Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc.

Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc.
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2007-03-23
Neutral citation
2007 SCC 15
Report
[2007] 1 SCR 650
Case number
30909
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; Bastarache, Michel; Binnie, William Ian Corneil; LeBel, Louis; Deschamps, Marie; Fish, Morris J.; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Charron, Louise; Rothstein, Marshall
On appeal from
Federal Court of Appeal
Subjects
Administrative law
Transportation
Notes
SCC Case Information: 30909
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc., [2007] 1 S.C.R. 650, 2007 SCC 15
Date: 20070323
Docket: 30909
Between:
Council of Canadians with Disabilities
Appellant
and
Via Rail Canada Inc.
Respondent
‑ and ‑
Canadian Transportation Agency, Canadian Human
Rights Commission, Ontario Human Rights Commission,
Commission des droits de la personne et des droits
de la jeunesse, Manitoba Human Rights Commission,
Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission,
Transportation Action Now, Alliance for Equality
of Blind Canadians, Canadian Association for
Community Living, Canadian Hard of Hearing
Association, Canadian Association of Independent
Living Centres and DisAbled Women’s Network Canada
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ.
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 246)
Joint Dissenting Reasons:
(paras. 247 to 370)
Abella J. (McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, LeBel and Charron JJ. concurring)
Deschamps and Rothstein JJ. (Binnie and Fish JJ. concurring)
______________________________
Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc., [2007] 1 S.C.R. 650, 2007 SCC 15
Council of Canadians with Disabilities Appellant
v.
VIA Rail Canada Inc. Respondent
and
Canadian Transportation Agency, Canadian
Human Rights Commission, Ontario Human
Rights Commission, Commission des droits
de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse,
Manitoba Human Rights Commission,
Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission,
Transportation Action Now, Alliance for Equality
of Blind Canadians, Canadian Association for
Community Living, Canadian Hard of Hearing
Association, Canadian Association of Independent
Living Centres and DisAbled Women’s Network Canada Interveners
Indexed as: Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc.
Neutral citation: 2007 SCC 15.
File No.: 30909.
2006: May 19; 2007: March 23.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ.
on appeal from the federal court of appeal
Transportation law — Railways — Duty to accommodate passengers with disabilities — VIA Rail purchasing rail cars — Canadian Transportation Agency ordering VIA Rail to modify 13 economy coach cars and 17 service cars to make them personal wheelchair accessible — Whether accommodation imposing undue hardship on VIA Rail — Whether Agency’s decision ordering VIA Rail to retrofit some of its newly purchased cars patently unreasonable — Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10, ss. 5 , 172 .
Administrative law — Judicial review — Standard of review — Canadian Transportation Agency ordering VIA Rail to modify 13 economy coach cars and 17 service cars to make them personal wheelchair accessible — Standard of review applicable to Agency’s decision — Whether preliminary jurisdictional question subject to different standard of review — Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10, s. 172 .
In late 2000, VIA Rail paid $29.8 million to purchase 139 rail cars (“Renaissance cars”) no longer required for overnight train service through the Channel Tunnel. These cars were inaccessible to persons with disabilities using personal wheelchairs. VIA saw the Renaissance cars as a unique opportunity to substantially increase the size of its fleet at a comparatively moderate cost. Preparing the equipment for service was estimated at $100 million, but there was no “plan document” to enhance accessibility when the cars were purchased. VIA claimed that the cars were sufficiently accessible and that its employees would transfer passengers into on‑board wheelchairs and assist them with services, such as washroom use. The Council of Canadians with Disabilities (“CCD”) applied to the Canadian Transportation Agency under s. 172 of the Canada Transportation Act (“CTA ”), complaining that many features of the Renaissance cars constituted undue obstacles to the mobility of persons with disabilities. CCD relied, in part, on VIA’s alleged non‑compliance with the “1998 Rail Code”, a voluntary Code negotiated with and agreed to by VIA that sets minimum standards applicable to its transportation network. Under this Code, modern accessibility standards apply to new rail cars or cars undergoing a major refurbishment. The Code also provides that at least one car in every train that leaves a railway station must be accessible to persons using personal wheelchairs. VIA argued that the Renaissance cars were not newly manufactured or undergoing a major refurbishment. The Agency found otherwise, concluding that the Code’s modern accessibility standards applied to the Renaissance cars.
The Agency issued a preliminary decision in March 2003 in which it gave VIA a final opportunity to provide specific evidence to show cause to the Agency why the obstacles it had identified were not undue and to provide feasibility and costing information relating to the remedial options under consideration by the Agency. Two months later, VIA replied that it was not reasonable to require it to modify the cars; it gave the Agency a brief estimate in a three‑page letter without any supporting evidence. In June 2003, the Agency advised VIA that its response lacked detail and feasibility information and was therefore unverifiable. The Agency reissued its original show cause order, giving VIA additional time to prepare a response. VIA submitted some cost estimates, but indicated that it was unable to comply with the show cause order any further. VIA did not request more time, instead repeatedly asking the Agency to render its final decision. On the basis of the record before it, the Agency issued its final decision and ordered VIA to implement remedial measures, all of which had been identified by the Agency by the time it had reissued its preliminary decision in June 2003. The main changes required VIA to modify 13 economy coach cars and 17 service cars out of the 139 cars, so that there would be one personal wheelchair accessible car on each daytime train and one car with personal wheelchair accessible sleeper facilities on each overnight train. The existing fleet provided one personal wheelchair accessible car per train. VIA used its VIA 1 cars for this purpose, which had been retrofitted to accommodate passenger‑owned wheelchairs, but the existing fleet was to be phased out and replaced by the Renaissance cars.
VIA successfully sought leave to appeal the Agency’s preliminary and final decisions to the Federal Court of Appeal. In support of its application for leave, VIA filed a report it had commissioned to review the Agency’s final decision. The report, which was prepared in less than 40 days after the Agency’s final decision, estimated that the cost of implementing that decision would be at least $48 million. The Federal Court of Appeal concluded that the Agency’s identification of undue obstacles to the mobility of persons with disabilities was reviewable on the standard of patent unreasonableness, but that the Agency’s interpretation of its jurisdiction under s. 172 of the CTA was reviewable on the standard of correctness. Although the court found that the Agency was correct to conclude that it had jurisdiction under s. 172 to proceed with CCD’s complaint, it disagreed with the Agency’s findings that the obstacles in the Renaissance cars were undue, concluding that the decision was made without considering VIA’s entire network, the interests of non‑disabled persons, and the interests of persons with disabilities other than personal‑wheelchair users. The court also disagreed with the Agency’s conclusion that there was no evidence on the record to support VIA’s view that its existing network was able to address obstacles in the Renaissance cars. Holding the Agency’s decision to be patently unreasonable, the court set it aside and referred the matter back to the Agency for reconsideration. The court was also of the view that, having identified the modifications it thought necessary, the Agency had violated VIA’s procedural fairness rights by failing to give VIA an adequate opportunity to respond to its requests for cost and feasibility information.
Held (Binnie, Deschamps, Fish and Rothstein JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed and the Agency’s decisions restored.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, LeBel, Abella and Charron JJ.: The standard of review applicable to the Agency’s decision as a whole is patent unreasonableness. Under s. 172 of the CTA , Parliament gave the Agency a specific mandate to determine how to render transportation systems more accessible to persons with disabilities. While that mandate undoubtedly has a human rights aspect, this does not take the questions of how and when the Agency exercises its human rights expertise outside the mandate conferred on it by Parliament. The Agency made a decision with many component parts, each of which fell squarely and inextricably within its expertise and mandate. The decision is therefore entitled to a single, deferential standard of review. Where an expert tribunal has charted an appropriate analytical course for itself, with reasons that serve as a rational guide, a reviewing court should not lightly interfere with the tribunal’s interpretation and application of its enabling legislation. Here, the Agency interpreted its authority to proceed with CCD’s complaint under s. 172(1) in a manner that is rationally supported by the relevant legislation. It also defined the analytical process to be followed in identifying undue obstacles in the federal transportation network in a way that is supported by the CTA and human rights jurisprudence. Viewed as a whole, the Agency’s reasons show that it approached and applied its mandate reasonably. [88] [97] [100] [104‑105] [108‑109]
Under Part V of the CTA , the Agency must identify — and order appropriate remedies for — undue obstacles to persons with disabilities in the transportation context in a manner that is consistent with the approach to identifying and remedying discrimination in human rights law. Here, it is the design of the Renaissance cars that is said to represent an undue obstacle. Under the concept of reasonable accommodation, service providers have a duty to do whatever is reasonably possible to accommodate persons with disabilities. The discriminatory barrier must be removed unless there is a bona fide justification for its retention, which is proven by establishing that accommodation imposes undue hardship on the service provider. What constitutes undue hardship depends on factors relevant to the circumstances and legislation governing each case. The factors set out in s. 5 of the CTA are compatible with those that apply under human rights principles. They flow out of the factors inherent in a reasonable accommodation analysis, such as cost, economic viability, safety, and the quality of service to all passengers, but are assessed based on the unique realities of the federal transportation context. In this case, VIA did not meet its onus of establishing that the obstacles created by its purchase of the Renaissance cars were not “undue”. The Agency’s analysis or decision was not unreasonable; in particular, there was nothing inappropriate about the factors it did, and did not, rely on. [117‑118] [121] [123] [133] [135] [138] [142] [144]
The Rail Code was a proper factor for the Agency to consider in its analysis. The purpose of this Code is to function as self‑imposed minimum standards all rail carriers have agreed to meet. The standard of “personal wheelchair use” set out in the Code is also consistent with human rights jurisprudence. Independent access to the same comfort, dignity, safety and security as those without physical limitations is a fundamental human right for all persons who use wheelchairs. In view of the widespread domestic and international acceptance of personal wheelchair-based accessibility standards, and particularly of VIA’s own Rail Code commitments, it was not unreasonable for the Agency to rely on the personal wheelchair as a guiding accessibility paradigm. VIA was not entitled to resile from this norm because it found a better bargain for its able‑bodied customers. Neither the Rail Code, the CTA , nor any human rights principle recognizes that a unique opportunity to acquire inaccessible cars at a comparatively low purchase price may be a legitimate justification for sustained inaccessibility. [146‑147] [161-165]
The Agency also considered VIA’s network and found that none of the evidence on the record supported VIA’s position that its existing fleet, or its network generally, would address obstacles found to exist in the Renaissance cars. The fact that there are accessible trains travelling along only some routes does not justify inaccessible trains on others. It is the global network of rail services that should be accessible. The ad hoc provision of services does not satisfy Parliament’s continuing goal of ensuring accessible rail services. To permit VIA to point to its existing cars, which were to be phased out, and special service‑based accommodations as a defence would be to overlook the fact that while human rights law includes an acknowledgment that not every barrier can be eliminated, it also includes a duty to prevent new ones, or at least not knowingly to perpetuate old ones where preventable. Here, VIA did not appear, from the evidence, to have seriously investigated the possibility of reasonably accommodating the use of personal wheelchairs or, for that matter, to have given serious consideration to any other issue related to providing access for persons with disabilities. [169] [176] [186‑187]
Finally, the Agency appropriately considered the cost of remedying an obstacle when determining whether it was “undue”. Its reasons make clear that retrofitting some cars in the Renaissance fleet to accommodate persons using personal wheelchairs would cost nowhere near the amounts claimed by VIA. Moreover, the record belies VIA’s assertions that it could not have provided cost estimates of the remedial measures prior to the Agency’s final decision, since VIA provided a new cost estimate 37 days after this decision was released. Each remedial measure with any cost implications had long been identified by the Agency and VIA’s views on the structural, operational and economic implications of each were repeatedly sought. However, the issue is not just cost; it is whether the cost constitutes undue hardship. In light of VIA’s refusal to provide concrete evidence in support of its undue hardship argument, no reasonable basis existed for refusing to eliminate the undue obstacles created by the design of the Renaissance cars. With the information it had, the Agency determined that the cost of the remedial measures it ordered would not be prohibitive and did not justify a finding of undue hardship based on financial cost. The Agency’s findings with respect to cost and undue hardship were reasonable. They should not, therefore, be disturbed. [190] [218‑219] [226‑229]
VIA’s right to procedural fairness was not breached by the Agency. There are no grounds for a reviewing court to interfere with the Agency’s decision not to wait for VIA to produce the cost estimates that VIA had repeatedly and explicitly refused to provide. Acceding to VIA’s persistent requests, the Agency released its final decision. VIA had obviously made a tactical decision to deprive the Agency of information uniquely in VIA’s possession that would have made the evaluation more complete. Further, the Agency’s final decision did not order any remedial measures for which VIA had not previously been asked to prepare feasibility and cost estimates. Lastly, the fact that a third party commissioned by VIA to prepare a cost estimate did so in less than 40 days after the Agency’s final decision belies VIA’s position that it lacked the time, expertise and money to prepare cost estimates. The timing of the third‑party report and its untested conclusions — conclusions fundamentally at odds with some of the Agency’s binding factual findings — render it an inappropriate basis for interfering with those findings and the Agency’s remedial responses. [235] [238‑239] [242] [245]
Per Binnie, Deschamps, Fish and Rothstein JJ. (dissenting): When the relevant factors of the pragmatic and functional approach are properly considered, the standard of review applicable to the issues of the Agency’s jurisdiction to adjudicate CCD’s application and the Agency’s determination of the applicable human rights law principles in the federal transportation context is correctness. These issues are pure questions of law, and the Agency is not protected by a privative clause in respect of questions of law or jurisdiction. Rather, there is a statutory appeal procedure on such questions under s. 41(1) of the CTA . On questions of jurisdiction and the determination of the applicable human rights law principles, the Agency does not have greater relative expertise than a court. Nor do these questions involve a balancing of interests. [281‑286]
The Agency did not exceed its jurisdiction. Under s. 172(1) of the CTA , the Agency has jurisdiction where an application is made to it, and its inquiry is to be directed to determining whether there is an undue obstacle. There is nothing to prevent the Agency from initiating an inquiry based on an application from a public interest group as long as the alleged obstacle exists. Given that the Renaissance cars had already been acquired by VIA, the inquiry into alleged obstacles in those cars was not beyond the Agency’s jurisdiction. Further, the Agency did not lose jurisdiction when its inquiry extended past the 120‑day deadline provided for in s. 29(1) of the CTA . When applied to s. 172 proceedings, this deadline is directory, not mandatory. Lastly, while the Agency’s exercise of its regulatory power is subject to more stringent oversight than the exercise of its adjudicative power, the Agency is given broad and pervasive jurisdiction under Part V of the CTA . It may not have been Parliament’s expectation that broad inquiries would be conducted under s. 172 , but the words used do not preclude such adjudications, even though they might impose a significant burden on the carrier. [315] [317] [321] [323‑324]
Part V of the CTA , which grants the Agency jurisdiction to deal with undue obstacles to the mobility of persons with disabilities, must be reconciled with prevailing human rights principles. Applying those principles in the federal transportation context, the Agency is required, in adjudicating applications under s. 172 , to conduct an undueness analysis: (1) the applicant must satisfy the Agency of the existence of a prima facie obstacle to the mobility of persons with disabilities; and (2) the burden then shifts to the carrier to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that the obstacle is not undue because (i) it is rationally connected to a legitimate objective, (ii) the carrier has opted not to eliminate the obstacle based on an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary for the fulfilment of that legitimate objective, and (iii) not eliminating the obstacle is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of that legitimate objective. [291] [293] [297]
In this case, the Agency erred in law with respect to the test for determining the undueness of an obstacle. Although the Agency did discuss some of the principles in the abstract, its analysis reveals that most of the applicable principles were excluded from its reasoning. The Agency did not acknowledge that it was required to identify the goals pursued by VIA in purchasing the cars; nor did it state whether it accepted VIA’s argument and evidence that the acquisition of the cars was rationally connected to a legitimate purpose. VIA was attempting to operate within the subsidy allocated by the federal government for the purchase of rail cars. Efficiency and economic viability are objectives of the National Transportation Policy under s. 5 of the CTA and must be considered legitimate. Moreover, the acquisition of the Renaissance cars for $130 million was rationally connected to these objectives. The error at this stage was compounded at the second stage by the Agency’s failure to identify VIA’s motives and to assess the evidence relevant to good faith belief. At the third stage, the Agency did not consider how the obstacles might be circumvented by network alternatives that would accommodate persons with disabilities, but focussed only on the Renaissance cars themselves. The basis of the Agency’s rejection of the network as a reasonable alternative was the requirement that the Renaissance cars be accessible to persons using personal wheelchairs as provided for in the Rail Code. But the Rail Code and other voluntary codes of practice cannot be elevated to the status of laws as if they were legally binding regulations. In adopting the Rail Code and personal wheelchair accessibility standards as if they were regulatory requirements, the Agency failed to consider the full range of reasonable alternatives offered through the network and thereby erred in law. Furthermore, the third stage also requires the Agency to balance the significance of the obstacles for the mobility of persons with disabilities against other factors, such as structural constraints and the total estimated cost to remedy the obstacles, having regard to the objective of economic viability. Where cost constraints are at issue in an undueness analysis, it is an error of law for the Agency not to determine a total cost estimate for the corrective measures it orders. Although the Agency provided figures and calculations in respect of certain corrective measures, it never provided its best estimate of the total cost to VIA. Without a total cost estimate, the Agency could not conduct the undueness analysis required by s. 172 . The Agency was also dismissive in its consideration of VIA’s ability to fund the corrective measures, treating VIA’s resources as virtually unlimited. The Agency’s reasons do not demonstrate the attention that is required in a case where the cost of the measures is potentially very substantial. It is up to the Agency, on the basis of new evidence, to determine the cost of the corrective measures and VIA’s ability to fund them, and to carry out the balancing exercise required of it at the third stage of the undueness analysis. [327‑328] [337] [340‑344] [346] [351‑352] [354‑356] [359] [366]
Cases Cited
By Abella J.
Applied: British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3; approved: Canadian National Railway Co. v. Ferroequus Railway Co., [2002] F.C.J. No. 762 (QL), 2002 FCA 193; referred to: Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Canada (Transportation Agency), [2003] 4 F.C. 558, 2003 FCA 271; Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp., [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227; Pasiechnyk v. Saskatchewan (Workers’ Compensation Board), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 890; Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982; U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048; Barrie Public Utilities v. Canadian Cable Television Assn., [2003] 1 S.C.R. 476, 2003 SCC 28; Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, 2003 SCC 20; Canada (Attorney General) v. Public Service Alliance of Canada, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 941; Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, 2003 SCC 63; National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324; British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 868; Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 513, 2006 SCC 14; Winnipeg School Division No. 1 v. Craton, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 150; Commission scolaire régionale de Chambly v. Bergevin, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 525; Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624; Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114; Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970; Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489; Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Borough of Etobicoke, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 202; Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons‑Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536; Howard v. University of British Columbia (1993), 18 C.H.R.R. D/353; Brock v. Tarrant Film Factory Ltd. (2000), 37 C.H.R.R. D/305; Quesnel v. London Educational Health Centre (1995), 28 C.H.R.R. D/474; Maine Human Rights Commission v. City of South Portland, 508 A.2d 948 (1986); Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montréal (City), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 665, 2000 SCC 27; VIA Rail Canada Inc. v. National Transportation Agency, [2001] 2 F.C. 25; Application by Yvonne Gaudet, on behalf of Marcella Arsenault, CTA Decision No. 641‑AT‑R‑1998, December 29, 1998; Hutchinson v. British Columbia (Ministry of Health) (No. 4) (2004), 49 C.H.R.R. D/348, 2004 BCHRT 58; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817; Gateway Packers 1968 Ltd. v. Burlington Northern (Manitoba) Ltd., [1971] F.C. 359; Allied Auto Parts Ltd. v. Canadian Transport Commission, [1983] 2 F.C. 248.
By Deschamps and Rothstein JJ. (dissenting)
Canada (Deputy Minister of National Revenue) v. Mattel Canada Inc., [2001] 2 S.C.R. 100, 2001 SCC 36; Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, 2003 SCC 20; Mattel, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., [2006] 1 S.C.R. 772, 2006 SCC 22; Dr. Q v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226, 2003 SCC 19; VIA Rail Canada Inc. v. National Transportation Agency, [2001] 2 F.C. 25; Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748; Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84, 2002 SCC 3; British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3; British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 868; Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489; Commission scolaire régionale de Chambly v. Bergevin, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 525; Shell Canada Ltd. v. Canada, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 622; Canadian National Railway Co. v. Ferroequus Railway Co., [2002] F.C.J. No. 762 (QL), 2002 FCA 193; Ainsley Financial Corp. v. Ontario Securities Commission (1994), 21 O.R. (3d) 104.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12162 (2000).
Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for Transportation Vehicles, 36 CFR Part 1192 (1999).
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Transportation Vehicles; Final Guidelines, 56 Fed. Reg. 45530 (September 6, 1991).
Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10, ss. 5 , 17 , 20 , 25 , 25.1 , 27(1) , 28(2) , 29 , 31 , 32 , 33(1) , 36 , 40 , 41(1) , 170(1) , 171 , 172 .
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms .
Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H‑6, ss. 5 (a), 15 .
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (U.K.), 1995, c. 50, s. 46.
Disability Standards for Accessible Public Transport 2002 (Austl.).
Financial Administration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F‑11 .
National Transportation Act, 1987, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28 (3rd Supp.).
National Transportation Agency General Rules, SOR/88‑23, s. 8.
Rail Vehicle Accessibility Regulations 1998, S.I. 1998/2456.
Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002‑156, r. 29(3).
Authors Cited
Brown, Donald J. M., and John M. Evans. Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada. Toronto: Canvasback, 1998 (loose‑leaf updated July 2005).
Canada. House of Commons. House of Commons Debates, vol. VI, 2nd Sess., 33rd Parl., June 17, 1987, p. 7273.
Canada. House of Commons. House of Commons Debates, vol. XIII, 2nd Sess., 33rd Parl., June 17, 1988, p. 16573.
Canada. House of Commons. Report of the Standing Committee on Transport. The Renaissance of Passenger Rail in Canada, June 1998.
Canada. Transport Canada. Passenger Car Safety Rules, November 8, 2001 (online: http://www.tc.gc.ca/railway/rules/TC_0‑26.htm).
Canadian Standards Association. Barrier‑Free Design Standard, CAN/CSA‑B651‑95.
Jones, David P., and Anne S. de Villars. Principles of Administrative Law, 4th ed. Toronto: Thomson Canada Ltd., 2004.
Lepofsky, M. David. “Federal Court of Appeal De‑Rails Equality Rights for Persons With Disabilities — Via Rail v. Canadian Transportation Agency and the Important Duty Not to Create New Barriers to Accessibility” (2005‑2006), 18 N.J.C.L. 169.
Lepofsky, M. David. “The Duty to Accommodate: A Purposive Approach” (1993), 1 Can. Lab. L.J. 1.
McKenna, Ian B. “Legal Rights for Persons with Disabilities in Canada: Can the Impasse Be Resolved?” (1997‑98), 29 Ottawa L. Rev. 153.
Mullan, David. “Tribunals and Courts — The Contemporary Terrain: Lessons from Human Rights Regimes” (1999), 24 Queen’s L.J. 643.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal (Décary, Sexton and Evans JJ.A.), [2005] 4 F.C.R. 473, 251 D.L.R. (4th) 418, 330 N.R. 337, [2005] F.C.J. No. 376 (QL), 2005 FCA 79, setting aside decisions of the Canadian Transportation Agency. Appeal allowed, Binnie, Deschamps, Fish and Rothstein JJ. dissenting.
David Baker and Sarah Godwin, for the appellant.
John A. Campion, Robin P. Roddey, Annie M. K. Finn and Carole Mackaay, for the respondent.
Inge Green and Elizabeth Barker, for the intervener the Canadian Transportation Agency.
Leslie A. Reaume and Philippe Dufresne, for the intervener the Canadian Human Rights Commission.
Written submissions only by Hart Schwartz, Eric del Junco and Sylvia Davis, for the intervener the Ontario Human Rights Commission.
Written submissions only by Béatrice Vizkelety and Stéphanie Fournier, for the intervener Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse.
Written submissions only by Sarah Lugtig, for the interveners the Manitoba Human Rights Commission and the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission.
Written submissions only by Debra M. McAllister and Lana Kerzner, for the interveners Transportation Action Now, the Alliance for Equality of Blind Canadians, the Canadian Association for Community Living and the Canadian Hard of Hearing Association.
Written submissions only by David Shannon and Paul‑Claude Bérubé, for the intervener the Canadian Association of Independent Living Centres.
Written submissions only by Melina Buckley and Fiona Sampson, for the intervener the DisAbled Women’s Network Canada.
The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, LeBel, Abella and Charron JJ. was delivered by
1 Abella J. — This appeal raises questions about the degree to which persons who use wheelchairs can be self-reliant when using the national rail network.
2 Under the Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10 , it is declared to be “National Transportation Policy” that Canada’s transportation services be accessible to persons with disabilities. Responsibility for determining whether there is an “undue obstacle” to the mobility of persons with disabilities is assigned by the Act to the Canadian Transportation Agency. Where such obstacles are found to exist, the Agency is also responsible for determining what corrective measures are appropriate in accordance with the Act and human rights principles.
3 In 1998, VIA Rail Canada Inc. took part in the negotiation and drafting of a voluntary Rail Code. The Code stipulated that for new or substantially refurbished rail cars, at least one car on each train should be accessible to persons using their own wheelchairs.
4 To replace its existing fleet, in late 2000 VIA purchased 139 rail cars and car parts no longer required for overnight train service through the Channel Tunnel. These rail cars, known then as the “Nightstock” fleet, were renamed the “Renaissance cars” by VIA. None of the cars was accessible to persons with disabilities using personal wheelchairs.
5 In the course of the proceedings before the Agency lasting almost three years, and contrary to the Agency’s directions, VIA unilaterally made modifications to the new cars without the prior approval of the Agency. VIA was also repeatedly asked to provide cost estimates so that the Agency could assess whether the remedial measures it was considering were reasonable. VIA consistently took the position that it had neither the time nor the money to prepare extensive cost estimates, several times asking the Agency to make its decision without these estimates.
6 The Agency, persuaded by VIA to issue its final decision without further cost estimates, ordered changes to 30 of the 139 newly purchased cars so that one car per train would be accessible to persons with disabilities using their own wheelchairs.
7 Thirty-seven days after the Agency issued its final decision, VIA presented newly prepared cost estimates to the Federal Court of Appeal as part of its leave application. Because VIA chose not to provide this information to the Agency during the proceedings, these estimates were not assessed or verified.
8 The Agency, an expert and specialized body, carefully considered the evidence and the law before imposing a remedy that was consistent both with the Rail Code and internationally accepted standards. In determining whether the design of the Renaissance cars represented undue obstacles for persons with disabilities, the Agency took into account factors usually associated with an “undue hardship” analysis, such as cost, economic viability and safety. In so doing, the Agency was properly merging human rights principles with its unique statutory mandate. I would not interfere with its decision.
I. Background
9 VIA finalized the purchase of the Renaissance fleet on December 1, 2000 and accepted delivery in 2001. At the time VIA acquired the rights to them, the cars were in various stages of assembly: 64 cars were fully assembled, construction had started on another 24, and the remaining 51 were unassembled. VIA saw the Renaissance fleet as a unique opportunity to substantially increase the size of its fleet at a comparatively moderate cost. It paid $29.8 million to purchase the Renaissance equipment, initially expecting that it would cost an additional $100 million to prepare the equipment for service, making a total estimated cost of $129.8 million. At the time of the purchase, VIA’s capital expenditure budget was $401.9 million.
10 VIA’s anticipated costs included the cost of transporting the cars and parts to Canada, weatherproofing the cars, modifying brake and electrical systems, removing redundant component parts, and renovating interiors. The interior changes included expanding lounge facilities for passengers by removing interior offices, adding vending machines, decommissioning one washroom in the coach cars to create additional baggage storage space, installing computer receptacles and a coat valet in the first class (“VIA 1”) cars, adding refrigeration equipment to the service cars to provide the current level of VIA 1 service, and removing one seat in each coach car to install a coat valet. The total cost of the Renaissance cars grew to $139 million.
11 There was no “plan document” to enhance accessibility when the cars were purchased. VIA’s position was that the cars were sufficiently accessible. Instead of renovations that would enable passengers with personal wheelchairs to independently meet their own needs, VIA proposed that its employees would transfer passengers into on-board wheelchairs, deliver their meals, assist them with the use of washroom facilities, and provide other necessary services. VIA argued that its budget for the acquisition of the Renaissance cars did not provide “for any major redesign or reconstruction” to make the cars more accessible because any such substantial changes would have “diminished or negated the value of the opportunity”.
12 On November 16, 2000, government officials and members of groups representing persons with disabilities were permitted to inspect demonstration models of the Renaissance cars.
13 On December 4, 2000, the Council of Canadians with Disabilities (“CCD”) applied to the Agency under s. 172 of the Canada Transportation Act complaining about the lack of accessibility of the Renaissance cars. The relevant portions provide:
172. (1) The Agency may, on application, inquire into a matter in relation to which a regulation could be made under subsection 170(1) , regardless of whether such a regulation has been made, in order to determine whether there is an undue obstacle to the mobility of persons with disabilities.
. . .
(3) On determining that there is an undue obstacle to the mobility of persons with disabilities, the Agency may require the taking of appropriate corrective measures or direct that compensation be paid for any expense incurred by a person with a disability arising out of the undue obstacle, or both.
14 The Agency’s mandate to address undue obstacles to the mobility of persons with disabilities originates in s. 5 of the Canada Transportation Act , which states that this mandate is an essential element of transportation services:
national transportation policy
5. [Declaration] It is hereby declared that a safe, economic, efficient and adequate network of viable and effective transportation services accessible to persons with disabilities and that makes the best use of all available modes of transportation at the lowest total cost is essential to serve the transportation needs of shippers and travellers, including persons with disabilities, and to maintain the economic well-being and growth of Canada and its regions and that those objectives are more likely to be achieved when all carriers are able to compete, both within and among the various modes of transportation, under conditions ensuring that, having due regard to national policy, to the advantages of harmonized federal and provincial regulatory approaches and to legal and constitutional requirements,
. . .
(g) each carrier or mode of transportation, as far as is practicable, carries traffic to or from any point in Canada under fares, rates and conditions that do not constitute
. . .
(ii) an undue obstacle to the mobility of persons, including persons with disabilities,
. . .
15 Under Part V of the Canada Transportation Act , entitled “Transportation of Persons With Disabilities”, the Agency is granted two remedial approaches to the removal of “undue obstacles” from the federal transportation network — regulation-making powers under s. 170(1) and complaint adjudication powers under s. 172(1) .
16 Section 170(1) empowers the Agency to “make regulations for the purpose of eliminating undue obstacles in the transportation network”, including regulations respecting “the design, construction or modification of . . . means of transportation and related facilities and premises” and the “conditions of carriage applicable in respect of the transportation of persons with disabilities”. Under s. 172(1), the Agency
may, on application, inquire into a matter in relation to which a regulation could be made under subsection 170(1) , regardless of whether such a regulation has been made, in order to determine whether there is an undue obstacle to the mobility of persons with disabilities.
17 Where the Ag