Delgamuukw v. British Columbia

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
1997-12-11
Report
[1997] 3 SCR 1010
Case number
23799
Judges
Lamer, Antonio; La Forest, Gérard V.; L'Heureux-Dubé, Claire; Sopinka, John; Cory, Peter deCarteret; McLachlin, Beverley; Major, John C.
On appeal from
British Columbia
Subjects
Constitutional law
Courts
Notes
SCC Case Information: 23799
Decision Content
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010
Delgamuukw, also known as Earl Muldoe, suing on his own behalf
and on behalf of all the members of the Houses of Delgamuukw and
Haaxw (and others suing on their own behalf and on behalf
of thirty‑eight Gitksan Houses and twelve
Wet’suwet’en Houses as shown in Schedule 1) Appellants/ Respondents on the cross‑appeal
v.
Her Majesty The Queen in Right of
the Province of British Columbia Respondent/ Appellant on the cross‑appeal
and
The Attorney General of Canada Respondent
and
The First Nations Summit,
the Musqueam Nation et al. (as shown in Schedule 2),
the Westbank First Nation,
the B.C. Cattlemen’s Association et al. (as shown in Schedule 3),
Skeena Cellulose Inc.,
Alcan Aluminum Ltd. Interveners
Indexed as: Delgamuukw v. British Columbia
File No.: 23799.
1997: June 16, 17; 1997: December 11.
Present: Lamer C.J. and La Forest, L’Heureux‑Dubé, Sopinka,* Cory, McLachlin and Major JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for british columbia
Constitutional law ‑‑ Aboriginal rights ‑‑ Aboriginal land title ‑‑ Claim made for large tract ‑‑ Content of aboriginal title ‑‑ How aboriginal title protected by s. 35(1) of Constitution Act, 1982 ‑‑ What required to prove aboriginal title ‑‑ Whether claim to self‑government made out ‑‑ Whether province could extinguish aboriginal rights after 1871, either under own jurisdiction or through the operation of s. 88 of the Indian Act (incorporating provincial laws of general application by reference) ‑‑ Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35(1) ‑‑ Indian Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I‑5, s. 88 .
Constitutional law ‑‑ Aboriginal rights ‑‑ Aboriginal land title ‑‑ Evidence ‑‑ Oral history and native law and tradition ‑‑ Weight to be given evidence ‑‑ Ability of Court to interfere with trial judge’s factual findings.
Courts ‑‑ Procedure ‑‑ Land claims ‑‑ Aboriginal title and self‑government ‑‑ Claim altered but no formal amendments to pleadings made ‑‑ Whether pleadings precluded the Court from entertaining claims.
The appellants, all Gitksan or Wet’suwet’en hereditary chiefs, both individually and on behalf of their “Houses”, claimed separate portions of 58,000 square kilometres in British Columbia. For the purpose of the claim, this area was divided into 133 individual territories, claimed by the 71 Houses. This represents all of the Wet’suwet’en people, and all but 12 of the Gitksan Houses. Their claim was originally for “ownership” of the territory and “jurisdiction” over it. (At this Court, this was transformed into, primarily, a claim for aboriginal title over the land in question.) British Columbia counterclaimed for a declaration that the appellants have no right or interest in and to the territory or alternatively, that the appellants’ cause of action ought to be for compensation from the Government of Canada.
At trial, the appellants’ claim was based on their historical use and “ownership” of one or more of the territories. In addition, the Gitksan Houses have an “adaawk” which is a collection of sacred oral tradition about their ancestors, histories and territories. The Wet’suwet’en each have a “kungax” which is a spiritual song or dance or performance which ties them to their land. Both of these were entered as evidence on behalf of the appellants. The most significant evidence of spiritual connection between the Houses and their territory was a feast hall where the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en people tell and retell their stories and identify their territories to remind themselves of the sacred connection that they have with their lands. The feast has a ceremonial purpose but is also used for making important decisions.
The trial judge did not accept the appellants’ evidence of oral history of attachment to the land. He dismissed the action against Canada, dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for ownership and jurisdiction and for aboriginal rights in the territory, granted a declaration that the plaintiffs were entitled to use unoccupied or vacant land subject to the general law of the province, dismissed the claim for damages and dismissed the province’s counterclaim. No order for costs was made. On appeal, the original claim was altered in two different ways. First, the claims for ownership and jurisdiction were replaced with claims for aboriginal title and self‑government, respectively. Second, the individual claims by each House were amalgamated into two communal claims, one advanced on behalf of each nation. There were no formal amendments to the pleadings to this effect. The appeal was dismissed by a majority of the Court of Appeal.
The principal issues on the appeal, some of which raised a number of sub‑issues, were as follows: (1) whether the pleadings precluded the Court from entertaining claims for aboriginal title and self‑government; (2) what was the ability of this Court to interfere with the factual findings made by the trial judge; (3) what is the content of aboriginal title, how is it protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 , and what is required for its proof; (4) whether the appellants made out a claim to self‑government; and, (5) whether the province had the power to extinguish aboriginal rights after 1871, either under its own jurisdiction or through the operation of s. 88 of the Indian Act .
Held: The appeal should be allowed in part and the cross‑appeal should be dismissed.
Whether the Claims Were Properly Before the Court
Per Lamer C.J. and Cory, McLachlin, and Major JJ.: The claims were properly before the Court. Although the pleadings were not formally amended, the trial judge did allow a de facto amendment to permit a claim for aboriginal rights other than ownership and jurisdiction. The respondents did not appeal this de facto amendment and the trial judge’s decision on this point must accordingly stand.
No amendment was made with respect to the amalgamation of the individual claims brought by the individual Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en Houses into two collective claims, one by each nation, for aboriginal title and self‑government. The collective claims were simply not in issue at trial and to frame the case on appeal in a different manner would retroactively deny the respondents the opportunity to know the appellants’ case.
A new trial is necessary. First, the defect in the pleadings prevented the Court from considering the merits of this appeal. The parties at a new trial would decide whether any amendment was necessary to make the pleadings conform with the other evidence. Then, too, appellate courts, absent a palpable and overriding error, should not substitute their own findings of fact even when the trial judge misapprehended the law which was applied to those facts. Appellate intervention is warranted, however, when the trial court fails to appreciate the evidentiary difficulties inherent in adjudicating aboriginal claims when applying the rules of evidence and interpreting the evidence before it.
Per La Forest and L’Heureux‑Dubé JJ.: The amalgamation of the appellants’ individual claims technically prevents a consideration of the merits. However, there is a more substantive problem with the pleadings. The appellants sought a declaration of “aboriginal title” but attempted, in essence, to prove that they had complete control over the territory. It follows that what the appellants sought by way of declaration and what they set out to prove by way of the evidence were two different matters. A new trial should be ordered.
McLachlin J. was in substantial agreement.
The Ability of the Court to Interfere with the Trial Judge’s Factual Findings
Per Lamer C.J. and Cory, McLachlin and Major JJ.: The factual findings made at trial could not stand because the trial judge’s treatment of the various kinds of oral histories did not satisfy the principles laid down in R. v. Van der Peet. The oral histories were used in an attempt to establish occupation and use of the disputed territory which is an essential requirement for aboriginal title. The trial judge refused to admit or gave no independent weight to these oral histories and then concluded that the appellants had not demonstrated the requisite degree of occupation for “ownership”. Had the oral histories been correctly assessed, the conclusions on these issues of fact might have been very different.
The Content of Aboriginal Title, How It Is Protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 , and the Requirements Necessary to Prove It
Per Lamer C.J. and Cory, McLachlin and Major JJ.: Aboriginal title encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land held pursuant to that title for a variety of purposes, which need not be aspects of those aboriginal practices, customs and traditions which are integral to distinctive aboriginal cultures. The protected uses must not be irreconcilable with the nature of the group’s attachment to that land.
Aboriginal title is sui generis, and so distinguished from other proprietary interests, and characterized by several dimensions. It is inalienable and cannot be transferred, sold or surrendered to anyone other than the Crown. Another dimension of aboriginal title is its sources: its recognition by the Royal Proclamation, 1763 and the relationship between the common law which recognizes occupation as proof of possession and systems of aboriginal law pre‑existing assertion of British sovereignty. Finally, aboriginal title is held communally.
The exclusive right to use the land is not restricted to the right to engage in activities which are aspects of aboriginal practices, customs and traditions integral to the claimant group’s distinctive aboriginal culture. Canadian jurisprudence on aboriginal title frames the “right to occupy and possess” in broad terms and, significantly, is not qualified by the restriction that use be tied to practice, custom or tradition. The nature of the Indian interest in reserve land which has been found to be the same as the interest in tribal lands is very broad and incorporates present‑day needs. Finally, aboriginal title encompasses mineral rights and lands held pursuant to aboriginal title should be capable of exploitation. Such a use is certainly not a traditional one.
The content of aboriginal title contains an inherent limit in that lands so held cannot be used in a manner that is irreconcilable with the nature of the claimants’ attachment to those lands. This inherent limit arises because the relationship of an aboriginal community with its land should not be prevented from continuing into the future. Occupancy is determined by reference to the activities that have taken place on the land and the uses to which the land has been put by the particular group. If lands are so occupied, there will exist a special bond between the group and the land in question such that the land will be part of the definition of the group’s distinctive culture. Land held by virtue of aboriginal title may not be alienated because the land has an inherent and unique value in itself, which is enjoyed by the community with aboriginal title to it. The community cannot put the land to uses which would destroy that value. Finally, the importance of the continuity of the relationship between an aboriginal community and its land, and the non‑economic or inherent value of that land, should not be taken to detract from the possibility of surrender to the Crown in exchange for valuable consideration. On the contrary, the idea of surrender reinforces the conclusion that aboriginal title is limited. If aboriginal peoples wish to use their lands in a way that aboriginal title does not permit, then they must surrender those lands and convert them into non‑title lands to do so.
Aboriginal title at common law was recognized well before 1982 and is accordingly protected in its full form by s. 35(1) . The constitutionalization of common law aboriginal rights, however, does not mean that those rights exhaust the content of s. 35(1) . The existence of an aboriginal right at common law is sufficient, but not necessary, for the recognition and affirmation of that right by s. 35(1) .
Constitutionally recognized aboriginal rights fall along a spectrum with respect to their degree of connection with the land. At the one end are those aboriginal rights which are practices, customs and traditions integral to the distinctive aboriginal culture of the group claiming the right but where the use and occupation of the land where the activity is taking place is not sufficient to support a claim of title to the land. In the middle are activities which, out of necessity, take place on land and indeed, might be intimately related to a particular piece of land. Although an aboriginal group may not be able to demonstrate title to the land, it may nevertheless have a site‑specific right to engage in a particular activity. At the other end of the spectrum is aboriginal title itself which confers more than the right to engage in site‑specific activities which are aspects of the practices, customs and traditions of distinctive aboriginal cultures. Site‑specific rights can be made out even if title cannot. Because aboriginal rights can vary with respect to their degree of connection with the land, some aboriginal groups may be unable to make out a claim to title, but will nevertheless possess aboriginal rights that are recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) , including site‑specific rights to engage in particular activities.
Aboriginal title is a right to the land itself. That land may be used, subject to the inherent limitations of aboriginal title, for a variety of activities, none of which need be individually protected as aboriginal rights under s. 35(1) . Those activities are parasitic on the underlying title. Section 35(1) , since its purpose is to reconcile the prior presence of aboriginal peoples with the assertion of Crown sovereignty, must recognize and affirm both aspects of that prior presence -- first, the occupation of land, and second, the prior social organization and distinctive cultures of aboriginal peoples on that land.
The test for the identification of aboriginal rights to engage in particular activities and the test for the identification of aboriginal title, although broadly similar, are distinct in two ways. First, under the test for aboriginal title, the requirement that the land be integral to the distinctive culture of the claimants is subsumed by the requirement of occupancy. Second, whereas the time for the identification of aboriginal rights is the time of first contact, the time for the identification of aboriginal title is the time at which the Crown asserted sovereignty over the land.
In order to establish a claim to aboriginal title, the aboriginal group asserting the claim must establish that it occupied the lands in question at the time at which the Crown asserted sovereignty over the land subject to the title. In the context of aboriginal title, sovereignty is the appropriate time period to consider for several reasons. First, from a theoretical standpoint, aboriginal title arises out of prior occupation of the land by aboriginal peoples and out of the relationship between the common law and pre‑existing systems of aboriginal law. Aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown’s underlying title. The Crown, however, did not gain this title until it asserted sovereignty and it makes no sense to speak of a burden on the underlying title before that title existed. Aboriginal title crystallized at the time sovereignty was asserted. Second, aboriginal title does not raise the problem of distinguishing between distinctive, integral aboriginal practices, customs and traditions and those influenced or introduced by European contact. Under common law, the act of occupation or possession is sufficient to ground aboriginal title and it is not necessary to prove that the land was a distinctive or integral part of the aboriginal society before the arrival of Europeans. Finally, the date of sovereignty is more certain than the date of first contact.
Both the common law and the aboriginal perspective on land should be taken into account in establishing the proof of occupancy. At common law, the fact of physical occupation is proof of possession at law, which in turn will ground title to the land. Physical occupation may be established in a variety of ways, ranging from the construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of fields to regular use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its resources. In considering whether occupation sufficient to ground title is established, the group’s size, manner of life, material resources, and technological abilities, and the character of the lands claimed must be taken into account. Given the occupancy requirement, it was not necessary to include as part of the test for aboriginal title whether a group demonstrated a connection with the piece of land as being of central significance to its distinctive culture. Ultimately, the question of physical occupation is one of fact to be determined at trial.
If present occupation is relied on as proof of occupation pre‑sovereignty, there must be a continuity between present and pre‑sovereignty occupation. Since conclusive evidence of pre‑sovereignty occupation may be difficult, an aboriginal community may provide evidence of present occupation as proof of pre‑sovereignty occupation in support of a claim to aboriginal title. An unbroken chain of continuity need not be established between present and prior occupation. The fact that the nature of occupation has changed would not ordinarily preclude a claim for aboriginal title, as long as a substantial connection between the people and the land is maintained. The only limitation on this principle might be that the land not be used in ways which are inconsistent with continued use by future generations of aboriginals.
At sovereignty, occupation must have been exclusive. This requirement flows from the definition of aboriginal title itself, which is defined in terms of the right to exclusive use and occupation of land. The test must take into account the context of the aboriginal society at the time of sovereignty. The requirement of exclusive occupancy and the possibility of joint title can be reconciled by recognizing that joint title can arise from shared exclusivity. As well, shared, non-exclusive aboriginal rights short of aboriginal title but tied to the land and permitting a number of uses can be established if exclusivity cannot be proved. The common law should develop to recognize aboriginal rights as they were recognized by either de facto practice or by aboriginal systems of governance.
Per La Forest and L’Heureux‑Dubé JJ.: “Aboriginal title” is based on the continued occupation and use of the land as part of the aboriginal peoples’ traditional way of life. This sui generis interest is not equated with fee simple ownership; nor can it be described with reference to traditional property law concepts. It is personal in that it is generally inalienable except to the Crown and, in dealing with this interest, the Crown is subject to a fiduciary obligation to treat the aboriginal peoples fairly. There is reluctance to define more precisely the right of aboriginal peoples to live on their lands as their forefathers had lived.
The approach to defining the aboriginal right of occupancy is highly contextual. A distinction must be made between (1) the recognition of a general right to occupy and possess ancestral lands and (2) the recognition of a discrete right to engage in an aboriginal activity in a particular area. The latter has been defined as the traditional use, by a tribe of Indians, that has continued from pre‑contact times of a particular area for a particular purpose. By contrast, a general claim to occupy and possess vast tracts of territory is the right to use the land for a variety of activities related to the aboriginal society’s habits and mode of life. As well, in defining the nature of “aboriginal title”, reference need not be made to statutory provisions and regulations dealing with reserve lands.
In defining the nature of “aboriginal title”, reference need not be made to statutory provisions and regulations dealing specifically with reserve lands. Though the interest of an Indian band in a reserve has been found to be derived from, and to be of the same nature as, the interest of an aboriginal society in its traditional tribal lands, it does not follow that specific statutory provisions governing reserve lands should automatically apply to traditional tribal lands.
The “key” factors for recognizing aboriginal rights under s. 35(1) are met in the present case. First, the nature of an aboriginal claim must be identified precisely with regard to particular practices, customs and traditions. When dealing with a claim of “aboriginal title”, the court will focus on the occupation and use of the land as part of the aboriginal society’s traditional way of life.
Second, an aboriginal society must specify the area that has been continuously used and occupied by identifying general boundaries. Exclusivity means that an aboriginal group must show that a claimed territory is indeed its ancestral territory and not the territory of an unconnected aboriginal society. It is possible that two or more aboriginal groups may have occupied the same territory and therefore a finding of joint occupancy would not be precluded.
Third, the aboriginal right of possession is based on the continued occupation and use of traditional tribal lands since the assertion of Crown sovereignty. However, the date of sovereignty may not be the only relevant time to consider. Continuity may still exist where the present occupation of one area is connected to the pre‑sovereignty occupation of another area. Also, aboriginal peoples claiming a right of possession may provide evidence of present occupation as proof of prior occupation. Further, it is not necessary to establish an unbroken chain of continuity.
Fourth, if aboriginal peoples continue to occupy and use the land as part of their traditional way of life, the land is of central significance to them. Aboriginal occupancy refers not only to the presence of aboriginal peoples in villages or permanently settled areas but also to the use of adjacent lands and even remote territories used to pursue a traditional mode of life. Occupancy is part of aboriginal culture in a broad sense and is, therefore, absorbed in the notion of distinctiveness. The Royal Proclamation, 1763 supports this approach to occupancy.
McLachlin J. was in substantial agreement.
Infringements of Aboriginal Title: The Test of Justification
Per Lamer C.J. and Cory, McLachlin and Major JJ.: Constitutionally recognized aboriginal rights are not absolute and may be infringed by the federal and provincial governments if the infringement (1) furthers a compelling and substantial legislative objective and (2) is consistent with the special fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the aboriginal peoples. The development of agriculture, forestry, mining and hydroelectric power, the general economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered species, and the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to support those aims, are objectives consistent with this purpose. Three aspects of aboriginal title are relevant to the second part of the test. First, the right to exclusive use and occupation of land is relevant to the degree of scrutiny of the infringing measure or action. Second, the right to choose to what uses land can be put, subject to the ultimate limit that those uses cannot destroy the ability of the land to sustain future generations of aboriginal peoples, suggests that the fiduciary relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples may be satisfied by the involvement of aboriginal peoples in decisions taken with respect to their lands. There is always a duty of consultation and, in most cases, the duty will be significantly deeper than mere consultation. And third, lands held pursuant to aboriginal title have an inescapable economic component which suggests that compensation is relevant to the question of justification as well. Fair compensation will ordinarily be required when aboriginal title is infringed.
Per La Forest and L’Heureux‑Dubé JJ.: Rights that are recognized and affirmed are not absolute. Government regulation can therefore infringe upon aboriginal rights if it meets the test of justification under s. 35(1) . The approach is highly contextual.
The general economic development of the interior of British Columbia, through agriculture, mining, forestry and hydroelectric power, as well as the related building of infrastructure and settlement of foreign populations, are valid legislative objectives that, in principle, satisfy the first part of the justification analysis. Under the second part, these legislative objectives are subject to accommodation of the aboriginal peoples’ interests. This accommodation must always be in accordance with the honour and good faith of the Crown. One aspect of accommodation of “aboriginal title” entails notifying and consulting aboriginal peoples with respect to the development of the affected territory. Another aspect is fair compensation.
McLachlin J. was in substantial agreement.
Self‑Government
Per The Court: The errors of fact made by the trial judge, and the resultant need for a new trial, made it impossible for this Court to determine whether the claim to self‑government had been made out.
Extinguishment
Per Lamer C.J. and Cory, McLachlin and Major JJ.: Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (the federal power to legislate in respect of Indians) carries with it the jurisdiction to legislate in relation to aboriginal title, and by implication, the jurisdiction to extinguish it. The ownership by the provincial Crown (under s. 109 ) of lands held pursuant to aboriginal title is separate from jurisdiction over those lands. Notwithstanding s. 91(24), provincial laws of general application apply proprio vigore to Indians and Indian lands.
A provincial law of general application cannot extinguish aboriginal rights. First, a law of general application cannot, by definition, meet the standard “of clear and plain intention” needed to extinguish aboriginal rights without being ultra vires the province. Second, s. 91(24) protects a core of federal jurisdiction even from provincial laws of general application through the operation of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. That core has been described as matters touching on “Indianness” or the “core of Indianness”.
Provincial laws which would otherwise not apply to Indians proprio vigore are allowed to do so by s. 88 of the Indian Act which incorporates by reference provincial laws of general application. This provision, however, does not “invigorate” provincial laws which are invalid because they are in relation to Indians and Indian lands.
Per La Forest and L’Heureux-Dubé JJ.: The province had no authority to extinguish aboriginal rights either under the Constitution Act, 1867 or by virtue of s. 88 of the Indian Act .
McLachlin J. was in substantial agreement.
Cases Cited
By Lamer C.J.
Considered: R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507; R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672; R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723; R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101; R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139; St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14 A.C. 46, aff’g sub nom. St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577; Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313; Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, [1980] 1 F.C. 518; Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335; referred to: R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821; R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025; Mabo v. Queensland (1992), 107 A.L.R. 1; Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. United Garment Workers of America, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031; Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 751; Dick v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309; Stein v. The Ship “Kathy K”, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 802; N.V. Bocimar S.A. v. Century Insurance Co. of Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1247; Schwartz v. Canada, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 254; Chartier v. Attorney General of Quebec, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 474; Kruger v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104; R. v. Taylor (1981), 62 C.C.C. (2d) 227; Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387; Uukw v. R., [1987] 6 W.W.R. 155; Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 654; Roberts v. Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 322; Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 344; Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85; St. Mary’s Indian Band v. Cranbrook (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 657; United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941); R. v. Sutherland, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 451; R. v. Francis, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1025; Derrickson v. Derrickson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285.
By La Forest J.
Considered: Calder v. Attorney‑General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313; Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335; Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 654; R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507; R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139; R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723; R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672; R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; referred to: R. v. Wesley, [1932] 4 D.L.R. 774; Sikyea v. The Queen, [1964] S.C.R. 642, aff’g R. v. Sikyea (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 91(24) , 109 .
Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35(1) .
Indian Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I‑5, ss. 18 , 88 .
Indian Oil and Gas Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I‑7, s. 6(2) .
Royal Proclamation, 1763, R.S.C., 1985, App. II, No.1.
Treaty Between Her Majesty And The United Stated Of America, For The Settlement Of The Oregon Boundary (Oregon Boundary Treaty, 1846), TS 120.
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APPEAL and CROSS‑APPEAL from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (1993), 30 B.C.A.C. 1, 49 W.A.C. 1, 104 D.L.R. (4th) 470, [1993] 5 W.W.R. 97, [1993] 5 C.N.L.R. 1, [1993] B.C.J. No. 1395 (QL), varying an order of McEachern C.J., [1991] 3 W.W.R. 97, [1991] 5 C.N.L.R. xiii, (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185, [1991] B.C.J. No. 525 (QL), and dismissing British Columbia’s cross‑appeal as abandoned. Appeal allowed in part; cross‑appeal dismissed.
Stuart Rush, Q.C., Peter Grant, Michael Jackson, Louise Mandell and David Paterson, for the appellants and respondents on the cross‑appeal, the Gitksan Hereditary Chiefs et al.
Marvin R. V. Storrow, Q.C., Joanne R. Lysyk and Joseph C. McArthur, for the appellants and respondents on the cross‑appeal, the Wet’suwet’en Hereditary Chiefs et al.
Joseph J. Arvay, Q.C., Mark G. Underhill and Brenda Edwards, for the respondent and appellant on the cross‑appeal, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia.
Graham Garton, Q.C., Judith Bowers, Q.C., Murray T. Wolf and Geoffrey S. Lester, for the respondent the Attorney General of Canada.
Arthur Pape, Harry A. Slade, Peter Hogg and Jean Teillet, for the intervener the First Nations Summit.
Jack Woodward and Albert C. Peeling, for the intervener the Westbank First Nation.
Marvin R. V. Storrow, Q.C., Joanne R. Lysyk and Joseph C. McArthur, for the interveners the Musqueam Nation et al.
J. Keith Lowes, for the interveners the B.C. Cattlemen’s Association et al.
Charles F. Willms, for the intervener Skeena Cellulose Inc.
J. Edward Gouge, Q.C., and Jill M. Marks, for the intervener Alcan Aluminum Ltd.
//The Chief Justice//
The judgment of Lamer C.J. and Cory and Major JJ. was delivered by
The Chief Justice --
I. Introduction
1 This appeal is the latest in a series of cases in which it has fallen to this Court to interpret and apply the guarantee of existing aboriginal rights found in s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 . Although that line of decisions, commencing with R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, proceeding through the Van der Peet trilogy (R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672, and R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723), and ending in R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821, R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, and R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, have laid down the jurisprudential framework for s. 35(1) , this appeal raises a set of interrelated and novel questions which revolve around a single issue -- the nature and scope of the constitutional protection afforded by s. 35(1) to common law aboriginal title.
2 In Adams, and in the companion decision in Côté, I considered and rejected the proposition that claims to aboriginal rights must also be grounded in an underlying claim to aboriginal title. But I held, nevertheless, that aboriginal title was a distinct species of aboriginal right that was recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) . Since aboriginal title was not being claimed in those earlier appeals, it was unnecessary to say more. This appeal demands, however, that the Court now explore and elucidate the implications of the constitutionalization of aboriginal title. The first is the specific content of aboriginal title, a question which this Court has not yet definitively addressed, either at common law or under s. 35(1) . The second is the related question of the test for the proof of title, which, whatever its content, is a right in land, and its relationship to the definition of the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) in Van der Peet in terms of activities. The third is whether aboriginal title, as a right in land, mandates a modified approach to the test of justification first laid down in Sparrow and elaborated upon in Gladstone.
3 In addition to the relationship between aboriginal title and s. 35(1) , this appeal also raises an important practical problem relevant to the proof of aboriginal title which is endemic to aboriginal rights litigation generally — the treatment of the oral histories of Canada’s aboriginal peoples by the courts. In Van der Peet, I held that the common law rules of evidence should be adapted to take into account the sui generis nature of aboriginal rights. In this appeal, the Court must address what specific form those modifications must take.
4 Finally, given the existence of aboriginal title in British Columbia, this Court must address, on cross-appeal, the question of whether the province of British Columbia, from the time it joined Confederation in 1871, until the entrenchment of s. 35(1) in 1982, had jurisdiction to extinguish the rights of aboriginal peoples, including aboriginal title, in that province. Moreover, if the province was without this jurisdiction, a further question arises -- whether provincial laws of general application that would otherwise be inapplicable to Indians and Indian lands could nevertheless extinguish aboriginal rights through the operation of s. 88 of the Indian Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-5 .
II. Facts
5 At the British Columbia Supreme Court, McEachern C.J. heard 374 days of evidence and argument. Some of that evidence was not in a form which is familiar to common law courts, including oral histories and legends. Another significant part was the evidence of experts in genealogy, linguistics, archeology, anthropology, and geography.
6 The trial judge’s decision (reported at [1991] 3 W.W.R. 97) is nearly 400 pages long, with another 100 pages of schedules. Although I am of the view that there must be a new trial, I nevertheless find it useful to summarize some of the relevant facts, so as to put the remainder of the judgment into context.
A. The Claim at Trial
7 This action was commenced by the appellants, who are all Gitksan or Wet’suwet’en hereditary chiefs, who, both individually and on behalf of their “Houses” claimed separate portions of 58,000 square kilometres in British Columbia. For the purpose of the claim, this area was divided into 133 individual territories, claimed by the 71 Houses. This represents all of the Wet’suwet’en people, and all but 12 of the Gitksan Houses. Their claim was originally for “ownership” of the territory and “jurisdiction” over it. (At this Court, this was transformed into, primarily, a claim for aboriginal title over the land in question.) The province of British Columbia counterclaimed for a declaration that the appellants have no right or interest in and to the territory or alternatively, that the appellants’ cause of action ought to be for compensation from the Government of Canada.
B. The Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en Peoples
(1) Demography
8 The Gitksan consist of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 persons, most of whom now live in the territory claimed, which is generally the watersheds of the north and central Skeena, Nass and Babine Rivers and their tributaries. The Wet’suwet’en consist of approximately 1,500 to 2,000 persons, who also predominantly live in the territory claimed. This territory is mainly in the watersheds of the Bulkley and parts of the Fraser-Nechako River systems and their tributaries. It lies immediately east and south of the Gitksan.