McDougall v. Canada (Attorney General)

McDougall v. Canada (Attorney General)
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2011-03-10
Neutral citation
2011 FC 285
File numbers
T-855-10
Decision Content
Federal Court
Cour fédérale
Date: 20110310
Docket: T-855-10
Citation: 2011 FC 285
Ottawa, Ontario, March 10, 2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
BETWEEN:
WARREN MCDOUGALL
Applicant
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
I. Overview
[1] Protection of society is the paramount consideration in decision-making in the context of conditional releases in the federal correctional system (Corrections and Conditional Release Act, RSC 1992, c 20 [CCRA] at para 4(a)). The federal system aims to contribute to the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society (s 3 of the CCRA).
[2] In order to fulfill their legislative mandates, the National Parole Board [NPB] and Correctional Service of Canada [CSC] may require an offender to undertake one or more risk assessments. This Court has distinguished risk assessments from medical health care or treatment as follows:
[10] There is an important distinction that needs to be drawn between medical and psychological assessments that are done for the benefit of the offender or to establish a diagnosis (mental health procedures), and risk assessments that are done for the protection of the public.
…
[15] In summary, risk assessments by CSC are not health care, treatment, or psychological assessments conducted in order to establish a diagnosis or to ascertain whether an offender requires health care or treatment. Risk assessments are a means to determine an offender's likelihood of recidivism and potential danger to the offender, other inmates, staff members and the public. It would be impossible to fulfill this mandate if an offender's consent were required prior to his or her risk being assessed as the consent could often be withheld.
(William Head Institution v Canada (Attorney General), 2003 FC 870, 237 FTR 127).
II. Introduction
[3] This case focuses on an inmate who applied for Escorted Temporary Absences [ETAs] and day parole. An ETA is a “temporary absence under escort from a penitentiary” (Temporary Absences and Work Releases, Commissioner’s Directive 710-3 [CD 710-3] at para 7) and day parole is “[a] form of conditional release, granted to an offender by the NPB or a provincial parole board, which requires the offender to return to a penitentiary, a Community-Based Residential Facility (CBRF), which includes an authorized private home placement, or a provincial correctional facility each night, unless otherwise authorized in writing” (Pre-Release Decision-Making, Commissioner’s Directive 712-1 [CD 712-1] at para 5).
III. Judicial Procedure
[4] This is an application for judicial review challenging decisions of the Acting Warden of the Ferndale Institution and of the NPB, both dated April 29, 2010, seeking declaratory relief to the effect that the law confers upon a Warden or NPB to require inmates serving life sentences to submit to mental health assessments as a condition prior to being considered for conditional release.
IV. Background
[5] The Applicant, Mr. Warren McDougall, is 42 years old and is currently an inmate at the Ferndale Institution, a minimum-security federal penitentiary in Mission, British Columbia.
[6] Mr. McDougall is serving a life sentence for second degree murder committed in May 1996. He has been incarcerated since May 31, 1996, with 14.5 years to serve prior to being eligible for full parole, on April 4, 2013. Since 1982, Mr. McDougall has also been convicted of numerous other offences; namely, breaking and entering, theft, robbery with violence, forcible confinement, possession of stolen property, possession of cannabis, kidnapping, unlawful confinement, escaping lawful custody, possession of property obtained by crime over $12,000, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, indignity to a dead body, and impersonation with intent.
ETA
[7] On March 8, 2010, Mr. McDougall applied for various ETAs for administrative, parental responsibility, personal development and community service purposes. On March 17, 2010, he applied for additional ETAs for personal development purposes.
[8] Mr. McDougall became eligible for day parole on April 4, 2010; consequently, as of that day, he became eligible for ETAs under the Warden of the Institution’s full authority without required approval from the NPB.
[9] On April 29, 2010, Acting Warden Mary Danel, of the Ferndale Institution, dismissed Mr. McDougall’s ETA applications. She concluded that no ETAs should be approved until updated psychiatric and psychological risk assessment reports for Mr. McDougall had been received and reviewed by CSC.
[10] On May 11, 2010, Mr. McDougall wrote to Warden Bill Thompson, of the Ferndale Institution, asking him to reconsider the Acting Warden’s decision. Warden Thompson replied, on May 18, 2010, confirming the Acting Warden’s decision which was consistent with the Commissioner’s Directive. On May 19, 2010, a Warden Board meeting was held, during which Mr. McDougall’s situation was reviewed. Warden Thompson confirmed, on May 27, 2010, that he was unable to grant the ETA requested, thereby, confirming the Acting Warden’s decision (Applicant’s Record [AR], Book 1 at 232 and 237).
Day Parole
[11] Mr. McDougall became eligible for day parole on April 4, 2010 and had previously applied for conditional release on day parole on December 14, 2009. On April 22, 2010, Mr. McDougall’s institutional parole officer completed an Assessment for Decision, explaining the reason why the case management team recommended against day parole.
[12] Mr. McDougall’s day parole review hearing was initially scheduled for May 2010; however, on April 29, 2010, a two-member panel adjourned that hearing for two months in order to obtain psychiatric and psychological mental health assessments of the Applicant.
[13] On May 31, 2010, Mr. McDougall filed a Notice of Application for judicial review for both the Acting Warden’s and the NPB decisions refusing the ETAs and the day parole requested.
[14] On June 17 2010, Dr. Saeed Ghaffari completed a psychological risk assessment report regarding Mr. McDougall (Respondent’s Record [RR], Vol 2 at 322-327).
[15] On June 21, 2010, Dr. Rakesh Lamba completed a psychiatric risk assessment report regarding Mr. McDougall (RR, Vol 2 at 289-311).
[16] On June 24, 2010, Mr. McDougall filed a motion seeking an interlocutory injunction requiring the reconsideration of the Acting Warden’s decision and to force the NPB to schedule the day parole hearing for July 2010.
[17] By June 30, 2010, the NPB was in possession of the current psychiatric risk assessment but had not received the psychological assessment; therefore, the NPB imposed a second adjournment. The psychiatric risk assessment was received by the NPB on July 2, 2010. The NPB was planning to schedule Mr. McDougall’s hearing for July 2010; however, on July 8, 2010, Mr. McDougall requested additional time to respond to the mental health assessments. The day parole hearing was postponed until August 12, 2010.
[18] On August 12, 2010, the NPB dismissed Mr. McDougall’s application for day parole. The decision was mainly based on the June 2010 psychological and psychiatric reports.
[19] Following the NPB decision, Mr. McDougall’s motion to have the Acting Warden’s decision reconsidered and to force the NPB to schedule his day parole review in July 2010 had been dismissed as moot by Justice Sean Harrington of the Federal Court, on September 1, 2010.
V. Decision under Review
[20] Mr McDougall’s declaratory demands relate to both the Acting Warden’s and the NPB decisions. First, on April 29, 2010, the Acting Warden of the Ferndale Institution refused Mr. McDougall’s applications for ETAs on the basis that, without updated psychiatric and psychological risk assessments, she was not satisfied that the proposed absences from detention would not pose an undue risk to society.
[21] On the same day as the Acting Warden’s decision, the NPB administratively adjourned Mr. McDougall’s day parole review hearing for two months, pending the NPB receiving updated psychiatric and psychological risk assessments.
VI. Position of the Parties
[22] The Applicant seeks declaratory relief, stating:
a. that ETAs are not a form of conditional release;
b. that the law authorizes only one adjournment not exceeding two months on any parole review where NPB needs more information or more time to render its decision; and
c. that the law confers no power on CSC or the NPB to require that life-sentenced inmates submit to mental health assessments as a condition precedent to consideration for conditional release.
[23] The Applicant submits that while two separate administrative tribunals, in the context of two distinct decisions, concluded that psychological and psychiatric assessments were required before rendering a final decision, the administrative tribunals had rendered their decisions at the same time and for the same ‘tactical reason’: to coerce the Applicant to submit to psychiatric and psychological exams. Mr. McDougall contends that he had participated in the mental health assessments only under the coercive pressure of denied liberty. He submits that the law confers no jurisdiction upon the Warden or the NPB to require risk assessments as a condition to being considered for ETA or day parole. The Applicant specified that he had not exhausted all of his available internal remedies, having no faith in their efficiency or fairness.
[24] The Respondent argues that this judicial review application is procedurally misconceived for numerous reasons. Firstly, the application is moot, since the Applicant had already undergone the required psychiatric and psychological assessments in June 2010. Secondly, the application purports to challenge two different decisions, made by two different administrative tribunals, which cannot be challenged together. Thirdly, the Applicant had not exhausted all his internal remedies prior to this judicial review.
[25] As to the substantive merit, the Respondent argues that the application is without merit and should be dismissed. Both the Acting Warden and the NPB had the jurisdiction to require psychiatric and psychological risk assessments; also, both the Acting Warden and the NPB rendered reasonable decisions within the limits of their respective jurisdictions.
VII. Issues
[26] (1) Should this application be dismissed on a preliminary basis because it is procedurally misconceived?
(2) Was the Acting Warden’s decision a reasonable exercise of her statutory discretion under the CCRA?
(3) Was the NPB adjournment a reasonable exercise of the NPB’s authority to adjourn a hearing to review day parole?
VIII. Pertinent Legislative Provisions
[27] Section 17 of the CCRA enables the conditional release of an inmate from a federal penitentiary institution by way of an ETA:
Temporary absences may be authorized
17. (1) Where, in the opinion of the institutional head,
(a) an inmate will not, by reoffending, present an undue risk to society during an absence authorized under this section,
(b) it is desirable for the inmate to be absent from penitentiary, escorted by a staff member or other person authorized by the institutional head, for medical, administrative, community service, family contact, personal development for rehabilitative purposes, or compassionate reasons, including parental responsibilities,
(c) the inmate’s behaviour while under sentence does not preclude authorizing the absence, and
(d) a structured plan for the absence has been prepared,
the absence may, subject to section 746.1 of the Criminal Code, subsection 140.3(2) of the National Defence Act and subsection 15(2) of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, be authorized by the institutional head
(e) for an unlimited period for medical reasons, or
(f) for reasons other than medical,
(i) for a period not exceeding five days, or
(ii) with the Commissioner’s approval, for a period exceeding five days but not exceeding fifteen days.
Conditions
(2) The institutional head may impose, in relation to a temporary absence, any conditions that the institutional head considers reasonable and necessary in order to protect society.
Cancellation
(3) The institutional head may cancel a temporary absence either before or after its commencement.
Reasons to be given
(4) The institutional head shall give the inmate written reasons for the authorizing, refusal or cancellation of a temporary absence.
Travel time
(5) In addition to the period authorized for the purposes of a temporary absence, an inmate may be granted the time necessary to travel to and from the place where the absence is authorized to be spent.
Delegation to provincial hospital
(6) Where, pursuant to an agreement under paragraph 16(1)(a), an inmate has been admitted to a hospital operated by a provincial government in which the liberty of patients is normally subject to restrictions, the institutional head may confer on the person in charge of the hospital, for such period and subject to such conditions as the institutional head specifies, any of the institutional head’s powers under this section in relation to that inmate.
Permission de sortir avec escorte
17. (1) Sous réserve de l’article 746.1 du Code criminel, du paragraphe 140.3(2) de la Loi sur la défense nationale et du paragraphe 15(2) de la Loi sur les crimes contre l’humanité et les crimes de guerre, le directeur du pénitencier peut autoriser un délinquant à sortir si celui-ci est escorté d’une personne — agent ou autre — habilitée à cet effet par lui lorsque, à son avis :
a) une récidive du délinquant pendant la sortie ne présentera pas un risque inacceptable pour la société;
b) il l’estime souhaitable pour des raisons médicales, administratives, de compassion ou en vue d’un service à la collectivité, ou du perfectionnement personnel lié à la réadapta- tion du délinquant, ou pour lui permettre d’établir ou d’entretenir des rapports familiaux notamment en ce qui touche ses responsabilités parentales;
c) la conduite du détenu pendant la détention ne justifie pas un refus;
d) un projet structuré de sortie a été établi.
La permission est accordée soit pour une période maximale de cinq jours ou, avec l’autorisation du commissaire, de quinze jours, soit pour une période indéterminée s’il s’agit de raisons médicales.
Conditions
(2) Le directeur peut assortir la permission des conditions qu’il juge raisonnables et nécessaires en ce qui touche la protection de la société.
Annulation de la permission
(3) Il peut annuler la permission même avant la sortie.
Motifs
(4) Le cas échéant, le directeur communique, par écrit, au détenu les motifs de l’autorisation, du refus ou de l’annulation de la permission.
Temps nécessaire aux déplacements
(5) La durée de validité de la permission ne comprend pas le temps que peut accorder le directeur pour les déplacements entre le lieu de détention et la destination du détenu.
Délégation au responsable d’un hôpital
(6) Le directeur peut, aux conditions et pour la durée qu’il estime indiquées, déléguer au responsable d’un hôpital sous administration provinciale où la liberté des personnes est normalement soumise à des restrictions l’un ou l’autre des pouvoirs que lui confère le présent article à l’égard des détenus admis dans l’hôpital aux termes d’un accord conclu conformément au paragraphe 16(1).
[28] Sections 101 and 102 address the NPB’s guiding principles as well as the criteria which must be followed by the NPB in granting parole:
Principles guiding parole boards
101. The principles that shall guide the Board and the provincial parole boards in achieving the purpose of conditional release are
(a) that the protection of society be the paramount consideration in the determination of any case;
(b) that parole boards take into consideration all available information that is relevant to a case, including the stated reasons and recommendations of the sentencing judge, any other information from the trial or the sentencing hearing, information and assessments provided by correctional authorities, and information obtained from victims and the offender;
(c) that parole boards enhance their effectiveness and openness through the timely exchange of relevant information with other components of the criminal justice system and through communication of their policies and programs to offenders, victims and the general public;
(d) that parole boards make the least restrictive determination consistent with the protection of society;
(e) that parole boards adopt and be guided by appropriate policies and that their members be provided with the training necessary to implement those policies; and
(f) that offenders be provided with relevant information, reasons for decisions and access to the review of decisions in order to ensure a fair and understandable conditional release process.
Criteria for granting parole
102. The Board or a provincial parole board may grant parole to an offender if, in its opinion,
(a) the offender will not, by reoffending, present an undue risk to society before the expiration according to law of the sentence the offender is serving; and
(b) the release of the offender will contribute to the protection of society by facilitating the reintegration of the offender into society as a law-abiding citizen.
Principes
101. La Commission et les commissions provinciales sont guidées dans l’exécution de leur mandat par les principes qui suivent :
a) la protection de la société est le critère déterminant dans tous les cas;
b) elles doivent tenir compte de toute l’information pertinente disponible, notamment les motifs et les recommandations du juge qui a infligé la peine, les renseignements disponibles lors du procès ou de la détermination de la peine, ceux qui ont été obtenus des victimes et des délinquants, ainsi que les renseignements et évaluations fournis par les autorités correctionnelles;
c) elles accroissent leur efficacité et leur transparence par l’échange de renseignements utiles au moment opportun avec les autres éléments du système de justice pénale d’une part, et par la communication de leurs directives d’orientation générale et programmes tant aux délinquants et aux victimes qu’au public, d’autre part;
d) le règlement des cas doit, compte tenu de la protection de la société, être le moins restrictif possible;
e) elles s’inspirent des directives d’orientation générale qui leur sont remises et leurs membres doivent recevoir la formation nécessaire à la mise en oeuvre de ces directives;
f) de manière à assurer l’équité et la clarté du processus, les autorités doivent donner aux délinquants les motifs des décisions, ainsi que tous autres renseignements pertinents, et la possibilité de les faire réviser.
Critères
102. La Commission et les commissions provinciales peuvent autoriser la libération conditionnelle si elles sont d’avis qu’une récidive du délinquant avant l’expiration légale de la peine qu’il purge ne présentera pas un risque inacceptable pour la société et que cette libération contribuera à la protection de celle-ci en favorisant sa réinsertion sociale en tant que citoyen respectueux des lois.
[29] Section 122 of the CCRA addresses day parole applications reviewed by the NPB:
Day parole review
122. (1) Subject to subsection 119(2), the Board shall, on application, at the time prescribed by the regulations, review, for the purpose of day parole, the case of every offender other than an offender referred to in subsection (2).
Special cases
(2) The Board may, on application, at the time prescribed by the regulations, review, for the purpose of day parole, the case of an offender who is serving a sentence of two years or more in a provincial correctional facility in a province in which no program of day parole has been established for that category of offender.
Decision or adjournment
(3) With respect to a review commenced under this section, the Board shall decide whether to grant day parole, or may adjourn the review for a reason authorized by the regulations and for a reasonable period not exceeding the maximum period prescribed by the regulations.
Renewal of application
(4) Where the Board decides not to grant day parole, no further application for day parole may be made until six months after the decision or until such earlier time as the regulations prescribe or the Board determines.
Maximum duration
(5) Day parole may be granted to an offender for a period not exceeding six months, and may be continued for additional periods not exceeding six months each following reviews of the case by the Board.
Withdrawal of application
(6) An offender may withdraw an application for day parole at any time before the commencement of the review under this section.
Examen : semi-liberté
122. (1) Sur demande des intéressés, la Commission examine, au cours de la période prévue par règlement, les demandes de semi-liberté.
Cas spéciaux
(2) Elle peut également le faire dans les mêmes conditions, dans le cas des délinquants qui purgent une peine de deux ans ou plus dans un établissement correctionnel provincial dans une province où aucun programme de semi-liberté visant cette catégorie de délinquants n’a été mis sur pied.
Décision
(3) Lors de l’examen, la Commission accorde ou refuse la semi-liberté, ou diffère sa décision pour l’un des motifs prévus par règlement; la durée de l’ajournement doit être la plus courte possible compte tenu du délai réglementaire.
Nouvelle demande
(4) En cas de refus, le délinquant doit, pour présenter une nouvelle demande, attendre l’expiration d’un délai de six mois à compter de la date du refus ou du délai inférieur que fixent les règlements ou détermine la Commission.
Durée maximale
(5) La semi-liberté est accordée pour une période maximale de six mois; elle peut être prolongée pour des périodes additionnelles d’au plus six mois chacune après réexamen du dossier.
Retrait de la demande
(6) Le délinquant peut retirer sa demande tant que la Commission n’a pas commencé l’examen de son dossier.
[30] The Correctional and Conditional Release Regulations, SOR/92-620 [CCRR], provide further details with regard to the adjournment of day parole reviews and the authorization of ETAs by the releasing authority:
Unescorted Temporary Absences
155. For the purposes of sections 116 and 117 of the Act, the releasing authority may authorize an unescorted temporary absence of an offender
(a) for medical reasons to allow the offender to undergo medical examination or treatment that cannot reasonably be provided in the penitentiary;
(b) for administrative reasons to allow the offender to attend to essential personal affairs or legal matters or to matters related to the administration of the sentence that the offender is serving;
(c) for community service purposes to allow the offender to undertake voluntary activity with a non-profit community institution, organization or agency, or for the benefit of the community as a whole;
(d) for family contact purposes to assist the offender in maintaining and strengthening family ties as a support to the offender while in custody and as a potential community resource on the offender's release;
(e) for parental responsibility reasons to allow the offender to attend to matters related to the maintenance of a parent-child relationship, including care, nurture, schooling and medical treatment, where such a relationship exists between the offender and the child;
(f) for personal development for rehabilitative purposes to allow the offender to participate in specific treatment activities with the goal of reducing the risk of the offender re-offending, and to allow the offender to participate in activities of a rehabilitative nature, including cultural and spiritual ceremonies unique to Aboriginal peoples, with the goal of assisting the reintegration of the offender into the community as a law-abiding citizen; and
(g) for compassionate reasons to allow the offender to attend to urgent matters affecting the members of the offender's immediate family or other persons with whom the offender has a close personal relationship.
…
Day Parole Reviews
157. (1) Where an offender applies for day parole pursuant to subsection 122(1) or (2) of the Act, the application shall be submitted to the Board not later than six months before the expiration of two thirds of the term of imprisonment to which the offender was sentenced.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), the Board shall review the case of an offender who applies, in accordance with subsection (1), for day parole within six months after receiving the application, but in no case is the Board required to review the case before the two months immediately preceding the offender's eligibility date for day parole.
(3) The Board may postpone a day parole review with the consent of the offender.
(4) The Board may adjourn a day parole review for a period of not more than two months where the Board requires
(a) further information relevant to the review; or
(b) further time to render a decision.
Permissions de sortir sans surveillance
155. Pour l'application des articles 116 et 117 de la Loi, l'autorité compétente peut accorder au délinquant une permission de sortir sans surveillance dans l'un des cas suivants :
a) pour des raisons médicales, afin de lui permettre de subir un examen ou un traitement médical qui ne peut raisonnablement être effectué au pénitencier;
b) pour des raisons administratives, afin de lui permettre de vaquer à des affaires personnelles importantes ou juridiques, ou à des affaires concernant l'exécution de sa peine;
c) à des fins de service à la collectivité, afin de lui permettre de faire du travail bénévole pour un établissement, un organisme ou une organisation à but non lucratif ou au profit de la collectivité toute entière;
d) à des fins de rapports familiaux, afin de lui permettre d'établir et d'entretenir des liens avec sa famille pour qu'elle l'encourage durant sa détention et, le cas échéant, le soutienne à sa mise en liberté;
e) à des fins de responsabilités parentales, afin de lui permettre de s'occuper de questions concernant le maintien de la relation parent-enfant, y compris les soins, l'éducation, l'instruction et les soins de santé, lorsqu'il existe une telle relation entre le délinquant et l'enfant;
f) pour du perfectionnement personnel lié à sa réadaptation, afin de lui permettre de participer à des activités liées à un traitement particulier dans le but de réduire le risque de récidive ou afin de lui permettre de participer à des activités de réadaptation, y compris les cérémonies culturelles ou spirituelles propres aux autochtones, dans le but de favoriser sa réinsertion sociale à titre de citoyen respectueux des lois;
g) pour des raisons humanitaires, afin de lui permettre de s'occuper d'affaires urgentes concernant des membres de sa famille immédiate ou d'autres personnes avec lesquelles il a une relation personnelle étroite.
[...]
Examens de demandes de semi-liberté
157. (1) La demande de mise en semi-liberté faite en vertu des paragraphes 122(1) ou (2) de la Loi doit être présentée à la Commission au plus tard six mois avant l'expiration des deux tiers de la peine d'emprisonnement du délinquant.
(2) Sous réserve du paragraphe (3), la Commission doit examiner le cas du délinquant qui présente une demande de mise en semi-liberté conformément au paragraphe (1) dans les six mois suivant la réception de la demande, mais elle n'est pas tenue de le faire plus de deux mois avant la date de l'admissibilité du délinquant à la semi-liberté.
(3) Avec l'accord du délinquant, la Commission peut reporter l'examen visant une mise en semi-liberté.
(4) La Commission peut ajourner, pour une période d'au plus deux mois, l'examen visant une mise en semi-liberté lorsque, selon le cas, elle a besoin :
a) de plus de renseignements pertinents;
b) de plus de temps pour prendre une décision.
[31] Pursuant to his jurisdiction under sections 97 and 98 of the CCRA, the Commissioner of CSC has issued Directives with respect to conditional release:
Rules
97. Subject to this Part and the regulations, the Commissioner may make rules
(a) for the management of the Service;
(b) for the matters described in section 4; and
(c) generally for carrying out the purposes and provisions of this Part and the regulations.
Commissioner’s Directives
98. (1) The Commissioner may designate as Commissioner’s Directives any or all rules made under section 97.
Accessibility
(2) The Commissioner’s Directives shall be accessible to offenders, staff members and the public.
Règles d’application
97. Sous réserve de la présente partie et de ses règlements, le commissaire peut établir des règles concernant :
a) la gestion du Service;
b) les questions énumérées à l’article 4;
c) toute autre mesure d’application de cette partie et des règlements.
Directives du commissaire
Nature
98. (1) Les règles établies en application de l’article 97 peuvent faire l’objet de directives du commissaire.
Publicité
(2) Les directives doivent être accessibles et peuvent être consultées par les délinquants, les agents et le public.
[32] The CD 710-3 and CD 712-1 are particularly pertinent to this case and will be further examined in the Court’s analysis below.
IX. Standard of Review
[33] In Bonamy v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 FC 153, 8 Admin LR (5th) 221 [Bonamy], this Court referred to Dunsmuir v New-Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190 [Dunsmuir], regarding the applicable standard of review:
[41] Dunsmuir … at para. 62 established a two-step process for determining the standard of review. First, the court ascertains whether the jurisprudence has already determined in a satisfactory manner the degree of deference to be accorded with regard to a particular category of question. Second, where the first inquiry proves unfruitful, the court must proceed to an analysis of the factors making it possible to identify the proper standard of review.
[34] The parties disagree as to the standard of review. The Applicant submits that the appropriate standard of review is correctness, while the Respondent argues that the decisions should be reviewed against the deferential standard of reasonableness.
[35] The present case could raise three separate issues: the procedural conception of the case, the limits of jurisdiction conferred by the law to the Warden’s Institution and to the NPB and, finally, the judicial review of the decisions themselves. In examining the Warden’s statutory discretion under the CCRA and the NPB’s authority to adjourn a day parole review hearing, as related to the declaratory relief asked in the Applicant’s application, the Court could rely on the standard of correctness which should be applied to a question of statutory interpretation of law (Dixon v Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 889 at para 10, 331 FTR 214).
[36] Nonetheless, the present case mainly addresses the judicial review of the decisions of the Acting Warden and of the NPB. A reasonableness standard will be applied by the Court in respect of the decisions as to the ETAs and the day parole. In examining the substantial merit of both decisions, which constitute, in fact, the main issues to be resolved, the case of Gagné v Canada (Correctional Service), 2010 FC 355, with regard to a judicial review of a decision refusing an ETA application on the basis that the Applicant might present an undue risk to society, the reasonableness standard is applied by the Court:
[7] Subsection 17(1) of the Act states that a warden of a penitentiary ‘‘may’’ authorize an ETA,
Where, in the opinion of the institutional head,
(a) an inmate will not, by reoffending, present an undue risk to society during an absence authorized under this section,
(b) it is desirable for the inmate to be absent from the penitentiary, escorted by a staff member or other person authorized by the institutional head, for medical, administrative, community service, family contact, personal development for rehabilitative purposes, or compassionate reasons, including parental responsibilities,
(c) the inmate’s behaviour while under sentence does not preclude authorizing the absence, and
(d) a structured plan for the absence has been prepared.
[8] The use of the verb ‘‘may’’ in this section indicates that Parliament intended the power to authorize an ETA to be discretionary (see section 11 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21), even though it adopted criteria which must guide the exercise of this power.
[37] Under Dunsmuir, above a paragraph 47, the decisions from administrative tribunals must fall “within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law” to be deemed reasonable.
[38] As for the procedural merit of the case, specifically, to determine whether the Court should hear the judicial review despite the Applicant’s failure to exhaust his remedies under the grievance process, the Court found:
[12] There is no standard of review in respect of the first issue. The Court is required to consider relevant factors and to reach a reasonable conclusion regarding the exercise of its discretion. The Court’s discretion with respect to hearing a judicial review where there is an adequate alternative remedy is subject to consideration of whether there are exceptional circumstances which might otherwise require the Court to hear a matter despite the existence of an adequate alternative remedy (see Froom v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2004 FCA 352 and McMaster v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 647 at paras. 23 and 27).
(Spidel v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 FC 1028).
X. Analysis
(1) Should this application be dismissed on a preliminary basis because it is procedurally misconceived?
[39] The Respondent submits several reasons as to why the judicial review should be considered as procedurally misconceived.
(a) Two Different Decisions
[40] The Respondent submits that Mr McDougall’s application purports to challenge two separate decisions made under different statutory provisions, which is contrary to Rule 302 of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106:
302. Unless the Court orders otherwise, an application for judicial review shall be limited to a single order in respect of which relief is sought.
302. Sauf ordonnance contraire de la Cour, la demande de contrôle judiciaire ne peut porter que sur une seule ordonnance pour laquelle une réparation est demandée.
[41] When dealing with a two-decision judicial review, the Federal Court of Appeal rejected the argument of an applicant who had proposed that one of the decisions “did not have a life of its own” and constituted an accessory to the main decision:
[26] The fact of the matter, however, is that conservatory measures are not necessarily pronounced in the course of every investigation. They are pronounced "for the protection of an estate" which presupposes that the assets are in a state of danger. This Court, in Tremblay v. Canada (Superintendent of Bankruptcy) (2001), 277 N.R. 376 (F.C.A.) at page 9, stated that "[a] person using or wishing to use conservatory measures must have reasonable grounds to believe the estate is threatened and it is necessary to preserve it". Conservatory measures answer to different criteria than those of the investigation itself. It is conceivable that, in some cases, conservatory measures could be set aside while the investigation itself could be held valid. A decision to issue conservatory measures is therefore distinct from a decision to investigate.
(Pfeiffer v Canada (Superintendent of Bankruptcy), 2004 FCA 192, 131 ACWS (3d) 382).
[42] In addition, this Court expressly stated that only one decision per application should be challenged, even in the case where the application is in the form of a declaratory relief:
[37] Under Rule 302 of the Federal Court Rules, SOR/98-106, only one decision should be challenged in an application for judicial review, even though the action at bar is in the form of declaratory relief. As the action is focused primarily on the CSC Commissioner’s Directive, the Court will not rule on any other policy or rule of the Commissioner prohibiting smoking inside cells and PFV facilities and will thus confine itself to the Directive.
(Boucher v Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FC 893, 325 FTR 122; in a similar but not identical case with respect to where rights begin and end: Mercier v Canada (Correctional Service), 2010 FCA 167, 320 DLR (4th) 429).
[43] On the question of separate orders, the Applicant argues that both decisions were merely tactics by which the tribunals coerced him to undergo mental health assessments. The Court does not subscribe to the Applicant’s presumption; moreover, the Acting Warden and the NPB made their respective decisions in two totally different and separate contexts:
[24] While it is no doubt true that there are exceptions to the rule that an application for judicial review should be limited to a single order, I do not think that the facts underlying the present application call for such an exception. I fail to see, in particular, how the decision of the Minister to appoint the adjudicator and the decision reached by that adjudicator can be assimilated to a continuing process. Quite to the contrary, they appear to me to be two discrete decisions of an entirely different nature. One is administrative and discretionary, and the other is quasi-judicial and circumscribed by legal principles as applied to the evidence.
(Bank of Montreal v Brown, 2006 FC 503, 291 FTR 71 [Bank of Montreal, 2006 FC 503], aff’d 2007 FCA 23, 155 ACWS (3d) 2).
[44] The Court is in full agreement with the Respondent that it could dismiss this application on a preliminary basis. In addition, under section 301 of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, the Respondent asserts that the Applicant’s memorandum contains a new claim regarding an additional remedy which did not appear in the Notice of Application; that is, a declaration to the effect that the NPB cannot adjourn the day parole hearing to await risk assessments. This Court must deal with a new argument:
[26] As Justice Gibson pointed out in Arona v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] F.C.J. No. 24, at para. 9:
[T]he principle that the court will deal only with the grounds of review invoked by the applicant in the originating notice of motion and in the supporting affidavit must, I am satisfied, govern. If, as here, the applicant was able to invoke new grounds of review in his memorandum of argument, the respondent would conceivably be prejudice [sic] through failure to have an opportunity to address the new ground in her affidavit or, once again as here, to at least consider filing an affidavit to address the new issue. In the result, I determine that the second issue raised on behalf of the applicant is not properly before the Court.
(Bank of Montreal, 2006 FC 503 above).
[45] In the present case, the Court recognizes that the NPB’s jurisdiction in respect of the adjournment is indicated within the grounds of the Notice of Application, themselves. In the case where the claim would be incomplete, the Court could have allowed the parties to make the appropriate modifications; however, as it has been the case in Bank of Montreal, 2006 FC 503 above, this will not be necessary, for self-explanatory reasons explained below.
(b) The Decision is Moot
[46] According to the Respondent, this judicial review serves no practical purpose as Mr. MacDougall had already undergone psychiatric and psychological assessments; and, the specific risk assessments, themselves, had been subsequently reviewed in August 2010 by the NPB, on which basis the Applicant’s day parole had been denied. On similar grounds, Justice Harrington, on September 1, 2010, dismissed the Applicant’s interlocutory injunction due to mootness, in recognition of the fact that the NPB hearing had