Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board

Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2007-10-04
Neutral citation
2007 SCC 41
Report
[2007] 3 SCR 129
Case number
31227
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; Bastarache, Michel; Binnie, William Ian Corneil; LeBel, Louis; Deschamps, Marie; Fish, Morris J.; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Charron, Louise; Rothstein, Marshall
On appeal from
Ontario
Subjects
Professional law
Torts
Notes
SCC Case Information: 31227
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Hill v. Hamilton‑Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129, 2007 SCC 41
Date: 20071004
Docket: 31227
Between:
Jason George Hill
Appellant / Respondent on cross‑appeal
and
Hamilton‑Wentworth Regional Police Services Board,
Jack Loft, Andrea McLaughlin, Joseph Stewart, Ian Matthews
and Terry Hill
Respondents / Appellants on cross‑appeal
‑ and ‑
Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General
of Ontario, Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto Inc.,
Association in Defence of the Wrongly Convicted,
Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, Criminal
Lawyers’ Association (Ontario), Canadian Civil
Liberties Association, Canadian Police Association
and Police Association of Ontario
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ.
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 106)
Dissenting Reasons on
Cross-Appeal:
(paras. 107 to 188)
McLachlin C.J. (Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish and Abella JJ. concurring)
Charron J. (Bastarache and Rothstein JJ. concurring)
______________________________
Hill v. Hamilton‑Wentworth Police Services Board, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129, 2007 SCC 41
Jason George Hill Appellant/Respondent on cross‑appeal
v.
Hamilton‑Wentworth Regional Police
Services Board, Jack Loft,
Andrea McLaughlin, Joseph Stewart,
Ian Matthews and Terry Hill Respondents/Appellants on cross‑appeal
and
Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General
of Ontario, Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto Inc.,
Association in Defence of the Wrongly Convicted,
Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, Criminal
Lawyers’ Association (Ontario), Canadian Civil
Liberties Association, Canadian Police Association
and Police Association of Ontario Interveners
Indexed as: Hill v. Hamilton‑Wentworth Regional Police Services Board
Neutral citation: 2007 SCC 41.
File No.: 31227.
2006: November 10; 2007: October 4.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for ontario
Torts — Negligence — Duty of care — Police investigation — Whether police owe duty of care to suspects in criminal investigations — If so, standard of care required by police investigating a suspect — Whether police officers’ conduct in investigating suspect was negligent.
Police — Investigation — Negligence — Whether Canadian law recognizes tort of negligent investigation.
H was investigated by the police, arrested, tried, wrongfully convicted, and ultimately acquitted after spending more than 20 months in jail for a crime he did not commit. Police officers suspected that H had committed 10 robberies. The evidence against H included a tip, a police officer’s photo identification of H, eyewitness identifications, a potential sighting of H near the site of one of the robberies, and witness statements that the robber was aboriginal. During their investigation, the police released H’s photo to the media. They also asked witnesses to identify the robber from a photo lineup consisting of H, who is an aboriginal person, and 11 similar‑looking Caucasian foils. The police, however, also had information that two Hispanic men, one of whom looks like H, were the robbers. Two similar robberies occurred while H was in custody. H was charged with 10 counts of robbery but 9 charges were withdrawn before trial. Trial proceeded on the remaining charge because two eyewitnesses remained steadfast in their identifications of H. H was found guilty of robbery. He appealed and a new trial was ordered. H was acquitted at the second trial and brought a civil action that included a claim in negligence against the police based on the conduct of their investigation. The trial judge dismissed the claim in negligence and H appealed. The Court of Appeal unanimously recognized the tort of negligent investigation, however a majority of the court held that the police were not negligent in their investigation. In this Court, H appealed from the finding that the police were not negligent. The respondents cross‑appealed from the finding that there is a tort of negligent investigation.
Held (Bastarache, Charron and Rothstein JJ. dissenting on the cross‑appeal): The appeal and the cross‑appeal should be dismissed.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish and Abella JJ.: The police are not immune from liability under the law of negligence and the tort of negligent investigation exists in Canada. Police officers owe a duty of care to suspects. Their conduct during an investigation should be measured against the standard of how a reasonable officer in like circumstances would have acted. Police officers may be accountable for harm resulting to a suspect if they fail to meet this standard. In this case, the police officers’ conduct, considered in light of police practices at the time, meets the standard of a reasonable officer in similar circumstances and H’s claim in negligence is not made out. [3] [74] [77]
A person owes a duty of care to another person if the relationship between the two discloses sufficient foreseeability and proximity to establish a prima facie duty of care. In the very particular relationship between the police and a suspect under investigation, reasonable foreseeability is clearly made out because a negligent investigation may cause harm to the suspect. Establishing proximity generally involves examining factors such as the parties’ expectations, representations, reliance and property or other interests. There is sufficient proximity between police officers and a particularized suspect under investigation to recognize a prima facie duty of care. The relationship is clearly personal, close and direct. A suspect has a critical personal interest in the conduct of an investigation. No other tort provides an adequate remedy for negligent police investigations. The tort is consistent with the values of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and fosters the public’s interest in responding to failures of the justice system. [21] [24‑25] [31‑39]
No compelling policy reasons negate the duty of care. Investigating suspects does not require police officers to make quasi‑judicial decisions as to legal guilt or innocence or to evaluate evidence according to legal standards. The discretion inherent in police work is not relevant to whether a duty of care arises, although it is relevant to the standard of care owed to a suspect. Police officers are not unlike other professionals who exercise levels of discretion in their work but who are subject to a duty of care. Recognizing a duty of care will not raise the reasonable and probable grounds standard required for certain police conduct such as arrest, prosecution, search and seizure. The record does not establish that recognizing the tort will change the behaviour of the police, cause officers to become unduly defensive or lead to a flood of litigation. The burden of proof on a plaintiff and a defendant’s right of appeal provide safeguards against any risk that a plaintiff acquitted of a crime, but in fact guilty of the crime, may recover against an officer for negligent investigation. [50‑51] [53] [55] [61‑65]
The standard of care of a reasonable police officer in similar circumstances should be applied in a manner that gives due recognition to the discretion inherent in police investigation. Police officers may make minor errors or errors in judgment without breaching the standard. This standard is flexible, covers all aspects of investigatory police work, and is reinforced by the nature and importance of police investigations. [68‑73]
To establish a cause of action for negligent police investigation, the plaintiff must show that he or she suffered compensable damage and a causal connection to a breach of the standard of care owed to him or her. Lawful pains and penalties imposed on a guilty person do not constitute compensable loss. The limitation period for negligent investigation begins to run when the cause of action is complete and the harmful consequences result. This occurs when it is clear that the suspect has suffered compensable harm. In this case, the limitation period did not start to run until H was acquitted of all charges of robbery. [90‑98]
The respondents’ conduct in relation to H, considered in light of police practices at the time, meets the standard of a reasonable officer in similar circumstances. The publication of H’s photo, incomplete records of witness interviews, interviewing two witnesses together, and failing to blind‑test photos are not good practices by today’s standards but the evidence does not establish that a reasonable officer at the time would not have followed similar practices or that H would not have been charged and convicted if these incidents had not occurred. The trial judge accepted expert evidence that there were no rules governing photo lineups and a great deal of variation of practice at the time. It was established that the photo lineup’s racial composition did not lead to unfairness. After H was arrested, credible evidence continued to support the charge against H and Crown prosecutors had assumed responsibility for the file. It has not been established that a reasonable police officer in either a supporting or a lead investigator’s role, in the circumstances, would have intervened to halt the case. [74] [78‑81] [86] [88]
Per Bastarache, Charron and Rothstein JJ. (dissenting on the cross-appeal): The tort of negligent investigation should not be recognized in Canada. A private duty of care owed by the police to suspects would necessarily conflict with an officer’s overarching public duty to investigate crime and apprehend offenders. This alone defeats the claim that there is a relationship of proximity between the parties sufficient to give rise to a prima facie duty of care. Even if a prima facie duty of care were found to exist, that duty should be negatived on residual policy grounds. The recognition of this tort would have significant consequences for other legal obligations and would detrimentally affect the legal system and society more generally. In light of the conclusion that the tort of negligent investigation is not available at common law, the action was properly dismissed by the courts below. [112‑113] [187]
There is no question that the police owe a duty to the public to investigate crime. Determining whether this translates into a private duty owed to suspects under investigation requires examining reasonable foreseeability and proximity. The reasonable foreseeability requirement poses no barrier to finding a duty of care. A police investigator can readily foresee that a targeted suspect could be harmed as a result of the negligent conduct of an investigation. With respect to proximity, the analysis can usefully start with a search for analogous categories. This case does not fall directly or by analogy within any category of cases in which a duty of care has previously been recognized. The analogy made to victims of crime by the Court of Appeal does not hold. There is a crucial distinction between victims and suspects. Whereas a victim’s interest is generally reconcilable with a police officer’s duty to investigate crime, a suspect will always suffer some harm from being targeted in an investigation, even if ultimately exonerated. A suspect’s interest in being left alone by the state is at odds with the fulfilment of the police officer’s public duty to investigate crime. Outside Ontario, no court of common law jurisdiction has found a private law duty of care owed by police to suspects under investigation and in cases where the issue has arisen, courts have declined to recognize such a duty. Cases based on the Civil Code of Québec provide little assistance in deciding the present appeal. [116‑119] [131] [135] [186]
The question at the next stage of the inquiry on proximity is whether the relationship is such as to make the imposition of legal liability for negligence appropriate. Although the relationship between a police officer and a suspect is sufficiently close and direct, other factors engaged by the relationship do not give rise to proximity. The critical factor which militates against recognizing a duty of care is the conflicting interests engaged by the relationship. Enforcing the criminal law is one of the most important aspects of maintaining law and order in a free society. Fulfilling this function often requires police officers to make decisions that might adversely affect the rights and interests of citizens. The fulfilment of this public duty necessarily collides with the individual’s interest to be left alone by the state. The imposition on the police of a private duty to take reasonable care not to harm the individual would therefore inevitably pull the police away from targeting that individual as a suspect. The overly cautious approach that may result from the imposition of conflicting duties would seriously undermine society’s interest in having the police investigate crime and apprehend offenders. This opposition of interests has been recognized in other countries as a sufficient reason not to impose a duty of care. [136‑140] [142] [147]
Residual policy considerations also militate against the recognition of such a duty. The potential imposition of civil liability gives rise to a significant concern about the improper exercise of the police discretionary power to not engage the criminal process despite the existence of reasonable and probable grounds. Police discretion must be exercised solely to advance the public interest, not out of a fear of civil liability. The proposed tort also raises difficult questions of public policy with respect to identifying the wrongfully convicted for the purpose of compensation. A verdict of not guilty is not a factual finding of innocence. A choice would have to be made whether compensation is available to all who are acquitted or reserved to those who are factually innocent. The issue is most pertinent where, as here, the alleged wrong is the conduct of a substandard police investigation. A person who committed an offence may benefit from a botched‑up investigation because a negligent investigation will often be the effective cause of an acquittal. Whichever approach is adopted, there may be unforeseen and undesirable ramifications in the criminal context. These considerations provide reason to be cautious about imposing on police officers a novel duty of care towards suspects. [148] [151] [156] [160‑161] [167]
Furthermore, the ordinary negligence standard, even if linked to the reasonable and probable grounds standard, cannot easily co‑exist with governing criminal standards. If the civil standard for liability is to be tailored to complement governing criminal standards, the presence of reasonable and probable grounds for laying a charge must constitute a bar to any civil liability. It cannot be sufficient to show that investigative techniques used by the police were substandard. Rather, it must be established that the identification process was so flawed that it destroyed the reasonable and probable grounds for laying the charge. While the Court of Appeal agreed that the standard of care owed to suspects must be linked to the reasonable and probable grounds standard, none of the judges considered whether the charges were nonetheless laid on the basis of reasonable and probable grounds in their negligence analysis. The private nature of the tort of negligent investigation narrows the focus to the individual rights of the parties and loses sight of the broader public interests at stake. By contrast to the proposed action in negligence, the existing torts of false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office do not give rise to these policy concerns. The recognition that the civil tort system is not the appropriate vehicle to provide compensation for the wrongfully convicted should not, however, be viewed as undermining the importance of achieving that goal. [169] [174‑175] [180-181] [187]
Cases Cited
By McLachlin C.J.
Applied: Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728; Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537, 2001 SCC 79; Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562; discussed: Childs v. Desormeaux, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, 2006 SCC 18; referred to: Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 562, 2001 SCC 80; Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, 2003 SCC 69; Canadian National Railway Co. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021; Jane Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) Commissioners of Police (1998), 160 D.L.R. (4th) 697; Chartier v. Attorney General of Quebec, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 474; Brooks v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 1495, [2005] UKHL 24; Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, [1988] 2 All E.R. 238; Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, 2003 SCC 63; Rufo v. Simpson, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 (2001); Ryan v. Victoria (City), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 201; R. v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 205; Jauvin v. Procureur général du Québec, [2004] R.R.A. 37; Lacombe v. André, [2003] R.J.Q. 720; Lapointe v. Hôpital Le Gardeur, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 351; Folland v. Reardon (2005), 74 O.R. (3d) 688; R. v. Sheppard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, 2002 SCC 26.
By Charron J. (dissenting on cross‑appeal)
Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728; Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537, 2001 SCC 79; Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 562, 2001 SCC 80; Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, 2003 SCC 69; Childs v. Desormeaux, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, 2006 SCC 18; Beckstead v. Ottawa (City) Chief of Police (1997), 37 O.R. (3d) 62; Reynen v. Canada (1993), 70 F.T.R. 158; McGillivary v. New Brunswick (1994), 149 N.B.R. (2d) 311; Al’s Steak House & Tavern Inc. v. Deloitte & Touche (1994), 20 O.R. (3d) 673; Collie Woollen Mills Ltd. v. Canada (1996), 107 F.T.R. 93; Stevens v. Fredericton (City) (1999), 212 N.B.R. (2d) 264; Dix v. Canada (Attorney General) (2002), 315 A.R. 1, 2002 ABQB 580; Kleysen v. Canada (Attorney General) (2001), 159 Man. R. (2d) 17, 2001 MBQB 205; Avery v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] N.B.J. No. 391 (QL), 2004 NBQB 372; A.A.D. v. Tanner (2004), 188 Man. R. (2d) 15, 2004 MBQB 213; Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, [1988] 2 All E.R. 238; Alexandrou v. Oxford, [1993] 4 All E.R. 328; Osman v. Ferguson, [1993] 4 All E.R. 344; Cowan v. Chief Constable of the Avon and Somerset Constabulary, [2001] E.W.J. No. 5088 (QL), [2001] EWCA Civ 1699; Brooks v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 1495, [2005] UKHL 24; Calveley v. Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police, [1989] 1 All E.R. 1025; Emanuele v. Hedley (1997), 137 F.L.R. 339; Courtney v. State of Tasmania, [2000] TASSC 83; Wilson v. State of New South Wales (2001), 53 N.S.W.L.R. 407, [2001] NSWSC 869; Tame v. New South Wales (2002), 191 A.L.R. 449, [2002] HCA 35; Gruber v. Backhouse (2003), 190 F.L.R. 122, [2003] ACTSC 18; Duke v. State of New South Wales, [2005] NSWSC 632; Gregory v. Gollan, [2006] NZHC 426; Sullivan v. Moody (2001), 183 A.L.R. 404, [2001] HCA 59; Cran v. State of New South Wales (2004), 62 N.S.W.L.R. 95, [2004] NSWCA 92, leave to appeal denied, [2005] HCA Trans 21; Simpson v. Attorney General, [1994] 3 N.Z.L.R. 667; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (1949); Thompson v. Olson, 798 F.2d 552 (1986); Kompare v. Stein, 801 F.2d 883 (1986); Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544 (1994); Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480 (1995); Schertz v. Waupaca County, 875 F.2d 578 (1989); Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S.Ct. 2796 (2005); Jane Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) Commissioners of Police (1998), 160 D.L.R. (4th) 697; Jane Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) Commissioners of Police (1990), 72 D.L.R. (4th) 580; Dorset Yacht Co. v. Home Office, [1970] A.C. 1004; R. v. Beare, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387; R. v. Beaudry, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2007 SCC 5; R. v. Storrey, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241; Lacombe v. André, [2003] R.J.Q. 720; Jauvin v. Procureur général du Québec, [2004] R.R.A. 37.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
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Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 1457.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46, ss. 504 , 548(1) (a), 696.1 to 696.6 .
Police Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P‑17, s. 38(1).
Police Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 367, s. 34(2).
Police Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. P‑11, s. 5(2).
Police Act, R.S.Q., c. P‑13.1, s. 48.
Police Act, S.N.B. 1977, c. P‑9.2, s. 12(1).
Police Act, S.N.S. 2004, c. 31, ss. 30(1), 31(1).
Police Act, 1990, S.S. 1990‑91, c. P‑15.01, ss. 18, 19(1).
Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15, ss. 1, 42.
Provincial Police Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. P150, C.C.S.M. c. P150, s. 5.
Public Authorities Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.38, s. 7(1).
Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. R‑10, s. 18 .
Royal Newfoundland Constabulary Act, 1992, S.N.L. 1992, c. R‑17, s. 8(1).
Authors Cited
Blackstone, Sir William. Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book IV, 1769.
Canada. Department of Justice. Guidelines: Compensation for Wrongfully Convicted and Imprisoned Persons. Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1988.
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APPEAL and CROSS‑APPEAL from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (Goudge, Feldman, MacPherson, MacFarland and LaForme JJ.A.) (2005), 76 O.R. (3d) 481, 259 D.L.R. (4th) 676, 202 O.A.C. 310, 36 C.C.L.T. (3d) 105, 33 C.R. (6th) 269, [2005] O.J. No. 4045 (QL), affirming a decision of Marshall J. (2003), 66 O.R. (3d) 746, [2003] O.J. No. 3487 (QL). Appeal dismissed. Cross‑appeal dismissed, Bastarache, Charron and Rothstein JJ. dissenting.
Sean Dewart, Louis Sokolov and Charlene Wiseman, for the appellant/respondent on cross‑appeal.
David G. Boghosian and Courtney Raphael, for the respondents/appellants on cross‑appeal.
Anne M. Turley, for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada.
M. Michele Smith and Heather C. Mackay, for the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario.
Jonathan Rudin and Kimberly R. Murray, for the intervener the Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto Inc.
Julian N. Falconer and Sunil S. Mathai, for the intervener the Association in Defence of the Wrongly Convicted.
Leona K. Tesar and Gregory R. Preston, for the intervener the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police.
Mark J. Sandler and Joseph Di Luca, for the intervener the Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario).
Bradley E. Berg and Allison A. Thornton, for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
Ian Roland and Emily Lawrence, for the interveners the Canadian Police Association and the Police Association of Ontario.
The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish and Abella JJ. was delivered by
The Chief Justice —
I. Introduction
1 The police must investigate crime. That is their duty. In the vast majority of cases, they carry out this duty with diligence and care. Occasionally, however, mistakes are made. These mistakes may have drastic consequences. An innocent suspect may be investigated, arrested and imprisoned because of negligence in the course of a police investigation. This is what Jason George Hill, appellant in the case at bar, alleges happened to him.
2 Can the police be held liable if their conduct during the course of an investigation falls below an acceptable standard and harm to a suspect results? If so, what standard should be used to assess the conduct of the police? More generally, is police conduct during the course of an investigation or arrest subject to scrutiny under the law of negligence at all, or should police be immune on public policy grounds from liability under the law of negligence? These are the questions at stake on this appeal.
3 I conclude that police are not immune from liability under the Canadian law of negligence, that the police owe a duty of care in negligence to suspects being investigated, and that their conduct during the course of an investigation should be measured against the standard of how a reasonable officer in like circumstances would have acted. The tort of negligent investigation exists in Canada, and the trial court and Court of Appeal were correct to consider the appellant’s action on this basis. The law of negligence does not demand a perfect investigation. It requires only that police conducting an investigation act reasonably. When police fail to meet the standard of reasonableness, they may be accountable through negligence law for harm resulting to a suspect.
II. Facts and Procedural History
4 This case arises out of an unfortunate series of events which resulted in an innocent person being investigated by the police, arrested, tried, wrongfully convicted, and ultimately acquitted after spending more than 20 months in jail for a crime he did not commit.
5 Ten robberies occurred in Hamilton between December 16, 1994 and January 23, 1995. The modus operandi in all of the robberies seemed essentially the same. Eyewitnesses provided similar descriptions of the suspect. The police, relying on similarities in the modus operandi and eyewitness descriptions, concluded early on in the investigation that the same person had committed all the robberies, and labelled the perpetrator “the plastic bag robber”.
6 The appellant, Jason George Hill, became a suspect in the course of the investigation of the “plastic bag” robberies. The police investigated. They released his photo to the media, and conducted a photo lineup consisting of the aboriginal suspect Hill and 11 similar‑looking Caucasian foils. On January 27, 1995, the police arrested Hill and charged him with 10 counts of robbery. The evidence against him at that point included: a Crime Stoppers tip; identification by a police officer based on a surveillance photo; several eyewitness identifications (some tentative, others more solid); a potential sighting of Hill near the site of a robbery by a police officer; eyewitness evidence that the robber appeared to be aboriginal (which Hill was); and the belief of the police that a single person committed all 10 robberies.
7 At the time of the arrest, the police were in possession of potentially exculpatory evidence, namely, an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip received on January 25, 1995 suggesting that two Hispanic men (“Frank” and “Pedro”) were the perpetrators. As time passed, other exculpatory evidence surfaced. Two similar robberies occurred while Hill was in custody. The descriptions of the robber and the modus operandi were similar to the original robberies, except for the presence of a threat of a gun in the last two robberies. The police received a second Crime Stoppers tip implicating “Frank”, which indicated that “Frank” looked similar to Jason George Hill and that “Frank” was laughing because Hill was being held responsible for robberies that Frank had committed. The police detective investigating the last two robberies (Detective Millin) received information from another officer that a Frank Sotomayer could be the robber. He proceeded to gather evidence and information which tended to inculpate Sotomayer — that Sotomayer and Hill looked very much alike, that there was evidence tending to corroborate the credibility of the Crime Stoppers tip implicating “Frank”, and that photos from the first robberies seemed to look more like Sotomayer than Hill. Information from this investigation of the later robberies was conveyed to the detective supervising the investigation of the earlier robberies (Detective Loft).
8 Two of the charges against Hill were dropped in response to this new evidence, the police having concluded that Sotomayer, not Hill, had committed those robberies. However, the police did not drop all of the charges.
9 Legal proceedings against Hill in relation to the remaining eight charges began. Two more charges were withdrawn by the Crown during the preliminary inquiry because a witness testified that Hill was not the person who robbed her. Five more charges were withdrawn by the Assistant Crown Attorney assigned to prosecute at trial. A single charge remained, and the Crown decided to proceed based on this charge, largely because two eyewitnesses, the bank tellers, remained steadfast in their identifications of Hill.
10 Hill stood trial and was found guilty of robbery in March 1996. He successfully appealed the conviction based on errors of law made by the trial judge. On August 6, 1997, his appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered. Hill was ultimately acquitted of all charges of robbery on December 20, 1999.
11 To summarize, Hill first became involved in the investigation as a suspect in January of 1995 and remained involved in various aspects of the justice system as a suspect, an accused, and a convicted person, until December of 1999. Within this period, he was imprisoned for various periods totalling more than 20 months, although not continuously.
12 Hill brought civil actions against the police (the Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board and a number of individual officers) and the Crown prosecutors involved in his preliminary inquiry and trial. The actions against some of the individual officers and all of the Crown prosecutors were discontinued before trial. The action against the remaining defendants was brought on the basis of negligence, malicious prosecution, and breach of rights protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . This appeal is concerned with the negligence claim.
13 Hill alleges that the police investigation was negligent in a number of ways. He attacks the identifications by the two bank tellers on the ground that they were interviewed together (not separately, as non-mandatory guidelines suggested), with a newspaper photo identifying Hill as the suspect on their desks, and particularly objects to the methods used to interview witnesses and administer a photo lineup. He also alleged that the police failed to adequately reinvestigate the robberies when new evidence emerged that cast doubt on his initial arrest.
14 At trial, Marshall J. of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice held that the police were not liable in negligence ((2003), 66 O.R. (3d) 746). In his view, the conduct of the police did not breach the standard of care of a reasonably competent professional in like circumstances; the police had acted in the frenzy of the moment, in circumstances where there was no recognized police procedure at the time, and it would be “facile hindsight” to conclude that they were negligent (para. 75). The trial judge expressed considerable sympathy for Hill and found frailties in the police evidence. Nevertheless, he concluded that the standard of care that would be expected of the reasonable officer at that time was met (paras. 75-76).
15 Hill appealed. The Court of Appeal unanimously held that there is a tort of negligent investigation and that the appropriate standard of care is the reasonable officer in like circumstances, subject to qualification at the point of arrest when the standard of care is tied to the standard of reasonable and probable grounds ((2005), 76 O.R. (3d) 481). However, the Court of Appeal split on the application of the tort of negligent investigation to the facts.
16 A majority of three (per MacPherson J.A. (Goudge and MacFarland JJ.A. concurring)) held that the standard of care was not breached and that the police should not be held liable in negligence. In the view of the majority, the impugned elements of the investigation pre-arrest complied with the standard of care. In particular, the majority was not prepared to find the photo lineup negligent. In light of the lack of uniform rules or procedures relating to photo lineups at the time, it was not clear that the police failed to do what the reasonable officer would have done in conducting the lineup as they did. Further, it was not established that the photo lineup was structurally biased. Nor was the failure to reinvestigate negligent. First, since “Hamilton is a fairly large city with many bank robberies”, it was reasonable that the police’s knowledge that later robberies were committed by Sotomayer did not cast doubt on the earlier arrest of the appellant (para. 112). Second, it was reasonable not to connect information relating to later robberies to the earlier robberies for which Hill was arrested because the later robberies involved a gun and the earlier ones did not. Third, police did take significant actions in response to new information, including dropping some of the charges against Hill. Fourth, some key evidence against Hill remained unchanged even after Sotomayer was arrested for some of the “plastic bag robberies”, including some of the eyewitness identifications. Finally, the ultimate decision to proceed to trial was made by the Crown prosecutor, not the police.
17 In dissent, Feldman and LaForme JJ.A. found aspects of the impugned police conduct constituted negligent failure to reinvestigate. They concluded that the trial judge had made errors of law and palpable and overriding errors of fact, in concluding that the photo lineup and failure to reinvestigate were not negligent. A photo lineup consisting of one aboriginal person and eleven Caucasians is “prima facie potentially structurally biased with obvious potential for unfairness” and thus “falls below the standard of care required of police” (para. 156). Feldman and LaForme JJ.A. also found that the police had not pursued a number of pieces of evidence which could potentially have exculpated Hill (paras. 144 ff.).
18 Hill appeals to this Court, contending that the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in finding that the police investigation leading to his arrest and prosecution was not negligent. The police cross-appeal, arguing that there is no tort of negligent investigation in Canadian law.
III. Analysis
The Tort of Negligent Investigation
1. Duty of Care
19 The issue at this stage is whether the law recognizes a duty of care on an investigating police officer to a suspect in the course of investigation. This matter is
not settled in Canada. Lower courts have divided and this Court has never considered the matter. We must therefore ask whether, as a matter of principle, a duty of care should be recognized in this situation.
20 The test for determining whether a person owes a duty of care involves two questions: (1) Does the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant disclose sufficient foreseeability and proximity to establish a prima facie duty of care; and (2) If so, are there any residual policy considerations which ought to negate or limit that duty of care? (See Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.), as affirmed and explained by this Court in a number of cases (Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537, 2001 SCC 79, at paras. 25 and 29-39; Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 562, 2001 SCC 80, at para. 9; Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, 2003 SCC 69, at paras. 47-50; Childs v. Desormeaux, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 643, 2006 SCC 18, at para. 47).)
(a) Does the Relationship Establish a Prima Facie Duty of Care?
21 The purpose of the inquiry at this stage is to determine if there was a relationship between the parties that gave rise to a legal duty of care.
22 The first element of such a relationship is foreseeability. In the foundational case of Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.), Lord Atkin stated:
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. . . . Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be — persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. [Emphasis added; p. 580.]
Lord Atkin went on to state that each person “must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour” (p. 580). Thus the first question in determining whether a duty in negligence is owed is whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the actions of the alleged wrongdoer would cause harm to the victim.
23 However, as acknowledged in Donoghue and affirmed by this Court in Cooper, foreseeability alone is not enough to establish the required relationship. To impose a duty of care “there must also be a close and direct relationship of proximity or neighbourhood”: Cooper, at para. 22. The proximity inquiry asks whether the case discloses factors which show that the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant was sufficiently close to give rise to a legal duty of care. The focus is on the relationship between alleged wrongdoer and victim: is the relationship one where the imposition of legal liability for the wrongdoer’s actions is appropriate?
24 Generally speaking, the proximity analysis involves examining the relationship at issue, considering factors such as expectations, representations, reliance and propert