Morton v. Canada (Fisheries and Oceans)

Morton v. Canada (Fisheries and Oceans)
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2015-05-06
Neutral citation
2015 FC 575
File numbers
T-789-13
Decision Content
Date: 20150506
Docket: T-789-13
Citation: 2015 FC 575
Ottawa, Ontario, May 6, 2015
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Rennie
BETWEEN:
ALEXANDRA MORTON
Applicant
and
MINISTER OF FISHERIES AND OCEANS and
MARINE HARVEST CANADA INC
Respondents
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PARA.
I. Overview
1
II. The regulatory scheme governing transfers
10
A. The Fisheries (General) Regulations
10
B. The licence and appendix
21
III. Standard of review
26
IV. Preliminary observations
33
A. Piscine reovirus (PRV) and heart and skeletal muscle inflammation (HSMI)
33
B. The record
36
C. The precautionary principle
40
V. Whether the licence conditions comply with section 56 of the FGRs
49
A. Analytical framework
49
B. Section 56 of the FGRs
54
C. Licence condition 3.1(b)(i)
61
D. Licence condition 3.1(b)(ii)
62
E. Licence condition 3.1(b)(iii)
68
F. Licence condition 3.1(b)(iv)
70
VI. Whether the delegation at issue was valid
74
A. Whether delegation occurred
74
B. Whether delegation is permissible under the FGRs
79
C. The Minister did not properly delegate to Marine Harvest
83
VII. The precautionary principle and licence conditions 3.1(b)(ii) and (iv)
96
VIII. Conclusion and remedy
100
IX. Costs
106
I. Overview [1] Under the authority of a license issued by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, Marine Harvest Canada Inc. operates a fish farm at Shelter Bay, British Columbia. In March, 2013, Marine Harvest transferred salmon smolts (that is, salmon which have undergone a physical change called “smolting” enabling them to live in salt water) from its Dalrymple hatchery (the hatchery) to the Shelter Bay fish farm (the fish farm). The smolts were subsequently sampled at the fish farm, and in June 2013 tested positive for piscine reovirus (PRV).
[2] Alexandra Morton (the applicant) is a biologist. She lives and works in the Broughton Archipelago, the area with the greatest density of fish farms on the British Columbia coast. Ms. Morton has researched aquatics since the 1990s and has longstanding concerns with respect to the effects of aquaculture on the health of the wild salmon population. She brought this proceeding in the public interest and her standing is not contested.
[3] Ms. Morton was troubled by the transfer of smolts that occurred in March 2013. In her view, the positive PRV test at their destination (the fish farm) demonstrated that the smolts had PRV at their origin (the hatchery), and therefore that Marine Harvest had transferred diseased fish contrary to the Fishery (General) Regulations, SOR/93-53 (FGRs). Ms. Morton contacted the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) to inquire as to the regulatory scheme governing such a transfer. In particular, Ms. Morton inquired about whether every transfer from a private hatchery to a fish farm required a transfer licence and, if so, whether such a licence was issued for Marine Harvest’s transfer of the smolts which tested positive for PRV.
[4] In response to Ms. Morton’s inquiry, Ms. Stacee Martin, DFO Co-Chair of the BC Introductions and Transfers Committee, advised that under DFO policies, the Pacific region was divided into nine Salmonid Transfer Zones, and that the regulatory scheme governing a specific transfer depended on whether or not the transfer was within a single Salmonid Transfer Zone or transited multiple Salmonid Transfer Zones. More specifically, Ms. Martin explained that transfers between Salmonid Transfer Zones require a transfer licence under the FGRs, whereas transfers within a single Salmonid Transfer Zone were regulated by the Pacific Aquaculture Regulations, SOR/2010-270 (Aquaculture Regulations). With respect to the transfer from the hatchery to the fish farm by Marine Harvest, Ms. Martin explained that this transfer was regulated by the Aquaculture Regulations because both the fish farm and the hatchery were situated within a single Salmonid Transfer Zone.
[5] Ms. Morton was concerned that the Salmonid Transfer Zone policy enabled the transfer of fish to occur under the regulatory authority of the Aquaculture Regulations, which provided, in her view, fewer safeguards against the transfer of fish than the FGRs. Ms. Morton therefore brought this application for judicial review. The application was framed, inter alia, on the ground that the condition in the licence granted to Marine Harvest authorizing the transfer of smolts from the hatchery to the farm was ultra vires the Aquaculture Regulations.
[6] As we will see, subsequent to the receipt of the applicant’s memorandum of fact and law, the Minister resiled from the position that the license authorizing the transfer was governed by the Aquaculture Regulations. In his memorandum and at the hearing of this application, the Minister took the position that the authority to authorize the transfer derived from section 56 of the FGRs. In consequence, the specific argument that the licence was ultra vires the Aquaculture Regulations became moot. Other grounds of challenge to the licence remained, however.
[7] The licence permits the transfer of fish by Marine Harvest subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions. The conditions governing the transfer of smolts from the hatchery to the fish-farms (essentially net-pens in the ocean) are set out in condition 3.1 of the licence. The issue is whether licence condition 3.1 meets or is consistent with the regulatory pre-conditions and requirements governing transfers established by section 56 of the FGRs.
[8] Subsection 22(1) of the FGRs stipulates that a licence condition cannot conflict with the FGRs. The applicant contends that the licence conditions conflict with the regulatory requirements that transferred fish “do not have any disease or disease agent that may be harmful to the protection and conservation of fish” (FGRs, section 56(b)). The applicant also says that the licence conflicts or is inconsistent with the regulatory requirements of section 56(c) that the release or transfer of fish “will not have an adverse effect on the stock size of fish or the genetic characteristics of fish or fish stocks.” Further, Ms. Morton contends the licence condition allows the licensee to make transfer decisions which by regulation are reserved to the Minister, and thus are an impermissible delegation of the Minister’s legislative responsibilities.
[9] For the reasons that follow, the application for judicial review is granted. I conclude that licence conditions 3.1(b)(ii) and 3.1(b)(iv) are inconsistent with the regulatory preconditions established by section 56 of the FGRs governing the transfer of farmed fish to the marine environment.
II. The regulatory scheme governing transfers A. The Fisheries (General) Regulations [10] The Minister’s power to issue licences is found in section 7 of the Fisheries Act, RSC 1985, c F-14 (Fisheries Act). The section accords the Minister an “absolute discretion” to either “issue” or “authorize to be issued” licences for fisheries or fishing:
7. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the Minister may, in his absolute discretion, wherever the exclusive right of fishing does not already exist by law, issue or authorize to be issued leases and licences for fisheries or fishing, wherever situated or carried on.
7. (1) En l'absence d'exclusivité du droit de pêche conférée par la loi, le ministre peut, à discrétion, octroyer des baux et permis de pêche ainsi que des licences d'exploitation de pêcheries -- ou en permettre l'octroi --, indépendamment du lieu de l'exploitation ou de l'activité de pêche.
[11] Section 43 of the Fisheries Act reinforces the broad scope of the Minister’s regulatory authority. This section allows the Governor in Council to make regulations for carrying out the purposes and provisions of the Fisheries Act, including:
(a) for the proper management and control of the sea-coast and inland fisheries;
(a) concernant la gestion et la surveillance judicieuses des pêches en eaux côtières et internes;
(b) respecting the conservation and protection of fish;
(b) concernant la conservation et la protection
[…]
[…]
(f) respecting the issue, suspension and cancellation of licences and leases;
(f) concernant la délivrance, la suspension et la révocation des licences, permis et baux;
(g) respecting the terms and conditions under which a licence and lease may be issued;
(g) concernant les conditions attachées aux licences, permis et baux;
[12] The FGRs establish an over-arching regulatory framework governing the management of the fishery. They also establish subcategories of licences, each of which is related to various aspects of the fishery. Thus, the key to understanding the scope of the Minister’s discretion regarding a specific licence, such as the Shelter Bay licence, is to know which part of the FGRs applies, based on the activity or species in question. As the name of the regulations suggests, (Fishery (General) Regulations) the regulations apply generally, save where there is an inconsistency with more specific, listed regulations.
[13] Part VIII of the FGRs, the title of which is “Release of Live Fish into Fish Habitat and Transfer of Live Fish to a Fish Rearing Facility” is specifically directed to the transfer of fish, and, as noted earlier, is now conceded by the Minister to govern the transfer of smolts from the Dalrymple hatchery to the Shelter Bay fish farm. Section 54, found in Part VIII, stipulates that a licence is required to transfer farmed fish:
54. In this Part, “licence” means a licence to release live fish into fish habitat or to transfer live fish to a fish rearing facility.
54. Dans la présente partie, « permis » s’entend du permis autorisant la libération de poissons vivants dans leur habitat ou le transfert de poissons vivants dans des installations d’élevage.
[14] Section 56 establishes specific constraints on the Minister’s discretion in respect of transfer licences. The Minister may only issue a licence if certain pre-conditions are met:
56. The Minister may issue a licence if
56. Le ministre peut délivrer un permis dans le cas où :
(a) the release or transfer of the fish would be in keeping with the proper management and control of fisheries;
(a) la libération ou le transfert des poissons est en accord avec la gestion et la surveillance judicieuses des pêches;
(b) the fish do not have any disease or disease agent that may be harmful to the protection and conservation of fish; and
(b) les poissons sont exempts de maladies et d’agents pathogènes qui pourraient nuire à la protection et à la conservation des espèces;
(c) the release or transfer of the fish will not have an adverse effect on the stock size of fish or the genetic characteristics of fish or fish stocks.
(c) la libération ou le transfert ne risque pas d’avoir un effet néfaste sur la taille du stock de poisson ou sur les caractéristiques génétiques du poisson ou des stocks de poisson.
[15] The interface between this regulatory requirement and the conditions in the licence granted to Marine Harvest are at the heart of this application. Broadly speaking, Ms. Morton contends that the licence conditions are inconsistent with the regulatory pre-conditions established by section 56 of the FGRs, and therefore run afoul of the requirement of subsection 22(1) of the FGRs that licence conditions cannot be inconsistent. Further, as noted earlier, she submits that the licence conditions constitute an unlawful delegation of ministerial discretion and ministerial responsibility for protection and conservation of the fishery to Marine Harvest. The respondents say that the licence conditions conform to the requirements of section 56.
[16] I conclude on three contextual points.
[17] The FGRs and the Aquaculture Regulations do not operate in separate silos – instead, the regulations work together to ensure the proper management of aquaculture. In the result, the licence granted to Marine Harvest is effectively an aggregate licence, addressing subject matter both within the ambit of the FGRs and the Aquaculture Regulations. That is, the licence granted to Marine Harvest provides both a transfer licence under the FGRs and an aquaculture licence under the Aquaculture Regulations.
[18] In 2009 as a result of Morton v British Columbia (Agriculture and Lands), 2009 BCSC 136, aff’d 2009 BCCA 481, the regulation of finfish aquaculture on Canada’s Pacific coast was confirmed to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament. Since that time, finfish aquaculture on Canada’s Pacific coast has been regulated under the Aquaculture Regulations and the FGRs. As the decision under review observes “the licences [now federal] were largely based on the manner in which the industry was regulated under the previous provincial regime…”
[19] I note, parenthetically, that there is a context to this issue. In 2012, the Honourable Justice Cohen submitted his final report from the Commission of Inquiry into the Decline of Sockeye Salmon in the Fraser River. The Commission of Inquiry began its work in 2009, the year in which the Fraser River Sockeye fishery had experienced its lowest return since the 1940s. The Government of Canada sought to identify the reasons for the decline and to determine whether changes were needed to fisheries management polices (Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Decline of Sockeye Salmon in the Fraser River, The Uncertain Future of Fraser River Sockeye (2012, vol 3 at 2). Significantly, Justice Cohen found that there is some risk posed to wild sockeye salmon from diseases on fish farms and ensuring the health of wild stocks should be “DFO’s number one priority in conducting fish health work” (Cohen Commission vol 2 at 113 and vol 1 at 474).
[20] With the historical and legislative landscape set, I turn to the licence itself.
B. The licence and appendix [21] As noted earlier, in correspondence with the applicant, DFO categorized the licence as being granted under the Aquaculture Regulations. This is unsurprising, given that the licence itself is titled “Finfish Aquaculture licence under the Pacific Aquaculture Regulations”. It is now conceded that there is no authority to transfer fish in the Aquaculture Regulations. The Aquaculture Regulations are silent regarding the transfer of diseased fish.
[22] Condition 3 of the licence begins with the title “Transfer of Fish”. Condition 3.1 states “[t]he licence holder may transfer to this facility live Atlantic or Pacific salmonids from a facility possessing a valid aquaculture licence issued pursuant to section 3 of the Pacific Aquaculture Regulations” provided the transfer conditions are satisfied. This is precisely the type of transfer contemplated by Part VIII of the FGRs which defines a Part VIII licence as a licence “to transfer live fish to a fish rearing facility”. Given the importance of transfer decisions as evidenced by the overall scheme of the FGRs, it would be unreasonable to conclude that there was a hiatus in the regulatory scheme, such that transfers from the hatchery to the fish farm were unregulated. I conclude that condition 3.1 of the licence authorizing the transfer of fish is derived from Part VIII of the FGRs and that the terms of that licence must comply with section 56 of those regulations.
[23] Condition 3.1 of the licence provides for the transfer of fish (the subject of a transfer licence under the FGRs). The cultivation or capture of fish (the subject of an aquaculture licence under the Aquaculture Regulations) is addressed in other parts of the licence. Condition 3.1 reads:
3. Transfer of Fish
3.1 The licence holder may transfer to this facility live Atlantic or Pacific salmonids from a facility possessing a valid aquaculture licence issued pursuant to section 3 of the Pacific Aquaculture Regulations between the Fish Health zones described in Appendix VI, provided transfers occur within the same salmonid transfer zone as outlined in Appendix II and provided:
(a) the species of live salmonid fish are the same as those listed on the face of this licence;
(b) the licence holder has obtained written and signed confirmation, executed by the source facility’s veterinarian or fish health staff, that, in their professional judgment:
(i) mortalities, excluding eggs, in any stock reared at the source facility have not exceeded 1% per day due to any infectious diseases, for any four consecutive day period during the rearing period;
(ii) the stock to be moved from the source facility shows no signs of clinical disease requiring treatment; and
(iii) no stock at the source facility is known to have had any diseases listed in Appendix IV; or
(iv) where conditions 3.1(b)(i) and/or 3.1(b)(iii) cannot be met transfer may still occur if the facility veterinarian has conducted a risk assessment of facility fish health records, review of diagnostic reports, evaluation of stock compartmentalization, and related biosecurity measures and deemed the transfer to be low risk.
[24] Both conditions 3.1(b)(iii) and 3.1(b)(iv) reference Appendix IV. Appendix IV is part of the licence and sets out what DFO has identified as eight “diseases of regional, national or international concern”. The list includes seven specific fish diseases and one residual category encompassing “any other filterable agent either causing cytopathic effects in tissue culture or is associated with identifiable clinical disease in fish”. Importantly, the preamble to Appendix IV states that the listed diseases “can severely impact fisheries and affect regional and national trade so they warrant urgent notification and immediate attention.”
[25] Condition 3.1 applies to fish transfers that occur between fish health zones and within a salmonid transfer zone. These zones are established by DFO policy, and cover different geographical areas. However, section 56 of the FGRs does not distinguish between salmonid transfer zones or fish health zones. The scope of the regulatory requirements, being law, cannot be limited by policy. As such, section 56 applies to all fish transfer decisions, regardless of zone, and therefore the licence condition 3.1 governing transfer must be consistent with section 56.
III. Standard of review [26] The applicant characterizes the issues in this proceeding as questions of jurisdiction, and argues that as such the licence condition should be reviewed on a correctness standard. The Minister and Marine Harvest disagree. They submit that the Court should adopt a highly deferential approach to the Minister’s determination.
[27] In determining the standard of review, the Minister places considerable emphasis on the fact that the underlying science involved in licencing the aquaculture industry is complex. Relying on McLean v British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2013 SCC 76 the Minister says that his decision is presumptively reasonable, and that the onus is on the applicant to demonstrate otherwise. The Minister relied on the presumption, and apart from the decision and licence, produced no record.
[28] Marine Harvest, for its part, predicates its position on the Minister’s broad discretion to issue fishing licences and to specify licence conditions pursuant to section 7 of the Fisheries Act. This provision empowers the Minister to issue or authorize to be issued licences for fisheries or fishing in “[his] absolute discretion.” Section 7, according to Marine Harvest, is a complete answer to any inquiry, of any nature or degree, into the licence conditions. Marine Harvest’s position, distilled to its essence, is that the Minister can do what the Minister wants. Alternatively, Marine Harvest contends, based on the expert evidence, that the licence conditions are reasonable.
[29] There is no question that the Minister has broad authority pursuant to section 7 of the Fisheries Act. As noted in Malcolm v Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), 2013 FC 363, aff’d 2014 FCA 130, leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2014] SCCA No 350, the Minister has “the widest discretion” to make fisheries policy decisions. This discretion may be exercised, for example, when granting or refusing to grant licences pursuant to the FGRs or the Aquaculture Regulations.
[30] Nevertheless, ministerial discretion is framed and controlled by the FGRs, section 22 of which prohibits licence conditions that are inconsistent with the FGRs. That is, ministerial discretion exists except where it has been prescribed by the law. As the Court of Appeal observed in Matthews v Canada (Attorney General), [1999] FCJ No 830 (CA) “however largely expressed”, the Minister’s discretion in respect of licence conditions is limited and governed by the objectives of the Fisheries Act and its provisions. The Supreme Court made the same point, in precisely relevant terms, in Comeau's Sea Foods Ltd. v Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), [1997] 1 SCR 12, where, at paragraph 36, Major J speaking for the Court said:
It is my opinion that the Minister’s discretion under s. 7 to authorize the issuance of licences, like the Minister’s discretion to issue licences, is restricted only by the requirement of natural justice, no regulations currently being applicable. [Emphasis added]
[31] In Tervita Corp. v Canada (Commissioner of Competition), 2015 SCC 3, the Supreme Court discussed the indicia required to rebut the presumption of reasonableness, few of which are present in this case. Based on the prevailing jurisprudence, the standard of review analysis must start from the premise that reasonableness applies to the review of the Minister’s licencing decisions: also see Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61; Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36; Canadian National Railway Co. v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 SCC 40.
[32] In my view, the question of whether the licence conditions are consistent with section 56 of the FGRs is to be assessed against a reasonableness standard. The Minister, through the imposition of conditions, is seeking to implement or render operational, the obligations imposed by sections 56(a), (b) and (c). A licence condition that is inconsistent or contrary to a regulatory obligation would be ultra vires, but it would also be unreasonable. As I characterize the issue before the Court, the question is whether the licence conditions are a reasonable articulation, or expression, of the mandatory requirements of section 56.
IV. Preliminary observations A. Piscine reovirus (PRV) and heart and skeletal muscle inflammation (HSMI) [33] HSMI is an infectious disease found in farmed salmon. It causes abnormal swimming behaviour and anorexia in fish. HSMI does not present observable symptoms until 5-9 months following the transfer of smolts to the ocean. There is no question that it is a threat to aquaculture operations. Mortality can range from 0% to 20% of the population, and in one reported case in Norway, the loss of an entire stock.
[34] First identified in Norway in 1999, HSMI is now prevalent throughout Norwegian salmon farming operations. HSMI was discovered in Scotland in 2005, and more recently in Chile and Canada.
[35] The causal relationship between PRV and HSMI has not been conclusively established. However, the weight of the expert evidence before this Court supports the view that PRV is the viral precursor to HSMI. Lengthy and extensive research efforts in Norway designed to identify viruses, other than PRV, which may be responsible for HSMI, have not identified any other agent. Although HSMI has not been found in wild salmon, PRV is now found in 14% of the wild salmon population of the Norwegian coast.
B. The record [36] Judicial review is focused on the decision itself. It is based on the material before the decision maker. As the Court of Appeal noted in Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2012 FCA 22, as a general rule, the record before the court on judicial review is restricted to the evidentiary record before the decision maker.
[37] There are exceptions to this rule, one of which is to provide general background or context which might assist the court in understanding the issues. Much of the evidence tendered in this proceeding, and the use to which it is put, goes beyond the exception. Marine Harvest vigorously contests the causal relationship between HSMI and PRV, and seeks to establish there is no such causality. This misconceives the role of the Court on judicial review. The Minister tendered no evidence, other than the page and one-half decision required by Rule 317 of the Federal Courts Rules. The Minister sheltered behind Marine Harvest’s evidence. The Minister nonetheless, made unequivocal statements of science:
HSMI has not been found in the Atlantic other than in Norway and Scotland. HSMI has never been diagnosed in any fish in the Pacific Ocean, including Pacific Salmon or farmed Atlantic Salmon.
[38] Given that Norway and Scotland are the two largest centers of farmed Atlantic salmon, the statement is more supportive of the applicant’s view of the science. But that is not the point at this stage. The point is that assertions made in order to bolster the reasonableness of the Minister’s exercise of discretion cannot be made without evidence.
[39] The Minister states that the onus is on the applicant to disprove that what the Minister says about science and the regulations is presumptively deemed reasonable. The Minister pleads that he was “guided by expert advisers” and that the licence conditions were based on “scientific criteria”. But it is important to note that the Minister has said nothing about the science which might inform the reasonableness of the conditions. If the Minister wishes to establish that the discretion exercised took into account various factors and that there were relevant limitations in the science, the Minister, or ministerial officials, can say so. What the Minister cannot do is make unsupported statements of science. Nor can the Minister point to expert affidavits, drafted many months after the decision and infer that those considerations must necessarily have been taken into account by the Minister in the exercise of his discretion.
C. The precautionary principle [40] The Minister contends that licence conditions 3.1(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) are reasonable and “take into account the reality of the current limitations of scientific knowledge and reflects a precautionary approach to fish transfers.” That is, the conditions are intended, in the face of scientific uncertainty, to prevent transfers that may be harmful to the protection and conservation of fish. The Minister stresses that the licence conditions are so broad and in line with the precautionary principle that they result in healthy fish being held back from transfers. Notably, the Minister did not argue that licence condition (iv) was consistent with the precautionary principle; Memoranda of the Minister at paras 4, 58, 100-103.
[41] In light of this argument it is useful to consider the exact meaning of the precautionary principle and its application in a legal context. In 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v Hudson (Town), 2001 SCC 40, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé adopted the precautionary principle and applied it as an element of statutory interpretation, noting at para 31:
The interpretation of By-law 270 contained in these reasons respects international law's "precautionary principle", which is defined as follows at para. 7 of the Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development (1990):
In order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on the precautionary principle. Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradation. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.
Canada "advocated inclusion of the precautionary principle" during the Bergen Conference negotiations (D. VanderZwaag, CEPA Issue Elaboration Paper No. 18, CEPA and the Precautionary Principle/Approach (1995), at p. 8). The principle is codified in several items of domestic legislation: see for example the Oceans Act, S.C. 1996, c. 31, Preamble (para. 6); Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C. 1999, c. 33, s. 2(1)(a); Endangered Species Act, S.N.S. 1998, c. 11, ss. 2(1)(h) and 11(1).
[42] More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the interface between the precautionary principle and an environmental regulatory scheme in Castonguay Blasting Ltd. v Ontario (Environment), 2013 SCC 52, at para 20. The Court referred to the principle as an emerging principle of international law, which informed the scope and application of the legislative provision in question.
[43] The precautionary principal recognizes, that as a matter of sound public policy the lack of complete scientific certainty should not be used as a basis for avoiding or postponing measures to protect the environment, as there are inherent limits in being able to predict environmental harm. Moving from the realm public policy to the law, the precautionary principle is at a minimum, an established aspect of statutory interpretation, and arguably, has crystallized into a norm of customary international law and substantive domestic law: Spraytech at paras 30-31. However, except as discussed in Part VII, the legal contours of the principle need not be determined here, as this decision does not rest or depend on the application of the principle.
[44] Invoking the precautionary principle, the respondents submit that the licence conditions are intended, in the face of scientific uncertainty, to prevent transfers that may be harmful to the protection and conservation of fish. However, they also contend that that same scientific uncertainty with respect to whether PRV is the agent of HSMI justifies the transfer of PRV infected smolts. A lack of full scientific certainty is the very situation addressed by the precautionary principle. The respondents’ arguments with respect to the precautionary principle are inconsistent, contradictory and, in any event, fail in light of the evidence.
[45] The evidence before the Court demonstrates that there is a body of credible scientific study, conducted by respected scientists in different countries, establishing a causal relationship between PRV and HSMI. The evidence also indicates that there are scientists who question the link – but concede that no other disease agent has been identified as the culprit for HSMI. As noted previously, HSMI was first identified in Norway in 1999 and is now prevalent throughout Norwegian salmon farming operations. It has subsequently been found in Iceland, and more recently Chile. Extensive research in Norway designed to identify viruses, other than PRV, which may be responsible for HSMI, have not identified any other agent. Thus, although there is a healthy debate between respected scientists on the issue, the evidence, suggests that the disease agent (PRV) may be harmful to the protection and conservation of fish, and therefore a “lack of full scientific certainty should not be used a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation”: Spraytech at para 31.
[46] In sum, it is not, on the face of the evidence, open to the respondents to assert that the licence conditions permitting a transfer of PRV infected smolts reflect the precautionary principle. The Minister is not, based on the evidence, erring on the side of caution.
[47] In making these observations about the precautionary principle, the Court is not arbitrating on the PRV/HSMI debate. Rather, the argument having been raised, and the assertion made that the conditions reflect a precautionary approach to aquaculture, the issue had to be considered. To conclude, based on the evidence before me, the Minister cannot, in support of the reasonableness of the licence conditions and their nexus to the requirements of section 56, contend that they reflect a precautionary approach. I will return briefly to the precautionary principle as an aspect of the interpretation of subsection 56(b) of the FGRs later in these reasons.
[48] With these three preliminary observations made (the record, the scientific context and the precautionary principle) I turn to the question whether the licence conditions meet the threshold regulatory requirements. Before doing so, I reiterate that the standard of review is reasonableness, or, put otherwise, whether the conditions are a reasonable articulation of the regulatory preconditions. The answer to this question turns, not on whether PRV is, as a matter of scientific certainty, the viral agent of HSMI, nor whether fish that are PRV positive should be transferred; rather, the answer turns on the application of orthodox principles governing the interpretation of subordinate legislation.
V. Whether the licence conditions comply with section 56 of the FGRs A. Analytical framework [49] It is self-evident that a regulation that is inconsistent with the enabling substantive statutory provisions cannot carry out the purposes of the act (Denys C. Holland and John P. McGowan, Delegated Legislation in Canada, (Agincourt, Ontario: The Carswell Co. Ltd., 1989) at 182). Delegated legislation, such as the FGRs, has the same legal force as a statute and is interpreted using the same rules and techniques (Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) at 11). Here, the inconsistency asserted is not between the act and the regulation, but the regulation and the licence. The same principles apply by analogy. Any condition of the licence that conflicts with the substantive regulatory provisions cannot carry out the purposes of the regulatory scheme: Matthews.
[50] The point is made, perhaps unnecessarily given the well-established principles noted above, by subsection 22(1) of the FGRs, which directs that the Minister may not specify a condition in a licence that is inconsistent with the Regulations.
[51] The licence and its attached conditions cannot derogate from or be inconsistent with the FGRs. To draw an analogy, as Professor Ruth Sullivan explains in Statutory Interpretation at p 312, “the paramountcy of statutes over delegated legislation operates as a presumption” and in cases of conflict, “the statute is presumed to prevail.” So too, the licence cannot grant that which the FGRs exclude. This applies with particular force where, as here, the language of the regulation requires certain pre-conditions be met before the Minister may issue a licence.
[52] The question of whether the licence satisfies its governing regulatory provisions requires analogy to the first principles of statutory interpretation. I rely on Driedger’s modern principle of statutory interpretation that “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament” (Elmer A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983). In other words, a purposive, contextual and harmonious interpretation should be applied to section 56 of the FGRs: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., Re [1998] 1 SCR 27 at para 21.
[53] It is, however, imperative to remember that the standard of review is reasonableness, in this case, infused with deference given that this aspect of the applicant’s argument asserts a substantive inconsistency between what the regulations require of the Minister, and the articulation of those requirements in the form of conditions on a licence.
B. Section 56 of the FGRs [54] Section 56 under Part VIII of the FGRs provides for prerequisites to the issuance of a licence to transfer fish. The section 56 prerequisites apply prior to and during the currency of a licence. Importantly, the section 56 prerequisites do not govern the conduct of a licensee but rather govern the conduct of the Minister in issuing a licence to transfer fish under section 56. Section 56 states:
56. The Minister may issue a licence if
56. Le ministre peut délivrer un permis dans le cas où :
(a) the release or transfer of the fish would be in keeping with the proper management and control of fisheries;
(a) la libération ou le transfert des poissons est en accord avec la gestion et la surveillance judicieuses des pêches;
(b) the fish do not have any disease or disease agent that may be harmful to the protection and conservation of fish; and
(b) les poissons sont exempts de maladies et d’agents pathogènes qui pourraient nuire à la protection et à la conservation des espèces;
(c) the release or transfer of the fish will not have an adverse effect on the stock size of fish or the genetic characteristics of fish or fish stocks.
(c) la libération ou le transfert ne risque pas d’avoir un effet néfaste sur la taille du stock de poisson ou sur les caractéristiques génétiques du poisson ou des stocks de poisson.
[55] In applying a statutory interpretation analysis, I look to the language of section 56(b). First, the FGRs do not define “disease” or “disease agent”; however, the licence defines “disease” as “an abnormality of form or function and can be caused by a suite of infectious, non-infectious and inherent factors.” Further, and although outside of the legislative scheme, the final report of the Cohen Commission concluded that “a host fish is diseased if it is behaviourally or physiologically comprised” and a “pathogen” as an “agent (such as a virus, bacteria, or sea louse) that causes disease” (Cohen Commission vol 3 at 20).
[56] The plain meaning of the language “any disease or disease agent” suggests that the phrase is not limited to only those few diseases prescribed by policy as listed in Appendix IV. The Minister’s legal duty under section 56 extends to any disease or disease agent that “may be harmful to the protection and conservation of fish.” Interpreting section 56(b) in this manner is consistent with a purposive and contextual approach, as it supports conservation of the resource, the Minister’s primary obligation under the Fisheries Act: R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 533 at para 40. It is also consistent with the precautionary approach which the Minister says was taken into account. I will address this issue further in Part VII of these reasons.
[57] Again, a purposive, contextual and plain meaning analysis of the language “that may be harmful” suggests this phrase means any disease or disease agent that might be harmful to the protection and conservation of fish. This interpretive approach is again consistent with the precautionary principle, the essence of which is that where a risk of serious or irreversible harm exists, a lack of scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take reasonable and cost-effective conservation and management measures to address that risk (Cohen Commission vol 3 at 20). I note, in this regard, that although HSMI was first identified in 1999, it was in Scotland in 2005 and subsequently in Chile, it would be an unreasonable inference to draw from the evidence that it will not appear in farmed Atlantic salmon on the Pacific Coast.
[58] The precautionary principle has been applied in international agreements to which Canada is a party (such as the Convention on Biological Diversity), domestic legislation (for example the Oceans Act or the Species at Risk Act). The Supreme Court of Canada has also relied on the precautionary principle in interpreting regulations directed to public health and the environment: 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v Hudson (Town), 2001 SCC 40 at paras 30-32; Castonguay Blasting Ltd. v Ontario (Environment