Mission Institution v. Khela

Mission Institution v. Khela
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2014-03-27
Neutral citation
2014 SCC 24
Report
[2014] 1 SCR 502
Case number
34609
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; LeBel, Louis; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Rothstein, Marshall; Cromwell, Thomas Albert; Moldaver, Michael J.; Karakatsanis, Andromache; Wagner, Richard
On appeal from
British Columbia
Subjects
Administrative law
Courts
Notes
SCC Case Information: 34609
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Mission Institution v. Khela, 2014 SCC 24, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 502
Date: 20140327
Docket: 34609
Between:
Diane Knopf, Warden of Mission Institution,
and Harold Massey, Warden of Kent Institution
Appellants
and
Gurkirpal Singh Khela
Respondent
- and -
Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, John Howard Society of Canada, Canadian Civil Liberties Association and British Columbia Civil Liberties Association
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ.
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 99)
LeBel J. (McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ. concurring)
Mission Institution v. Khela, 2014 SCC 24, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 502
Diane Knopf, Warden of Mission Institution, and
Harold Massey, Warden of Kent Institution Appellants
v.
Gurkirpal Singh Khela Respondent
and
Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies,
John Howard Society of Canada,
Canadian Civil Liberties Association and
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association Interveners
Indexed as: Mission Institution v. Khela
2014 SCC 24
File No.: 34609.
2013: October 16; 2014: March 27.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for british columbia
Courts — Jurisdiction — Habeas corpus — Transfer of federal inmate from medium security institution to maximum security institution on emergency and involuntary basis — Scope of provincial superior court’s review power on application for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid in respect of detention in federal penitentiary — Whether on application for habeas corpus a provincial superior court is entitled to examine reasonableness of administrative decision to transfer offender to higher security institution or whether reasonableness of decision must be determined in Federal Court on judicial review.
Administrative law — Prisons — Procedural fairness — Duty to disclose — Scope of duty to disclose — Transfer of federal inmate from medium security institution to maximum security institution on emergency and involuntary basis — Whether transfer decision meeting statutory requirements related to duty of procedural fairness — Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20, ss. 27 to 29 — Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, SOR/92‑620, ss. 5, 13.
K is a federal inmate serving a life sentence for first degree murder at Kent Institution in British Columbia. After three years at this maximum security facility, he was transferred to Mission Institution, a medium security facility. In 2009, an inmate was stabbed at Mission Institution. Roughly one week after the stabbing, the Security Intelligence Office at Mission received information implicating K in the incident. A Security Intelligence Report was completed which contained information that K had hired two other inmates to carry out the stabbing in exchange for three grams of heroin. As a result, K was involuntarily transferred back to the maximum security facility on an emergency basis after the Warden reassessed his security classification. It is this transfer that was the subject of K’s initial habeas corpus application. He claimed that this transfer to a higher security institution was both unreasonable and procedurally unfair, and therefore unlawful. Both the British Columbia Supreme Court and, on appeal, the British Columbia Court of Appeal agreed K’s habeas corpus application should be granted.
Held: The appeal should be dismissed.
The question before the Court is whether on an application for habeas corpus a provincial superior court may rule on the reasonableness of an administrative decision to transfer an inmate to a higher security institution or whether the reasonableness of the decision must be dealt with by the Federal Court on an application for judicial review. An inmate can choose either to challenge the reasonableness of the decision by applying for judicial review in the Federal Court or to have the decision reviewed for reasonableness by means of an application for habeas corpus. “Reasonableness” is therefore a legitimate ground upon which to question the legality of a deprivation of liberty in an application for habeas corpus.
Given the flexibility and the importance of the writ of habeas corpus, as well as the underlying reasons why the jurisdiction of the provincial superior courts is concurrent with that of the Federal Court, it is clear that a review for lawfulness will sometimes require an assessment of the decision’s reasonableness. Including a reasonableness assessment in the scope of the review is consistent with this Court’s case law. In particular, allowing provincial superior courts to assess reasonableness in the review follows logically from how this Court has framed the remedy and from the limits the courts have placed on the avenues through which the remedy can be obtained. This Court has recognized in its decisions that habeas corpus should develop over time to ensure that the law remains consistent with the remedy’s underlying goals: no one should be deprived of their liberty without lawful authority.
Many of the same principles which weigh in favour of concurrent jurisdiction between provincial superior courts and the Federal Court apply to the determination of the scope of a provincial superior court’s review power. First, each applicant should be entitled to choose his or her avenue of relief. If a court hearing a habeas corpus application cannot review the reasonableness of the underlying decision, then a prisoner who has been deprived of his or her liberty as a result of an unreasonable decision does not have a choice of avenues through which to obtain redress but must apply to the Federal Court. Second, there is no reason to assume that the Federal Court is more expert than the superior courts in determining whether a deprivation of liberty is lawful. Third, if inmates are not able to obtain review of their potentially unreasonable loss of liberty under an application for habeas corpus, they will have to wade through the lengthy grievance procedure available under the statute in order to have their concerns heard. Fourth, the fact that inmates have local access to relief in the form of habeas corpus also weighs in favour of including a review for reasonableness. Fifth, the non‑discretionary nature of habeas corpus and the traditional onus on an application for that remedy favour an inmate who claims to have been unlawfully deprived of his or her liberty. If the inmate were forced to apply to the Federal Court to determine whether the deprivation was unreasonable, the remedy would be a discretionary one. Further, on an application for judicial review, the onus would be on the applicant to show that the transfer decision was unreasonable. Lastly, requiring inmates to challenge the reasonableness of a transfer decision in the Federal Court could result in a waste of judicial resources.
A transfer decision that does not fall within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the law will be unlawful. Similarly, a decision that lacks justification, transparency, and intelligibility will be unlawful. For it to be lawful, the reasons for and record of the decision must in fact or in principle support the conclusion reached. A decision will be unreasonable, and therefore unlawful, if an inmate’s liberty interests are sacrificed absent any evidence or on the basis of unreliable or irrelevant evidence, or evidence that cannot support the conclusion. Deference will be shown to a determination that evidence is reliable, but the authorities will nonetheless have to explain that determination. A review to determine whether a decision was reasonable, and therefore lawful, necessarily requires deference. An involuntary transfer decision is nonetheless an administrative decision made by a decision maker with expertise in the environment of a particular penitentiary. To apply any standard other than reasonableness in reviewing such a decision could well lead to the micromanagement of prisons by the courts. The application of a standard of review of reasonableness, however, should not change the basic structure or benefits of the writ of habeas corpus. First, the traditional onuses associated with the writ will remain unchanged. Second, the writ remains non‑discretionary as far as the decision to review the case is concerned. Third, the ability to challenge a decision on the basis that it is unreasonable does not necessarily change the standard of review that applies to other flaws in the decision or in the decision‑making process. For instance, the standard for determining whether the decision maker complied with the duty of procedural fairness will continue to be “correctness”.
In this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the decision made by the Warden in the instant case was unlawful on the basis of unreasonableness. The decision was unlawful because it was procedurally unfair. The statute at issue in this case, the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20 (“CCRA ”), outlines the disclosure that is required for a reviewing court to find a transfer decision fair, and therefore lawful. Section 27 of the CCRA guides the decision maker and elaborates on the resulting procedural rights. In order to guarantee fairness in the process leading up to a transfer decision, s. 27(1) provides that the inmate should be given all the information that was considered in the taking of the decision, or a summary of that information. This disclosure must be made within a reasonable time before the final decision is made. The onus is on the decision maker to show that s. 27(1) was complied with.
The statutory scheme allows for some exemptions from the onerous disclosure requirement of s. 27(1) and (2). Section 27(3) provides that where the Commissioner has reasonable grounds to believe that disclosure of information under s. 27(1) or (2) would jeopardize (a) the safety of any person, (b) the security of a penitentiary, or (c) the conduct of a lawful investigation, he or she may authorize the withholding from the inmate of as much information as is strictly necessary in order to protect the interest that would be jeopardized. A decision to withhold information pursuant to s. 27(3) is necessarily reviewable by way of an application for habeas corpus. Such a decision is not independent of the transfer decision made under s. 29 of the CCRA . If the correctional authorities failed to comply with s. 27 as a whole, a reviewing court may find that the transfer decision was procedurally unfair, and the deprivation of the inmate’s liberty will not be lawful. If the Commissioner, or a representative of the Commissioner, chooses to withhold information from the inmate on the basis of s. 27(3) , the onus is on the decision maker to invoke the provision and prove that there were reasonable grounds to believe that disclosure of that information would jeopardize one of the listed interests.
Here, it is clear from the record that the Warden, in making the transfer decision, considered information that she did not disclose to K. Nor did she give him an adequate summary of the missing information. The withholding of this information was not justified under s. 27(3). If s. 27(3) is never invoked, pled, or proven, there is no basis to find that the Warden was justified in withholding information that was considered in the transfer decision from the inmate. As a result, the Warden’s decision did not meet the statutory requirements related to the duty of procedural fairness. The decision to transfer K from Mission Institution to Kent Institution was therefore unlawful. The British Columbia Supreme Court properly granted habeas corpus and K was properly returned to a medium security institution.
Cases Cited
Applied: May v. Ferndale Institution, 2005 SCC 82, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 809; Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643; R. v. Miller, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 613; Morin v. National Special Handling Unit Review Committee, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 662; referred to: Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342; Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190; Bushell’s Case (1670), Vaughan 135, 124 E.R. 1006; Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Board, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602; Mooring v. Canada (National Parole Board), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 75; Mitchell v. The Queen, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 570; R. v. Gamble, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 595; R. v. J.P.G. (2000), 130 O.A.C. 343; Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1962); Peiroo v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989), 69 O.R. (2d) 253; Libo‑on v. Alberta (Fort Saskatchewan Correctional Centre), 2004 ABQB 416, 32 Alta. L.R. (4th) 128; Goldhar v. The Queen, [1960] S.C.R. 431; Re Sproule (1886), 12 S.C.R. 140; Re Trepanier (1885), 12 S.C.R. 111; R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Cheblak, [1991] 2 All E.R. 319; R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Muboyayi, [1992] 1 Q.B. 244; R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Armah, [1968] A.C. 192; R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Khawaja, [1984] 1 A.C. 74; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339; Lake v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2008 SCC 23, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 761; R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326; Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), 2002 SCC 75, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3; Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817; Chiarelli v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711; Therrien (Re), 2001 SCC 35, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 3; Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 SCC 38, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 326.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 7 , 9 .
Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20, ss. 27 , 28 , 29 .
Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, SOR/92‑620, ss. 5(1)(b), 13.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46 .
Criminal Rules of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, SI/97‑140, r. 4.
Federal Court Rules, SOR/98‑106, rr. 301 to 314.
Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F‑7, ss. 18 , 18.1(2) , (3) (b), (4) .
Habeas Corpus Act, 1679 (Engl.), 31 Cha. 2, c. 2.
Authors Cited
Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. III. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1768.
Canada. Correctional Service. Commissioner’s Directive 081, “Offender Complaints and Grievances”, 2014.
Canada. Correctional Service. Commissioner’s Directive 710‑2, “Transfer of Offenders”, 2010.
Cromwell, Thomas. “Habeas Corpus and Correctional Law — An Introduction” (1977), 3 Queen’s L.J. 295.
Duker, William F. A Constitutional History of Habeas Corpus. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980.
Dyzenhaus, David. “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy”, in Michael Taggart, ed., The Province of Administrative Law. Oxford: Hart, 1997, 279.
Farbey, Judith, Robert J. Sharpe and Simon Atrill. The Law of Habeas Corpus, 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Ford, Cristie. “Dogs and Tails: Remedies in Administrative Law”, in Colleen M. Flood and Lorne Sossin, eds., Administrative Law in Context, 2nd ed. Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2013, 85.
Halliday, Paul D. Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2010.
Harvey, D. A. Cameron. The Law of Habeas Corpus in Canada. Toronto: Butterworths, 1974.
Mullan, David J. Administrative Law. Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001.
Parkes, Debra. “The ‘Great Writ’ Reinvigorated? Habeas Corpus in Contemporary Canada” (2010), 36 Man. L.J. 351.
Sharpe, Robert J. “Habeas Corpus in Canada” (1976), 2 Dal. L.J. 241.
Sharpe, Robert J. The Law of Habeas Corpus, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Wade, H. W. R. “Habeas Corpus and Judicial Review” (1997), 113 L.Q.R. 55.
APPEAL from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (Smith, Chiasson and Groberman JJ.A.), 2011 BCCA 450, 312 B.C.A.C. 217, 531 W.A.C. 217, 246 C.R.R. (2d) 277, 27 Admin. L.R. (5th) 41, 90 C.R. (6th) 149, [2011] B.C.J. No. 2111 (QL), 2011 CarswellBC 3095, setting aside in part a decision of Bruce J., 2010 BCSC 721, 210 C.R.R. (2d) 251, 19 Admin. L.R. (5th) 173, [2010] B.C.J. No. 971 (QL), 2010 CarswellBC 1288. Appeal dismissed.
Anne M. Turley and Jan Brongers, for the appellants.
Bibhas D. Vaze and Michael S. A. Fox, for the respondent.
Allan Manson and Elizabeth Thomas, for the interveners the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies and the John Howard Society of Canada.
D. Lynne Watt, for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
Michael Jackson, Q.C., and Joana G. Thackeray, for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
LeBel J. —
I. Introduction
[1] This case arises from a decision of correctional authorities to transfer a federal inmate from a medium security institution to a maximum security institution on an emergency and involuntary basis. In response to the transfer decision, the inmate filed an application for relief in the form of habeas corpus on the grounds that the decision taken was unreasonable and that it was procedurally unfair.
[2] At issue in this case is the state of the law with respect to the writ of habeas corpus. In particular, this Court must clarify the scope of a provincial superior court’s review power on an application for habeas corpus made by a prison inmate. The first question before the Court is whether on such an application a provincial superior court may rule on the reasonableness of an administrative decision to transfer an inmate to a higher security institution or whether the reasonableness of the decision must be dealt with by the Federal Court on an application for judicial review. The second question concerns the information that must be disclosed to ensure that a transfer decision is procedurally fair.
[3] In my view, superior courts are entitled to review an inmate transfer decision for reasonableness on an application for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid. If a decision is unreasonable, it will be unlawful. Support for this conclusion can be found in the nature of the writ, in past court decisions regarding the writ, and in the importance of swift access to justice for those who have been unlawfully deprived of their liberty.
[4] Moreover, it is well established that a superior court hearing a habeas corpus application may also review a transfer decision for procedural fairness. The statute at issue in this case, the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20 (“CCRA ”), outlines the disclosure that is required for a reviewing court to find such a decision fair, and therefore lawful.
[5] In this case, the correctional authorities did not comply with the statutory disclosure requirements. The breach of the statutory requirements rendered the decision procedurally unfair, and therefore unlawful. Given this finding, I would dismiss the appeal. The judgments of both the British Columbia Supreme Court and the British Columbia Court of Appeal are well founded.
II. Background Facts
[6] The respondent, Mr. Khela, is a federal inmate. He began serving a life sentence for first degree murder at Kent Institution in British Columbia in 2004. After three years at this maximum security facility, he was transferred to Mission Institution, a medium security facility. In February 2010, however, Mr. Khela was involuntarily transferred back to the maximum security facility on an “emergency basis” after the Warden reassessed his security classification. It is this transfer that was the subject of Mr. Khela’s initial habeas corpus application. Mr. Khela claimed that this transfer to a higher security institution was both unreasonable and procedurally unfair, and therefore unlawful.
[7] The events that led up to the transfer in question are as follows. On September 23, 2009, an inmate was stabbed several times at Mission Institution. Roughly one week after the stabbing, the Security Intelligence Office at Mission received information implicating Mr. Khela in the incident. On February 2, 2010, that office completed a Security Intelligence Report (“Security Report”), which contained information that Mr. Khela had hired two other inmates to carry out the stabbing in exchange for three grams of heroin. As a result of the Security Report, Mr. Khela was immediately transferred back to the maximum security prison.
[8] On February 4, 2010, Mr. Khela received an “Assessment for Decision” (“Assessment”) and a “Notice of Emergency Involuntary Transfer Recommendation” (“Notice”). The Assessment indicated that “[t]he primary reason for Mr. Khela’s emergency transfer [was the] Security Intelligence Report . . . and the culmination of information [it] contained”, including the identification of Mr. Khela as the person responsible for organizing the stabbing. The Assessment stated that the Warden came to this conclusion on the basis of “source” and “kite”, i.e. anonymous, information received from “three separate and distinct sources”. The Assessment did not contain detailed information with respect to the sources’ names, what they said or why they might be considered reliable.
[9] The Notice confirmed that although his security classification had been determined, on the basis of the Correctional Service of Canada (“CSC”) Security Reclassification Scale (“SRS”), to be “medium security”, his case management team had recommended that this classification be overridden so as to be increased to “maximum security”.
[10] On February 26, 2010, Mr. Khela submitted a written rebuttal in response to his transfer. Mr. Khela asked that the scoring matrix used to determine his ranking in accordance with the SRS be disclosed to him together with the Security Report, and with information on why the “sources” should be considered reliable and how the Warden had determined that they were reliable.
[11] On March 15, 2010, Mr. Khela received a response to his rebuttal in the form of a “Referral Decision Sheet” that informed him that the Warden’s final decision was to transfer him to the maximum security facility. In it, the Warden explained, among other things, why Mr. Khela’s “medium” security rating had been overridden by his case management team. She also noted, in response to Mr. Khela’s questioning of the credibility of the sources, that “the information received and assessed by the [Security Intelligence Officer was] believed reliable despite the Assessment . . . only referring to the information as ‘source’ information” because of the expertise and policies of the security intelligence officers.
[12] On April 27, 2010, Mr. Khela filed a notice that he would be making a habeas corpus application in the British Columbia Supreme Court. The application was heard by Bruce J. on May 11, 2010. Ten days later, Bruce J. granted the writ and ordered that Mr. Khela be returned to the general population of Mission Institution, the medium security facility. This appeal concerns the lawfulness of that transfer decision.
A. Mootness
[13] It is important to note that this appeal is now factually moot. On July 23, 2010, the Warden of Mission Institution made another decision to reclassify Mr. Khela as requiring maximum security. As a result of that decision, Mr. Khela was transferred back to Kent Institution, the maximum security facility. This second transfer was the subject of another habeas corpus application, which was dismissed by a judge of the British Columbia Supreme Court (2011 BCSC 577, 237 C.R.R. (2d) 15, at paras. 1, 58 and 89). Mr. Khela did not appeal the dismissal of that application. The lawfulness of his current incarceration is therefore not before this Court.
[14] Despite being moot, this appeal merits a decision in the circumstances of this case. The nature of habeas corpus applications involving the transfer and segregation of inmates is such that the factual circumstances of a given application can change quickly, before an appellate court can review the application judge’s decision. This means that such cases will often be moot before making it to the appellate level, and are therefore “capable of repetition, yet evasive of review” (Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342, at p. 364). As was true in May v. Ferndale Institution, 2005 SCC 82, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 809, at para. 14, and Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643, at p. 652, the points in issue here are sufficiently important, and they come before appellate courts as “live” issues so rarely, that the law needs to be clarified in the instant case.
III. Judicial History
A. British Columbia Supreme Court, 2010 BCSC 721, 210 C.R.R. (2d) 251
[15] The British Columbia Supreme Court granted Mr. Khela habeas corpus (para. 64). Bruce J. first determined that on a habeas corpus application, a provincial superior court has jurisdiction to review a warden’s transfer decision for reasonableness. Relying on this Court’s decisions in May and in the “Miller trilogy” (R. v. Miller, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 613; Cardinal; Morin v. National Special Handling Unit Review Committee, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 662), she found that provincial superior courts, when hearing habeas corpus applications, have concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Court (para. 37), which means that it is open to a superior court to determine whether the decision in question is reasonable. Bruce J. explained that the discretion to refuse to hear a habeas corpus application can only be exercised “where by statute a court of appeal is vested with exclusive authority to hear an appeal or where there is a complete internal process for review of an administrative decision” (para. 38). She found that a challenge based on reasonableness falls into neither of these categories, which means that reasonableness is a legitimate ground for review (paras. 38-40). Ultimately, however, Bruce J. held that it was unnecessary to address Mr. Khela’s argument that the transfer decision was unreasonable, because she had already found the transfer to be unlawful on the basis of insufficient disclosure.
[16] Bruce J. found that the statutory obligation to disclose under s. 27(1) of the CCRA is “onerous, substantial and extensive”, and that it is “underscored by the common law duty of fairness” (para. 44). In addition, she noted that Commissioner’s Directive 710-2, “Transfer of Offenders”, requires specific disclosure of the details of the incidents and the information that prompted the transfer recommendation. Bruce J. concluded that the Warden had failed to prove that she had fulfilled her obligation to make disclosure “to the greatest extent possible” (paras. 46 and 59). In particular, she found that the Warden had unjustifiably failed to disclose the specific statements made by the anonymous sources, information concerning the reliability of these anonymous sources, and the scoring matrix relied upon for the SRS calculation (paras. 51 and 56).
[17] Bruce J. also held that s. 27(3) of the CCRA grants the authority to withhold information only when strictly necessary to protect the safety of a person, the security of the penitentiary, or the conduct of a lawful investigation. She stated that a warden who withholds information for one of these reasons must invoke that provision and present evidence to the court to show that the information was properly withheld. Bruce J. noted that the Warden had failed to invoke s. 27(3) and had presented no evidence to justify the withholding of the information. Thus, Mr. Khela had not been given “all the information to be considered”. As a result of this failure to disclose, Bruce J. declared the Warden’s decision “null and void for want of jurisdiction” (para. 64). She ordered Mr. Khela’s return to the general population of Mission Institution.
B. British Columbia Court of Appeal, 2011 BCCA 450, 312 B.C.A.C. 217
[18] The British Columbia Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, but only to the extent of limiting Bruce J.’s order to read that habeas corpus was granted and that Mr. Khela should be returned to a medium security institution (at para. 95). Chiasson J.A. found that it was unnecessary and undesirable to state that the transfer was “null and void for want of jurisdiction”. In substance, however, the Court of Appeal largely agreed with Bruce J.’s decision.
[19] The Court of Appeal held that an inmate transferred from a medium to a maximum security facility may apply for habeas corpus in a provincial superior court on the ground that the transfer decision was unreasonable. In Chiasson J.A.’s view, an unreasonable decision is an unlawful decision, and habeas corpus is therefore available (para. 66). Chiasson J.A. further explained that where a habeas corpus application concerns the substance of the underlying decision, the standard of review is reasonableness, with considerable deference to those charged with the administration of penal institutions (paras. 69-70).
[20] The Court of Appeal also addressed the issue of disclosure. Chiasson J.A. held that a warden is statutorily obliged to provide an applicant in Mr. Khela’s position with all the information he or she considered in making the decision, or with a summary of that information (para. 42). However, he did not agree that the warden has to provide the substance and details of the events leading up to the decision “to the greatest extent possible” (para. 43). Rather, Chiasson J.A. found that all that is required is an outline of the basic facts of the incident leading to the transfer that would be sufficient for the inmate to know the case he or she must meet (para. 43). He added that s. 27(3) of the CCRA provides a basis for justifying non-compliance. But he noted that it also requires the warden to invoke this provision and establish that he or she had reasonable grounds to believe that withholding the information was necessary in the circumstances.
[21] Applying this statutory standard, Chiasson J.A. determined that Mr. Khela had not been provided with adequate disclosure given the statutory and the common law requirements (para. 55). In particular, he found that Bruce J. had not erred in concluding that Mr. Khela should have been given additional information concerning the sources of information considered by the Warden. Chiasson J.A. accordingly found that the Warden had not met her statutory obligation and that, as a result, the transfer was procedurally unfair and therefore unlawful. He agreed with Bruce J.’s decision to grant habeas corpus.
IV. Issues and Positions of the Parties
[22] This case revolves around three core issues:
(a) What is the scope of the review on an application for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid in respect of detention in a federal penitentiary? In particular, does the scope of the review on such an application include an assessment of reasonableness?
(b) What is the scope of the duty of disclosure under s. 27 of the CCRA ?
(c) In this case, were there grounds for finding that the decision was unlawful and granting the writ of habeas corpus?
[23] With regard to the first issue, the appellants argue that on an application for habeas corpus in this context, the scope of a provincial superior court’s review is limited to an assessment of whether the decision was “lawful”. In the appellants’ view, the merits of the underlying decision are irrelevant to that assessment. Only the Federal Court can assess the reasonableness of federal administrative decisions. The respondent argues, on the contrary, that it is open to a superior court on an application for habeas corpus to review the reasonableness of a correctional decision which resulted in a deprivation of liberty.
[24] The interveners largely support Mr. Khela on this issue. The British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (“BCCLA”) argues that to determine whether a decision was “lawful”, a provincial superior court hearing a habeas corpus application must be able to conduct a robust review. It nevertheless cautions against allowing a superior court to conduct a “wholesale review for ‘reasonableness’”. According to the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (“CCLA”), habeas corpus, as a Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms remedy, should be interpreted in a manner that is responsive to the particular needs of an individual who has been unlawfully deprived of his or her liberty. For this purpose, a superior court must be able to consider the merits of the underlying decision. Finally, the John Howard Society of Canada and the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies submit that the appellants’ interpretation of the scope of habeas corpus is too restrictive, but that “Dunsmuir reasonableness” cannot apply as a standard of review on a habeas corpus application (Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190).
[25] As for the second issue, the appellants contend that disclosure will be sufficient when, as a matter of logic and common sense, it enables the inmate to know the case he or she has to meet. They further argue that if information is withheld pursuant to s. 27(3) of the CCRA , the decision to withhold it cannot be impugned by means of an application for habeas corpus, but must be challenged in the Federal Court on judicial review. The respondent counters that s. 27(1) indicates, in plain language, that the decision maker must disclose all the information considered in the taking of a decision or a summary of that information. He adds that if information is withheld from an inmate pursuant to s. 27(3) , the onus is on the warden to demonstrate that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the safety of a person, the security of the institution or the conduct of an investigation would have been jeopardized had the information been disclosed. All four interveners (the CCLA, the BCCLA, the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies together with the John Howard Society of Canada) are in substantial agreement with the respondent.
[26] Finally, on the third issue, the appellants submit that the courts below erred in granting Mr. Khela’s habeas corpus application. First, they argue that the courts below erred in holding that it is acceptable for a provincial superior court to review the merits of a transfer decision for reasonableness. Second, they argue that the courts below erred in finding that the Warden’s disclosure constituted a denial of procedural fairness. In their opinion, the information disclosed to Mr. Khela was sufficient for him to know the case to be met. The respondent contends that the Warden did not disclose all the information she had considered, and that she provided no evidentiary basis for withholding it as she was required to do in the context of s. 27 . The decision to transfer Mr. Khela was accordingly unlawful for want of procedural fairness.
V. Analysis
A. Habeas Corpus: The History and Nature of the Remedy
[27] W. Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England (1768), vol. III, c. 8, at p. 131, asserted that habeas corpus is “the great and efficacious writ in all manner of illegal confinement” (cited by D. Parkes, “The ‘Great Writ’ Reinvigorated? Habeas Corpus in Contemporary Canada” (2012), 36 Man. L.J. 351, at p. 352; May, at para. 19; W. F. Duker, A Constitutional History of Habeas Corpus (1980), at p. 3). In an earlier incarnation, habeas corpus was a means to ensure that the defendant in an action was brought physically before the Court (Duker, at p. 4; J. Farbey, R. J. Sharpe and S. Atrill, The Law of Habeas Corpus (3rd ed. 2011), at p. 16; P. D. Halliday, Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire (2010), at p. 2). Over time, however, the writ was transformed into a vehicle for reviewing the justification for a person’s imprisonment (Duker, at p. 4). Indeed, by the late 17th century, Vaughan C.J. of the Court of Common Pleas stated that “[t]he Writ of habeas corpus is now the most usual remedy by which a man is restored again to his liberty, if he have been against law deprived of it” (Duker, at p. 54, citing Bushell’s Case (1670), Vaughan 135, 124 E.R. 1006, at p. 1007).
[28] The first legislation respecting habeas corpus was enacted in 1641. The remedy was subsequently codified a second time in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 (Engl.), 31 Cha. 2, c. 2 (T. Cromwell, “Habeas Corpus and Correctional Law — An Introduction” (1997), 3 Queen’s L.J. 295, at p. 298), the many purposes of which included addressing problematic delays in obtaining the writ, ensuring that prisoners were provided with copies of their warrants so that they would know the grounds for their detention, and ensuring that prisoners “would not be taken to places beyond the reach of the writ” (Farbey, Sharpe and Atrill, at p. 16; Halliday, at pp. 239-40).
[29] Through both the Charter and the common law, Canada has attempted to maintain and uphold many of the goals of the Habeas Corpus Act, which embodied the evolving purposes and principles of the writ. Habeas corpus has become an essential remedy in Canadian law. In May, this Court emphasized the importance of habeas corpus in the protection of two of our fundamental rights:
(1) the right to liberty of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice (s. 7 of the Charter ); and (2) the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned (s. 9 of the Charter ). [para. 22]
These rights belong to everyone in Canada, including those serving prison sentences (May, at paras. 23-25). Habeas corpus is in fact the strongest tool a prisoner has to ensure that the deprivation of his or her liberty is not unlawful. In articulating the scope of the writ both in the Miller trilogy and in May, the Court has ensured that the rule of law continues to run within penitentiary walls (Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Board, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602, at p. 622) and that any deprivation of a prisoner’s liberty is justified.
[30] To be successful, an application for habeas corpus must satisfy the following criteria. First, the applicant must establish that he or she has been deprived of liberty. Once a deprivation of liberty is proven, the applicant must raise a legitimate ground upon which to question its legality. If the applicant has raised such a ground, the onus shifts to the respondent authorities to show that the deprivation of liberty was lawful (Farbey, Sharpe and Atrill, at pp. 84-85; May, at paras. 71 and 74).
B. Court Oversight of Penal Institutions
[31] Both the Federal Court and provincial superior courts are tasked with reviewing decisions made within federal prison walls. Section 18 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 (“FCA ”), confers exclusive original jurisdiction on the Federal Court to issue an injunction, writ of certiorari, writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus or writ of quo warranto, or grant declaratory relief against any federal board, commission or other tribunal. In Martineau this Court held that the writ of certiorari is available if an administrative decision was unfair, regardless of whether the decision was “judicial or quasi-judicial” (pp.