du responsable de l’institution :
(i) des raisons d’intérêt public justifieraient nettement une éventuelle violation
de la vie privée,
(ii) l’individu concerné en tirerait un avantage certain.
[30] Section 12 of the Act grants individuals the right of access to their personal information:
12. (1) Subject to this Act, every individual who is a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act has a right to and shall, on request, be given access to
(a) any personal information about the individual contained in a personal information bank; and
(b) any other personal information about the individual under the control of a government institution with respect to which the individual
is able to provide sufficiently specific information on the location of the information as to render it reasonably retrievable by the government institution.
[…]
12. (1) Sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi, tout citoyen canadien et tout
résident permanent au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés ont le droit de se faire communiquer sur demande :
a) les renseignements personnels le concernant et versés dans un fichier de renseignements personnels;
b) les autres renseignements personnels le concernant et relevant d’une institution fédérale, dans la mesure où il peut fournir sur leur localisation des indications suffisamment précises pour que l’institution fédérale puisse les retrouver sans problèmes sérieux.
[…]
[31] Section 14 of the Act requires the head of the government institution to acknowledge in writing receipt of a request for access to personal information within 30 days of the request being made and indicate whether access will be granted:
14. Where access to personal information is requested under subsection 12(1), the head of
the government institution to which the request is made shall, subject to section 15, within thirty days after the request is received,
(a) give written notice to the individual who made the request as to whether or not access to the information or a part thereof will be given; and
(b) if access is to be given, give the individual who made the request access to the information or the part thereof.
14. Le responsable de l’institution fédérale à qui est faite une demande de communication de renseignements personnels en vertu du paragraphe 12(1) est tenu, dans les trente jours suivant sa réception, sous réserve de l’article 15 :
a) d’aviser par écrit la personne qui a fait la demande de ce qu’il sera donné ou non communication totale ou partielle des renseignements
personnels;
b) le cas échéant, de procéder à la communication.
[32] Section 15 of the Act allows the head of a government institution to extend the time limit for complying with a request for access for a maximum of an additional 30 days:
15. The head of a government institution may extend the time limit set out in section 14 in respect of a request for
(a) a maximum of thirty days if
(i) meeting the original time limit would unreasonably interfere with the operations
of the government institution, or
(ii) consultations are necessary to comply with the request that cannot reasonably be completed within the original time limit, or
(b) such period of time as is reasonable, if additional time is necessary for translation
purposes or for the purposes of converting the personal information into an alternative
format, by giving notice of the extension and the length of the extension to the individual who made the request within thirty days after the request is received, which notice shall contain a statement that the individual has a right to make a complaint to the Privacy Commissioner about the extension.
15. Le responsable d’une institution fédérale peut proroger le délai mentionné à l’article 14 :
a) d’une période maximale de trente jours dans les cas où :
(i) l’observation du délai entraverait de façon sérieuse le fonctionnement de l’institution,
(ii) les consultations nécessaires pour donner suite à la demande rendraient pratiquement impossible l’observation du délai;
b) d’une période qui peut se justifier dans les cas de traduction ou dans les cas de transfert sur support de substitution. Dans l’un ou l’autre de ces cas, le responsable de l’institution fédérale envoie à la personne
qui a fait la demande, dans les trente jours suivant sa réception, un avis de prorogation de délai en lui faisant part du nouveau délai ainsi que de son droit de déposer une plainte à ce propos auprès du Commissaire à la protection de la vie privée.
[33] Subsection 16(3) of the Act deems the government institution to have refused the request for disclosure following the expiry of the time limits under the Act:
16(3) Where the head of a government institution fails to give access to any personal information requested under subsection 12(1) within the
time limits set out in this Act, the head of the institution shall, for the purposes of this
Act, be deemed to have refused to give access.
16(3) Le défaut de communication de renseignements personnels demandés en vertu du paragraphe 12(1) dans les
délais prévus par la présente loi vaut décision de refus de communication.
[34] Subsection 22(1)(b) of the Act permits the government institution to refuse to disclose personal information which by its disclosure would be injurious to the conduct of a lawful investigation:
22. (1) The head of a government institution
may refuse to disclose any personal information
requested under subsection 12(1)
(b) the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the enforcement of any law of Canada or a province or the conduct of lawful investigations, including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, any such information
(i) relating to the existence or nature of a particular investigation,
(ii) that would reveal the identity of a confidential source of information, or
(iii) that was obtained or prepared in the course of an investigation; or
22. (1) Le responsable d’une institution fédérale
peut refuser la communication des renseignements
personnels demandés en vertu du paragraphe 12(1) :
b) soit dont la divulgation risquerait vraisemblablement
de nuire aux activités destinées
à faire respecter les lois fédérales ou provinciales ou au déroulement d’enquêtes
licites, notamment :
(i) des renseignements relatifs à l’existence ou à la nature d’une enquête déterminée,
(ii) des renseignements qui permettraient de remonter à une source de renseignements
confidentielle,
(iii) des renseignements obtenus ou préparés au cours d’une enquête;
.
[35] Subsection 22(3) defines the term “investigation”:
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(b), “investigation” means an investigation that
(a) pertains to the administration or enforcement
of an Act of Parliament;
(b) is authorized by or pursuant to an Act of Parliament; or
(c) is within a class of investigations specified in the regulations.
(3) Pour l’application de l’alinéa (1)b), « enquête » s’entend de celle qui :
a) se rapporte à l’application d’une loi fédérale;
b) est autorisée sous le régime d’une loi fédérale;
c) fait partie d’une catégorie d’enquêtes précisée dans les règlements.
[36] Section 29 of the Act allows individuals or their representatives to file a complaint with the Commissioner if their request for disclosure has been refused:
29. (1) Subject to this Act, the Privacy Commissioner shall receive and investigate complaints
(d) from individuals who have requested access to personal information in respect of which a time limit has been extended pursuant to section 15 where they consider the extension unreasonable;
[…]
(2) Nothing in this Act precludes the Privacy Commissioner from receiving and investigating complaints of a nature described in
subsection (1) that are submitted by a person authorized by the complainant to act on behalf of the complainant, and a reference to a complainant in any other section includes a reference to a person so authorized.
29. (1) Sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi, le Commissaire à la protection
de la vie privée reçoit les plaintes et fait enquête sur les plaintes :
d) déposées par des individus qui ont demandé des renseignements personnels dont les délais de communication ont été prorogés en vertu de l’article 15 et qui considèrent la prorogation comme abusive;
[…]
(2) Le Commissaire à la protection de la vie privée peut
recevoir les plaintes visées au paragraphe (1) par l’intermédiaire d’un représentant du plaignant. Dans les autres articles de la présente loi, les dispositions qui concernent le plaignant concernent également son représentant.
[37] Section 41 of the Act gives individuals or their representatives who have been refused access to their personal records a right to apply to the Federal Court for a review of the matter following an investigation and report by the Commissioner:
41. Any individual who has been refused access to personal information requested under subsection 12(1) may, if a complaint has been made to the Privacy Commissioner in respect of the refusal, apply to the Court for a review of the matter within forty-five days after the time the results of an investigation of the complaint
by the Privacy Commissioner are reported to the complainant under subsection 35(2) or within such further time as the Court may, either before or after the expiration of those forty- five days, fix or allow.
41. L’individu qui s’est vu refuser communication
de renseignements personnels demandés en vertu du paragraphe 12(1) et qui a déposé ou fait déposer une plainte à ce sujet devant le Commissaire à la protection de la vie privée peut, dans un délai de quarante-cinq jours suivant le compte rendu du Commissaire prévu au paragraphe 35(2), exercer un recours en révision de la décision de refus devant la Cour. La Cour peut, avant ou après l’expiration du délai, le proroger ou en autoriser la prorogation.
[38] Section 47 of the Act places the burden of justifying refusal to grant access to the applicant’s personal information upon the government institution:
47. In any proceedings before the Court arising from an application under section 41, 42 or 43, the burden of establishing that the head of a government institution is authorized to refuse to disclose personal information requested under subsection 12(1) or that a file should be included in a personal information bank designated as an exempt bank under section 18 shall be on the government institution concerned.
47. Dans les procédures découlant des recours prévus aux articles 41, 42 ou 43, la charge d’établir le bien-fondé du refus de communication de renseignements personnels ou le bienfondé du versement de certains dossiers dans un fichier inconsultable classé comme tel en vertu de l’article 18 incombe à l’institution fédérale concernée.
[39] Section 48 and section 49 of the Act delineate the remedial powers of the Federal Court under the Act:
48. Where the head of a government institution refuses to disclose personal information requested under subsection 12(1) on the basis of a provision of this Act not referred to in section 49, the Court shall, if it determines that the head of the institution is not authorized under this Act to refuse to disclose the personal information, order the head of the institution to disclose the personal information, subject to such
conditions as the Court deems appropriate, to the individual who requested access thereto, or shall make such other order as the Court deems appropriate.
49. Where the head of a government institution refuses to disclose personal information requested under subsection 12(1) on the basis of section 20 or 21 or paragraph 22(1)(b) or (c) or 24(a), the Court shall, if it determines that the head of the institution did not have reasonable grounds on which to refuse to disclose the personal information, order the head of the institution to disclose the personal information, subject to such conditions as the Court deems
appropriate, to the individual who requested access thereto, or shall make such other order as the Court deems appropriate.
48. La Cour, dans les cas où elle conclut au bon droit de l’individu qui a exercé un recours en révision d’une décision de refus de communication de renseignements personnels fondée sur des dispositions de la présente loi autres que celles mentionnées à l’article 49, ordonne, aux conditions qu’elle juge indiquées, au responsable de l’institution fédérale dont relèvent les renseignements d’en donner communication à l’individu; la Cour rend une autre ordonnance si elle l’estime indiqué.
49. Dans les cas où le refus de communication des renseignements personnels s’appuyait sur les articles 20 ou 21 ou sur les alinéas 22(1)b) ou c) ou 24a), la Cour, si elle conclut que le refus n’était pas fondé sur des motifs raisonnables, ordonne, aux conditions qu’elle juge indiquées, au responsable de l’institution fédérale dont relèvent les renseignements d’en donner communication à l’individu qui avait fait la
demande; la Cour rend une autre ordonnance si elle l’estime indiqué.
[40] Section 52 of the Act grants the Court discretion to awards the costs of all judicial proceedings following the event or to the unsuccessful applicant if an important principle was raised:
52. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the costs of and incidental to all proceedings in the Court
under this Act shall be in the discretion of the Court and shall follow the event unless the Court orders otherwise.
(2) Where the Court is of the opinion that an application for review under section 41 or 42
has raised an important new principle in relation to this Act, the Court shall order that costs be awarded to the applicant even if the applicant has not been successful in the result.
52. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), les frais et dépens sont laissés à l’appréciation de la Cour et suivent, sauf ordonnance contraire de la Cour, le sort du principal.
(2) Dans les cas où elle estime que l’objet du recours a soulevé un principe important et nouveau quant à la présente loi, la Cour accorde les frais et dépens à la personne qui a exercé le recours devant elle, même si cette personne a été déboutée de son recours.
[41] Section 10 of the Privacy Act Regulations (“Privacy Regulations”), SOR/83-508 sets out who may exercise the rights to access under Act:
10. The rights or actions provided for under the Act and these Regulations may be exercised or performed
[…]
(b) on behalf of a deceased person by a person authorized
by or pursuant to the law of Canada or a province to administer the estate of that person, but only for the purpose of such administration; and
(c) on behalf of any other individual by any person
authorized in writing to do so by the individual.
10. Les droits ou recours prévus par la Loi et le présent
règlement peuvent être exercés,
[…]
b) au nom d’une personne décédée, par une personne
autorisée en vertu d’une loi fédérale ou provinciale à
gérer la succession de cette personne, mais aux seules
fins de gérer la succession; et
c) au nom de tout autre individu, par une personne
ayant reçu à cette fin une autorisation écrite de cet individu.
ISSUES
[42] The applicant raises the following issues:
a. Does the death of Ms. Ashley Smith vitiate her consent and authorization for the applicant to have access to her records?
b. Can the respondent rely on the RCMP criminal investigation to exempt the personal records from disclosure under subsection 22(1)(b) of the Act?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[43] In Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, 372 N.R. 1, the Supreme Court of Canada held at paragraph 62 that the first step in conducting a standard of review analysis is to "ascertain whether the jurisprudence has already determined in a satisfactory manner the degree of (deference) to be accorded with regard to a particular category of question": see also Khosa v. Canada (MCI), 2009 SCC 12, per Justice Binnie at paragraph 53.
[44] Applications under section 41 are for review of a decision not to disclose personal information. While seeking an opinion from the Privacy Commissioner is a prerequisite to filing an application under section 41, the Commissioner's determination is not the subject of the review: see my decision in Cemerlic v. Canada (Solicitor General), 2003 FCT 133, at para. 7. Despite the non-binding nature of the Commissioner’s report, this Court has held that its opinions are an important consideration in the proceedings under section 41 of the Act: Richards v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), 2003 FC 1450, per Justice Lemieux at paragraph 9; Gordon v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2008 FC 258, per Justice Gibson at paragraph 20; Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Information Commissioner) (2004), 32 C.P.R. (4th) 464 (F.C.), per Justice Dawson at paragraph 84.
[45] In Savard v. Canada Post Corp., 2008 FC 671, Justice Blanchard set out at paragraph 17 the standard of review in an application under section 41 of the Act:
¶17 In this matter, the Court is invited to review a decision made by the respondent on an issue of disclosure of personal information under the PA. It is a two-step analysis (Kelly v.Canada (Solicitor General), [1992] F.C.J. No. 302 (Lexis) at paragraph 5). The first is to determine whether the statement of mailing is in fact the applicant's "personal information" within the meaning of paragraphs 3(g) and (h) of the PA. The goal is to determine whether the information at issue falls under a legal exception (Blank v. Canada (Minister of the Environment), 2006 FC 1253, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1635 (Lexis), at paragraph 26). The appropriate standard at this stage is that of correctness (Elomari v. Canada (Space Agency), 2006 FC 863 at paragraph 19; and Thurlow, supra at paragraph 28). If this first question is answered in the affirmative, we then move on to the second step. This step involves determining whether the discretionary power exercised by the respondent in regard to the refusal to disclose the statement of mailing was reasonable. On this issue, it should be noted that the PA does not contain any privative clause, that the decision-maker does not have special expertise in the matter and that the nature of the question is essentially discretionary. Taking these factors into account, it is my opinion that the appropriate standard at this stage is that of reasonableness.
(See also Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2009 FC 1221 per Justice de Montigny at paragraph 27).
[46] The parties and the Court are in agreement that Ms. Smith’s records are “personal information” and thus governed by the Act. The first issue in this application is whether
Ms. Smith’s consent to the disclosure of her personal information was vitiated by her death. In other words, the question is whether the respondent made the correct decision in law in determining that Ms. Smith’s records are wholly exempted by reason of her vitiated consent. This issue is determinable on a correctness standard. The second issue, whether section 22(1)(b) of the Act operates to exempt Ms. Smith’s records, if her consent is not vitiated, is also reviewable on a correctness standard.
BURDEN OF PROOF
[47] Section 48 of the Act places the burden of justifying an exemption under the Act on the respondent government organization. Therefore, the respondent must satisfy the Court that, on a balance of probabilities, that the CSC’s decision to refuse to disclose Ms. Smith’s personal records was correct: see my decision in Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of Industry), 2006 FC 132, at paragraph 25.
ANALYSIS
The importance of privacy in a free and democratic society
[48] Privacy is a fundamental right in a free and democratic society. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects a person’s privacy from unreasonable search and seizure by government authorities. Government cannot interfere with the privacy of an individual unless there are reasonable grounds to believe that that person has committed an offence, and it is necessary for the government to enter the private domain of that person. As well as this privacy right of an individual, the Privacy Act sets out two quasi-constitutional rights of privacy for an individual:
a. it protects personal information held by government institutions from disclosure to any