R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard

R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2005-07-20
Neutral citation
2005 SCC 43
Report
[2005] 2 SCR 220
Case number
30005, 30063
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; Major, John C.; Bastarache, Michel; LeBel, Louis; Fish, Morris J.; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Charron, Louise
On appeal from
Nova Scotia
Subjects
Aboriginal law
Notes
SCC Case Information: 30005, 30063
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220, 2005 SCC 43
Date: 20050720
Docket: 30005, 30063
Between:
Her Majesty The Queen
Appellant/Respondent on the cross-appeal
v.
Stephen Frederick Marshall, Keith Lawrence Julien,
Christopher James Paul, Jason Wayne Marr,
Simon Joseph Wilmot, Donald Thomas Peterson,
Stephen John Knockwood, Ivan Alexander Knockwood,
Leander Philip Paul, William John Nevin, Roger Allan Ward,
Mike Gordon Peter‑Paul, John Michael Marr,
Carl Joseph Sack, Matthew Emmett Peters,
Stephen John Bernard, William Gould, Camillius Alex Jr.,
John Allan Bernard, Peter Alexander Bernard,
Eric Stephen Knockwood, Gary Hirtle,
Jerry Wayne Hirtle, Edward Joseph Peter‑Paul,
Angus Michael Googoo, Lawrence Eric Hammond,
Thomas M. Howe, Daniel Joseph Johnson,
Dominic George Johnson, James Bernard Johnson,
Preston Macdonald, Kenneth M. Marshall,
Stephen Maurice Peter‑Paul, Leon R. Robinson
and Phillip F. Young
Respondents/Appellants on the cross-appeal
‑ and ‑
Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General of Ontario,
Attorney General of Quebec, Attorney General of New Brunswick,
Attorney General of British Columbia, Attorney General of Alberta,
Attorney General of Newfoundland and Labrador,
Forest Products Association of Nova Scotia,
Keptin John Joe Sark and Keptin Frank Nevin
(of the Mi’kmaq Grand Council), Native Council
of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick Aboriginal
Peoples Council, Congress of Aboriginal Peoples,
Assembly of First Nations and Songhees Indian Band,
Malahat First Nation, T’Sou‑ke First Nation,
Snaw‑naw‑as (Nanoose) First Nation and
Beecher Bay Indian Band (collectively the Te’mexw Nations)
Interveners
and between:
Her Majesty The Queen
Appellant
v.
Joshua Bernard
Respondent
‑ and ‑
Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General of Ontario,
Attorney General of Quebec, Attorney General of Nova Scotia,
Attorney General of British Columbia, Attorney General of Alberta,
Attorney General of Newfoundland and Labrador,
Union of New Brunswick Indians, New Brunswick Forest
Products Association, Keptin John Joe Sark and Keptin Frank
Nevin (of the Mi’kmaq Grand Council), Native Council of
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick Aboriginal Peoples Council,
Congress of Aboriginal Peoples, Assembly of First Nations and
Songhees Indian band, Malahat First Nation, T’Sou‑ke
First Nation, Snaw‑naw‑as (Nanoose) First Nation and
Beecher Bay Indian Band (collectively the Te’mexw Nations)
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Major, Bastarache, LeBel, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ.
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 109)
Concurring Reasons:
(paras. 110 to 145)
McLachlin C.J. (Major, Bastarache, Abella and Charron JJ. concurring)
LeBel J. (Fish J. concurring)
______________________________
R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220, 2005 SCC 43
Her Majesty The Queen Appellant/Respondent on the cross‑appeal
v.
Stephen Frederick Marshall, Keith Lawrence Julien,
Christopher James Paul, Jason Wayne Marr,
Simon Joseph Wilmot, Donald Thomas Peterson,
Stephen John Knockwood, Ivan Alexander Knockwood,
Leander Philip Paul, William John Nevin, Roger Allan Ward,
Mike Gordon Peter‑Paul, John Michael Marr,
Carl Joseph Sack, Matthew Emmett Peters,
Stephen John Bernard, William Gould, Camillius Alex Jr.,
John Allan Bernard, Peter Alexander Bernard,
Eric Stephen Knockwood, Gary Hirtle,
Jerry Wayne Hirtle, Edward Joseph Peter‑Paul,
Angus Michael Googoo, Lawrence Eric Hammond,
Thomas M. Howe, Daniel Joseph Johnson,
Dominic George Johnson, James Bernard Johnson,
Preston Macdonald, Kenneth M. Marshall,
Stephen Maurice Peter‑Paul, Leon R. Robinson
and Phillip F. Young Respondents/Appellants on the cross‑appeal
and
Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General of Ontario,
Attorney General of Quebec, Attorney General of New Brunswick,
Attorney General of British Columbia, Attorney General of Alberta,
Attorney General of Newfoundland and Labrador,
Forest Products Association of Nova Scotia,
Keptin John Joe Sark and Keptin Frank Nevin
(of the Mi’kmaq Grand Council), Native Council
of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick Aboriginal
Peoples Council, Congress of Aboriginal Peoples,
Assembly of First Nations and Songhees Indian Band,
Malahat First Nation, T’Sou‑ke First Nation,
Snaw‑naw‑as (Nanoose) First Nation and
Beecher Bay Indian Band (collectively the Te’mexw Nations) Interveners
and between
Her Majesty The Queen Appellant
v.
Joshua Bernard Respondent
and
Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General of Ontario,
Attorney General of Quebec, Attorney General of Nova Scotia,
Attorney General of British Columbia, Attorney General of Alberta,
Attorney General of Newfoundland and Labrador,
Union of New Brunswick Indians, New Brunswick Forest
Products Association, Keptin John Joe Sark and Keptin Frank
Nevin (of the Mi’kmaq Grand Council), Native Council of
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick Aboriginal Peoples Council,
Congress of Aboriginal Peoples, Assembly of First Nations and
Songhees Indian Band, Malahat First Nation, T’Sou‑ke
First Nation, Snaw‑naw‑as (Nanoose) First Nation and
Beecher Bay Indian Band (collectively the Te’mexw Nations) Interveners
Indexed as: R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard
Neutral citation: 2005 SCC 43.
File Nos.: 30063, 30005.
2005: January 17, 18; 2005: July 20.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Major, Bastarache, LeBel, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for nova scotia
on appeal from the court of appeal for new brunswick
Indians — Treaty rights — Logging — Interpretation of truckhouse clause — Mi’kmaq Indians charged with cutting and removing timber from Crown lands without authorization, or with unlawful possession of Crown timber — Whether Mi’kmaq in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have treaty right to log on Crown lands for commercial purposes.
Indians — Aboriginal title — Logging sites — Mi’kmaq Indians charged with cutting and removing timber from Crown lands without authorization, or with unlawful possession of Crown timber — Whether Mi’kmaq hold aboriginal title to lands they logged — Standard of occupation and type of evidence required to prove title — Whether Royal Proclamation of 1763 or Belcher’s Proclamation of 1762 granted aboriginal title to Mi’kmaq.
This appeal deals with two cases. In Marshall, 35 Mi’kmaq Indians were charged with cutting timber on Crown lands in Nova Scotia without authorization. In Bernard, a Mi’kmaq Indian was charged with unlawful possession of spruce logs he was hauling from the cutting site to the local saw mill. The logs had been cut on Crown lands in New Brunswick. In both cases, the accused argued that as Mi’kmaq Indians, they were not required to obtain provincial authorization to log because they have a right to log on Crown lands for commercial purposes pursuant to treaty or aboriginal title. The trial courts entered convictions which were upheld by the summary conviction courts. The courts of appeal set aside the convictions. A new trial was ordered in Marshall and an acquittal entered in Bernard.
Held: The appeals should be allowed and the convictions restored. The cross‑appeal in Marshall should be dismissed.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Major, Bastarache, Abella and Charron JJ.: The treaties of 1760‑61 do not confer on modern Mi’kmaq a right to log contrary to provincial regulation. The truckhouse clause of the treaties was a trade clause which only granted the Mi’kmaq the right to continue to trade in items traditionally traded in 1760‑61. While the right to trade in traditional products carries with it an implicit right to harvest those resources, this right to harvest is the adjunct of the basic right to trade in traditional products. Nothing in the wording of the truckhouse clause comports a general right to harvest or gather all natural resources then used. The right conferred is the right to trade. The emphasis therefore is not on what products were used, but on what trading activities were in the contemplation of the parties at the time the treaties were made. Only those trading activities are protected. Ancestral trading activities, however, are not frozen in time and the question in each case is whether the modern trading activity in issue represents a logical evolution from the traditional trading activities at the time the treaties were made. Here, the trial judges applied the proper test and the evidence supports their conclusion that the commercial logging that formed the basis of the charges against the accused was not the logical evolution of a traditional Mi’kmaq trading activity in 1760‑61. [16‑20] [25] [35]
The accused did not establish that they hold aboriginal title to the lands they logged. Delgamuukw requires that in analyzing a claim for aboriginal title, both aboriginal and European common law perspectives must be considered. The court must examine the nature and extent of the pre‑sovereignty aboriginal practice and translate that practice into a modern common law right. Since different aboriginal practices correspond to different modern rights, the question is whether the practices established by the evidence, viewed from the aboriginal perspective, correspond to the core of the common law right claimed. Here, the accused did not assert an aboriginal right to harvest forest resources but aboriginal title simpliciter. Aboriginal title to land is established by aboriginal practices that indicate possession similar to that associated with title at common law. The evidence must prove “exclusive” pre‑sovereignty “occupation” of the land by their forebears. “Occupation” means “physical occupation” and “exclusive occupation” means an intention and capacity to retain exclusive control of the land. However, evidence of acts of exclusion is not required. All that is required is demonstration of effective control of the land by the group, from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the group could have excluded others had it chosen to do so. Typically, this is established by showing regular occupancy or use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or the exploitation of resources. These principles apply to nomadic and semi‑nomadic aboriginal groups; the right in each case depends on what the evidence establishes. Continuity is required, in the sense of showing the group’s descent from the pre‑sovereignty group whose practices are relied on for the right. On all these matters, evidence of oral history is admissible, provided it meets the requisite standards of usefulness and reasonable reliability. The trial judges in both cases applied the proper test in requiring proof of sufficiently regular and exclusive use of the cutting sites by Mi’kmaq people at the time of the assertion of sovereignty, and there is no ground to interfere with their conclusions that the evidence did not establish aboriginal title. [45‑60] [70] [72]
The text, the jurisprudence and historic policy all support the conclusion that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 did not reserve aboriginal title to the Mi’kmaq in the former colony of Nova Scotia. On the evidence, there is also no basis for finding title to the cutting sites in Belcher’s Proclamation. [96] [106]
Per LeBel and Fish JJ.: The protected treaty right includes not only a right to trade but also a corresponding right of access to resources for the purpose of engaging in trading activities. The treaty right comprises both a right to trade and a right of access to resources: there is no right to trade in the abstract because a right to trade implies a corresponding right of access to resources for trade. There are limits, however, to the trading activities and access to resources that are protected by the treaty. Only those types of resources traditionally gathered in the Mi’kmaq economy for trade purposes would reasonably have been in the contemplation of the parties to the treaties of 1760‑61. In order to be protected under those treaties, trade in forest products must be the modern equivalent or a logical evolution of Mi’kmaq use of forest products at the time the treaties were signed. On the facts of these cases, the evidence supports the conclusion that trade in forest products was not contemplated by the parties and that logging is not a logical evolution of the activities traditionally engaged in by Mi’kmaq at the time the treaties were entered into. [110-118]
In the context of aboriginal title claims, aboriginal conceptions of territoriality, land use and property should be used to modify and adapt the traditional common law concepts of property in order to develop an occupancy standard that incorporates both the aboriginal and common law approaches. However, the role of the aboriginal perspective cannot be simply to help in the interpretation of aboriginal practices in order to assess whether they conform to common law concepts of title. The patterns and nature of aboriginal occupation of land should inform the standard necessary to prove aboriginal title. The common law notion that “physical occupation is proof of possession” remains but is not the governing criterion: the nature of the occupation is shaped by the aboriginal perspective, which includes a history of nomadic or semi‑nomadic modes of occupation. Since proof of aboriginal title relates to the manner in which the group used and occupied the land prior to the assertion of Crown sovereignty, the mere fact that an aboriginal group travelled within its territory and did not cultivate the land should not take away from its title claim. Therefore, anyone considering the degree of occupation sufficient to establish title must be mindful that aboriginal title is ultimately premised upon the notion that the specific land or territory at issue was of central significance to the aboriginal group’s culture. Occupation should be proved by evidence not of regular and intensive use of the land but of the tradition and culture of the group that connect it with the land. Thus, intensity of use is related not only to common law notions of possession but also to the aboriginal perspective. The record in the courts below lacks the evidentiary foundation necessary to make legal findings on the issue of aboriginal title in respect of the cutting sites in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick and, as a result, the accused in these cases have failed to sufficiently establish their title claim. [127-141]
The appropriateness of litigating aboriginal treaty, rights and title issues in the context of proceedings of a penal nature is doubtful. When issues of aboriginal title or other aboriginal rights claims arise in the context of summary conviction proceedings, it may be most beneficial to all concerned to seek a temporary stay of the charges so that the aboriginal claim can be properly litigated in the civil courts. Once the aboriginal rights claim to the area in question is settled, the Crown could decide whether or not to proceed with the criminal charges. [142-144]
Cases Cited
By McLachlin C.J.
Referred to: R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456; R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533; Jack v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 294; R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507; R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013; R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010; R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101; R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139; Powell v. McFarlane (1977), 38 P. & C.R. 452; Red House Farms (Thorndon) Ltd. v. Catchpole, [1977] E.G.D. 798; Keefer v. Arillotta (1976), 13 O.R. (2d) 680; Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, 2001 SCC 33; Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29; R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [1982] 1 Q.B. 892; R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025.
By LeBel J.
Referred to: R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456; R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533; R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010; Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313; Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, 2001 SCC 33; St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577; R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35(1) .
Crown Lands Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 114, s. 29.
Crown Lands and Forests Act, S.N.B. 1980, c. C‑38.1, s. 67(1)(c).
Treaties and Proclamations
Belcher’s Proclamation (1762).
Mi’kmaq Treaties of 1760‑61.
Royal Proclamation (1763), R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1.
Treaty of Paris (1763).
Authors Cited
Borrows, John. “Creating an Indigenous Legal Community” (2005), 50 McGill L.J. 153.
Canada. Canadian Archives. Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada, 1759‑1791, Selected and Edited with Notes by Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty, 2nd and rev. ed. by the Historical Documents Publications Board, Part I. Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1918.
Hepburn, Samantha. “Feudal Tenure and Native Title: Revising an Enduring Fiction” (2005), 27 Sydney L. Rev. 49.
McNeil, Kent. Common Law Aboriginal Title. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.
APPEAL and CROSS‑APPEAL from a judgment of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal (Cromwell, Saunders and Oland JJ.A.) (2003), 218 N.S.R. (2d) 78, 687 A.P.R. 78, [2004] 1 C.N.L.R. 211, [2003] N.S.J. No. 361 (QL), 2003 NSCA 105, allowing an appeal from a judgment of Scanlan J. (2002), 202 N.S.R. (2d) 42, 632 A.P.R. 42, [2002] 3 C.N.L.R. 176, [2002] N.S.J. No. 98 (QL), 2002 NSSC 57, dismissing an appeal from a judgment of Curran Prov. Ct. J. (2001), 191 N.S.R. (2d) 323, 596 A.P.R. 323, [2001] 2 C.N.L.R. 256, [2001] N.S.J. No. 97 (QL), 2001 NSPC 2, convicting the accused of cutting and removing timber from Crown land without authorization. Appeal allowed and cross‑appeal dismissed.
APPEAL from a judgment of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal (Daigle, Deschênes and Robertson JJ.A.) (2003), 262 N.B.R. (2d) 1, 688 A.P.R. 1, 230 D.L.R. (4th) 57, 4 C.E.L.R. (3d) 1, [2003] 4 C.N.L.R. 48, [2003] N.B.J. No. 320 (QL), 2003 NBCA 55, allowing an appeal from a judgment of Savoie J. (2001), 239 N.B.R. (2d) 173, 619 A.P.R. 173, [2002] 3 C.N.L.R. 141, [2001] N.B.J. No. 259 (QL), 2001 NBQB 82, dismissing an appeal from a judgment of Lordon Prov. Ct. J., [2000] 3 C.N.L.R. 184, [2000] N.B.J. No. 138 (QL), convicting the accused of possessing timber from Crown land without authorization. Appeal allowed.
Alexander M. Cameron, William D. Delaney and James Clarke, for the appellant/respondent on the cross‑appeal in Marshall and the intervener the Attorney General of Nova Scotia.
William B. Richards, Pierre Castonguay, Sylvain Lussier and Iain R. W. Hollett, for the appellant in Bernard and the intervener the Attorney General of New Brunswick.
Bruce H. Wildsmith, Q.C., and Eric A. Zscheile, for the respondents/appellants on the cross‑appeal in Marshall and the respondent in Bernard.
Mitchell R. Taylor and Charlotte Bell, Q.C., for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada.
Robert H. Ratcliffe and Mark Crow, for the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario.
René Morin, for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec.
John J. L. Hunter, Q.C., for the intervener the Attorney General of British Columbia.
Robert J. Normey and Donald Kruk, for the intervener the Attorney General of Alberta.
Donald H. Burrage, Q.C., and Justin S. C. Mellor, for the intervener the Attorney General of Newfoundland and Labrador.
Thomas E. Hart and Harvey L. Morrison, Q.C., for the intervener the Forest Products Association of Nova Scotia.
D. Bruce Clarke, for the interveners Keptin John Joe Sark and Keptin Frank Nevin (of the Mi’kmaq Grand Council), the Native Council of Nova Scotia and the New Brunswick Aboriginal Peoples Council.
Andrew K. Lokan and Joseph E. Magnet, for the intervener the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples.
Bryan P. Schwartz and Candice Metallic, for the intervener the Assembly of First Nations.
Robert J. M. Janes and Dominique Nouvet, for the interveners the Songhees Indian Band, the Malahat First Nation, the T’Sou‑ke First Nation, the Snaw‑naw‑as (Nanoose) First Nation and the Beecher Bay Indian Band (collectively the Te’mexw Nations).
Daniel R. Theriault, for the intervener the Union of New Brunswick Indians.
Mahmud Jamal and Neil Paris, for the intervener the New Brunswick Forest Products Association.
The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Major, Bastarache, Abella and Charron JJ. was delivered by
The Chief Justice —
I. Introduction
1 Can members of the Mi’kmaq people in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick engage in commercial logging on Crown lands without authorization, contrary to statutory regulation? More precisely, do they have treaty rights or aboriginal title entitling them to do so? These are the central issues on this appeal.
2 In the Marshall case, Stephen Frederick Marshall and 34 other Mi’kmaq Indians were charged with cutting timber on Crown lands without authorization, contrary to s. 29 of the Crown Lands Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 114, between November 1998 and March 1999. The logging took place in five counties on mainland Nova Scotia and three counties on Cape Breton Island, in the Province of Nova Scotia. The accused admitted all the elements of the offence, except lack of authorization.
3 In the Bernard case, Joshua Bernard, a Mi’kmaq Indian, was charged with unlawful possession of 23 spruce logs he was hauling from the cutting site to the local saw mill in contravention of s. 67(1)(c) of the Crown Lands and Forests Act, S.N.B. 1980, c. C-38.1, as amended. Another member of the Miramichi Mi’kmaq community had cut the logs from Crown lands in the Sevogle area of the watershed region of the Northwest Miramichi River, in the Province of New Brunswick. Like the accused in Marshall, Bernard argued that as a Mi’kmaq, he was not required to obtain authorization to log.
4 In both cases the trial courts entered convictions. In both cases, these convictions were upheld by the summary appeal court. And in both cases, these decisions were reversed by the Court of Appeal. In Marshall, the convictions were set aside and a new trial ordered. In Bernard, the conviction was set aside and an acquittal entered.
5 The significance of these cases transcends the charges at stake. They were used as vehicles for determining whether Mi’kmaq peoples in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have the right to log on Crown lands for commercial purposes pursuant to treaty or aboriginal title. Many witnesses, including experts in aboriginal history and treaty interpretation, testified. The trial judges made detailed findings of fact and the Justices of the Court of Appeal wrote extensive reasons. The cases now come before us for final determination of the issues.
6 I conclude that the trial judges in each case correctly held that the respondents’ treaty rights did not extend to commercial logging and correctly rejected the claim for aboriginal title in the relevant areas. I would thus allow the appeals, dismiss the cross-appeal in Marshall and restore the convictions.
II. Aboriginal Treaty Right
A. The Background: Marshall 1 and Marshall 2
7 In 1760 and 1761, the British Crown concluded “Peace and Friendship” treaties with the Mi’kmaq peoples of the former colony of Nova Scotia, now the Provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The British had succeeded in driving the French from the area. The Mi’kmaq and French had been allies and trading partners for almost 250 years. The British, having defeated the French, wanted peace with the Mi’kmaq. To this end, they entered into negotiations, which resulted in the Peace and Friendship treaties. The existence of a treaty and a right to claim under it are questions of fact to be determined in each case. Although different treaties were made with different groups, for the purposes of this case we assume that the main terms were the same, similar to those in R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 (“Marshall 1”).
8 A critical aspect of the treaties was the trading clause, whereby the British agreed to set up trading posts, or “truckhouses”, and the Mi’kmaq agreed to trade only at those posts, instead of with others, like their former allies, the French. In the crucial clause, the Mi’kmaq Chiefs agreed:
And I do further engage that we will not traffick, barter or Exchange any Commodities in any manner but with such persons or the managers of such Truck houses as shall be appointed or Established by His Majesty’s Governor . . . .
The pact was mutual. The English were desirous of ensuring that the Mi’kmaq could continue to peacefully live in the area. To do this, the Mi’kmaq needed to trade for European goods, as they had been doing for more than two centuries. The English wanted the Mi’kmaq to do this with them, and not with the French. For their part, the Mi’kmaq wanted assurance that the English would provide trading posts where they could barter their goods and obtain necessaries.
9 In Marshall 1, a member of the Mi’kmaq nation was charged with fishing and selling eels contrary to Federal regulations. The defendant in that case, Donald Marshall Jr., admitted that he had caught and sold several hundred pounds of eel out of season. His defense was that the truckhouse clause of the treaties of 1760-61 gave him the right to catch and trade fish. The issue before the Court was whether the treaties conferred this right.
10 The majority of this Court concluded that the truckhouse clause amounted to a promise on the part of the British that the Mi’kmaq would be allowed to engage in traditional trade activities so as to obtain a moderate livelihood from the land and sea. The Mi’kmaq had traded in fish at the time of the treaties. Marshall’s activity could be characterized as fishing in order to obtain a moderate livelihood. It was thus the logical evolution of an aboriginal activity protected by the treaties. Marshall was acquitted.
11 In response to a subsequent application for a rehearing, the Court issued reasons now known as Marshall 2 (R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533). In the course of these reasons, the Court commented on the nature of the right and the implication of Marshall 1 on the right of the Mi’kmaq to harvest and sell other resources. It stated that treaty rights pertaining to activities other than fishing, like logging, would fall to be decided on such evidence as might be led in future cases directed to that issue.
12 Relying on their interpretation of Marshall 1, the respondents commenced logging activities on Crown lands in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick without authorization. They were arrested and charged. They raised the treaties and Marshall 1 and 2 in support of the defense that they were entitled to log for commercial purposes without permit. Their arguments were rejected at trial and on summary appeal, but accepted on appeal to their respective provincial courts of appeal. The issue of whether the treaties of 1760-61 grant modern Mi’kmaq a right to log contrary to provincial regulation is now squarely before this Court.
B. The Scope of the Treaty Right
13 Marshall 1 and 2 held that the treaties of 1760-61 conferred on the Mi’kmaq the right to catch and sell fish for a moderate livelihood, on the ground that this activity was the logical evolution of a trading practice that was within the contemplation of the parties to the treaties. The cases now before us raise issues as to the scope of the right.
14 The respondents argue that the truckhouse clause, as interpreted in Marshall 1 and 2, confers a general right to harvest and sell all natural resources which they used to support themselves in 1760. Provided they used a form of the resource either for their own needs or for trade at the time of the treaties, they now have the right to exploit it, unless the government can justify limitations on that exploitation in the broader public interest. The respondents argue that they used forest products for a variety of purposes at the time of the treaties, from housing and heat to sleds and snowshoes, and indeed occasionally traded products made of wood, all to sustain themselves. Logging represents the modern use of the same products, they assert. Therefore the treaties protect it.
15 This interpretation of the truckhouse clause in the treaties asks what resources were used by the Mi’kmaq to sustain themselves at the time of the treaties, and concludes that these resources continue to be available to the Mi’kmaq for the purpose of gaining a moderate livelihood. It takes Marshall 2 as confirming that the truckhouse clause conferred a perpetual right to use “the types of resources traditionally ‘gathered’ in an aboriginal economy” (para. 19). The only question is what was “gathered” or used in 1760. If wood was gathered in any way, for any purpose, in 1760, modern Mi’kmaq have the right to log, subject only to such limits as the government can justify in the greater public good.
16 The appellant Crown takes a narrower view of the import of the truckhouse clause. It accepts Marshall 1 and 2, but argues that the respondents misread them. The appellant asserts that these cases did not decide that the truckhouse clause of the treaties granted a perpetual right to any natural resources used or “gathered” at the time, subject only to justification. On its view, the clause merely granted the Mi’kmaq the right to continue to trade in items traded in 1760-61. Only those trading activities were protected; other activities, not within the contemplation of the British and Mi’kmaq of the day, are not protected. The emphasis is not on what products were used, but on what trading activities were in the contemplation of the parties at the time the treaties were made. Ancestral trading activities are not frozen in time; the treaty protects modern activities that can be said to be their logical evolution. But new and different trading activities, like modern commercial logging, are not protected. To grant such protection, the appellant asserts, would be to transform the treaty right into something new and different.
17 For the reasons that follow, I must reject the respondents’ interpretation of the scope of the right conferred by the truckhouse clause and endorse the view of the appellant. The purpose of the truckhouse clause, the wording of the clause, and holdings of this Court in Marshall 1 and 2, all lead inexorably to this conclusion.
18 I turn first to the purpose of the truckhouse clause as revealed by the historical record. The truckhouse clause was a trade clause. It was concerned with what could be traded. As discussed in Marshall 1, the British wanted the Mi’kmaq to cease trading with the French, whom they had just defeated, and trade only with them. The Mi’kmaq were willing to do this, but sought assurances that the British would provide trading posts, or truckhouses, where they could trade. The Mi’kmaq had been trading with Europeans for 250 years by this time, and relied on trading their products, like furs and fish, in exchange for European wares. The purpose of the truckhouse clause was to give the British the exclusive right to trade with the Mi’kmaq and the Mi’kmaq the assurance that they would be able to trade with the British as they had traded with the French in the past.
19 Thus, the truckhouse clause was concerned with traditionally traded products. The right to trade in traditional products carried with it an implicit right to harvest those resources: Marshall 1, at para. 35. But this right to harvest is the adjunct of the basic right to trade in traditional products. The right conferred is not the right to harvest, in itself, but the right to trade.
20 This is supported by the wording of the truckhouse clause. It speaks only of trade. The Mi’kmaq affirmed “that we will not traffick, barter or Exchange any Commodities in any manner but with such persons or the managers of such Truck houses as shall be appointed or Established by His Majesty’s Governor”. Nothing in these words comports a general right to harvest or gather all natural resources then used.
21 The historic records and the wording of the truckhouse clause indicate that what was in the contemplation of the British and the Mi’kmaq in 1760 was continued trade in the products the Mi’kmaq had traditionally traded with Europeans. The clause affirmed that this trade would continue, but henceforth exclusively with the British.
22 This view of the truckhouse clause was confirmed by this Court in Marshall 1 and 2. In Marshall 1 the majority, per Binnie J., proceeded on the basis that at the time of the treaties the Mi’kmaq had sustained themselves, in part, by trading fish with the Europeans:
. . . the Mi’kmaq people have sustained themselves in part by harvesting and trading fish (including eels) since Europeans first visited the coasts of what is now Nova Scotia in the 16th century. [para. 2]
. . .
What is plain from the pre-Confederation period is that the Indian fishermen were encouraged to engage in their occupation and to do so for both food and barter purposes. [para. 25, quoting Dickson J. in Jack v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 294, at p. 311]
23 Thus, the ruling in Marshall 1 was based on the proposition that fishing for trade in 1760 was a traditional activity of the Mi’kmaq. From this, Binnie J. concluded that the treaty conferred a right to continue to obtain necessaries through the traditional Mi’kmaq activity of trading fish. He concluded that “the surviving substance of the treaty is not the literal promise of a truckhouse, but a treaty right to continue to obtain necessaries through hunting and fishing by trading the products of those traditional activities” (para. 56 (emphasis added)).
24 This is consistent with the assertion in Marshall 2 that the fundamental issue is whether trade in a particular commodity “was in the contemplation of [the] parties to the 1760 treaty” (para. 20). It is also consistent with the reference in Marshall 2 to treaty rights to “the type of things traditionally ‘gathered’ by the Mi’kmaq in a 1760 aboriginal lifestyle” (para. 20) like “fruits and berries” (para. 19). The respondents argued that the reference to fruits and berries shows that the treaty right extends beyond things traditionally traded, to a right to harvest anything the Mi’kmaq used in 1760. However, the evidence in Marshall 1 in fact referred to the Indians trading fruits and berries with the Europeans.
25 Of course, treaty rights are not frozen in time. Modern peoples do traditional things in modern ways. The question is whether the modern trading activity in question represents a logical evolution from the traditional trading activity at the time the treaty was made: Marshall 2, at para. 20. Logical evolution means the same sort of activity, carried on in the modern economy by modern means. This prevents aboriginal rights from being unfairly confined simply by changes in the economy and technology. But the activity must be essentially the same. “While treaty rights are capable of evolution within limits, . . . their subject matter . . . cannot be wholly transformed” (Marshall 2, at para. 19).
26 In summary, what the treaty protects is not the right to harvest and dispose of particular commodities, but the right to practice a traditional 1760 trading activity in the modern way and modern context. The question is whether the logging here at issue is the logical evolution of a traditional Mi’kmaq trade activity, in the way modern eel fishing was found to be the logical evolution of a traditional trade activity of the Mi’kmaq in Marshall 1.
C. The Test Applied
27 The trial judges in both cases applied this test to the evidence before them, asking whether the respondents’ logging activity could be considered the logical evolution of a traditional Mi’kmaq trade activity.
28 Curran Prov. Ct. J. in the Marshall case ((2001), 191 N.S.R. (2d) 323, 2001 NSPC 2) asked whether there was any evidence that the Mi’kmaq had traded in wood products and timber at the time of the 1760-61 treaties. He emphasized the trade-based nature of the right and the need that it relate to traditional Mi’kmaq activities. And he asked himself whether the logging activity at issue before him could be considered to be the logical evolution of a traditional trade-based activity.
29 Lordon Prov. Ct. J. in Bernard ([2000] 3 C.N.L.R. 184) asked essentially the same questions. He inquired whether the evidence showed a traditional Mi’kmaq trade in logs and wood. Emphasizing trade, he rejected the broader interpretation of the treaty that the Mi’kmaq were entitled to exploit all natural resources that they had used historically. To permit this would “alter the terms of the treaty” and “wholly transform” (para. 87) the rights it conferred, in his view.
30 Each judge applied the right test and asked himself the right questions. The remaining question is whether the evidence supports their conclusions of fact.
D. The Factual Findings of the Trial Judges and the Evidence
31 In each case, the trial judge concluded that the evidence did not support a treaty right to commercial logging.
32 In Marshall, Curran Prov. Ct. J. found no direct evidence of any trade in forest products at the time the treaties were made, but concluded that trade in forest products was likely “at some point”:
There is no doubt the Mi’kmaq in 1760 and for a long time before gathered and used forest products. They made canoes, baskets, snowshoes and toboggans. They also gathered and used forest products in making their wigwams and other dwellings. There was no direct evidence that any of those items was traded either before the 1760-61 treaties were made or during the time of the truckhouses. Despite that, both [appellants’] and [respondents’] witnesses said it was likely the Mi’kmaq had traded some forest-based items to the British or other Europeans at some point. [Emphasis added; para. 91.]
After comparing the evidence before him with the evidence of fishing for trade in Marshall 1, Curran Prov. Ct. J. concluded that the respondents had not met the legal test:
Trade in logging is not the modern equivalent or a logical evolution of Mi’kmaq use of forest resources in daily life in 1760 even if those resources sometimes were traded. Commercial logging does not bear the same relation to the traditional limited use of forest products as fishing for eels today bears to fishing for eels or any other species in 1760. . . . Whatever rights the defendants have to trade in forest products are far narrower than the activities which gave rise to these charges. [para. 95]
33 In Bernard, Lordon Prov. Ct. J. made similar findings on similar evidence. He held that on the evidence “there was no traditional trade in logs”, while “trade in wood products . . . such as baskets, snowshoes, and canoes was secondary to fur trade and was occasional and incidental” (para. 85). He noted that Chief Augustine had reluctantly conceded that it is “unlikely . . . that the Mi’kmaq contemplated commercial logging during th[e] treaty process” (para. 85). Nor did the evidence suggest that the British ever contemplated trade in anything but traditionally produced products, like fur or fish.
34 These findings were firmly grounded in the evidence given by expert and aboriginal witnesses at trial, as well as the documentation and the cultural and historical background. As Curran Prov. Ct. J. observed, “[the Mi’kmaq] had no need to cut stands of trees for themselves. . . . Trees were readily available and Europeans could cut their own” (para. 92). The experts agreed that it was probably in the 1780s before the Mi’kmaq became involved in logging and then only in a limited fashion as part of British operations. Logging was not a tradi