Gazi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)

Gazi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2017-01-25
Neutral citation
2017 FC 94
File numbers
IMM-2401-16
Notes
A correction was made on February 6, 2017.
Decision Content
Date: 20170125
Docket: IMM-2401-16
Citation: 2017 FC 94
Ottawa, Ontario, January 25, 2017
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Brown
BETWEEN:
MOHAMMAD JEWEL HOSSAIN GAZI
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Nature of the Matter
[1] This is an application for judicial review by Mohammad Jewel Hossain Gazi [the Applicant] pursuant to s. 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [the IRPA], of a decision made by a Senior Immigration Officer [the Officer], dated May 16, 2016, in which the Applicant’s application for permanent residence [PR] as a protected person was rejected on the grounds of inadmissibility pursuant to paragraphs 34(1)(f) [membership] and (c) [engaging in terrorism] of the IRPA [the Decision].
[2] A non-disclosure order, pursuant to section 87 of the IRPA, was granted by Justice Noël on December 2, 2016.
[3] The application is dismissed for the reasons that follow.
II. Facts
[4] The Applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He arrived in Canada on January 18, 2013. He made a refugee claim that same day. On September 26, 2013, he was found to be a refugee under the IRPA. On February 27, 2014, the Applicant applied for permanent resident status. On April 28, 2015, he received stage one approval. At the second stage, security concerns resulted in a delay in processing his application; the Applicant was subsequently found inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 34(1)(f) of the IRPA for being a member of the Bangladesh National Party [BNP].
[5] The Applicant admitted his membership in the BNP on several occasions. In his Basis of Claim [BOC] Narrative, he states that he joined the student wing of the BNP in mid-1997, while a student at college in Dhaka. During that time, he participated in political activities such as demonstrations, seminars and political meetings. In 2004, he went to Korea to study and returned to a worsening political situation in Bangladesh. He left for Japan in 2005 and remained there “to observe the situation” at home. Upon expiry of his visa, he was arrested and deported to Bangladesh in 2008. He joined the Sechashebak Dal (Volunteers’ Party) of the BNP Mirpur chapter in late 2008 and campaigned for them in a subsequent election. He was also a member of the political party. He stated that “[A]ll the local leaders of the AL [Awami League], BNP, and other major political parties knew me personally as a dedicated worker of the BNP and my attachment with the party was sincere, wholehearted and devotional.”
[6] He admitted his membership in BNP and therefore, his membership is taken as conclusively determined; his membership in BNP is not at issue, it is a given.
[7] On October 27, 2015, a Section 34(1) Inadmissibility Assessment was completed by the CBSA National Security Screening Division, which included the following summary of the Applicant’s comments regarding the BNP’s activities:
The applicant indicated that the BNP is a “party that uses armed struggle or violence to reach political objectives.” He specified that when there is a strike, the party uses ammunitions and arms. The BNP, like the opposition party, “uses arms like a war. They use hand bombs, pistols, and big swords. They attack the leading government’s people at the time of strike or precession.” During a strike, the applicant stated that no one is able to come out of their homes, offices are closed, there is no transportation, and the roads are barricaded. He specified that these acts are done by the opposition party.
The applicant further elaborated on the violent methods used by the BNP on his IMM 5669 form, stating that he was a member of an organization that is or was engaged in an activity that is part of a pattern of criminal activity. He stated that the BNP meets this definition as the group “…uses sticks to hit people and shoot pistols at people and throw hand bombs. They burn the stores.” When asked if he personally has ever taken part in the aforementioned activities, he stated that he has not and is trying to stay away from these activities. He stated that he was just an “ordinary” member of the party. The applicant stated that he would attend the meetings, processions, and when there was a strike, “[he] would have to be there for [the BNP].” He declared that while he was asked numerous times “to throw cocktails,” he never did and simply provided “accompaniment.” He took part in strikes in Gubtoly, Mirpur. He also admitted that he witnessed people being hurt by members of the BNP. About two months prior to his arrival in Canada, the BNP approached a car that was running, took the passenger outside, and beat them up. He stated that “when this kind of situation [happened], I always go and hide because the police [were] there also.” When he told the party that he did not want to engage in its violent activities, he stated that he was told he must as the elections were upcoming. He stated that he said he wanted to quit because he did not want to be arrested by the police. He stated that the BNP will try to kill him and hide his body.
[8] On January 21, 2016, the Applicant received a request for updated information in his PR application. On February 22, 2016, the Applicant replied, submitting that the BNP is not a terrorist organization. In this respect, he pointed to a decision from a US Immigration Court, dated July 2015, which found that the BNP had not “evolved into a terrorist organization.” The Applicant submitted the reasoning of that case was persuasive support for finding the BNP not to be a terrorist organization and the Applicant therefore not inadmissible under paragraphs 34(1)(f) and (c) of the IRPA. While paragraph 34(1)(b) of the IRPA, namely, whether the BNP engaged in or instigated subversion against a democratic government or subversion by force of any government, was initially in issue, that allegation was not pursued before this Court.
III. Decision
[9] On May 16, 2016, the Applicant was found inadmissible for PR status as a protected person because he was found to have been a member of an organization which there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts of terrorism under paragraphs 34(1)(f) and (c) [engaging in terrorism] of IRPA.
[10] Citing from both Poshteh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 85 [Poshteh] and Al Yamani v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2006 FC 1457 [Yamani], the Officer made note of the broad meaning ascribed to the word “member.” He noted the Applicant’s self-admitted membership in the BNP and concluded that “on reasonable grounds, the applicant was a member of the BNP.”
[11] Regarding the BNP’s engagement in acts of subversion or terrorism, the Officer cites several reports, news articles and studies, as well as “general information” found online on Wikipedia. The Officer acknowledges searching for and finding this general information on the internet by using the search term “Bangladesh nationalist party terrorist acts”, but notes these search results were not shared with the Applicant since they are “publicly available information.” Several excerpts of information collected through this search are included in the Decision, discussing BNP-led air strikes and general strikes (hartal), the economic effects of hartal blockades and sieges, firebomb attacks and the history of the violent conflict between the BNP and the AL:
The BNP and the Awami League have been the two main political parties in Bangladesh. As counsel for the Applicant has noted, politics in Bangladesh is a violent affair. In that respect both parties have engaged in similar tactics. One such practice is the use of general strikes (hartal) as a form of political protest. The underlying reason to stage a hartal is economic disruption as a means of coercion against the government to achieve a particular goal. The other issue with these hartals is that they also frequently resulted in violence by BNP activists and members and those incidences too became a means of coercion against the government.
[12] In analyzing whether the actions of the BNP fall under subsection 83.01(1) of the Criminal Code, RSC, 1985, c C-46, the Officer concluded:
The hartals employed by the BNP have significant economic impact on Bangladesh’s economy and have resulted in both substantial damage to property and both death and serious bodily harm caused by BNP activists and members as well as disruptions in services. I note that in some cases, BNP leadership have denied responsibility in the past for some actions and have condemned the violence. However, the continued use of hartals by the BNP as a means of forcibly compelling the government to meet the BNP’s demands as well as the incidences of violence that erupts from these hartals are indicators that these tactics rise above simple peaceful protest or advocacy.
[13] The Officer also noted that the definition used to define terrorism is broader in Canada than it is in the States, insofar as it relates to the Criminal Code definition: “there are sufficient differences in the application of how a terrorist organization is defined and the standard of proof used to make that determination, between the one in IRPA and the one used in the US Immigration case cited.”
[14] In conclusion, the Officer states:
I note that there is little evidence before me to find that the applicant personally engaged in violence for the BNP. However, I note that the BNP’s continued reliance on hartals as a tool to coerce the government by creating significant economic disruption as well as the incidences of violence that resulted from the implementation of the hartals caused by BNP members are sufficient to find that the BNP constituted terrorist acts.
I therefore find there are reasonable grounds to believe the applicant is inadmissible to Canada under section A34(1)(f) being a member of an organizations [sic], namely the Bangladesh National Party, that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in terrorist acts.
[15] It is from this Decision the Applicant seeks judicial review.
IV. Issues
[16] The issue is whether the Officer’s finding that he or she had reasonable grounds to believe that the BNP engaged, is engaging or will engage in terrorism, is reasonable.
V. Standard of Review
[17] In Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at paras 57, 62 [Dunsmuir], the Supreme Court of Canada held that a standard of review analysis is unnecessary where “the jurisprudence has already determined in a satisfactory manner the degree of deference to be accorded with regard to a particular category of question.” Findings under s. 34(1) of the IRPA are reviewed on the reasonableness standard: Najafi v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2014 FCA 262 at para 56, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 36241 (23 April 2015) [Najafi (FCA)].
[18] In Dunsmuir at para 47, the Supreme Court of Canada explained what is required of a court reviewing on the reasonableness standard of review:
A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.
[19] In addition, I also wish to note at the outset that Senior Immigration Officers have a recognized and accepted degree of expertise in these matters: Gutierrez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 623 at para 21 [Gutierrez]:
[21] The Federal Court of Appeal has held that the question of whether a person is a “member” of an organization described in paragraph 34(1)(f) of the IRPA is a question of mixed fact and law reviewable on a standard of reasonableness: Poshteh, above. The same applies to determining whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the organizations in question have engaged, are engaging or will engage in acts of terrorism. In fact, these two aspects are closely related, and both raise questions of mixed fact and law in which immigration officers have a degree of expertise, as our Court has also recognized on a number of occasions: see, inter alia, Jalil v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 246 at paras 19‑20, [2006] 4 FCR 471 [Jalil]; Daud v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 701 at para 6, (available on CanLII) [Daud]; Omer v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007FC 478 at paras 8‑9, 157 ACWS (3d) 601.
[emphasis added]
[20] Moreover, the Federal Court of Appeal said of paragraph 34(1)(b) of IRPA that there is a presumption of deference to be afforded to the IAD’s interpretation of its home statute: Najafi (FCA), above at para 56. I see no reasons why a Senior Immigration Officer acting under paragraph 34(1)(c) of IRPA should not be afforded the benefit of the same presumption of deference, and so find.
[21] This Court in Gutierrez considered the standard of review in terms of the standard of proof under paragraph 34(1)(f):
[22] On the other hand, it should be noted that the standard of proof that an immigration officer must apply in the context of sections 34 to 37 of the IRPA is that of “reasonable grounds to believe” that the facts stated in those sections have occurred, are occurring or may occur (IRPA, s 33). It is settled law that this standard requires more than mere suspicion but is not equivalent to the balance of probabilities required in civil matters: Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40 at para 114, [2005] 2 SCR 100; Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9 at para 39, [2007] 1 SCR 350. Accordingly, the role of this Court when reviewing an immigration officer’s inadmissibility decision is not to determine whether, in fact, there were reasonable grounds to believe that the individual engaged in or was a member of an organization that engaged in the alleged acts but to consider whether the officer’s finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe can itself be regarded as reasonable.
[22] The Supreme Court of Canada held in Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40 at para 114, that “reasonable grounds to believe” requires something more than mere suspicion but less than the balance of probabilities:
The Federal Court of Appeal has found, and we agree, that the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard requires something more than mere suspicion, but less than the standard applicable in civil matters of proof on the balance of probabilities [citations omitted] in essence, reasonable grounds will exist where there is an objective basis for the belief which is based on compelling and credible evidence.
[23] The Supreme Court of Canada instructs that judicial review is not a line-by-line treasure hunt for errors; the decision should be approached as an organic whole: Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd, 2013 SCC 34. Further, a reviewing court must determine whether the decision, viewed as a whole in the context of the record, is reasonable: Construction Labour Relations v Driver Iron Inc, 2012 SCC 65; see also Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62.
VI. Relevant Provisions
[24] Sections 33 and 34(1) of the IRPA state:
Rules of interpretation
marginale : Interprétation
33 The facts that constitute inadmissibility under sections 34 to 37 include facts arising from omissions and, unless otherwise provided, include facts for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that they have occurred, are occurring or may occur.
33 Les faits — actes ou omissions — mentionnés aux articles 34 à 37 sont, sauf disposition contraire, appréciés sur la base de motifs raisonnables de croire qu’ils sont survenus, surviennent ou peuvent survenir.
Security
Sécurité
34 (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for
34 (1) Emportent interdiction de territoire pour raison de sécurité les faits suivants :
(a) engaging in an act of espionage that is against Canada or that is contrary to Canada’s interests;
a) être l’auteur de tout acte d’espionnage dirigé contre le Canada ou contraire aux intérêts du Canada;
(b) engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any government;
b) être l’instigateur ou l’auteur d’actes visant au renversement d’un gouvernement par la force;
(b.1) engaging in an act of subversion against a democratic government, institution or process as they are understood in Canada;
b.1) se livrer à la subversion contre toute institution démocratique, au sens où cette expression s’entend au Canada;
(c) engaging in terrorism;
c) se livrer au terrorisme;
(d) being a danger to the security of Canada;
d) constituer un danger pour la sécurité du Canada;
(e) engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada; or
e) être l’auteur de tout acte de violence susceptible de mettre en danger la vie ou la sécurité d’autrui au Canada;
(f) being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b), (b.1) or (c).
f) être membre d’une organisation dont il y a des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’elle est, a été ou sera l’auteur d’un acte visé aux alinéas a), b), b.1) ou c).
[25] Section 83.01(1) of Criminal Code states:
Definitions
Définitions
83.01 (1) The following definitions apply in this Part.
83.01 (1) Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente partie.
…
(EN BLANC/BLANK)
terrorist activity means
activité terroriste
…
...
(b) an act or omission, in or outside Canada,
b) soit un acte — action ou omission, commise au Canada ou à l’étranger :
(i) that is committed
(i) d’une part, commis à la fois :
(A) in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause, and
(A) au nom — exclusivement ou non — d’un but, d’un objectif ou d’une cause de nature politique, religieuse ou idéologique,
(B) in whole or in part with the intention of intimidating the public, or a segment of the public, with regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act, whether the public or the person, government or organization is inside or outside Canada, and
(B) en vue — exclusivement ou non — d’intimider tout ou partie de la population quant à sa sécurité, entre autres sur le plan économique, ou de contraindre une personne, un gouvernement ou une organisation nationale ou internationale à accomplir un acte ou à s’en abstenir, que la personne, la population, le gouvernement ou l’organisation soit ou non au Canada,
(C) causes a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or any segment of the public,
(C) compromet gravement la santé ou la sécurité de tout ou partie de la population,
(D) causes substantial property damage, whether to public or private property, if causing such damage is likely to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of clauses (A) to (C), or
(D) cause des dommages matériels considérables, que les biens visés soient publics ou privés, dans des circonstances telles qu’il est probable que l’une des situations mentionnées aux divisions (A) à (C) en résultera,
(E) causes serious interference with or serious disruption of an essential service, facility or system, whether public or private, other than as a result of advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work that is not intended to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of clauses (A) to (C),
(E) perturbe gravement ou paralyse des services, installations ou systèmes essentiels, publics ou privés, sauf dans le cadre de revendications, de protestations ou de manifestations d’un désaccord ou d’un arrêt de travail qui n’ont pas pour but de provoquer l’une des situations mentionnées aux divisions (A) à (C).
and includes a conspiracy, attempt or threat to commit any such act or omission, or being an accessory after the fact or counselling in relation to any such act or omission, but, for greater certainty, does not include an act or omission that is committed during an armed conflict and that, at the time and in the place of its commission, is in accordance with customary international law or conventional international law applicable to the conflict, or the activities undertaken by military forces of a state in the exercise of their official duties, to the extent that those activities are governed by other rules of international law. (activité terroriste)
Sont visés par la présente définition, relativement à un tel acte, le complot, la tentative, la menace, la complicité après le fait et l’encouragement à la perpétration; il est entendu que sont exclus de la présente définition l’acte — action ou omission — commis au cours d’un conflit armé et conforme, au moment et au lieu de la perpétration, au droit international coutumier ou au droit international conventionnel applicable au conflit ainsi que les activités menées par les forces armées d’un État dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions officielles, dans la mesure où ces activités sont régies par d’autres règles de droit international. (terrorist activity)
…
…
terrorist group means
groupe terroriste
(a) an entity that has as one of its purposes or activities facilitating or carrying out any terrorist activity, or
a) Soit une entité dont l’un des objets ou l’une des activités est de se livrer à des activités terroristes ou de les faciliter;
(b) a listed entity,
b) soit une entité inscrite.
and includes an association of such entities. (groupe terroriste)
Est assimilé à un groupe terroriste un groupe ou une association formé de groupes terroristes au sens de la présente définition. (terrorist group)
VII. Analysis
[26] In my respectful view, the Officer’s conclusion that he had reasonable grounds to believe that the BNP was, is, or will be engaged in terrorism is reasonable; it is supported by the evidence having regard to the broad definition of terrorism under Canadian law. I should note this is not the end of the matter for the Applicant. He is entitled to apply to the Minister under subsection 42.1(1) of the IRPA for an individual exemption such that he might obtain permanent residence status. I also note that the Officer stated there was “little evidence before me to find that the applicant personally engaged in violence for the BNP”.
[27] I will begin with the definition of terrorism. The IRPA does not define terrorism. The Officer applied the definition of terrorist activity found in subsection 83.01(1) of the Criminal Code, set out above; this was not in issue. Subsection 83.01(1) in the context of this case, notably covers both acts and omissions whether they are conducted in or outside Canada (in this case, it applies to activities and, importantly, omissions occurring in Bangladesh), that are in whole or in part for a political purpose, objective, or cause, and which are committed in whole or in part with the intention of intimidating the public, or a segment of the public, with regard to its security, including economic security, or compelling a person or government to do or refrain from doing any act whether inside or outside Canada, where that act or omission intentionally causes death or serious bodily harm to a person by violence, endangers a person’s life, causes a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a segment thereof, causes substantial property damage or where such acts or omissions intentionally cause serious interference with or serious disruption of an essential service, facility or system [my emphasis].
[28] In addition, the definition of terrorist activity in the Criminal Code is further broadened in that it includes not only acts or omissions, but also conspiracies, attempts or threats to commit any such act or omission, being an accessory after the fact, or counselling in relation to any such acts or omissions. There are limitations, but these are the broad strokes.
[29] In this case, the Officer focused on the BNP’s use of general strikes (or hartals) as a form of political protest. The Officer determined that such general strikes (or hartals) have as their underlying reasons “economic disruption as a means of coercion against the government to achieve a particular goal. The other issue with these hartals is that they also frequently resulted in violence by BNP activists and members and those incidences too became a means of coercion against the government.”
[30] In my respectful view, the reasons of the Officer speak for themselves in terms of the evidence relied upon. In relevant part, the Officer’s reasons state:
IS/WAS THE BANGLADESH NATIONALIST PARTY (BNP) AN ORGANIZATION THAT ENGAGED, ENGAGES OR WILL ENGAGE I N ACTS OF SUBVERSI ON OR TERRORI SM?
Some general information about the BNP from Wikipedia:
“The party was founded on 1 September 1978 by former Bangladeshi President Ziaur Rahman, politician and physician A. Q. M. Badruddoza Chowdhurv, human rights activist and lawyer Moudud Ahmed and leftist politician Mashiur Rahman as the key people.
Till date, BNP has won the second, fifth, sixth and eighth national election and two Presidential elections in 1978 and 1981 respectively. The party also holds the record of being the largest opposition in the history of parliamentary elections of the country with 116 seats in the seventh national election of 1996.
The party floated the ideology of Bangladeshi nationalism as its core concept and adopted 19 points program with a view to "realize the golden harvest of the Bangladesh liberation war" according to its manifesto.”
The BNP and the Awarni League have been the two main political parties in Bangladesh. As counsel for the applicant has noted, politics in Bangladesh is a violent affair. In that respect both parties have engaged in similar tactics. One such practice is the use of general strikes (hartal) as a form of political protest. The underlying reason to stage a hartal is economic disruption as a means of coercion against the government to achieve a particular goal. The other issue with these hartals is that they also frequently resulted in violence by BNP activists and members and those incidences too became a means of coercion against the government.
Basic research on the internet was conducted using the following search term: “Bangladesh nationalist party terrorist acts” and the following information was found. As this is publicly available information, it has not been shared with the applicant.
From an article from BBC News: Bangladesh BNP-led strike arred by deaths, it states:
“The strike began at 06:00 (00:00 GMT), with the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its lslamist ally Jamaat-e-lslam hoping to bring the country to a standstill.
They want to force the prime minister to allow a neutral caretaker administration to oversee the election process.”
From the Institute of Commonwealth Studies-Note on Hartal Blockades and Sieges:
“The economic damage to the country from frequent politico/ strikes is significant. A former finance adviser to the caretaker government, A. B. Mirza Azizul Islam, said he believed the country's GDP would be reduced by 0.5 to 0.6% because of political instability. ”It hampers exports, it hampers production, it hampers transport," he said.
The association representing the country's largest export industry, the readymade garment sector, the BGMEA, estimated factories were losing approximately £17 million daily in 2013 as a result of strikes. The garment sector is particularly vulnerable to unrest because of time sensitivity of exports that need to feed modern supply chains.
Hartals also have longer term effects, discouraging foreign and local investment. Attempts have been made to estimate what the country's growth might have been if it weren't for the stoppages. Economists complain there appear to be no proper record kept of hartal days to help them calculate their impact. It's also not clear if the cost of a hartal is a full day of productivity, or less in practice, since some economic activity does always continue. Conversely the long term impact on the country's development could be much greater than one days loss of trade.
The World Bank calculated that during the 1990's, 5% of GDP was lost annually to hartal. A 2005 UNDP study thought it might actually be less-around 3-4%. UNDP pointed out that regional and localized hartal occurred more often and lasted longer than nationwide hartal. It observed that hartal tend to happen around periods connected to regime change.”
From BBC News: Bangladesh Firebomb Attacks on Bus and Truck Kill Nine:
Police reportedly blamed opposition activists for the violence, which also injured 30 others. At least 70 people have been killed in attacks since anti-government protests began last month.
The opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) called for a general shutdown in January, on the anniversary of last year's disputed election.
The BNP had boycotted that election, saying it would be rigged, and is now trying to force Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to step down and call new polls.
Six people died when petrol bombs hit a packed bus from the northern district of Gaibandha to Dhaka on Friday, police said.
A similar arson attack on a truck in the southern district of Barisol killed three people early on Saturday, police added.
Last week, police charged BNP leader Khaleda Zia with instigating an arson attack on a bus which killed seven people.
Ms Zia denied responsibility and condemned the violence.
The BNP has been blockading roads, railways and waterways as part of anti-government protests that began last month, and says they will not end the protests until the government resigns.
More than 7,000 opposition activists have been arrested since the protests began.
The BNP has called for another 72-hour countrywide general strike from Sunday, and demanded that schools and businesses remain closed.
From an article from Foreign Policy.com:
“The opposition party BNP took to the streets earlier this year in protests that turned violent when the party called for a transport blockade and sought to enforce it by firebombing buses. More than 120 people were killed over a four month period in the political clashes. While the violence has calmed for the time being, there has been no resolution to the political deadlock, and tensions continue to simmer.”
In an article from the Economist, 02 February 2015, it states
“For the past month Bangladesh, a country of nearly 160m people, has (yet again) been paralysed. The opposition leader, Khaleda Zia, has been confined to a party office in the capital, Dhaka. Her Bangladesh Nationalist Party {BNP} has been staging a nationwide blockade of roads, railways and waterways. The trigger for the unrest was a banned protest to mark the anniversary on January 5th of last year's election, in which the incumbent Awami League, led by the prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, was re-elected easily thanks to an opposition boycott. Nearly 50 people have been killed and more than 10,000 opposition activists arrested. BNP leaders are mostly in jail, in exile or in hiding, and face criminal charges that will probably bar them from running in the next election. This week events appeared to be reaching a head. The government temporarily cut the electricity supply and internet cables to Mrs Zia's redoubt. In addition to the crippling blockade, she called a three-day national strike from February 1st.”
…
With this in mind, I turned to a Congressional Research Service report, CRS report for Congress: Bangladesh: Background and US Relations which states:
“Both the AL and the BNP, when out of power, have devoted their energies to parliamentary boycotts, demonstrations, and strikes in on effort to unseat the ruling party. The strikes often succeed in immobilizing the government and disrupting economic activity. The President's powers are largely ceremonial, though they ore expanded during the tenure of a caretaker government.”
A report from the International Relations and Security Network entitled, Bangladesh: Political and Strategic Developments and US Interests, notes that:
“Despite these challenges, Bangladesh has established a reputation as a largely moderate and democratic majority Muslim country. This status has, however, been under threat. When in opposition, both parties have sought to regain control of the government through demonstrations, labor strikes, and transport blockades. The BNP likely will increasingly use such tactics, as it lacks sufficient representation in parliament at present to mount any substantial opposition to the government in that body. This makes continued control of the military a key aspect of stability for the AL in order to maintain control of the streets.”
It later states in the same report:
“Bangladeshi politics have been characterized by a bitter struggle between the Bangladesh Notional Party (BNP) and the Awami League (AL), and particularly between the two leaders of the respective parties, former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia (1991-1996, 2001-2006) and Prime Minister Sheikh HasinoWajed (1996-2001, 2009 to the present). Zia is the widow of former president and military strongman Ziaur Rahman, who was assassinated in 1981. Sheikh Hasina is the daughter of Bangladeshi independence leader and first Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who was assassinated in 1975. When out of power, both the Al and the BNP have devoted their energies to parliamentary boycotts, demonstrations, and strikes in an effort to unseat the ruling party. The strikes often succeeded in immobilizing the government and disrupting economic activity. The president's powers are largely ceremonial but are expanded during the tenure of a caretaker government.”
In an Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) Report on Bangladesh: Political Developments December 1996-April 1998, it notes:
“Figures compiled by the Coordinating Council for Human Rights in Bangladesh (CCHRB) indicate there were 6 nation-wide and 99 local-level general strikes (hartals) in Bangladesh in 1997 (Bangladesh Observer 31 Dec. 1997, 12). Most of these were called by opposition political parties and their student wings and worker organizations, as well as various business and local organizations (ibid. 31 Dec. 1997, 12). Five of the six nation­wide hartals were called by the BNP to pressure the government to meet various political demands (ibid. 31 Dec. 1997, 12). Hartals were most numerous in the three-month period July-September 1997, when four nation-wide and 40 local hartals were called (ibid. 31Dec. 1997, 12), but overall the number was “greatly reduced” as compared to 1996 (Country Reports 1997 1998, 1626). Both government and opposition party supporters used armed violence and intimidation to enforce hartals or disrupt rival parties' demonstrations and street rallies, resulting in at least 18 deaths and hundreds of injuries (ibid. 1998, 1615). For example, at least seven people were killed and 200 injured in a series of clashes between Al and BNP supporters in Chittagong from 27 to 30 November 1997 (Bangladesh Observer 1Jan. 1998, 3; Country Reports 1997 1998, 1615, 1616).
In 1997 and early 1998, ostensibly for reasons of public security, the government took measures to restrict where and when political rallies and demonstrations could be held (ibid.1998, 1620; AFP 9 Oct. 1997). On 31 August 1997 the Al mayor of Dhaka, Muhammad Hanif, banned political rallies from city streets {Country Reports 1997 1998, 1620; AFP 9 Oct. 1997). Although political marches and parades were still permitted to pass through city streets, demonstrations and rallies were required to be held at seven open-air venues designated by city council (ibid.; The Hindu 26 Sept. 1997). The government claimed the ban was instituted not for political reasons but to prevent traffic jams, but opposition parties denounced the measure as an unnecessary restriction on the right to freedom of assembly (AFP 9 Oct. 1997; Country Reports 1997 1998, 1620). Although some opposition parties that opposed the ban held their events at the government-approved sites (AFP 9 Oct. 1997), the BNP was determined to defy the government (The Hindu 26 Sept. 1997; Bangladesh Observer 23 Sept. 1997, 1; AFP 25 Sept. 1997). On 22 and 25 September 1997, the BNP called general strikes in an attempt to force the government to back down (The Hindu 26 Sept. 1997; Bangladesh Observer 23 Sept. 1997, 1; AFP 25 Sept. 1997), but strict enforcement of the ban resulted in repeated violent clashes between police and opposition protesters (Bangladesh Observer 23 Sept.1997, 1; AFP 25 Sept. 1997; Country Reports 1997 1998, 1620). In late September Dhaka's mayor, on the advice of President Shahabuddin Ahmed, organized a meeting to discuss alternate venues, but both the BNP and Jamaat declined to attend (AFP 9 Oct. 1997; Country Reports 1997 1998, 1620; The Hindu 26 Sept. 1997). Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina indicated the government would not repeal the ban (AFP 9 Oct. 1997).”
In another Congressional Research Service report, Bangladesh: Political and Strategic Developments and US Interests, it states:
“Despite these challenges, Bangladesh has established a reputation as a largely moderate and democratic majority Muslim country. This status has, however, been under threat. When in opposition, both parties have sought to regain control of the government through demonstrations, labor strikes, and transport blockades. The BNP likely will increasingly use such tactics, as it lacks sufficient representation in parliament at present to mount any substantial opposition to the government in that body. This makes continued control of the military a key aspect of stability for the AL in order to maintain control of the streets.”
It later states in the same report:
“Bangladeshi politics have been characterized by a bitter struggle between the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and the Awami League (AL}, and particularly between the two leaders of the respective parties, former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia (1991-1996, 2001-2006} and Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed (1996-2001, 2009 to the present). Zia is the widow of former president and military strongman Ziaur Rahman, who was assassinated in 1981. Sheikh Hasina is the daughter of Bangladeshi independence leader and first Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who was assassinated in 1975. When out of power, both the Al and the BNP have devoted their energies to parliamentary boycotts, demonstrations, and strikes in an effort to unseat the ruling party. The strikes. often succeeded in immobilizing the government and disrupting economic activity. The president's powers are largely ceremonial but are expanded during the tenure of a caretaker government.”
The same Immigration Judge's decision also recognizes that:
However, at least some of the incidents credibly reported by Human Rights Watch, as well as some of the less reliable reports from more dubious sources, fall within the definition of terrorist activity. ... Here, it appears that several acts which were reliably reported fall within the definition. For example, the attacks on villages reported in the reliable Human Rights Watch report