Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick

Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2008-03-07
Neutral citation
2008 SCC 9
Report
[2008] 1 SCR 190
Case number
31459
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; Bastarache, Michel; Binnie, William Ian Corneil; LeBel, Louis; Deschamps, Marie; Fish, Morris J.; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Charron, Louise; Rothstein, Marshall
On appeal from
New Brunswick
Subjects
Administrative law
Notes
SCC Case Information: 31459
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2008 SCC 9
Date: 20080307
Docket: 31459
Between:
David Dunsmuir
Appellant
v.
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of New Brunswick
as represented by Board of Management
Respondent
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ.
Joint Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 118)
Concurring Reasons:
(paras. 119 to 157)
Concurring Reasons:
(paras. 158 to 173)
Bastarache and LeBel JJ. (McLachlin C.J. and Fish and Abella JJ. concurring)
Binnie J.
Deschamps J. (Charron and Rothstein JJ. concurring)
______________________________
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2008 SCC 9
David Dunsmuir Appellant
v.
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of
New Brunswick as represented by Board of Management Respondent
Indexed as: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick
Neutral citation: 2008 SCC 9.
File No.: 31459.
2007: May 15; 2008: March 7.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for new brunswick
Administrative law — Judicial review — Standard of review — Proper approach to judicial review of administrative decision makers — Whether judicial review should include only two standards: correctness and reasonableness.
Administrative law — Judicial review — Standard of review — Employee holding office “at pleasure” in provincial civil service dismissed without alleged cause with four months’ pay in lieu of notice — Adjudicator interpreting enabling statute as conferring jurisdiction to determine whether discharge was in fact for cause — Adjudicator holding employer breached duty of procedural fairness and ordering reinstatement — Whether standard of reasonableness applicable to adjudicator’s decision on statutory interpretation issue — Public Service Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P‑25, ss. 97(2.1), 100.1(5) — Civil Service Act, S.N.B. 1984, c. C‑5.1, s. 20.
Administrative law — Natural justice — Procedural fairness — Dismissal of public office holders — Employee holding office “at pleasure” in provincial civil service dismissed without alleged cause with four months’ pay in lieu of notice — Employee not informed of reasons for termination or provided with opportunity to respond — Whether employee entitled to procedural fairness — Proper approach to dismissal of public employees.
D was employed by the Department of Justice for the Province of New Brunswick. He held a position under the Civil Service Act and was an office holder “at pleasure”. His probationary period was extended twice and the employer reprimanded him on three separate occasions during the course of his employment. On the third occasion, a formal letter of reprimand was sent to D warning him that his failure to improve his performance would result in further disciplinary action up to and including dismissal. While preparing for a meeting to discuss D’s performance review the employer concluded that D was not right for the job. A formal letter of termination was delivered to D’s lawyer the next day. Cause for the termination was explicitly not alleged and D was given four months’ pay in lieu of notice.
D commenced the grievance process under s. 100.1 of the Public Service Labour Relations Act (“PSLRA”), alleging that the reasons for the employer’s dissatisfaction were not made known, that he did not receive a reasonable opportunity to respond to the concerns, that the employer’s actions in terminating him were without notice, due process or procedural fairness, and that the length of the notice period was inadequate. The grievance was denied and then referred to adjudication. A preliminary issue of statutory interpretation arose as to whether, where dismissal was with notice or pay in lieu thereof, the adjudicator was authorized to determine the reasons underlying the province’s decision to terminate. The adjudicator held that the referential incorporation of s. 97(2.1) of the PSLRA into s. 100.1(5) of that Act meant that he could determine whether D had been discharged or otherwise disciplined for cause. Ultimately, the adjudicator made no finding as to whether the discharge was or was not for cause. In his decision on the merits, he found that the termination letter effected termination with pay in lieu of notice and that the termination was not disciplinary. As D’s employment was hybrid in character, the adjudicator held that D was entitled to and did not receive procedural fairness in the employer’s decision to terminate his employment. He declared that the termination was void ab initio and ordered D reinstated as of the date of dismissal, adding that in the event that his reinstatement order was quashed on judicial review, he would find the appropriate notice period to be eight months.
On judicial review, the Court of Queen’s Bench applied the correctness standard and quashed the adjudicator’s preliminary decision, concluding that the adjudicator did not have jurisdiction to inquire into the reasons for the termination, and that his authority was limited to determining whether the notice period was reasonable. On the merits, the court found that D had received procedural fairness by virtue of the grievance hearing before the adjudicator. Concluding that the adjudicator’s decision did not stand up to review on a reasonableness simpliciter standard, the court quashed the reinstatement order but upheld the adjudicator’s provisional award of eight months’ notice. The Court of Appeal held that the proper standard with respect to the interpretation of the adjudicator’s authority under the PSLRA was reasonableness simpliciter, not correctness, and that the adjudicator’s decision was unreasonable. It found that where the employer elects to dismiss with notice or pay in lieu of notice, s. 97(2.1) of the PSLRA does not apply and the employee may only grieve the length of the notice period. It agreed with the reviewing judge that D’s right to procedural fairness had not been breached.
Held: The appeal should be dismissed.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, LeBel, Fish and Abella JJ.: Despite its clear, stable constitutional foundations, the system of judicial review in Canada has proven to be difficult to implement. It is necessary to reconsider both the number and definitions of the various standards of review, and the analytical process employed to determine which standard applies in a given situation. Notwithstanding the theoretical differences between the standards of patent unreasonableness and reasonableness simpliciter, any actual difference between them in terms of their operation appears to be illusory. There ought to be only two standards of review: correctness and reasonableness. [32] [34] [41]
When applying the correctness standard in respect of jurisdictional and some other questions of law, a reviewing court will not show deference to the decision maker’s reasoning process; it will rather undertake its own analysis of the question and decide whether it agrees with the determination of the decision maker; if not, the court will substitute its own view and provide the correct answer. A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable. Reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision‑making process and with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the law. It is a deferential standard which requires respect for the legislative choices to leave some matters in the hands of administrative decision makers, for the processes and determinations that draw on particular expertise and experiences, and for the different roles of the courts and administrative bodies within the Canadian constitutional system. [47‑50]
An exhaustive analysis is not required in every case to determine the proper standard of review. Courts must first ascertain whether the jurisprudence has already determined in a satisfactory manner the degree of deference to be accorded to a decision maker with regard to a particular category of question. If the inquiry proves unfruitful, courts must analyze the factors making it possible to identify the proper standard of review. The existence of a privative clause is a strong indication of review pursuant to the reasonableness standard, since it is evidence of Parliament or a legislature’s intent that an administrative decision maker be given greater deference and that interference by reviewing courts be minimized. It is not, however, determinative. Where the question is one of fact, discretion or policy, or where the legal issue is intertwined with and cannot be readily separated from the factual issue, deference will usually apply automatically. Deference will usually result where a decision maker is interpreting its own statute or statutes closely connected to its function, with which it will have particular familiarity. While deference may also be warranted where an administrative decision maker has developed particular expertise in the application of a general common law or civil law rule in relation to a specific statutory context, a question of law that is of central importance to the legal system as a whole and outside the specialized area of expertise of the administrative decision maker will always attract a correctness standard. So will a true question of vires, a question regarding the jurisdictional lines between two or more competing specialized tribunals, and a constitutional question regarding the division of powers between Parliament and the provinces in the Constitution Act, 1867 . [52‑62]
The standard of reasonableness applied on the issue of statutory interpretation. While the question of whether the combined effect of ss. 97(2.1) and 100.1 of the PSLRA permits the adjudicator to inquire into the employer’s reason for dismissing an employee with notice or pay in lieu of notice is a question of law, it is not one that is of central importance to the legal system and outside the specialized expertise of the adjudicator, who was in fact interpreting his enabling statute. Furthermore, s. 101(1) of the PSLRA includes a full privative clause, and the nature of the regime favours the standard of reasonableness. Here, the adjudicator’s interpretation of the law was unreasonable and his decision does not fall within the range of acceptable outcomes that are defensible in respect of the facts and the law. The employment relationship between the parties in this case was governed by private law. The combined effect of ss. 97(2.1) and 100.1 of the PSLRA cannot, on any reasonable interpretation, remove the employer’s right, under the ordinary rules of contract, to discharge an employee with reasonable notice or pay in lieu thereof without asserting cause. By giving the PSLRA an interpretation that allowed him to inquire into the reasons for discharge, the adjudicator adopted a reasoning process that was fundamentally inconsistent with the employment contract and, thus, fatally flawed. [66‑75]
On the merits, D was not entitled to procedural fairness. Where a public employee is employed under a contract of employment, regardless of his or her status as a public office holder, the applicable law governing his or her dismissal is the law of contract, not general principles arising out of public law. Where a dismissal decision is properly within the public authority’s powers and is taken pursuant to a contract of employment, there is no compelling public law purpose for imposing a duty of fairness. The principles expressed in Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19 in relation to the general duty of fairness owed by public authorities when making decisions that affect the rights, privileges or interests of individuals are valid and important. However, to the extent that Knight ignored the important effect of a contract of employment, it should not be followed. In the case at bar, D was a contractual employee in addition to being a public office holder. Section 20 of the Civil Service Act provided that as a civil servant he could only be dismissed in accordance with the ordinary rules of contract. To consider a public law duty of fairness issue where such a duty exists falls squarely within the adjudicator’s task to resolve a grievance. Where, as here, the relationship is contractual, it was unnecessary to consider any public law duty of procedural fairness. By imposing procedural fairness requirements on the respondent over and above its contractual obligations and ordering the full “reinstatement” of D, the adjudicator erred and his decision was therefore correctly struck down. [76‑78] [81] [84] [106] [114] [117]
Per Binnie J.: The majority reasons for setting aside the adjudicator ruling were generally agreed with, however the call of the majority to re‑evaluate the pragmatic and functional test and to re‑assess “the structure and characteristics of the system of judicial review as a whole” and to develop a principled framework that is “more coherent and workable” invites a broader reappraisal. Judicial review is an idea that has lately become unduly burdened with law office metaphysics. Litigants find the court’s attention focussed not on their complaints, or the government’s response, but on lengthy and arcane discussions of something they are told is the pragmatic and functional test. The Court should at least (i) establish some presumptive rules and (ii) get the parties away from arguing about the tests and back to arguing about the substantive merits of their case. [119-122] [133] [145]
The distinction between “patent unreasonableness” and reasonableness simpliciter is now to be abandoned. The repeated attempts to explain the difference between the two, was in hindsight, unproductive and distracting. However, a broad reappraisal of the system of judicial review should explicitly address not only administrative tribunals but issues related to other types of administrative bodies and statutory decision makers including mid‑level bureaucrats and, for that matter, Ministers. If logic and language cannot capture the distinction in one context, it must equally be deficient elsewhere in the field of judicial review. [121‑123] [134-135] [140]
It should be presumed that the standard of review of an administrative outcome on grounds of substance is reasonableness. In accordance with the ordinary rules of litigation, it should also be presumed that the decision under review is reasonable until the applicant shows otherwise. An applicant urging the non‑deferential “correctness” standard should be required to demonstrate that the decision rests on an error in the determination of a legal issue not confided (or which constitutionally could not be confided) to the administrative decision maker to decide, whether in relation to jurisdiction or the general law. The logic of the constitutional limitation is obvious. If the limitation did not exist, the government could transfer the work of the courts to administrative bodies that are not independent of the executive and by statute immunize the decisions of these bodies from effective judicial review. Questions of law outside the administrative decision maker’s home statute and closely related rules or statutes which require his or her expertise should also be reviewable on a “correctness” standard whether or not it meets the majority’s additional requirement that it be “of central importance to the legal system as a whole”. The standard of correctness should also apply to the requirements of “procedural fairness”, which will vary with the type of decision maker and the type of decision under review. Nobody should have his or her rights, interests or privileges adversely dealt with by an unjust process. [127‑129] [146‑147]
On the other hand when the application for judicial review challenges the substantive outcome of an administrative action, the judge is invited to cross the line into second‑guessing matters that lie within the function of the administrator. This is controversial because it is not immediately obvious why a judge’s view of the reasonableness of an administrative policy or the exercise of an administrative discretion should be preferred to that of the administrator to whom Parliament or a legislature has allocated the decision, unless there is a full statutory right of appeal to the courts, or it is otherwise indicated in the conferring legislation that a “correctness” standard is intended. [130]
Abandonment of the distinction between reasonableness simpliciter and patent unreasonableness has important implications. The two different standards addressed not merely “the magnitude or the immediacy of the defect” in the administrative decision but recognized that different administrative decisions command different degrees of deference, depending on who is deciding what. [135]
“Contextualizing” a single standard of “reasonableness” review will shift the courtroom debate from choosing between two standards of reasonableness that each represented a different level of deference to a debate within a single standard of reasonableness to determine the appropriate level of deference. [139]
Thus a single “reasonableness” standard will now necessarily incorporate both the degree of deference owed to the decision maker formerly reflected in the distinction between patent unreasonableness and reasonableness simpliciter, and an assessment of the range of options reasonably open to the decision maker in the circumstances. The judge’s role is to identify the outer boundaries of reasonable outcomes within which the administrative decision maker is free to choose. [141] [149]
A single “reasonableness” standard is a big tent that will have to accommodate a lot of variables that inform and limit a court’s review of the outcome of administrative decision making. “Contextualizing” the reasonableness standard will require a reviewing court to consider the precise nature and function of the decision maker including its expertise, the terms and objectives of the governing statute (or common law) conferring the power of decision including the existence of a privative clause and the nature of the issue being decided. Careful consideration of these matters will reveal the extent of the discretion conferred. In some cases the court will have to recognize that the decision maker was required to strike a proper balance (or achieve proportionality) between the adverse impact of a decision on the rights and interests of the applicant or others directly affected weighed against the public purpose which is sought to be advanced. In each case careful consideration will have to be given to the reasons given for the decision. This list of “contextual” considerations is non‑exhaustive. A reviewing court ought to recognize throughout the exercise that fundamentally the “reasonableness” of the administrative outcome is an issue given to another forum to decide. [144] [151‑155]
Per Deschamps, Charron and Rothstein JJ.: Any review starts with the identification of the questions at issue as questions of law, questions of fact or questions of mixed fact and law. In the adjudicative context, decisions on questions of fact, whether undergoing appellate review or administrative law review, always attract deference. When there is a privative clause, deference is owed to the administrative body that interprets the legal rules it was created to interpret and apply. If the body oversteps its delegated powers, if it is asked to interpret laws in respect of which it does not have expertise or if Parliament or a legislature has provided for a statutory right of review, deference is not owed to the decision maker. Finally, when considering a question of mixed fact and law, a reviewing court should show an adjudicator the same deference as an appeal court would show a lower court. [158‑164]
Here, the employer’s common law right to dismiss without cause was the starting point of the analysis. Since the adjudicator does not have specific expertise in interpreting the common law, the reviewing court can proceed to its own interpretation of the applicable rules and determine whether the adjudicator could enquire into the cause of the dismissal. The applicable standard of review is correctness. The distinction between the common law rules of employment and the statutory rules applicable to a unionized employee is essential if s. 97(2.1) of the PSLRA is to be applied mutatis mutandis to the case of a non‑unionized employee as required by s. 100.1(5) of the PSLRA. The adjudicator’s failure to inform himself of this crucial difference led him to look for a cause for the dismissal, which was not relevant. Even if deference had been owed to the adjudicator, his interpretation could not have stood. Employment security is so fundamental to an employment relationship that it could not have been granted by the legislature by providing only that the PSLRA was to apply mutatis mutandis to non‑unionized employees. [168‑171]
Cases Cited
By Bastarache and LeBel JJ.
Referred to: Chalmers (Dr. Everett) Hospital v. Mills (1989), 102 N.B.R. (2d) 1; Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653; Alberta Union of Provincial Employees v. Lethbridge Community College, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 727, 2004 SCC 28; Crevier v. Attorney General of Quebec, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 220; Dr. Q v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226, 2003 SCC 19; Executors of the Woodward Estate v. Minister of Finance, [1973] S.C.R. 120; U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817; Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 1; Mount Sinai Hospital Center v. Quebec (Minister of Health and Social Services), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 281, 2001 SCC 41; C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539, 2003 SCC 29; Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710, 2002 SCC 86; Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp., [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227; Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748; Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982; Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, 2003 SCC 63; Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, 2003 SCC 20; Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. Via Rail Canada Inc., [2007] 1 S.C.R. 650, 2007 SCC 15; Voice Construction Ltd. v. Construction & General Workers’ Union, Local 92, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 609, 2004 SCC 23; Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 157; Toronto (City) Board of Education v. O.S.S.T.F., District 15, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 487; McLeod v. Egan, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 517; Cartaway Resources Corp. (Re), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 672, 2004 SCC 26; Westcoast Energy Inc. v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 322; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, 2003 SCC 54; United Taxi Drivers’ Fellowship of Southern Alberta v. Calgary (City), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 485, 2004 SCC 19; Regina Police Assn. Inc. v. Regina (City) Board of Police Commissioners, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 360, 2000 SCC 14; Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 185, 2004 SCC 39; Canada Safeway Ltd. v. RWDSU, Local 454, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1079; Moreau‑Bérubé v. New Brunswick (Judicial Council), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 249, 2002 SCC 11; Ridge v. Baldwin, [1963] 2 All E.R. 66; Nicholson v. Haldimand‑Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311; Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Board, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602; Kane v. Board of Governors of the University of British Columbia, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1105; Attorney General of Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735; Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643; Reglin v. Creston (Town) (2004), 34 C.C.E.L. (3d) 123, 2004 BCSC 790; Gismondi v. Toronto (City) (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 688; Seshia v. Health Sciences Centre (2001), 160 Man. R. (2d) 41, 2001 MBCA 151; Rosen v. Saskatoon District Health Board (2001), 202 D.L.R. (4th) 35, 2001 SKCA 83; Hanis v. Teevan (1998), 111 O.A.C. 91; Gerrard v. Sackville (Town) (1992), 124 N.B.R. (2d) 70; Malloch v. Aberdeen Corp., [1971] 2 All E.R. 1278; Hughes v. Moncton (City) (1990), 111 N.B.R. (2d) 184, aff’d (1991), 118 N.B.R. (2d) 306; Rosen v. Saskatoon District Health Board, [2000] 4 W.W.R. 606, 2000 SKQB 40; Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199; School District No. 5 (Southeast Kootenay) and B.C.T.F. (Yellowaga) (Re) (2000), 94 L.A.C. (4th) 56; Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701.
By Binnie J.
Referred to: Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp., [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227; Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863), 14 C.B. (N.S.) 180, 143 E.R. 414; Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing Branch), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781, 2001 SCC 52; U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048; Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., [1947] 2 All E.R. 680; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817; Mount Sinai Hospital Center v. Quebec (Minister of Health and Social Services), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 281, 2001 SCC 41; Idziak v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 631; Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 1; Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441; Attorney General of Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735; Westcoast Energy Inc. v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 322; Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, 2003 SCC 20; Moreau‑Bérubé v. New Brunswick (Judicial Council), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 249, 2002 SCC 11; C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539, 2003 SCC 29; Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121.
By Deschamps J.
Referred to: H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401, 2005 SCC 25; Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, 2003 SCC 63.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Civil Service Act, S.N.B. 1984, c. C‑5.1, s. 20.
Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 96 to 101 .
Employment Standards Act, S.N.B. 1982, c. E‑7.2.
Extradition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E‑23.
Human Rights Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H‑11.
Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I‑21, s. 23(1) .
Interpretation Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. I‑13, s. 20.
Public Service Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P‑25, ss. 92(1), 97, 97(2.1) [ad. 1990, c. 30, s. 35], 100.1 [idem, s. 40], 101(1) [idem, s. 41], (2) [idem].
Authors Cited
Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West, 2004, “pleasure appointment”.
Brown, Donald J. M., and John M. Evans. Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada. Toronto: Canvasback, 1998 (loose‑leaf updated July 2007).
Cromwell, Thomas A. “Appellate Review: Policy and Pragmatism”. In 2006 Pitblado Lectures, Appellate Courts: Policy, Law and Practice. Winnipeg: Fort Garry, 2006, V‑1.
de Smith, Stanley A. Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 5th ed. By Lord Woolf and Jeffrey Jowell. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995.
Dyzenhaus, David. “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy”, in Michael Taggart, ed., The Province of Administrative Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997, 279.
England, Geoff. Employment Law in Canada, 4th ed. Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005 (loose‑leaf updated March 2007, release 10).
Hogg, Peter W., and Patrick J. Monahan. Liability of the Crown, 3rd ed. Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 2000.
Mullan, David J. Administrative Law. Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001.
Mullan, David J. “Recent Developments in Standard of Review”, in Taking the Tribunal to Court: A Practical Guide for Administrative Law Practitioners. Canadian Bar Association (Ontario), October 20, 2000.
Mullan, David J. “Establishing the Standard of Review: The Struggle for Complexity?” (2004), 17 C.J.A.L.P. 59.
Sossin, Lorne, and Colleen M. Flood, “The Contextual Turn: Iacobucci’s Legacy and the Standard of Review in Administrative Law” (2007), 57 U.T.L.J. 581.
Wade, Sir William. Administrative Law, 8th ed. by Sir William Wade and Christopher Forsyth. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
APPEAL from a judgment of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal (Turnbull, Daigle and Robertson JJ.A.) (2006), 297 N.B.R. (2d) 151, 265 D.L.R. (4th) 609, 44 Admin. L.R. (4th) 92, 48 C.C.E.L. (3d) 196, 2006 CLLC ¶220‑030, [2006] N.B.J. No. 118 (QL), 2006 CarswellNB 155, 2006 NBCA 27, affirming a judgment of Rideout J. (2005), 293 N.B.R. (2d) 5, 43 C.C.E.L. (3d) 205, [2005] N.B.J. No. 327 (QL), 2005 CarswellNB 444, 2005 NBQB 270, quashing a preliminary ruling and quashing in part an award made by an adjudicator. Appeal dismissed.
J. Gordon Petrie, Q.C., and Clarence L. Bennett, for the appellant.
C. Clyde Spinney, Q.C., and Keith P. Mullin, for the respondent.
The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, LeBel, Fish and Abella JJ. was delivered by
Bastarache and LeBel JJ. —
I. Introduction
[1] This appeal calls on the Court to consider, once again, the troubling question of the approach to be taken in judicial review of decisions of administrative tribunals. The recent history of judicial review in Canada has been marked by ebbs and flows of deference, confounding tests and new words for old problems, but no solutions that provide real guidance for litigants, counsel, administrative decision makers or judicial review judges. The time has arrived for a reassessment of the question.
A. Facts
[2] The appellant, David Dunsmuir, was employed by the Department of Justice for the Province of New Brunswick. His employment began on February 25, 2002, as a Legal Officer in the Fredericton Court Services Branch. The appellant was placed on an initial six-month probationary term. On March 14, 2002, by Order‑in‑Council, he was appointed to the offices of Clerk of the Court of Queen’s Bench, Trial Division, Administrator of the Court of Queen’s Bench, Family Division, and Clerk of the Probate Court of New Brunswick, all for the Judicial District of Fredericton.
[3] The employment relationship was not perfect. The appellant’s probationary period was extended twice, to the maximum 12 months. At the end of each probationary period, the appellant was given a performance review. The first such review, which occurred in August 2002, identified four specific areas for improvement. The second review, three months later, cited the same four areas for development, but noted improvements in two. At the end of the third probationary period, the Regional Director of Court Services noted that the appellant had met all expectations and his employment was continued on a permanent basis.
[4] The employer reprimanded the appellant on three separate occasions during the course of his employment. The first incident occurred in July 2002. The appellant had sent an email to the Chief Justice of the Court of Queen’s Bench objecting to a request that had been made by the judge of the Fredericton Judicial District for the preparation of a practice directive. The Regional Director issued a reprimand letter to the appellant, explaining that the means he had used to raise his concerns were inappropriate and exhibited serious error in judgment. In the event that a similar concern arose in the future, he was directed to discuss the matter first with the Registrar or the Regional Director. The letter warned that failure to comply would lead to additional disciplinary measures and, if necessary, to dismissal.
[5] A second disciplinary measure occurred when, in April 2004, it came to the attention of the Assistant Deputy Minister that the appellant was being advertised as a lecturer at legal seminars offered in the private sector. The appellant had inquired previously into the possibility of doing legal work outside his employment. In February 2004, the Assistant Deputy Minister had informed him that lawyers in the public service should not practise law in the private sector. A month later, the appellant wrote a letter to the Law Society of New Brunswick stating that his participation as a non-remunerated lecturer had been vetted by his employer, who had voiced no objection. On June 3, 2004, the Assistant Deputy Minister issued to the appellant written notice of a one-day suspension with pay regarding the incident. The letter also referred to issues regarding the appellant’s work performance, including complaints from unnamed staff, lawyers and members of the public regarding his difficulties with timeliness and organization. This second letter concluded with the statement that “[f]uture occurrences of this nature and failure to develop more efficient organized work habits will result in disciplinary action up to and including dismissal.”
[6] Third, on July 21, 2004, the Regional Director wrote a formal letter of reprimand to the appellant regarding three alleged incidents relating to his job performance. This letter, too, concluded with a warning that the appellant’s failure to improve his organization and timeliness would result in further disciplinary action up to and including dismissal. The appellant responded to the letter by informing the Regional Director that he would be seeking legal advice and, until that time, would not meet with her to discuss the matter further.
[7] A review of the appellant’s work performance had been due in April 2004 but did not take place. The appellant met with the Regional Director on a couple of occasions to discuss backlogs and organizational problems. Complaints were relayed to her by staff but they were not documented and it is unknown how many complaints there had been. The Regional Director notified the appellant on August 11, 2004, that his performance review was overdue and would occur by August 20. A meeting had been arranged for August 19 between the appellant, the Regional Director, the Assistant Deputy Minister and counsel for the appellant and the employer. While preparing for that meeting, the Regional Director and the Assistant Deputy Minister concluded that the appellant was not right for the job. The scheduled meeting was cancelled and a termination notice was faxed to the appellant. A formal letter of termination from the Deputy Minister was delivered to the appellant’s lawyer the next day. The letter terminated the appellant’s employment with the Province of New Brunswick, effective December 31, 2004. It read, in relevant part:
I regret to advise you that I have come to the conclusion that your particular skill set does not meet the needs of your employer in your current position, and that it is advisable to terminate your employment on reasonable notice, pursuant to section 20 of the Civil Service Act. You are accordingly hereby advised that your employment with the Province of New Brunswick will terminate on December 31, 2004. Cause for termination is not alleged.
To aid in your search for other employment, you are not required to report to work during the notice period and your salary will be continued until the date indicated or for such shorter period as you require either to find a job with equivalent remuneration, or you commence self‑employment.
. . .
In the circumstances, we would request that you avoid returning to the workplace until your departure has been announced to staff, and until you have returned your keys and government identification to your supervisor, Ms. Laundry as well as any other property of the employer still in your possession . . . .
[8] On February 3, 2005, the appellant was removed from his statutory offices by order of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council.
[9] The appellant commenced the grievance process under s. 100.1 of the Public Service Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P-25 (“PSLRA”; see Appendix), by letter to the Deputy Minister on September 1, 2004. That provision grants non-unionized employees of the provincial public service the right to file a grievance with respect to a “discharge, suspension or a financial penalty” (s. 100.1(2)). The appellant asserted several grounds of complaint in his grievance letter, in particular, that the reasons for the employer’s dissatisfaction were not made known; that he did not receive a reasonable opportunity to respond to the employer’s concerns; that the employer’s actions in terminating him were without notice, due process or procedural fairness; and that the length of the notice period was inadequate. The grievance was denied. The appellant then gave notice that he would refer the grievance to adjudication under the PSLRA. The adjudicator was selected by agreement of the parties and appointed by the Labour and Employment Board.
[10] The adjudication hearing was convened and counsel for the appellant produced as evidence a volume of 169 documents. Counsel for the respondent objected to the inclusion of almost half of the documents. The objection was made on the ground that the documents were irrelevant since the appellant’s dismissal was not disciplinary but rather was a termination on reasonable notice. The preliminary issue therefore arose of whether, where dismissal was with notice or pay in lieu thereof, the adjudicator was authorized to assess the reasons underlying the province’s decision to terminate. Following his preliminary ruling on that issue, the adjudicator heard and decided the merits of the grievance.
B. Decisions of the Adjudicator
(1) Preliminary Ruling (January 10, 2005)
[11] The adjudicator began his preliminary ruling by considering s. 97(2.1) of the PSLRA. He reasoned that because the appellant was not included in a bargaining unit and there was no collective agreement or arbitral award, the section ought to be interpreted to mean that where an adjudicator determines that an employee has been discharged for cause, the adjudicator may substitute another penalty for the discharge as seems just and reasonable in the circumstances. The adjudicator considered and relied on the decision of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in Chalmers (Dr. Everett) Hospital v. Mills (1989), 102 N.B.R. (2d) 1.
[12] Turning to s. 100.1 of the PSLRA, he noted the referential incorporation of s. 97 in s. 100.1(5). He stated that such incorporation “necessarily means that an adjudicator has jurisdiction to make the determination described in s. 97(2.1), i.e. that an employee has been discharged or otherwise disciplined for cause” (p. 5). The adjudicator noted that an employee to whom s. 20 of the Civil Service Act, S.N.B. 1984, c. C-5.1 (see Appendix), applies may be discharged for cause, with reasonable notice or with pay in lieu of reasonable notice. He concluded by holding that an employer cannot avoid an inquiry into its real reasons for dismissing an employee by stating that cause is not alleged. Rather, a grieving employee is entitled to an adjudication as to whether a discharge purportedly with notice or pay in lieu thereof was in fact for cause. He therefore held that he had jurisdiction to make such