Re Unnamed person

Re Unnamed person
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2020-12-31
Neutral citation
2020 FC 1190
Decision Content
TOP SECRET
Date: 20201231
Docket: ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Citation: 2020 FC 1190
Ottawa, Ontario, December 31, 2020
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Brown
BETWEEN:
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION
BY |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| FOR WARRANTS PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 12 AND 21
OF THE CANADIAN SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ACT,
RSC 1985, c C-23
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION
BY |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| FOR WARRANTS PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 12 AND 21
OF THE CANADIAN SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ACT,
RSC 1985, c C-23
AND IN THE MATTER OF |||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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AND IN THE MATTER OF |||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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ORDER AND REASONS
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
I. Introduction and summary 2
II. Background 8
III. Solicitor-client privilege 18
A. The definition of solicitor-client communication was too narrow 19
B. It was necessary to strengthen the conditions to minimize access by the Service and AG Canada to communications potentially covered by solicitor-client privilege 21
C. Jurisprudence governing solicitor-client communications 23
D. Need to appoint amici and Referees 36
E. Review of documents at the Federal Court’s secure premises 37
F. Provincial bar not engaged regarding likely incidental intercept of lawyer’s communications 38
G. Sequestration and preservation Orders 40
H. Procedure adopted with respect to communications potentially containing solicitor-client privileged information implemented in the Fall of 2018 41
I. Decisions on Draft Reports – forwarded in some cases without and in some cases with redactions 44
IV. Duty of Candour 45
A. First interruption of review and release of redacted or complete Draft Reports January – February 2019 – disclosure of potentially illegal conduct by human sources not brought to the Court’s attention in October 2018 45
B. CSIS ordered to report non-disclosure to SIRC 46
C. Interruption of Draft Reports and Orders allowing full or redacted Draft Reports – February 2019 to April 2019 47
D. Alleged illegality of human source activities disclosed February 2019 51
E. Criminal Code provisions on participation in terrorist activity 52
F. Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on participation in terrorist activities generally and section 83.18 58
G. Supreme Court jurisprudence on the defence of de minimis 62
H. Application of legal principles to the Supplemental Evidence 66
I. Full Balancing Analysis – determining whether any information should be excised from the 2018 Application for Warrants 71
J. Resumption of Draft Reports and Orders allowing full or redacted Draft Reports – April 10, 2019 72
K. Second interruption of review and release of Draft Reports September / October 2019 due to additional evidence concerning (1) non-disclosure of material going to reliability and credibility of human sources and (2) disclosure of additional potentially criminal conduct by human sources 74
L. New information regarding credibility and reliability | 79
M. General observations on reliability and credibility 81
N. Assessment of potentially negative information concerning the credibility and reliability | 87
O. Assessment of new evidence of potentially positive reliability and credibility 92
P. High legal risk assessments, report to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, and meeting of Warrant Committee in the Summer of 2018 98
V. Concluding remarks 115
I. Introduction and summary
[1] These reasons are divided into four parts: introduction and summary, background, solicitor-client privilege, and duty of candour and full disclosure. They are issued as part of the Court’s ongoing effort to shed public light where appropriate on the Court’s role in relation to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service [“CSIS” or “the Service”] and its counsel, the Attorney General of Canada [AG Canada], in relation to warranted activities involving suspected threats to the security of Canada. These Reasons deal with a number of determinations in relation to two issues which arose in connection to warrants issued by me in October 2018 [2018 Warrants].
[2] The first issue concerns how best to protect solicitor-client privilege in the context of judicially warranted intercepted communications under the Canadian Security and Intelligence Act, RSC 1985, c C-23, as amended [CSIS Act]. This issue arises because |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| I dealt with the solicitor-client issues both when the 2018 Warrants issued in October 2018 and in a number of subsequent Orders and Directions, some but not all of which are discussed below.
[3] The second issue relates to the duties of candour and full disclosure. I consider this one duty and will henceforth refer to it as the duty of candour. The duty of candour was first drawn to the Court’s attention by the Service in January and early 2019 with disclosure of information that was available to the Service, but which the Service did not present to the Court when the Service requested the 2018 Warrants. In early October 2019, almost a year after the 2018 Warrants were issued, the Service revealed additional previously undisclosed information not revealed in January 2019. Once again, almost all this additional information was available to the Service in October 2018, but was not presented to the Court at that time.
[4] These instances of non-disclosure squarely raise the duty of candour resting on the Service, which requires the Service to make full disclosure when seeking national security warrants under the CSIS Act. This duty arises because Service applications for national security warrants are of necessity and by statute, conducted in secret. In addition, the Court does not generally hear from anyone except the Service; that is, warrant applications are made in private, in camera and ex parte.
[5] The Service frankly concedes, and I agree, that the non-disclosures reported in January and early 2019 and in October 2019 breached its duty of candour by failing to disclose information that should have been disclosed when it applied for the 2018 Warrants in October 2018. The information belatedly disclosed in January and early 2019 concerned potentially unlawful conduct on the part of confidential informants, or ‘human sources’ relied upon by the Service. The information belatedly brought to the attention of the Court in October 2019 concerned matters that may have affected the Court’s assessment of the credibility and reliability of information |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| relied on by the Service to obtain the 2018 Warrants. The October 2019 disclosures provided additional information concerning potentially unlawful human source conduct.
[6] In summary, with respect to the issue of solicitor-client privilege, the Court will outline the required balancing exercise and the mechanisms the Court put in place to ensure that the Service did not gain impermissible access to intercepted communications that might contain solicitor-client communications, while also ensuring, to the extent possible, that the Service is able to investigate threats to the security of Canada in a timely manner where authorized to do so under CSIS Act warrants issued by this Court.
[7] On the issue of non-disclosure, there is no doubt, it is admitted and I find that the Service failed in its duty of candour by not disclosing that human source information relied upon in the warrant application might have been derived from activities that potentially contravened the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code], and in particular, that might have breached the anti-terrorism provisions in sections 83.01 and following thereof.
[8] The Court also finds that the Service breached its duty of candour in failing to disclose information that had the potential to reflect adversely on the reliability and credibility of the human source information the Service presented to and the Court relied upon in the 2018 Warrant application.
[9] Both breaches occurred through a combination of institutional and systemic negligence. Nevertheless, I am unable to find any intention to mislead or deceive the Court. The Court does not find personal culpability on the part of either the lawyers or Service witnesses who appeared before it. The breach of candour resulted from numerous factors discussed below, and in far more detail by my colleague Justice Gleeson in Sections 12 and 21 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, RSC 1985, c C-23 (Re), 2020 FC 616, [2020 FC 616]. I should note that I sat with Justice Gleeson (and Justice Kane) in a mini en banc, when much of the evidence in his case of a general nature was presented. The three of us were also part of a full Court en banc hearing in 2019. I have read the decision of Justice Gleeson, and concur with his findings, analysis and conclusions on the general.
[10] In particular, some matters addressed by Justice Gleeson are mirrored in the matter before me now, in particular the question of whether the Court may invalidate the warrant or take other action after it has issued, if the Court becomes aware that information placed before it was likely collected in contravention of the law.
[11] I fully agree with and adopt the analytical framework outlined by Justice Gleeson in his decision: a judge of the Federal Court may review a prior decision to issue a warrant. As outlined by Justice Gleeson at paragraph 223 of his decision:
As a matter of practicality and in furtherance of the efficient use of judicial resources, when faced with the review of a previously issued warrant for reasons of candour, a designated judge may commence with a sufficiency assessment after automatically excluding the impugned information as an initial procedural step […] However, if automatic excision leads to the conclusion that the warrant could not have issued then I am of the view that the designated judge would be required to engage in a full balancing analysis prior to reaching a final conclusion on the question of whether the warrant could have issued.
[12] Justice Gleeson explains that the balancing analysis to determine what information on the record is to be excised, if any, in an ex post facto review where the validity of a warrant is called into question for reasons relating to a breach of candour should take into account the following factors: (1) seriousness of the illegal activity; (2) fairness; and (3) societal interest.
[13] In this case, I have opted in my discretion, as allowed by Justice Gleeson’s framework, not to first assess the validity of the warrant after automatically excluding the impugned information. Instead I will proceed directly with the full balancing analysis.
[14] I have weighed the above-mentioned factors in reviewing the information relating to human source activities provided after the fact. I am not required to determine if the conduct belatedly identified breached the Criminal Code. In this case I am required to determine if the human source information obtained through potentially illegal activity could have been relied on in issuing the warrants and whether the potential illegality and other information brought to the Court’s attention after the 2018 Warrants were issued sufficiently affects the credibility of human source information such that the warrant could not have issued.
[15] Let me be clear: the Service should have disclosed the undisclosed human source related information to the Court when it applied for the 2018 Warrants. That was required as part of the duty of candour resting on the Service. However, in my respectful view and on a balance of probabilities, much if not all of the human source conduct in question would be entitled to the defence of de minimis: if the conduct contravened the Criminal Code, the contraventions were minor and technical in nature, and in some cases lacked a causal connection to the information relied upon to issue the warrants. I have concluded that the potentially illegal conduct could not have affected the issuance of the 2018 Warrants; they could have issued even if this information had been disclosed.
[16] I have reached the same conclusion with respect to the information potentially reflecting adversely on the reliability |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| I am far from persuaded on a balance of probabilities that the 2018 Warrants could not have issued if the information reported in October 2019 was disclosed when the 2018 Warrants were issued in October 2018. In my respectful view, in my ex post facto review, the human source related information should not be excised, and consequently, the 2018 Warrants could have issued even if this information had been disclosed.
II. Background
[17] The Federal Court is authorized by section 12 and Part II of the CSIS Act to issue warrants authorizing CSIS to intercept communications if this Court is satisfied there are reasonable grounds to believe such a warrant is required to enable the Service to investigate a threat to the security of Canada, and where other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or are unlikely to succeed. These powers are set out in subsections and paragraphs 21(1), 21(2)(a), (b) and (c) and (3) (a), (b), and (c), of the CSIS Act and the definition of what constitutes a threat to the security of Canada is found in section 2:
Definitions
Définitions
2 In this Act,
2 Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi.
[…]
[…]
threats to the security of Canada means
menaces envers la sécurité du Canada Constituent des menaces envers la sécurité du Canada les activités suivantes :
(a) espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or is detrimental to the interests of Canada or activities directed toward or in support of such espionage or sabotage,
a) l’espionnage ou le sabotage visant le Canada ou préjudiciables à ses intérêts, ainsi que les activités tendant à favoriser ce genre d’espionnage ou de sabotage;
(b) foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person,
b) les activités influencées par l’étranger qui touchent le Canada ou s’y déroulent et sont préjudiciables à ses intérêts, et qui sont d’une nature clandestine ou trompeuse ou comportent des menaces envers quiconque;
(c) activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political, religious or ideological objective within Canada or a foreign state, and
c) les activités qui touchent le Canada ou s’y déroulent et visent à favoriser l’usage de la violence grave ou de menaces de violence contre des personnes ou des biens dans le but d’atteindre un objectif politique, religieux ou idéologique au Canada ou dans un État étranger;
(d) activities directed toward undermining by covert unlawful acts, or directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or overthrow by violence of, the constitutionally established system of government in Canada,
d) les activités qui, par des actions cachées et illicites, visent à saper le régime de gouvernement constitutionnellement établi au Canada ou dont le but immédiat ou ultime est sa destruction ou son renversement, par la violence.
but does not include lawful advocacy, protest or dissent, unless carried on in conjunction with any of the activities referred to in paragraphs (a) to (d). (menaces envers la sécurité du Canada)
La présente définition ne vise toutefois pas les activités licites de défense d’une cause, de protestation ou de manifestation d’un désaccord qui n’ont aucun lien avec les activités mentionnées aux alinéas a) à d). (threats to the security of Canada)
[…]
[…]
Collection, analysis and retention
Informations et renseignements
12 (1) The Service shall collect, by investigation or otherwise, to the extent that it is strictly necessary, and analyse and retain information and intelligence respecting activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada and, in relation thereto, shall report to and advise the Government of Canada.
12 (1) Le Service recueille, au moyen d’enquêtes ou autrement, dans la mesure strictement nécessaire, et analyse et conserve les informations et renseignements sur les activités dont il existe des motifs raisonnables de soupçonner qu’elles constituent des menaces envers la sécurité du Canada; il en fait rapport au gouvernement du Canada et le conseille à cet égard.
[…]
[…]
Application for warrant
Demande de mandat
21 (1) If the Director or any employee designated by the Minister for the purpose believes, on reasonable grounds, that a warrant under this section is required to enable the Service to investigate, within or outside Canada, a threat to the security of Canada or to perform its duties and functions under section 16, the Director or employee may, after having obtained the Minister’s approval, make an application in accordance with subsection (2) to a judge for a warrant under this section.
21 (1) Le directeur ou un employé désigné à cette fin par le ministre peut, après avoir obtenu l’approbation du ministre, demander à un juge de décerner un mandat en conformité avec le présent article s’il a des motifs raisonnables de croire que le mandat est nécessaire pour permettre au Service de faire enquête, au Canada ou à l’extérieur du Canada, sur des menaces envers la sécurité du Canada ou d’exercer les fonctions qui lui sont conférées en vertu de l’article 16.
Matters to be specified in application for warrant
Contenu de la demande
(2) An application to a judge under subsection (1) shall be made in writing and be accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant deposing to the following matters, namely,
(2) La demande visée au paragraphe (1) est présentée par écrit et accompagnée de l’affidavit du demandeur portant sur les points suivants :
(a) the facts relied on to justify the belief, on reasonable grounds, that a warrant under this section is required to enable the Service to investigate a threat to the security of Canada or to perform its duties and functions under section 16;
a) les faits sur lesquels le demandeur s’appuie pour avoir des motifs raisonnables de croire que le mandat est nécessaire aux fins visées au paragraphe (1);
(b) that other investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or why it appears that they are unlikely to succeed, that the urgency of the matter is such that it would be impractical to carry out the investigation using only other investigative procedures or that without a warrant under this section it is likely that information of importance with respect to the threat to the security of Canada or the performance of the duties and functions under section 16 referred to in paragraph (a) would not be obtained;
b) le fait que d’autres méthodes d’enquête ont été essayées en vain, ou la raison pour laquelle elles semblent avoir peu de chances de succès, le fait que l’urgence de l’affaire est telle qu’il serait très difficile de mener l’enquête sans mandat ou le fait que, sans mandat, il est probable que des informations importantes concernant les menaces ou les fonctions visées au paragraphe (1) ne pourraient être acquises;
[…]
[…]
Issuance of warrant
Délivrance du mandat
(3) Notwithstanding any other law but subject to the Statistics Act, where the judge to whom an application under subsection (1) is made is satisfied of the matters referred to in paragraphs (2)(a) and (b) set out in the affidavit accompanying the application, the judge may issue a warrant authorizing the persons to whom it is directed to intercept any communication or obtain any information, record, document or thing and, for that purpose,
(3) Par dérogation à toute autre règle de droit mais sous réserve de la Loi sur la statistique, le juge à qui est présentée la demande visée au paragraphe (1) peut décerner le mandat s’il est convaincu de l’existence des faits mentionnés aux alinéas (2)a) et b) et dans l’affidavit qui accompagne la demande; le mandat autorise ses destinataires à intercepter des communications ou à acquérir des informations, documents ou objets. À cette fin, il peut autoriser aussi, de leur part :
(a) to enter any place or open or obtain access to any thing;
a) l’accès à un lieu ou un objet ou l’ouverture d’un objet;
(b) to search for, remove or return, or examine, take extracts from or make copies of or record in any other manner the information, record, document or thing; or
b) la recherche, l’enlèvement ou la remise en place de tout document ou objet, leur examen, le prélèvement des informations qui s’y trouvent, ainsi que leur enregistrement et l’établissement de copies ou d’extraits par tout procédé;
(c) to install, maintain or remove any thing.
c) l’installation, l’entretien et l’enlèvement d’objets.
[…]
[…]
Matters to be specified in warrant
Contenu du mandat
(4) There shall be specified in a warrant issued under subsection (3)
(4) Le mandat décerné en vertu du paragraphe (3) porte les indications suivantes :
(a) the type of communication authorized to be intercepted, the type of information, records, documents or things authorized to be obtained and the powers referred to in paragraphs (3)(a) to (c) authorized to be exercised for that purpose;
a) les catégories de communications dont l’interception, les catégories d’informations, de documents ou d’objets dont l’acquisition, ou les pouvoirs visés aux alinéas (3)a) à c) dont l’exercice, sont autorisés;
(b) the identity of the person, if known, whose communication is to be intercepted or who has possession of the information, record, document or thing to be obtained;
b) l’identité de la personne, si elle est connue, dont les communications sont à intercepter ou qui est en possession des informations, documents ou objets à acquérir;
(c) the persons or classes of persons to whom the warrant is directed;
c) les personnes ou catégories de personnes destinataires du mandat;
(d) a general description of the place where the warrant may be executed, if a general description of that place can be given;
d) si possible, une description générale du lieu où le mandat peut être exécuté;
(e) the period for which the warrant is in force; and
e) la durée de validité du mandat;
(f) such terms and conditions as the judge considers advisable in the public interest.
f) les conditions que le juge estime indiquées dans l’intérêt public.
[Emphasis added.]
[Non souligné dans l’original.]
[18] In this case, CSIS applied to the Federal Court for a number of national security warrants in October 2018. I say a number because several different warrants were requested albeit in respect of the same targets. These requests were made under section 12 and sought the warrant powers set out in Part II of the CSIS Act.
[19] The application was based on an alleged threat to the security of Canada posed by what were described as |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| a group of individuals whose members are known or suspected to have |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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[21] I should say that the explanation for my issuing the 2018 Warrants appear in brief compass in “Part I – Recitals” as set out on the face of the 2018 Warrants themselves. At that time, the Court had considerable evidence, including human source evidence, relating to the threat posed |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| Previous warrants relating to the same threat had been issued by this Court. The threat posed |||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||| was outlined, and the individuals whose communications were targeted by the 2018 Warrants were identified along with their activities.
[22] In addition, among other things, the application for the 2018 Warrants identified individuals whose communications might incidentally be intercepted.
[23] ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
[24] I granted the requested warrants on the basis of written evidence supplemented by oral testimony presented at an ex parte, in camera hearing held on October |||| 2018. As noted, the evidence before the Court included human source information. “Human source” is a term used by the Service and by Parliament in the CSIS Act to describe confidential informants. Human sources are individuals directed and relied upon by the Service who provide relevant information to the Service. The Service in turn presented the information to the Court in support of its application. The CSIS Act describes human source as follows:
Definitions
Définitions
2 In this Act,
2 Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi.
[…]
[…]
human source means an individual who, after having received a promise of confidentiality, has provided, provides or is likely to provide information to the Service; (source humaine)
source humaine Personne physique qui a reçu une promesse d’anonymat et qui, par la suite, a fourni, fournit ou pourrait vraisemblablement fournir des informations au Service. (human source):
[25] At the time of the October 2018 hearing, the Court was required to satisfy itself that the conditions necessary for the issuance of the warrants were established. This was done to my satisfaction.
[26] The Court was given no reason to be concerned with any breach of the duty of candour by either the Service or its counsel, AG Canada. The Service affiant was called to give oral testimony before me, and assured me relative to knowledge of and compliance with the duty of candour. The Service affiant was examined by counsel for the Service, and the witness was cross-examined by specialized amici appointed by me to assist the Court.
[27] While the material filed in support of the 2018 Warrants specifically referred to human source information reported in the Service employee’s affidavit, there was no indication that the human source information relied on might be connected to contravention or contraventions of the anti-terrorism provisions of the Criminal Code.
[28] Nor was the Court given any reason to believe that the human source information was unreliable or not credible even though brief information was presented in the Human Source Précis. A Human Source Précis is an outline provided by the Service with the Warrant application of issues related to the credibility and reliability of human source information. In this case it was to the effect that human source information was provided by a person or persons who had ‘run-ins’ with the law.
[29] It may be that information presented in the Human Source Précis might also go to the character of a relevant human source. I note this because while of course character evidence might go to the reliability or credibility of human source information, there is no requirement that human sources be without blemish or exemplars of rectitude for their evidence to be believed by the Court.
[30] Suffice it to say that nothing in the October 2018 warrant application could have stood in the way of issuing the 2018 Warrants.
[31] The issue of solicitor-client privilege, however, was immediately, very specifically and properly flagged by the Service when it applied for the 2018 Warrants. The Service disclosed that |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| As noted, the Service fully and as required by the duty of candour, disclosed that communications |||||||||||||||||||||||||| would likely be incidentally intercepted during surveillance of individuals named as targets of the requested warrants.
III. Solicitor-client privilege
[32] The Federal Court has long provided specific protections to prevent unauthorized interceptions and use of communications protected by solicitor-client privilege. This is accomplished through special conditions forming part of each warrant issued by the Court pursuant to the CSIS Act.
[33] The warrants I was asked to issue included among other things the following provisions relating to solicitor-client privilege, the first of which was set out in the definition section, and the second was set out in the applicable warrant conditions:
“solicitor” means persons authorized to practice as an advocate or notary in Quebec or as a barrister or solicitor in any territory or other province in Canada;
“solicitor-client communication” means any communication of a confidential character between a client and a solicitor directly related to the seeking, formulating or giving of legal advice or legal assistance;
…
CONDITION 1
No communication and no oral communication may be intercepted and no information may be obtained at the office or residence of a solicitor or at any other place ordinarily used by solicitors for the purpose of consultation with clients.
Any solicitor-client communication intercepted or obtained shall be destroyed unless the Deputy Director Operations or his designate has reasonable grounds to believe the communication relates to a threat in relation to which a warrant issued pursuant to section 21 of the Act is in force, in which case an application shall be brought to the Court for directions before the Service can use, retain or disclose the communication.
However, where the Deputy Director Operations or his designate determines that there is information that raises real concerns that an individual or group is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, the Deputy Director Operations or his designate may use, retain or disclose the communication to the extent strictly necessary to address that danger. The Service shall advise the Court, in writing, within 48 hours of such determination and shall seek directions from the Court for further retention or disclosure of the communication.
[34] Two problems arose with the above.
A. The definition of solicitor-client communication was too narrow
[35] First, the definition of “solicitor” was too narrow because it only applied to those actually authorized to practice as a lawyer or notary. In this connection, it appeared the Service treated communications with a lawyer differently from communications between a client and an individual acting in support of a lawyer’s law practice, such as a secretary, legal assistant, paralegal, or articling student. However, the law extends solicitor-client privilege not just to communications between a client and his or her actual lawyer (or notary), but also to those acting in support of a lawyer’s law practice.
[36] In this connection, the definitions in the warrants needed to be expanded to protect communications between a client and any individual acting in support of a lawyer’s law practice. In this respect the Supreme Court of Canada has made it clear that all communications made with a view to obtaining legal advice must be kept confidential, whether the communications are made to the lawyer or to employees and whether the communications deal with matters of an administrative nature or with the actual nature of the legal problem. The Supreme Court did so in Descôteaux v Mierzwinski, [1982] 1 SCR 860 per Lamer J (as he was then) at 892-893 [Descôteaux]:
In summary, a lawyer’s client is entitled to have all communications made with a view to obtaining legal advice kept confidential. Whether communications [page 893] are made to the lawyer himself or to employees, and whether they deal with matters of an administrative nature such as financial means or with the actual nature of the legal problem, all information which a person must provide in order to obtain legal advice and which is given in confidence for that purpose enjoys the privileges attached to confidentiality. This confidentiality attaches to all communications made within the framework of the solicitor-client relationship, which arises as soon as the potential client takes the first steps, and consequently even before the formal retainer is established.
There are certain exceptions to the principle of the confidentiality of solicitor-client communications, however. Thus communications that are in themselves criminal or that are made with a view to obtaining legal advice to facilitate the commission of a crime will not be privileged, inter alia.
…
[Emphasis added.]
[37] The solution to the excessively narrow definition of “solicitor” was achieved in two stages. Initially, the Service and AG Canada agreed, and I ordered that the definition of solicitor was “understood to include such communications between a client and an individual acting in support of a solicitor’s law practice.” This addition was made at the suggestion of AG Canada’s counsel in a recital as part of an Order. Subsequently, on April 10, 2019, I specifically ordered that the definition of solicitor-client privilege “includes communications between a client and an individual acting in support of a solicitor’s law practice.” This revision to the definition of solicitor has been adopted by subsequent judges and currently applies in all national security warrants issued by the Court.
B. It was necessary to strengthen the conditions to minimize access by the Service and AG Canada to communications potentially covered by solicitor-client privilege
[38] The second solicitor-client issue posed by the draft Condition in the circumstances of this case was that while the Deputy Director Operations [DDO] of the Service was authorized to seek directions from the Federal Court in relation to solicitor-client privileged communications, it turned out that many other individuals in addition to the DDO were in fact involved in the process leading up to the DDO’s decision.
[39] Without going into the details that are on the record, evidence at the hearing revealed some of those individuals had lower level functions, while others had what I will call operational and managerial responsibilities in the risk and threat analysis and assessment. In fact, the evidence was that as many as eight or ten, and possibly more, Service personnel would have access to communications that were potentially solicitor-client privileged communications, as they worked their way up the chain of command from initial analyst’s report on the intercept, to the report to the DDO him or herself.
[40] Mindful of the constitutional and legal imperative to minimize access to solicitor-client privilege and the wide scope of what is protected, I determined at the outset that too many Service personnel had potential access to potential solicitor-client communications. In addition, I determined that once anyone with hands-on responsibility for the analysis and assessment of risk read a potentially solicitor-client privileged communication, it would be difficult if not impossible not to factor that into subsequent assessments. The privilege in other words could or would have been lost by the time the DDO made a decision.
[41] In my view at the time, this situation could very well have been in breach of Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence. That indeed turned out to be the case as discussed below.
[42] Accordingly, I ordered the sequestration of all information that might be protected by solicitor-client