R. v. Côté

R. v. Côté
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
1996-10-03
Report
[1996] 3 SCR 139
Case number
23707
Judges
Lamer, Antonio; La Forest, Gérard V.; L'Heureux-Dubé, Claire; Sopinka, John; Gonthier, Charles Doherty; Cory, Peter deCarteret; McLachlin, Beverley; Iacobucci, Frank; Major, John C.
On appeal from
Quebec
Subjects
Action
Constitutional law
Notes
SCC Case Information: 23707
Decision Content
R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139
Franck Côté, Peter Decontie, Frida Morin‑Côté, Appellants/Respondents
Russell Tenasco and Ben Decontie on Cross‑Appeal
v.
Her Majesty The Queen Respondent/Appellant on Cross‑Appeal
and
The Attorney General of Canada,
Atikamekw‑Sipi/Council of the Atikamekw Nation
and Chief Robert Whiteduck, on behalf of the
Algonquins of Golden Lake First Nation
and on behalf of others Interveners
Indexed as: R. v. Côté
File No.: 23707.
1996: June 17; 1996: October 3.
Present: Lamer C.J. and La Forest, L’Heureux‑Dubé, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for quebec
Constitutional law ‑‑ Aboriginal rights ‑‑ Natives teaching traditional fishing techniques -- Charge of fishing without licence laid ‑‑ Incident occurring in traditional fishing area ‑‑ Whether an aboriginal fishing or other right must be necessarily incident to a claim of aboriginal title in land ‑‑ Whether an aboriginal right may exist independently of a claim of aboriginal title ‑‑ Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35(1) .
Constitutional law ‑‑ Aboriginal rights ‑‑ Quebec ‑‑ Aboriginal law not recognized by French colonial regime prior to transition to British sovereignty ‑‑ Whether constitutional protection extends to aboriginal practices, customs and traditions of Quebec natives ‑‑ Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35(1) -- Quebec Act, 1774, R.S.C., 1985, App. II, No. 2 -- Royal Proclamation, 1763, R.S.C., 1985, App. II, No. 1.
Constitutional law ‑‑ Aboriginal rights ‑‑ Treaty right to fish ‑‑ Division of powers ‑‑ Natives entering a provincial controlled harvest zone by motorized vehicle ‑‑ Provincial regulation requiring payment of fee for such entry ‑‑ Fee directly tied to cost of roads and infrastructure ‑‑ Entry by other modes of transportation free ‑‑ Whether a provincial regulation infringing a treaty right to fish was of no force or effect given the overlapping statutory and constitutional protection extended to treaty rights from provincial legislation under both s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 , and s. 88 of the Indian Act ‑‑ Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35(1) ‑‑ Indian Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I‑5, s. 88 ‑‑ Regulation respecting controlled zones, R.R.Q. 1981, 370 (supp.), ss. 5, 5.1.
Practice ‑‑ Defective information ‑‑ Amendment ‑‑ Information indicating wrong section ‑‑ Parties aware of infraction notwithstanding defect ‑‑ Whether the information should be amended by this Court ‑‑ Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 601 ‑‑ Summary Convictions Act, R.S.Q., c. P‑15, ss. 66(1), 82, 90, 101 ‑‑ Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S‑26, s. 48 .
The appellants, all Algonquins, were members of an expedition to teach traditional fishing methods. All were convicted under Quebec’s Regulation respecting controlled zones with entering a controlled harvest zone (Z.E.C.) without paying the required fee for motor vehicle access. This zone was located within the appellants’ traditional hunting and fishing grounds. The appellant Côté was also convicted under s. 4(1) of the Quebec Fishery Regulations of fishing within the zone without a valid licence. The Superior Court and the Court of Appeal upheld the convictions. The appellants jointly challenged their convictions on the basis that they were exercising an aboriginal right and a concurrent treaty right to fish on their ancestral lands as recognized and protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 . The Attorney General cross‑appealed the Court of Appeal’s holding that the appellants enjoyed a treaty right to fish under a treaty concluded at Swegatchy in 1769.
In resolving this appeal, the Court had to address three questions: (1) whether an aboriginal fishing or other right must be necessarily incident to a claim of aboriginal title in land, or whether an aboriginal right may exist independently of a claim of aboriginal title; (2) whether, under the principles of the Van der Peet trilogy, the constitutional protection of s. 35(1) extends to aboriginal practices, customs and traditions which may not have achieved legal recognition under the colonial regime of New France prior to the commencement of British sovereignty in 1763; and, (3) whether a provincial regulation allegedly infringing a treaty right to fish was of no force or effect given the overlapping statutory and constitutional protection extended to treaty rights from provincial legislation under both s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 , and s. 88 of the Indian Act .
The information laid was defective in that it referred to s. 5 rather than s. 5.1 of the Regulation respecting controlled zones. A further issue existed as to whether the information, absent any confusion because of the error, should be amended by this Court.
Held: The appeal against the conviction of Franck Côté under s. 4(1) of the Quebec Fishery Regulations should be allowed. The appeals against conviction under the Regulation respecting controlled zones should be dismissed.
Per Lamer C.J. and Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major JJ.: The appellants were not obliged to prove aboriginal title over the Z.E.C., whether at common law or under the Royal Proclamation, 1763, as a precondition to demonstrating the existence of an ancestral right to fish. For the reasons given in R. v. Adams, aboriginal rights may indeed exist independently of aboriginal title. Aboriginal title is simply one manifestation of the doctrine of aboriginal rights. The purpose of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 was to constitutionally entrench and recognize those practices, customs and traditions central to the distinctive culture of pre‑existing aboriginal societies. These defining practices, customs and traditions are not limited to those representing incidents of a continuous and historical occupation of a specific tract of land. A protected aboriginal right falling short of aboriginal title may nonetheless have an important link to the land. An aboriginal practice, custom or tradition entitled to protection as an aboriginal right will frequently be limited to a specific territory of location, depending on the actual pattern of exercise of such an activity prior to contact. As such, an aboriginal right will often be defined in site‑specific terms, with the result that it can only be exercised upon a specific tract of land.
French law, while never explicitly recognizing the existence of a sui generis aboriginal interest in land, did not explicitly deny its existence. Indeed, the French Crown may never have assumed full title and ownership to the lands occupied by aboriginal peoples in light of the nature and pattern of French settlement in New France and given its diplomatic relations which maintained that aboriginal peoples were sovereign nations rather than mere subjects of the monarch.
It is not clear that French colonial law governing relations with aboriginal peoples was mechanically received by the common law upon the commencement of British sovereignty. The common law recognizing aboriginal title was arguably a necessary incident of British sovereignty which displaced the pre‑existing colonial law governing New France. Indeed, the law of aboriginal title has been found to be a distinct species of federal common law rather than a simple subset of the common or civil law or property law operating within the province.
Even if it is assumed that the French Crown did not legally recognize the right of the Algonquins to fish within the Z.E.C. prior to the commencement of British sovereignty, the appellants can still seek to establish their aboriginal right to fish within the Z.E.C. under the principles of the Van der Peet trilogy. The intervention of French sovereignty did not negate the potential existence of aboriginal rights within the former boundaries of New France under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 . The fact that a particular practice, custom or tradition continued, in an unextinguished manner, following the arrival of Europeans but in the absence of the formal gloss of legal recognition from French colonial law should not undermine the constitutional protection accorded to aboriginal peoples. Section 35(1) would fail to achieve its noble purpose of preserving the integral and defining features of distinctive aboriginal societies if it only protected those defining features receiving the legal recognition and approval of European colonizers. Such a static and retrospective interpretation of s. 35(1) cannot be reconciled with the noble and prospective purpose of the constitutional entrenchment of aboriginal and treaty rights in the Constitution Act, 1982 . Indeed, the respondent’s proposed interpretation risks undermining the very purpose of s. 35(1) by perpetuating the historical injustice suffered by aboriginal peoples at the hands of colonizers who failed to respect the distinctive cultures of pre‑existing aboriginal societies. In addition, the French Regime’s failure to recognize legally a specific aboriginal practice, custom or tradition (and indeed the French Regime’s tacit toleration of a specific practice, custom or tradition) clearly cannot be equated with a “clear and plain” intention to extinguish such practices under the extinguishment test of s. 35(1) .
A substantive aboriginal right will normally include the incidental right to teach such a practice, custom and tradition to a younger generation to ensure the continuity of aboriginal practices, customs and traditions. The actual substantive claim in this instance was therefore a site‑specific right to fish for food. The Quebec Fishery Regulations prohibit all fishing within the area in the absence of a licence and on its face directly regulates the appellant’s fishing practices. The Regulation respecting controlled zones, however, only prohibits access to the Z.E.C. by motor vehicle in the absence of payment of a fee. At face value, the provincial regulation would appear to regulate a right of access to land, rather than a right to fish. But a right to fish for food upon a certain tract of territory would be meaningless without a right of physical access to that territory. If the provincial regulation effectively precluded the Algonquins from gaining access to the Z.E.C., such a regulation would have a direct impact upon the claimed right to fish. Under the totality of the circumstances, the asserted right is therefore properly framed as a right to fish for food within the territory of the Z.E.C.
The second stage of the Van der Peet analysis requires the court to inquire whether the activity claimed to be an aboriginal right is part of a practice, custom or tradition which was, prior to the contact with Europeans, an integral part of the distinctive aboriginal society of the aboriginal people in question. Evidence that a custom was a significant part of their distinctive culture at contact will generally be sufficient to demonstrate that that custom was also significant to that particular culture prior to contact. Here, the relevant time period for contact is best identified as the arrival of Samuel de Champlain in 1603.
In light of the Crown’s failure to elicit any contrary historical evidence at trial, the evidence produced at trial coupled with the findings of fact of the Superior Court was sufficient to support the inference that fishing for food within the lakes and rivers of the territory of the Z.E.C. was a significant part of the life of the Algonquins from at least 1603 and the arrival of French explorers and missionaries into the area. Fishing was significant to the Algonquins, as it represented the predominant source of subsistence during the season leading up to winter.
The second stage of the Van der Peet analysis requires a “continuity” between aboriginal practices, customs and traditions that existed prior to contact and a particular practice, custom or tradition that is integral to aboriginal communities today. Because the courts below collectively operated on the assumption that the claim of an aboriginal right to fish must rest in an underlying claim to aboriginal title, they did not direct themselves to answering this question. Nevertheless, a survey of the record revealed that this part of the Van der Peet test was met. In conclusion, the appellants have demonstrated the existence of an aboriginal right to fish within the lakes and rivers of the territory of the Z.E.C. under the Van der Peet test.
The Algonquins’ aboriginal right to fish within the Z.E.C. was not extinguished prior to 1982, because the respondent declined to offer any proof relating to the question of extinguishment.
Certain factors might indicate that there had been a prima facie infringement of an aboriginal right: (1) whether the limitation is unreasonable; (2) imposes undue hardship; (3) or denies the holder of the right the preferred means of exercising that right. As noted in R. v. Gladstone, however, these questions do not define the concept of prima facie infringement; they only point to factors which will indicate if such an infringement has taken place. The onus of proving a prima facie infringement lies on the individual or group challenging the legislation.
The Quebec Fishery Regulations infringed the appellant Côté’s right to fish for food within the Z.E.C. They stipulated that a person fishing within designated territories must hold a valid licence. The regulations, while authorizing the Minister at his or her discretion to issue a special permit to an aboriginal person authorizing that person to fish for food, did not prescribe any criteria to guide or structure the exercise of this discretion. Such a regulatory scheme must, in the very least, structure the exercise of a discretionary power to ensure that the power is exercised in a manner consistent with the Crown’s special fiduciary duties towards aboriginal peoples, as is held in Adams. Section 4(1) and the surrounding provisions of the Quebec Fishery Regulations therefore impose undue hardship on the appellant and interfere with his preferred mode of exercising his rights.
The Regulation respecting controlled zones does not infringe the appellants’ right to fish for food within the Z.E.C. Under the terms of the provincial regulation, an Algonquin person is at liberty to enter the Z.E.C. by a variety of means other than motor vehicle without fee. Although the regulation may infringe an aboriginal or treaty right under the Sparrow test by conditioning the exercise of such a right upon the payment of a user fee, the financial burden in this instance does not amount to an infringement of the appellants’ ancestral right to fish for food. The fee, rather than constituting a revenue‑generating tax for the provincial government or the Z.E.C. administration, represented a form of user fee dedicated to the upkeep of the facilities and roads of the Z.E.C. The access fee, by improving the means of transportation within the Z.E.C., effectively facilitates rather than restricts the constitutional rights of the appellants.
In determining whether an infringement is justified, the court must first be satisfied that the asserted legislative objective is “compelling and substantial” and then examine whether the infringement unduly restricts the aboriginal right in question and whether the restriction can be accommodated with the Crown's special fiduciary relationship with First Nations. The infringement of the appellant Côté’s right to fish resulting from s. 4(1) of the Quebec Fishery Regulations was not justified. The Crown failed to meet both legs of the test of justification, since the scheme appeared driven by the objective of facilitating sport fishing, and since the scheme provided no priority to aboriginal rights to fish for food. Absent infringement, it was not necessary to consider whether this provincial regulatory scheme met the test of justification.
Section 88 of the Indian Act serves two distinct purposes. The first is jurisdictional. Through its operation, provincial laws otherwise not applicable to native persons under the division of powers are made applicable as incorporated federal law. The second is to accord federal statutory protection to aboriginal treaty rights through the operation of the doctrine of federal paramountcy.
Section 88 was not engaged here. Assuming without deciding the existence of the alleged treaty right, the impugned provincial regulation did not restrict or infringe this treaty right to fish. Rather, it only imposed a modest financial burden on the exercise of this alleged treaty right where access is sought by motor vehicle, and under the circumstances, the access fee actually facilitated rather than restricted the exercise of this right. Thus, even if the relevant right is characterized as a treaty right, the provincial regulation remains operative in relation to the activities of the appellants.
In considering whether to amend a defective information or indictment, a court must concern itself with the impact of the proposed amendment upon the accused. The applicable standard under s. 601 of the Criminal Code is whether the accused would suffer “irreparable prejudice” as a result of the amended charge. The applicable standard for amendment is the same under the Summary Convictions Act. To the extent that the evidence conforms with the correct charge and the appellants have not been misled or irreparably prejudiced by the variance between the evidence and the information, the defect can and should be remedied. There is no evidence here that the appellants have been prejudiced or misled by the reference to s. 5 in the information.
Per La Forest J.: The traditional use by natives that has continued from pre‑contact times of a particular area for a particular purpose can be recognized as an aboriginal right, even though the natives have no general right of occupation ( “Indian title”) of the affected land. This type of servitude should be recognized and was sufficiently established here. The fact that Quebec once fell under the French regime does not affect the matter. It was not established ‑‑ and certainly not in clear and plain terms ‑‑ that this aboriginal right was extinguished either during the French regime or later. The right claimed is, therefore, an “existing right” under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 . Agreement was expressed with the reasons of Lamer C.J. with respect to the claimed right’s being infringed by the Quebec Fishery Regulations but not by the Regulation respecting controlled zones and with respect to his discussion under the headings “Treaty Rights” and “Amendment of Information and Constitutional Questions”.
Per L’Heureux‑Dubé J.: The reasons of Lamer C.J. were agreed with subject to the comments made in R. v. Adams.
Cases Cited
By Lamer C.J.
Applied: R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, rev’g sub nom. Adams v. La Reine, [1993] R.J.Q. 1011; R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507; R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723; R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672; R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; referred to: R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, aff’g [1987] R.J.Q. 1722; Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313; R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771; Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335; Campbell v. Hall (1774), 1 Cowp. 204, 98 E.R. 1045; Sammut v. Strickland, [1938] A.C. 678; Roberts v. Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 322; Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1; Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, [1980] 1 F.C. 518; R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013; R. v. Dick, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309; Kruger v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104; Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387; R. v. P. (M.B.), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 555; R. v. Tremblay, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 932; Vézina and Côté v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 2; Morozuk v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 31.
By La Forest J.
Referred to: R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101.
By L’Heureux‑Dubé J.
Applied: R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
An Act respecting the Conservation and Development of wildlife, S.Q. 1983, c. 39.
Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35(1) .
Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C‑46, s. 601 .
Fisheries Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F‑14 .
Indian Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I‑5 [formerly R.S.C. 1970, c. I-6], s. 88 .
Quebec Act, 1774, R.S.C., 1985, App. II, No. 2.
Quebec Fishery Regulations, C.R.C., c. 852, ss. 4(1) [rep. & sub. SOR/84-56, s. 3(1)], 5(3) [rep. & sub. SOR/81-660, s. 2(1)], (9) [ad. idem, s. 2(2)].
Regulation respecting controlled zones, R.R.Q. 1981, 370 (supp.), ss. 5 [rep. & sub. (1984) 116 G.O. II, 2114, s. 4], 5.1 [ad. idem].
Royal Proclamation, 1763, R.S.C., 1985, App. II, No. 1.
Summary Convictions Act, R.S.Q., c. P‑15, ss. 66(1), 82, 90, 101.
Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S‑26, s. 48 .
Authors Cited
Boivin, Richard. “Le droit des autochtones sur le territoire québécois et les effets du régime français” (1995), 55 R. du B. 135.
Brun, Henri. “Les droits des Indiens sur le territoire du Québec” (1969), 10 C. de D. 415.
Brun, Henri. Le territoire du Québec: six études juridiques. Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1974.
Canada. Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal Peoples, Self‑Government, and the Constitution. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1993.
Cumming, Peter A., and Neil H. Mickenberg, eds. Native Rights in Canada, 2nd ed. Toronto: Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada in association with General Publishing Co. Ltd., 1972.
Eccles, W. J. “Sovereignty ‑ Association, 1500‑1783”, Canadian Historical Review, 65, 4 (1984): 475-510.
Green, Leslie Claude, and Olive P. Dickason. The Law of Nations and the New World. Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 1989.
Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada. Native Rights in Canada. Report of the Legal Committee of the Indian‑Eskimo Association of Canada. Toronto: Harvie Foundation, 1970.
Jaenen, Cornelius J. “French Sovereignty and Native Nationhood during the French Régime”, in J. R. Miller, ed., Sweet Promises: A Reader on Indian-White Relations in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991, 19.
MacFarlane, R. O. “British Indian Policy in Nova Scotia to 1760”, Canadian Historical Review, 19, 2 (1938): 154-167.
MacNutt, W. S. The Atlantic Provinces: The Emergence of Colonial Society 1712‑1857. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1965.
Slattery, Brian. “Did France Claim Canada Upon ‘Discovery’?” In J. M. Bumsted, ed., Interpreting Canada’s Past (1986), vol. I. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Slattery, Brian. “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1987), 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727.
Stanley, G. F. G. “The First Indian ‘Reserves’ in Canada”, Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française 4, 2 (1950): 178-210.
Stanley, G. F. G. New France: The Last Phase 1744‑1760. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1968.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal, [1993] R.J.Q. 1350, [1994] 3 C.N.L.R. 98, (1993) 107 D.L.R. (4th) 28, dismissing an appeal from a judgment of Frenette J., [1989] R.J.Q. 1893, [1991] 1 C.N.L.R. 107, dismissing an appeal from conviction by Barrière Prov. Ct. J., [1988] R.J.Q. 1969, [1989] 3 C.N.L.R. 141, under the Quebec Fishery Regulations and the Regulation respecting controlled zones. Appeal allowed with respect to the conviction under the Quebec Fishery Regulations but dismissed with respect to the convictions under the Regulation respecting controlled zones.
Agnès Laporte, Richard Gaudreau and Michel Ste‑Marie, for the appellants, respondents on the cross‑appeal.
René Morin and Pierre Lachance, for the respondent, appellant on the cross‑appeal.
Jean‑Marc Aubry, Q.C., and Richard Boivin, for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada.
Paul Dionne and Anjali Choksi, for the intervener Atikamekw‑Sipi/Council of the Atikamekw Nation.
Alan Pratt and Paul Williams, for the intervener Chief Robert Whiteduck, on behalf of the Algonquins of Golden Lake First Nation and on behalf of others.
The judgment of Lamer C.J. and Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major JJ. was delivered by
The Chief Justice --
I. Introduction
1 This appeal and the appeal of R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, have been released simultaneously and should be read together in light of the closely related issues raised by both cases.
2 The appellants, members of the Algonquin people, were convicted of the offence of entering a controlled harvest zone in the Outaouais region of Quebec without paying the required fee for motor vehicle access. The appellant Côté was additionally convicted of the offence of fishing within the zone in the absence of a valid licence. The appellants jointly challenge their convictions on the basis that they were exercising an aboriginal right and a concurrent treaty right to fish on their ancestral lands as recognized and protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 .
3 The appellant Côté was convicted under the same federal fishing regulation as the accused in Adams. In resolving both this appeal and Adams, this Court must answer the question of whether an aboriginal fishing or other right must be necessarily incident to a claim of aboriginal title in land, or whether an aboriginal right may exist independently of a claim of aboriginal title. In the trilogy of R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723, and R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672, this Court elaborated the appropriate principles for identifying aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) . This case and Adams will require an application of the principles articulated in this trilogy to the question of the relationship between aboriginal title and other aboriginal rights, particularly fishing rights, recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) .
4 Additionally, these two related appeals involve the claim of an aboriginal right within the historic boundaries of New France. As such, this Court must answer the question of whether, under the principles of the Van der Peet trilogy, the constitutional protection of s. 35(1) extends to aboriginal practices, customs and traditions which did not achieve legal recognition under the colonial regime of New France prior to the transition to British sovereignty in 1763.
5 However, unlike the appeals in Van Der Peet, Gladstone, N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd. and Adams, this appeal also implicates the constitutionality of a provincial regulation which allegedly infringes a treaty right to fish. Therefore, in the context of this appeal, this Court is additionally asked to consider the overlapping statutory and constitutional protection extended to treaty rights from inconsistent provincial legislation under both s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 , and s. 88 of the Indian Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-5 .
II. Facts
6 The five appellants are Algonquin Indians, members of the Desert River Band and residents of the Maniwaki reserve. The relevant facts are not in dispute. In July 1984, the appellants, accompanied by a number of young aboriginal students, entered the Controlled Harvest Zone of Bras-Coupé-Desert (the "zone d'exploitation contrôlée", or "Z.E.C."), a 1 100 km2 wilderness zone located in the Outaouais region of Quebec, by motor vehicle. The Z.E.C. falls outside the Maniwaki reserve. The appellants entered the Z.E.C. for the purpose of teaching the students traditional hunting and fishing practices. The appellants refused to pay the required fee for motor vehicle access to the Z.E.C. Upon entry within the zone, the appellant Côté fished the waters of Desert Lake to demonstrate traditional Algonquin fishing practices. Côté did not possess a fishing licence.
7 The appellants were collectively charged with the provincial offence of failing to pay the access fee required under the Regulation respecting controlled zones, R.R.Q. 1981, 370 (supp.), promulgated under An Act respecting the conservation and development of wildlife, S.Q. 1983, c. 39. Under the Regulation as it existed at the time, an individual on foot could enter the Z.E.C. free of charge, but an individual within a vehicle could only enter the Z.E.C. for an access fee ranging from $3 to $7. The penalty for failing to pay the access fee was a fine ranging from $75 to $200 per infraction. While the sworn informations charged the appellants with infractions under s. 5 of the Regulation, the prosecution was conducted under the assumption that the appellants had committed infractions under s. 5.1 of the Regulation. As the two regulatory provisions read:
5. In order to hunt, fish or trap in a controlled zone, the following dues are payable:
(1) not more than 10 $ per day for fishing, hunting or trapping activities, except for hunting deer, moose and black bear;
(2) not more than 25 $ per day for hunting deer, moose and black bear.
5.1 In order to enter a controlled zone, the following dues are payable:
(1) not more than 3 $ when a person enters alone in a vehicle;
(2) not more than 5 $ when 2 persons enter in a vehicle;
(3) not more than 7 $ when 3 persons or more enter in a vehicle;
(4) not more than an additional 3 $ per vehicle entering or leaving the controlled zone between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m.
8 The single appellant Côté was additionally charged with the federal offence of fishing without a licence contrary to s. 4(1) of the Quebec Fishery Regulations, C.R.C., c. 852, promulgated under the Fisheries Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-14 . Under ss. 5(3) and 5(9) of the Regulations, the appellant could have applied for a special licence exempting him from the requirements of the Regulations. As the provisions read:
4. (1) Subject to subsections (2), (6), (18), (19) and 18(1.2), no person shall fish for any fresh-water, anadromous or catadromous fish unless he is the holder of the appropriate licence described in Schedule III.
5. ...
(3) The Minister may issue to any person engaged in activities of an educational nature or in biological management or research a special licence exempting, subject to the conditions set out therein, the licensee from the requirements of these Regulations.
(9) The Minister may issue to an Indian or an Inuk, to a band of Indians or to an Inuit group, a special licence permitting, subject to the conditions set out therein, the catching of fish for food.
There is no evidence in the record which indicates that Côté had attempted to obtain a special licence.
9 The appellants admit the constituent elements of both offences. However, they claim that the federal and provincial regulations were inoperative in relation to their activities as they were exercising an aboriginal right and a concurrent treaty right to fish on their ancestral lands as recognized and affirmed under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 . More specifically, they claim an aboriginal right to fish incident to a right of aboriginal title over the Z.E.C. derived from historical occupation at common law or, alternatively, under the terms of the Royal Proclamation, 1763, R.S.C., 1985, App. II, No. 1 (hereinafter the "Proclamation"). For the purposes of the application of s. 35(1) and the Proclamation, it is accepted that the Z.E.C. falls within the boundaries of New France prior to 1763, and within the interior of the Colony of Quebec under the Proclamation at 1763.
10 On April 21, 1988, Barrière Prov. Ct. J. rejected the appellants' constitutional arguments and convicted the appellants of the stipulated offences. The appellants appealed their convictions to the Superior Court under s. 90 of the former Summary Convictions Act, R.S.Q., c. P-15, and on May 19, 1989, Frenette J. upheld their convictions. On further appeal to the Quebec Court of Appeal, a majority of the Court (Baudouin and Tyndale JJ.A.) again affirmed the convictions. The majority found that the appellants enjoyed a treaty right to fish within the Z.E.C., but concluded that the access fee regulation and the licensing regulation could ultimately be justified under the test set out in R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. Delisle J.A., dissenting in part, would have allowed the appellant Côté's appeal of his conviction under the Quebec Fishery Regulations, as the licensing requirement could not be justified under the Sparrow test.
III. Judgments Below
11 As a preliminary remark, I wish to note two important features of the judgments below. First, the judgments in the Provincial Court and the Superior Court were rendered prior to this Court's decisions in Sparrow and R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025. Accordingly, both courts lacked the elaboration by this Court of the appropriate methodology and framework for approaching both aboriginal rights under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 , and treaty rights under s. 88 of the Indian Act . Second, in all three of the courts below, the parties characterized their asserted aboriginal right to fish as a right incident to aboriginal title. As such, the judgments of the Provincial Court, Superior Court, and the Quebec Court of Appeal uniformly focused their factual inquiries and their legal analysis on whether the appellants had established the existence of aboriginal title over the Z.E.C. territory. In short, the courts below did not consider the possibility that the appellants may have enjoyed a free-standing aboriginal right to fish independent of title.
Provincial Court, [1988] R.J.Q. 1969, [1989] 3 C.N.L.R. 141
12 At trial, the appellants adduced testimonial evidence from a number of lay and expert witnesses, including Dr. Raynald Parent (historian), Mr. Jean-Guy Deschênes (anthropologist), Mr. Jacques Frenette (anthropologist and ethnohistorian), and Messrs. Albert Brascoupé and William Commanda (elders of the Desert River Band). In argument, the appellants submitted that they had demonstrated the existence of aboriginal title over the territory of the Z.E.C. under the terms of the Proclamation and at common law. Alternatively, the appellants submitted that they had established the existence of a valid treaty, concluded in 1760 at Swegatchy and subsequently confirmed at Caughnawaga, which guaranteed a right to fish within the territory of the Z.E.C.
13 In reply, the respondent Attorney General called only three witnesses: Ms. Jacqueline Beaulieu (a geographer), Mr. Gilbert Ryan (an employee of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development) and Mr. Claude Morin (Director of the Z.E.C.). The respondent rejected the existence of both an aboriginal right and a concurrent treaty right. The respondent further took the position that aboriginal title does not exist within the former territories of New France, as French colonial law received through the Quebec Act, 1774, R.S.C., 1985, App. II, No. 2, recognized no aboriginal right arising from prior occupation.
14 At the outset of his analysis, Barrière Prov. Ct. J. engaged in a close examination of the legal effect of the Proclamation. After surveying the relevant history, and relying upon the decisions of the Quebec Superior Court and the Quebec Court of Appeal in Adams v. La Reine, [1993] R.J.Q. 1011 (C.A.), Barrière Prov. Ct. J. concluded that the Proclamation did not create or recognize any new aboriginal rights to land within the interior of the Colony of Quebec. However, it remained to be determined whether the appellants could establish a right to title outside the Proclamation.
15 Proceeding to the circumstances of this case, Barrière Prov. Ct. J. held that the appellants did not enjoy any right to hunt or fish within the Z.E.C. on the basis of an ancestral right connected to aboriginal title. On the basis of the historical evidence presented before him (particularly by the historian Parent, and the anthropologists Deschênes and Frenette), the trial judge arrived at a number of conclusions. He found that the Z.E.C. was indeed located within the ancestral lands of the Desert River Band of the Algonquin Indians. He also concluded that the legal requirements for the existence of aboriginal title over this specific territory were satisfied. However, based on his interpretation of the jurisprudence, Barrière Prov. Ct. J. held that the Proclamation was not the source of any new aboriginal rights to land within the interior of the Colony of Quebec; this territorial restriction also prevented the application, within Quebec, of the common law of aboriginal title. Since the Z.E.C. fell within the boundaries of the Colony, he concluded that the appellant did not enjoy any aboriginal title over the relevant lands. In the absence of title and given the manner in which the case had been argued before him, Barrière Prov. Ct. J. thus reasoned that the appellants did not enjoy any accessory aboriginal rights to fish and hunt.
16 Barrière Prov. Ct. J. also concluded that the appellants did not enjoy a treaty right to hunt and fish within the entire territory of the Z.E.C. He did find that an enforceable and valid treaty was concluded in 1760 at Swegatchy. He further found that this treaty included the right to possess the settled lands the Algonquins occupied at the time of discovery. But in light of the nomadic quality of the Algonquins, he was sceptical whether the Algonquins enjoyed a roaming right to hunt or fish over all their traditional hunting grounds. Rather, he was of the view that the Algonquins only enjoyed a right to hunt and fish in proximity to the lands they actually settled -- lands which did not include the entire expanse of the Z.E.C.
17 However, unguided by this Court's future jurisprudence, Barrière Prov. Ct. J. concluded that "our laws" recognize a general aboriginal right to hunt and fish. It was during this discussion that the trial judge made his important findings of fact. More specifically, he found that the Algonquins represented an organized society which exercised exclusive occupation over this specific territory in the past. However, it is important to stress that his finding was dated at the time of the British Conquest rather than at the time of first contact. As he stated at p. 156 (C.N.L.R.):
[translation] Based on the foregoing, although the Algonquins were not the “owners” of the place where the offences were committed, the evidence showed that they had the right to hunt and fish for their subsistence. This was an organized society that occupied the said territory. The testimony of the historian Dr. Parent, the anthropologists Mr. Deschênes and Mr. Frenette and the two elders William Commando [sic] and Albert Brascoupé is also sufficient for the Court to conclude that this occupation was exclusive to the Algonquins at the time Great Britain took possession. There was no evidence that the whites or anyone else occupied the said territory. [Emphasis added.]
Accordingly, he concluded that the appellants enjoyed an aboriginal right to hunt and fish for subsistence within the Z.E.C. which was entitled to constitutional protection under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 .
18 Lastly, the trial judge found that the regulations did not unreasonably infringe the rights of the appellants, and he accordingly entered convictions. Barrière Prov. Ct. J. did not neatly divide the questions of infringement and justification. However, he appeared to conclude that there was no infringement in this instance, as he reasoned that the appellants were not exercising their right to fish for subsistence but rather had engaged in fishing for the purpose of teaching.
Superior Court, [1989] R.J.Q. 1893, [1991] 1 C.N.L.R. 107
19 On appeal, Frenette J. affirmed the convictions. Frenette J. arrived at the same result as the trial judge, but he did so by