Oberlander v. Canada (Attorney General)

Oberlander v. Canada (Attorney General)
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2018-09-27
Neutral citation
2018 FC 947
File numbers
T-1590-17
Notes
Reported Decision
Decision Content
Date: 20180927
Docket: T-1590-17
Citation: 2018 FC 947
BETWEEN:
HELMUT OBERLANDER
Applicant
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
and
LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS OF B'NAI BRITH CANADA
Intervener
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTIONS:
PARAGRAPH #
I. Introduction
[1] - [8]
II. Factual Background
[9]
A. The Applicant
[10] - [19]
B. The Law of Citizenship Revocation
[20] - [32]
C. Procedural History – Summary
[33]
(1) The First Decision: Order in Council PC 2001-1227
[33] - [39]
(2) The Second Decision: Order in Council PC 2007-801
[40] - [41]
(3) The Third Decision: Order in Council PC 2012-1137
[42] - [43]
(4) The Fourth (and Present) Decision: Order in Council PC 2017-793
[44]
(5) The Minister’s Report
[45] - [52]
(a) The Size and Nature of the Organization
[53]
(b) The Part of the Organization with which the Applicant was most directly concerned
[54]
(c) The Applicant’s Duties and Activities within the Organization
[55] - [61]
(d) The Applicant’s Position or Rank in the Organization
[62]
(e) The Length of Time the Applicant was in the Organization, particularly after acquiring Knowledge of the Group’s Crime or Criminal Purpose
[63]
(f) Knowledge
[64]
(g) Significant Contribution
[65] - [66]
(h) Voluntariness/Duress
[67] - [69]
(i) Imminent Physical Peril
[70]
(j) No Safe Avenue for Escape
[71] - [72]
(k) Proportionality
[73] - [75]
(l) Personal Interests
[76] - [77]
(m) The Applicant’s Submissions
[78]
(6) Impugned Decision
[79]
III. Issues
[80]
IV. Standard of Review
[81] - [98]
V. Analysis
[99]
A. Issue 1: Is the decision to revoke the Applicant’s citizenship an abuse of process?
[99]
(1) Re: Delay
[100] - [105]
(2) Re: Improper Behaviour and Bad Faith
[106] - [111]
(3) Re: Credibility
[112] - [113]
(4) Re: Abuse of Process
[114] - [117]
B. Issue 2: Was there a breach of procedural fairness?
[118] - [123]
(1) Re: Oral Hearing
[124] - [132]
(2) Re: Right to Reply
[133] - [137]
(3) Re: Prosecutor’s Brief
[138] - [142]
(4) Re: Star Chamber
[143] - [147]
C. Issue 3: Was the correct standard of proof applied?
[148] - [160]
D. Issue 4: Was the decision to revoke the Applicant’s citizenship reasonable?
[161]
(1) The Report
[162]
(2) Re: Complicity
[163] - [167]
(3) Re: Age
[168] - [169]
(4) Re: Significant Contribution
[170] - [178]
(5) Re: Duress
[179] - [185]
(6) Re: Credibility
[186] - [187]
VI. Conclusion
[188] - [189]
PHELAN J.
I. Introduction
[1] The Governor in Council [GIC] revoked Mr. Oberlander’s citizenship because of the nature of his involvement in the activities of a Nazi Schutzstaffell [SS] killing squad - Einsatzkommando 10a [Ek10a]. He had previously been found to have significantly misrepresented his wartime activities when he and his wife applied to enter Canada. He failed to disclose his service as an interpreter with this SS killing squad.
[2] This is the judicial review of that GIC decision – and the fourth attempt by Canada to strip Oberlander of his citizenship. The GIC concluded that Oberlander voluntarily made a knowing and significant contribution to the crimes and criminal purpose of this SS killing squad.
[3] In the previous Federal Court of Appeal decision – Oberlander v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FCA 52, [2016] 4 FCR 55 [FCA-3], that Court remitted the matter back to the GIC for redetermination on the issue of complicity under the framework of Ezokola v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40, [2013] 2 SCR 678 [Ezokola] and if found complicit, to reassess his defence of duress. The Court of Appeal directed (at para 22):
The appellant was entitled to a determination of the extent to which he made a significant and knowing contribution to the crime or criminal purpose of the Ek10a.
In so doing, the earlier decisions on complicity by virtue of membership are superseded. This is a new analytical framework.
[4] It is uncontested that Oberlander obtained his Canadian citizenship by false representation or by knowingly concealing material circumstances by failing to disclose involvement in the SS at the time of his immigration screening. There is no doubt that to have done so would have resulted in the rejection of his citizenship application.
[5] This type of material misrepresentation, as found by Justice MacKay in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Oberlander (2000), 185 FTR 41 (FCTD), 95 ACWS (3d) 614 [MacKay Decision], allowed the GIC to revoke Oberlander’s citizenship pursuant to s 10 of the Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29.
[6] At issue and a limitation on the GIC’s power of revocation, throughout the Oberlander saga, is Canada’s policy to pursue the revocation of citizenship for World War II matters in only those cases for which there is evidence of complicity in war crimes or crimes against humanity [the Policy].
[7] In the decision at issue in this case, the GIC found that the Applicant was sufficiently complicit (as those words are now interpreted pursuant to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Ezokola), and that the defence of duress was not engaged.
[8] The relevant legislation is set forth in Appendix A to these Reasons.
II. Factual Background
[9] The basic facts of this matter have been canvassed in the four previous GIC decisions. For ease of reference, Appendix B to these Reasons is a factual and procedural history. Many of the critical facts are found in the MacKay Decision.
A. The Applicant
[10] Oberlander was born on February 15, 1924, to a family of German ethnicity in Halbstadt, Ukraine. He was not a German citizen until later in World War II. He is now 94 years old.
[11] He was a member of a mobile killing squad known as Ek10a serving as an interpreter and an auxiliary starting in 1941 or 1942 and ending in 1943 or 1944. Ek10a was one of the squads of the Einsatzgruppen which was operated by the SS and responsible for the execution of more than two million people (primarily Jewish) who were considered “unacceptable” to Nazi Germany. The Applicant’s duties included interpreting for the security police force of the SS – the Sicherheitsdienst [SD] – which was found to be a criminal organization in 1946 by the International Military Tribunal and by Article II of Control Council Law No 10.
[12] No evidence was led that indicated the Applicant directly participated in the atrocities committed by Ek10a but he was aware that these atrocities were being committed.
[13] In 1943 or 1944, Oberlander became an infantryman in the German army. In part because of his service in the SS, he, his mother, and sister were granted German citizenship in April 1944.
[14] In 1952, Oberlander and his wife applied to immigrate to Canada. Security screening of such applicants included an interview in 1953 by a security officer who asked questions about the Applicant’s background, his origins in the Ukraine, how he came to Germany, his previous addresses and, importantly, his military and other service during the wartime.
[15] Critically, had Oberlander answered the security officer’s questions truthfully by including his service as an interpreter with Ek10a, his application would have been rejected on security grounds.
[16] Absent truthful responses, Oberlander’s application to immigrate was approved and he was admitted to Canada in 1954 as a permanent resident. He obtained Canadian citizenship on April 19, 1960, having made false representation and knowingly concealing material circumstances.
[17] In 1970, the Applicant was interviewed by a German consular official in Toronto in relation to a German trial against one of the wartime commanders of Ek10a. This resulted in a signed statement from the Applicant regarding his wartime experience. In 1995, RCMP officers commenced an investigation regarding the Applicant’s involvement in war crimes. Two days later, the process of revoking the Applicant’s citizenship began.
[18] The Applicant has two daughters, both born in Canada, one of whom is challenged and requires family support. His wife passed away in 2013.
[19] The Applicant had worked in building development in the Kitchener-Waterloo area and is reputed to have made a significant contribution to the local community. Oberlander’s life since arriving in Canada has been beyond reproach. He is in his 90s with significant health issues.
B. The Law of Citizenship Revocation
[20] The revocation of citizenship in this case requires consideration of statute, policy, and jurisprudence. A summary of those considerations follows.
[21] Subsection 10(1) of the Citizenship Act, as it read on May 27, 2015 (the relevant date, as explained below), states that a person ceases to be a citizen where the GIC is satisfied, on report from the Minister, that citizenship was obtained by false representation, fraud, or by knowingly concealing material circumstances.
[22] Subsection 10(2) provides the presumption that citizenship is deemed to have been obtained by false representation, fraud, or knowingly concealing material circumstances if the person was lawfully admitted to Canada for permanent residence on the basis of such actions and subsequently obtained citizenship.
[23] Section 18, a procedural provision, provides the person concerned with the opportunity to have the matter referred to the Federal Court as a “reference” prior to the Minister’s report. Subsection 18(3) makes that reference decision final and not subject to further appeal.
[24] The Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, SC 2014, c 22, amended the Citizenship Act in a manner that resulted in ss 10 and 18 being combined into the new s 10. Amongst other changes, the decision-maker changed from the GIC to the Minister. These amendments came into force by Order in Council PC 2015-0626 on May 28, 2015.
[25] As is clear from the procedural history, three of the attempts to revoke the Applicant’s citizenship clearly occurred under the old regime, prior to the above amendments.
[26] Due to the transitional provisions in ss 32 and 33 of the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, the most recent decision and the subject of this judicial review also proceeds under the old regime. Sections 32 and 33 provide that ongoing matters – where the Minister was already entitled to make or had made a report, or where an order had been set aside and referred back for redetermination by the Federal Court – are to be determined by the GIC in accordance with s 10 as it read immediately before the day the amended s 10 came into force: May 27, 2015. This is the case at hand.
[27] Once the GIC is satisfied that citizenship has been obtained through false representation, fraud, or by knowingly concealing material circumstances in a manner consistent with ss 10 and 18, the Policy, regarding the revocation of citizenship of war criminals in World War II, must be met. The relevant portion of the Policy, from the public report entitled Canada’s War Crimes Program 2000-2001, is as follows:
The policy of the Government of Canada is clear. Canada will not become a safe haven for those individuals who have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity or any other reprehensible act during times of conflict.
…
World War II Cases
The government pursues only those cases for which there is evidence of direct involvement in or complicity of war crimes or crimes against humanity. A person is considered complicit if, while aware of the commission of war crimes or crimes against humanity, the person contributes, directly or indirectly, to their occurrence. Membership in an organization responsible for committing the atrocities can be sufficient for complicity if the organization in question is one with a single, brutal purpose, e.g. a death squad.
[Emphasis in original]
[28] Although policy guidelines are not binding, the Federal Court of Appeal in Oberlander v Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FCA 213, [2005] 1 FCR 3 [FCA-1] found at para 30 that since the GIC opted in this case to adopt guidelines and to apply them to the case, it had to put its mind to determining whether the Applicant came within the scope of the Policy. This required a determination of the Applicant’s complicity.
[29] Prior to 2013, the jurisprudence provided that membership in a limited brutal purpose organization created a factual presumption of complicity that could be rebutted by evidence that there was no knowledge of or involvement in the acts: Oberlander v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FCA 330, [2010] 4 FCR 395 [FCA-2] at para 18. The Policy was consistent with this jurisprudence.
[30] In the s 18 reference decision in this case, the MacKay Decision, Justice MacKay was tasked with making findings of fact relevant to s 10. Justice MacKay found that the Applicant had obtained his Canadian citizenship by false representation or by knowingly concealing material circumstances, and that he had been a member of Ek10a.
[31] In 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada subsequently changed the test for complicity in Ezokola. The Court in Ezokola set the new test for complicity at para 29, requiring that there be “serious reasons for considering that he or she voluntarily made a knowing and significant contribution to the crime or criminal purpose of the group alleged to have committed the crime.” The following factors guide this analysis (para 91):
(i) the size and nature of the organization;
(ii) the part of the organization with which the refugee claimant was most directly concerned;
(iii) the refugee claimant’s duties and activities within the organization;
(iv) the refugee claimant’s position or rank in the organization;
(v) the length of time the refugee claimant was in the organization, particularly after acquiring knowledge of the group’s crime or criminal purpose; and
(vi) the method by which the refugee claimant was recruited and the refugee claimant’s opportunity to leave the organization.
[32] Membership in a single, brutal purpose organization is no longer sufficient for a determination of complicity. As the MacKay Decision found that the Applicant had obtained citizenship through false representation or by knowingly concealing material circumstances, the statutory requirements in the Citizenship Act for revocation have been conclusively satisfied. The only live issue remains whether the Applicant was complicit with Ek10a’s crimes pursuant to the Policy in a manner consistent with the law in Ezokola.
C. Procedural History – Summary
(1) The First Decision: Order in Council PC 2001-1227
[33] On January 27, 1995, pursuant to ss 10(1) and 18(1) of the Citizenship Act, the Minister gave notice to the Applicant of his intention to make a report to the GIC recommending that the Applicant’s citizenship be revoked on the grounds that he had been admitted to Canada for permanent residence and had obtained citizenship by false representations, fraud, or knowingly concealing material circumstances.
[34] At the Applicant’s request, and as provided by s 18 of the Citizenship Act, the case was referred to the Federal Court. The case then met with many procedural disputes. It was joined with two other similar matters in an attempt to resolve these preliminary issues.
[35] Due to issues of the apparent compromise of judicial independence, these joined cases were stayed until the stays were lifted by the Federal Court of Appeal, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Tobiass, [1997] 3 SCR 391, 151 DLR (4th) 119 [Tobiass].
[36] The Federal Court reference went forward. In the MacKay Decision, Justice MacKay decided that the Applicant had obtained his Canadian citizenship by false representation or by knowingly concealing material circumstances within the meaning of s 18(1) of the Citizenship Act. The MacKay Decision, pursuant to s 18(3), is final and not subject to appeal.
[37] Following the MacKay Decision, the Minister considered submissions from the Applicant, then sent a report to the GIC recommending that the Applicant’s Canadian citizenship be revoked. On July 12, 2001, the GIC decided that the Applicant had obtained citizenship by false representation, fraud, or knowingly concealing material circumstances and revoked his citizenship pursuant to s 10 of the Citizenship Act. Order in Council PC 2001-1227 was issued revoking the Applicant’s citizenship.
[38] The Applicant sought judicial review of this decision. In Oberlander v Attorney General (Canada), 2003 FC 944, 238 FTR 35 [FC-1], Justice Martineau dismissed the application. The Federal Court of Appeal in FCA-1 set aside Justice Martineau’s decision and remitted the matter back to the GIC with direction to explicitly consider the Applicant’s personal interests and whether the case fell within the Policy.
[39] Meanwhile, the Applicant had sought an order in the Federal Court to stay deportation proceedings that had been commenced under the Immigration Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, pending resolution of the judicial review application. This motion was denied: Oberlander v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 771 (FCTD), 116 ACWS (3d) 12, aff’d 2003 FCA 134.
(2) The Second Decision: Order in Council PC 2007-801
[40] The GIC reviewed the Minister’s new report, which included submissions from the Applicant as well as the Department of Justice, but made the same recommendation to revoke the Applicant’s citizenship. On May 17, 2007, the GIC decided for a second time to revoke the Applicant’s Canadian citizenship. Order in Council PC 2007-801 was issued to this effect.
[41] The Applicant again sought judicial review of this decision, and in Oberlander v Attorney General (Canada), 2008 FC 1200, [2009] 3 FCR 358 [FC-2], I dismissed his application. The Federal Court of Appeal in FCA-2 allowed the appeal on a new ground of duress not previously raised and remitted the matter back to the GIC for determination of the defence of duress.
(3) The Third Decision: Order in Council PC 2012-1137
[42] The Applicant provided further submissions on the issue of duress, and the Minister prepared a supplementary report which still recommended that the Applicant’s citizenship be revoked. On September 27, 2012, the GIC decided to revoke the Applicant’s citizenship for the third time and issued Order in Council PC 2012-1137.
[43] The Applicant again sought judicial review of this decision. Justice Russell in Oberlander v Attorney General (Canada), 2015 FC 46, [2016] 1 FCR 56 [FC-3] dismissed this application. The Federal Court of Appeal in FCA-3 remitted the matter back to the GIC for redetermination on the issue of complicity under the new framework set out in Ezokola, and, if it was found that he was complicit, to reassess his defence of duress. The Attorney General of Canada’s application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed on July 7, 2016.
(4) The Fourth (and Present) Decision: Order in Council PC 2017-793
[44] The GIC undertook to re-evaluate the matter in light of the new test for complicity and the defence of duress. The Minister completed a draft version of the report to the GIC, and provided it to the Applicant, who provided 95 pages of submissions in response. The Minister revised the draft report in consideration of these submissions, but recommended again that the GIC revoke the Applicant’s citizenship. The final report [the Report] is 94 pages long, and forms the majority of the reasons for the decision at issue.
(5) The Minister’s Report
[45] Since the finding of misrepresentation in the MacKay Decision was binding, the GIC now had to conclude whether the Applicant was complicit in war crimes or crimes against humanity in a manner consistent with Ezokola.
[46] Since some of the elements required by Ezokola were not put before Justice MacKay in 1998, the assessment of complicity was supplemented by all of the Applicant’s prior sworn statements, affidavits, memoranda of facts and law, and his Court testimony.
[47] The Applicant argued as if the MacKay decision was the only critical evidence against the Applicant. Counsel particularly noted Justice MacKay’s comment that there was no evidence of the Applicant committing the war crimes of Ek10a.
[48] However, the materials in support of the Report consisted of more than the MacKay Decision. They included an expert report by Manfred Messerschmitt outlining the role of the Einsatzgruppen, including the role of support personnel such as drivers, radio operators and interpreters. He outlined in detail such matters as organizational structure, the “cleansing actions” directed at Bolsheviks and Jews; the route of Ek10a’s operations in the summer and fall of 1941; and the function of interpreters.
[49] The record also consisted of materials from the Nuremberg War Crimes trials regarding the conduct of the Einsatzgruppen.
[50] Justice MacKay found many inconsistencies and improbabilities in the Applicant’s evidence and a pattern of minimizing his wartime role, which gave rise to serious doubts regarding reliability. The transcripts of government witnesses were also examined since Justice MacKay noted they were credible witnesses who had assisted the Court.
[51] Pursuant to Ezokola, the Report stated that “an individual will be found inadmissible for complicity in international crimes if there are serious reasons for considering that he voluntarily made a knowing and significant contribution to the crime or criminal purpose of the group alleged to have committed the crime.” [Emphasis by the Minister.] The factors from Ezokola were then each considered.
[52] The following paragraphs summarize the key elements of the Report’s assessment of each of the factors from Ezokola. The Report substantially constitutes the reasons for the decision.
(a) The Size and Nature of the Organization
[53] The Applicant was a member of a limited, brutal purpose organization. The relatively small size of Ek10a gave grounds for believing that the Applicant likely knew of and contributed to the crimes or facilitated the criminal purpose of Ek10a. This was consistent with the policy in the Citizenship and Immigration Manual, ENF 18: War crimes and crimes against humanity (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada) [Manual].
(b) The Part of the Organization with which the Applicant was most directly concerned
[54] The Applicant was a member of Ek10a as an unpaid auxiliary interpreter who lived, ate, and travelled with Ek10a, and had a uniform but no rank.
(c) The Applicant’s Duties and Activities within the Organization
[55] The Applicant described various mundane tasks he fulfilled in addition to interpreting, but he was also issued a weapon. His description of his duties as an interpreter was inconsistent, but Justice MacKay noted that he admitted to serving as an interpreter in occasional interrogation sessions where German officers questioned those detained who were suspected of anti-German sentiments or activities.
[56] A witness in the MacKay reference, Mr. Sidorenko, observed the Applicant’s involvement in two interrogations, one of a woman suspected of being Jewish who was then released, and his own for allegedly helping a prisoner escape. He implied that if the outcome were different he would have been shot, leading to the inference that the Applicant participated in interrogation sessions that could result in death of the person detained.
[57] The Applicant took particular exception to the story of the woman suspected of being a Jew on the basis that no wrong was committed when she was determined not to be Jewish. The Applicant’s position ignores the consequence if she had been found to be Jewish (execution) and the role played by interpreters in making that type of determination with those types of consequences.
[58] Justice MacKay found that the Applicant’s role later expanded to include questioning detained persons and those without valid explanation for their presence or activities. Justice MacKay also found that the Applicant had served as an interpreter for many months.
[59] The Applicant’s denials of involvement in Ek10a’s crimes were insufficient to negate the common purpose and shared objectives that could be inferred from the Applicant’s duties and activities, which corresponded with Justice MacKay’s finding that “Oberlander served the purpose of his unit, the Ek10a.” There was a sufficient link between the Applicant’s day-to-day participation as an interpreter and the crimes and criminal purpose of Ek10a.
[60] The Report considered the record and reliable public information to determine the usual participation of interpreters in the crimes of Ek10a. As noted earlier, Justice MacKay found there was no evidence that the Applicant participated in any atrocities, but noted that he admitted to serving as an interpreter during occasional interrogations of detained individuals, and found his evidence not credible and evasive. Expert evidence on interpreters suggested that they were generally present at executions, conveyed orders to victims, or participated during interrogations.
[61] Justice MacKay made no finding on the inconsistencies in the evidence regarding the timing of the Applicant’s service. The Applicant’s testimony, with which Justice MacKay had reliability and credibility concerns, the witnesses Mr. Huebert and Mr. Sidorenko, who Justice MacKay found more persuasive, and historical accounts of Ek10a’s activities were considered in the Report to construct the most plausible timeline to consider the Applicant’s duties in the context of Ek10a’s activities as a killing squad:
the Applicant started to serve as an interpreter with the Ek10a in early October 1941 at the age of 17, and the same day he was asked to report to headquarters, he departed for either Mariupol or Melitopol. During that time, there were 2,000 victims of Ek10a in Melitopol;
the Applicant arrived in Taganrog in mid to late October 1941 and stayed until at least July 1942, where there were roughly 1,500 victims in that period;
the Applicant arrived in Rostov in early July 1942 and stayed for four weeks, where there were around 2,000 victims;
the Applicant arrived in Krasnodar in early August 1942 and left by the end of the month, where there were around 7,000 victims during that time; and
the Applicant arrived in Novorossiysk in late August 1942 and stayed until the end of February 1943, where prisoners were executed after interrogations and also Jewish people were executed with or without interrogation.
(d) The Applicant’s Position or Rank in the Organization
[62] The Applicant was an auxiliary interpreter with Ek10a, and not part of the upper hierarchy of his unit, but an interpreter for interrogations is more likely to have knowledge of his organization’s crimes or criminal purpose than many foot soldiers. As an interpreter, he would have had some control over the decisions made by his superiors to send a prisoner to his death through the power to translate whatever information he wanted.
(e) The Length of Time the Applicant was in the Organization, particularly after acquiring Knowledge of the Group’s Crime or Criminal Purpose
[63] The Applicant served as an auxiliary interpreter with the Ek10a from roughly October 1941 to late 1943. Only October 1941 to February 1943 was considered for the complicity analysis in the Report, during which Ek10a killed at least 91,678 people.
(f) Knowledge
[64] Based on Justice MacKay’s findings, the size and limited, brutal purpose of Ek10a, the Applicant’s role as an interpreter, and his knowledge of the group’s crimes or criminal purpose, the Applicant was found to have made his contribution knowingly.
(g) Significant Contribution
[65] International jurisprudence suggested that admitted involvement as an interpreter in occasional interrogations could amount to serving as a step towards the realization of the group’s crime or criminal purpose:
United States v Osidach, 513 F Supp 51 at 96-99 (ED Pa 1981) - an interpreter during interrogations from 1942 to 1944 was found to have facilitated the persecution of civilians as the necessary link between the Germans and the Jewish people while aware of the overarching criminal purpose.
The Report of Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No 10, Nuremberg, October 1946 - April 1949, Volume IV [Radetzky] - it was noted in regards to an interpreter in a unit similar to Ek10a that providing interpretive services during interrogations, while aware that it might result in execution based on what was said, was conduct of a culpable nature as it served a step towards the realization of the group's purpose.
Miranda Alvarado v Gonzales, 449 F (3d) 915 (9th Cir 2006) - interpreting during interrogations was found to have contributed to the crimes to a sufficient degree to establish complicity.
Zhang Jian Xie v INS, 434 F (3d) 136 at 142-143 (2d Cir 2006) - an individual was found to have made a significant contribution for only occasional involvement after transporting women to hospitals for forced abortion three to five times.
[66] The Applicant’s work as an interpreter facilitated the screening process for executions and served an important step towards the realization of Ek10a’s criminal purpose. Given Ek10a’s unique nature, there was no other purpose to interpretation during interrogation other than to fulfill the group’s deadly mandate. The Applicant’s occasional involvement as an interpreter in interrogation of those suspected of anti-German sentiments and activities contributed significantly to Ek10a’s crimes or criminal purpose.
(h) Voluntariness/Duress
[67] Justice MacKay observed that the Applicant believed that he had no alternative and that he would have been subject to the harshest penalties if he had not done as ordered by Ek10a. However, this was not a finding of fact. The only evidence of conscription was the Applicant’s testimony that he needed to register with the German occupying forces as an Ethnic German, which was unrelated to conscription as an interpreter. Since conscription was not a barrier to complicity, the issue of conscription was considered moot in the Report.
[68] As noted, if the Applicant knew nothing and did only mundane activities, it was unclear why he claimed to have been under duress.
[69] The test for duress drew on the tests from immigration law in Ramirez v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 2 FC 306 (CA), 89 DLR (4th) 173 [Ramirez], criminal common law in R v Ryan, 2013 SCC 3, [2013] 1 SCR 14, international law in Article 31(d) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 July 2002) [Rome Statute], and the policy set out in the Manual.
(i) Imminent Physical Peril
[70] There was insufficient evidence to establish a threat of death or bodily harm, explicit or implicit, imminent, past, or future, or that such apprehension was reasonable. The Applicant’s statements about fear of death were not substantiated by other evidence on the record.
(j) No Safe Avenue for Escape
[71] The Applicant had a safe opportunity for escape during his posting in Rostov when he was a solitary guard armed with a rifle protecting a barge for three to four weeks. There was no imminent, real, or inevitable threat during that time. There may have also been an opportunity for escape while he was home on leave. The Military Tribunal in Radetzky also noted that there was the opportunity in the Einsatzgruppen to ask for a transfer or to be excused from participating without immediate peril.
[72] A reasonable person in the same situation as the Applicant with the same personal characteristics and experience would have concluded that a safe avenue for escape existed. Whether he was 17 or 18 years old when he started, he had shown his maturity by supporting his family, and stayed with the Ek10a until he was 20, which allowed for him to consider desertion or transfer. His continued service was therefore not involuntary.
(k) Proportionality
[73] The harm inflicted by the Applicant must not be greater than the harm threatened against the Applicant. There were at least 10,000 victims of the Ek10a’s large scale executions in the locations where the Applicant was working as an interpreter, but the Applicant failed to establish an imminent physical threat for leaving Ek10a. The harm faced by the victims far outweighed the fear of harm alleged.
[74] The Applicant benefited from receiving a War Service Cross and German citizenship, which were both voluntary, as was his service after any alleged conscription. Duress was therefore not established.
[75] The Report concluded that the Applicant served the members of Ek10a voluntarily, significantly, and knowingly in accordance with the Ezokola factors and the Policy.
(l) Personal Interests
[76] Revocation of citizenship would render the Applicant stateless, but Article 8, subparagraph 2(b) of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 4 December 1954, 989 UNTS 175 (entered into force 13 December 1975) allows for the deprivation of nationality where it has been gained through misrepresentation or fraud.
[77] The Applicant’s personal circumstances in Canada were compelling, but did not outweigh the importance of preserving the integrity of Canadian citizenship from deceit and recognition of Canada’s obligation to ensure that there is no safe haven for those involved in mass atrocities. It was noted that the Applicant has not acknowledged the seriousness of his misrepresentation in gaining citizenship, nor has he expressed any remorse for having served with the Ek10a despite its atrocities.
(m) The Applicant’s Submissions
[78] The Minister responded to the Applicant’s submissions in detail. A number of changes were made to the Report as a result of those submissions.
(6) Impugned Decision
[79] Order in Council PC 2017-793, dated June 20, 2017, states that the GIC, on the Report from the Minister, is satisfied that the Applicant obtained Canadian citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances pursuant to s 10(2) of the Citizenship Act as it read on May 27, 2015. The Order in Council then states as follows:
Therefore, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, pursuant to section 10 of the Citizenship Act, as it read on May 27, 2015, fixes the date of this Order as the date on which the [Applicant] ceases to be a Canadian citizen.
III. Issues
[80] The issues which the Court concludes must be addressed are:
Is the decision to revoke the Applicant’s citizenship an abuse of process?
Was there a breach of procedural fairness?
Was the correct standard of proof applied?
Was the decision to revoke the Applicant’s citizenship reasonable?
(The Applicant abandoned the issue of whether the leave requirements of the Citizenship Act violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 or the Canadian Bill of Rights, SC 1960, c 44.)
IV. Standard of Review
[81] The parties and I agree that the standard of review for the GIC’s decision to revoke citizenship is the standard of reasonableness: League for Human Rights of B’Nai Brith Canada v Odynsky, 2010 FCA 307 at para 85, [2012] 2 FCR 312 [Odynsky]; Montoya v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 827 at para 21, 269 ACWS (3d) 227 [Montoya]. The issue between the parties is the appropriate level of deference to be awarded the GIC in these circumstances.
[82] The Respondent highlights that a decision by the GIC implicates “the decision-making of Cabinet, a body of diverse policy perspectives representing all constituencies within government”, that “exercises its discretion to decide on a different platform, based on polycentric considerations and a balancing of individual and public interests”: Odynsky at para 78; Prophet River First Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FC 1030 at para 46 [Prophet River FC], aff’d 2017 FCA 15 [Prophet River FCA]. Considerable deference is owed to a decision of the GIC, since it is a result of “a highly discretionary, policy-based and fact driven process”: Prophet River FCA at para 30; Prophet River FC at para 46.
[83] The Intervener similarly emphasizes that the individual rights at stake must be balanced with “elements of general policy” in determining whether to revoke citizenship, and the GIC is free to make a determination on general policy as long as it does not conflict with the Citizenship Act or its purposes: Odynsky at para 86 and 81, citing FC-1 at para 18. The highly deferential standard that was used to uphold the decision of the GIC not to revoke citizenship in Odynsky should not be altered now that the decision is to revoke citizenship.
[84] The Applicant submits that the GIC is not engaging in a polycentric decision-making process, but is instead called upon to apply the facts to the legal definition of complicity in Ezokola. Additionally, this decision has been sent back three times for reconsideration due to the GIC’s mistakes. The lowest level of deference is appropriate.
[85] The Intervener argues, to the contrary, that the presumption of regularity of administrative procedures, absent evidence to the contrary, indicates that after four tries the GIC should be presumed to get the law right: Ellis-Don Ltd v Ontario (Labour Relations Board), 2001 SCC 4 at para 33, [2001] 1 SCR 221. That decision does not necessarily support the Intervener’s argument.
[86] The Applicant further notes that in Vavilov v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FCA 132 at paras 36-37, 281 ACWS (3d) 472 [Vavilov], the Federal Court of Appeal noted that when significant interests were at stake, or on issues of statutory interpretation in the immigration context, the reasonableness standard has been applied “in a more exacting way”.
[87] I find that considerable deference is owed to the GIC’s decision due to the polycentric nature of the specific issue being addressed. Reasonableness assessed in an exacting way is an appropriate standard when examining facts and the application of law to those facts.
[88] Although the Applicant’s individual interests are high, which in Vavilov indicated that the reasonableness standard should be approached in a more exacting way, statutory interpretation is not at issue in this case. The MacKay Decision conclusively found that the Applicant obtained citizenship through false representation or by knowingly concealing material circumstances pursuant to s 10 of the Citizenship Act.
[89] Once the Citizenship Act requirements for revocation have been met, the GIC must weigh the Policy, the Applicant’s personal interests, and the public interest to determine whether citizenship should be revoked. As stated by the Respondent, this is a polycentric balancing.
[90] What is at issue is whether the Applicant’s citizenship should be revoked in light of the Policy, which requires that only those cases be pursued where the individual was complicit in war crimes or crimes against humanity. This assessment requires an application of the legal framework of complicity in Ezokola. In addition, if it is determined that the Applicant was complicit, and the Policy was satisfied, the Applicant’s personal interests and the public interest must also be considered. As noted in Montoya at para 21, the GIC’s decision involves broad discretion and a delicate balancing of policy and personal and public interests.
[91] Reasonableness in the context of a revocation of citizenship by the GIC was also comprehensively described by Justice Stratas in Odynsky, which provides considerable guidance in this case:
[85] Under the standard of reasonableness, our task is not to find facts, reweigh them, or substitute our decision for the Governor in Council.