Canadian National Railway v. Seeley

Canadian National Railway v. Seeley
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2013-02-01
Neutral citation
2013 FC 117
File numbers
T-1775-10
Notes
Digest
Decision Content
Date: 20130201
Docket: T-1775-10
Citation: 2013 FC 117
Ottawa, Ontario, February 1, 2013
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Mandamin
BETWEEN:
CANADIAN NATIONAL RAILWAY
Applicant
and
DENISE SEELEY AND
CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
Respondents
ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION,
FEDERALLY REGULATED EMPLOYERS
– TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATION
Interveners
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1] This is an application for judicial review of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal [the Tribunal] September 29, 2010 decision allowing Ms. Denise Seeley’s complaint of human rights discrimination because of family status by the employer the Canadian National Railway [CN].
[2] Ms. Seeley had filed a complaint alleging that her employer, CN, has discriminated against her on the basis of her family status by failing to accommodate her parental childcare obligations and by terminating her employment. Family status is a protected ground under the Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6 [the Act].
[3] Ms. Seeley was employed by CN as a freight train conductor and her home terminal was Jasper, Alberta. She was on laid off status and was recalled by CN to report to a temporary work assignment to cover a major shortage in Vancouver, British Columbia. She advised she could not report to Vancouver because of childcare issues. CN gave Ms. Seeley additional time to report. After she did not report for work to Vancouver by a June 30, 2005 deadline, CN terminated her employment.
[4] The Tribunal found that Ms. Seeley had proven prima facie employment discrimination on the basis of family status. It further found that CN had not met its duty to accommodate Ms. Seeley. Finally, the Tribunal issued the remedial order directing the CN review its accommodation policy, pay compensation for lost earnings as well as additional compensation for pain and suffering and for reckless conduct.
[5] The Applicant submits the Tribunal made errors of law as well as fact in sustaining Ms. Seeley's complaint. It submits the Tribunal erred in finding prima facie case of discrimination had been made out, in finding CN had not met its duty to accommodate, and in awarding additional damages based on a finding of reckless conduct.
[6] I conclude that the Tribunal did not err in finding parental childcare obligations comes within the term "family status" in the Act. I also conclude the Tribunal applied the correct test for finding prima facie discrimination on the basis of family status. Finally, I conclude the Tribunal did not err in finding, on the evidence before it, that the CN had not met its duty to accommodate Ms. Seeley.
Background
[7] Ms. Seeley was hired by CN as a brakeman in 1991 and qualified as a freight train conductor 1993. Her home terminal was Jasper, Alberta. Ms. Seeley’s husband is also employed by CN as a locomotive engineer. Ms. Seeley’s first child was born in 1999 and her second child was born in 2003. The family lived in Brule, Alberta approximately 98 km from Jasper.
[8] Ms. Seeley worked as a conductor from 1991 to 1997. In 1997 she was laid off. Ms. Seeley remained on layoff status from November 1997 until February 2005 but continued to accumulate seniority in accordance with the collective agreement between CN and the Union. During the period 1997 to 2001 she performed work for CN on emergency calls.
[9] CN is a transcontinental railway operating throughout Canada and the United States. It operates trains 24 hours a day, seven days a week, throughout the entire year.
[10] CN has negotiated arrangements to protect against shortages of employees to run trains in any particular terminal in its large rail network. Article 115 of CN’s collective agreement with the United Transportation Union allows the CN to recall employees who have been laid off, in order of seniority, and require such employees to report to work within 15 days. Article 148.11 requires employees with a seniority date after June 29, 1990 to protect shortages throughout the western region of Canada which includes Vancouver.
[11] In 2005 CN experienced a severe shortage of conductors at its Vancouver terminal. In response to that shortage, CN recalled 47 laid-off employees from across western Canada in order of seniority beginning February 25, 2005.
[12] A CN representative telephoned Ms. Seeley's home on February 26, 2005 and spoke to Ms. Seeley's husband advising that Ms. Seeley was being recalled to protect the Vancouver shortage.
[13] Ms. Seeley wrote and requested a 30-day extension of the reporting deadline which CN granted. Shortly before the new deadline she wrote a further letter to CN asking that she be relieved from reporting to Vancouver on a compassionate basis. Her concern related to the lack of childcare options.
[14] Ms. Seeley’s initial March 4, 2005 letter to CN set out her family situation. She indicated she had two children, one six years old in kindergarten and the other 21 months old. She had no immediate family nearby to help care for the children and the daycare in nearby Hinton only covered the standard daily business hours. Her husband is also a railroader and may be away for periods from 14 to 24 hours at a time. She requested the 30-day extension to explore childcare options that may exist. She also made telephone requests. On March 26, 2005 Ms. Seeley wrote asking she be relieved from reporting to Vancouver on a compassionate basis under the terms of the collective agreement. CN never responded nor did it provide any information about the term or details of the shortage recall assignment in Vancouver.
[15] CN maintained its position that Ms. Seeley was required to report to Vancouver under the terms of the collective agreement but did provide additional time. Ms. Seeley's reporting date was extended from March 14, 2005 to March 29, 2005 and further extended until May 6, 2005. The Union indicated that Ms. Seeley required additional time to report and CN extended that the reporting deadline to June 30, 2005.
[16] On June 20, 2005, CN requested Ms. Seeley advise, by June 30, 2005, whether or not she would report for duty to cover the shortage in Vancouver. CN further informed her that her failure to do so would result in her employment being terminated. Ms. Seeley responded on June 27, 2005 stating that she was awaiting a decision on her request for relief and asked the June 30 deadline be forgone until CN made a decision on the request for compassionate allowance.
[17] On July 4, 2005, CN advised to Ms. Seeley her employment was terminated because she failed to cover the shortage in Vancouver.
[18] Ms. Seeley filed a complaint with the Canada Human Rights Commission [the Commission] on June 26, 2006, alleging discrimination on the basis of family status. The matter went before the Tribunal in 2009, and the Tribunal released its decision on September 29, 2010, allowing Ms. Seeley's complaint.
Decision under Review
[19] The Tribunal noted that Ms. Seeley bore the onus of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination based on family status. It adopted the approach that a prima facie case exists where the duties and obligations incurred by parents combined with the employer's rules make the complainant unable to participate equally and fully in employment with the employer. Hoyt v Canadian National Railway, [2006] CHRD No 33 [Hoyt]; Brown v Canada (Department of National Revenue, Customs and Excise), [1993] CHRD No 7 [Brown].
[20] The Tribunal decided that family status included parental child care obligations. It rejected CN’s submission for a more onerous test for prima facie discrimination of “a serious interference” drawn from the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in Health Services Association of British Columbia v Campbell River and North Island Transition Society, 2004 BCCA 260 [Campbell River].
[21] The Tribunal concluded that Ms. Seeley had established a prima facie case since CN’s ordering Ms. Seeley into cover the Vancouver shortage made it impossible for her to arrange for appropriate childcare. The Tribunal found, because of Ms. Seeley’s parental duties and obligations, she was unable to participate equally and fully in employment due to CN rules and practices.
[22] The Tribunal held the onus shifted it to CN to demonstrate that the requirement to report to cover the Vancouver shortage was a bona fide occupational requirement [BFOR]. Public Service Labour Relations Commission v BCGSEU, [1999] 3 SCR 3, at paras. 54 – 68 [Meiorin].
[23] The Tribunal went on to conclude CN did not produce evidence to prove that accommodating Ms. Seeley would have constituted undue hardship for the CN. The Tribunal decided the undue hardship analysis must be applied in the context of the individual accommodation requested which was not done in Ms. Seeley's case. The Tribunal found the CN had a comprehensive accommodation policy which could include the ground of family status and the collective agreement allowed CN to exempt employees from covering the shortage if they have a "satisfactory reason".
[24] The Tribunal decided that CN did not provide reasonable accommodation to Ms. Seeley because CN did not respond to Ms. Seeley's request for accommodation nor did it meet with her to discuss her situation. The Tribunal found CN did not apply its own accommodation guidelines and policies and instead had decided that parental childcare obligations was not a family status category for which accommodation was required.
[25] Finally the Tribunal imposed following remedies:
a. CN must work with the Commission to ensure discriminatory practices did not continue and appropriate accommodation policies were in place,
b. CN reinstate Ms. Seeley as of March 2007 with her seniority uninterrupted,
c. compensation for loss of wages and benefits,
d. compensation for pain and suffering in the amount of $15,000, and
e. damages for reckless conduct in the amount of $20,000, the maximum allowable.
[26] CN now applies for judicial review of the Tribunal decision.
[27] The Commission [the Respondent Commission] participates as a respondent along with Ms. Seeley [the Respondent].
[28] The Ontario Human Rights Commission [the Intervener OHRC] intervenes as well as the Federally Regulated Employers - Transportation and Communications [the Intervener FRE-T&C].
Legislation
[29] The Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC, 1985, c H-6 provides:
2. The purpose of this Act is to extend the laws in Canada to give effect, within the purview of matters coming within the legislative authority of Parliament, to the principle that all individuals should have an opportunity equal with other individuals to make for themselves the lives that they are able and wish to have and to have their needs accommodated, consistent with their duties and obligations as members of society, without being hindered in or prevented from doing so by discriminatory practices based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability or conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted or in respect of which a record suspension has been ordered.
3. (1) For all purposes of this Act, the prohibited grounds of discrimination are race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability and conviction for which a pardon has been granted.
7. It is a discriminatory practice, directly or indirectly,
...
(b) in the course of employment, to differentiate adversely in relation to an employee, on a prohibited ground of discrimination.
10. It is a discriminatory practice for an employer, employee organization or employer organization
(a) to establish or pursue a policy or practice, or
(b) to enter into an agreement affecting recruitment, referral, hiring, promotion, training, apprenticeship, transfer or any other matter relating to employment or prospective employment,
that deprives or tends to deprive an individual or class of individuals of any employment opportunities on a prohibited ground of discrimination.
53. (1) At the conclusion of an inquiry, the member or panel conducting the inquiry shall dismiss the complaint if the member or panel finds that the complaint is not substantiated.
(2) If at the conclusion of the inquiry the member or panel finds that the complaint is substantiated, the member or panel may, subject to section 54, make an order against the person found to be engaging or to have engaged in the discriminatory practice and include in the order any of the following terms that the member or panel considers appropriate:
(a) that the person cease the discriminatory practice and take measures, in consultation with the Commission on the general purposes of the measures, to redress the practice or to prevent the same or a similar practice from occurring in future, including
(i) the adoption of a special program, plan or arrangement referred to in subsection 16(1), or
(ii) making an application for approval and implementing a plan under section 17;
(b) that the person make available to the victim of the discriminatory practice, on the first reasonable occasion, the rights, opportunities or privileges that are being or were denied the victim as a result of the practice;
(c) that the person compensate the victim for any or all of the wages that the victim was deprived of and for any expenses incurred by the victim as a result of the discriminatory practice;
(d) that the person compensate the victim for any or all additional costs of obtaining alternative goods, services, facilities or accommodation and for any expenses incurred by the victim as a result of the discriminatory practice; and
(e) that the person compensate the victim, by an amount not exceeding twenty thousand dollars, for any pain and suffering that the victim experienced as a result of the discriminatory practice.
(3) In addition to any order under subsection (2), the member or panel may order the person to pay such compensation not exceeding twenty thousand dollars to the victim as the member or panel may determine if the member or panel finds that the person is engaging or has engaged in the discriminatory practice wilfully or recklessly.
[Emphasis added]
2. La présente loi a pour objet de compléter la législation canadienne en donnant effet, dans le champ de compétence du Parlement du Canada, au principe suivant : le droit de tous les individus, dans la mesure compatible avec leurs devoirs et obligations au sein de la société, à l’égalité des chances d’épanouissement et à la prise de mesures visant à la satisfaction de leurs besoins, indépendamment des considérations fondées sur la race, l’origine nationale ou ethnique, la couleur, la religion, l’âge, le sexe, l’orientation sexuelle, l’état matrimonial, la situation de famille, la déficience ou l’état de personne graciée.
3. (1) Pour l’application de la présente loi, les motifs de distinction illicite sont ceux qui sont fondés sur la race, l’origine nationale ou ethnique, la couleur, la religion, l’âge, le sexe, l’orientation sexuelle, l’état matrimonial, la situation de famille, l’état de personne graciée ou la déficience.
7. Constitue un acte discriminatoire, s’il est fondé sur un motif de distinction illicite, le fait, par des moyens directs ou indirects :
...
b) de le défavoriser en cours d’emploi.
10. Constitue un acte discriminatoire, s’il est fondé sur un motif de distinction illicite et s’il est susceptible d’annihiler les chances d’emploi ou d’avancement d’un individu ou d’une catégorie d’individus, le fait, pour l’employeur, l’association patronale ou l’organisation syndicale :
a) de fixer ou d’appliquer des lignes de conduite;
b) de conclure des ententes touchant le recrutement, les mises en rapport, l’engagement, les promotions, la formation, l’apprentissage, les mutations ou tout autre aspect d’un emploi présent ou éventuel.
53. (1) À l’issue de l’instruction, le membre instructeur rejette la plainte qu’il juge non fondée.
(2) À l’issue de l’instruction, le membre instructeur qui juge la plainte fondée, peut, sous réserve de l’article 54, ordonner, selon les circonstances, à la personne trouvée coupable d’un acte discriminatoire :
a) de mettre fin à l’acte et de prendre, en consultation avec la Commission relativement à leurs objectifs généraux, des mesures de redressement ou des mesures destinées à prévenir des actes semblables, notamment :
(i) d’adopter un programme, un plan ou un arrangement visés au paragraphe 16(1),
(ii) de présenter une demande d’approbation et de mettre en oeuvre un programme prévus à l’article 17;
b) d’accorder à la victime, dès que les circonstances le permettent, les droits, chances ou avantages dont l’acte l’a privée;
c) d’indemniser la victime de la totalité, ou de la fraction des pertes de salaire et des dépenses entraînées par l’acte;
d) d’indemniser la victime de la totalité, ou de la fraction des frais supplémentaires occasionnés par le recours à d’autres biens, services, installations ou moyens d’hébergement, et des dépenses entraînées par l’acte;
e) d’indemniser jusqu’à concurrence de 20 000 $ la victime qui a souffert un préjudice moral.
(3) Outre les pouvoirs que lui confère le paragraphe (2), le membre instructeur peut ordonner à l’auteur d’un acte discriminatoire de payer à la victime une indemnité maximale de 20 000 $, s’il en vient à la conclusion que l’acte a été délibéré ou inconsidéré.
Issues
[30] The parties and interveners raise a number of issues. The Intervener OHRC does not set out issues but addresses topics that relate to the issues. The issues identified overlap or are differently phrased and may be reduced to the following:
a. what is the appropriate standard of review for the Tribunal’s rulings with respect to:
i. the interpretation of family status in the Act;
ii. the test for prima facie discrimination on family status;
iii. the determination of remedies?
b. did the Tribunal err in finding prima facie discrimination on the evidence before it?
c. did the Tribunal err in finding a failure to accommodate?
d. did the Tribunal err in its order for remedies?
[31] The issues in the proceeding follow much as in Attorney General of Canada v Fiona Ann Johnstone and the Canadian Human Rights Commission 2013 FC 113 which I have also decided.
Standard of Review
[32] CN submits that the issues relating to the proper interpretation of family status, the legal test for establishing prima facie discrimination and whether the Tribunal erred in crafting its remedial orders are all questions of law to which the standard of correctness applies. While the Act is the home statute for the Tribunal, it is also within the jurisdiction of other tribunals, such as labour, arbitration and public service tribunals.
Standard of Review for Interpretation of “family status” in the Act
[33] CN submits the interpretation of “family status” is a question of central importance to the legal system since the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that all human rights legislation across Canada should be similarly interpreted. If human rights legislation is to be interpreted in a purposive manner, differences in wording should not obscure the essentially similar purposes of such provisions, unless the wording evinces a different purpose on behalf of a particular provincial legislature. University of British Columbia v Berg, [1993] 2 SCR 353 at para 32 [Berg]; Gould v Yukon Order of Pioneers, [1996] 1 SCR 571 at para 48 [Gould].
[34] In 2008, the Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir] held there are two standards of review: correctness and reasonableness. Dunsmuir recognized that deference is generally appropriate where a tribunal is interpreting its home statute. Deference may also be warranted where a tribunal has developed particular expertise in the application of a general common law or civil rule in relation to a specific statutory context (Dunsmuir at para 54). In Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 [Khosa] the Supreme Court confirmed that administrative decision makers are entitled to a measured deference in matters that relate to their special role, function and expertise (Khosa at paras 25-26).
[35] The Supreme Court stated the standard of correctness will continue to apply to constitutional questions, questions of law that are of central importance to the legal system as a whole and that are outside the adjudicator’s expertise as well as questions regarding jurisdictional boundaries between two or more competing specialized tribunals (Dunsmuir at paras 58, 60, 61). Furthermore, the standard of correctness will also apply to true questions of jurisdiction.
[36] Recently, in Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 53 [Mowat SCC], the Supreme Court considered whether the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal could order legal costs as a form of compensation. This issue directly related to the interpretation and application of the Tribunal's own statute, namely the Act. The Supreme Court held the question of whether a particular tribunal could grant legal costs was not one of central importance to the Canadian legal system. The Court also found that question was not outside the expertise of the Tribunal. The Supreme Court found the Tribunal's decision on the issue of awarding costs based on its interpretation of the relevant provision in the Act to be reviewable on the standard of reasonableness. Mowat SCC at paragraph 27 stating:
In summary, the issue of whether legal costs may be included in the Tribunal's compensation order is neither a question of jurisdiction, nor a question of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole and outside the Tribunal's area of expertise within the meaning of Dunsmuir. As such, the Tribunal's decision to award legal costs to the successful complainant is reviewable on the standard of reasonableness.
[Emphasis added]
[37] In assessing the reasonableness of the Tribunal decision the Supreme Court went on to state:
[33] The question is one of statutory interpretation and the object is to seek the intent of Parliament by reading the words of the provision in their entire context and according to the grammatical and ordinary sense, harmoniously with the scheme an object of the Act and the intention of Parliament [citation omitted]. In approaching this task in relation to human rights legislation, one must be mindful that it expresses fundamental values and pursues fundamental goals. It must therefore be interpreted liberally and purposely so that the rights enunciated are given their full recognition and effect: [citation omitted]. However, what is required is nonetheless an interpretation of the text of the statute which respects the words chosen by Parliament.
Accordingly, the standard of review of the Tribunal’s interpretation of its home statute was that of reasonableness keeping in mind the basic principles of statutory interpretation and respect for the words of Parliament.
[38] While the scope of human rights is an important question and important issues arise because of family matters, it cannot be readily said that the interpretation of family status in the Act is a question of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole. It is true that provincial human rights tribunals across the country also address human rights issues arising because of family matters but they do so in accordance with their own legislation and, while preferable, the tribunals are not obligated to apply the same precise interpretation as given similar provisions in federal or other provincial jurisdictions as long as regard is had for similar purposes;
[39] Turning to the specific question of the standard of review of the Tribunal’s interpretation of family status in the Act in this proceeding, the following considerations apply:
a. the Tribunal is interpreting its home statute;
b. the Tribunal is adjudicating within an area in which it has expertise;
c. this question does not relate to jurisdictional boundaries between competing specialized tribunals; in this respect the various federal tribunals that may have regard to the Act, such as labour arbitrators and public service tribunals, have overlapping rather than jurisdictional boundaries; and
d. the interpretation of family status in the Act cannot be said to raise a constitutional question given it involves the interpretation of a federal statute.
[40] Having regard to the teachings in Dunsmuir and Mowat SCC and to the above considerations, I conclude that the Tribunal’s determination of whether family status in the Act includes childcare is reviewable on a standard of reasonableness.
Prima Facie Discrimination Based on Family Status
[41] In Johnstone v Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FC 36 [Johnstone FC] the Court was reviewing the screening decision of the Commission in dismissing Ms. Johnstone’s complaint. Justice Barnes found the issue was very much like that in Sketchley v Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FCA 404 [Sketchley]. In Sketchely, the Commission’s reasoning was dependent on its legal conclusions as to the precedential value of Scheuneman v Canada (Attorney General), 2000, 266 NR 154 and did not engage the respondent’s specific circumstances and facts situation.
[42] The Federal Court of Appeal undertook a pragmatic and functional approach to the issue in reviewing the Commission’s decision identified as the legal question of whether the employer Treasury Board’s policy was prima facie discriminatory. Sketchley at paras. 61- 81 The Federal Court of Appeal concluded:
[81] Applying the pragmatic and functional approach to the Commission’s particular decision in the TB complaint, the four factors lead on balance to a standard of review of correctness. For its decision with respect to this complaint to be upheld, the Commission was required to have decided correctly the legal
question of whether the TB policy is prima facie discriminatory, a question which I consider below.
[Emphasis added]
[43] In Johnstone FC, the Federal Court decided the appropriate standard of review of the Commission’s screening decision to be correctness stating:
[18] In this case the Commission was not convinced that the loss of hours suffered by Ms. Johnstone brought about by the CBSA’s fixed shift policy constituted “a serious interference” with her parental duties or that it had a discriminatory impact on the basis of family status. As in Sketchley, above, this characterization of the CBSA’s employment policy as non-discriminatory was based on a discrete and abstract question of law and, as such, it is reviewable on the standard of correctness.
[Emphasis added]
[44] Johnstone v Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FCA 101 [Johnstone FCA] was appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal which upheld the Federal Court decision stating:
[2] The reasons given by the Commission for screening out the compliant indicate that the Commission adopted a legal test for prima facie discrimination that is apparently consistent with Health Sciences Association of British Columbia v. Campbell River & North Island Transition Society, [2004] B.C.J. No. 922, 2004 BCCA 260 but inconsistent with the subsequent decision of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal in Hoyt v. C.N.R., [2006] C.H.R.D. No. 33. We express no opinion on what the legal test is. …
[45] In the case at hand, CN submits the Tribunal erred in the legal test for establishing prima facie discrimination based on family status.
[46] The requirement for prima facie discrimination was reviewed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario Human Rights Commission and O’Malley v Simpson Sears, [1985] 2 SCR 536 [O’Malley]. The Supreme Court stated a complainant must show a prima facie case of discrimination in proceedings before human rights tribunals describing the test at paragraph 28 as:
A prima facie case in this context is one which covers the allegations made and which, if they are believed, is complete and sufficient to justify a verdict in the complainant’s favour in the absence of an answer from the respondent-employer.
[47] CN submits that the test for prima facie discrimination based on family status is a question of law of central importance to the legal system. A reasonableness standard would promote disparate interpretations, contrary to the principle that a public statue that applies equally to all should have a universally accepted interpretation.
[48] There are many situations that may arise with respect to family status and employment, some which would not constitute grounds for a finding of discrimination on the basis of family status on a prima facie basis, some of which would.
[49] In my view it is necessary to have reference to the facts relating to the individual’s circumstances since questions of discrimination based on family status may arise in many different situations. For instance, in B v Ontario, [2002] 3 SCR 403 [B], the basis for the complainant was his status of being in a family relationship with two others, his wife and daughter who incurred the ire of the employer. The Supreme Court confirmed that to prove discrimination on the grounds of marital or family status, complainants only needed to establish they experienced discrimination on the prohibited grounds. The Court recognized grounds such as family or marital status, or age, may have less to do with belonging to a disadvantaged group than with the individual’s personal characteristics.
[50] The examination of individualized circumstances necessarily calls for a contextual assessment of the facts. The requirement for a contextual analysis with respect to accommodation on a case by case basis was made by Justice Abella in McGill University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal, [2007] 1 SCR 161, 2007 SCC 4 at paragraph 22 [McGill]. In my view, the same is true for a finding of prima facie discrimination. What is the employee’s individual circumstances and does it give rise to prima facie discrimination based on family status? This attracts a standard of review of reasonableness being a matter of fact and fact and law as enunciated in Dunsmuir.
[51] I conclude the standard of review applicable to the Tribunal’s finding of prima facie discrimination based on family status necessarily involves application of the law to the facts, a question of mixed law and fact. This invokes a standard of reasonableness. Dunsmuir para 53.
Remedies
[52] Finally, the standard of review applicable to the assessment of the Tribunal’s remedial orders is dependent on the Tribunal’s findings of fact. As such the Tribunal must address questions of fact and law and fact.
[53] The Tribunal is entitled to deference given its expertise in human rights questions. The award of remedies comes within the Tribunal’s expertise in deciding factual questions as to the amount of compensation, if any, to award. Furthermore, the issuing of remedial orders to address offending discrimination is entirely within the Tribunal’s discretion as is the question whether punitive damages should be awarded where supported by the facts.
[54] In result I am satisfied the standard of review is reasonableness with respect to the Tribunal’s determination of remedies.
Analysis
[55] CN submits that the underlying issue in this proceeding is whether the question of balancing obligations of family life and employment duties will be transferred from the home to the work place. In its written submissions it submits:
The Tribunal erred by equating “family status” with a parent’s choice as to how to define and meet his or her childcare obligations. … Such personal choices, which have no link to one’s employment and which no employer is in a position to evaluate, are not protected by human rights legislation. Parliament cannot have intended that an employee could choose to live in a location with few child care options, and require her employer to accommodate her child care needs until such time as she chose to move elsewhere.
[56] In counterpoint to this broad declaration, the Respondent Commission submits this Court should be guided by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Brooks v Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 SCR 1219 [Brooks]:
That those who bear children and benefit society as a whole thereby should not be economically or socially disadvantaged seems to bespeak the obvious.
[57] CN submits the Tribunal erred on four major questions:
a. the Tribunal’s interpretation of “family status” in the Act is overly broad;
b. the Tribunal erred in making out a prime facie case of discrimination merely because Ms. Seeley suffered adverse effects in balancing family and work obligations;
c. the Tribunal erred in finding CN did not meet its duty to accommodate; and
d. the Tribunal erred in deciding CN was wilful and reckless in awarding punitive damages.
[58] I will address each in turn.
Does “family status” in the Act include childcare obligations?
[59] Section 3 of the Act provides as follows:
3. (1) For all purposes of this Act, the prohibited grounds of discrimination are race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability and conviction for which a pardon has been granted.
[Emphasis added]
The Act does not define the term ‘family status’.
[60] CN submits the Tribunal erred in adopting an overly broad interpretation of ‘family status’ under the Act.
[61] The Tribunal was cognizant that in recent years the notion of family status has led to two distinct schools of thought. Some cases have taken a broad approach while others have taken a more narrow approach. It took note of its decision in Schaap v Canada (Dept. of National Defence), [1988] CHRD No 4 where is found the need for a blood or legal relationship to exists and defined family status as including among other relationships the blood relationship between a parent and child.
[62] The Tribunal also referenced Brown v Department of National Revenue (Customs and Excise), 91993) TD 7/93. There the Tribunal had stated:
We can therefore understand the obvious dilemma facing the modern family wherein the present socio-economic trends find both parents in the work environment, often with different rules and requirements. More often that not, we find the natural nurturing demands upon the female parent place her invariably in the position wherein she is required to strike this fine balance between family needs and employment requirements.
The Tribunal concluded that a purposive interpretation required “clear recognition that within the context of ‘family status’ it is a parent’s right and duty to strike that balance coupled with a clear duty on the part of the employer to facilitate and accommodate that balance within the criteria set out by jurisprudence.”
[63] The inclusion of family childcare obligations within family status has been adopted in other forums and jurisdictions: provincial human rights tribunals (Ontario: Wight v Ontario (Office of the Legislative Assembly), [1998] OHRBID No 13; Alberta: Rennie v Peaches and Cream Skin Care Ltd., 2006 AHRC 13 (CanLII) [Rennie]; federal labour boards (Canada Post v Canada Union of Postal Workers (Somerville Grievance, CUPW 790-03-00008, Arb. Lanyon), [2006] CLAD No 371 at para 66 and Rajotte v the President of the Canadian Border Services et al, 2009 PSST 0025 [Rajotte], and the Federal Court: Johnstone FC.
[64] In addition, while CN relies on the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in Campbell River, it must be noted that the Court of Appeal in that decision proceeded on the premise that the reference to family status in the British Columbia human rights legislation does include childcare obligations.
[65] Human rights legislation has a quasi-constitutional status. This elevated status derives from the fundamental character values such legislation expresses and pursues. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that human rights legislation must be interpreted in a large and liberal manner in order to attain the objects of the legislation. In C.N.R. v Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 SCR 1114 [Action Travail des Femmes] the Supreme Court stated:
24 Human rights legislation is intended to give rise, amongst other things, to individual rights of vital importance, rights capable of enforcement, in the final analysis, in a court of law. I recognize that in the construction of such legislation the words of the Act must be given their plain meaning, but it is equally important that the rights enunciated by given their full recognition and effect. We should not search for ways and means to minimize those rights and to enfeeble their proper impact. Although it may seem commonplace, it may be wise to remind ourselves of the statutory guidance given by the federal Interpretation Act which asserts that statutes are deemed to be remedial and are thus to be given such fair, large and liberal interpretation as will best ensure that their objects are attained. …
[Emphasis added]
[66] Finally, the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985 c I-21, section 12 provides: “Every enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large, and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objectives” The term ‘family status’ in section 3 of the Act should be interpreted in a large and liberal manner consistent with the attainment of the Act’s objectives and purposes, stated in section 2:
The purpose of this Act is to extend the laws in Canada to give effect, within the purview of matters coming within the legislative authority of Parliament, to the principle that all individuals should have an opportunity equal with other individuals to make for themselves the lives that they are able and wish to have and to have their needs accommodated, consistent with their duties and obligations as members of society, without being hindered in or prevented from doing so by discriminatory practices based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation marital status, family status, disability or conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted.
[Emphasis added]
[67] If one looks to the ordinary meaning of the words, the definition of word ‘family’ in the Canadian Oxford Dictionary 2d includes “the members of a household esp. parents and their children.” The definition of the word ‘status’ includes “a person’s legal standing which determines his or her rights and duties”. The two words taken together amount to more than a mere descriptor of a parent of a child and also reference the obligations of a parent to care for the child.
[68] Finally, it is difficult to have regard to family without giving thought to children in the family and the relationship between parents and children. The singular most important aspect of that relationship is the parents’ care for children. It seems to me that if Parliament intended to exclude parental childcare obligations, it would have chosen language that clearly said so.
[69] In Mowat, the Supreme Court stated that the standard of review was of a tribunal interpreting its own statute is reasonableness but nevertheless having regard to the principles of statutory interpretation:
The question is one of statutory interpretation and the object is to seek the intent of Parliament by reading the words of the provision in their entire context and according to the grammatical and ordinary sense, harmoniously with the scheme an object of the Act and the intention of Parliament [citation omitted]. In approaching this task in relation to human rights legislation, one must be mindful that it expresses fundamental values and pursues fundamental goals. It must therefore be inte