Opportunities for the Disabled Foundation v. Canada (National Revenue)

Opportunities for the Disabled Foundation v. Canada (National Revenue)
Court (s) Database
Federal Court of Appeal Decisions
Date
2016-03-24
Neutral citation
2016 FCA 94
File numbers
A-230-15
Notes
A correction was made on April 11, 2016
Decision Content
Date: 20160324
Docket: A-230-15
Citation: 2016 FCA 94
CORAM:
RYER J.A.
NEAR J.A.
BOIVIN J.A.
BETWEEN:
OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE DISABLED FOUNDATION
Appellant
and
MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE
Respondent
Heard at Vancouver, British Columbia, on March 15, 2016.
Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on March 24, 2016.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:
RYER J.A.
CONCURRED IN BY:
NEAR J.A.
BOIVIN J.A.
Date: 20160324
Docket: A-230-15
Citation: 2016 FCA 94
CORAM:
RYER J.A.
NEAR J.A.
BOIVIN J.A.
BETWEEN:
OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE DISABLED FOUNDATION
Appellant
and
MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
RYER J.A.
[1] This is an appeal by Opportunities for the Disabled Foundation (the “Appellant”), pursuant to paragraph 172(3)(a.1) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) (the “Act”) from a decision of the Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”) dated October 7, 2014, in which the Minister proposed to revoke the Appellant’s registration as a charitable organization, within the meaning of subsection 149.1(1) (the “Revocation Proposal”). Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references in these reasons shall be to the corresponding provisions of the Act that are applicable to this appeal.
I. BACKGROUND [2] The Canada Revenue Agency (the “CRA”) raised concerns with respect to deficiencies in the Appellant’s books and records, failures to devote all of its resources to charitable activities, incomplete/inaccurate information returns and gifts made to non-qualified donees in three prior audits of the Appellant in respect of its 1995 to 1997 taxation years, its 1998 taxation year and its 2004 taxation years.
[3] Subsequent to the last of these three audits, on December 28, 2006, the Appellant and the CRA entered into an agreement (the “Compliance Agreement”) in which the CRA spelled out a number of its concerns and the Appellant agreed to undertake a number of corrective actions.
[4] Pursuant to the Compliance Agreement, the Appellant committed, inter alia, to:
a) maintain adequate books and records that addressed a significant number of the concerns;
b) reduce its fundraising costs in future fundraising negotiations and provide accurate allocations as between charitable and non-charitable expenditures in its annual reporting required under the Act;
c) within two months from the date of the Compliance Agreement, with the prior approval of the CRA Charities Directorate, amend its constating documents to better reflect its objects in respect of Canadian activities and to permit it to undertake foreign activities;
d) assuming prior receipt of CRA Charities Directorate approval to undertake foreign activities was obtained, prepare an Agency Agreement and submit it to the CRA Charities Directorate for approval, so that it could demonstrate that it had control over the foreign activities and that it would receive written reports from the foreign agent setting out the way in which resources transferred to the foreign agent were deployed; and
e) file, on a timely basis, complete and accurate information reports as required by the Act.
[5] The Revocation Proposal resulted from an audit that was conducted by the CRA in relation to the Appellant’s 2010 taxation year (the “2010 Audit”).
[6] By correspondence dated September 12, 2013 (the “Administrative Fairness Letter”), the CRA communicated a number of concerns that it had identified in the 2010 Audit and invited the Appellant to respond. For the most part, the Appellant declined this opportunity, insisting that the CRA answer certain questions posed by counsel to the Appellant, as a precondition to its making any submissions.
[7] The Administrative Fairness Letter referred to concerns that had been raised by the CRA in three prior audits of the Appellant and had also been spelled out in the Compliance Agreement.
[8] In the Revocation Proposal, the CRA outlined its reasons for not responding to the questions that were posed to it by Appellant’s counsel and stated that the limited responses to the concerns expressed in the Administrative Fairness Letter that were provided by Appellant’s counsel did not address those concerns. The CRA proposed to revoke the registration of the Appellant as a charitable organization on the basis of the following instances of non-compliance with the Act by the Appellant, which had been previously mentioned in the Administrative Fairness Letter, namely that it:
failed to devote all of its resources to charitable activities carried on by it; made gifts to non-qualified donees; provided undue benefits to fundraisers and directors; failed to maintain adequate books and records; and failed to file an information return as required by the Act.
[9] It is apparent that a number of those concerns overlap with the commitments made by the Appellant in the Compliance Agreement.
[10] On January 5, 2015, the Appellant filed a notice of objection to the Revocation Proposal (the “Notice of Objection”), as permitted by subsection 168(4).
[11] On February 7, 2015, the Minister published the Revocation Proposal in the Canada Gazette, thereby revoking the registration of the Appellant as a charitable organization (the “Revocation”). The Appellant did not prosecute an application to this Court to defer such publication, as it was permitted to do in accordance with paragraph 168(2)(b).
[12] On May 8, 2015, the Appellant filed a notice of appeal (the “Notice of Appeal”) in respect of the Revocation Proposal, as permitted by paragraph 172(3)(a.1), notwithstanding that the Minister had not, as of that date, varied, vacated or confirmed the Revocation Proposal in accordance with subsection 165(3).
[13] In the Notice of Appeal, the Appellant requests that the Court:
a) provide declarations that each of subsection 168(2) and sections 188 and 189 violates paragraph 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44 (the “Bill of Rights”) and is therefore of no force and effect;
b) quash the Revocation; and
c) quash the Revocation Proposal.
[14] In its Memorandum of Fact and Law, the Appellant changed its position to some degree, asserting that this Court lacks the jurisdiction to provide the requested declaratory relief with respect to the invalidity of subsection 168(2) and sections 188 and 189 on the basis of paragraph 2(e) of the Bill of Rights. In addition, the Appellant no longer contends that this Court has jurisdiction to quash the Revocation. Finally, the Appellant asserts that the order of Justice Stratas, dated September 17, 2015 (the “Appeal Book Order”), which determined that documents that were not before the Minister when the Revocation Proposal was issued ought not to be included in the Appeal Book, has deprived this Court of its jurisdiction to hear this appeal. It is noted that the Appellant did not appeal the Appeal Book Order.
II. ISSUE [15] The overarching issue in this appeal is whether the Minister erred in issuing the Revocation Proposal.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW [16] In an appeal pursuant to paragraph 172(3)(a.1), questions of fact and mixed fact and law in respect of which there is no readily extricable question of law are reviewed on the standard of reasonableness, while questions of law are reviewed on the standard of correctness (see Prescient Foundation v. Canada (National Revenue), 2013 FCA 120, 358 D.L.R. (4th) 541). Moreover, a conclusion or decision will be reasonable if it is within a range of acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the law (see Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16 at paragraph 50, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3).
IV. RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS [17] The relevant statutory provisions are subsection 165(3), paragraphs 168(1)(a), (c) and (e), paragraph 168(2)(b), subsection 168(4), paragraph 172(3)(a.1), section 180, section 188, section 189 and subsections 230(2) and (3). These provisions are reproduced in the Appendix to these reasons.
V. DISCUSSION [18] In keeping with Parliament’s direction in subsection 180(3) that this appeal must be heard and determined in a summary way, I will deal with the six issues that were raised by the Appellant in its Memorandum of Fact and Law.
A. Issue One – Did the Order of Justice Stratas deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to hear the appeal? [19] The Appellant asserts that this Court is without jurisdiction to hear its appeal from the Minister’s decision to issue the Revocation Proposal by virtue of the Appeal Book Order, which settled the contents of the Appeal Book. This argument is difficult to fathom. The appeal right in issue is provided by paragraph 172(3)(a.1) and not by paragraph 180(1)(a). The latter provision only stipulates a time limit for the launching of an appeal where there has been a confirmation of, or other Ministerial action in respect of, a notice of objection under subsection 165(3). Where a notice of objection has been filed but there has been no such confirmation or other action, the objecting party is free to bring its appeal at any time after the expiration of 90 days from the filing of the notice of objection. When such an appeal is launched, as was the case in the instant circumstances, it is not sanctioned by paragraph 180(1)(a), but rather by subsection 172(3), as stipulated in the opening words of subsection 180(1). Clearly, the appeal described in paragraph 172(3)(a.1) is an “appeal pursuant to subsection 172(3)”, as stipulated in subsection 180(1). The content of the appeal books has no bearing on this statutory basis for jurisdiction. Thus, it is my view that this Court has jurisdiction to hear the instant appeal.
B. Issue Two – Does this Court lack jurisdiction to provide remedies to the Appellant after the publication of the Revocation Notice in the Canada Gazette? [20] In the Notice of Appeal, the Appellant purported to appeal the Revocation as well as the Revocation Proposal, asserting that the Court’s jurisdiction to deal with the Revocation springs from section 3 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, Rule 300(b) of the Federal Courts Rules, S.O.R./98-106 and this Court’s “original jurisdiction”.
[21] In its Memorandum of Fact and Law, the Appellant changed its position and asserted that our jurisdiction only extends to the appeal from the Revocation Proposal.
[22] I agree with the Appellant that subsection 172(3) provides no appeal from a revocation of the registration of a charitable organization that results from the timely publication in the Canada Gazette of a notice given by the Minister under subsection 168(1).
[23] While this is sufficient to deal with this issue, I would observe that the Court should not be taken to have endorsed the Appellant’s assertion in paragraph 25 of its Memorandum of Fact and Law that:
…the structure of subsection 168(2) operates to restrict access to a fair trial because it is almost impossible for a registered charity to obtain an order within 30 days from the Federal Court of Appeal on application under subsection 168(4)…
C. Issue Three – Does this Court have jurisdiction in this appeal to determine if paragraph 168(2)(b) violates paragraph 2(e) of the Bill of Rights? [24] In its Memorandum of Fact and Law, the Appellant asserts that the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide this issue in an appeal under paragraph 172(3)(a.1), after having first raised it in the Notice of Appeal, where declaratory relief was requested.
[25] I agree with the Appellant. In my view, the Court lacks the jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief on mere issues of statutory interpretation that are not grounded in the actual circumstances of an appeal that is properly before the Court under paragraph 172(3)(a.1) (see Harris v. R., [2000] 4 F.C. 37, [2000] 3 C.T.C. 220 (C.A.); Universal Aide Society v. Canada (National Revenue), 2009 FCA 107, [2009] C.T.C. 209).
D. Issue Four – Does this Court have jurisdiction in this appeal to determine if subsections 188 and 189 violate paragraph 2(e) of the Bill of Rights? [26] As the Appellant acknowledges that this issue should not have been included in the Notice of Appeal, there is no need for the Court to consider it. In any event, it is my view that the conclusion reached above with respect to this Court’s lack of jurisdiction to grant the declaratory relief with respect to the potential application of paragraph 2(e) of the Bill of Rights to paragraph 168(2)(b) has equal application with respect to this issue.
E. Issue Five – Did the Minister violate the common law of procedural fairness and natural justice? [27] The Appellant asserts that the Minister has violated the common law of procedural fairness because the Minister failed to respond to the Notice of Objection with all due dispatch. In my view, this assertion is groundless.
[28] The phrase “with all due dispatch” in subsection 165(3) has been interpreted to mean within a reasonable period of time (see Hillier v. Canada (Attorney General), 2001 FCA 197, 273 N.R. 245). Additionally, this Court found that where subsection 165(3) is in play, potential concerns with respect to the timeliness of the Minister’s consideration of a notice of objection can be addressed by the exercise of the appeal right that is available to the taxpayer on the 91st day after the filing of the notice of objection. (see Bolton v. R. [1996] 3 C.T.C. 3, 200 N.R. 303 [Bolton]).
[29] The Appellant chose to launch this appeal approximately one month after the expiration of the 90-day period in paragraph 172(3)(a.1). The Appellant tendered no evidence to suggest that the Appeal Division of the CRA was tardy in its consideration of the Notice of Objection or that it would not have varied, vacated or confirmed the Revocation Proposal within a reasonable time. Moreover, as contemplated in Bolton, the Appellant pursued its direct appeal right to this Court within approximately one month after the expiry of the 90-day period in paragraph 172(3)(a.1).
[30] Additionally, I reject the Appellant’s “suppression of evidence” argument because it is an impermissible attempt to collaterally attack or reargue the case that was before Justice Stratas when he made the Appeal Book Order. If the Appellant was displeased with that order, it could have pursued its appeal rights.
[31] The Appellant also asserts that it did not know the case it had to meet in order to stave off the revocation of its status as a charitable organization. In my view, this assertion is groundless. The Administrative Fairness Letter fully described the concerns that arose from the 2010 Audit and the Appellant was invited to make submissions in response. To a large degree, the Appellant chose not to avail itself of its right to make submissions in response to the Administrative Fairness Letter. Moreover, the Compliance Agreement, which arose out of issues raised in three audits that preceded the 2010 Audit, spelled out, to a large extent, the same concerns that the CRA described in the Administrative Fairness Letter and the Revocation Proposal.
F. Issue Six —Did the Minister err in issuing the Revocation Proposal? [32] Having dealt with the preliminary issues raised by the Appellant, it is now opportune to deal with the merits of the Revocation Proposal.
[33] The Revocation Proposal is based upon five grounds. The Appellant’s challenge to them raises, in each case, a question of mixed fact and law, which must be reviewed upon the standard of reasonableness. A finding that any of one of the asserted grounds is reasonable is a sufficient basis for the Court to uphold the Revocation Proposal and dismiss the appeal (see World Job and Food Bank Inc. v. Canada, 2013 FCA 65, [2013] 4 C.T.C. 24, Humane Society of Canada for the Protection of Animals and the Environment v. Canada (National Revenue), 2015 FCA 178, 2015 D.T.C. 5091, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 36688 (March 10, 2016) [Humane Society]).
[34] In Human Life International in Canada Inc. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1998] 3 F.C. 202, [1998] 3 C.T.C. 126, the Minister proposed to revoke the registration of a charity on the basis that, by engaging in some political activities, the charity had failed to devote substantially all of its resources to charitable activity. In dismissing the charity’s appeal, Justice Strayer determined that the Appellant had the onus of demonstrating that the Minister had erred in his conclusions that led to the proposed revocation.
[35] The onus is therefore on the Appellant to demonstrate that the Minister acted unreasonably in respect of each ground raised by the Minister as a justification for issuing the Revocation Proposal.
Ground one — Failure to keep adequate books & records [36] The Minister identified a number of deficiencies in the Appellant’s books and records. A number of these deficiencies were also addressed in the Compliance Agreement. In the Minister’s view, the Appellant failed to satisfy the requirement to maintain books and records set out in subsection 230(2) and that such non-compliance warranted the Minister’s issuance of the Revocation Proposal. In that regard, paragraph 168(1)(e) provides that the Minister may propose to revoke registration of a charitable organization if it fails to comply with or contravenes any of sections 230 to 231.5.
[37] Other than by way of a bare denial of inadequacy, the Appellant does not contest any of the Minister’s claims regarding its books and records (Appellant’s Memorandum of Fact and Law at paragraph 75). Instead, the Appellant argues that the Minister was not permitted by any provision of the Act to propose revocation on the basis of inadequate books and records.
[38] The Appellant bases this argument on the existence of what it considers to be a remedy in subsection 230(3), whereby the Minister may require a charitable organization that has failed to keep adequate books and records to keep such books and records as the Minister specifies. In the Appellant’s view, this is the sole remedy for a failure to comply with the requirement under subsection 230(2) to keep books and records.
[39] The Appellant’s submission disregards the clear language of paragraph 168(1)(e), which unambiguously permits the Minister to issue a notice that it proposes to revoke the registration of a charitable organization on the basis of noncompliance with any of sections 230 to 231.5. Moreover, this Court has already determined that non-compliance with subsection 230(2) is a proper basis upon which the Minister may issue such a notice (see Humane Society at paragraph 81).
[40] As the Appellant’s legal argument is without basis and it has not meaningfully contested the Minister’s conclusion that it failed to comply with its obligation to maintain adequate books and records, it is my view that the Appellant has failed to demonstrate that it was unreasonable for the Minister to issue the Revocation Proposal on this ground. It follows, in my view, that this failure on the part of the Appellant is a sufficient basis for the Court to dismiss the appeal.
Ground two — Undue benefits [41] The Appellant makes a similar legal argument with respect to the Minister’s reliance on the provision of undue benefits as a basis for the Revocation Proposal. Because “undue benefits” is a defined term in subsections 188.1(4) and (5), the Appellant contends that it falls outside the ambit of subsection 168(1).
[42] This argument was rejected in Humane Society at paragraph 59. Subsection 189(7) makes it clear that the Minister is entitled to revoke registration in addition to imposing the penalties set out in Part V.
[43] Paragraph 168(1)(a) entitles the Minister to issue a notice that it proposes to revoke if the person ceases to comply with the requirements of the Act for its registration. Under subsection 149.1(1), a charitable organization is required to devote all of its resources to the charitable activities that it carries on. This requirement is necessarily breached if resources of the organization are instead devoted to the provision of undue benefits.
[44] The Appellant made no submissions with respect to the substance of the Minister’s conclusion that the Appellant had provided undue benefits. Accordingly, as the Appellant’s legal argument is without merit, in my view, the Appellant has failed to demonstrate that it was unreasonable for the Minister to issue the Revocation Proposal on this ground. Once again, in my view, it follows that this failure on the part of the Appellant is a sufficient basis for the Court to dismiss the appeal.
Ground three — Failure to file an information return as required by the Act [45] The Minister concluded that the Appellant’s T3010 information return was significantly inaccurate and incomplete and for that reason, the Appellant had not filed an information return “as and when required under [the] Act or a regulation” within the meaning of paragraph 168(1)(c). Paragraph 68 of the Crown’s Memorandum of Fact and Law delineates ten instances of errors and omissions in the Appellant’s T3010 for 2010. The Minister determined that these failures on the Appellant’s part constituted a reasonable basis upon which to issue the Revocation Proposal.
[46] In the Compliance Agreement, the Appellant committed to ensure that the information contained in its information returns would be complete and accurate in every respect. It argues now that merely filing the requisite form before the stipulated deadline fulfills the requirement to file as and when required under the Act and that any inaccuracies or omissions are irrelevant to that question.
[47] Notwithstanding the numerous and specific instances of inaccuracy in the return, the Appellant asserts only that these alleged inaccuracies are the result of “the arbitrary reallocation of expenditures by the CRA auditor,” and claims that there were no specific material allegations that it was incomplete (Appellant’s Memorandum of Fact and Law at paragraph 80).
[48] I reject the Appellant’s narrow interpretation of paragraph 168(1)(c). Filing an information return “as required” by the Act or a regulation must entail filing a return that corresponds with the requirements for a return set out in the Act and in applicable regulations. The Appellant’s submission essentially reads down paragraph 168(1)(c) to eliminate the word “as.”
[49] On the other hand, I do not wish to be taken as having concluded that any minor inaccuracy in a T3010 will justify a Ministerial decision to issue a notice of intention to revoke the registration of a registered charity.
[50] In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the record amply demonstrates that the inaccuracies in the T3010 cited by the Minister in the Administrative Fairness Agreement are well beyond what might reasonably be viewed as minor.
[51] In light of the rejection of the Appellant’s legal interpretation and in view of the significant number of inaccuracies in the T3010 information return, considered in the context of the Appellant’s failure to meet its related commitment under the Compliance Agreement, in my view, it is clear that the Appellant has failed to demonstrate that it was unreasonable for the Minister to issue the Revocation Proposal on this ground. Once again it follows, in my view, that this failure on the part of the Appellant is a sufficient basis for the Court to dismiss the appeal.
Ground four — Gifting resources to non-qualified donees [52] The Minister determined that the Appellant made gifts in the period under consideration to the Isabela Provincial Hospital (the “Hospital”) in the Philippines and that the Hospital was not a qualified donee, as defined in subsection 149.1(1), at the time that it received such gifts.
[53] This matter was covered by the Compliance Agreement, in which the Appellant committed to seek the prior approval of the CRA Charities Directorate in relation to any agency agreement that the Appellant wished to put in place with each foreign entity that was to receive materials from the Appellant. The purpose of such agreements is to ensure that the Appellant is and remains in control over the deployment of gifts of its property that are made outside of Canada.
[54] The Appellant refers to an agency agreement (the “Agency Agreement”) in the Appeal Book but has not established that this particular agreement was put in place in accordance with the Compliance Agreement.
[55] Moreover, the Appellant did not contend that the Agency Agreement in the Appeal Book was sufficient to establish that the Hospital was not the recipient of a gift from it. Rather, the Appellant asserts that the Administrative Fairness Letter was not decisive or clear enough in its conclusion that the Hospital received a gift from the Appellant when it was not a qualified donee. Additionally, the Appellant invokes “unfairness” on the part of the Minister in failing to analyze the Agency Agreement in the Appeal Book.
[56] In my view, these bare assertions are inconsequential in light of the fact that the Appellant has the onus of establishing the unreasonableness of the position taken by the Minister.
[57] As a result, I conclude that the Appellant has failed to demonstrate that it was unreasonable for the Minister to base the Revocation Proposal on the Appellant’s having made gifts to the Hospital when it was not a qualified donee. Once again, in my view, it follows that this is a sufficient basis for the Court to dismiss the appeal.
Ground five — Failure to devote all resources to charitable activities [58] The Minister determined that the Appellant had failed to devote all of its resources to charitable activities, as required under subsection 149.1(1). The Minister made this determination on the basis that only one percent of the funds raised by the Appellant was deployed towards charitable activities in the period under review. This led the Minister to determine that fundraising itself was the Appellant’s primary activity during this period.
[59] The Minister calculated that approximately 70% of the Appellant’s revenues for the relevant period were expended on fundraising. This percentage was slightly higher than it was in the period that led to the Compliance Agreement, notwithstanding that the Appellant had committed in that agreement to reduce the percentage of its funds that was spent on fundraising.
[60] The Appellant contested this 70% determination arguing that amounts paid to fundraisers who were disabled constitute charitable expenditures. In my view, this argument is unpersuasive. Regardless of who was engaged in the fundraising, fundraising was nonetheless being undertaken.
[61] An element of fundraising is commonplace in the charitable world, but fundraising itself cannot become a raison d'être for a charity. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the high level of fundraising activities undertaken by the Appellant in the period in question, especially in light of its commitment in the Compliance Agreement to reduce those activities, can reasonably be regarded as having become an end in itself.
[62] The Appellant asserts that if its fundraising activities were business activities and not charitable activities, it was unreasonable for the CRA not to have determined that those fundraising activities constituted a related business, within the meaning of paragraph 149.1(1) and for the purposes of paragraph 149.1(6)(a), which provides that a charitable organization will be considered to have devoted its resources to charitable activities to the extent that it carries on a related business.
[63] The Appellant offered no evidence or jurisprudence-based arguments on this point, beyond its assertion of “unreasonableness”, once again failing to recognize the onus that it bears in this appeal.
[64] In response, the Crown referred to its “What is a Related Business?”, Policy Statement CPS-019 (March 31, 2003), asserting that the Appellant’s fundraising activities do not constitute a related business as contemplated by that publication.
[65] In my view, the Appellant’s bare assertion that it was unreasonable for the CRA not to have concluded its fundraising activities constituted a related business does not warrant a determination by the Court on this point. In the absence of detailed argument from either the Appellant or the Crown, I would leave the interpretation of the term “related business” for another day.
[66] The Appellant has not demonstrated that it was unreasonable for the Minister to have determined that the Appellant’s extensive fundraising activities in the period under consideration meant that it was not devoting all of its resources to charitable purposes and to have based the Revocation Proposal on that determination. Once again, in my view, it follows that this is a sufficient basis for the Court to dismiss the appeal.
VI. DISPOSITION [67] For the foregoing reasons, I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
"C. Michael Ryer"
J.A.
“I agree
D.G. Near J.A.”
“I agree
Richard Boivin”
ANNEX A – RELEVANT STATOTORY PROVISIONS
Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.)
Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu, L.R.C. 1985, c. 1 (5e suppl.)
165. (3) On receipt of a notice of objection under this section, the Minister shall, with all due dispatch, reconsider the assessment and vacate, confirm or vary the assessment or reassess, and shall thereupon notify the taxpayer in writing of the Minister’s action.
165. (3) Sur réception de l’avis d’opposition, le ministre, avec diligence, examine de nouveau la cotisation et l’annule, la ratifie ou la modifie ou établit une nouvelle cotisation. Dès lors, il avise le contribuable de sa décision par écrit.
[…]
168. (1) The Minister may, by registered mail, give notice to a person described in any of paragraphs (a) to (c) of the definition “qualified donee” in subsection 149.1(1) that the Minister proposes to revoke its registration if the person
168. (1) Le ministre peut, par lettre recommandée, aviser une personne visée à l’un des alinéas a) à c) de la définition de « donataire reconnu » au paragraphe 149.1(1) de son intention de révoquer l’enregistrement si la personne, selon le cas :
…
[…]
(b) ceases to comply with the requirements of this Act for its registration;
b) cesse de se conformer aux exigences de la présente loi relatives à son enregistrement;
(c) in the case of a registered charity or registered Canadian amateur athletic association, fails to file an information return as and when required under this Act or a regulation;
c) dans le cas d’un organisme de bienfaisance enregistré ou d’une association canadienne enregistrée de sport amateur, omet de présenter une déclaration de renseignements, selon les modalités et dans les délais prévus par la présente loi ou par son règlement;
…
[…]
(e) fails to comply with or contravenes any of sections 230 to 231.5; or
e) omet de se conformer à l’un des articles 230 à 231.5 ou y contrevient;
…
[…]
(2) Where the Minister gives notice under subsection 168(1) to a registered charity or to a registered Canadian amateur athletic association,
(2) Le ministre doit, dans le cas de l’alinéa a), et peut, dans les autres cas, publier dans la Gazette du Canada copie de l’avis prévu au paragraphe (1). Sur publication de cette copie, l’enregistrement de l’organisme de bienfaisance ou de l’association canadienne de sport amateur est révoqué. La copie de l’avis doit être publiée dans les délais suivants :
…
[…]
(b) in any other case, the Minister may, after the expiration of 30 days from the day of mailing of the notice, or after the expiration of such extended period from the day of mailing of the notice as the Federal Court of Appeal or a judge of that Court, on application made at any time before the determination of any appeal pursuant to subsection 172(3) from the giving of the notice, may fix or allow, publish a copy of the notice in the Canada Gazette,
and on that publication of a copy of the notice, the registration of the charity or association is revoked
b) dans les autres cas, soit 30 jours après la mise à la poste de l’avis, soit à l’expiration de tout délai supérieur à 30 jours courant de la mise à la poste de l’avis que la Cour d’appel fédérale ou l’un de ses juges fixe, sur demande formulée avant qu’il ne soit statué sur tout appel interjeté en vertu du paragraphe 172(3) au sujet de la signification de cet avis.
…
[…]
(4) A person may, on or before the day that is 90 days after the day on which the notice was mailed, serve on the Minister a written notice of objection in the manner authorized by the Minister, setting out the reasons for the objection and all the relevant facts, and the provisions of subsections 165(1), (1.1) and (3) to (7) and sections 166, 166.1 and 166.2 apply, with any modifications that the circumstances require, as if the notice were a notice of assessment made under section 152, if
(4) Une personne peut, au plus tard le quatre-vingt-dixième jour suivant la date de mise à la poste de l’avis, signifier au ministre, par écrit et de la manière autorisée par celui-ci, un avis d’opposition exposant les motifs de l’opposition et tous les faits pertinents, et les paragraphes 165(1), (1.1) et (3) à (7) et les articles 166, 166.1 et 166.2 s’appliquent, avec les adaptations nécessaires, comme si l’avis était un avis de cotisation établi en vertu de l’article 152, si :
(a) in the case of a person that is or was registered as a registered charity or is an applicant for such registration, it objects to a notice under any of subsections (1) and 149.1(2) to (4.1), (6.3), (22) and (23);
a) dans le cas d’une personne qui est ou était enregistrée à titre d’organisme de bienfaisance enregistré ou qui a présenté une demande d’enregistrement à ce titre, elle s’oppose à l’avis prévu au paragraphe (1) ou à l’un des paragraphes 149.1(2) à (4.1), (6.3), (22) et (23);
(b) in the case of a person that is or was registered as a registered Canadian amateur athletic association or is an applicant for such registration, it objects to a notice under any of subsections (1) and 149.1(4.2) and (22); or
b) dans le cas d’une personne qui est ou était enregistrée à titre d’association canadienne enregistrée de sport amateur ou qui a présenté une demande d’enregistrement à ce titre, elle s’oppose à l’avis prévu aux paragraphes (1) ou 149.1(4.2) ou (22);
(c) in the case of a person described in any of subparagraphs (a)(i) to (v) of the definition “qualified donee” in subsection 149.1(1), that is or was registered by the Minister as a qualified donee or is an applicant for such registration, it objects to a notice under any of subsections (1) and 149.1(4.3) and (22).
c) dans le cas d’une personne visée à l’un des sous-alinéas a)(i) à (v) de la définition de « donataire reconnu » au paragraphe 149.1(1) qui est ou a été enregistrée par le ministre à titre de donataire reconnu ou qui a présenté une demande d’enregistrement à ce titre, elle s’oppose à l’avis prévu aux paragraphes (1) ou 149.1(4.3) ou (22).
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172. (3) Where the Minister
172. (3) Lorsque le ministre :
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(a.1) confirms a proposal, decision or designation in respect of which a notice was issued by the Minister to a person that is or was registered as a registered charity, or is an applicant for registration as a registered charity, under any of subsections 149.1(2) to (4.1), (6.3), (22) and (23) and 168(1), or does not confirm or vacate that proposal, decision or designation within 90 days after service of a notice of objection by the person under subsection 168(4) in respect of that proposal, decision or designation,
a.1) soit confirme toute intention, décision ou désignation à l’égard de laquelle le ministre a délivré, en vertu de l’un des paragraphes 149.1(2) à (4.1), (6.3), (22) et (23) et 168(1), un avis à une personne qui est ou était enregistrée à titre d’organisme de bienfaisance enregistré ou qui a demandé l’enregistrement à ce titre, soit omet de confirmer ou d’annuler cette intention, décision ou désignation dans les 90 jours suivant la signification, par la personne en vertu du paragraphe 168(4), d’un avis d’opposition concernant cette intention, décision ou désignation;
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the person described in paragraph (a), (a.1) or (a.2), the applicant in a case described in paragraph (b), (e) or (g), a trustee under the plan or an employer of employees who are beneficiaries under the plan, in a case described in paragraph (c), the promoter in a case described in paragraph (e.1), the administrator of the plan or an employer who participates in the plan, in a case described in paragraph (f) or (f.1), or the administrator of the plan in a case described in paragraph (h) or (i), may appeal from the Minister’s decision, or from the giving of the notice by the Minister, to the Federal Court of Appeal.
la personne, dans le cas visé aux alinéas a), a.1) ou a.2), le demandeur, dans le cas visé aux alinéas b), e) ou g), le fiduciaire du régime ou l’employeur dont les employés sont bénéficiaires du régime, dans le cas visé à l’alinéa c), le promoteur, dans le cas visé à l’alinéa e.1), l’administrateur du régime ou l’employeur qui participe au régime, dans le cas visé aux alinéas f) ou f.1), ou l’administrateur du régime, dans le cas visé aux alinéas h) ou i), peuvent interjeter appel à la Cour d’appel fédérale de cette décision ou de la signification de cet avis.
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180. (1) An appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal pursuant to subsection 172(3) may be instituted by filing a notice of appeal in the Court within 30 days from
180. (1) Un appel à la Cour d’appel fédérale prévu au paragraphe 172(3) est introduit en déposant un avis d’appel à la cour dans les 30 jours suivant, selon le cas :
(a) the day on which the Minister notifies a person under subsection 165(3) of the Minister’s action in respect of a notice of objection filed under subsection 168(4),
a) la date à laquelle le ministre avise une personne, en application du paragraphe 165(3), de sa décision concernant l’avis d’opposition signifié aux termes du paragraphe 168(4);
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as the case may be, or within such further time as the Court of Appeal or a judge thereof may, either before or after the expiration of those 30 days, fix or allow.
ou dans un autre délai que peut fixer ou accorder la Cour d’appel ou l’un de ses juges, avant ou après l’expiration de ce délai de 30 jours.
(2) Neither the Tax Court of Canada nor the Federal Court has jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding in respect of a decision of the Minister from which an appeal may be instituted under this section.
(2) La Cour canadienne de l’impôt et la Cour fédérale n’ont, ni l’une no l’autre, compétence pour connaître de toute affaire relative à une décision du ministre contre laquelle il peut être interjeté appel en vertu du présent article.
(3) An appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal instituted under this section shall be heard and determined in a summary way.
(3) Un appel dont est saisie la Cour d’appel fédérale, en vertu du présent article, doit être entendu et jugé selon une procédure sommaire.
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188. (1) If on a particular day the Minister issues a notice of intention to revoke the registration of a taxpayer as a registered charity under any of subsections 149.1(2) to (4.1) and 168(1) or it is determined, under subsection 7(1) of the Charities Registration (Security Information) Act, that a certificate served in respect of the charity under subsection 5(1) of that Act is reasonable on the basis of information and evidence available,
188. (1) Si un avis d’intention de révoquer l’enregistrement d’un contribuable comme organisme de bienfaisance enregistré est délivré par le ministre en vertu de l’un des paragraphes 149.1(2) à (4.1) et 168(1) ou si, compte tenu des renseignements et des autres éléments de preuve disponibles, un certificat sig