Canada (Office of the Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Prime Minister)

Canada (Office of the Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Prime Minister)
Court (s) Database
Federal Court of Appeal Decisions
Date
2019-04-24
Neutral citation
2019 FCA 95
File numbers
A-311-17, A-313-17
Decision Content
Date: 20190424
Dockets: A-311-17
A-313-17
Citation: 2019 FCA 95
CORAM:
NEAR J.A.
DE MONTIGNY J.A.
WOODS J.A.
Docket: A-311-17
BETWEEN:
THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER OF CANADA
Appellant
and
THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA
Respondent
Docket: A-313-17
BETWEEN:
THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA
Appellant
and
THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER OF CANADA
Respondent
Heard at Ottawa, Ontario, on September 17, 2018.
Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on April 24, 2019.
PUBLIC REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:
DE MONTIGNY J.A.
CONCURRED IN BY:
NEAR J.A.
WOODS J.A.
Date: 20190424
Dockets: A-311-17
A-313-17
Citation: 2019 FCA 95
CORAM:
NEAR J.A.
DE MONTIGNY J.A.
WOODS J.A.
Docket: A-311-17
BETWEEN:
THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER OF CANADA
Appellant
and
THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA
Respondent
Docket: A-313-17
BETWEEN:
THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA
Appellant
and
THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER OF CANADA
Respondent
PUBLIC REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
DE MONTIGNY J.A.
[1] Before this Court are two appeals from a decision of the Federal Court (per Justice O’Reilly), dated September 13, 2017, by which the Court allowed, in part, the application for judicial review brought by the Information Commissioner of Canada (the Commissioner) against the Prime Minister of Canada (the Prime Minister) (2017 FC 827). At issue was the denial of a reporter’s 2013 request for copies of certain records held by the Privy Council Office (PCO) related to four senators. The Federal Court ultimately directed the PCO to disclose a portion of the records in question.
[2] For the reasons that follow, I am of the view that both appeals should be allowed in part.
I. Facts
[3] On August 22, 2013, a reporter made a request under the Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1 (the Act), for the disclosure of “[a]ny records created between March 26, 2013 to present [August 22, 2013] related to Senators Mike Duffy, Mac Harb, Patrick Brazeau and/or Pamela Wallin”.
[4] On September 20, 2013, the PCO responded to the access request. It identified 28 pages of records as responsive to the request, but withheld 27 of them. The refusal to disclose the records was justified by PCO on the basis that it contained information of a personal nature (subsection 19(1) of the Act), information covered by solicitor-client privilege (section 23 of the Act), as well as recommendations and advice to the Prime Minister (paragraph 21(1)(a) of the Act).
[5] The records pertain to |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
[6] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
[7] On October 10, 2013, the reporter sent a complaint to the Commissioner regarding PCO’s refusal to disclose the requested documents and receipt of that complaint was confirmed on October 23, 2013. On November 13, 2013, the Commissioner notified the PCO that this complaint would be investigated.
[8] On February 21, 2014, PCO provided the Commissioner with written representations relating to its refusal of access. It expressed its continued reliance on the exemptions cited above, and slightly modified its position as to which provision was relied upon for each portion of the record.
[9] On May 23, 2014, in the course of its investigation, the Commissioner wrote to PCO, pursuant to paragraph 35(2)(b) of the Act, to ask for further representations in support of its refusal of access, and regarding how it exercised its discretion. The letter emphasized that the burden fell on PCO to demonstrate that the information at issue was covered by the exemptions relied upon and that, where necessary, it exercised its discretion in a reasonable manner.
[10] On June 13, 2014, PCO responded to the Commissioner’s letter, confirming its reliance on the exemptions cited, and explaining how it had weighed factors for and against disclosure when exercising its discretion.
[11] On March 23, 2015, the Commissioner informed Prime Minister Harper, under subsection 37(1) of the Act, of the results of her investigation. In this letter, she explained why she felt that the complaint at issue was well-founded, and recommended that PCO facilitate partial release of the responsive records.
[12] On May 8, 2015, PCO responded that, having looked at the report, it remained convinced that the exemptions of sections 19, 21(1)(a) and 23 of the Act applied, and that it had reasonably exercised its discretion to refuse disclosure. The letter also mentioned that, following a reassessment of the application of section 25 of the Act, it was concluded that further information, such as signatures, dates, and names, could be released.
[13] On July 24, 2015, a record of decision for the final disclosure package was signed on behalf of PCO, approving mandatory exemptions under subsection 19(1) and discretionary exemptions under sections 21(1)(a) and 23 of the Act.
[14] On September 11, 2015, the Commissioner filed with the Federal Court an application for judicial review of PCO’s decision. This application was made against the Prime Minister of Canada.
II. The Federal Court decision
[15] The application Judge determined that the standard of review was correctness for reviewing the exemptions applied by PCO, and reasonableness for the exercise of any residual discretion by PCO (Reasons at para. 3).
[16] With respect to section 19 of the Act, the Judge concluded that, insofar as the information at issue - that is information regarding |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| - related to “discretionary financial benefits”, it fell within one of the exceptions to the exemption for “personal information” as defined in section 3 of the Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21 [Privacy Act] (at para. 9). The Judge thus rejected the Prime Minister’s arguments that |||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| was not a benefit (at paras. 10-16), that it was not discretionary (at paras. 17-22), and that for these reasons the information pertaining to the alleged benefits should not be released.
[17] Concerning paragraph 21(1)(a) of the Act, the Judge concluded that while documents containing advice and recommendations to a government institution are exempt from disclosure, their factual basis is not (at para. 26). The “factual portions” of the records thus can, according to the Judge, be severed from the rest and disclosed (at para. 27). These include the following information:
Description of ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||;
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Decisions taken ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||.
[18] As for the Prime Minister’s decisions, the Judge held that they do not constitute advice or recommendations and that they can therefore be disclosed (at para. 27).
[19] The Judge also found that PCO had reasonably exercised its discretion not to disclose the information covered by the exemption under paragraph 21(1)(a) of the Act (at para. 30). While the factors favouring disclosure were not explicitly identified in its analysis, whereas the factors against disclosure were, the Judge was confident that they were implicitly considered (at para. 30). It would be a “somewhat artificial exercise”, the Judge wrote, “for those senior officials to set out explicitly the factors favouring public disclosure” (at para. 31).
[20] As for section 23 of the Act, the Judge agreed with the Commissioner that some of the information withheld by the PCO “does not fall within the scope of solicitor-client privilege” (at para. 34). This conclusion was based on the observation that some portions of this information, which includes ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||, “did not involve communications … relating to the provision of legal advice that was intended to be confidential” (Ibid). Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Solosky v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 821 [Solosky], the Judge concluded that these portions of the record were thus not privileged. Regarding the documents which, according to the Judge, clearly fell within the privilege, he was “satisfied that PCO reasonably exercised its proper discretion not to disclose them” (at para. 35). Here again, the factors favouring disclosure were said to have been implicitly considered.
[21] On October 13, 2017, both the Prime Minister and the Commissioner appealed from this judgment.
III. Issues
[22] The six main questions raised by the two appeals can be summarized as follows:
What is the applicable standard of appellate review?
Was PCO authorized to refuse the disclosure of the records based on paragraph 21(1)(a) of the Act?
Was PCO authorized to refuse the disclosure of the records based on section 23 of the Act?
To the extent that PCO was authorized to refuse the disclosure of the records based on either sections 21(1)(a) or 23 of the Act, did it reasonably exercise its discretion not to disclose these records?
Was PCO authorized to refuse the disclosure of the records based on subsection 19(1) of the Act?
Did PCO reasonably exercise its discretion not to disclose the information at issue under subsection 19(2) of the Act?
[23] These questions will be considered in turn.
IV. Analysis
A. What is the applicable standard of appellate review?
[24] There has been some uncertainty in this Court as to the applicable standard of appellate review to be applied to a reviewing court’s findings on the applicability of an exemption to the right of access under the Act. This confusion stems from the apparent inconsistency resulting from the decisions of the Supreme Court in Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada, 2012 SCC 3, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 23 [Merck Frosst], and in Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 559 [Agraira].
[25] In Merck Frosst, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a Federal Court decision pertaining to the application of an exemption under the Act ought to be reviewed pursuant to the framework set out in Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235 [Housen]. Justice Deschamps (concurring with the majority on this issue) explained that this exception to the “classic process” of judicial review stems from the peculiarities of the review process provided for in section 44 of the Act. She mentioned, notably, Parliament’s intent “to set up an independent review process”, the lack of “adjudicatory powers” afforded to the federal Commissioner, the fact that the government’s opinion was not authoritative, as well as the Federal Court’s role as “first impartial gatekeeper” (at paras. 249-250).
[26] Slightly more than a year after Merck Frosst, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Agraira. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice LeBel adopted the reasoning of this Court in Telfer v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2009 FCA 23 [Telfer], and found that the proper approach on an appeal from a judgment of a reviewing court deciding an application for judicial review of an administrative decision “is simply [to ask] whether the court below identified the appropriate standard of review and applied it correctly” (Telfer at para. 18, quoted with approval by Justice LeBel at para. 45 of his reasons in Agraira). While Agraira was admittedly decided in the context of immigration law, there is nothing in Justice LeBel’s reasons suggesting, either explicitly or by implication, that his approach is to be confined to the facts of that case and should not find application more broadly whenever an appeal court deals with the decision of a reviewing court sitting on judicial review (indeed, Telfer was an appeal from a decision of the Federal Court sitting on judicial review of a ministerial decision made pursuant to subsection 220(3.1) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) [Income Tax Act]).
[27] As pointed out by the parties, these two decisions have given rise to seemingly conflicting decisions of this Court as to the appropriate standard of appellate review concerning the applicability of an exemption provision under the Act (see Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Canada (Information Commissioner), 2013 FCA 104 at para. 18 [Canada (Information Commissioner)]; Blank v. Canada (Justice), 2016 FCA 189 at paras. 22-24 [Blank 2016]; Canada (Office of the Information Commissioner) v. Calian Ltd., 2017 FCA 135 at paras. 26-27; Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board et al., 2018 FCA 10 at paras. 9-17, 59 and 61 [Husky Oil]; Suncor Energy Inc. v. Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board et al., 2018 FCA 11 at paras. 14 and 26).
[28] There is no need to rehash the diverging views on the matter nor to restate the position that I have already expressed in earlier decisions. I remain of the view that on appeal from a decision of the Federal Court disposing of an application for judicial review, the proper role of this Court is to focus on the administrative decision, or, to use the colloquial expression of Justice Deschamps in Merck Frosst, to “[step] into the shoes” of the lower court (at para. 247; Husky Oil at paras. 9-17). In the administrative law context, it is only in situations where the issues raised in appeal relate to decisions made by a judge of the Federal Court (such as decisions pertaining to mootness or prematurity, admissibility of evidence and remedy), as opposed to a judge’s review of a decision made by an administrative decision-maker, that the applicable standard of appellate review will be the one set out in Housen.
[29] I readily acknowledge that the debate is far from over, and could eventually become academic if Bill C-58, An Act to amend the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 1st Sess., 42nd Parl., 2017, s. 21 (as passed by the House of Commons on December 6, 2017) comes to be adopted (since a new section 44.1 would provide, “for greater certainty”, that an application under sections 41 or 44 will be the subject of a de novo review).
[30] There is no dispute here that, assuming the Agraira framework applies, the Judge appropriately identified the correctness standard in deciding whether the exemptions claimed by the Prime Minister applied (Blank 2016 at para. 24; Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2011 SCC 25, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 306 at paras. 21-22 [PM Agendas]: 3430901 Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Industry), 2001 FCA 254 at paras. 28-42 [Telezone]; Blank v. Canada (Justice), 2010 FCA 183 at paras. 16-17 [Blank 2010]). I am comforted in that view by the fact that one of the main contextual factors favouring a more deferential approach - the expertise of the decision-maker - is lacking here. As previously noted by this Court, it is not at all clear that the Prime Minister and the Ministers, even with the assistance of the specialized units tasked with the processing of access to information requests, have greater expertise than the Court in dealing with statutory exemptions. I believe that the importance of an independent scrutiny of access refusals militates strongly in favour of an exacting standard of review. While decided prior to Dunsmuir, I can only reiterate the views of then Chief Justice Richard in Wyeth-Ayerst Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2003 FCA 257 at paragraph 13:
Since the Minister has no greater expertise than the Court, a less deferential standard of review is warranted. The Minister, through the specialized departmental unit referred to as the Access Office, does have expertise in responding to access to information requests. However, the Access Office has no more expertise than the Court which often interprets and applies statutory exemptions. The Court is better skilled in balancing the public's right to disclosure against the individual's right to confidentiality. Further, as Evans J. aptly explained in [Telezone] at para. 36: "...if the Court were to confine its duty...to review ministerial refusals to access requests by deferring to ministerial interpretations and applications of the Act, it would, in effect, be putting the fox in charge of guarding the henhouse." The greater expertise of the Court supports less deference.
(See also PM Agendas at paras. 21-22; Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2003 SCC 8, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 66 at paras. 14-19; Canadian Council of Christian Charities v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1999] 4 F.C. 245 (C.A.) at para. 13.)
[31] I hasten to add that there is no debate between the parties with respect to the applicable standard of review to the Judge’s findings on the exercise of discretion by the Prime Minister to either disclose or refuse to disclose exempted information. Discretionary decisions of administrative decision-makers are to be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness, and this is the standard that the Judge applied (see Blank 2016 at para. 24; Husky at paras. 17 and 62).
[32] In the analysis below, the Agraira framework will be applied in the manner described above. The role of this Court, therefore, is to determine whether the Judge properly applied these standards.
B. Was PCO authorized to refuse the disclosure of the records based on paragraph 21(1)(a) of the Act ?
[33] The Prime Minister argues that some of the information severed by the Judge as being purely factual either contains normative elements of advice that should remain exempt from disclosure, is intertwined in the analysis for consideration ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||, or cannot reasonably be severed without directly or indirectly revealing exempt information. The Prime Minister also claims that the reasons of the Judge do not spell out clearly why certain pieces of information were severed, and that they are inconsistent with respect to what information is considered purely factual.
[34] It has been repeated more than once that the purpose of the Act is to strike a balance between democracy and effective governance. In Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 403 (at para. 61), Justice La Forest (dissenting but not on this point) emphatically stressed that the overarching purpose of access to information legislation is to facilitate democracy, first by ensuring that citizens have the necessary information to participate meaningfully in the democratic process, and secondly by making sure that politicians and bureaucrats are accountable. More recently, the Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed that rationale, stating in its opening paragraph of Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association, 2010 SCC 23, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 815 [Criminal Lawyers’ Association]:
Access to information in the hands of public institutions can increase transparency in government, contribute to an informed public, and enhance an open and democratic society. Some information in the hands of those institutions is, however, entitled to protection in order to prevent the impairment of those very principles and promote good governance.
(See also PM Agendas at paras. 15 and 78-83.)
[35] This balancing act finds expression in subsection 2(1) of the Act, which sets out the purpose of Parliament in the following terms:
2 (1) The purpose of this Act is to extend the present laws of Canada to provide a right of access to information in records under the control of a government institution in accordance with the principles that government information should be available to the public, that necessary exceptions to the right of access should be limited and specific and that decisions on the disclosure of government information should be reviewed independently of government.
2 (1) La présente loi a pour objet d’élargir l’accès aux documents de l’administration fédérale en consacrant le principe du droit du public à leur communication, les exceptions indispensables à ce droit étant précises et limitées et les décisions quant à la communication étant susceptibles de recours indépendants du pouvoir exécutif.
[36] The right to access created to achieve this purpose is contained in subsection 4(1) of the Act:
4 (1) Subject to this Act, but notwithstanding any other Act of Parliament, every person who is
4 (1) Sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi mais nonobstant toute autre loi fédérale, ont droit à l’accès aux documents relevant d’une institution fédérale et peuvent se les faire communiquer sur demande :
(a) a Canadian citizen, or
a) les citoyens canadiens;
…
…
has a right to and shall, on request, be given access to any record under the control of a government institution.
[BLANK]
[37] Though not absolute (see Criminal Lawyers’ Association at para. 35; Rubin v. Canada (Clerk of the Privy Council), [1994] 2 F.C. 707 at p. 712 (C.A.), affirmed [1996] 1 S.C.R. 6), the right of access is generally interpreted liberally in accordance with a purposive interpretation and the specific exceptions provided for in sections 13 to 26 of the Act receive a narrow construction (Macdonell v. Quebec (Commission d’accès à l’information), 2002 SCC 71, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 661 at para. 18). There is a presumption of a right of access, and the government institution opposing disclosure bears the burden of establishing that the records at issue fall within one of the exemptions under the Act (see section 48 of the Act; PM Agendas at para. 22). Moreover, section 25 of the Act specifies that, where a request is made for access to a record that the institution is authorized to refuse to disclose because of the information or material it contains, there is a duty on the institution to disclose “any part of the record that does not contain, and can reasonably be severed from any part that contains, any such information”.
[38] It is with these principles in mind that I will now turn to the various exemptions claimed by the Prime Minister, the first of which being the exemption for “advice or recommendations developed by or for a government institution or a minister of the Crown” (paragraph 21(1)(a) of the Act). The rationale behind that exemption has been aptly described by Justice Evans (as he then was) in Canadian Council of Christian Charities v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1999] 4 F.C. 245 (C.A.):
[30] … To permit or to require the disclosure of advice given by officials, either to other officials or to ministers, and the disclosure of confidential deliberations within the public service on policy options, would erode government’s ability to formulate and to justify its policies.
[31] It would be an intolerable burden to force ministers and their advisors to disclose to public scrutiny the internal evolution of the policies ultimately adopted. Disclosure of such material would often reveal that the policy-making process included false starts, blind alleys, wrong turns, changes of mind, the solicitation and rejection of advice, and the re-evaluation of priorities and the re-weighing of the relative importance of the relevant factors as a problem is studied more closely. In the hands of journalists or political opponents this is combustible material liable to fuel a fire that could quickly destroy governmental credibility and effectiveness.
[39] This reasoning was explicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court in John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), 2014 SCC 36, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 44 [John Doe], albeit in the context of the Ontario Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31. Writing for the Court, Justice Rothstein added that requiring the disclosure of such advice or recommendations would be antithetical to the political neutrality of the civil service in Canada and could lead to self-censorship (at para. 45).
[40] The words “advice” and “recommendation” are not defined in the Act. The distinction between the two concepts is not readily apparent, although the former must have a distinct meaning and would appear to be broader than the latter. Justice Evans found as much in Telezone (at para. 50), and the Supreme Court endorsed that approach in John Doe (at para. 24). It would appear that a “recommendation” points to a suggested course of action that may or may not be accepted by the person being advised, whereas “advice” will not necessarily urge a specific course of action but could encompass a range of options with pros and cons for each of them without expressly advocating for one or the other (Telezone at paras. 61-64; John Doe at paras. 25-28). As broad as the term “advice” may be, however, it clearly does not encompass information of a largely factual and objective nature (John Doe at para. 26). Information of that nature must be severed and disclosed whenever reasonably practicable in accordance with section 25 of the Act.
[41] The Prime Minister agrees that paragraph 21(1)(a) of the Act only exempts opinion, policy or normative elements of advice and does not extend to the facts on which it is based, but goes on to claim that “[m]ost internal documents that analyze a problem, starting with an initial identification of a problem, then canvassing a range of solutions, and ending with a specific recommendation are still likely to be caught within [subsection] 21(1), notwithstanding their factual components” (Prime Minister’s Appellant Memorandum of Fact and Law at para. 66). The Judge rejected that argument, and properly so, as it goes much too far and is not in keeping with the rationale underlying that provision of the Act. The categories of information found to be severable by the Judge (information such as a description of ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||, the fact that ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||, the identity of |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||, and the decisions taken ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||) are clearly of a factual nature and would not directly or indirectly reveal exempted information.
[42] For example, the information in the Memorandum to the Prime Minister dated July 10, 2013, |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||. While the Clerk slightly reformulated |||||||||||||||||||||||||| in his Memorandum, he clearly conveys the same objective information and is not offering advice or recommendation; moreover, it is not intertwined in the analysis for consideration by the Prime Minister, and as such it can reasonably be severed from the record.
[43] The same is true of the information found in the second and third bullets in the Memorandum to the Clerk, dated August 6, 2013, pertaining to the fate of |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (Appeal Book, vol. 2, tab 6(11), at p. 208). This is clearly factual and objective information that is devoid of any normative element.
[44] I am of the same view with respect to the information contained in the second bullet of the Memorandum to the Clerk dated July 2, 2013 (Appeal Book, vol. 2, tab 6(11), at p. 222). Here, the information at issue is an enumeration, in the Clerk’s own words, of |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| considered at the time of the making of the Memorandum. Once again, no recommendation or advice is offered here; it is merely a summary of the arguments made by ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||, without any gloss. This is to be contrasted with the third bullet in the same Memorandum, where the author expressed the views of the Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet and Counsel to the Clerk with respect to ||||||||||||||||||||||. The information in the second bullet of the July 2 Memorandum is quite different from that information, and from the one considered by the Court in the following excerpt of Telezone:
[63] … a memorandum to the Minister stating that something needs to be decided, identifying the most salient aspects of an application, or presenting a range of policy options on an issue, implicitly contains the writer’s view of what the Minister should do, how the Minister should view a matter, or what are the parameters within which a decision should be made. All are normative in nature and are an integral part of an institutional decision-making process. They cannot be characterized as merely informing the Minister of matters that are largely factual in nature. Nor do I think that the use in the French text of paragraph 21(1)(a) of the word “avis”, which is generally translated into English as “opinion”, conveys a narrower meaning in this context than the word “advice” in the English version.
[45] When reading the second bullet of the above-mentioned Memorandum, there is not the slightest hint as to the writer’s opinion regarding what the Clerk should do or how |||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||| should be treated. The advice or recommendation is fully set out in the third bullet, where the writer addresses in turn each of ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||. The second bullet is completely neutral and reads as a faithful and objective description of |||||||||||||||||||||||| submissions, without even drawing attention to what could be considered the most salient or persuasive of his arguments.
[46] The only information that cannot be considered purely factual and that should have been exempted by the Judge is that found in the third bullet of the summary that is part of the Memorandum to the Prime Minister dated July 10, 2013 (Appeal Book, vol. 2, tab 6(11), at p. 212). That piece of information clearly “relates to a suggested course of action that will ultimately be accepted or rejected by the person being advised” (John Doe at para. 23). Indeed, almost identical wording found in the body of the Memorandum has been redacted by the Judge (see Appeal Book, vol. 2, tab 6(11), p. 214, second to last bullet). I note as well that the Commissioner agrees with the Prime Minister that this information constitutes a recommendation under paragraph 21(1)(a) of the Act; although not binding on this Court, this agreement is further support for the view that it ought to have been redacted by the Judge.
C. Was PCO authorized to refuse the disclosure of the records based on section 23 of the Act?
(1) General Principles
[47] Section 23 of the Act recognizes another discretionary exemption to the broad section 4 right to access, stating that a government institution “may refuse” the disclosure of any record containing “information that is subject to solicitor-client privilege”.
[48] The common law recognizes two types of solicitor-client privilege: legal advice privilege and litigation privilege. In Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2006 SCC 39, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 319, the Supreme Court confirmed that the phrase “solicitor-client privilege” in section 23 of the Act refers to both legs of the privilege (at para. 4). In the case at bar, the Prime Minister relied only upon the legal advice privilege to exempt some of the information in the 27 pages of records at issue. The Judge accepted that some of the information that the Prime Minister sought to shield from disclosure was privileged, but for the most part found that the documents did not involve solicitor-client communications (Reasons at para. 34).
[49] The legal advice privilege attaches to all communications between a solicitor and his or her client for the purpose of obtaining or giving legal advice. The test for determining whether a document or communication is subject to that privilege was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Solosky. Three conditions must be met for a document to be considered as legal advice giving rise to the privilege: 1) there must be a communication made in confidence between a lawyer and his or her client; 2) that communication must be for the purpose of seeking or giving legal advice; and 3) the parties must have intended the communication to be confidential (Solosky at p. 837; Blank 2016 at para. 44).
[50] The Supreme Court has often reiterated the critical importance of the solicitor-client privilege to the proper functioning of our legal system, and has gone as far as stating that it should only be set aside in the “most unusual circumstances” (Pritchard v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), 2004 SCC 31, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 809 at para. 17; see also Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. University of Calgary), 2016 SCC 53, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 555 at para. 34). That being said, a party asserting that a document is privileged bears the onus of establishing the privilege; this onus requires more than a bald assertion of privilege and will only be met if there is sufficient evidence to show that each of the three criteria of the Solosky test are met (see Canada (Attorney General) v. Williamson, 2003 FCA 361 at paras. 11-13).
[51] Solicitor-client privilege applies to communications that take place within what the case law refers to as a “continuum of communication”. This notion was considered as follows by this Court in Canada (Information Commissioner):
[27] Part of the continuum protected by privilege includes “matters great and small at various stages … includ[ing] advice as to what should prudently and sensibly be done in the relevant legal context” and other matters “directly related to the performance by the solicitor of his professional duty as legal advisor to the client”…
[28] In determining where the protected continuum ends, one good question is whether a communication forms “part of that necessary exchange of information of which the object is the giving of legal advice” … If so, it is within the protected continuum. Put another way, does the disclosure of the communication have the potential to undercut the purpose behind the privilege - namely, the need for solicitors and their clients to freely and candidly exchange information and advice so that clients can know their true rights and obligations and act upon them?
[52] The Prime Minister argues that the Judge was right to conclude that a letter dated July 31, 2013 |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| in various documents, were exempt from disclosure under section 23 of the Act. However, the Prime Minister is of the view that the Judge failed to apply the legal test to determine if a continuum of communications existed to protect other parts of the record; had he done so, it is submitted, he would have found the Clerk’s Memorandum to the Prime Minister (Appeal Book, vol. 2, tab 6(11), at pp. 212-215), the Decision Annex (Appeal Book, vol. 2, tab 6(11), at p. 220), the two draft letters attached to the Memorandum (Appeal Book, vol. 2, tab 6(11), at pp. 217, 219) and a four-page letter dated June 18, 2013 from |||||||||||||||||| to the Clerk |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||| (Appeal Book, vol. 2, tab 6(11), at pp. 225-228), to be covered by the privilege. Needless to say, the Commissioner takes the opposite view on all of these documents.
(2) The |||||||||||||||||| Letter
[53] I shall now turn to each of these documents, starting with the letter sent to the Clerk by ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||