Hilewitz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration); De Jong v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)

Hilewitz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration); De Jong v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2005-10-21
Neutral citation
2005 SCC 57
Report
[2005] 2 SCR 706
Case number
30125, 30127
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; Major, John C.; Bastarache, Michel; Binnie, William Ian Corneil; LeBel, Louis; Deschamps, Marie; Fish, Morris J.; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Charron, Louise
On appeal from
Federal Court of Appeal
Subjects
Immigration
Notes
SCC Case Information: 30125, 30127
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Hilewitz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration); De Jong v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 706, 2005 SCC 57
Date: 20051021
Docket: 30125, 30127
David Hilewitz
Appellant
v.
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
Respondent
‑ and ‑
Canadian Association for Community Living and
Ethno-Racial People with Disabilities Coalition
Interveners
and:
Dirk de Jong
Appellant
v.
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
Respondent
‑ and ‑
Canadian Association for Community Living and
Ethno-Racial People with Disabilities Coalition
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Major, Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ.
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 72)
Dissenting reasons:
(paras. 73 to 124)
Abella J. (McLachlin C.J. and Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Fish and Charron JJ. concurring)
Deschamps J. (LeBel J. concurring)
______________________________
Hilewitz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration); De Jong v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 706, 2005 SCC 57
David Hilewitz Appellant
v.
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Respondent
and
Dirk de Jong Appellant
v.
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Respondent
and
Canadian Association for Community Living and
Ethno‑Racial People with Disabilities Coalition of Ontario Interveners
Indexed as: Hilewitz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration); De Jong v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
Neutral citation: 2005 SCC 57.
File Nos.: 30125, 30127.
2005: February 8; 2005: October 21.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Major, Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ.
on appeal from the federal court of appeal
Immigration — Exclusion and removal — Inadmissible persons — Excessive demands on social services — Applicants qualified to be admitted to Canada under “investor” and “self‑employed” classes — Applications for admission denied because dependant child’s admission found to be reasonably expected to cause excessive demands on social services — Whether applicants’ financial resources should be considered when determining if admission of disabled children might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demands on social services — Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I‑2, s. 19(1)(a)(ii).
H and J both applied for permanent residence in their name and in that of their families’, respectively under the “investor” and “self‑employed” classes set out in the Immigration Act. These categories require that applicants have substantial financial resources to qualify. Both qualified, but were denied admission because the intellectual disability of a dependent child “would cause or might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demands on . . . social services” in Canada (s. 19(1)(a)(ii) of the Immigration Act). On judicial review, the judge in H’s case set aside the visa officer’s decision, holding that financial circumstances were relevant in determining whether the admission of H’s son to Canada would cause excessive demands on social services. In J’s case, a different judge upheld the visa officer’s decision, concluding that the willingness of J to pay for private schooling for his daughter was irrelevant in determining medical inadmissibility under s. 19(1)(a)(ii) of the Act. The Federal Court of Appeal restored the visa officer’s decision in H’s case and dismissed J’s appeal. The court held that non‑medical factors, such as the availability of family support and the ability and willingness to pay, were not relevant considerations.
Held (LeBel and Deschamps JJ. dissenting): The appeals should be allowed. The applications are referred to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration for reconsideration and redetermination by different visa officers.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ.: The personal circumstances of the families of disabled dependants are relevant factors in a s. 19(1)(a)(ii) assessment of their anticipated impact on social services. The “investor” and “self‑employed” categories under which H and J were qualified for admission to Canada are, to a large extent, concerned with an individual’s assets. It seems somewhat incongruous to interpret the Immigration Act in such a way that the very assets that qualify these individuals for admission to Canada can simultaneously be ignored in determining the admissibility of their disabled children. Moreover, a review of the more recent legislative history indicates a legislative intention to shift from an approach based on categorical exclusion, such as intellectual disability, to one calling for individualized assessments. [39‑40] [53]
Section 19(1)(a)(ii) calls for an assessment of whether an applicant’s health would cause, or might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demands on Canada’s social services. The term “excessive demands” is inherently evaluative and comparative, and shows that medical officers must assess likely demands on social services, not mere eligibility for them. Since, without consideration of an applicant’s ability and intention to pay for social services, it is impossible to determine realistically what “demands” will be made, medical officers must necessarily take into account both medical and non‑medical factors. This requires individualized assessments. If medical officers consider the need for potential services based only on the classification of the impairment rather than on its particular manifestation, the assessment becomes generic rather than individual. It is an approach which attaches a cost assessment to the disability rather than to the individual. The clear legislative threshold is reasonable probability, not remote possibility. It should be more likely than not, based on a family’s circumstances, that the contingencies will materialize. The same analysis is applicable to the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act . [54‑56] [58‑59]
Accordingly, H and J’s ability and willingness to attenuate the burden on the public purse that would otherwise be created by their intellectually disabled children are relevant factors in determining whether those children would reasonably be expected to cause excessive demands on Canada’s social services. Given their financial resources, H and J would likely be required to contribute substantially, if not entirely, to any costs for social services provided by the province of Ontario, where they wish to settle. The fears articulated in the rejections of the applications, such as possible bankruptcy, mobility, school closure or parental death, represent contingencies that could be raised in relation to any applicant. Using such contingencies to negate a family’s genuine ability and willingness to absorb some of the burdens created by a child’s disabilities anchors an applicant’s admissibility to conjecture, not reality. In both cases, the visa officers erred by confirming the medical officers’ refusal to account for the potential impact of the families’ willingness to assist. Moreover, their failure to read the families’ responses to the “fairness letters” sent to them meant that their decisions were not based on all the relevant available information. [57] [61] [68‑70]
Per LeBel and Deschamps JJ. (dissenting): The wealth of an applicant is not a factor to be considered by medical officers under s. 19(1)(a)(ii) of the Immigration Act. To adopt an overly expansive view of s. 19(1)(a)(ii) would run counter to the text, history and purpose of the legislation and is inconsistent with the scheme of Part III of the Act, which concerns exclusion from entry into Canada. [76] [85]
A plain reading of the words of the provision suggests that the determination of excessive demands is made by reference to the nature, severity and probable duration of the medical condition itself. Rather than exclude persons on the basis of the condition alone, Parliament intended the medical officer to look at how the condition affects the individual. This does not, however, mean looking at criteria that have nothing to do with the medical condition. If Parliament had wanted to direct medical officers to consider family support or wealth, it had ample opportunity to do so when revising the rules in 1976. The subsequent statute, regulations and internal guidelines all point to the applicant’s medical condition alone and not to his or her wealth. Moreover, the fact that Parliament expressly considered whether family support was relevant to excessive demands assessments and chose not to include it in the Immigration Act and the regulations strongly suggests that Parliament did not intend wealth to be a relevant factor. Lastly, while many of the predecessors to s. 19(1)(a)(ii) specifically provided that family support and wealth were relevant to the question of admissibility, no such provision is made in s. 19(1)(a)(ii). [90‑91] [95‑97] [104]
The process established by the regulations and guidelines reflects an attempt to integrate as many objective factors as possible into the assessment in order to ensure that all applicants receive fair and equal treatment. To add to the medical officers’ responsibilities the burden of inquiring into the ability and desire of the applicant’s family and community to provide financial and other support would render their task even more difficult. The more a medical officer’s analysis is tied to highly subjective non‑medical factors, the more likely it is that the medical officer will be drawn into assessments outside his or her area of expertise. Such an approach may produce inconsistent results for similarly situated applicants and thwart efforts to treat all applicants equally, and would result in longer delays. Finally, without the ability to enforce the promise to pay for social services, there is no way to ensure that the family will in fact mitigate the excessive demands placed on public funding. [103] [109] [111‑112]
Although it may seem incongruous to admit investors, entrepreneurs and self‑employed persons on the basis of their financial means and then ignore those same assets when making a determination of excessive demands, this is what Parliament has done. It has chosen to use criteria for the decision on medical inadmissibility that are distinct from those used for the selection as business or economic applicants. Business or economic applicants are evaluated on the basis of their potential contribution to Canada; however, in order to avoid undermining their potential contribution, these applicants must not fall into an inadmissible class of persons. The applicants can still be admitted on the basis of their wealth, but this is left to the discretion of the Minister who can issue a permit despite the medical inadmissibility. The Minister is in a better position to determine whether the special circumstances of a case warrant a departure from the rules. This also ensures that, because of their potential burden on Canadian health and social services, these exceptional cases are decided by a single authority. [105]
In this case, the medical officers considered all the appropriate factors and correctly concluded on a balance of probabilities that the admission of the applicants would create excessive demands on social services. [120‑121]
Cases Cited
By Abella J.
Approved: Poste v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1997), 140 F.T.R. 126; Wong v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 141 F.T.R. 62; Wong v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2002), 220 F.T.R. 137, 2002 FCT 625; Simmons v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2002), 221 F.T.R. 303, 2002 FCT 866; Karmali v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2003), 230 F.T.R. 140, 2003 FCT 358; referred to: Gao v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) (1993), 14 Admin. L.R. (2d) 233; Deol v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] 1 F.C. 301, 2002 FCA 271; Hiramen v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1986), 65 N.R. 67; Badwal v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) (1989), 64 D.L.R. (4th) 561.
By Deschamps J. (dissenting)
Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, 2002 SCC 42; Ismaili v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 100 F.T.R. 139; F.N. (Re), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35; Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982; Fei v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 F.C. 274.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Act respecting Emigrants and Quarantine, C.S.C. 1859, c. 40, s. 10(2).
Act respecting Immigration and Immigrants, S.C. 1869, c. 10.
Act to amend the Immigration Act, S.C. 1919, c. 25, s. 3.
Developmental Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. D.11.
Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1886, c. 65.
Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1906, c. 93, s. 26.
Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 93, s. 3.
Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 325.
Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I‑2, ss. 3(a), (b), (c), (g), (h), (i), 5(2), 6(2), (4), (5), 9(2), (4), 11(1), 19(1)(a), (b), 27(1)(b), (3), (4), 37(1), 118.
Immigration Act, S.C. 1910, c. 27, s. 3.
Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52.
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 3(1) (b), (c), (d), 3(2) , 38(1) .
Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002‑227, s. 34.
Immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR/78‑172, ss. 2(1), 4, 5, 6, 6.11 [ad. SOR/93‑412, s. 3], 7, 8(1)(b), (c), 8(4), 9(1), 22, 23(1), 23.1 [ad. SOR/93‑44, s. 17].
R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 272 (Developmental Services Act), ss. 15, 16.
Authors Cited
Canada. Department of Manpower and Immigration. White Paper on Immigration. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966.
Canada. Health and Welfare. Medical Services Branch. Medical Officer’s Handbook: Immigration Medical Service, Section III, “Assessing System and Method”. Ottawa: Health and Welfare Canada, 1992 (loose-leaf amended October 1995).
Canada. House of Commons. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Labour, Manpower and Immigration, Issue No. 11, April 5, 1977, pp. 11A:42 to 11A:43.
Canada. House of Commons. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Labour, Manpower and Immigration, Issue No. 42, June 28, 1977, p. 42:76.
Driedger, Elmer A. Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. Toronto: Butterworths, 1983.
Kelley, Ninette, and Michael Trebilcock. The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration Policy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal (Linden, Evans and Malone JJ.A.), [2004] 1 F.C.R. 696, 234 D.L.R. (4th) 439, 312 N.R. 201, 9 Admin. L.R. (4th) 79, 245 F.T.R. 319, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1677 (QL), 2003 FCA 420, setting aside a decision of Gibson J., [2003] 2 F.C. 3, 221 F.T.R. 213, 26 Imm. L.R. (3d) 23, [2002] F.C.J. No. 1121 (QL), 2002 FCT 844. Appeal allowed, LeBel and Deschamps JJ. dissenting.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal (Linden, Evans and Malone JJ.A.) (2003), 315 N.R. 59, 36 Imm. L.R. (3d) 174, 245 F.T.R. 320, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1679 (QL), 2003 FCA 422, affirming a decision of Pinard J. (2002), 224 F.T.R. 151, 26 Imm. L.R. (3d) 42, [2002] F.C.J. No. 1573 (QL), 2002 FCT 1165. Appeal allowed, LeBel and Deschamps JJ. dissenting.
Cecil L. Rotenberg, Q.C., Andrew Z. Wlodyka, Nicholas McHaffie, Howard Greenberg, Inna Kogan, Rachel Rotenberg and Mario D. Bellissimo, for the appellants.
Urszula Kaczmarczyk and Michael H. Morris, for the respondent.
Ena Chadha and Dianne Wintermute, for the interveners.
The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ. was delivered by
1 Abella J. — These appeals involve the interpretation of a provision of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, denying admission to persons who would cause “excessive demands” on Canadian social services as a result of a health impairment. David Hilewitz from South Africa and Dirk de Jong from the Netherlands applied for permanent residence under the “investor” and “self-employed” classes set out in the legislation. These categories require that applicants have substantial financial resources to qualify.
2 Both Mr. Hilewitz and Mr. de Jong qualified. Both applicants, however, were denied admission by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration because of the intellectual disability of a dependent child.
3 The operative provision at the time the applications were refused was s. 19(1)(a)(ii) of the 1985 Immigration Act, since repealed and replaced by a substantially similar provision, s. 38(1) (c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 . Section 19(1) (a)(ii) stated:
19. (1) No person shall be granted admission who is a member of any of the following classes:
(a) persons who are suffering from any disease, disorder, disability or other health impairment as a result of the nature, severity or probable duration of which, in the opinion of a medical officer concurred in by at least one other medical officer,
. . .
(ii) their admission would cause or might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demands on health or social services;
4 Although s. 19(1)(a)(ii) referred to the impact of an individual’s disabilities on either health or social services, these appeals are restricted to social services.
5 Synoptically, the process followed in making the determinations at issue was the following. Pursuant to s. 11(1) of the Immigration Act, every applicant was required to undergo a special examination by a qualified medical officer (Immigration Act, ss. 9(4) and 11(1); Immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR/78-172, s. 9(1)). The medical officer’s opinion must be concurred in by at least one other medical officer (s. 19(1)(a)).
6 After assessing an applicant’s medical condition, the medical officers prepared a “medical notification” giving the visa officer their opinions along with the applicant’s medical profile. The visa officer relied on this information to issue a decision on the applicant’s admissibility. A visa would not be issued to the principal applicant if an accompanying dependant was found to be medically inadmissible.
7 The issue in these appeals is whether the financial resources that otherwise qualified these two families for admission to this country could nonetheless be disregarded in assessing the impact of their children’s disabilities on Canada’s social services.
I. Background
A. The Hilewitz Family
8 David Ralph Hilewitz, a citizen of South Africa, applied for permanent residence in Canada in 1999 under the “investor” category. He is a successful South African businessman. The “investor” category requires an applicant to have substantial business experience and a net worth of at least $800,000. The applicant must also commit to making a significant financial investment in Canada (Immigration Regulations, 1978, s. 2(1)). Mr. Hilewitz satisfied these requirements.
9 In his application, Mr. Hilewitz included his dependent wife, Jean Susan Hilewitz, and two sons. Their younger son, Gavin Martin Hilewitz, was born in 1982 with intellectual disabilities. The family hoped to settle in the Toronto area.
10 While in South Africa, the Hilewitzes helped establish a private school for children with developmental disabilities, investing their own money and raising funds from others. They never resorted to publicly funded services for Gavin in South Africa, and expressed an intention to send him to a private school in Toronto.
11 On December 7, 1999, a medical officer, Dr. J. Larzarus, examined Gavin Hilewitz, who was then 17 years old, and issued a medical notification. The notification was concurred in by Dr. Jacques Saint-Germain, another medical officer. The notification outlined Gavin’s intellectual disabilities and concluded that he was inadmissible under s. 19(1)(a)(ii) of the Immigration Act because of his and his family’s entitlement to social services:
This 17 year old dependent applicant has developmental delay and is functioning at the level of a child aged 8 years. He has delayed comprehension and reading skills as well as difficulty problem solving. He is easily distracted and impulsive. He is currently attending a special school for pupils with delayed scholastic ability.
If admitted to Canada, [Gavin] and his supporting family, where applicable, will be eligible for, and will likely require, a variety of social services such as further special education, continuous training to enhance his ability to carry out the activities of daily living and attain his full potential, respite care for parents, and ultimately vocational training. These requirements are far in excess of those of an average Canadian and will place an excessive demand on Canadian social services. [Emphasis added.]
12 Subsequently, on December 9, 1999, Mr. Hilewitz had an interview with the visa officer, Virginia Hughes. They discussed Gavin’s disability, the private school Mr. Hilewitz had founded for Gavin in South Africa and the arrangements made for Gavin’s admission to a private school in Canada.
13 Ms. Hughes found Mr. Hilewitz to be credible and felt that he would make a valuable contribution to Canada.
14 On March 22, 2000, pursuant to the requirements set out in Gao v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 14 Admin. L.R. (2d) 233 (F.C.T.D.), Ms. Hughes sent Mr. Hilewitz what is known as a “fairness letter”, advising him that questions had been raised regarding his application and giving him an opportunity to submit further relevant evidence before a final decision was made. Citing the medical notification of Dr. Larzarus, Ms. Hughes warned that since the admission of his son could reasonably be expected to cause excessive demands on Canada’s social services, Mr. Hilewitz’s application for permanent residence was at risk of being refused.
15 Mr. Hilewitz responded by letter to Ms. Hughes on May 10, 2000. He did not dispute the medical officer’s opinion that Gavin had intellectual disabilities, but countered with information that in some respects Gavin functioned with a maturity that was well above the eight-year-old level attributed to him, and enjoyed many leisure and social activities appropriate for his age. Mr. Hilewitz pointed out that Gavin had never used publicly funded schooling in South Africa and that the family had helped establish a special school for him and others with similar disabilities.
16 Moreover, noting Gavin’s affinity and competence for operating computers, Mr. Hilewitz expressed his intention to establish or purchase a business such as a video game franchise as one of his Canadian business interests in order to ensure Gavin’s employment. “As demonstrated,” he wrote, “we have never been a drain on any institutional or social service structure to support our son and cannot conceivably ever contemplate any change to this ethos in the future.” He confirmed that he was financially able and willing to send Gavin to a private school and had, in fact, already identified a suitable one in Toronto. Included in his letter were brief reports from a clinical psychologist and a doctor who had known Gavin for many years, as well as extensive material relating both to his schooling and his educational progress.
17 Ms. Hughes was of the view that it was not part of her mandate to read Mr. Hilewitz’s response. His letter was therefore sent directly to and reviewed by Dr. Saint-Germain, the medical officer who had concurred in Dr. Larzarus’ medical notification. On May 23, 2000, Dr. Saint-Germain issued a short note, concurred in by Dr. Walter G. Waddell, concluding that the new information provided by Mr. Hilewitz “does not modify the current assessment” of Gavin’s medical inadmissibility.
18 On September 15, 2000, Ms. Hughes, relying on this medical opinion and without reading Mr. Hilewitz’s May 10 response, refused his application for a visa:
I have now completed the assessment of your application [for permanent residence]. I regret to inform you that your dependant son, Gavin Martin Hilewitz, comes within the inadmissible class of persons described in paragraph 19(1)(a) of the Immigration Act, 1976, in that he is suffering from developmental delay as a result of which, in the opinion of a medical officer concurred in by at least one other medical officer, his admission would cause or might reasonably be expected to cause an excessive demand on Canadian social services.
Since one of your dependants comes within an inadmissible class as described above . . . I am unable to issue an immigrant visa to you. Therefore, your application has been refused.
I have also considered possible humanitarian and compassionate factors but have determined that there are insufficient grounds to warrant special consideration. According to your application you have no relatives in Canada. You have lived in your native country of South Africa your entire life and I know of no reason that would prevent you from doing so in the future.
19 However, since she found Mr. Hilewitz to be credible and likely to make a significant economic contribution to Canada, Ms. Hughes recommended that a discretionary Minister’s permit be issued so that he and his family could enter and remain in Canada for up to three years, but without access to the social services available only to permanent residents. For reasons that are unclear from the record, no permit was ever authorized for Mr. Hilewitz.
20 Mr. Hilewitz applied for judicial review of Ms. Hughes’ decision. In the Federal Court, Trial Division, Gibson J. considered whether an applicant’s financial circumstances were relevant in determining whether his or her admission to Canada would cause excessive demands on social services ([2003] 2 F.C. 3, 2002 FCT 844).
21 After reviewing the jurisprudence of the Federal Court, in particular Deol v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] 1 F.C. 301, 2002 FCA 271, Gibson J. was of the view that while parental resources and willingness to pay may be irrelevant in determining whether a disabled child’s admission to Canada is likely to cause excessive demands on health services, the same cannot be said of social services which are funded and delivered on a different basis. In his view, therefore, the medical officer ought to have considered Mr. Hilewitz’s ability and willingness to contribute to whatever social services his son might require.
22 He also concluded that the visa officer ought to have read and taken Mr. Hilewitz’s response into account before making her decision, rather than basing her opinion exclusively on the medical officer’s recommendation.
23 Gibson J. therefore set aside the visa officer’s decision and referred the Hilewitz application for permanent residence back to the Minister for redetermination by a different officer. The Minister appealed.
24 At the Federal Court of Appeal, Evans J.A., writing for a unanimous court (Linden and Malone JJ.A.), agreed with Gibson J. that the Hilewitz family’s situation was distinguishable from that in Deol, a case where only health, not social services, were at issue ([2004] 1 F.C.R. 696, 2003 FCA 420). After an extensive review of the Federal Court jurisprudence, Evans J.A. noted that in the majority of those cases, non-medical factors, such as the availability of family support and the ability and willingness of the family to pay, were held to be relevant considerations in determining whether “excessive demands” would be made on Canada’s social services.
25 It was a view he did not share. He found that the Minister’s denial of Mr. Hilewitz’s application reflected what Evans J.A. characterized as a risk-averse policy which takes into account the contingency that a family’s financial situation could deteriorate, thereby creating a burden on Canadian social services.
26 He allowed the appeal and restored the decision of the visa officer denying Mr. Hilewitz’s application for a visa.
B. The de Jong Family
27 In 1996, Dirk Cornelis Jan de Jong, a Dutch citizen, applied for permanent residence in the “self‑employed” category. This category permits applicants to enter Canada if they demonstrate that they can successfully establish or purchase a business which would create jobs for themselves and make a significant contribution to Canada’s economy or cultural life (Immigration Regulations, 1978, s. 2(1)). At the time of his application, Mr. de Jong owned a dairy farm in the Netherlands and expressed an intention, if admitted to Canada, to buy a similar kind of farm in Ontario.
28 Mr. de Jong’s application included his wife, Maaike de Jong, and their six dependent children. One of their daughters, Dirkje, born in 1988, is intellectually disabled.
29 Mr. de Jong had visited Canada in 1996 and selected a farm in the Rehoboth Christian community in Ontario as a possible home. At the time of his application, his stated intention was to send all the children, including Dirkje, who was then nine years old, to the private Rehoboth Christian School in Norwich. The school had agreed to accept all the de Jong children.
30 On February 6, 1997, a medical officer, Dr. James Beltran, concluded that Dirkje had “developmental delay” and was inadmissible under s. 19(1)(a)(ii) of the Immigration Act because her requirement for specialized education was “in excess of the requirements for her peer group and therefore represents an excessive demand on social services”. Dr. Beltran’s opinion was concurred in by Dr. George Giovinazzo on June 23, 1997. Their conclusion was confirmed on July 30, 1998, in a letter from the visa officer, Eliane Wassler, rejecting Mr. de Jong’s application for permanent residence. Neither Dr. Beltran nor Ms. Wassler considered the additional information submitted by the de Jongs to be relevant, namely that Dirkje had been accepted by a private church-run school, making it unlikely that she would have to rely on publicly funded special education.
31 Mr. de Jong’s application to the Federal Court for judicial review was allowed by Reed J., who, in her order dated April 29, 1999, directed that Mr. de Jong’s application be reconsidered by a different visa officer. She specified that in assessing the application under s. 19(1)(a)(ii), the Minister was
required to consider all of the individual’s particular circumstances, as well as the personal circumstances of the Applicant and his family, including in this case the Applicant’s ability and willingness to provide for his child’s education through private schooling.
32 A new medical officer, Dr. Sylvain Bertrand, reviewed Dirkje’s situation. In a letter dated August 13, 1999 to Mr. de Jong’s counsel, Dr. Bertrand speculated that as Dirkje grew older, she would require vocational training and life-skills training, as well as respite care for her family.
33 Dr. Bertrand also wrote that he was compelled to take into account that Dirkje might not remain in private school and that the family might move or experience economic hardship, even though none of these possibilities were currently likely. His specific speculative concerns were expressed as follows:
I cannot assume that Dirkje will remain in this school for the next 11 years, and if she transfers into the public school system, the costs of her specialized education will be excessive.
This private school may close, the family may decide to move towns, cities or provinces, the family may fall upon bad economic times, they may decide that their limited financial resources must be allocated on items other than this child’s schooling, etc. While you maintain none of these possibilities are probable, in my view, I would be remiss in my responsibilities under the Immigration Act if I did not take them into account. [Emphasis in original.]
34 Mr. de Jong’s counsel responded by letter on September 8, 1999, strenuously objecting to Dr. Bertrand’s failure to give effect to the specific directions in the order of Reed J. Nevertheless, on November 10, 1999, Dr. Bertrand issued a medical notification, concurred in by Dr. Jacques Saint-Germain, concluding that Dirkje was inadmissible. In a letter of the same date to Mr. de Jong’s counsel, Dr. Bertrand defended his decision and reiterated the rationale given in his earlier letter of August 13, 1999.
35 A new visa officer, J. W. André Valotaire, reassessed Mr. de Jong’s visa application based on Dr. Bertrand’s opinion. It appears that he did not review Mr. de Jong’s September 8 response and, relying exclusively on the medical opinion, rejected the de Jong application on November 17, 1999.
36 Once again, Mr. de Jong applied to the Federal Court for judicial review. Pinard J. expanded the analysis in Deol and concluded that a family’s financial resources and willingness to support a disabled dependent were irrelevant not only in determining whether excessive demands would be placed on health services, but also in assessing the potential demands on social services ((2002), 224 F.T.R. 151, 2002 FCT 1165). Unlike Reed J., in his view the willingness of the de Jong family to pay for private schooling was irrelevant in determining medical inadmissibility under s. 19(1)(a)(ii). He dismissed the application.
37 Mr. de Jong appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal. The de Jong and Hilewitz appeals were heard consecutively. Evans J.A., relying on his reasons in the Hilewitz case, dismissed Mr. de Jong’s appeal ((2003), 315 N.R. 59, 2003 FCA 422).
II. Analysis
38 The issue in these appeals is whether the resources of the Hilewitz and the de Jong families should be disregarded in determining whether their disabled children would create an undue burden on Canada’s social services.
39 It is important to recognize at the outset that we are dealing with individuals who qualify for admission to Canada in the “investor” and “self-employed” categories. These categories are, to a large extent, concerned with an individual’s assets. While there is no doubt that most immigrants, regardless of the state of their resources when they come to Canada, eventually contribute to this country in a variety of ways, the categories applicable to the applicants in these appeals reflect an aspect of immigration policy which admits individuals expected to make a more immediate substantial economic contribution.
40 It seems to me somewhat incongruous to interpret the legislation in such a way that the very assets that qualify investors and self-employed individuals for admission to Canada can simultaneously be ignored in determining the admissibility of their disabled children. I agree with those on the Federal Court who, like Justices Reed and Gibson, have held that the personal circumstances of the families of disabled dependants are relevant factors in a s. 19(1)(a)(ii) assessment of their anticipated impact on social services. See Poste v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1997), 140 F.T.R. 126, per Cullen J.; Wong v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 141 F.T.R. 62, per Reed J.; Wong v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2002), 220 F.T.R. 137, 2002 FCT 625, per McKeown J.; Simmons v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2002), 221 F.T.R. 303, 2002 FCT 866, per Martineau J.; Karmali v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2003), 230 F.T.R. 140, 2003 FCT 358, per O’Keefe J.
41 The financial impact of a potential immigrant’s health impairments is not a new legislative preoccupation in Canada, but its formulation has changed over time. Among the first statutes to deal with the admission of persons with physical or mental disabilities who might impose financial burdens on the state and charitable institutions was An Act respecting Emigrants and Quarantine, C.S.C. 1859, c. 40. Unlike the current system of pre-travel immigration approval, ships then coming to Canada were quarantined on arrival and their passengers inspected by a medical superintendent. Section 10(2) of the 1859 Act directed that the authorities be notified of the presence among the passengers of persons likely to permanently become a public charge, including
any Lunatic, Idiotic, Deaf and Dumb, Blind or Infirm Person, not belonging to any Emigrant family, [if] such person is, in the opinion of the Medical Superintendent, likely to become permanently a public charge, the Medical Superintendent shall forthwith report the same . . . to the Collector of Customs . . . who shall . . . require the Master of the Vessel . . . to execute . . . a Bond to Her Majesty in the sum of three hundred dollars for every such Passenger so specially reported . . .
42 The ban was not absolute. Persons with disabilities who belonged to an “Emigrant family” or were not “likely to become permanently a public charge” were permitted entry. Substantially the same provision was contained in An Act respecting Immigration and Immigrants (S.C. 1869, c. 10) and the Immigration Act of 1886 (R.S.C. 1886, c. 65).
43 This approach to the admission of persons with disabilities was continued in s. 26 of the 1906 legislation (Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1906, c. 93), whereby entry was possible if the disabled person was part of a family with the ability and willingness to provide satisfactory and permanent financial security:
No immigrant shall be permitted to land in Canada, who is feeble-minded, an idiot, or an epileptic, or who is insane, or has had an attack of insanity within five years; nor shall any immigrant be so landed who is deaf and dumb, or dumb, blind or infirm, unless he belongs to a family accompanying him or already in Canada and which gives security, satisfactory to the Minister, and in conformity with the regulations in that behalf, if any, for his permanent support if admitted into Canada.
44 In 1910, a significant change occurred with the introduction of “prohibited classes” (Immigration Act, S.C. 1910, c. 27). Section 3 of this Act stated:
3. No immigrant, passenger, or other person, unless he is a Canadian citizen, or has Canadian domicile, shall be permitted to land in Canada, or in case of having landed in or entered Canada shall be permitted to remain therein, who belongs to any of the following classes, hereinafter called “prohibited classes”, —
(a) idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, epileptics, insane persons, and persons who have been insane within five years previous;
(b) persons afflicted with any loathsome disease, or with a disease which is contagious or infectious, or which may become dangerous to the public health, whether such persons intend to settle in Canada or only to pass through Canada in transit to some other country: . . .
(c) immigrants who are dumb, blind, or otherwise physically defective, unless in the opinion of a Board of Inquiry or officer acting as such they have sufficient money, or have such profession, occupation, trade, employment or other legitimate mode of earning a living that they are not liable to become a public charge or unless they belong to a family accompanying them or already in Canada and which gives security satisfactory to the Minister against such immigrants becoming a public charge;
45 The 1910 Act departed from previous legislation by distinguishing between those with mental and physical disabilities. There was an absolute prohibition on admission for those with mental disabilities