Penner v. Niagara (Regional Police Services Board)

Penner v. Niagara (Regional Police Services Board)
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2013-04-05
Neutral citation
2013 SCC 19
Report
[2013] 2 SCR 125
Case number
33959
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; LeBel, Louis; Fish, Morris J.; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Rothstein, Marshall; Cromwell, Thomas Albert; Karakatsanis, Andromache
On appeal from
Ontario
Subjects
Civil procedure
Notes
SCC Case Information: 33959
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Penner v. Niagara (Regional Police Services Board), 2013 SCC 19, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 125
Date: 20130405
Docket: 33959
Between:
Wayne Penner
Appellant
and
Regional Municipality of Niagara Regional Police Services Board, Gary E. Nicholls, Nathan Parker, Paul Koscinski and Roy Federkow
Respondents
- and -
Attorney General of Ontario, Urban Alliance on Race Relations, Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario), British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, Canadian Police Association and Canadian Civil Liberties Association
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ.
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 72)
Dissenting Reasons:
(paras. 73 to 127)
Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. (McLachlin C.J. and Fish J. concurring)
LeBel and Abella JJ. (Rothstein J. concurring)
Penner v. Niagara (Regional Police Services Board), 2013 SCC 19, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 125
Wayne Penner Appellant
v.
Regional Municipality of Niagara Regional Police
Services Board, Gary E. Nicholls, Nathan Parker,
Paul Koscinski and Roy Federkow Respondents
and
Attorney General of Ontario, Urban Alliance on
Race Relations, Criminal Lawyers’ Association
(Ontario), British Columbia Civil Liberties Association,
Canadian Police Association and Canadian Civil
Liberties Association Interveners
Indexed as: Penner v. Niagara (Regional Police Services Board)
2013 SCC 19
File No.: 33959.
2012: January 11; 2013: April 5.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for ontario
Civil procedure — Issue estoppel — Administrative law — Police disciplinary proceedings — Complaint alleging police misconduct brought under Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15 (“PSA”) — Civil action for damages arising from same incident also commenced — PSA hearing officer finding no misconduct and dismissing complaint — Motion judge and Court of Appeal exercising discretion to apply issue estoppel to bar civil claims on basis of hearing officer’s decision — Whether public policy rule precluding applicability of issue estoppel to police disciplinary hearings should be created — Whether unfairness arises from application of issue estoppel in this case.
P was arrested for disruptive behaviour in an Ontario courtroom. He filed a complaint against two police officers under the Police Services Act (“PSA”), alleging unlawful arrest and unnecessary use of force. He also started a civil action claiming damages arising out of the same incident. The hearing officer appointed by the Chief of Police under the PSA found the police officers not guilty of misconduct and dismissed the complaint. That decision was reversed on appeal by the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services on the basis that the arrest was unlawful. On further appeal, the Ontario Divisional Court concluded that the officers had legal authority to make the arrest and restored the hearing officer’s decision. The police respondents then successfully moved in the Superior Court of Justice to have many of the claims in the civil action struck on the basis of issue estoppel. While finding several factors weighed against the application of issue estoppel, the Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that applying the doctrine would not work an injustice in this case and dismissed P’s appeal.
Held (LeBel, Abella and Rothstein JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Fish, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ.: It is neither necessary nor desirable to create a rule of public policy excluding police disciplinary hearings from the application of issue estoppel. The doctrine of issue estoppel allows for the exercise of discretion to ensure that no injustice results; it calls for a case‑by‑case review of the circumstances to determine whether its application would be unfair or unjust even where, as here, the preconditions for its application have been met. There is no reason to depart from that approach. However, in the circumstances of this case, it was unfair to P to apply issue estoppel to bar his civil action on the basis of the hearing officer’s decision. The Court of Appeal erred in its analysis of the significant differences between the purpose and scope of the two proceedings, and failed to consider the reasonable expectations of the parties about the impact of the proceedings on their broader legal rights.
The legal framework governing the exercise of the discretion not to apply issue estoppel is set out in Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 2001 SCC 44, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460. This framework has not been overtaken by this Court’s subsequent jurisprudence. While finality is important both to the parties and to the judicial system, unfairness in applying issue estoppel may nonetheless arise. First, the prior proceedings may have been unfair. Second, even where the prior proceedings were conducted fairly, it may be unfair to use the results of that process to preclude the subsequent claim, for example, where there is a significant difference between the purposes, processes or stakes involved in the two proceedings. The text and purpose of the legislative scheme shape the parties’ reasonable expectations in relation to the scope and effect of the administrative proceedings. They guide how and to what extent the parties participate in the process. Where the legislative scheme contemplates multiple proceedings and the purposes of those proceedings are widely divergent, the application of the doctrine might not only upset the parties’ legitimate and reasonable expectations but may also undermine the efficacy and policy goals of the administrative proceedings, by either encouraging more formality and protraction or discouraging access to the administrative proceedings altogether. These considerations are also relevant to weighing the procedural safeguards available to the parties. A decision whether to take advantage of those procedural protections available in the prior proceeding cannot be divorced from the party’s reasonable expectations about what is at stake in those proceedings or the fundamentally different purposes between them. The connections between the relevant considerations must be viewed as a whole.
In this case, the disciplinary hearing was itself fair and P participated in a meaningful way; however, the Court of Appeal failed to fully analyze the fairness of using the results of that process to preclude P’s civil action. Nothing in the legislative text gives rise to an expectation that the disciplinary hearing would be conclusive of P’s legal rights in his civil action: the standards of proof required, and the purposes of the two proceedings, are significantly different; and, unlike a civil action, the disciplinary process provides no remedy or costs for the complainant. Another important policy consideration arises in this case: the risk of adding to the complexity and length of administrative proceedings by attaching undue weight to their results through applying issue estoppel. P could have participated more fully by hiring counsel, however that would also have meant that the officers would effectively have been forced to face two prosecutors rather than one. This would enhance neither the efficacy nor the fairness to the officers in a disciplinary hearing and potential complainants may not come forward with public complaints in order to avoid prejudicing their civil actions. These are important considerations and the Court of Appeal did not take them into account in assessing the weight of other factors, such as P’s status as a party and the procedural protections afforded by the administrative process. Finally, the application of issue estoppel had the effect of using the decision of the Chief of Police’s designate to exonerate the Chief in the civil claim and is therefore a serious affront to basic principles of fairness.
Per LeBel, Abella and Rothstein JJ. (dissenting): The doctrine of issue estoppel seeks to protect the finality of litigation by precluding the relitigation of issues that have been conclusively determined in a prior proceeding. The finality of litigation is a fundamental principle assuring the fairness and efficacy of the justice system in Canada. The doctrine of issue estoppel seeks to protect the reasonable expectation of litigants that they can rely on the outcome of a decision made by an authoritative adjudicator, regardless of whether that decision was made in the context of a court or an administrative proceeding. In applying issue estoppel in the context of administrative adjudicative bodies, differences in the process or procedures used by the administrative tribunal, including procedures that do not mirror traditional court procedures, should not be used as an excuse to override the principle of finality. The purposes and procedures may vary, but the principle of finality should be maintained.
The applicable approach to issue estoppel in the context of prior administrative proceedings was most recently articulated by this Court in 2011 in British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Figliola, 2011 SCC 52, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 422. This is the precedent that governs the application of the doctrine in this case. The key relevant aspect of this precedent is that it moved away from the approach to issue estoppel taken in Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 2001 SCC 44, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460, which had held that a different and far wider discretion should apply in the context of administrative tribunals than the “very limited” discretion applied to courts.
The twin principles which underlie the doctrine of issue estoppel — that there should be an end to litigation and that the same party shall not be harassed twice for the same cause — are core principles which focus on achieving fairness and preventing injustice by preserving the finality of litigation. The ultimate goal of issue estoppel is to protect the fairness of finality in decision‑making and the avoidance of the relitigation of issues already decided by a decision‑maker with the authority to resolve them. As the Court said in Figliola, this is the case whether we are dealing with courts or administrative tribunals. An approach that fails to safeguard the finality of litigation undermines these principles and risks uniquely transforming issue estoppel in the case of administrative tribunals into a free‑floating inquiry. This revives the Danyluk approach that the Court refused to apply in Figliola.
This Court’s recent affirmation of the principle of finality underlying issue estoppel in Figliola is also crucial to preserving the principles underlying our modern approach to administrative law. The Court’s residual discretion to refuse to apply issue estoppel should not be used to impose a particular model of adjudication in a manner inconsistent with the principles of deference that lie at the core of administrative law. Where an adjudicative tribunal has the authority to make a decision, it would run counter to the principles of deference to uniquely broaden the court’s discretion in a way that would, in most cases, permit an unsuccessful party to circumvent judicial review and turn instead to the courts for a re‑adjudication of the merits.
Under the principles set out in Figliola, issue estoppel should apply. The difference between the standard of proof required to establish misconduct under the PSA and that required in a civil trial is irrelevant in this case. The hearing officer made unequivocal findings that there was virtually no evidence to support P’s claims. That means that there is simply no evidence to support P’s claims whatever standard of proof is applied. P should not be allowed to circumvent the clear findings of the hearing officer and put the parties through a duplicative proceeding which would inevitably yield the same result.
The disciplinary hearing conducted by the hearing officer was conducted in accordance with the requirements prescribed by the statute and principles of procedural fairness. The hearing officer’s decision was made in circumstances in which P knew the case he had to meet, had a full opportunity to meet it, and lost. Had he won, the hearing officer’s decision would have been no less binding and the application of issue estoppel would have assisted him in a subsequent civil action for damages by relieving him of having to prove liability.
Preventing the courts from applying issue estoppel in the context of these disciplinary proceedings means that decisions would not be final or binding and would be open to relitigation and potentially inconsistent results. This would undermine public confidence in the reliability of the complaints process and in the integrity of the administrative decision‑making process more broadly.
Nor does the method used to appoint an adjudicator in this case provide a basis for exercising the discretion in a way that precludes the application of issue estoppel. The Chief of Police designated an outside prosecutor and an independent adjudicator. Similar methods of appointment are quite common in other parts of the law and are not seen as an obstacle to independent adjudication. Tenure is not the sole marker and condition of adjudicative independence.
Cases Cited
By Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ.
Applied: Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 2001 SCC 44, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460; referred to: Parker v. Niagara Regional Police Service (2008), 232 O.A.C. 317; Elsom v. Elsom, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1367; Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3; Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77; Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190; Sharma v. Waterloo Regional Police Service (2006), 213 O.A.C. 371; Minott v. O’Shanter Development Co. (1999), 42 O.R. (3d) 321; Schweneke v. Ontario (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 97; British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Bugbusters Pest Management Inc. (1998), 50 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1; Burchill v. Yukon (Commissioner), 2002 YKCA 4 (CanLII); Porter v. York (Regional Municipality) Police, [2001] O.J. No. 5970 (QL).
By LeBel and Abella JJ. (dissenting)
British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Figliola, 2011 SCC 52, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 422; Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 2001 SCC 44, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460; Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190; Smith v. Alliance Pipeline Ltd., 2011 SCC 7, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 160; Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 53, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 471; Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd. (No. 2), [1967] 1 A.C. 853; Parker v. Niagara Regional Police Service (2008), 232 O.A.C. 317; EnerNorth Industries Inc., Re, 2009 ONCA 536, 96 O.R. (3d) 1; Tsaoussis (Litigation Guardian of) v. Baetz (1998), 41 O.R. (3d) 257, leave to appeal refused, [1999] 1 S.C.R. xiv; Revane v. Homersham, 2006 BCCA 8, 53 B.C.L.R. (4th) 76; Angle v. Minister of National Revenue, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 248; Boucher v. Stelco Inc., 2005 SCC 64, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 279; Rasanen v. Rosemount Instruments Ltd. (1994), 17 O.R. (3d) 267; Schweneke v. Ontario (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 97; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708; Wong v. Shell Canada Ltd. (1995), 174 A.R. 287, leave to appeal refused, [1996] 3 S.C.R. xiv; Porter v. York (Regional Municipality) Police, [2001] O.J. No. 5970 (QL).
Statutes and Regulations Cited
O. Reg. 123/98, Part V, Sch., s. 2(1)(g)(i), (ii).
Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15, Part II, Part V, ss. 56, 57, 60(4), 64(1), (7) to (10), 68(1), (5), 69(3), (4), (7), (8), (9), 70(1), 71(1), 76, 80, 83(7), (8), 95.
Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33.
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 21.01.
Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, ss. 10, 10.1.
Authors Cited
Handley, K. R. Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata, 4th ed. London: LexisNexis, 2009.
Lange, Donald J. The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 3rd ed. Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Canada, 2010.
LeSage, Patrick J. Report on the Police Complaints System in Ontario. Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 2005.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (Laskin, Moldaver and Armstrong JJ.A.), 2010 ONCA 616, 102 O.R. (3d) 688, 267 O.A.C. 259, 325 D.L.R. (4th) 488, 94 C.P.C. (6th) 262, [2010] O.J. No. 4046 (QL), 2010 CarswellOnt 7164, affirming a decision of Fedak J., 2009 CarswellOnt 9420. Appeal allowed, LeBel, Abella and Rothstein JJ. dissenting.
Julian N. Falconer, Julian K. Roy and Sunil S. Mathai, for the appellant.
Eugene G. Mazzuca, Kerry Nash and Rafal Szymanski, for the respondents.
Malliha Wilson, Dennis W. Brown, Q.C., and Christopher P. Thompson, for the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario.
Maureen Whelton and Richard Macklin, for the intervener the Urban Alliance on Race Relations.
Louis Sokolov and Daniel Iny, for the intervener the Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario).
Robert D. Holmes, Q.C., for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.
Ian J. Roland and Michael Fenrick, for the intervener the Canadian Police Association.
Tim Gleason and Sean Dewart, for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Fish, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. was delivered by
[1] Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. — This appeal focuses on the discretionary application of issue estoppel. More particularly, the question is whether the Ontario courts erred by striking many of the claims in the appellant’s civil action against the police on the basis that his complaint of police misconduct arising out of the same facts had been dismissed by a police disciplinary tribunal.
[2] The appellant, Wayne Penner, was arrested for disruptive behaviour in an Ontario courtroom. He filed a complaint against two police officers under the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15 (“PSA”), alleging unlawful arrest and use of unnecessary force. He also started a civil action against the court security officer, the two police officers, their chief of police, and the Regional Municipality of Niagara Regional Police Services Board (“Police Services Board”) in the Superior Court of Justice, claiming damages arising out of the same incident.
[3] Mr. Penner’s complaint under the PSA was referred by the Chief of Police to a disciplinary hearing presided over by a retired police superintendent. The police officers were found not guilty of misconduct. Mr. Penner was a party to the disciplinary hearing and the subsequent appeals to the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services (“Commission”) and the Divisional Court.
[4] The respondents applied to have the civil action dismissed on the basis of issue estoppel because, in their view, the disciplinary hearing had finally resolved the key issues underpinning Mr. Penner’s civil claims.
[5] Many of Mr. Penner’s civil claims were struck on the basis of issue estoppel. The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge, and determined that the application of issue estoppel would not work an injustice in this case.
[6] On appeal to this Court, the appellant did not seriously challenge that the preconditions of issue estoppel had been met. The issue is whether the Court of Appeal erred in exercising its discretion to apply issue estoppel to bar Mr. Penner’s civil claims. Mr. Penner contends that the application of issue estoppel in this context would work an injustice or unfairness because of the public interest in promoting police accountability. He submits that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution and of individual rights and freedoms, must oversee the exercise of police powers: the importance of this judicial oversight requires that issue estoppel not apply to a disciplinary hearing decision under the PSA.
[7] The respondents reply that this case turns upon its own exceptional circumstances, that the civil suit represents a collateral attack on the final decision of the complaints process, and that the courts below were right to apply issue estoppel in order to preclude relitigation of the same issues finally decided in the disciplinary proceedings.
[8] We conclude that there is not and should not be a rule of public policy precluding the applicability of issue estoppel to police disciplinary hearings based upon judicial oversight of police accountability. The flexible approach to issue estoppel provides the court with the discretion to refuse to apply issue estoppel if it will work an injustice, even where the preconditions for its application have been met. However, in our respectful view, the Court of Appeal erred in its analysis of the significant differences between the purpose and scope of the two proceedings, and failed to consider the reasonable expectations of the parties about the impact of the proceedings on their broader legal rights. Further, it is unfair to use the decision of the Chief of Police’s designate to exonerate the Chief in a subsequent civil action. In the circumstances of this case, it was unfair to the appellant to apply issue estoppel to bar his civil action. We would allow the appeal.
I. Background
[9] In January 2003, Mr. Penner was sitting in a Provincial Offences Court while his wife was on trial for a traffic ticket issued by Constable Nathan Parker. It was alleged that Mr. Penner disrupted the proceedings, refused to stop interrupting and to leave when asked to do so, and resisted arrest by Constable Nathan Parker. Constables Parker and Koscinski used force to remove him from the courtroom. Once outside the courtroom, they again used force and handcuffed him. Handcuffed, Mr. Penner was then taken to the Niagara Regional Police station by Constable Parker, where he was strip-searched and put into a holding cell. He sustained a black eye, numerous scrapes, a bruised knee, and a sore wrist, elbow and sore ribs. Mr. Penner was escorted by police to a hospital where he was examined and treated for injuries he had sustained during the arrest. Mr. Penner was subsequently returned to the police station and charged with causing a disturbance, breach of probation and resisting arrest. All charges were withdrawn by the Crown some five months later, in June 2003.
[10] After his arrest, Mr. Penner filed a public complaint under ss. 56 and 57 of the PSA against Constables Parker and Koscinski, alleging unlawful or unnecessary arrest, as well as use of unnecessary force. This led to a disciplinary hearing for both police officers. In addition, in July 2003, Mr. Penner filed a statement of claim in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in relation to the same arrest, by which a civil action was commenced against the Police Services Board, Constables Parker and Koscinski, the Chief of Police and the Court Security Officer. Mr. Penner claimed damages for unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, use of unnecessary force during and after the arrest, an unnecessary strip-search, failure on the part of other officers to prevent his mistreatment, failure to provide timely medical assistance, improper use of handcuffs, malicious prosecution and failure to co-operate with the investigation of his allegations.
II. Summary of the Complaint Proceedings
A. Disciplinary Hearing Under the PSA (Decision of Superintendent R. J. Fitches, Dated June 28, 2004; A.R., at pp. 99-116)
[11] Under the PSA, a complaint is referred to the chief of police: s. 60(4). (All statutory references are to the legislation as it existed at the relevant time.) The chief is obliged to have the complaint investigated (with some exceptions not relevant here) and, in light of the results, to order a hearing into the matter if he or she is of the opinion that the officer’s conduct could constitute misconduct: s. 64(1) and (7). If a hearing is ordered, it is conducted by the chief or a designate on his or her behalf: ss. 64(7) and 76. The chief also appoints the prosecutor: s. 64(8). The complainant is made a party by statute and has participatory rights (s. 69(3) and (4); Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, ss. 10 and 10.1), but no access to discovery or production of documents beyond what the prosecution relies on, and there is no right to compel the officer in question to testify: PSA, s. 69(7). The issue at the hearing is whether the alleged misconduct has been “proved on clear and convincing evidence” (s. 64(10)) and, if so, what penalty is to be imposed on the officer under s. 68(1) and (5). No remedy or costs may be awarded to the complainant.
[12] Here, disciplinary charges of unnecessary and unlawful arrest and use of unnecessary force were laid against two police officers: O. Reg. 123/98, Part V, Sch., Code of Conduct, s. 2(1)(g)(i) and (ii). The Chief appointed a retired police superintendent of the Ontario Provincial Police to conduct the hearing on his behalf. The hearing took place over the course of several days in 2004. Mr. Penner represented himself. As the complainant, he led evidence, cross-examined witnesses and made submissions. Several individuals who were present in the courtroom at the time of Mr. Penner’s arrest gave evidence before the hearing officer at the disciplinary hearing: the prosecutor, clerk of the court, court security officer, two lay people awaiting their own respective trials, Mr. Penner, his wife, and Constables Parker and Koscinski.
[13] The hearing officer rejected much of the Penners’ testimony. Instead, he relied primarily on the testimony of other witnesses regarding the events surrounding Mr. Penner’s arrest and concluded that Constables Parker and Koscinski had reasonable grounds to arrest Mr. Penner for causing a disturbance in a public place. On the issue of whether the officers had the lawful authority to make an arrest in a courtroom under the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, while a Justice of the Peace was presiding, the hearing officer concluded that the prosecutor had failed to provide sufficient evidence to show, “in any clear and cogent way, that Mr. Penner’s arrest was not authorized by statute”: p. xiii (A.R., at p. 111). The hearing officer therefore dismissed the allegation of unlawful arrest and found the constables not guilty of misconduct on this count.
[14] Turning to the allegation of unnecessary use of force, the hearing officer found that the Constables used a level of force that was necessary to gain control over Mr. Penner. Relying upon his review of the video record at the police station, he found that there was “no clear, convincing, or cogent evidence whatsoever” of unnecessary force there either: p. xvi (A.R., at p. 114).
B. Appeal Before the Commission (Decision Dated April 22, 2005; A.R., at pp. 117-30)
[15] As a party to the disciplinary hearing, Mr. Penner appealed the decision of the hearing officer to the Commission pursuant to s. 70(1) of the PSA. He took the position before the Commission that there were no legal grounds for his arrest.
[16] The Commission concluded that the arrest in the courtroom was unlawful because the Justice of the Peace gave no direction to the Constables to arrest Mr. Penner. The Commission was satisfied that there was clear and convincing evidence that Constables Parker and Koscinski were guilty of misconduct due to an unlawful and unnecessary arrest, and thus any force used was unjustified and unnecessary.
C. Appeal Before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice — Divisional Court (Parker v. Niagara Regional Police Service (2008), 232 O.A.C. 317)
[17] On a further appeal by the constables pursuant to s. 71(1) of the PSA, the Divisional Court held that the Commission unreasonably ignored findings of fact made by the hearing officer, and that the Commission was not justified in substituting their own findings. The Divisional Court concluded that the officers had legal authority to make the arrest and restored the hearing officer’s finding that the constables were not guilty of misconduct.
III. History of the Civil Action
[18] Mr. Penner initiated a civil action in July 2003 based on the same events that formed the subject matter of the disciplinary hearing, alleging, among other things, unlawful arrest and use of excessive force. After the decision from the disciplinary hearing was reinstated by the Divisional Court in January 2008, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss the civil action on the basis of issue estoppel.
A. Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Fedak J.; 2009 CarswellOnt 9420)
[19] The motion judge concluded that Mr. Penner was estopped from bringing these claims. Mr. Penner’s civil action raised, among others, the same two questions that were already decided by the disciplinary hearing and restated by the Divisional Court: (1) was the arrest lawful? and (2) was unnecessary force used, either at the court or at the police station? The judge applied the test outlined in Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 2001 SCC 44, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460, and concluded that the three preconditions for issue estoppel had been met.
[20] First, the hearing officer’s decision was judicial and the hearing fulfilled the requirements of procedural fairness because Mr. Penner made the complaint, appeared before the decision maker, led evidence, examined witnesses and made written submissions. Second, the decision was final. And third, the same parties to the civil action were also engaged in the disciplinary hearing.
[21] As to the second part of the Danyluk test, the motion judge stated that there were no grounds to exercise his discretion to not apply issue estoppel.
[22] We are assuming but not deciding that the decision of the hearing officer was admissible before the motion judge for the purpose of considering issue estoppel. This issue was not addressed in the decisions below. Given our disposition, it is not necessary to decide the issue.
B. Ontario Court of Appeal (Laskin J.A., Moldaver and Armstrong JJ.A. Concurring; 2010 ONCA 616, 102 O.R. (3d) 688)
[23] The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the three preconditions for issue estoppel had been met. However, the Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in failing to explain why there were no grounds to exercise his discretion to not apply issue estoppel. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal considered whether it would be unfair or unjust to apply issue estoppel despite the satisfaction of the three preconditions.
[24] The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the different purposes of the disciplinary hearing and the civil action weighed against the application of issue estoppel. The Court of Appeal concluded that the legislature did not intend to preclude Mr. Penner’s civil action simply because he filed a public complaint under the PSA: para. 42. Further, the Court of Appeal considered that Mr. Penner had no financial stake in the disciplinary hearing (as the statute does not provide for compensation to a public complainant affected by police misconduct), although the strength of that factor was diminished, in its view, by the potential benefit to Mr. Penner had there been a finding of misconduct. Despite these factors weighing against the application of issue estoppel, the Court of Appeal concluded that they were not determinative considerations in the discretionary analysis.
[25] The Court of Appeal ultimately concluded that applying issue estoppel would not work an injustice and decided against exercising its discretion to not apply the doctrine based on the following factors:
• on issues of reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, as well as the use of excessive force during arrest, the hearing officer had as much expertise as a court (para. 45);
• the disciplinary hearing had “all the hallmarks of an ordinary civil trial”, and, in this case, the different standards of proof in police disciplinary hearings and in civil actions are immaterial (paras. 48-51);
• Mr. Penner actively participated in the disciplinary hearing (para. 52); and
• the PSA provides an aggrieved party with the right to appeal to the Commission, a right which Mr. Penner exercised (para. 53).
[26] Accordingly, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
IV. Standard of Review
[27] A discretionary decision of a lower court will be reversible where that court misdirected itself or came to a decision that is so clearly wrong that it amounts to an injustice: Elsom v. Elsom, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1367, at p. 1375. Reversing a lower court’s discretionary decision is also appropriate where the lower court gives no or insufficient weight to relevant considerations: Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3, at pp. 76-77.
V. Analysis
A. Issue Estoppel: The Legal Framework
[28] Relitigation of an issue wastes resources, makes it risky for parties to rely on the results of their prior litigation, unfairly exposes parties to additional costs, raises the spectre of inconsistent adjudicative determinations and, where the initial decision maker is in the administrative law field, may undermine the legislature’s intent in setting up the administrative scheme. For these reasons, the law has adopted a number of doctrines to limit relitigation.
[29] The one relevant on this appeal is the doctrine of issue estoppel. It balances judicial finality and economy and other considerations of fairness to the parties. It holds that a party may not relitigate an issue that was finally decided in prior judicial proceedings between the same parties or those who stand in their place. However, even if these elements are present, the court retains discretion to not apply issue estoppel when its application would work an injustice.
[30] The principle underpinning this discretion is that “[a] judicial doctrine developed to serve the ends of justice should not be applied mechanically to work an injustice”: Danyluk, at para. 1; see also Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, at paras. 52-53.
[31] Issue estoppel, with its residual discretion, applies to administrative tribunal decisions. The legal framework governing the exercise of this discretion is set out in Danyluk. In our view, this framework has not been overtaken by this Court’s subsequent jurisprudence. The discretion requires the courts to take into account the range and diversity of structures, mandates and procedures of administrative decision makers; however, the discretion must not be exercised so as to, in effect, sanction collateral attack, or to undermine the integrity of the administrative scheme. As highlighted in this Court’s jurisprudence, particularly since Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, legislation establishing administrative tribunals reflects the policy choices of the legislators and administrative decision making must be treated with respect by the courts. However, as this Court said in Danyluk, at para. 67: “The objective is to ensure that the operation of issue estoppel promotes the orderly administration of justice but not at the cost of real injustice in the particular case.”
B. No Public Policy Rule Precluding Issue Estoppel With Respect to Police Disciplinary Hearings
[32] The Ontario Court of Appeal applied a conventional analysis of issue estoppel, analyzing the various factors identified in Danyluk. Mr. Penner and a number of interveners ask this Court, as a matter of public policy, to prohibit the application of issue estoppel to findings made in a police disciplinary hearing if it prevents a complainant from accessing the courts for damages on the same claims. They submit that the application of issue estoppel to police disciplinary hearings usurps the role of the courts as guardians of the Constitution and the rule of law, and that public policy requires that police accountability be subject to judicial oversight. These submissions were raised overtly for the first time before this Court.
[33] Police oversight is a complex issue that attracts intense public attention and differing public policy responses. Over time, legislative frameworks have been revised with the stated goals of promoting efficient police services and increasing the transparency and accountability of the public complaints process. In a 2006 case, the Ontario Divisional Court concluded that the legislature allowed for “institutional bias” in the manner of appointing a hearing officer under s. 76(1) of the PSA: Sharma v. Waterloo Regional Police Service (2006), 213 O.A.C. 371, at para. 27. The parties in this case do not contest that this is a legitimate exercise of the legislature’s authority, and the Divisional Court in Sharma, at para. 28, concluded that the ability to appoint “retired police officers not associated with this force is capable of founding such independence as necessary”. See also the Honourable Patrick J. LeSage, Report on the Police Complaints System in Ontario (2005), at pp. 77-78.
[34] The public complaints process incorporates a number of features to enhance public participation and accountability. For instance, pursuant to Part II of the PSA, the Commission, as an agency comprised of civilian members, provides independent oversight of police services in Ontario to ensure fairness and accountability to the public. Part V sets out a comprehensive public complaints process by which members of the public can file official complaints against policies or services. Judicial oversight of disciplinary hearings under the PSA is available by statutory right of appeal to the Commission and then to the Divisional Court: see ss. 70(1) and 71(1).
[35] We are not persuaded that it is either necessary or desirable to create a rule of public policy excluding police disciplinary hearings from the application of issue estoppel. The doctrine of issue estoppel allows for the exercise of discretion to ensure that no injustice results; it calls for a case-by-case review of the circumstances to determine whether its application would be unfair or unjust.
C. Discretionary Application of Issue Estoppel
(1) Approach to the Exercise of Discretion
[36] We agree with the decisions of the courts below that all three preconditions for issue estoppel are established in this case. Thus, this case turns upon the Court of Appeal’s exercise of discretion in determining whether it would be unjust to apply the doctrine of issue estoppel in this case.
[37] This Court in Danyluk, at paras. 68-80, recognized several factors identified by Laskin J.A. in Minott v. O’Shanter Development Co. (1999), 42 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.), that are relevant to the discretionary analysis in the context of a prior administrative tribunal proceeding.
[38] The list of factors in Danyluk merely indicates some circumstances that may be relevant in a particular case to determine whether, on the whole, it is fair to apply issue estoppel. The list is not exhaustive. It is neither a checklist nor an invitation to engage in a mechanical analysis.
[39] Broadly speaking, the factors identified in the jurisprudence illustrate that unfairness may arise in two main ways which overlap and are not mutually exclusive. First, the unfairness of applying issue estoppel may arise from the unfairness of the prior proceedings. Second, even where the prior proceedings were conducted fairly and properly having regard to their purposes, it may nonetheless be unfair to use the results of that process to preclude the subsequent claim.
(a) Fairness of the P